2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › CRISPR solves Heg
Patrick Tucker, 12-1-2018, Technology Editor, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/12/us-military-genetically-engineering-new-life-forms-detect-enemy-subs/153200/, "The US Military Is Genetically Engineering New Life Forms To Detect Enemy Subs," Defense One (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
How do you detect submarines in an expanse as large as the ocean? The U.S. military hopes that common marine microorganisms might be genetically engineered into living tripwires to signal the passage of enemy subs, underwater vessels, or even divers.
It’s one of many potential military applications for so-called engineered organisms, a field that promises living camouflage that reacts to its surroundings to better avoid detection, new drugs and medicines to help deployed forces survive in harsh conditions, and more. But the research is in its very early stages, military officials said.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › CRISPR solves Heg
Peter H. Schwartz, April 2020, Indiana University Center for Bioethics, Indiana University School of Medicinehttps://www.cell.com/molecular-therapy-family/molecular-therapy/pdf/S1525-0016(20)30142-8.pdf, " Ethics of Gene Therapy in the Military: Promise and Potential Problems" Molecular Therapy Vol. 28 No 4 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Recent research on mice has shown that gene therapy can neutralize the effect of certain types of chemical weapons.1,2 This approach may one day protect people, but it also raises worries. Some of these questions stem from it being gene therapy, but most stem from the fact that its key use would be on the battlefield. The most challenging questions involve assessing a therapy that is designed to protect soldiers but could also hurt them.
It’s important to begin the discussion by reviewing how dangerous chemical weapons are and why they have been banned by international treaty since the 1960s.3,4 The most commonly used nerve agents, such as sarin, tabun, and VX, are organophosphates that inhibit acetylcholinesterase and lead to nerve dysfunction, resulting in the inability to breathe, heart problems, seizures, and death. Chemoprotective clothing and gas masks provide some defense, but they are not perfect. Once a person is exposed, medical treatments have limited efficacy and may not be able to forestall death or brain damage.3,4
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › CRISPR solves Heg
Marsha Greene & Zubin Master, 2018, Senior Policy Analyst, Peraton & Biomedical Ethics Research Program, Mayo Clinic, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY21%20Briefings/NDU%206070/CRISPR_Military.pdf?ver=2020-08-11-170728-347, " Ethical Issues of Using CRISPR Technologies for Research on Military Enhancement" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
More practically, the availability of CRISPR gene editing is likely to impact both policy and practice in warfighter health and performance research. CRISPR itself could be used to weaponize biological agents and the military will need to consider how the warfighter could be optimized for performance during a hypothetical attack (Hoehn et al. 2017). Historically, service members are often subject to mandatory vaccination programs to protect against biological agents while deployed. However, it may prove difficult to develop effective vaccines for some of these new and emerging biological threats. Initial work aimed at identifying candidate genes that confers sensitivity to anthrax could lay the ground work for these types of studies (Martchenko et al. 2012). Reduced expression of one such gene, capillary morphogenesis gene 2 (CMG 2), correlates strongly with lower susceptibility to anthrax. Interestingly, individuals who are closely related express CMG2 at similar levels which could indicate that sensitivity to these types of bioagents may be heritable traits. If genes such as CMG2 can be validated, the CRISPR system could be exploited in a variety of ways, some of which may not involve gene editing at all. In 2012, a team of researchers engineered a Cas9 enzyme that was unable to cut DNA (Qi et al. 2013). Essentially, the CRISPR/Cas9 machinery could be directed to a specific locus in the genome and used as either a gene promoter or suppressor, a sort of on/off switch for certain genes. More importantly, the effects could be reversible. One study did report targeted silencing of CMG receptors protected against anthrax toxin (Arévalo et al. 2014). Potential advantages are a shorter time frame between warfighter inoculation and deployment to a hostile zone and the ability to naturally reverse effects over time. More research is needed to determine the precise timing required for such inoculations and how long the expected response would be sustained.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › CRISPR solves Heg
