Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg – AT Analytic Eclecticism › Perm Fails – Exclusion DA

Exclusion DA – Consensus is not always possible - forcing the alternative to coexist with the plan fosters inclusionary violence and inevitably excludes the voices of the oppressed

Jessica Peet, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Eclecticism or exclusivity? The (critical) pragmatist ethos of (intersectional) analytic eclecticism,” 75(3): 420-432, mm

At first glance, pragmatism seems to provide an appropriate foundation for analytic eclecticism. Pragmatism’s investment in consensus combined with its recognition that knowledge is discursive and social—and thus open to reformulation—provides an alternative perspective to IR’s tendencies to understand knowledge as either the product of objective rationalism or subjective interpretivism. Where specific theoretical paradigms choose one approach or the other, pragmatism advocates the utility of both derivations. Thus, in theory, a pragmatist ethos allows eclectic research to sidestep metatheoretical debates and the challenges inherent in combining opposing perspectives.18 In practice, by not acknowledging the power dynamics which shape these controversies in disciplinary IR,19 a pragmatist ethos can have the effect of (re)producing the status quo, privileging rationalism, positivism, and the dominant theoretical triad. This inattention to power, generally, and the disciplinary power dynamics of epistemological difference, specifically, can be linked to pragmatism’s investment in universalism. Universalism, or the belief in a common category or position salient across theoretical traditions, enables multiple perspectives to be combined without fear of incommensurability, an issue that Fred Chernoff addresses in more detail in his contribution to this forum.20 Yet, by assuming that a universal category exists, pragmatism actually simplifies complex issues. Moreover, this focus on a universal category privileges that category as most important, marginalizing the relevance of other categories along with their potential explanatory power. This marginalization directly counters analytic eclecticism’s goal of attending to complexity and bringing diverse approaches to the forefront. This investment in universalism also brings about a static view of categories. Universal categories are identified by their similarities, which are fixed and unchanging across time and theoretical tradition. Sil and Katzenstein identify the substantive referent (i.e., the research problem) to be the universal category, arguing that the research problem is not dependent on the theoretical approach(es) being employed. However, to identify a common category among different approaches, it must be determined a priori what similarities are to be contained within that category. Thus, for any determination to be made, artificial boundaries must be imposed upon the referent so that it can be identified. But imposing constructed boundaries upon the referent works to simplify the problem, which again contravenes the goals of analytic eclecticism. Pragmatism also provides a questionable foundation for analytic eclecticism because it tends to privilege consensus over difference.21 Achieving consensus renders dynamic and complex interactions among and within categories invisible. This both undermines the spirit of eclecticism and ignores the wider power dynamics that shape the field. Consensus is not always possible. Sometimes commonality cannot be found because no universal category or position exists, and forcing commonality can breed violences of inclusion.22 Gayatri Spivak famously argues that the subaltern is rendered mute (and therefore can neither speak nor be heard) because of the complexities of finding consensus between the position of the subaltern and that of the oppressor.23 Achille Mbembe argues that the illusion of consensus across wide power differentials is only possible in conditions of extreme violence perpetrated on those at the lower end of those differentials.24 Taken together, these problems show how eclectic theorizing functions to exclude. Investment in consensus and universality inhibits the visibility of (disciplinary) power dynamics, even though they are central to shaping what is considered universal and who is considered part of any consensus produced by analytic eclecticism. When conceptualized with this kind of ethos, analytic eclecticism will always have exclusive effects because it lacks the tools to recognize or correct its own exclusivity. To achieve inclusivity, these foundations must be challenged.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg – AT Analytic Eclecticism › Perm Fails - Ethics DA / Policing DA

Their permutation can’t capture the ethical orientation of the alternative – their method’s insistence on “policy relevance” is an act of disciplinary policing

Eric Blanchard, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Combing the same beach: analytic eclecticism and the challenge of theoretical multilingualism ,” 75(3): 404-419, mm

Christian Reus-Smit has argued that Sil and Katzenstein’s epistemologically “empirical-theoretic project” is not equipped to deal with normative reflection and thus unable to produce the kind of practical knowledge that can “animate social and political action.”71 This lack of “systematic reflection on values,”72 according to Reus-Smit, hobbles analytic eclecticism’s efforts to produce policy-relevant knowledge as it intends, in the spirit of Aristotelian phronesis. Relatedly, an avowed concern with ethics is never far from the top of the intellectual priority list of many non-triad scholars. For instance, feminist IR approaches to research methods place ethics among epistemology, ontology, and choice of method as primary elements of a definition of methodology.73 Constructivists Klotz and Lynch recognize what they see as the unavoidable ethical dimension of constructivist scholarship, though they warn “against translating ethical assumptions into particular tools of analysis” and against granting any particular method the “moral high ground.”74 Ethical motivations are certainly not the monopoly of critical scholars, but this community tends to foreground ethical concerns in its publications more prominently than realist, liberal, and causal-oriented constructivists. Sil and Katzenstein’s discussion of ethics (in their review of the work of Hoffmann and Finnemore) is scattered, lacks focus, and could be enriched through dialogue with non-triad approaches.75 This is not to say it will be easy to surface ethics in the eclectic analytic heuristic. The urgency of climate change clearly raises enormous ethical issues: intergenerational responsibilities, the morality of population growth, the commitment to exuberant consumption and carbon-intensive transportation practices, and obligations to (distant) humans and non-human life, to name a few. Generally, the commitments of the dominant paradigms of IR, with their group-centric power politics and free-trade-centred pursuit of progress, sit uneasily with the range of anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental ethics. Burke et al. suggest we develop an ethics of climate change, one worthy of the unprecedented challenge, one that goes beyond “visions of the good life” to address “the goodness of life itself.”76 At a more modest scale, ethical approaches to climate change scholarship align with reflexive postures that acknowledge and foreground researcher positionality and entail giving respectful voice to marginalized peoples and impacted positions. Given the demand for ethics in a chaotic present and uncertain future, non-triad approaches are arguably better placed to cultivate the necessary ethical imagination or identify the constitution of nascent planetary identities, but they certainly complicate the picture we have of climate change beyond states and markets, geopolitics, and public goods, making the boundaries of policy relevancy particularly salient. Critical and post-positivist scholars might naturally be suspicious of the eclectic project, directed at climate change or as a general program, if it seems to reify existing power-laden disciplinary structures by policing the borders of legitimate scholarship. This particular emphasis on power relates to a possible post-positivist concern with the eclectic impulse toward policy relevance. Recall Sil and Katzenstein’s argument that the value-added of eclecticism involves relating research to ordinary actors and policy-makers. Sil and Katzenstein suspect the “compartmentalization of knowledge” prohibits the beneficial sharing of insights that address real-world dilemmas. Yet a move toward policy relevance as a criterion for research may strike many who self-identify outside of the mainstream as political and even disciplining. Steve Smith argues that when “one party announces that approaches have to be policy relevant, [it is] usually defined as relevant for activities of the state. Dismissing work as being irrelevant to policy choices is a powerful disciplining device.”77 This issue evokes further discussion of the ethics of useful knowledge, of its “relevance” (to the state? to ordinary or marginal people? to whom?) and intelligibility. From Sil and Katzenstein’s text, it seems eclecticism emphasizes an appeal to policy-makers more than “ordinary actors,” but this need not be the case. Feminist IR scholars, for example, can argue that their theories and scholarship, developed in close consultation and interaction with real-world activists, policy-makers, and ordinary women, does not “sit on the sidelines” and suffers no such relevance deficit (witness titanic efforts to theorize “gender mainstreaming” in global governance, attention to rape in warfare and other forms of sexual violence, and projects to enable women by making them “productive” in the global economy).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg – AT Analytic Eclecticism › Perm Fails – Pragmatism Bad

The pragmatic nature of the permutation renders power relations invisible which reinforces the dominant norms of IR

Jessica Peet, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Eclecticism or exclusivity? The (critical) pragmatist ethos of (intersectional) analytic eclecticism,” 75(3): 420-432, mm

Analytic eclecticism holds significant promise for IR. However, as it is currently conceptualized, analytic eclecticism falls short of resulting in eclectic research. Instead, it has the opposite effect, reinforcing the hold of mainstream paradigms on the field. Why does analytic eclecticism fall short of its emancipatory promise? In this article, I trace this contradictory effect to the pragmatist ethos underlying analytic eclecticism. The internal contradiction begins with the pragmatist tenets Sil and Katzenstein lay out. These tenets rely on a popular—but uncritical—understanding of pragmatism, one that fails to account for power.15 This foundation is especially problematic as it makes invisible the disciplinary power dynamics which reify and are reified in the privileging of the dominant theoretical triad in IR.16 Given this contradictory outcome, can analytic eclecticism’s promise of liberating scholarship from paradigmatic boundaries still be achieved? Perhaps, but not without a critical ethos.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg – AT Analytic Eclecticism › Perm Fails – Reinforces Dominant Theories of IR

The perm fails – it is not an authentic attempt at analytic eclecticism. The attempt to tack our alternative onto the plan reinforces dominant discourses in IR

Eric Blanchard, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Combing the same beach: analytic eclecticism and the challenge of theoretical multilingualism ,” 75(3): 404-419, mm

If analytic eclecticism is to successfully engage post-positivist research, it must continue to engage in debates over “reflexivity,” debates which have been mostly confined to the field’s dissident periphery. But to do so, it will have to more fully engage the “double hermeneutic,” which denotes the “slippage”—between the meaningful frames of lay actors on the one hand and the metalanguages of social scientists on the other—that a researcher will encounter while practising social science.47 Meaning is imposed doubly, by the objects of research upon the relevant events situated in their own context and by the researchers. This is challenging to forms of triad scholarship modelled on natural sciences, which, being concerned with unreflective physical objects and a world that “does not answer back,” need neither take into account the self-interpretations of the people being studied nor weigh the researchers’ self-interpretations, as do the social sciences. Eclecticism will also have to navigate myriad conceptions of “reflexivity” and, as Michael Lynch suggests, there is “a confusing array of reflexivities” but “no single way to be, or not to be, reflexive.”48 In IR, reflexivity has been deployed to signal the self-conscious situating of a researcher in their research, attending to the premises of one’s process of theorizing and researching (including one’s cultural-political prejudices), the submission of favoured theories to contextualization and historical reflection, and recognition of how analytic and data-gathering choices condition the data produced, among other definitions.49 Though variously conceived, reflexivity is a key value commitment of non-triad research traditions in IR. Constructivists Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch urge that scholars recognize the inevitability of “bias,” yet “strive to be self-aware, in order to understand the moral and methodological implications of our choices.”50 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson argues that the recognition that methodology is “complicit in the production and reproduction of the world” commits the scholar who wants to research this world to reflexivity, “an awareness of how the habits and experiences that one is bringing to bear on a situation shape and construct that situation.”51 Feminist IR theory offers perhaps the most sustained reflection on reflexivity and IR research. For example, Ackerly, Stern, and True place reflexivity, which they define as the continual re-interrogation of one’s own scholarship, at the core of the feminist approach to methodology.52 Following the work of Sandra Harding and others, Ann Tickner describes feminist reflexivity as a posture that recasts the relationship between researcher and subject, attends to related power disparities, and resists the assumption of scholarly detachment.53 Thus, eclecticists must be willing not only to countenance a broad rejection of the belief in any transcendent, universally valid knowledge,54 but also to open their own scholarly practices up to scrutiny and consider their own normative influences. As Cai Wilkinson observes, since reflexivity cannot “be retrospectively bolted on to our research” analytic eclectics can start from an “explicit articulation of how the research was actually done, why and with what effects for the resulting interpretation that is presented.”55 Reflexivity may prompt a variety of reappraisals regarding the ways scholars are bound up in the production of knowledge about climate change. Directed at institutions, reflexive attitudes may inspire us to inquire into the funding sources of the modern university system, colonized as it is by corporate sponsorship of academic institutions and foundations funded by energy extractive industries with a pronounced “interest in staving off any government action on climate change and weakening environmental safeguards.”56 Individual-level approaches to scholarly reflexivity are diverse and defy summary, but Heather A. Smith’s work is illustrative. Writing in a post-positivist feminist vein, Smith presents Indigenous voices and ways of knowing, which, she argues, disrupt the “global” discourse of climate change in a way so as not to colonize or exoticize their discourse while at the same time flagging the contested and political nature of the term “Indigenous.” Smith further emphasizes how un-reflexive scholarly practices can reinforce dominant discourses, seen for example in discussions of climate inequality that ignore Indigenous peoples from the global North.57

2022 Michigan Negative
BBE Updates – Aff/Neg › Cognitive Biotech Neg › International Collaboration Good

International collaboration solves

Aliman 17 (Nadisha-Marie, transdisciplinary analyst, autistic systemizer, philosopher, security artist, cyborgnetician, information theoretician, crypto-lyricist, hyperlexic poet, cyborgnetic painter, illustrator and curator. Postdoctoral researcher at Utrecht University. PhD in Computer Science with a transdisciplinary thesis on "Hybrid Cognitive-Affective Strategies for AI Safety". International Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, "Malevolent Cyborgization", 07/15/2017, https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-63703-7_18, accessed on 7/17/2022)//le

In the future, cyborg-systems could become a daily reality offering a variety of promising perspectives regarding human enhancement, but their development and deployment will then need to be regulated. Besides a legal obligation for open source cyborg-sytems, a possible approach for a society willing to prevent MC and related risks could for instance be measures inducing an obligation for all stakeholders developing cyborg-systems to adhere to “Cyborg Safety” guidelines, which could be defined by an ethical board for superintelligence. Nowadays, there is yet no explicit binding international interdisciplinary ethical board for superintelligence containing e.g. AI, AI Safety, Cybersecurity, Neuroscience, Biotechnology, Nanotechnology, Law experts (just to name a few) at the same time. Such a collaboration would though be of great value to maintain an overview of all critical developments with the aim to reach superintelligence. However, forward-thinking interdisciplinary frameworks similar to the Asilomar AI Principles (FLI 2017) could serve as a basis and should be extended, since there are always security holes that remain undetected and characteristically, only one specially selected successful MAI or MC attack trial could be

2022 Michigan Negative
BBE Updates – Aff/Neg › Cognitive Biotech Neg › Alt Causes

Alt Causes to MAI

Aliman 17 (Nadisha-Marie, transdisciplinary analyst, autistic systemizer, philosopher, security artist, cyborgnetician, information theoretician, crypto-lyricist, hyperlexic poet, cyborgnetic painter, illustrator and curator. Postdoctoral researcher at Utrecht University. PhD in Computer Science with a transdisciplinary thesis on "Hybrid Cognitive-Affective Strategies for AI Safety". International Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, "Malevolent Cyborgization", 07/15/2017, https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-63703-7_18, accessed on 7/17/2022)//le

Cyborgization is only one possible path towards superintelligent enhanced humans. It could in principle also be reached e.g. by means of genetic engineering/breeding and biotechnology. Yampolskiy and Spellchecker (2016) conclude that “augmented humans with IQ beyond 250 would be superintelligent with respect to our current position on the intelligence curve but would be just as dangerous to us, unaugmented humans, as any sort of artificial superintelligence.” We come to the same conclusion with regard to Malevolent Cyborgization, because it could serve similar stakeholders to accomplish the same unethical goals representing existential risks for humanity as in the MAI case

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › IMPACT-Political Violence/Civil War

Democracy Survived 2020 but Renewed Efforts to Overturn Election Results Lead to Destruction of our Democracy and widespread violence and chaos

Galston and Kamarck -1/4/22

William A. Galston (William A. Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Program, where he serves as a Senior Fellow. Prior to January 2006 he was the Saul Stern Professor and Acting Dean at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, founding director of the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), and executive director of the National Commission on Civic Renewal, co-chaired by former Secretary of Education William Bennett and former Senator Sam Nunn. A participant in six presidential campaigns, he served from 1993 to 1995 as Deputy Assistant to President Clinton for Domestic Policy. Galston is the author of nine books and more than 100 articles in the fields of political theory, public policy, and American politics) and Elaine Kamarck. (Elaine C. Kamarck is a Senior Fellow in the Governance Studies program as well as the Director of the Center for Effective Public Management at the Brookings Institution. She is an expert on American electoral politics and government innovation and reform in the United States, OECD nations, and developing countries. She focuses her research on the presidential nomination system and American politics and has worked in many American presidential campaigns. Kamarck is the author of “Primary Politics: Everything You Need to Know about How America Nominates Its Presidential Candidates” and “Why Presidents Fail And How They Can Succeed Again.” She is also the author of “How Change Happens—or Doesn’t: The Politics of US Public Policy” and “The End of Government-As We Know It: Making Public Policy Work.” Kamarck is also a Lecturer in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.) “ Is democracy failing and putting our economic system at risk?” The Brookings Institute. . January 4, 2022 LV

