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2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 2 Biosafety

Synth-bio engineered pandemics are the #1 existential risk

Bryan Walsh, 5-14-2020, Axios, "The coronavirus pandemic reawakens bioweapon fears," https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-pandemic-pathogen-bioweapon-45417c86-52aa-41b1-8a99-44a6e597d3a8.html (ermo/sms, Acc 9-26-2020)

The immense human and economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic only underscores the threat posed by pathogens that could be deliberately engineered and released.

Why it matters: New technology like gene editing and DNA synthesis has made the creation of more virulent pathogens easier. Yet security and regulation efforts haven't kept pace with the science.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 2 Biosafety

Climate change threatens human extinction

C. E. Richards et al, 2/19/2021 (Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge), CLIMATIC CHANGE, Feb. 19, 2021. Retrieved Apr. 20, 2021 from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-021-02957-w

There is increasing concern that climate change poses an existential risk to humanity. Understanding these worst-case scenarios is essential for good risk management. However, our knowledge of the causal pathways through which climate change could cause societal collapse is underdeveloped. This paper aims to identify and structure an empirical evidence base of the climate change, food insecurity and societal collapse pathway. We first review the societal collapse and existential risk literature and define a set of determinants of societal collapse. We develop an original methodology, using these determinants as societal collapse proxies, to identify an empirical evidence base of climate change, food insecurity and societal collapse in contemporary society and then structure it using a novel-format causal loop diagram (CLD) defined at global scale and national granularity. The resulting evidence base varies in temporal and spatial distribution of study and in the type of data-driven methods used. The resulting CLD documents the spread of the evidence base, using line thickness and colour to depict density and type of data-driven method respectively. It enables exploration of how the effects of climate change may undermine agricultural systems and disrupt food supply, which can lead to economic shocks, socio-political instability as well as starvation, migration and conflict. Suggestions are made for future work that could build on this paper to further develop our qualitative understanding of, and quantitative complex systems modelling capabilities for analysing, the causal pathways between climate change and societal collapse. Introduction Despite recent social protests and climate emergency declarations, efforts to mitigate climate change to-date are insufficient (Ripple et al. 2019). Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue to rise and global warming above 3 °C is increasingly likely this century (Raftery et al. 2017). There is emerging evidence of amplifying feedbacks accelerating (Natali 2019) and dampening feedbacks decelerating (Walker et al. 2019). These feedbacks exacerbate the possibility of runaway global warming (Steffen et al. 2018), estimated at 8 °C or greater by 2100 (Schneider et al. 2019). Such temperature increases translate to a range of real dangers (The Center for Climate and Security 2020), shifting the narrow climate niche within which humans have resided for millennia (Xu et al. 2020). Looking beyond the framing of ‘global warming’, there is concern that the effects of climate change may pose an existential risk to humanity, one that threatens ‘societal collapse’ or even extinction (Ord 2020). Understanding these worst-case scenarios is essential for good risk management (Kunreuther et al. 2013). Improving awareness of potential pathways through which climate change poses such a risk can help inform decision-making about interventions (Shepherd et al. 2018). Considering societal impacts that are more tangible for individuals, businesses and governments (Briggs et al. 2015), and better aligned with conventional risk priorities (Wagner and Weitzman 2015), may facilitate more effective action to mitigate climate change (Weber 2006). A number of pathways through which climate change could cause societal collapse have been identified, one being via food insecurity (Gowdy 2020). Climate change is predicted to undermine agricultural systems and disrupt food supply (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF 2020), which may lead to economic shocks, socio-political instability as well as starvation, migration and conflict at local through to global scale (Rivington et al. 2015). While the climate science underpinning global warming estimates is well established (IPCC 2014), albeit subject to sensitivities, the uncertainties increase significantly when we start to consider these tangible societal impacts given the complex relationships involved (Butzer 2012). Our understanding of worst-case scenarios, and particularly of empirical evidence addressing the causal pathways through which climate change may cause societal collapse, is underdeveloped (Kemp 2020).