Marsha Greene & Zubin Master, 2018, Senior Policy Analyst, Peraton & Biomedical Ethics Research Program, Mayo Clinic, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY21%20Briefings/NDU%206070/CRISPR_Military.pdf?ver=2020-08-11-170728-347, " Ethical Issues of Using CRISPR Technologies for Research on Military Enhancement" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Other military applications of CRISPR could involve directly enhancing human soldiers. Humans remain the rate-limiting factor in the conduct of war. While weapons have become increasingly more sophisticated, provisions must be made in modern wargame exercises to allow the warfighter to sleep, receive nutrition, and heal after trauma or injury. Science fiction has conjured images of warfighters with super strength, enhanced vision, and limited psychosomatic reactions to the horrors of war. CRISPR research in the private sector is also trending towards enhancements that could be desirable for military applications. For example, a study with CRISPR-mediated gene editing of beagle embryos produced pups with twice the muscle mass having direct implications for human research (Zou et al. 2015). Scientists have also isolated genes from other species that could theoretically be genetically engineered to enhance humans such as a thermal imaging gene in reptiles which may confer the ability to see in low light conditions (Gracheva et al. 2010). Even a potential candidate gene for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder has been described indicating that it may be possible to one day eliminate emotional detachment that warfighters sometimes encounter in the aftermath of war (Cornelis et al. 2010). Such experimental endeavours are likely to face major regulatory hurdles if they are ever seriously considered for development.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › CRISPR solves Heg
Marsha Greene & Zubin Master, 2018, Senior Policy Analyst, Peraton & Biomedical Ethics Research Program, Mayo Clinic, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY21%20Briefings/NDU%206070/CRISPR_Military.pdf?ver=2020-08-11-170728-347, " Ethical Issues of Using CRISPR Technologies for Research on Military Enhancement" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
The development of the CRISPR/Cas 9 system has revived the debate over gene editing applications in many areas including biological research, human health, and agriculture and food production among others. What is discussed less in the literature is the use of CRISPR/Cas and other gene editing technologies to enhance humans specifically for military purposes. The President’s Council on Bioethics under former President George W. Bush acknowledged that when performance is a matter of life and death, such as with soldiers on the battlefield, human enhancement may be more acceptable and indeed allowable (President’s Council for Bioethics 2003). Yet the Council cautioned that it may be unwise to allow the warfighter to become indistinguishable from his weapon. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) in 2014, human performance optimization continues to be a major area of research focus (DARPABAA-14-38). In this call, DARPA solicited proposals to improve warfighter performance, improve bioengineering safety, and create a biological based manufacturing platform. The announcement underscores the Department’s current focus on temporary optimization measures to include the development of short acting drugs and biologics designed to enhance everything from wound healing to improvement of a broad range of cognitive abilities. With the emergence of CRISPR/Cas technology and the possibility for permanent gene enhancements of service members, the debate over where the ethical line should be drawn in military human performance optimization requires further consideration.
In this paper, we focus on the ethics of research using CRISPR on adult military service members, specifically as it relates to potential exposure to biological agents. This focus is deliberate because warfare is increasingly becoming asymmetrical with the emergence of guerrilla and insurgent forces. Military operations have shifted to counterinsurgency with specific attention regarding how to combat the threat of non-lethal weapons (e.g., bioagents). We discuss the governance of research involving humans in the military and follow with a discussion of how CRISPR can be used to protect warfighters against biological agents. Finally, we perform an ethical analysis of research involving military personnel specifically on issues of risks–benefit analysis, informed consent, and equality of access and outline several considerations for institutional review boards (IRBs) and policymakers.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › CRISPR solves Heg
Marsha Greene & Zubin Master, 2018, Senior Policy Analyst, Peraton & Biomedical Ethics Research Program, Mayo Clinic, https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/AY21%20Briefings/NDU%206070/CRISPR_Military.pdf?ver=2020-08-11-170728-347, " Ethical Issues of Using CRISPR Technologies for Research on Military Enhancement" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
CRISPR/Cas9 is a major technological feat with tremendous potential to impact the agriculture and health industries. These tools are currently being used to expedite crop and livestock breeding, engineer new antimicrobials, and control populations of disease-carrying insects (Gao 2018; Nunez and Lu 2017; Hammond et al. 2016). For human health, CRISPR can be used to treat diseases for which gene editing has previously been considered a therapeutic strategy, including Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, muscular dystrophy, cystic fibrosis, sickle cell disease, hemophilia, autism, HIV, and various cancers among other applications (NASEM 2017). Two first-in-human safety trials have been initiated to study whether CRISPR edited immune cells are more efficient at killing tumour cells in people with terminal cancer (Cyranoski 2016; Reardon 2016). CRISPR technology has reportedly been used to correct gene defects in human embryos (Ma et al. 2017) and is considered important in improving assisted reproductive technologies (Simón 2013; Ishii 2017). Research involving human embryo manipulation, however, is largely being conducted outside the United States due to regulatory restrictions. Several of these applications have relevance to Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › A2 Currrent frameworks solve
Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Continuing advances in biotechnology provide a plethora of opportunities to address global challenges such as the spread of infectious diseases, food insecurity, and environmental degradation. However, the same technologies can be deployed by nefarious actors or hostile states to create deadly pathogens that can deliberately cause human infections, negatively target agricultural supply chains, or disrupt existing ecological balances. The world has already seen some troubling historical precedents of the deliberate misuse of biotechnology to develop bioweapons, instances of accidental releases of living organisms from labs, and cases of laboratory-acquired infections.
To tackle such challenges, most countries have adopted informal guidelines or laws to ensure the safety of biotechnology-related research, instituted mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to biological material, and created export control regimes to govern the transfer of sensitive biological material.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › A2 Currrent frameworks solve
Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
There are numerous international treaties and regimes in place to help mitigate the risks at play with biotechnology. Three of the most significant ones are the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australian Group. Each of these agreements or regimes tackles a different aspect of the risk profile—biosafety, bioweapons, and banned substances—but each of them comes with limitations, such as limited scope, sparse funding, and inadequate verification and monitoring mechanisms. None of the agreements create a binding framework to holistically address biosafety and biosecurity risks, making for an overall lack of accountability and rendering the development of international standards piecemeal and incomplete. In this regulatory environment, it is difficult to keep up with rapidly emerging advances in biotechnology or address pressing issues such as releasing biotechnology products, like gene drives, into nature.
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Unregulated biotech risks extinction
Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Biotechnology has the potential to revolutionize the societies that humans live in and the organisms that they live alongside. Recent advances include cheaper and more accessible DNA sequencing, faster DNA synthesis, the discovery of efficient and accurate gene-editing tools such as CRISPR/Cas9, and developments in synthetic biology. Meanwhile, there is a growing do-it-yourself (DIY) community of independent biotechnology practitioners and enthusiasts who are unaffiliated with any single lab. Despite their promise, developments in the field do raise certain safety and security concerns that policymakers and scientists must bear in mind.
SAFETY THREATS
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Unregulated biotech risks extinction
Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Safety concerns extend beyond pathogens that may escape from research laboratories. Genetically engineered organisms that are introduced into a natural environment for beneficial purposes can also sometimes have unintended consequences. For example, although CRISPR/Cas9-enabled gene drives have the potential to eradicate vector-borne diseases, tackle invasive species, and control pests that target crops, the self-propagating nature of gene drives and the possibility that they could either spread indefinitely or accidently manipulate nontargeted species have raised concerns among regulators.
Similar experimental techniques, like sterilizing insects en masse, have been conducted in the past. One technique involves the mass sterilization of a targeted pest, such as fruit flies, using irradiation. Scientists advocating for gene drives argue that irradiation can cause random mutations, which might also have unintentional effects on the environment. Such off-target mutations can be avoided using gene drive technology that relies on genomic information obtained through reliable DNA sequencing tools. Although the technology has immense beneficial applications, it is important to update existing regulations and initiate public discourse on the benefits and the risks of this emerging technology.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Unregulated biotech risks extinction
Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
Accessibility is the difficulty in obtaining dual-use biotechnology. It is the first step of the intentional misuse of biotechnology, including obtaining hardware, software, and intangible information that can be applied to such technology for non-state actors to carry out bioterrorism activities. In the field of dual-use biotechnology, non-state actors can include ethnic separatists, transnational criminal organizations, terrorist organizations, cults, biohackers, and others who engage in covert behavior, have more freedom to conduct research, and are more difficult to supervise than state actors. At the Eighth Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, the U.S. government announced that bioterrorism plots had been foiled by Kenya and Morocco. In addition, more than 15 criminal cases in the past ten years have involved the use of biological weapons in the U.S. There is therefore increasing concern over non-state actors using dual-use biotechnology to carry out bioterrorist attacks [5].