SECTION 1: IS DEMOCRACY FAILING? We examine this question along two key dimensions: public opinion and institutional performance. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC Based on six high-quality surveys conducted in the last year and a half, support for democracy as the best form of government remains overwhelming and mostly stable across party lines.[3] However, about 1 in 5 Americans have views that make them at least open to, if not outright supportive of, authoritarianism.[4] But there’s an important qualification: Americans distinguish sharply between democracy in principle and in practice. There is near-universal agreement that our system is not working well—in particular, that it is not delivering the results people want. This is troubling because most people value democracy for its fruits, not just its roots.[5] Given that situation, it is not surprising that public support is very high for fundamental change in our political system to make the system work better. There is no party of the status quo in contemporary America: both sides want changes, but they disagree about the direction of change. Unfortunately, about 6 in 10 Americans do not think that the system can change.[6] And because it has not changed despite growing dysfunction, polarization has led to legislative gridlock, which has generated rising support for unfettered executive action to carry out the people’s will. - Center for Effective Public Management Senior Fellow - Governance Studies Democracy means the rule of the people, but Americans do not fully agree about who belongs to the people. Although there are areas of agreement across partisan and ideological lines, some in our nation hold that to be “truly” American, you must believe in God, identify as Christian, and be born in the United States.[7] In a period of increasing immigration and religious pluralism, these divisions can become dangerous. Disagreements about who is truly American are part of a broader cleavage in American culture. 70% of Republicans believe that America’s culture and way of life have changed for the worse since the 1950s, while 63% of Democrats believe that they have changed for the better.[8] Strong majorities of Republicans agree that “Things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own county,” that “Today, America is in danger of losing its culture and identity,” and that “the American way of life needs to be protected for foreign influences.” Majorities of Democrats reject these propositions. Support for political violence is significant. In February 2021, 39% of Republicans, 31% of Independents, and 17% of Democrats agreed that “if elected leaders will not protect America, the people must do it themselves, even if it requires violent actions.” In November, 30% of Republicans, 17% of Independents, and 11% of Democrats agreed that they might have to resort to violence in order to save our country.”[9] While public support for many of the reforms in federal compromise legislation is strong, there is a divide in the electorate on what they view as the largest problem in our current system.[10] In September, only 36% believed that “rules that make it too difficult for eligible citizens to vote” constituted the largest problem for our elections, compared to 45% who identified “rules that are not strict enough to prevent illegal votes from being cast” as the largest problem. The conclusion we draw from this quick review of public opinion is that if democracy fails in America, it will not be because a majority of Americans is demanding a non-democratic form of government. It will be because an organized, purposeful minority seizes strategic positions within the system and subverts the substance of democracy while retaining its shell—while the majority isn’t well organized, or doesn’t care enough, to resist. As we show in a later section, the possibility that this will occur is far from remote. AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS A second way of considering whether democracy is failing is to look at the institutions of government. Successful democratic systems are not designed for governments composed of ethical men and women who are only interested in the public good. If leaders were always virtuous there would be no need for checks and balances. The Founding Fathers understood this. They designed a system to protect minority points of view, to protect us from leaders inclined to lie, cheat and steal, and (paradoxically) to protect the majority against minorities who are determined to subvert the constitutional order. During the Trump presidency, the formal institutional “guardrails” of democracy—Congress, the federalist system, the Courts, the bureaucracy, and the press—held firm against enormous pressure. At the same time, there is evidence that the informal norms of conduct that shape the operation of these institutions have weakened significantly, making them more vulnerable to future efforts to subvert them.[11] There is no guarantee that our constitutional democracy will survive another sustained—and likely better-organized—assault in the years to come. We begin with the good news about our institutions. Former President Trump did not succeed in materially weakening the powers of the Congress.[12] He did not try to disband Congress, and while he often fought that institution, it fought back. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) had no trouble confronting him, and Democrats brought impeachment charges against him not once but twice. Although speculation was rampant, in the end then-Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) did not block either trial. While former Leader McConnell and allies have been called former President Trump’s lapdogs, on virtually all domestic policy issues they have acted like almost any Republican majority would act, and on foreign policy former Leader McConnell neither stopped nor punished Republican senators who tried to constrain Trump when they thought he was wrong.[13] The American system is a federalist system. The Constitution distributes power between the federal government and the state government, codified in the 10th Amendment to the Constitution. States have repeatedly and successfully exercised their power against former President Trump, especially in two areas, COVID-19 and voting.[14] Despite Mr. Trump’s attempts to pressure the nation’s governors and other state officials into doing what he wanted, he did not inflict lasting damage on the federalist system, and the states are no weaker—perhaps even stronger—than they were before his presidency. Citizens now understand that in a crisis, states are the ones who control things that are important to them like shutdown orders and vaccine distribution. DEMOCRACY In the spring of 2020 then-President Trump, anxious to get past COVID in time for his re-election campaign, was pushing hard for states to open up early. Only a few complied, while many—including some Republican governors—ignored him. Seeing that the governors were not scared of him, Mr. Trump then threatened to withhold medical equipment based on states’ decisions about opening up. He came up against the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 10th Amendment, which prevents the president from conditioning federal aid on the basis of governors’ acquiescing to a president’s demands.[15] The guardrails between the federal government and the states also held when it came to Mr. Trump’s campaign to reverse the 2020 election results. In Georgia, the Republican Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, a stalwart Republican and Trump supporter, certified election results in spite of personal calls and threats from the president. In Michigan, Republican Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey and Republican House Speaker Lee Chatfield did not give in to Trump’s attempts to get them to diverge from the process of choosing electors. One of the hallmarks of failing democracies is a weak judicial system under heavy political control. But under assault from then-President Trump, the judiciary remained independent despite his repeated attempts to win in the courts what he could not win at the ballot box. President Trump-appointed judges often made decisions that thwarted Mr. Trump’s attempts to overturn the results. In fact, after the election Mr. Trump’s team and allies brought 62 lawsuits and won exactly one.[16] (The others he either dropped or lost.) Many of those decisions were handed down by Republican judges.[17] Perhaps former President Trump’s biggest disappointment was the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear election challenges concerning states he claimed he had won.[18] A free press is an essential element of a healthy democracy. Former President Trump spent four years using the bully pulpit of the presidency to mock the press, calling them names and “the enemy of the people” and referring to outlets he does not like as “failing.” He revoked the press credentials of reporters he did not like. (The courts restored them.) Nevertheless, reporters were not afraid to call out his lies. With Mr. Trump out of office for months now, no major news outlets have gone broke. Few are afraid to criticize former President Trump or his supporters. The free press is still fundamentally free (although President Trump undoubtably contributed to some decline in public trust of the media, which in turn weakens its oversight and accountability functions). Its financial and structural problems, most of which are attributable to the challenges of internet age, predated Mr. Trump. Some argue that former President Trump increased distrust in the media but, as polling indicates, the lack of trust in media declined to less than fifty percent in the first decade of the 21st century and has stayed in the low forties in recent years.[19] One final point: democracies often fail when their military sides with anti-democratic insurgents. But in the United States, the tradition of civil control over the armed forces remains strong—especially within the military. After the chaos in Lafayette Park last June, when Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared with then-President Trump in military fatigues, Mr. Milley and other top military leaders went out of their way to reaffirm this tradition, which is drilled into all officers throughout their careers. A military coup is the least likely way for democracy in America to end.[20] SO WHY ARE WE WORRIED? Although scholars and pundits have long chronicled with regret the rise of partisan polarization and the decline of congressional effectiveness, concern about the outright failure of American democracy was rare before the rise of Donald Trump. Never before in American history have we had a candidate, not to mention a president, who disparaged the integrity of the electoral system and who hinted repeatedly during his election that he would not accept the results of the election if he lost. This behavior began during the Republican primaries and continued in advance of the 2016 election, which he won, and the 2020 election, which he lost.[21] It built to a crescendo that exploded on January 6, 2021, when supporters, called to Washington for a “Stop the Steal” rally, marched to the Capitol, attacked law enforcement officers, vandalized offices, and breached the Senate gallery where the electoral college vote was supposed to be taking place. The non-stop attacks on American elections were part of a broader attack on the truth. Any story Mr. Trump and his supporters disliked became “fake news,” creating, slowly but surely, an alternate universe that encompassed everything from the integrity of the election to public health guidelines for the COVID pandemic. The very existence of a sizeable number of citizens who cannot agree on facts is an enormous threat to democracy. As the Yale historian Timothy Snyder points out in his 2018 book, The Road to Unfreedom, authoritarians like Vladimir Putin have no use for truth or for the facts, because they use and disseminate only what will help them achieve and maintain power.[22] As our colleague Jonathan Rauch argues in The Constitution of Knowledge, disinformation and the war on reality have reached “epistemic” proportions.[23] Even though constitutional processes prevailed and Mr. Trump is no longer president, he and his followers continue to weaken American democracy by convincing many Americans to distrust the results of the election. About three-quarters of rank-and-file Republicans believe that there was massive fraud in 2020 and Joe Biden was not legitimately elected president. “A ‘Politico’/Morning Consult survey found that more than one-third of American voters feel the 2020 election should be overturned, including three out of five Republicans.”[24] The aftermath of the 2020 election revealed structural weaknesses in the institutions designed to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. A focus of concern is the Electoral Count Act of 1887, which was adopted in response to the contested election of 1876. This legislation is so ambiguously drafted that one of former President Trump’s lawyers used it as the basis of a memorandum arguing that former Vice President Pence, whom the Constitution designates as the chair of the meeting at which the Electoral College ballots are counted, had the right to ignore certified slates of electors the states had sent to Washington. If Mr. Pence had yielded to then-President Trump’s pressure to act in this manner, the election would have been thrown into chaos and the Constitution placed in jeopardy.[25] Recently, former President Trump’s assault on the integrity of the 2020 election has taken a new and dangerous turn. Rather than focusing on federal government, his supporters have focused on the obscure world of election machinery. Republican majorities in state legislatures are passing laws making it harder to vote and weakening the ability of election officials to do their jobs. In many states, especially closely contested ones such as Arizona and Georgia, Mr. Trump’s supporters are trying to defeat incumbents who upheld the integrity of the election and replace them with the former President’s supporters.[26] At the local level, death threats are being made against Democratic and Republican election administrators, with up to 30% of election officials surveyed saying they are concerned for their safety.[27] As seasoned election administrators retire or just quit, Mr. Trump supporters are vying for these obscure but pivotal positions. In Michigan, for instance, the Washington Post reports that there is intense focus on the boards charged with certifying the vote at the county level. Republicans who voted against former President Trump’s efforts to alter the vote count are being replaced. And most dangerous of all, some states are considering laws that would bypass the long-established institutions for certifying the vote-count and give partisan legislatures the authority to determine which slate of electors will represent them in the Electoral College. American democracy is thus under assault from the ground up. The most recent systematic attack on state and local election machinery is much more dangerous than the chaotic statements of a disorganized former president. A movement that relied on Mr. Trump’s organizational skills would pose no threat to constitutional institutions. A movement inspired by him with a clear objective and a detailed plan to achieve it would be another matter altogether. The chances that this threat will materialize over the next few years are high and rising. The evidence suggests that Mr. Trump is preparing once again to seek the Republican presidential nomination—and that he will win the nomination if he tries for it. Even if he decides not to do so, the party’s base will insist on a nominee who shares the former president’s outlook and is willing to participate in a plan to win the presidency by subverting the results of state elections if necessary. The consequences could include an extended period of political and social instability, and an outbreak of mass violence.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › IMPACT-Political Violence/Civil War

The impact of a civil war outweighs all aff impact scenarios – civil war is probable in this context, goes international and effects become widespread

Elshelmani 2015 Arij, a studious author with multiple publications all revolving around unique socio-economic, political, cultural issues, “Why Are Civil Wars so Protracted and Difficult to End?”, 10-20-2015, E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2015/11/20/why-are-civil-wars-so-protracted-and-difficult-to-end/#:~:text=While%20the%20populations%20of%20warring,large%20number%20of%20civilian%20casualties. //EddyV