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 2 Biosafety

Biotech solves climate, disease, food & ecology

Ronit Langer & Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Technology and International Affairs Fellow & Technology and Society Sr. Research Analyst), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)

Before turning to the safety and security of biotechnology research and the need to balance risk mitigation with innovations in the field, it is important to understand the scope and applications of such technologies. Biotechnology, as defined by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, refers to “the application of scientific and engineering principles to the processing of materials by biological agents to provide goods and services.” Some applications of biotechnology include developing food products, biochemicals, beverages, and pharmaceuticals, as well as services like using genetically altered organisms for water purification, waste management, and sustainable resource procurement.

Scientific developments in biotechnology can offer solutions to address global challenges such as combating the spread of infectious diseases, reducing hunger, and remediating environmental degradation.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 2 Biosafety

Biotech risks extinction without experimentalist governance to secure its benefits

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

Abstract: Dual-use biotechnology faces the risks of availability, novel biological agents, knowledge, normative, and other dual-use risks. If left unchecked, these may destroy human living conditions and social order. Despite the benefits of dual-use technology, good governance is needed to mitigate its risks. The predicaments facing all governments in managing the dual-use risks of biotechnology deserve special attention. On the one hand, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology prevents the traditional self-governance model in the field of biotechnology from playing its role. On the other hand, top-down public regulation often lags behind technological iteration due to the difficulty of predicting the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology. Therefore, we argue that governance of the dual-use risks of biotechnology should avoid the traditional bottom-up or top-down modes. We suggest the governance for dual-use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed. The first stage is to achieve consensus on a broad governance framework with open-ended principles. The second stage is for countries to take action based on local conditions and the open-ended framework. The third stage is to establish a dynamic consultation mechanism for transnational information sharing and action review. The fourth and final stage is to evaluate and revise the global governance framework.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 2 Biosafety

The foresight model is key to avert biosafety dangers

Cassidy Nelson, 9-8-2021 Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford ALSO Ilker Adiguzel, Marie-Valentine Florin, Filippa Lentzos, Rickard Knutsson, Catherine Rhodes, Paul Rutten & Annika Vergin, , https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-024-2086-9_12, "Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats," SpringerLink (ermo/sms, Acc:6-25-2022)

The study of the future dates back to antiquity. Understanding what could lie ahead was of strategic importance to rulers and military leaders and was of great general interest to ancient societies and religions. While cultures developed different ways of thinking about the future that evolved over time, a historically common point of view was that there was one single predetermined future (Cuhls et al. 2012). The systematic study of different possible futures, and how these could be shaped by present actions, emerged as a new field of inquiry in the mid-twentieth century, in part due to pioneering work conducted by the Research and Development (RAND) corporation in Santa Monica, California (Kaplan et al. 1950; Helmer 1967). Since its emergence, the field of futures studies has undergone rapid expansion with the refinement of its conceptual underpinnings and development of different methodologies.

Today, futures work is undertaken by governments, militaries and scientific institutions, and other interested groups, with the aim of gaining actionable insight into possible emerging futures. In fields like synthetic biology and biotechnology that are undergoing rapid and continuous change, the ability to gain strategic insight from possible futures is highly relevant to policy development, risk assessment and threat analysis. It is particularly important to be able to identify the underlying drivers, range of uncertainty, points of convergence, and potential opportunities and challenges in these developing fields, and how these might be affected by particular policy interventions. For all of these, foresight – a process of conducting futures work – can offer strategic insight.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 2 Biosafety

Biotech NATO coop on biotech builds cascading resilience to address a wide range of risks

Mircea Geoană, 12-10-2020, Deputy Secretary General, NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_180067.htm, "Building transatlantic resilience: Why critical infrastructure is a matter of national security," NATO (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

You know, as an Alliance we face and we’ve faced and we will face many challenges, and some of them we have been dealing with for many years. Look at Russia, they continue to seek to undermine our democracy, they're expanding their military they're attempting to dominate their neighbours like Ukraine, Georgia or the Republic of Moldova. These things are not new. There's also the scourge of terrorism that continues to haunt our societies. And our mission in Afghanistan to ensure it can deliver a place which should be, you know, not becoming again a safe haven for terrorists to launch attacks on our lands, or on their neighbours is also something which is very important.