There are three accessibility risks of dual-use biotechnology. One is the disclosure of key technical information, such as key gene sequences of highly pathogenic pathogens that can be easily obtained from academic conferences, journals and public databases. In 2011, scientists from the United States and the Netherlands published academic papers on the transmission ability of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in mammalian cells, in which the methods of modifying the virus so as to enhance its transmission ability were made public [6]. This event that triggered global concern about the dual-use risk of biotechnology [7]. In addition, it is now easier than ever to obtain key experimental materials. In light of the industrialization of biotechnology, biotechnology enterprises can provide technical services and related reagents, including the detailed steps of entire experiments. Anyone can readily order laboratory equipment, consumables and substitutes online, and each year these become less expensive, so it is not difficult to set up a simple biology laboratory [8]. Finally, there are more ways than ever to obtain technology. More methods of communication have emerged outside of traditional channels in recent years, including the International Genetic Engineering Machine Competition (iGEM) and other international biology academic competitions, as well as online forums such as DIY biology.
2022
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Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Biotech solves everything
Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Environmental biotechnology has the potential to help mitigate pollution by using microbes and their byproducts, instead of chemical methods, to treat solid, liquid, and gaseous wastes. Plastic pollution, one of the most pressing environmental concerns, can also be addressed through biotechnology. For example, some bacterial enzymes can digest the raw material used to produce single-use bottles for beverages. Moreover, bioplastics can be produced with renewable raw materials such as plants, vegetables, and other recycled forms of waste that can be environmentally friendly alternatives to oil-based plastics.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Biotech solves everything
Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Agricultural biotechnology can be used to create genetically modified crops for combating hunger and malnutrition. Traditional biotechnology techniques such as selective breeding, hybridization, and fermentation have been modifying living plants for improved yield or enhanced nutritional value from time immemorial. However, with improvements in knowledge about the role of individual plant genes, modern biotechnology techniques can be used to add, delete, or edit specific genes to produce a desired variety, thereby reducing the possibility of off-target effects. For example, golden rice, an engineered variety of rice, contains two extra genes to make it produce beta-carotene, a precursor to Vitamin A, that can help address nutrient deficiencies that lead to blindness, anemia, and weakened immune systems among children. Scientific advances can also help develop genetically modified crops that withstand natural calamities, pests, and diseases. Such varieties can increase crop yields, lessen the need to use pesticides and insecticides, lift farmers out of poverty, and ensure food security. Beyond that, biotechnology can help produce healthier and faster-growing animals and improve the quality and quantity of milk, eggs, and meat for human consumption.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Biotech solves everything
Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Biotechnology has the potential to create novel diagnostics, vaccines, drugs, and other medical countermeasures needed to detect, prevent, and treat infectious diseases. For example, the coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the promising role that biotechnology can play in this way. Researchers around the globe are actively working to combat the pandemic. They have been using different technologies to develop cheap diagnostics, repurpose existing antivirals, discover new drugs, and create safe and effective vaccines. In addition, biotechnology can be used to create genetically engineered organisms that can be deliberately introduced into the environment for purposes such as mosquito control. As an example, advances in genome engineering technologies—such as clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and CRISPR-associated protein 9 (Cas9)—have enabled the development of gene drives, a technology that allows desired genetic alterations to spread faster through a population over many generations. This technique can be used to cure vector-borne human diseases such as malaria and dengue fever by either making mosquitoes resistant to the parasites that cause these diseases or by completely wiping out disease-carrying mosquito populations.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Panviral approaches solve
Jennifer Kahn 4-21-2020 UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism “How Scientists Could Stop the Next Pandemic Before It Starts” New York Times Magazine (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
On a cold morning in February 2018, a group of 30 microbiologists, zoologists and public-health experts from around the world met at the headquarters of the World Health Organization in Geneva. The group was established by the W.H.O. in 2015 to create a priority list of dangerous viruses — specifically, those for which no vaccines or drugs were already in development. The consensus, at least among those in the room, was that as populations and global travel continued to grow and development increasingly pushed into wild areas, it was almost inevitable that once-containable local outbreaks, like SARS or Ebola, could become global disasters.