As interstate war has become less common, academic attention has shifted to the plethora of armed conflicts occurring within the boundaries of states. These civil wars have proven to be more protracted and difficult to terminate for numerous reasons that vary according to their unique socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. Hence, providing a perfect general theory is problematic. Nevertheless, a number of critical factors that affect the duration of civil wars and their inability to be resolved relative to interstate wars can be distinguished. Firstly, unlike interstate wars, which occur between clearly-defined armies and are generally amenable to compromise, civil wars tend to be low-intensity, existential struggles, making them, therefore, inherently-protracted affairs. Moreover, the decentralized organizational structure of contemporary insurgencies and their tendency to fragment and become engulfed in internecine fighting further undermines attempts at reaching a political settlement. Third, peace is difficult to achieve when, for many actors, war is preferable. Often ignored is the capacity of war to endow belligerents with profits and power. Various cases of “enemies” colluding to prolong violence challenge the common assumption that the ultimate objective of war is victory. Finally, the essay questions what an “end” to civil war implies. Even when one side claims total victory or in the rare cases where peace accords are signed and the war is formally concluded, the transition from large-scale civil violence to peace is not so clear. Collective memories of mutual violence persist into the post-conflict period, and cultures of violence are sustained. If not fully addressed, along with the underlying grievances that originally inspire violence, peace will remain at best fragile, and violence may continue in other forms. In this light, even the success stories of post-accord societies in Latin America and Lebanon appear to be “unfinished” civil wars.[1] The Asymmetric Nature of Civil Wars: Given that interstate wars are generally fought in a series of direct confrontations between professional armies and across defined frontlines, they are relatively quick and decisive. In contrast, intrastate wars are distinguished by the asymmetric distribution of material power among the main parties of the conflict, usually the incumbent government or power and the rebels or insurgents opposing it. The asymmetric nature of internal conflicts forces insurgents to adopt a strategy of guerrilla warfare in which the evasion of the enemy is a matter of survival. To overcome its military weakness, the insurgent force gradually wears down the enemy through hit-and-run tactics. Civil war is thus an inherently-protracted affair. What adds complexity to these wars is that they are almost never wholly internal. In an age of interconnectivity and interdependency, their outcome is often of strategic interest not only to neighboring powers but also to the international community at-large. The role of external intervention in influencing the balance of power between parties and therefore the trajectory of civil wars is critical. When external intervention is balanced between the opposing sides it can increase the duration of war.[2] This was most evident when the Cold War superpowers played out their ideological struggle in the conflict theater of the global South. The weaponry and supplies they provided fueled some of the most ferocious internal conflicts. Similarly, the internationalization of the contemporary Syrian conflict seems to have reconfigured the balance of power towards a prolonged stalemate.[3] Here, negotiation may only be contemplated when both parties reach a “mutually hurting stalemate,”[4] that is, a stage of deadlock when both sides simultaneously perceive continued fighting as offering little returns and mounting costs. However, with external actors distorting the perception of warring parties’ prospects on the battlefield, arriving at this stage may take many years. Limited Space for Compromise Interstate wars may be driven by border disputes; they could be a reaction to some existential threat, an attempt at regional hegemony, or a contest for access to trade routes and resources, to name a few. In theory, all of these factors are amenable to compromise, even if they too can produce long and costly wars. The Persian Gulf War is but one example; after eight years of conflict, Saddam Hussein relinquished his demands for complete control over Shatt-Al Arab and began withdrawing his forces from Iran, effectively bringing the war to a close. Where civil wars are driven by limited aims and objectives, the government can respond with the necessary reforms and negotiate with the aggrieved parties to stifle the conflict. When the objective is to secede, to overthrow the government, or even to radically transform social structures, compromise is improbable if not impossible. Secession is unfeasible for there can only be one government. Such wars are existential struggles with each side framing the conflict in terms of “victory or death.” Unsurprisingly, they take an intensely violent nature. Where belligerents cannot envision a common future of power sharing, incumbents have attempted to delegitimize their opponents by labeling them “terrorists,” “criminals,” or “ foreign agents.” This de-politicization of the opposition is a common feature of civil wars and serves as a serious impediment to their termination through civil means. As long as insurgents are excluded from the political arena, violent force will remain their primary means of communication. In other cases, parties may be willing to compromise on their original political goals and form a united government. However, the vulnerability of disarming and demobilizing entails, given the absence of mutual trust and the lack of a third party entity to monitor and enforce the agreement, can encourage combatants to reject opportunities for a peace settlement.[5] Here, it is the security dilemma, rather than the limited scope of compromise that inhibits the resolution of civil wars.[6] Organizational Structure: Fragmentation and Internal Rivalry A central requirement for any effective peace settlement is the presence of strong, representative leaders at the negotiating table. Interstate wars meet this condition more easily. Governments tend to maintain a unified hierarchical structure, with a strategic apex that exerts a tight reign over its security apparatus. In contrast, contemporary insurgencies are decentralized coalitions, plagued by factionalism and weak command and control.[7] Their propensity for fragmentation is a serious impediment to their resolution, which only becomes more potent as the war goes on and as new sub-groups emerge with their own interests and agendas. As the number of parties to a conflict increases, the prospects for agreement shrink, and, consequently, the duration of the internal war expands.[8] The contemporary experience of Syria is telling. As the war enters its third year, the broad coalition of groups constituting the armed opposition has grown to include thousands of foreign fighters and Salafist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, who all possess their own unique ideological vision of Syria’s future.[9] These increasingly potent groups, among other factions, refuse to succumb to the influence and control of the Free Syrian Army and its political wing, viewing the latter as an elite grouping of self-interested exiles. The detachment between the political wing of the opposition and those on the battleground is problematic. Any decision made on the negotiating table at the national or international level is of limited value without the consent of those who control the reality on the ground. The Personalization of Civil Wars Though fragmentation can prolong civil wars, strong leadership is not necessarily a panacea. The Syrian civil war, like others, has also been sustained by its deeply personalized nature. The reputation of Bashar Al Assad among loyalists has achieved a “non-negotiable” status, while the opposition has refused to accept anything short of his removal from power. Gaddafi and Milosevic are two examples of leaders who opted for their own political survival over the national interest, manipulating and inflaming existing social divisions to escalate the war and secure their power.[10] Jonas Savimbi appeared to be the main “spoiler” of the Bicesse peace accords, rejecting the outcome of 1992 presidential election and returning the country to a state of war. Indeed, it was only with his death that his successor, Paulo Armindo Lukamba returned UNITA to the negotiating table and large-scale violence subdued.[11] General Michel Awn’s sense of omnipotence drove him to reject numerous invitations to join the post-Ta’ if government, and instead to declare a “war of liberation” against the Syrian military presence that would claim more than a thousand lives.[12] Of course, leaders are not always the all- powerful decision makers who the media portrays, and placing too much emphasis on their character can lend to their demonization. Nonetheless, the role of the individual cannot be completely discredited either. Indeed, breakthroughs in peace negotiations have frequently coincided with changes in the top leadership.[13] A Political Economy Perspective: Entrenched Interests in the Continuation of Violence The amount of material destruction and human suffering a civil war produces is immense. Yet, while the majority of the population may seek its end, a minority can develop an entrenched interest in its continuation. Thus, attempts to explain the longevity of civil wars are only complete with reference to the political and economic incentives they present. As the civil war rages on, the state’s capacity to control all its territories, enforce the law, and provide basic goods and services are eroded. A range of informal actors, from warlords, militias, and gangs, emerges to fill the vacuum, often carving out their own enclaves where they can become the prime source of social administration and coercion as well as the de-facto owners of the area and its resources. In this context of the state collapse, ordinary civilians can become willing participants in violence. For young uneducated and unemployed men and women, joining an armed band may be the only alternative to a life of destitution. Violence becomes a means of subsistence, supplying its members with shelter and food as well as a sense of protection, belonging and status in a society in which family networks and state institutions have disintegrated.[14] State collapse does not imply an inherent descent into anarchy and senseless violence. Rather, an organized war economy based on looting, extortion, and protection rackets forms around the armed groups. Militias originally relying on volunteers to fill their ranks and finance their operations mutate into professional business entities with profitable links to regional and international trading networks. This has been particularly the case after the end of Cold War. With the sudden absence of external patronage, the warring parties to many conflicts in the South still had to look beyond their borders for alternative means of financing their operations. Therefore, even if economic globalization may not cause civil wars, for their roots often lay in cultural, historical and political grievances, one cannot deny its role in empowering violent sub-national actors by sustaining contemporary war economies. [15] As sub-national actors develop their taste for the status, power and profits violence accrues, they may show small interest in capturing a weak state with no means of enforcing its control over its territories and resources. In the current state of conflict there is a sense of familiarity and economic security. Meanwhile, peace represents uncertainty. For a negotiated peace is ultimately based on promises of political and economic inclusion that can easily be betrayed. A popular assumption is that the objective of each of the warring parties is the total defeat of the enemy’s capability.[16] In reality, the state of violent conflict can endow criminal activities with a rare legitimacy, and therefore every effort is made by belligerents to eschew decisive battles.[17] Indeed, governments may form informal alliances with their enemies to exploit unarmed civilians and natural resources. In Sierra Leone, the poor pay and training of government forces and their affiliated irregulars encouraged them to prey on civilians rather than engage in costly combat with the Revolutionary United Front. Demonstrating this, elite figures in the Angolan administration and security forces have been accused of selling weapons to UNITA on multiple occasions.[18] Similarly, an authoritarian government may deliberately prolong the civil war as a means of concentrating its power and destroying all opposition. In the name of combating “terror” and suppressing “rebels,” a government may declare a state of emergency; introduce draconian laws to limit the freedom of expression, assembly, and association; and indefinitely delay elections. The actions of the Algerian government’s in its contest with Islamist insurgents during the 1990s seem to follow this logic. In the series of massacres of the mid and late 1990s, government forces merely watched from a close distance as Islamist guerrillas slaughtered and mutilated civilians for hours.[19] As the war progressed, the population became alienated from the Islamist cause while the government enjoyed an increase in its support. Only by escalating and prolonging the war could Algeria’s military regime entrench its political power. Unfinished Civil Wars: Sustained Cultures of Violence and the Legacy of Atrocities Even where these barriers to negotiated settlement have been overcome and contesting forces have engaged in dialogue and agreed to end all military confrontations, the transition from war to peace has been less than clear. In Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, the ideological violence of their protracted civil wars seems to have been merely substituted with extreme levels of criminal violence.[20] There are many explanations for why “peace” can be difficult to distinguish from war. However, in all cases where the peace process has failed to address the roots of the conflict and to challenge the political structures, social divisions and economic inequalities that gave rise to insurgencies in the first place, violence has been renewed. In the case of Nicaragua and Guatemala, the continued economic marginalization of its youth and the incomplete efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life have manifested in the plethora of criminal gangs that dominate urban and increasingly rural areas and threaten the rule of law.[21] The same failure to reintegrate demobilized fighters was a feature of the Dayton and Abouja peace processes.[22] Post- Ta’if Lebanon’s peace is at best described as a fragile one. The incessant paralysis of state institutions, which is to a large extent the product of the accords’ consociational formula, has allowed crime to fester and the country to be consumed by political assassinations and kidnappings. More problematically, it has led citizens to increasingly rely on their own sects for economic and social security.[23] Consequently, the relationship between the various confessional groups in Lebanon is still dominated by a degree of distance, suspicion, and even animosity. Problematically, these social divisions have proven to be easily inflamed by regional developments and external forces as well as local elites.[24] It follows that Post-Ta’if Lebanon is more accurately conceptualized as a prolonged ceasefire, rather than as a consolidated peace as virtually the same socio-economic and political structures that gave rise to the civil war remain intact. In such an environment the threat of renewed large-scale violence is omnipresent. Critical to understanding the fragility of post-conflict societies peace are the legacies of atrocities, which remain unaddressed. While the populations of warring states are separated and secured by their respective borders, civil wars do not offer such sanctuary. By their nature, civil wars occur among and between the people and, therefore, claim large number of civilian casualties. With the objective of controlling the populace, factions resort to coercive and brutal means. When so many civilians are displaced, brutalized and killed, a once unified society becomes a deeply polarized one. Healing the psychological wounds of a protracted civil war to avoid its renewal proves to be a long and challenging process. The consolidation of peace is further endangered by the culture of violence that protracted civil wars can breed and sustain, and which often persists into the post-war period. During the civil war, the barrel of the gun becomes the main means of resolving disputes, making demands, and attaining perceived rights among large swaths of the population. The intensity of battle and the level of atrocities against civilians can erode the social norms that may have regulated the use of violence in the past. In the post-civil war environment, often characterized by a weak security apparatus and criminal justice system, the widespread availability of weapons and weak civil society, and with the collective memories of atrocities still fresh, every incentive is available for an individual to distribute his or her own retributive justice. When violence is not sanctioned and barely condemned it becomes normalized and legitimated. Conclusion This essay has attempted to present a number of structural explanations for the protracted and persistent nature of civil wars relative to interstate conflicts. At the most fundamental level, civil wars’ protracted nature stems from the material asymmetry between the incumbent and the insurgents, their tendency to become internationalized, and the limited space of compromise they involve. The essay has also highlighted the role of their factionalized as well as personalized nature as barriers to a negotiated settlement. Given the immense physical destruction protracted civil wars entail, they are often reduced to irrational and meaningless conflicts. However, such views disregard the economic and political incentives that the continuation of violence presents to both sub-state actors and the state itself. The structural aspects of intrastate conflict present clear barriers to a negotiated settlement, but even in the cases where it has been reached, it has rarely succeeded in putting a decisive end to the war. As long as the root causes of civil war: insecurity, poverty, overpopulation, political exclusion as well as the legacy of atrocities and cultures of violence, are not addressed, violence continues, even if it mutates into different forms and occurs between different parties.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › IMPACT-Political Violence/Civil War

Political Unrest and Fragility cause violence

Grono 2022, Nick, Former Deputy President and Chief Operating Officer, Fragile States and Conflict June 22 2022, International Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/fragile-states-and-conflict