There's also things that are relatively ‘new-er’, which is the rise of China, not an adversary to NATO per se but the global actor whom we must understand, and with its rise, it brings a lot of challenges, a lot of problems, a lot of opportunities and we have to act accordingly. And of course the use of emerging technologies as instruments of disruption and instruments of power. We are speaking of geo-technology. We are in the midst of the most, one of most, intense technological races in recent history. And for the political West and for democratic societies, this is also part of a very important conversation, because maintaining the security of our vital technologies is central in a way in which we can do, not only defending our people, but also protecting everything we do from airports, to power plants to infrastructures.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 2 Biosafety

Next pandemic will exceed Covid-19, preparedness funding mitigates impact

Reuters, 12-6-2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/next-pandemic-could-be-more-lethal-than-covid-oxford-vaccine-creator-says-2021-12-06/, "Next pandemic could be more lethal than COVID, vaccine creator says," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

LONDON, Dec 6 (Reuters) - Future pandemics could be even more lethal than COVID-19 so the lessons learned from the outbreak must not be squandered and the world should ensure it is prepared for the next viral onslaught, one of the creators of the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine said.

The novel coronavirus has killed 5.26 million people across the world, according to Johns Hopkins University, wiped out trillions of dollars in economic output and turned life upside down for billions of people.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 1 NATO resilience

Long term investment is vital to NATO’s security

Julie Gerberding, 6-29-2021, co-chair of the CSIS commission and executive vice president at Merck https://www.csis.org/analysis/cepi-20-critical-inflection-point, "CEPI 2.0: A Critical Inflection Point," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)

Julie Gerberding, M.D.: I realize that, you know, it’s tempting to want to keep this in the mindset of public health, because it is a public health issue. But it’s far more than a public health issue. This has been an economic catastrophe for countries, for businesses, and for individual families. But it’s also a threat to our national security in a very direct way. When I saw the Navy ship with the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2, I realized a really important dimension of that threat, that you could take out a Navy with a respiratory pathogen. And that makes it something that is germane not just to the civilian population, but it’s germane to our force protection and our whole ability to defend our nation.

Now, that’s an extreme example. I wouldn’t use that as my leading argument. But I think we have to get ourselves into a mindset that this isn’t an outbreak. It is a threat to individuals, to businesses, to countries, and to the global order. And we need to approach it with the level of strategy, the level of investment, and the long-term sustained commitment that we do approach other threats to national security. I’m not saying put it in the Pentagon, but I’m saying that it’s a commensurate threat. And it’s significant enough that it merits the same level of intention and political support, alliances, and long-term strategic investments.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 1 NATO resilience

CBRN weapons risk extinction

Marko M. Krstic 17. Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Published in the Military Techinical Courier--Vol 65, Issue 2--a multidisciplinary scientific journal of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia. TENDENCY OF USING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES. 2017. scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0042-8469/2017/0042-84691702481K.pdf