“The meeting was in a big room, with all the tables arranged around the edge, facing each other,” one of the group’s members, Peter Daszak, recalled recently. “It was a very formal process. Each person was asked to present the case for including a particular disease on the list of top threats. And everything you say is being taken down, and checked factually, and recorded.”
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Experimentalist Governance solves
Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
3.2. Stage 1: Achieving Consensus on a General Global Governance Framework with
Open-Ended Principles
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Biosafety Extensions › Experimentalist Governance solves
Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
3. Governing Dual-Use Biotechnology Based on Experimentalist Governance Model
3.1. Experimentalist Governance Framework
2022
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Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › NATO Resilience Extensions › Solves via buzzwords
Dr Stefan Kowitz, 3-8-2021, Director MMCC/EMC https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/bundeswehr-medical-service-/a-lighthouse-project-bridging-nato-and-eu-5039060, "A lighthouse project bridging NATO and EU," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)
Brigadier, Medical Corps, Dr Stefan Kowitz answers the questions of the European Parliament on the European Medical Command, one of the first PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) Projects.
On 25 February 2021, the Director of the Multinational Medical Coordination Centre / European Medical Command (MMCC/EMC), Brigadier, Medical Corps, Dr Stefan Kowitz, briefed the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) of the European Parliament on the setup of this new multinational organisation. He explained the roots of the organisation originating from NATO and EU initiatives, for both of which Germany is the framework nation. One of the projects is the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) with the European Medical Command. PESCO is one of the most important defence initiatives of the EU. Therefore, the members of the European Parliament were interested in getting an overview on the development and progress of MMCC/EMC and on the integration of the PESCO project into MMCC/EMC. Task of MMCC/EMC is to support the medical services of NATO and the EU. The experiences made in the management of large-scale medical emergencies, the Ebola crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have shown that the interdependencies between public health protection and external and internal security are increasing.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › NATO Resilience Extensions › Solves via buzzwords
Rico Maderthoner, 4-7-2021, Commander J.G. (OF-3) Germany Navy, https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/bundeswehr-medical-service-/multinational-medical-care-nato-response-force-land-5050504, "Multinational medical care for NATO Response Force Land," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)
The Multinational Medical Coordination Centre/European Medical Command (MMCC/EMC) has been tasked with the coordination of the multinational medical contributions of the NATO Response Force Land 2022-2024.
As one of the framework nations, Germany will provide the brigade of the NRF Land in 2023 again. Altogether eight nations will participate in this major unit. The threads for the various multinational medical portions come together in Koblenz. The lead nation has tasked MMCC/EMC to head the Multinational Medical Working Group (steering element to coordinate the multinational medical forces) for the NRF brigade. The brigade constitutes the spearhead of the NRF.
2022
SDI
Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › NATO Resilience Extensions › Solves New Threats
Rico Maderthoner, 4-13-2021, Commander J.G. (OF-3) Germany Navy, https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/bundeswehr-medical-service-/multinational-workshop-on-biosensor-technology-5054550, "Multinational Workshop on Biosensor Technology," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)
Biosensors Supporting Healthcare in Missions will be the central theme of the virtual event, during which MMCC/EMC – together with the Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO (COMEDS) and international stakeholders in the fields of telehealth and biosensor technology – will combine military and civilian expertise with the latest scientific developments.
More than 80 participants from 14 nations