Fragile and failed states have been with us since we've had a state-based international order. But the interest of policymakers in such states took on a new life after 9/11. The events of that day, and subsequent terrorist attacks, made devastatingly clear just how dangerous failed states such as Afghanistan could be, not only to their own people, but to communities around the world. Afghanistan and the neighboring tribal areas of Pakistan continue to demonstrate the threat posed by ungoverned areas to their citizens, their neighbors and the broader international community. Somalia has been a failed state since the nineties, and has recaptured the international community’s attention in recent years – not because of the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in the country, but because it has become a base and haven for pirates preying on international shipping. And an unsuccessful bomber who probably received training in Yemen has been the catalyst for a surge of international interest in that fragile state. So what is a fragile state? There’s now a substantial body of literature on such states. And every academic or agency appears to have their own descriptor – so apart from fragile statues, you also have states that are “weak,” “failing,” “failed,” “collapsed,” “at risk,” “precarious”, “vulnerable” or “recovering”. Some of these are alternate descriptions to “fragile” and some are encompassed within it. Even the term “fragile state” has come under criticism in recent years. Some scholars now consider the term both pejorative and analytically imprecise. They claim that fragility is not an either/or concept but rather exists along a continuum, and that it is highly context-specific and comes in a variety of economic, political, and social forms. But regardless of the specific conceptual formulation, these descriptors and analyses all point to some type of significant state failure or dysfunction. The World Bank provides a good working definition, observing such states “share a common fragility, in two particular respects: State policies and institutions are weak in these countries: making them vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services to their citizens, to control corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability. They face risks of conflict and political instability.” Predicting conflict in fragile states One consistent theme is the strong correlation between state fragility and conflict. Not all states experiencing conflict are fragile (India is a good example, with a number of internal conflicts, and the conflict in Kashmir), but most of them are; and not all fragile states are experiencing conflict, but almost all of them of them are or recently have. The World Bank identifies 37 fragile situations in 2010 – and all bar a small handful are post conflict or conflict affected. It shouldn’t be surprising that there is such a strong correlation. Many of the indicators for conflict are indicators for state weakness. Low and declining growth are widely recognised indicators for conflict - and low income and weak growth typically translate into lack of state capacity. A lack of state capacity usually results in an inability to mediate between competing interests. Low income also lowers the cost of rebellion, making it more attractive to would-be rebels. And the converse is also true. Conflict invariably has a negative impact on economic growth. Resources directed to conflict are diverted from development. Conflict destroys the infrastructure needed for economic activity. And without security, development efforts are unlikely to take hold and have the desired effects. While the link between fragility and conflict is by now widely accepted there is certainly no similar consensus about how this link plays out in practice. Much academic work is now devoted to mapping the various causal flows between fragility and conflict. And it’s the kind of academic work that has direct relevance to policymakers, particularly when it comes to prevention and its necessary accompaniment, prediction. Policymakers focus on the linkages in their efforts to obtain early warning of fragile states that may slip into conflict, and in an effort to ensure timely and cost-effective responses. There is no shortage of early warning in this age of proliferating NGOs, instant and widespread internet and satellite communications, and an awareness of the threat posed by failing states. In fact, there may be too much of it – the challenge for policymakers can be to determine which of the barrage of warning they receive is credible, and requires action, and which can be ignored. The related challenge is to tie early warning to effective early action - early action here means policy response by governments and international and regional organisations. Analytical and advocacy NGOs have the luxury, and the frustration, of being able to warn, but not being able to respond. So what kind of early warning do policymakers have access to? Very broadly, there are two types of early warning – qualitative and quantitative warning. The early warning produced by my organization, the International Crisis Group, is a good example of qualitative early warning. The task of our analysts is to find out what is happening and why. They identify the underlying political, social and economic factors creating the conditions for conflict as well as the more immediate causes of tension. Our role is to warn, as early and effectively as possible, those who are able to influence a situation where the risk of new or renewed conflict has reached a dangerous threshold. Crisis Group’s particular value-added in this respect is that all our reporting and analysis is field-based. At last count we had people on the ground from 50 different nationalities, speaking between them 49 different languages. They are steeped in local language and culture, getting dust on their boots, engaged in endless interaction with locals and internationals on the scene, and operating from 9 regional offices and 17 other locations in the field. Crisis Group also produces the monthly CrisisWatch bulletin which summarises developments during the previous month in some 70 situations of current or potential conflict, assessing for each whether the overall situation has significantly deteriorated, improved, or on balance remained more or less unchanged. This is one of the few examples of very short term early warning in the public domain. The challenge that this kind of qualitative early warning poses for policymakers is that its credibility and hence usability relies to a significant extent on the reputation of the external provider of such analysis. It is difficult, though not impossible, for governments to make big resource allocation decisions (ie whether to intervene to seek to prevent a looming conflict) on the basis of independent, non government, analysis. Of course, governments have their own analysts, but these often they won’t have the expertise, or the institutional freedom, of their non-governmental peers. There are ways to incorporate independent qualitative analysis into governments’ own analysis and planning, but the constraints will usually act to inhibit governments from using such external analysis as the predominant basis for their early response decision making. This is where quantitative early warning comes into the picture. The advantage (in theory) behind quantitative analysis is that it relies on verifiable data, and hence provides an independent and transparent basis for making resource allocation decisions. That’s the theory. The reality is more complex. Quantitative warning, relying as it does on statistical analysis, requires a model of conflict with quantifiable factors that can be measured, compared and analysed. But this conflict modelling is still more of an art than a science, despite rapid advances in the field over the last decade or so. The other challenge with quantitative warning is the timeframe of its predictive ability. It is much better adapted to highlight worrying trends than to identify with great specificity a likely tipping point into violence. Quantitative theories used to be broadly, if simplistically divided into two camps – that of greed versus grievance – with the greed camp holding that economic factors were largely responsible for conflict, and the grievance camp blaming on inequality and political, ethnic and religious grievances. The debate has been refined in recent years - concurrent with big improvements in the data - and now is more usefully characterized as one between feasibility and regime type, with the proponents of the feasibility thesis focusing on the conditions that determine the economic viability of rebellion, whereas the regime type proponents conclude that it is political institutions and not economic conditions that are the most powerful predictor of instability. The doyen on the feasibility side of the debate is Oxford academic Paul Collier. His models have been developed and refined over the years, but the essence of his analysis is that the defining feature of civil war is the emergence and durability of a private rebel army, and under most conditions such organizations are likely to be neither financially nor militarily feasible. Civil war will only occur if a rebel organisation can build and sustain a private army. He and his co-authors go on to argue that “where insurrection is feasible it will occur, with the actual agenda of the rebel movement being indeterminate.” Their research shows that three factors in particular are important in demonstrating feasibility of conflict - namely low per capita income, slow economic growth, and large exports of natural resources. Further variables have been recently added to the model, namely whether a country is under the implicit French security umbrella and the proportion of its population who are males in the age range 15-29, and a weaker variable that mountainous countries are more conflict prone (see “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War”, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner, May 2008). Low per capita income points to the incapacity of the state to maintain effective control over its territory. Both low income and slow growth can be interpreted as lowering the recruitment cost of rebel troops, and natural resources can provide rebel organizations with finance. The attractiveness of this theory of conflict is that most of these factors can be quantified. And many civil conflicts over the past couple of decades can be readily explained by it – for example, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo, Sudan, Aceh, Niger Delta, and Cote d’Ivoire – but does not provide a robust explanation for all civil conflicts or for the lack of conflict in some states. Collier has more recently looked at the links between democracy, development and conflict. He has argued that income level is the key factor in preventing violence during transitions to democracy. He believes that while the international community often favours promoting democracy as a solution to overcoming violent conflict, democracy also constrains the technical possibilities of government repression, and that this makes rebellion easier. Although the net effect of democracy is therefore ambiguous, he suggests that the higher is income the more likely is it to be favourable. He finds that whereas in rich countries democracy makes countries safer, below an income threshold democracy increases proneness to political violence. The regime type advocates take a different approach. The most sophisticated and sustained research on factors influencing motivation has been done by the Political Instability Task Force (formerly known as the State Failure Task Force), a panel of scholars that has worked since 1994 to collect and analyze data on political regimes and conflict around the world. Its work has focused particularly on regime type and quality. The Task Force’s research postulates that regime type is overwhelmingly the dominant factor behind revolutions, ethnic wars, and adverse regime changes. However, the effect of regime type is not a simple function of the degree of democracy or autocracy. The starting point is that strong autocracies are rarely prone to conflict. Strong democracies are also not prone to conflict. It is certain kinds of partial autocracies and partial democracies that are much more vulnerable than other regime types, with the vulnerability depending on the patterns of executive recruitment and political participation under those regimes. A particularly strong contributor to instability is that of factionalism within the political process. The taskforce model has four independent variables: regime type, infant mortality (as a proxy for poverty), a “bad neighborhood” indicator flagging cases with four or more bordering states embroiled in armed civil or ethnic conflict, and the presence or absence of state-led discrimination. They claim for this model an 80% success rate in identifying likely instability within a period of two years. Interesting recent research has also looked at the linkage between climate and conflict. Studies by scholars such as Edward Miguel at Berkeley attempt to establish clear causal links between climate factors and conflict. While most studies claim that poverty (which can be intensified or induced by climate change) has suffered from questions of reverse causality – namely, whether conflict leads to poverty or vice versa - Miguel finds that drops in rainfall in Africa, clearly an exogenous factor not affected by conflict, produce drops in income, increasing the likelihood of conflict the following year by nearly half. He recommends pre-empting violence by targeting foreign aid to shore up incomes in regions where livelihood is affected by rainfall, thereby removing a short term trigger of violence. The latest work in this field has moved beyond precipitation to looking at warming and finds strong historical linkages between civil war and temperature in Africa, with warmer years leading to significant increases in the likelihood of war. One recent research paper suggested a roughly 54% increase in armed conflict incidence by 2030 if current climate model projections are correct. So that is a very quick run through of the current models for predicting conflict and instability. As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of this type of quantitative analysis depends on the robustness of the models, and the quality of the data – and these are both continuing to evolve. For policymakers seeking to establishes processes in which early response is less ad hoc and more systematic, perhaps the best course of action is to use quantitative analysis to identify a small group of fragile states at risk of violent conflict within a two year timeframe, and then incorporate external qualitative analysis to refine that list and determine the most appropriate intervention. Policy approaches to fragile states Another difference between quantitative and qualitative analysis is that while the former may tell policymakers when to intervene, it doesn’t give them much guidance on how. Good qualitative analysis is much better geared to inform policymakers’ interventions in particular fragile states. So how should policymakers engage with such states? Given the variations between states, their problems, the tools available to interveners, the political will to intervene and all the other permutations, I won’t attempt to set out a menu of policy options here. However there are a number of guidelines that could usefully inform interventions in all fragile states. 1. Understand the problem. This is perhaps a statement of the obvious – but it is salutary to understand how often the obvious is ignored when the international community intervenes. Far too often lessons painfully learned in earlier interventions are forgotten or ignored. There is no checklist of appropriate policies for fragile states. What may have worked in Iraq for instance – such as international support for tribally based militias - is unlikely to work in Afghanistan. In fact in the latter country, the last five years have seen failed incarnations of the same policy on militias – first in the form of arbakai (tribal militias), then the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, then the Afghan Public Protection Force, and now the Coalition appears determined to repeat the failures of those initiatives with its latest effort, the Local Defense Initiative. So perhaps an exhortation to understand the problem is not quite as obvious as it seems. Policies have to be evidence-based. They have to build on a field-based understanding of the history, culture, political dynamics and region. This is where the work of organizations like Crisis Group is so important. We produced field-based policy reports. Our analysts are stationed in or near the countries they cover. They are steeped in an understanding of the country, its culture, politics, and the interests of the key players. They can and do travel around countries much more freely than embassy staff can. They usually have better access too. All of which is reflected in our analysis. 2. Recognise that prevention is better than cure, and that prevention does work. There was an excellent report published in 2005 – the Human Security Report – which documented the trends in conflicts since the Second World War. (The 2009 issue of this report is forthcoming.) Its headline statistic is an encouraging one, and perhaps counterintuitive – namely that there has been a 40% reduction in the number of state-based armed conflicts since the early 1990s. And, while there has been a small uptick in the number of state-based conflicts since 2003, when non-state conflicts are included (i.e. conflicts in which all both parties are non-state actors, such as rebel groups) there has been a continuing decline in the overall number of conflicts since 2003. There has also been a longer term trend decline in battle deaths (ie military personal and civilians killed in fighting.) There were only some 12,000 reported battle deaths in 2005 – less than any year since 1946. Why has there been a decline in conflict, and what lessons can we learn from these trends? The Human Security Report posits a number of causes, such as end of the Cold War leading to a reduction in proxy conflicts, and the growth in the number of democracies. But it attributes much of the reduction to a surge in international conflict prevention and resolution activities in the 1990s, led by a reinvigorated United Nations. Between 1987 and 2008, the number of Special Representatives of the Secretary- General increased six-fold. UN peacekeeping missions – which play a key role in preventing renewed conflict - increased from four in 1990 to 15 currently.[v] The international financial institutions and donor governments and civil society have played a significant role with their efforts to address the root causes of conflict. The key message is that conflict prevention efforts, for all their failings and inadequacies, can make a real difference. There are some examples of where these advances – seen, for example, in the rise in resources devoted to peacekeeping and conflict prevention work among national governments, stronger regional peace and security response mechanisms, the evolution of vibrant civil society engagement in conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives, and advances at the level of international law – have paid dividends. In some cases, coordinated international engagement has been instrumental in shifting states affected by devastating civil wars onto the fragile road to transition. Countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Nepal continue to face considerable challenges, in economic development, institution building and professionalization of their public services in the wake of devastating civil wars. The painful and long-term task of reconciling societies damaged by war will remain relevant for some years. But these states also managed to execute a transition to post-war recovery that would have seemed inconceivable in the early 2000s. Concerted efforts by regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have also played a decisive role in preventing violent outbreak in fragile states and in bringing states back to the fold. We saw some encouraging evidence of the impact of coordinated regional and international engagement in Guinea over the past few months. Effective regional and international actions in response to 2009’s military takeover have been instrumental in encouraging the country’s shift back to civilian rule from January this year. Of course, there is no room for complacency. Climate change, the fallout from the global economic crisis (including falling commodity prices and reduced remittances from diasporas), the aftermath of recent fuel and food price shocks, and a likely fall in the aid and development budgets of rich countries are all likely to increase the likelihood of conflict in fragile states in the coming years. Given this outlook, policymakers need to develop smarter and more cost effective interventions. And that being the case, we need to recognise that prevention is not only more effective than intervention after the bullets have started flying – but (and this should be music to policymakers’ ears) it is also much cheaper. A 2004 study estimated that on average one euro spent on conflict prevention generates over 4 euros in savings to the international community.[vi] As with all such studies, there are a number of heroic assumptions involved - but not so heroic to render the key finding redundant, namely that the cost of properly targeted prevention is a lot less than the cost of conflict. To give some concrete figures, though again, very much context specific: the former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has estimated that the small preventive military deployment in Macedonia, stopping the slide to war there, cost the British taxpayer £14 million (24 m euros), while fighting the war in Kosovo, by contrast, cost Britain £200 million (350 m euros), and in Bosnia over £1.5 billion (2.6 billion euros). And those are just the military costs, not the costs of reconstruction. 3. Understand the regional context Fragile state policies are generally geared towards individual states, and too often ignore the regional context. But as the experience of Africa and the Balkans and South Asia have amply demonstrated -- conflict and state-failure usually have very strong regional dynamics. Neighboring states can contribute to conflict in a number of ways. The most obvious is by being a party to the conflict. They can be active participants, for instance by being at war with the state in question, but more usually they are indirect participants, preferring to support proxy militias or fund rebel groups. Rwanda and Uganda were both in the Congo. Neighboring states can also provide a safe haven for rebels or spoilers, as Pakistan is doing with the Taliban, and Chad and Sudan are doing for each other’s rebels. They can funnel arms and supplies to governments or rebels (as some 11 countries are alleged to have been doing in Somalia, many of them being neighboring countries); or they can be more subtle in their destabilisation – as one could perhaps characterise Ethiopia’s role in Somalia, as it pulled its troops after its intervention, leaving a security vacuum and likely ensuring Somalia remains a failed state for many years yet. As noted above, the Political Instability Task Force has identified “bad neighborhood” as a statistically significant risk factor for conflict, with bad neighborhood here being defined as four or more bordering states embroiled in armed civil or ethnic conflict. So when it comes to strengthening or rebuilding fragile states, failing to address these regional dynamics will probably consign even the best-designed and most well-intentioned peacekeeping mission or development assistance package to failure as soon as the troops leave or the donor community’s generosity runs dry. 4. Commit the necessary political, financial and security resources The key political resource is a commitment to stay the course. It takes many years to rebuild a state, and premature disengagement can very quickly destroy all the progress and the billions invested in rebuilding. Just look at Timor Leste, where premature disengagement allowed that country to fall back into conflict, with the result that in 2006 it was almost back to where it started after its violent rebirth in 1999. Doubt among Afghans about the international community’s commitment to stay feeds insecurity there, and feeds patronage-based politics, and a willingness to do deals with the insurgent leadership - driven in part by their fear that the internationals will abandon them, as they have done in the past. The sad fact is that the international community isn’t good at staying the course. Too often we adopt a formulaic approach – particularly to those states requiring large scale international intervention. The standard response is a four or five year commitment, in the form of largish peacekeeping missions to back up internationally mediated peace agreements or Security Council resolutions, some DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants) and SSR (security system reform) followed by a rush of indigestible aid dollars, a flurry of institution building, and premature elections – followed too often and too soon by a withdrawal of peacekeeping troops and a drying up of aid money just when it is most needed and the absorptive capacity is able to beginning coping with it. A rush to early elections can be particularly problematic. Holding elections – although good for political show business (and, in post-conflict peacebuilding contexts, much loved as an exit benchmark for governments anxious to meet their commitments and go home) - quite often has nothing much to do with democracy. Crisis Group was one of the first organisations to really make this point loudly and clearly, opposing as we did a rush to an early election in Bosnia in 1996 because we feared this would consolidate ethnic divisions which hadn’t had the chance to be counterbalanced by the development national secular political forces, or at least strong civil society institutions. The recent presidential election in Afghanistan, held when there evidently wasn’t the domestic institutional capacity to manage a credible and legitimate process, is another example. We know that the period of transition to democracy is in many ways one of the most dangerous and fragile of all. This doesn’t mean that we should retreat from democratisation, but that we should rethink our priorities in the way we pursue it. The most important of all things to prioritise is the rule of law – often a very difficult challenge, but essential if democratic institutions are to take root and flourish. When it comes to financial resources – the temptation is to do it on the cheap. This is the ultimate false economy. Conflict imposes horrendous financial costs, not to mention the devastating human toll. And failure to get it right after conflict significantly increases the risk of a return to conflict. It has been estimated (in 2004) that civil war in a low-income country costs that country and its neighbors on average 42 billion euros in direct and indirect costs. That is for a single conflict. To put that figure in perspective, the worldwide aid budget in 2004 was 60 billion euros. So we should properly fund effective prevention, and thereby reduce the costs spent on peacebuilding post-conflict reconstruction. And when we do have to fund peacebuilding, we shouldn’t do it on the cheap – as the likelihood is that this will increase the risk of the country falling back into conflict, thereby requiring yet further expenditure on peacekeeping and stabilisation forces and the follow-up peacebuilding. Finally there are the security resources. A secure environment is a necessary but not sufficient condition to strengthening a fragile state. It’s sobering to realise that rebel groups and militias responsible for terrorizing a country or large parts of it are often very weak and brittle. They often survive and prosper because there are no capable forces to oppose them. When confronted with effective forces, they will often collapse – as happened with the rebels in Sierra Leone (confronted first by the mercenaries of Executive Outcomes, and subsequently routed by a few hundred British special forces); militias in Bunia, DRC (confronted by EU/French forces in Operation Artemis); or rebelling soldiers recently in Timor Leste (confronted by Australian troops and police). More importantly, security guarantees can be critical in deterring future spoilers. The ability to rapidly deploy an effective military force can be sufficient to ensure that the need to deploy will not arise. The commitment can be an over-the-horizon one – as the UK provided to Sierra Leone – but it needs to be real and credible. But sometimes a small security commitment will not be sufficient, and large scale sustained commitments are required. Even then, an effective and timely commitment may repay the investment many fold in terms of the avoidance of future costs. Such commitments are expensive and politically difficult – particularly where there is a likelihood of casualties – but as always the cost of failing has to be weighed against the cost of the commitment. Back in March 2002, when there were some 4,500 NATO peacekeepers stationed in Kabul, Crisis Group called for the peacekeeping force to be expanded to 25,000-30,000 and deployed around the country – a call subject to much criticism and ridicule from some Coalition governments, and NATO itself, as being greatly in excess of what was needed or feasible. Some eight years later, NATO is on track to have 150,000 troops deployed by September 2010. Conclusion Fragile states need lots of security and lots of development if they are to become viable and effective states in future. And it’s important to remember that in a globalised world, it’s not just capital and trade that travel the world – terrorism and extremism can also be exported, or nurtured in fragile states, and ill-gotten funds laundered by them. But while that provides an incentive for international engagement, it’s important that it not become the sole justification for engagement. Fragile states inflict untold misery on their citizens and on neighboring countries. When it comes to addressing state fragility we increasingly understand what works and what doesn’t – even if we are a long way from having all the answers yet. We certainly know enough to know that we aren’t doing enough to assist such states. Earlier and better targeted assistance to fragile states would dramatically improve the quality of life for hundreds of millions of people, which makes it a tremendously worthy goal in its own right.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › INTERNAL LINK-Dem Win Bad