The studies of a few cases of earlier CBRN actions have led experts to identify the key characteristics of terrorist groups that could potentially have an interest to use these weapons. It is thought that conservatism is inherent in terrorist organizations, but it must not be forgotten that some terrorists are inclined to innovations in weapons and tactics, as well as to taking risks in actions or in the choice of weapons. Many experts agree that most terrorist organizations want to use proven methods to achieve desired effects. Innovations, especially in the field of CBRN weapons, often indicate terrorists are likely to be led by other factors rather than by pure curiosity and desire to experiment. For some individuals, repression and democratic and strong rule of law are positive determinants of the emergence of CBRN actions which points to a new and more complex global security environment with an increasing risk of terrorists trying to perform a CBRN attack. It is a frightening fact that a single terrorist or isolated terrorist group could improvise a biological weapon or use other ways to spread anthrax, smallpox or other biological agents and thereby cause mass casualties and destroy the health care system of a state. CBRN weapons are secretly shipped to terrorists or hostile governments and represent a significant and growing threat to many countries. Although the threat of CBRN attacks is widely recognized as the central issue of national security, most analysts assume that the primary danger is a threat of the military use of these weapons in conventional wars with tra-ditional military means while the threat of covert attacks, which include terrorism, is rashly and unfairly neglected. Covert attacks are difficult to deter or prevent and CBRN weapons suitable for this type of attack are available to a growing number of enemy states and groups. At the same time, restrictions on their use appear to be diminishing, and so-called new terrorists do not always escalate and become apparent only by using unconventional weapons. These weapons are easily spread or transmitted from person to person, have a high mortality rate and a potential impact on public health, causing mass casualties that can crush health systems and cause public panic and social disruption, thus requiring special efforts to suppress them. When assessing the threat of CBRN weapons, we should take into account the change in capacity to carry out terrorist attacks that are on the rise among countries and non-government elements. Analysts believe that the fear of chemical and biological terrorist attacks is excessive, they point out that, in the past, very few attacks involved these weapons, and even those few attempts that have occurred were mostly thwarted by the authorities. A relative ease with which biological weapons can be obtained, along with other current changes and turbulences in the world, sets the stage for another type of warfare in the 21st century. The potential for CBRN terrorism has widely grown since 11 September, when some of these materials were used. The danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction represents a very serious threat for many countries; if a terrorist group could gain access to this weapon, it is highly likely it would use it, or threaten to use it. Although there is very little information on terrorists and their ability to come into possession of nuclear weapons or on their intentions to get them, the risk of CBRN weapons has certainly increased since the terrorists started to become more familiar with these agents and their harmful consequences. Discovering the nature of the threat of biological weapons, as well as the appropriate response to them requires an emphasis on the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. Preparing for a terrorist attack may seem daunting and there are a small number of people with practical experience and a good knowledge of CBRN weapons, because until recently there was no need to own them. In the past, most of the planning regarding emergency response to terrorism concentrated on the concerns of open attacks (bombing). However, the threats of CBRN weapons are taken seriously, especially in the USA, where media, fascinated by new weapons of mass destruction, encourage a growing fear for public safety. Terrorists who have significant human and material resources are much more likely to realize their intentions than lone perpetrators or small terrorist groups. A CBRN terrorism threat is certainly a matter of concern; however, terrorists will face many obstacles in the implementation of an attack of this kind. This includes the acquisition of materials and preparation for spreading them as well as a selection and a survey of a chosen objective and a correct dose required to achieve a desired effect. The growing threat of CBRN terrorism Terrorism can be defined as a deliberate act of violence intended to cause damage, but also to create