Republican prevail in midterms won’t be significant in the 2024 election whatsoever – past elections prove . EA

Schneider 7/10, Bill, Bill Schneider is an emeritus professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and author of “Standoff: How America Became Ungovernable”, “Republicans aren’t guaranteed to sweep the midterms, but if they do, here’s what to expect”, 07-10-2022, The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/3551419-republicans-arent-guaranteed-to-sweep-the-midterms-but-if-they-do-heres-what-to-expect/ //EddyV

“A week is a long time in politics,” former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson once said. By that standard, four months is an eternity. Everything could change between now and Nov. 8. At least, Democrats better hope so. Because as things now stand, Democrats are likely to lose their slim majority in the House of Representatives. If that happens, President Biden’s agenda will be doomed. One shock has already happened: the Supreme Court’s decision in the Dobbs case last month to overturn Roe v. Wade and thereby end the constitutionally protected status of abortion rights. You can’t take away a right that Americans have had for 50 years without expecting a political backlash. Like what’s happening now. “It’s up to every single one of us to go out day after day after day until November,” Rep. Diana DeGette (D-Colo.) told protesters outside the Supreme Court. What exactly can the voters do this November? They can elect more Democrats to the House and Senate, thereby making it more likely that Congress will give statutory protection to abortion rights. As long as the filibuster is in place, however, such a measure is likely to go nowhere in the Senate. The prospect of either party gaining a 60-vote (and thereby filibuster-proof) Senate majority seems remote. And Democrats may want the filibuster in place if they lose their single-vote majority in the Senate this year. Donald Trump is eager to get press attention in order to defend himself from the damaging revelations coming out of the Jan. 6 committee hearings in Congress. Suppose Trump enters the 2024 presidential race before November. It would electrify the 2022 campaign, especially if the Justice Department initiates a criminal investigation of the former president. Democrats would have a powerful issue: “Look at what President Trump did to the Supreme Court. Imagine what he could do if he is reelected with a Republican Congress!” Some Democrats are supporting extremist Republicans in the GOP primaries — on the theory that they would be easy to defeat in November. Those Democrats are missing a crucial fact about political behavior. Democrats now control the White House and both houses of Congress. When voters vote for the opposition party, they are typically not making an ideological statement. They are voting for change. If the demand for change becomes strong enough, many people will vote for the opposition party no matter who the candidate is. Once voters start saying, “We can’t go on like this!” — inflation, gas prices, crime, immigration — even radical opposition candidates will look acceptable. Do Democrats really want to take that risk? Suppose Republicans do enjoy a sweeping victory this year. Will it mean anything for the 2024 presidential race? Not necessarily. Ronald Reagan’s first midterm election in 1982 was a serious setback for the new president and his party. The country was in a deep recession (10.8 percent unemployment) following the hyperinflation of the Carter years. Reaganomics had never worked. Republicans ended up losing 26 House seats, one Senate seat and seven governors. Republicans were able to limit their losses by running on the theme “Stay the course!” Voters knew what the course was. Reagan had set it out in his first budget message to Congress in February 1981: “This plan is aimed at reducing the growth in government spending and taxing [and] reforming and eliminating regulations which are unnecessary and unproductive.” At the same time, President Reagan promised to protect “the social safety net.” In fact, Reagan was the first president to use the term “safety net.” Will Biden be able to argue “Stay the course” in 2024? His “Build Back Better” program has never gotten through a nominally Democratic Congress. By 1984, it was “Morning in America.” The economic recovery was underway, unemployment was falling and, most importantly, the inflation rate dropped from 13.6 to 4.3 percent. Reagan was reelected with almost 60 percent of the popular vote. Bill Clinton’s first midterm in 1992 was a catastrophe for his party. It was the year of the “angry white male.” With a net loss of 54 seats, Democrats lost their majority in the House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years. And look at what happened two years later. In 1996, Clinton was easily reelected over Republican Bob Dole. A tough agenda: Biden and AMLO to talk migration, crime, the economy The unintended consequences (and benefits) of high energy costs Barack Obama faced a huge “tea party” uprising in his first midterm in 2010. The backlash to Obamacare brought Republicans a phenomenal gain of 63 House seats — the largest midterm election shift since 1938. What did it mean two years later? Nothing. Obama was reelected over Republican Mitt Romney with 51 percent of the popular vote — the first Democrat to carry a majority of the popular vote twice since FDR. Here’s a prediction: If Republicans win the House this year, they will vote to impeach Biden. For what? They’ll find something. But they won’t convict him because they won’t have anything close to the required two-thirds majority in the Senate. The popular backlash to a spite-driven impeachment will deliver a second term for Biden in 2024.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › INTERNAL LINK-Dem Win Bad

Conservative Radio falsely claim the Dems will cheat in midterms if they win, may insight Jan 6th V2

Thompson ’22 [Stuart A. Thompson, 7-5-2022, "On Conservative Radio, Misleading Message Is Clear: ‘Democrats Cheat’," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/05/business/media/conservative-radio-democrats-cheat.html]

November’s midterm elections are still months away, but to many conservative commentators, the fix is already in. Democrats have cheated before, they say, and they will cheat again. Never mind that the claims are false. In Lafayette, La., Carol Ross, host of “The Ross Report,” questioned how Democrats could win a presidential election again after a tumultuous few years in power. “They’re going to have to cheat again,” she said. “You know that. There will be rampant cheating.” In Greenville, S.C., Charlie James, a host on 106.3 WORD, read from a blog post arguing that “the Democrats are going to lose a majority during the midterm elections unless they’re able to cheat in a massive wide-scale way.” And on WJFN in Virginia, Stephen K. Bannon, the erstwhile adviser to former President Donald J. Trump who was indicted for refusing to comply with subpoenas issued by the House committee investigating the Jan. 6 Capitol riot, summed it up this way: “If Democrats don’t cheat, they don’t win.” Mr. Trump introduced the nation to a flurry of false claims about widespread voter fraud after his electoral loss in 2020. The extent of his efforts has been outlined extensively in the past couple of weeks during the hearings on the Jan. 6 Capitol riot — including a speech that day in which he falsely said Democrats changed voting laws “because they want to cheat.”Republican politicians and cable outlets like Fox News have carried the torch for Mr. Trump’s conspiracy theories ever since. But the loudest and most consistent booster of these unfounded claims has been talk radio, where conservative hosts reduce the jumble of false voter fraud theories into a two-word mantra: “Democrats cheat.” 

False Claims That ‘Democrats Cheat’

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › LINK

Dems want government action to solve misinfo NOW

Lima 22, Christiano, Cristiano Lima is a business reporter and author of The Washington Post's Technology 202 newsletter, focusing on the intersection of tech, politics and policy, Democrats are calling on LinkedIn to crack down on misinformation, too, April 1, 2022, The Washington post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/01/democrats-are-calling-linkedin-crack-down-misinformation-too/

Happy Friday! Feel free to send us pranks or news tips on this April Fools’ Day, but please, specify which is which: cristiano.lima@washpost.com. Below: A major Facebook ranking failure exposes users to harmful posts, and two Amazon union votes are coming down to the wire. First: Democrats are calling on LinkedIn to crack down on misinformation, too An unexpected tech platform is facing new pressure from Democrats to step up its policies against misinformation: LinkedIn. The Microsoft-owned networking site is the latest major platform added to the Democratic National Committee’s misinformation scorecard, which for years has graded platforms based on their rules against false or misleading content. LinkedIn joins Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, TikTok, Reddit and Snapchat as platforms Democrats are pressing to “take responsibility for information quality on their sites,” according to a forthcoming announcement shared exclusively with The Technology 202. Advertisement The platform is rarely discussed in the same vein as those peers, largely due to its career and business focus. But it’s still a substantial source of news for American adults, and Democratic officials say it deserves scrutiny, particularly when it comes to misinformation. Concerns over tech companies’ content moderation practices are slowly extending to a wider pool of social networking sites, even as larger platforms like Facebook, TikTok, YouTube and Twitter remain the most common targets. The DNC’s rubric rates companies on a number of fronts, including whether their algorithms surfaced “authoritative news” over “highly engaging news,” if they police rules against hate speech and incitement “consistently and comprehensively,” and whether they remove “maliciously manipulated media and deepfakes.” Advertisement In their latest update, the DNC said that while the company fared well against its peers when it came to its misinformation rules, the information they disclose about their policies is lacking. “Our analysis suggests that while the company has strong policies in place to combat misinformation, its lack of transparency makes it difficult to evaluate their effectiveness,” said Timothy Durigan, the top analyst for the DNC’s “Counter Disinformation Program.” LinkedIn spokesperson Greg Snapper said in a statement that the company has "strong policies and [takes] a number of proactive actions to protect against the spread of misinformation," and that the platform will be rolling out "even greater transparency around how we action content that doesn’t belong in our community" in coming weeks. Unlike other platforms that restrict or prohibit specific types of misinformation, such as posts about the covid-19 pandemic, LinkedIn’s policies explicitly tell users not to “share content in a way that you know is, or think may be, misleading or inaccurate.” Advertisement LinkedIn’s rules say that the platform “may prevent you from posting content from sites that are known to produce or contain misinformation.” They also prohibit users from posting “misleading or deceptive information about yourself,” or engaging in “spam or scams.” But the DNC knocked LinkedIn in its report for providing “little transparency into how it ranks content in feeds” and not making “public content or engagement data available to researchers.” LinkedIn holds a unique position among major tech platforms: it’s one of the most widely used social networks in the United States, and yet much like its parent company, Microsoft, it has faced little-to-no scrutiny in recent years from Washington. LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, who sits on Microsoft’s board, is also one of the Democratic Party’s most prominent megadonors — a relative rarity among prominent tech moguls, who have come under pressure in recent years to remain largely apolitical. Advertisement While the platform is known more for career updates and business news than politics and current events, LinkedIn has faced its fair share of misinformation challenges. In its sweeping report detailing Russian meddling online during the 2016 U.S. elections, the Senate Intelligence Committee wrote that LinkedIn discovered activity on the platform linked to the notorious Kremlin-backed Internet Research Agency during the election cycle. The panel noted that while the activity appeared to be “limited,” LinkedIn is still “a significant target for foreign intelligence services” because its users post “significant personal and professional data in pursuit of networking opportunities.” “This renders the platform a valuable source of information on an array of sensitive intelligence targets — including the identities of government employees, active duty military personnel, cleared defense contractors, and others,” the panel wrote in its 2019 report. Advertisement In 2020, the Wall Street Journal reported that supporters of the QAnon conspiracy theory “are increasingly going public on LinkedIn, expanding their online presence and prompting the professional-networking site to take steps to limit the spread of the community.” (A company spokesperson said at the time that “QAnon misinformation is not tolerated on LinkedIn.”) Later that year, my colleagues Cat Zakrzewski and Rachel Lerman reported that “users shared articles and videos that pushed false claims about the election results” on the site. The scorecard may be a sign that more scrutiny is incoming. Our top tabs Massive Facebook ranking flub exposed users to harmful content for months “A group of Facebook engineers identified a ‘massive ranking failure’ that exposed as much as half of all News Feed views to ‘integrity risks’ over the past six months,” the Verge's Alex Heath reports, citing a report obtained by the publication. Advertisement According to the report: “Instead of suppressing dubious posts reviewed by the company’s network of outside fact-checkers, the News Feed was instead giving the posts distribution, spiking views by as much as 30 percent globally. Unable to find the root cause, the engineers watched the surge subside a few weeks later and then flare up repeatedly until the ranking issue was fixed on March 11th.” The revelations are sure to stoke the ire of lawmakers in Washington, who have long criticized the platform over allegations it amplifies harmful material. Amazon union vote too close to call early on A pair of union elections at Amazon warehouses in Alabama and New York are too close to call after the first day of voting, and their future will hinge on contested and uncounted ballots, my colleagues Rachel Lerman and Gerrit De Vynck report. Advertisement The dead heat so far is “keeping open the potential for a historic turnaround in the efforts to unionize workers at the e-commerce giant,” Rachel and Gerrit report. They added, “If either warehouse votes yes, it would result in the first successful unionization effort at the nation’s second largest private employer and would generate major momentum for the labor movement there.” Amazon did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Amazon founder Jeff Bezos owns The Washington Post. Treasury hits Russia's tech sector in new sanctions The new sanctions “target parts of the Russian technology sector that enable Moscow to acquire technology critical for its military, including one firm that is Russia’s largest microchip producer,” my colleague Jeff Stein reports. The Biden administration has faced growing pressure to ratchet up its economic restrictions against Russia in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. The White House previously targeted Russia’s central banks and its technology imports, and has banned Russian energy imports. Advertisement “We will continue to target Putin’s war machine with sanctions from every angle, until this senseless war of choice is over,” Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen said in a statement Thursday. Inside the industry Attacking rival, Google says Microsoft’s hold on government security is a problem (NBC) Adults or Sexually Abused Minors? Getting It Right Vexes Facebook (New York Times) Competition watch Four U.S. Senators Cite Microsoft-Activision Deal Concern in FTC Letter (Wall Street Journal) Social media interoperability project Bluesky names first employees (Reuters) Privacy monitor EU parliament committees vote against crypto privacy Some Russian oligarchs are using U.K. data privacy law to sue (Reed Albergotti) Workforce report Amazon hired an influential Democratic pollster to fight Staten Island union drive (CNBC) Before you log off A Ukrainian soldier went in to inspect an abandoned home. He left with a shaggy dog who was missing her owners and in need of a friend. pic.twitter.com/ubYbKNIj4v — CBS News (@CBSNews) March 31, 2022 That’s all for today — thank you so much for joining us! Make sure to tell others to subscribe to The Technology 202 here. Get in touch with tips, feedback or greetings on Twitter or email.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › LINK

Voters care about avoiding fake news in elections – poll proves that the spread of false information is a key issue to voters in the United States

West ‘18 - Darrell, Vice President and Director - Governance Studies Senior Fellow - Center for Technology Innovation - Douglas Dillon Chair in Governmental Studies, “Brookings survey finds 57 percent say they have seen fake news during 2018 elections and 19 percent believe it has influenced their vote”, 10-23-2018, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/10/23/brookings-survey-finds-57-percent-say-they-have-seen-fake-news-during-2018-elections-and-19-percent-believe-it-has-influenced-their-vote/ //EddyV

The subject of fake news has sparked considerable discussion over the last two years. Following revelations of foreign government meddling and online disinformation campaigns, there is concern regarding the sources of false information and the possible impact on voters. Political observers worry that U.S. elections are being disrupted and democracy is being undermined. To examine this topic just a few weeks before the 2018 midterm elections, researchers at the Brookings Institution undertook a national poll and asked a series of questions about the prevalence of fake news, shifts since 2016, sources of fake news, and how to combat disinformation campaigns. The survey was an online U.S. national poll undertaken with 2,024 adult internet users between October 14 to 16, 2018. It was overseen by Darrell M. West, vice president of Governance Studies and director of the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution and the author of The Future of Work: Robots, AI, and Automation. Responses were weighted using gender, age, and region to match the demographics of the national internet population as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey. PREVALENCE OF FAKE NEWS AND IMPACT ON VOTE Fifty-seven percent say they have seen fake news during the 2018 elections and 19 percent believe it has influenced how they plan to vote. In addition, 42 percent think there now is more fake news than in 2016. Related A trader watches, as a television displays the news about former U.S. national security adviser Michael Flynn, at the New York Stock Exchange, (NYSE) in New York, U.S., December 1, 2017. REUTERS/Brendan McDermid - RC18062BEA70 How to combat fake news and disinformation Heavy machinery and the American flag are seen before the arrival of U.S. President Donald Trump as he participates in the Foxconn Technology Group groundbreaking ceremony for its LCD manufacturing campus, in Mount Pleasant, Wisconsin, U.S., June 28, 2018. REUTERS/Darren Hauck TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY - RC175D6CD2E0 Brookings survey finds 58% see manufacturing as vital to US economy, but only 17% are very confident in its future An Israeli drone is seen in action over the border between Israel and Gaza during a protest on the Gaza side June 8, 2018. REUTERS/Amir Cohen - RC133A224370 Brookings survey finds divided views on artificial intelligence for warfare, but support rises if adversaries are developing it There are some differences by gender and age. Men (59 percent) are slightly more likely than women (56 percent) to see fake news. Of the age groups, senior citizens (60 percent) are more likely than young people (50 percent) to see fake news. Regarding vote impact, men (23 percent) were more likely than women (16 percent) to say fake news has influenced their vote. Senior citizens (22 percent) are more likely than those aged 35 to 54 (15 percent) to claim fake news has influenced them. Survey results of American adult internet users on attitudes towards fake news WHO GENERATES FAKE NEWS? We asked who they thought generates the most fake news in terms of political party, ideology, and country. Thirty-two percent believe Republicans generate the most fake news, 32 percent cite Democrats, 2 percent name independents, and 34 percent are unsure. In terms of ideology, 33 percent believe liberals generate the most fake news, 30 percent say conservatives, 2 percent name moderates, and 35 percent aren’t sure. Forty-six percent see Russia as the country generating the most fake news, compared to 21 percent who name some other country, 16 percent who cite North Korea, 13 percent say China, and 4 percent claim it is Iran. HOW MUCH OF A THREAT TO DEMOCRACY? Forty-five percent believe fake news is very much a threat to democracy, 28 percent say it is somewhat of a threat, 10 believe it is not very much of a threat, and 17 percent are unsure. BELIEVE TECHNOLOGY FIRMS AND GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO MORE TO PROTECT PEOPLE Sixty percent believe major technology companies should be doing more to protect people from fake news and 56 percent think the U.S. government should be doing more to safeguard people. CHANGE IN INFORMATION ACQUISITION TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM FAKE NEWS Forty-six percent say they have changed the way they get information in order to protect themselves from fake news, 29 percent have not, and 25 percent are unsure. SURVEY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1. Have you seen fake news during the 2018 elections? 16% definitely no 8% possibly no 10% possibly yes 47% definitely yes 19% don’t know or no answer 2. Do you think there now is: 8% less fake news 34% about the same amount 42% more fake news than in 2016 16% don’t know or no answer 3. Has fake news influenced how you plan to vote in the 2018 elections? 57% definitely no 10% possibly no 4% possibly yes 15% definitely yes 14% don’t know or no answer 4. Who do you think generates the most fake news? (rotate answers) 32% Republicans 2% Independents 32% Democrats 34% don’t know or no answer 5. Who do you think generates the most fake news? (rotate answers) 30% conservatives 2% moderates 33% liberals 35% don’t know or no answer 6. Of organizations outside the United States, which countries do you think generate the most fake news? (rotate answers) 46% Russia 13% China 4% Iran 16% North Korea 21% some other country 7. How much of a threat to democracy do you think fake news is: 10% not very much 28% somewhat 45% very much 17% don’t know or no answer 8. Do you think major technology companies should be doing more to protect people from fake news? 12% definitely no 7% possibly no 17% possibly yes 43% definitely yes 21% don’t know or no answer 9. Do you think the U.S. government should be doing more to protect people from fake news? 14% definitely no 8% possibly no 15% possibly yes 41% definitely yes 22% don’t know or no answer 10. Have you changed the way you get information in order to protect yourself from fake news? 18% definitely no 11% possibly no 15% possibly yes 31% definitely yes 25% don’t know or no answer Gender: 55.5% male, 44.5% female in sample 47.9% male, 52.1% female in target population Age: 8.4% 18-24, 15.7% 25-34, 17.7% 35-44, 20.2% 45-54, 20.4% 55-64, 17.6% 65+ in sample 13.9% 18-24, 19.4% 25-34, 17.8% 35-44, 18.3% 45-54, 16.4% 55-64, 14.2% 65+ in target population Region: 15.5% Northeast, 26.5% Midwest, 35.4% South, 22.6% West in sample 18.0% Northeast, 22.0% Midwest, 36.4% South, 23.6% West in target population

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › LINK

Americans are worried about Russian interference in the upcoming midterm elections

Fitzgerald 22 [4/27/2022] Madeline Fitzgerald is a yearlong reporter with the news team. Originally from Connecticut, she recently graduated from Mount Holyoke College, where she studied politics and philosophy. Her experience includes editing for her college newspaper and interning at TIME Magazine. _ amber

More than half of Americans are worried about Russian interference in the 2022 midterm elections, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll.

The poll released on Tuesday found that 52% of Americans were worried about Russian misinformation on the internet negatively affecting the 2022 midterm elections. The same percentage of Americans also fear that Russia will send illicit financial support to some American politicians.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › LINK

Dems want AI solved within the government

Zakrzewski 21, Cat, Cat Zakrzewski is a technology policy reporter, tracking Washington's efforts to regulate Silicon Valley companies. She tracks antitrust, privacy and social media policy, as well as efforts to bring more Americans online, The Technology 202: Democrats introduce legislation prohibiting algorithmic discrimination, May 27, 2021, Washington post,

There’s a growing push among Democrats in Congress to ensure social networks and other websites aren’t promoting discrimination. Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Rep. Doris Matsui (D-Calif.) will today introduce legislation that prohibits online algorithms from discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, ability and other protected classes. It also aims to create greater transparency about how digital platforms operate by requiring companies to explain in plain language the ways their algorithms work and what kind of information they collect. The bill, called the Algorithmic Justice and Online Platform Transparency Act, would additionally create a task force of various federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, to probe potential instances of bias in algorithms. “It is time to open up Big Tech’s hood, enact strict prohibitions on harmful algorithms, and center justice for communities who have long been discriminated against online as we work toward platform accountability,” Markey said in a statement to The Technology 202. Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass., speaks during a hearing on Capitol Hill. (AP Photo/Andrew Harnik, File) There are growing concerns in Washington about the ways social networks and other tech tools can further entrench racism and sexism and harm society’s most vulnerable. The murder of George Floyd last year sparked heightened awareness of the ways algorithms can be biased or abused to harm minorities and others. Now in control of the White House and Congress, Democrats have used recent hearings with tech executives to highlight these concerns. Markey says as lawmakers think broadly about civil rights measures, they can’t ignore the role of tech companies. He called for other lawmakers to join in the effort to pass the legislation. “As we work to eliminate injustice in our society, we cannot ignore the online ecosystem,” Markey said. Civil rights advocates are pressuring Congress to regulate tech companies, after years of campaigns to make tech giants change their policies to ensure their products aren't harming Black and Brown people. They've been particularly active in pressuring the companies to do more to address hate speech and disinformation about elections. In the aftermath of the 2016 election, researchers found that the Russian influence operation specifically attempted to dampen turnout of Black voters and found that they were targeted with more Facebook ads than any group. The new measure would specifically prohibit algorithmic processes that interfere with individuals’ voting rights. The bill comes as some large tech companies have made changes under pressure to ensure their products and services aren’t abused in sensitive contexts, such as in regards to housing or policing. For instance, as part of a 2019 settlement, Facebook agreed to block advertisers from targeting housing, employment and credit ads based on age, gender and Zip code, which can be used as a proxy for race. But lawmakers have continued to raise concerns about such targeting in other categories, such as financial services. People have repeatedly challenged tech companies’ practices under existing civil rights law, but Markey’s new bill would ensure there are specific rules on the books for digital platforms. Democrats have proposed other measures that take aim at these concerns. Rep. Yvette D. Clarke (D-N.Y.) has proposed changes to Section 230, a key Internet legal shield, to target discriminatory advertising. The legislation comes as lawmakers are increasingly showing an interest in focusing on algorithms and transparency. Following years of debate about how to regulate social media companies, lawmakers from both political parties are now interested in advancing legislation to force greater transparency about the content moderation practices and algorithms that power major tech platforms. The Senate Judiciary Committee recently hosted a hearing on algorithms and amplification, where senators homed in on the ways the design of social networks influences society. Markey and Matsui’s proposal would also require tech companies to publish annual reports detailing their content moderation practices, something some large companies, including Facebook, already do. The companies also would have to maintain detailed records describing their algorithmic process for review by the FTC. Companies generally very closely guard these processes because of privacy and commercial concerns. Certain personal details would be removed from those records to ensure privacy. Our top tabs Lawmakers from both parties blasted Amazon’s planned acquisition of MGM Studios. Lawmakers who lead Capitol Hill's antitrust efforts were among the most vocal. (Chris Delmas/AFP/Getty Images) Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), who chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee’s antitrust subcommittee, called on the Justice Department to investigate the $8.45 billion deal, which she said “has the potential to impact millions of consumers.” The barrage of criticism underscores the increased antitrust scrutiny of the e-commerce giant amid broad backlash against tech giants in Washington. House Judiciary Committee’s antitrust subcommittee chair, Rep. David N. Cicilline (D-R.I.), tweeted that the deal “reinforces what we already know — they are laser-focused on expanding and entrenching their monopoly power. That’s bad for workers, consumers, and small businesses.” Rep. Ken Buck (Colo.), the top Republican on the panel, said he was “deeply concerned” by the deal. Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), whose congressional district includes Amazon’s corporate headquarters, also criticized the deal and called for Congress to “work quickly to rein in anti-competitive behavior.” Jeff Bezos, Amazon's founder and CEO, owns The Washington Post. Facebook says it will crack down on chronic spreaders of debunked information. Critics say Facebook has been too lenient on the spread of baseless claims. (Jeff Chiu/AP) The company says it will begin reducing the reach of posts made by users who repeatedly share debunked content. The company, which already reduces the reach of individual posts that have been fact-checked, has been criticized for harboring influencers who repeatedly post baseless information, including about the coronavirus and vaccinations. The new policy does have some limitations, however. It will not apply to politicians whose posts are exempt from Facebook's fact-checking policies, CNN correspondent Donie O’Sullivan noted. The company has also begun to allow posts claiming that the coronavirus was man-made, Politico’s Cristiano Lima reports, as the U.S. intelligence community looks into the theory that the source of the virus was a laboratory in Wuhan, China. Google and a national hospital chain agreed to work together to build algorithms with patient records. The goal of the partnership is to develop algorithms that will boost efficiency at hospitals, monitor patients and help doctors. (Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images) HCA Healthcare, which has about 2,000 locations nationwide, and Google said the algorithms would boost the efficiency at hospitals, help monitor patients and give doctors insights when making decisions, the Wall Street Journal’s Melanie Evans reports. The deal will further entrench Google in the health-care sector, but raises new privacy and competition concerns. HCA will remove personally identifiable information from the records before they’re shared with Google engineers, according to an HCA executive who spoke with the Journal. But Google's critics are wary of the deal, especially after the privacy concerns with one of Google's previous health-care partnerships. From Buck: Privacy monitor The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other groups called for Biden to issue an executive order on federal use of facial recognition technology. The groups are calling for a “combination of technological safeguards and policy measures” rather than a ban on use of the technology. In their letter to Biden, the groups also called on the administration to boost funding of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Facial Recognition Vendor Test, and said Biden should establish a National Artificial Intelligence Advisory Committee as directed by Congress. Google's track record in artificial intelligence and privacy did not inspire confidence in the new partnership on Twitter. From Brian Nord, a researcher at the Fermilab AI Project Office and Cosmic Physics Center:

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › LINK

Across the Political Spectrum, Americans Overwhelmingly View Cyber Security as one of Nation’s Top Threats to Address

Leffel, Zachary.6/7 Chicago Council on Global Affairs. June 7, 2022

Over the course of the last year there have been a number of high-profile cyberattacks, including government-sponsored and private attacks on targets within the United States. More recently, Russia has brought the topic of cybersecurity to the forefront by engaging in repeated hacking of Ukrainian government and civilian systems in coordination with their conventional military attack on the country. Americans across the partisan spectrum agree that cyberattacks are a critical threat to the interests of the United States. However, since cyber warfare is a relatively new and rapidly developing concept, there are not yet clear norms determining how it fits into the escalatory ladder of conventional warfare. For their part, the American public seems to view cyberattacks as warranting an in-kind response, but not as cause for launching a conventional military attack. Americans View Cyberattacks as a Top Security Threat. Public opinion polling shows a lack of consensus about where cyberattacks fall within the escalatory ladder of conventional warfare. Over the course of the last year there have been a number of high-profile cyberattacks, including government-sponsored and private attacks on targets within the United States. More recently, Russia has brought the topic of cybersecurity to the forefront by engaging in repeated hacking of Ukrainian government and civilian systems in coordination with their conventional military attack on the country. Over the past decade, international confrontations in cyberspace have increased in both frequency and intensity. In general, public opinion has tracked along with this dynamic. In 2010 just over half of the public (53 percent) saw cyberattacks as a critical threat. In the Council’s March 25–28 survey, that figure rose to 73 percent, making cyberattacks one of the top threats in the eyes of Americans. This position is popular across party lines—held by more than seven in 10 Republicans (77 percent critical threat), Democrats (71 percent), and Independents (73 percent). Along with this widespread concern over cyberattacks, four in five Americans see preventing cyberattacks as a very important US foreign policy goal (83 percent).

According to a Council survey from 2017, concerns about cyberattacks are primarily focused on the possible effects on US infrastructure. Americans expressed more concern about damage to US infrastructure (43 percent) than the theft of personal information (34 percent) or classified government information (22 percent). Both recent events and expert forecasts about cyber vulnerability indicate that these concerns about American infrastructure are likely valid. A May 2021 cyberattack on the Colonial Pipeline resulted in a massive shutdown of gasoline transport on the East Coast of the United States and certainly caught the attention of the American public. According to a poll by YouGov America, 85 percent of Americans were aware of the attack a week later. Fighting Virtual Fire with Fire As international actors’ cyber capabilities evolve, how cyber warfare fits into countries’ traditional foreign policy toolboxes and strategies has remained somewhat of a gray area. Debates surrounding how international law will be applied in cyberspace and whether conventional military attacks are justified responses to cybercrimes are certainly not closed ones, and countries are already developing a range of different approaches. For their part, the American public seems to support most retaliatory measures short of conventional warfare in response to cyberattacks. These include imposing sanctions on countries that have launched cyberattacks (85 percent) as well as conducting retaliatory cyberattacks against governmental computer systems (59 percent). However, Americans are reluctant to escalate cyberwarfare into conventional warfare: only 41 percent support responding to cyberattacks with airstrikes aimed at another country’s military. Public support is also low for retaliatory cyberattacks targeting another country’s civilian infrastructure (35 percent). Across the board, Republicans display higher levels of support for retaliatory actions. Gaps between Republicans and Democrats ranged from eight percentage points on imposing sanctions to 13 points on airstrikes against military targets. "Bar graph" What Does This Mean for Ukraine? The above data on potential responses to cyberattacks are from July 2021, well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia has been linked to multiple cyberattacks against Ukraine’s government infrastructure, and the European Union has recently declared them responsible for an attack on European satellite internet just before the invasion of Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has brought international cyberwarfare squarely into the public focus, and recent polling is beginning to tease out how Americans see cyberwarfare fitting into the broader US response to the invasion. A YouGov survey fielded April 30–May 3 finds that Americans are conflicted about launching cyberattacks on Russia as a response to in the country’s invasion of Ukraine. Just over a third of Americans think that launching cyberattacks is a good idea (38 percent), while another third say it is a bad idea (33 percent), and the final third is unsure (29 percent). The survey found a similar level of support (35 percent) for sending soldiers to Ukraine solely to provide help and not to fight Russian soldiers. A number of other proposed responses to Russian aggression received higher support among the American public. Over six in 10 support sending financial aid (65 percent) and weapons (62 percent) to Ukraine. Policies that fall cleanly into the nonmilitary category, such as imposing economic sanctions on Russia (68 percent) and banning Russian imports (60 percent) are also more popular among the public. These differing levels of support indicate Americans likely view cyberattacks as a significant escalation from nonmilitary support for Ukraine, more on par in severity with putting American troops on Ukrainian soil, but still short of full military engagement. These findings specific to the current situation in Ukraine are difficult to directly compare to the general cyberwarfare questions above because of Russia’s tense relationship with the United States. Responses may suggest an unwillingness by Americans to directly involve the United States in a conflict with a powerful adversary instead of being a statement on the norms of engaging in cyber warfare. As Russia’s war in Ukraine progresses, it may serve to shape the norms and regulation of cyber warfare as a dimension of international conflict.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › LINK