an appropriate political and ideological situation, so that the use of these non-traditional weapons of terror outside the context is obvious, and the goals will not be military, but civilian ones (Bioterrorism, chemical weapons, and radiation terrorism, nd). Toxic substances, regardless of whether they are of animal, vegetable or mineral origin, were used throughout the history for political assassinations and sabotage; despite the risk of severe penalties, the prospects for success favoured the use of toxic substances. Such use has always been reduced, however, since only a small number of people had access to substances and possessed the ability of learn how to use them (Pascal, 1999). CBRN weapons are rightly viewed with a special sense of horror, their effects can be devastating and indiscriminating, and they take the most stringent toll among the most vulnerable population, non-combatants (e.g. a biological attack cannot be detected sufficiently fast after the disease spreads through the population). Moreover, chemical and biological weapons are a particularly attractive alternative for groups that do not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, and this risk raises complex but important ethical issues (London, 2003). The common name for CBRN terrorism which causes the death of a large number of people, large scale damage and a strong echo worldwide is post-industrial or hyper-terrorism. This means that non-state elements possess and dispose of assets that were previously held only by states, but unlike them, which often fear reprisals after WMD attacks, terrorists, having no geographical location, are ready to use WMD with much less scrupulousness and fear (Kurmnik, Ribnikar, 2003). Some authors have described the factors that make chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks in many ways unique and demanding, such as an element of surprise, invisible agents, ordnance, the risk of repetition and new types of risks (Ruggiero, Voss, 2015). In the past 30 years, the use of CBRN weapons has become a major concern for many nations around the world. The public has become insensitive to traditional terrorist attacks that seem to be a less efficient way for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. What causes shock and fear is actually presenting the properties of weapons which can be used by terrorist organizations to enhance their efforts and the effectiveness of attacks. CBRN terrorism is often a synonym for weapons of mass destruction, although this form of terrorism and related incidents do not require attacks and inflicting harm to large numbers of people - they do not even require deadly attacks at all. The number of studies on this type of terrorism is limited due to the lack of available data on this terrorism type. There is a very small number of databases of CBRN incidents, and even the existing ones have relatively little to do with them and they are compared to conventional terrorism (Jesse, 2012). Some experts emphasize the factors that promote such attacks and these factors include the availability of information and expertise, increased frustration of terrorists, demonization of the target population, as well as a millennial, apocalyptic or messianic vision. Experts also differ in opinion when it comes to possible perpetrators of CBRN incidents, and include religious fundamentalists and cults1 as possible perpetrators of such attacks, especially when these groups address to ethereal audience, emphasizing the hatred of unbelievers (Ivanova, Sandler, 2007). Concerns about super terrorism which involves the use of CBRN weapons are mainly focused on what terrorists can do in the context of our social reality, with an emphasis on terrorist motivations, initiatives and limitations. When considering which terrorist groups may be inclined to commit CBRN terrorism, it is important to recognize the spectrum of these acts, as well as to analyze the following categorization: (a) massive casualty events produced by conventional weapons; (b) CBRN scams; (c) conventional attack on a nuclear facility; (d) limited-scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; (e) large scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; and (f) CBRN strikes (super terrorism) that can lead to thousands of victims. In addition to the motivation and willingness to inflict mass casualties in any way, terrorists must have technical and financial capabilities to come into possession of material and acquire skills for these types of weapons and materials and carry out a successful attack. Chemical and biological weapons can pose a risk to terrorists thus deterring them from using such weapons (Post, 2005, pp.148-151). The possibility that terrorists use chemical or biological substances may increase over the next decade, according to US intelligence agencies. According to CIA2 , an interest among non-state actors, including terrorists, for biological and chemical materials