Majority of Americans Support Engagement With NATO

Fagan and Poushter. 2020 MOIRA FAGAN AND JACOB POUSHTER “NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States Many in member countries express reservations about fulfilling Article 5’s collective defense obligations” Pew Research Center. , 2020 LV

NATO is generally seen in a positive light across publics within the alliance, despite lingering tensions between the leaders of individual member countries. A median of 53% across 16 member countries surveyed have a favorable view of the organization, with only 27% expressing a negative view. But opinions of NATO and related issues vary widely across the countries surveyed, especially regarding the obligations of Article 5 of the 70-year-old Washington Treaty, which declares that an attack against one member nation is considered an attack against all members. Positive ratings of NATO among members range from a high of 82% in Poland to 21% in Turkey, with the United States and Germany in the middle at 52% and 57%, respectively. And in the three nonmember states surveyed, Sweden and Ukraine see the alliance positively (63% and 53%, respectively), but only 16% of Russians say the same. A map showing NATO seen favorably in member states, but few in Turkey agree Favorable views of the organization have fluctuated over time among both NATO member and nonmember countries. Since the late 2000s, favorable opinions of NATO are up 10 percentage points or more in Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland. However, positive opinions of NATO are down significantly in Bulgaria, Russia, Germany and France over the past decade, with double-digit percentage point declines in each of these countries. Favorable views of the organization are also down significantly in Spain and the Czech Republic. A chart showing views of NATO have changed in both member countries and among non-NATO members over past decade In addition, across several countries surveyed, favorable views of the organization are related to ideological orientation, with those on the right sharing a more positive view than those on the ideological left. NATO serves as a political and military alliance for its 29 member states spanning Europe and North America. Founded in 1949 to provide collective defense against the Soviet Union, the alliance seeks to balance Russian power and influence, in addition to a host of other operations. A chart showing NATO publics more likely to believe U.S. would defend them from Russian attack than to say their own country should Despite the organization’s largely favorable ratings among member states, there is widespread reluctance to fulfill the collective defense commitment outlined in Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty. When asked if their country should defend a fellow NATO ally against a potential attack from Russia, a median of 50% across 16 NATO member states say their country should not defend an ally, compared with 38% who say their country should defend an ally against a Russian attack. Publics are more convinced that the U.S. would use military force to defend a NATO ally from Russia. A median of 60% say the U.S. would defend an ally against Russia, while just 29% say the U.S. would not do so. And in most NATO member countries surveyed, publics are more likely to say the U.S. would defend a NATO ally from a Russian attack than say their own country should do the same. In terms of transatlantic relations, some Western European publics prefer a close relationship with the U.S., but many others prefer a close relationship with both the U.S. and Russia. Nevertheless, few want to prioritize their relationship with Russia over their U.S. relations. Ideology also relates to views of potential allies: Those on the right in several countries are more likely than those on the left to prefer a relationship with the U.S. Despite the reservations many have about NATO’s Article 5 commitments, half or more in nearly every country surveyed agree it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. In most countries surveyed, those who say military force is sometimes necessary are also more likely to agree that their country should use military force to defend a fellow NATO ally. These views have changed significantly over the past decade in some countries. In Ukraine, Russia, Slovakia and Germany, more say military force is sometimes necessary than said the same in 2007. And in Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic, publics have grown less inclined to agree. On the topic of territorial ambitions, when asked if there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to their country, relatively few surveyed agree. However, among NATO member states, majorities in Hungary, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria agree that parts of other countries belong to them. In many European countries, those with a favorable view of right-wing populist parties are more likely to support this statement. These are among the key findings from a Pew Research Center survey of 19 countries, including 16 NATO member states, Sweden, Russia and Ukraine. The survey was conducted among 21,029 people from May 13 to Aug. 12, 2019. Throughout this report, German results are occasionally sourced from a series of surveys conducted in Germany by Körber-Stiftung, in partnership with Pew Research Center. NATO viewed favorably across member states, though opinions have shifted over time A chart showing views of NATO Across the 16 NATO member countries surveyed, NATO is generally seen in a positive light. A median of 53% across these countries have a favorable view of the organization, while a median of 27% have an unfavorable opinion. In 13 of these countries, roughly half or more have a positive view of NATO. Among NATO member countries, positive views of the organization range from 82% in Poland to 21% in Turkey. Majorities of people in Poland, Lithuania, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany rate NATO positively in Europe. Opinions are also relatively positive in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, France, Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria. Canadians and Americans hold positive views of NATO, with 66% in Canada and 52% in the U.S. expressing favorable opinions. In Turkey and Greece, publics are particularly unfavorable toward the alliance: Roughly half or more express a negative opinion. Among the three non-NATO countries surveyed, views of the alliance are mixed. In Sweden and Ukraine, more than half have a favorable view of NATO. But in Russia, 60% have an unfavorable view of the organization, while just 16% view it favorably, the smallest share across all countries surveyed. Views of NATO have fluctuated since Pew Research Center began asking this question in 2007. In non-NATO-member Ukraine, for example, 34% said they had a favorable view of the organization in 2007. In 2019, 53% said the same, an increase of 19 percentage points. Lithuanians and Poles have also grown more favorable toward NATO over the past 10 to 12 years (increases of 18 and 10 points, respectively). Several countries have soured on the alliance over that period. In France, favorable views of NATO dropped from 71% in 2009 to 49% in 2019, a decrease of 22 percentage points. In Germany, favorable views of the organization declined by 16 points, and in Bulgaria favorable views are down by 12 points. In nonmember Russia, positive views have been nearly cut in half: In 2007, 30% had a favorable view of NATO. By 2019, just 16% expressed the same sentiment. A table showing NATO favorability over time In U.S., views of NATO differ among Democrats and Republicans Americans’ views of NATO differ by political party affiliation. Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents have been more likely to have a favorable opinion of NATO than Republicans and Republican-leaning independents across most years. That remained true in 2019, as 61% of Democrats had a positive view of the alliance, compared with 45% of Republicans. A chart showing Democrats consistently more favorable toward NATO than Republicans Both Democratic and Republican views of NATO remained generally stable until 2017, when Democrats grew much more likely to support NATO than their counterparts, a difference that has not changed significantly since. In 2017, 74% of Democrats and 48% of Republicans had a favorable opinion of the alliance, a difference of 26 percentage points. Since 2018, U.S. views of NATO have declined among supporters of both parties. Positive views among Democrats fell 15 points, while views among Republicans dropped 7 points. Those on the right tend to have a more positive view of NATO A chart showing those on the ideological right more favorable toward NATO Ideology is a factor when it comes to views of NATO in several countries. In six countries, those placing themselves on the right side of the ideological spectrum are more favorable toward NATO than those on the left. In Sweden, for example, 79% of those on the ideological right have a positive opinion of NATO, compared with 38% of those on the left, a difference of 41 percentage points. Significant differences between those on the right and the left are also seen in Bulgaria (38 percentage points), the Czech Republic (36 points), Spain (25), Greece (19) and Slovakia (16). Public reluctance on Article 5 obligations across NATO member countries A chart showing publics in NATO countries express reluctance on Article 5 obligations Article 5 of the NATO treaty is “at the very heart of NATO’s founding treaty,” according to the organization. The article states that “an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.” When asked whether their country should or should not use military force to defend a NATO ally from a hypothetical attack by Russia, in only five of the 16 member states surveyed – the Netherlands, the U.S., Canada, the UK and Lithuania – do half or more say that they should use such force. Across the 16 countries, a median of 50% say that their country should not defend a NATO ally in the event of an attack by Russia, while 38% say they should. Larger shares in 10 NATO member countries surveyed say their country should not use force to defend a NATO ally should there be an attack by Russia. This includes majorities in Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Germany and Spain. In Poland, sentiment is divided. A chart showing changing views on whether their country should intervene in a conflict between Russia and a NATO ally The belief that their country should respond to a hypothetical Russian attack on a NATO ally has become less common over time in a handful of countries. For example, in Italy, only a quarter in 2019 say that their country should defend a NATO ally, down from four-in-ten in 2015. Similar declines over this time period occurred in Poland (-8 percentage points), Spain (-7) and France (-6). However, support for protecting a fellow NATO nation has increased in the UK since 2015 (+6). In eight of the countries polled, men are significantly more likely than women to say that their country should defend a NATO ally. For example, in Germany, 43% of men say that in the case of a Russian attack on a fellow NATO member their country should respond with force, compared with only a quarter of women. Similar double-digit differences occur in Spain, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Poland. Ideology also plays a role in people’s views about coming to an ally’s aid. In six countries, those who place themselves on the right end of the ideological spectrum are more willing to say they should defend a NATO ally than those on the right. This includes double-digit differences between right and left in all six countries: Spain (30 percentage points), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (21 points), Greece (14), and the UK and Italy (both 13 points). A table showing those who agree military force is sometimes necessary are more likely to support defending a NATO ally Views on defending an ally from a potential Russian attack are related to general attitudes toward the use of military force. Across most of the NATO member countries surveyed, those who agree that military force is sometimes necessary to maintain order in the world are more likely to say that they would defend a fellow NATO member from an armed incursion than those who disagree that a military solution is the best choice for keeping order. For example, in Spain, 53% of those who agree that military force is sometimes necessary say they would come to the aid of a NATO ally, versus only 26% of those who disagree with the principle of military force – a 27 percentage point difference. A chart showing people in member states say the U.S. would defend a NATO ally In contrast to skeptical opinions on whether their own country should come to the defense of a NATO ally, people are much more likely to think the U.S. would take military action in response to a Russian attack. A median of 60% across the member countries say the U.S. would use military force to defend a NATO country that was subject to a Russian incursion. Only 29% across these countries believe the U.S. would not defend the country that was attacked. Roughly two-thirds or more in Italy, the UK, Spain, Canada, the Netherlands and Greece say the U.S. would defend a NATO ally. Majorities in Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and France agree. Poles, on balance, say the U.S. would help out should Russia use military force against a neighboring NATO country, but sentiment is more divided in Turkey, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Since 2015, there has been some change in a few countries on this question. The belief that the U.S. would defend a NATO ally is down 8 percentage points in France but up 7 points in the UK and Spain. These sentiments are also up 6 points in Turkey. In Hungary, views that the U.S. would help out in the event of a Russia attack are down significantly since 2017, falling 16 percentage points. A table showing more in NATO countries say the U.S. would use military force to defend an ally from Russia than say that their country should do the same Young adults in Spain, France, Slovakia, Canada and Germany are more likely to believe the U.S. would defend a NATO ally against a Russian attack. For example, in Spain, 84% of 18- to 29-year-olds say the U.S. would uphold their Article 5 obligations, compared with 68% of those 50 and older. In almost every country surveyed, people are significantly more likely to say the U.S. would defend an ally from a Russia attack than say their own country should take such action. The biggest difference measured is in Italy, where three-quarters say the U.S. would use such military force in such a scenario, compared with only a quarter who say Italy should defend that NATO ally, a 50 percentage point difference. Similar differences are seen in Greece (40 points), Spain (31), Germany (29), Slovakia (25), the UK (18), France (16), Turkey (14) and Canada (13). Many NATO countries in Europe value a close relationship with both the U.S. and Russia A chart showing western Europeans favor close relationship with U.S. over Russia; Central and Eastern Europeans tend to prefer both In nearly every country surveyed, larger shares support close ties with the U.S. than with Russia, with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Slovakia. And in many countries polled, publics tend to volunteer that a close relationship with both the U.S. and Russia is important. Particularly in Western Europe, the share of the public that says a relationship with the U.S. is more important is substantial. For example, in the UK and the Netherlands, about eight-in-ten support ties with the U.S. over Russia or both. And in Sweden, a non-NATO state, 71% support closer ties with the U.S. than with Russia (11%) or both countries (9%). Choosing a close relationship with Russia over the U.S. is considerably less widespread across the countries surveyed. Bulgarians are the most prone to this point of view, but just 28% say a close relationship with Russia is more important for their country. A quarter of Germans say it is important for their country to have a close relationship with Russia, compared with 39% who favor a close relationship with the U.S. Three-in-ten Germans volunteer that a close relationship with both countries would be preferable. A chart showing those on right ideologically more likely to favor close relationship with U.S. Central and Eastern European publics tend to volunteer their preference for a close relationship with both the U.S. and Russia. In Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria, roughly half or more say a relationship with both countries is important. And in Italy, Greece, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, about four-in-ten or more say the same. Ideology is linked to views of closer relations with the U.S. In 11 of 14 countries, those on the ideological right are more likely to support a close relationship with the U.S. than those on the left. In the Czech Republic, for example, 40% of those on the right say a close relationship with the U.S. is more important, compared to 15% of those on the left, a difference of 25 percentage points. Hungary is an exception. Hungarians on the left (40%) are almost twice as likely as their counterparts on the right (21%) to support close U.S. relations. Most NATO and non-NATO countries believe military force is sometimes necessary A chart showing across most of Europe and North America, support for military force to maintain order in the world There is widespread support across most of the NATO countries surveyed for the use of military force to maintain order in the world. A median of 57% across 16 member countries agree that military force is sometimes necessary, while a median of 36% disagree. Across most countries surveyed – both members of NATO and those that do not belong to the organization – about half or more support the use of military force to maintain order. And in seven countries (Sweden, the U.S., Canada, the UK, Turkey, Russia and Hungary) seven-in-ten or more hold this view. Germans are more divided, with 47% saying that military force is sometimes necessary and a similar 52% disagreeing with that statement. In Bulgaria, only 38% say military force is sometimes necessary. A table showing views of military force have changed across several countries Support for military force has changed since Pew Research Center asked this question in 2007. For example, in both Ukraine and Russia, two countries engaged in conflict since 2014, publics increasingly say military force is sometimes necessary (by 11 and 9 percentage points, respectively). This opinion has also become more common in Slovakia and Germany. Yet in several European countries, support for military force has waned. This is the case in Italy (a decrease of 21 percentage points), Spain (10 points) and the Czech Republic (9). A chart showing those on the right more likely to say military force can be necessary to maintain order In 12 countries, people on the right of the ideological spectrum are more apt than those on the left to agree that military force can be justified. In Spain, for example, those on the right are about twice as likely to support military force as their counterparts on the left. In the U.S., conservatives are 25 percentage points more likely than liberals to say military force is sometimes needed. Similarly, 91% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say military force is sometimes necessary, while 71% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents agree. Gender also shapes views of military action. Across most of the NATO and non-NATO countries surveyed, men are more likely than women believe in the need for military force. In the Czech Republic, for example, 63% of men say military force is sometimes necessary, compared with 45% of women. And in Ukraine, 71% of men support military force, versus 56% of women. Double-digit gender differences are also present in Germany (14 points), Poland (12), Bulgaria (12), Hungary (11), Italy (11) and Spain (10). Are there parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us? A chart showing Europeans divided over whether parts of neighboring countries belong to them Across NATO and non-NATO countries, there is disagreement over whether parts of neighboring countries really belong to them. A median of 45% across the 16 NATO countries surveyed disagree, while a median of 35% agree (in several countries, the share who did not express an opinion is relatively high). The shares who agree with this statement are highest in Central and Eastern European countries surveyed. About two-thirds of Hungarians (67%) agree that parts of neighboring countries belong to them, including 40% who completely agree. In Turkey, 58% agree that parts of nearby countries belong to them. And in neighboring Greece, 60% say the same. In Western European countries, sentiments tend to run in the opposite direction. In Sweden (82%), the Netherlands (74%), the UK (72%), Germany (62%), Spain (60%) and France (59%), majorities disagree that there are parts of other countries that belong to them. In both the U.S. and Canada, publics overwhelmingly disagree that parts of other countries belong to them (73% and 65%, respectively). However, a quarter of Canadians and roughly one-in-five Americans say the opposite and agree that there are parts of neighboring countries that belong to them. Russians and Ukrainians tend to agree that parts of neighboring countries belong to them (53% and 47%, respectively). A table showing those with a favorable view of right-wing populist parties more likely to say parts of other countries belong to them In Europe, supporters of right-wing populist parties tend to be more likely to say parts of neighboring countries belong to their country. Supporters of right-wing populist parties are more likely to agree with this statement for nearly every European right-wing populist party included in the survey. In Spain, for example, those who have a favorable view of Vox are 27 percentage points more likely to say parts of another country belong to Spain than those who do not have a favorable view of the party. Correction (February 12, 2020): This post has been updated with the proper characterization of NATO’s founding treaty and revised a significant difference in Lithuania. The changes due to these adjustments do not materially change the analysis of the report.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › UNIQUENESS-Dems will Lose in November

Democrats expected to lose big.