is real and growing, and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The agency also noted that many of these groups had developed an international network and did not need to rely on state sponsors for financial and technical support. However, it is believed that it is less likely that terrorists would choose chemical and biological weapons over conventional explosives, because these weapons are difficult to control and their results are unpredictable (Condesman, Burke, 2001). The risk of CBRN weapons is growing since terrorists are better acquainted with these agents and their potential for causing harm3 . These agents possess desirable characteristics as weapons of terror; they are biologically invisible to the naked eye, odorless and potentially lethal in the form of particles; natural organisms are so readily available, and can be "camouflaged" in natural disasters and used to spread fear and various diseases. Chemical agents quickly attack the critical physiological centers of the body, disabling or killing the victim. Biological and chemical weapons require the application of huge amounts of resources and result in different effects, causing fear and panic in the contaminated areas. Often referred to as "weapons of mass destruction", but, in medical terms, they are weapons of potential mass casualties because they can lead to massive death toll in the absence of preventive measures and timely response (Meyer, Spinella, 2014, pp.645-656). "Bioterrorism is the intentional use of microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms used for hostile purposes intended to cause disease or death in man, animals and plants, on which they depend". The threat of bioterrorist attacks is real, and each individual is a potential terrorist, when terrorists are "invisible" prior to an attack which also can be "invisible" in the form of causing infectious disea-ses or epidemics. Citizens who are not aware they are infected are potential safety hazard and so-called dangerous bodies (Mijalković, 2011). In the last ten years, the issue of CBRN weapons has attracted the attention of experts, but a list of priorities by the heads of states has never been established. Biological weapons almost became forgotten after they had been banned by the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. A significant attention was paid to them during the 90s of the last century. The important thing is that biological weapons attract much less attention than other similar weapons, but probably represent the greatest danger, and in addition to their use in war, they are available as instruments of terror in peace. Some countries showed willingness to use such weapons against defenseless populations to achieve strategic objectives, and in this regard, some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 applied cyanide on their bombs (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in possession of the perpetrators). Such a group will prove to be less inefficient, because if terrorists decide to shock and surprise the government by inflicting enormous damage, CBRN weapons will become more attractive and more accessible (Bettis, 1998). Motives and forms of behavior of individuals and groups who acquired or used CBRN weapons have existed since long ago and there is no doubt that modern society is vulnerable to such attacks (Tucker, 2000). Fear of biological terrorism is certainly greater than the fear of the conventional forms of terrorism; some of these fears are justified and some are often exaggerated. Some agents are really very contagious and deadly, and if used properly, have a potential to result in casualties similar to those in a nuclear attack. Perhaps the scariest aspect of biological weapons is that the body is attacked without warning, people are afraid of the threat as it is invisible, and cannot be heard or felt. The history of warfare, terrorism and crime involving biological agents in the last century is considerably less dangerous and more deadly than the history of conventional warfare (Parachini, 2001). Today, some states and some terrorist groups can more easily overcome technological barriers due to the increased flow of information and access to previously unavailable technologies. Along with nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are part of an unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction (Davis, Johnson-Winegar, 2000, pp.15-28). The society is now faced with the threat of an apocalyptic and asymmetric war scenario in which kamikaze attackers are able to arm themselves with WMD4 without even having to have a "physical" weapon to create fear; they probably still prefer simple, proven methods: a stampede in an enclosed place, or just an explosive device, which will kill many people5 (Palmer, 2004, pp.3-9). Early detection and response to biological or chemical terrorism are crucial to solving this problem (U.S. Congress House, 2003, p.117).

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 1 NATO resilience

NATO weakness fuels Russian influence in the region causing a dynamic shift in power balance—that goes nuclear

Hans Binnendijk, 06-09-2020, (Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has served two tours on the National Security Council and as director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. He has worked on NATO issues for four decades.), “The folly of a NATO troop withdrawal decision”, Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/09/the-folly-of-a-nato-troop-withdrawal-decision/ceng

A reported decision by President Trump to remove some 9,500 American troops from Germany could undercut a half decade long effort to prevent war by enhancing NATO’s deterrent posture in the Baltic area. The prospect of a withdrawal came without warning to American commanders in Europe and has no known strategic underpinning. NATO has been clear about the Russian threat and how to counter it. During the 2018 Brussels summit, NATO leaders concluded that “Russia’s aggressive actions, including the threat and use of force to attain political goals, challenge the Alliance and are undermining Euro-Atlantic security and the rules-based international order.” NATO’s response has been to construct a deterrent posture with several thousand NATO troops forward deployed in the Baltic states and Poland as a solid trip wire and with ready reserves further back poised for quick reinforcement should the trip wire fail. This deterrent posture is already fragile. There are doubts that the NATO Response Force and other national forces are adequately ready and that the logistics infrastructure is capable of enabling the rapid forward movement of troops. To deal with this fragility, NATO adopted two initiatives on readiness and mobility to assure that reserve forces would arrive in time. All of this has been constructed to deal with what U.S. commanders in Europe have called their nightmare scenario. They fear a quick Russian land grab in the Baltic states followed by Russian propaganda, a Russian call for a cease fire, and a nuclear threat are all designed to divide NATO in time of crisis and make it impotent. If this scenario is not adequately countered, NATO leaders fear Russia might take the gamble as they have gambled in Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, and now Libya. U.S. Russian experts note that President Vladimir Putin may take risky foreign policy steps to counter the growing COVID-19 crisis in Russia. Russia just announced the forward deployment of a motorized brigade to the Western Military District bordering the Baltic States. This is not the time to remove American troops. So how would a withdrawal decision undercut NATO’s strategy to deter the nightmare scenario? The U.S. forces most likely to be cut are F-16s and support troops in Germany. They are both crucial to NATO’s reinforcement strategy. Support forces are needed for training and as part of the mobility effort to move NATO troops forward in time of crisis. American air power is needed since it is able to launch strikes quickly in support of forward forces while other ground forces, both American and European, mobilize and move forward. Without these 9,500 troops, Poland and the Baltic states will be more vulnerable, along with the American personnel that remain. But the problem goes deeper. A withdrawal would be a clear signal that Trump is not serious about defending Europe. It would undercut the very deterrent strategy that both the Obama and Trump administrations have put in place to contain an aggressive Russia. It further undermines European confidence that America has Europe’s back. European powers may think twice before extending the deployment of their now more vulnerable forward deployed troops, further reducing deterrence. Plus the flawed decision could lead to the demise of the NATO Readiness Initiative and the Mobility Initiative, both of which the United States pressed hard for and Europe has supported. If the United States undercuts the reinforcement strategy that underpins these two initiatives, why would Europe have faith in them? This decision would compound the damage done to transatlantic security by earlier Trump decisions. For example, Trump’s withdrawal from the INF mid-range nuclear agreement — rather than fixing it — now gives Russia a significant and legal nuclear advantage over NATO’s nuclear deterrent on the continent. So if that nightmare scenario takes place, NATO will be less well prepared to deal with a nuclear threat, again tempting the Kremlin to take the risk. All is not lost. Both houses of Congress have shown strong support for the NATO alliance in face of continuous Trump assaults and should pass legislation aimed at overturning such an unwise decision.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 1 NATO resilience

MMCC coop checks CBRN impacts

Stefan Kowitz,, 9-22-2021, Interviewer: Lt Gen (Rtd) Prof. Martin Bricknell, Editor-in-Chief, military-medicine.com Interviwee: Brigadier Stefan Kowitz, Director, NATO Multi-National Coordination Centre/European Union Medical Command https://military-medicine.com/article/4191-the-nato-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-interview-with-brigadier-stefan-kowitz.html, "The NATO response to the COVID-19 pandemic – Interview with Brigadier Stefan Kowitz," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)

During the COVID pandemic, the current role of MMCC/EMC has been to use lessons identified for its future work to support military medical collaboration and coordination across our participating nations, NATO and the EU.

Our Telehealth Workshop in May 2021 is an excellent example. Telehealth has been a game-changer during the COVID pandemic, and the use of telehealth has increased in different areas of medical support. Telehealth provides significant means to measure the health of our soldiers and to improve the outcome of their medical treatment. COVID has been a trigger for transformation in telemedicine and telehealth. A follow-on Biosensor and Telehealth Workshop is planned in June 2022

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 1 NATO resilience

NTT’s increase security dangers from Russia & China – will control all future wars – NATO key

Jim Townsend, 10-14-2020, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy and an adjunct senior fellow in the CNAS Transatlantic Security Program and Anca Agachi assistant director with the Foresight, Strategy and Risks (FSR) Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/build-resilience-for-an-era-of-shocks/, "Build resilience for an era of shocks," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)

The novel coronavirus is one of the most formative events of the twenty-first century. Despite warnings about pandemics from public health and intelligence officials, the world was caught off guard by COVID19. Though they had experience containing MERS and SARS, scientists and doctors had to learn about COVID-19 while trying to control it. Further, governments across the globe were forced to make impossible decisions between saving lives and saving economies.