Roche 7/7 [Darragh Roche, 7-7-2022, "Democrats' worst case scenario for the midterms," Newsweek, ]   LW and JV 

Democrats are widely expected to suffer defeats in the upcoming 2022 midterm elections, with Republicans aiming to retake the House of Representatives and the Senate. The serving president's party usually performs poorly during midterms and while it seems likely President Joe Biden will see major losses this November, it's not clear just how bad things will be for the Democrats. Polls suggest the Democrats are on course for disappointment and that the party could potentially lose control of both chambers of Congress and see newly empowered Republican majorities stymying Biden's agenda in the run up to the next presidential election. A GOP gain in either chamber would hamstring the Biden administration, but the worst case scenario would see comfortable Republican majorities in both chambers, potentially leading to a slew of investigations and possibly even impeachment of the president. Losing the Senate. Poll tracker FiveThirtyEight's 2022 election forecast rates the Senate as a toss up with 35 seats up for re-election. Fourteen are currently held by Democrats and 21 by Republicans. FiveThirtyEight gives Republicans [have] an 80 percent chance of holding between 47 and 54 seats. If that latter figure is reached, it would represent a major defeat for Biden's party. The Senate is currently divided between 50 Republicans, 48 Democrats and two independents who caucus with the Democrats. Vice President Kamala Harris has had to use her casting vote on a number of occasions and a single Democratic loss in the midterms would hand control to the Republicans. FiveThirtyEight rates the Senate races in Arizona, Georgia, Nevada and Pennsylvania as toss-ups. If Republicans can win all four, it would be a major loss for the Democrats. Three of those seats are held by incumbent Democrats, while Republican Senator Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania is retiring. However, it's highly unlikely that Republicans could gain enough seats in November to secure a 60-vote, filibuster proof majority. This means Democrats are likely to deploy the filibuster if the GOP retakes the chamber. Nonetheless, a Republican-led Senate could hold up Biden's judicial nominees and potentially prevent him filling any vacant seats that might arise on the U.S. Supreme Court, as Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell did in 2016 when he was majority leader. A new poll found that nearly 60 percent of Americans disapprove of the job President Joe Biden is doing as president. Republicans are favored to win the House, according to FiveThirtyEight, while Democrats currently hold 220 seats to Republicans' 210, with five seats vacant. The poll tracker's analysis gives Republicans an 80 percent chance of holding between 215 and 258 seats. If the larger figure proves accurate, that would be a huge gain for the GOP, though it remains an outside possibility. The single worst midterm loss of House seats occurred in 2010 when Democrats lost 63 seats under then President Barack Obama. However, Obama's party retained control of the Senate until the 2014 midterms. It seems likely that Republican gains this year will be more modest but that the GOP will still win the House. That will allow House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy to become speaker for the first time and possibly mean the end of Speaker Nancy Pelosi's political career. FiveThirtyEight's generic congressional ballot shows Republicans with 44.8 percent support to the Democrats' 43.2 percent, as of July 6 - a margin of just 1.7 percent. If Republicans retake the House, recent reporting suggests they will launch a series of investigations into the Biden administration. Those probes could include the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the business dealings of Hunter Biden and even an investigation into the House Select Committee currently examining the events of January 6, 2021. Republican investigations could dominate the political agenda heading into the 2024 presidential election. Democrats may also be concerned about potential impeachment charges against President Biden, as some Republicans have previously suggested. An impeachment push could center on the withdrawal from Afghanistan or accusations relating to Biden's involvement in his son's business. He has denied any involvement with Hunter Biden's foreign business affairs. If the GOP controls both the House and Senate, investigations could multiply and the possibility of impeachment could be even greater. Losses in the midterms will prove disappointing for Democrats and politically difficult for Biden, but Thomas Gift, founding director of University College London's Centre on U.S. Politics, told Newsweek the president's party may have even bigger problems. "For Democrats, the worst case scenario isn't just that they lose big in November. It's that they lose big—and learn the wrong lessons about why they got beat," Gift said. "There's a certain faction within the Democratic Party that will argue that its looming defeats in the midterms are the result of not leaning hard enough into the progressive agenda. That's not just wrong. It's delusional," he said. Gift said that data showed centrist positions "poll well with American voters. Far-left positions don't." "If Democrats continue to embrace policies that most voters perceive as unacceptably liberal, 2022 will only be the harbinger of more losses in 2024," he said. "The sooner Democrats realize that what earns likes on Twitter doesn't earn votes in swing states, the sooner they'll figure out what it takes to beat the eminently beatable Republican Party," Gift added.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › UNIQUENESS-Dems will Lose in November

Republicans are hoping to add to their success of 2020, and history indicates they will

 and May 16, 2022. Marianna Sotomayor and Dan Balz (George Washington University, BA in political communications; George Washington University, MA in strategic communications) “The Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2022/house-control-midterms-2022/

When House Democrats are asked how they feel about their chances to keep the majority, the answer often is a sigh or a groan. As the party in the White House, the historical odds have not been in Democrats’ favor — and that was before President Biden’s approval ratings took a tumble, inflation permeated the economy, and a war broke out in Ukraine. “The problem is not the voters,” he added. “The problem is us.” Republicans need a net gain of just five seats to retake the House majority. The Cook Report with Amy Walter’s of competitive races includes 26 Democratic-held seats as either toss-up races or favoring Republicans. House editor Dave Wasserman predicts that number will jump after New Hampshire and New York complete their redistricting processes. By contrast, only nine Republican-held seats are toss-ups or leaning to the Democrats. Republicans have tried to learn the lessons of the 2018 midterms, when a Democratic “blue wave” of primarily first-time female candidates their House majority thanks to high turnout by suburban women rebelling against President Donald Trump and his party’s efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act. In 2020, Republicans flipped 15 Democratic-held seats, including 11 with female candidates, by female candidates and by labeling their Democratic opponents as far-left “socialists” who wanted to “defund the police” and favored open borders. Republicans hope to replicate that success this year by focusing on inflation and to the rise in crime across the United States as evidence Democrats cannot handle law and order. House Republican leaders have tried to support candidates who better reflect the districts they seek to represent, like Hispanics in Texas’s . Vulnerable Democrats have also been instructed by party leaders to confront attacks like “socialism” and “defund the police” head on, even though doing so may alienate liberals. Asked about being an extremist by Republicans, Wild said: “I think people identify me as Susan Wild, who is our representative who does this and that and the other. It’s going to be harder for the GOP to tag me as just being a Pelosi puppet or that she’s part of the Biden administration that’s screwing up everything.” Knowing that they could lose the majority this year, Democrats spent the past year urgently trying to pass Biden’s agenda. While they were able to inject trillions into the economy to combat the pandemic and rebuild infrastructure, Democratic infighting came to define the of “Build Back Better” at a time when voters are sick of political toxicity. Republicans are trying to frame Democrats as the party of fiscal irresponsibility, arguing that the coronavirus aid package was a source for inflation. Republicans also plan to hammer Democrats for stripping parents of their ability to decide when their children return to school and allowing criminals and drugs to seep across the border. Danna Garcia Cisneros takes notes during her third-grade class at Samuel W. Tucker Elementary in Alexandria, Va. Part of the Republican strategy this midterm is to hammer Democrats for stripping parents of their ability to decide when their kids return to school. (Amanda Andrade-Rhoades for The Washington Post) “The number one question every American is asking is can we afford it? Can we afford their policies where the gas prices rise, where home prices rise, where your rent rises?” House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) said in his party’s slogan. “The real answer is we cannot afford it.” The National Republican Campaign Committee is bullish about flipping five Democratic-held seats: Reps. Tom O’Halleran (Ariz.), Jared Golden (Maine), Marcy Kaptur (Ohio), Cindy Axne (Iowa) and Malinowski. In total, the NRCC is about 70 Democratic seats, including 12 districts that Trump won in 2020, a number that could increase when all states complete redistricting. While 33 seats are in districts Biden carried by over 10 points, Republicans believe that they could win in those areas with high voter turnout. Independent analysts are skeptical.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
MIDTERMS POLITICS DA- BLV 2022 › DEM WIN BAD SCENARIO › UNIQUENESS-Dems will Lose in November

Midterms are not looking hopeful for Dems

Gallup 6/14 [Gallup, Inc., 6-14-2022, "Usual Midterm Indicators Very Unfavorable for Democrats," Gallup, ] JV and LW

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- With less than five months to go before voters elect all members of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate, the current Democratic congressional majority is facing an extremely unfavorable election environment. The party of the president typically loses U.S. House seats in midterm elections -- an average of 23 since 1974. However, 2022 is not shaping up to be an average year. Rather, as of May, Gallup finds presidential job approval and three other key national mood indicators well below the historical averages measured in past midterm election years. On their own, those numbers would all predict a greater-than-average loss of seats for the Democratic Party this fall. Gallup's latest data, from a May 2-22 survey, finds 41% of Americans , 18% approving of the job Congress is doing, 16% satisfied with the way things are going in the U.S., and a 32-percentage-point deficit in positive (14%) versus negative (46%) ratings of current economic conditions. Each of those metrics is at least 10 points lower than the historical average at the time of past midterm elections, and most are on pace to be the worst of such readings. The following sections of this report discuss how each of these four polling indicators, as well as party affiliation, has related to midterm election outcomes historically. Midterm elections are widely seen as a referendum on the incumbent president, and this is justified by the high correspondence between overall job approval and seat loss for the president's party. Given this, congressional seat losses for unpopular presidents' parties have been above average historically, . Biden's current 41% approval rating puts him in the lower tier of all prior presidents' job approval ratings taken just before past midterm elections. Biden currently has the same approval rating that Donald Trump did at the time of the 2018 elections, when the GOP lost 40 House seats, and similar to Ronald Reagan's 42% in October 1982, before the Republicans lost 26 seats. Only one president, George W. Bush, had a lower rating than Biden does today, and his 38% rating in November 2006 was associated with a 30-seat loss. Biden's fellow Democrats Bill Clinton and Barack Obama lost an even larger number of House seats in 1994 and 2010, respectively, with slightly higher approval ratings than Biden has now. Those steeper losses reflect the relatively large number of House seats held by Democrats going into those elections in addition to the president's unpopularity. The Democratic Party lost fewer seats in Obama's second midterm in 2014 when Obama was no more popular than in his first midterm four years earlier, but Democrats were defending fewer seats. In the few elections where the president's party has gained seats (1998 and 2002) or lost a small number of seats (1986 and 1990), the incumbent president has been broadly popular, with approval ratings well above 50%. The exception was 1974, with Gerald Ford's 54% job approval more reflective of his honeymoon period in the months after he took office following Richard Nixon's resignation in August of that year. The GOP's 43-seat loss was likely tied to Nixon's unpopularity (24% approval in his last rating) stemming from the Watergate scandal that led to his resignation. While Biden's job approval rating could improve by November, putting his party in a less precarious position, he would be bucking the trend for second-year presidents. Historically, presidents' job approval ratings have  in the last few months before their first midterms. Democrats currently hold 220 seats in the House, just two above the number needed for a majority, and far fewer than the 250-plus they held before the Republican wave elections of 1994 and 2010. This relatively low seat exposure could help to check Democratic losses, as occurred in 2014. The 18% of Americans who approve of the job Congress is doing would be the lowest Gallup has measured in a midterm election if it holds at that level through the fall. However, it would not be much lower than the 20% to 21% approval ratings for Congress at the time of the past three midterm elections. Americans' view of the job Congress is doing is also broadly predictive of how the president's party -- if not also the majority party in Congress -- will perform in the midterms. In 1994, 2010 and 2018 -- all years when Congress' approval rating was between 21% and 23% and the president's party was in the majority -- the incumbent party lost between 40 and 63 House seats. In 2014, even with approval of Congress at 20%, the Democratic Party lost only 13 seats -- again explained by Democrats' weak starting position that year when House Republicans were in the majority. In years when congressional approval was significantly higher, the president's party suffered minimal losses or even gained seats. Americans' satisfaction with the way things are going in the U.S. is also on pace to be the worst it has been in a midterm election year. The 16% currently satisfied is six points lower than the prior midterm low -- 22% in 2010. Satisfaction relates to midterm House seat loss in a similar way as the job approval variables, with greater losses tending to happen in elections when satisfaction is low -- such as in 1982 (24%), 1994 (30%) and 2010 (22%) -- and more minimal losses or gains for the president's party in years when satisfaction is high, including 1986 (58%), 1998 (60%) and 2002 (48%). Gallup has a shorter history of measuring Americans' perceptions of current U.S. economic conditions, dating back to the early 1990s. Since that time, Americans' views of the economy during midterm election years have only ever been similarly bad as now once before -- in 2010, when net ratings of economic conditions were -31. Economic ratings tend to be less strongly related to midterm election outcomes than other mood indicators are, though views of the economy certainly influence how Americans rate the job that political leaders are doing and whether they are satisfied with the way things are going in the country. Positive evaluations of the economy in 2006 and 2018 were not enough to overcome weak job approval ratings for Presidents Bush and Trump, respectively, and for Congress, suggesting political leaders were being evaluated on factors besides the economy. But even if the economy is less correlated with midterm election outcomes, the fact that Americans view it negatively this year is just one more issue that does not reflect favorably on the governing Democratic Party. Vote choices in elections are strongly tied to a voter's political leanings. Party affiliation has been a good indicator of midterm election outcomes in the past because it either related to the partisanship of the electorate or was a harbinger of how people would vote. On average over the past three months, Americans have been equally likely to identify politically as Republicans or say they are independents who lean toward the Republican Party (45%) as to identify as Democrats or to lean Democratic (45%). While the parties appear, then, to be on equal footing heading into the midterms, the figures are generally a better sign for the Republican Party than the Democratic Party for two key reasons: First, historically, Democrats usually have an advantage on this measure of party affiliation. For example, in , Democrats had a three-point advantage (though the numbers varied greatly over the course of the year), which is typical. Second, Republican voters usually turn out at higher rates than Democratic voters do. If usual turnout patterns hold, and partisanship among all national adults is even, then the electorate will have more Republican identifiers and leaners than Democratic ones. There were also even splits in party affiliation in 1994, 2002, 2010, 2014 and 2018 election years, and all but one were good years for Republican candidates. The major exception was 2018, a year in which the parties were fairly evenly matched but Democrats did better in the elections, perhaps because of Trump's unpopularity and the  that year. By contrast, in years when the Democratic Party had sizable advantages on party identification, like in 1998 and 2006, Democrats picked up seats in Congress. At the same time, the relatively slim majority enjoyed by House Democrats should shield the party from losses in the upper range of what's possible when presidential approval is in the low 40s and less than a quarter of Americans are satisfied with the state of the nation. While it is unclear whether policy issues can eclipse presidential performance or the national mood as midterm election voting factors, Democrats may benefit politically from the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade and Republican opposition to gun control measures in the wake of a series of mass shootings. Recent Gallup data suggest abortion will be  this year than it usually is in U.S. elections, more so among those who support rather than oppose legalized abortion. Also, even before the mass shootings, the majority of Americans expressed dissatisfaction with  and favored enacting stricter laws. On the other hand, further increases in gas prices or renewed focus on the border crisis could compound Democrats' problems in November. Regardless of what issues might drive voter behavior, unless Americans' opinions of the job Biden is doing and the state of the nation improve over the next five months, the Democratic Party may face a situation similar to 1994 and 2010 when it suffered major losses in its presidents' first midterms but regrouped in time to win the presidential election two years later.