Unfortunately, threats like COVID-19 might be a blueprint of the future. A rise in environmentally destabilizing human activity and extreme economic inequality, coupled with patchy investments in social safety nets and frail governance, have degraded human security conditions around the world. This combustible combination will likely result in a rise in non-traditional security threats. By definition, these threats are transnational, impacting entire regions or continents; systemic, resulting from an accumulation of widespread permissive and causal factors; and outside the realm of traditional military concepts and operations, in that they are normally associated with development issues. Non-traditional security threats include climate change, irregular migration, resource scarcity, criminality, and of course pandemics. Their pattern is similar: in the shortterm, they lead to loss of life in catastrophic events; however, more perniciously, they undermine societal functioning and therefore weaken deterrence capabilities in the long-term. In light of this trend, COVID-19 might be just the canary in the coal mine.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 1 NATO resilience

Resilience solves all impacts

Jim Townsend, 10-14-2020, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy and an adjunct senior fellow in the CNAS Transatlantic Security Program and Anca Agachi assistant director with the Foresight, Strategy and Risks (FSR) Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/build-resilience-for-an-era-of-shocks/, "Build resilience for an era of shocks," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)

This shift in the Alliance’s culture and architecture would yield several benefits. First, by adding an adequately resourced fourth core task focused on resilience, NATO could effectively conceptualize how to address non-traditional security threats, and do so in time to prevent and mitigate future COVID-like scenarios. Threats like climate change are a certainty; the only unknown is the level of damage they will cause. This variable depends on current efforts to adapt and bolster allies’ resilience, a capacity thus far underutilized at NATO headquarters.12 By starting now and using an improved and expanded resilience framework, NATO will be better prepared for and better able to bounce “forward” from future non-traditional threats.

Second, improving resilience is essential across the entire threat spectrum and reinforces traditional defense and deterrence.13 Proactive investments in community resilience are helpful not only in preventing non-traditional threats, but also in ensuring societal and state continuity and resistance in the case of an armed attack. Such measures can also serve to deter aggression by convincing adversaries their plans will not have the desired impact. In this new security environment, civilian and military components are intrinsically connected. As an ETH Zurich report notes, “solutions that mix military and non-military elements,” and cooperation across silos are necessary to achieve a “whole-of-society approach to security.”14

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 1 NATO resilience

Plan enables effective NATO resilience via publicity and battlefield readiness

Jamie Shea, 4-1-2020, Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe and former DASG-ESC Deputy Assistant Secretary General for emerging security challenges at NATO, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/never-waste-a-good-crisis-are-pandemics-natos-new-security-challenge/, "Never waste a good crisis: are pandemics NATO’s new security challenge?," Friends of Europe (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

Rahm Emmanuel, the former chief of staff to President Obama and mayor of Chicago, was fond of telling his boss that he should “never let a good crisis go to waste”. The word “crisis” in Chinese also translates as opportunity. The international institutions that will emerge successfully from the current COVID-19 crisis will not only be those that act swiftly and usefully, but also which use the crisis to adapt their missions and their business models.

So far NATO is indeed having a good crisis, which may seem surprising as the alliance has never referred to pandemics in its list of emerging security challenges nor the various strategic concepts that it has developed since the end of the Cold War. New threats for NATO have been more in the realms of cyber-attacks, energy cut-offs, terrorism and state-driven hybrid campaigns. NATO’s forte has always been to focus on the man-made, human-driven threats to the future of humanity rather than those originating from natural causes.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Advantage 1 NATO resilience

Multinational Medical Coordination Centre / European Medical Command (MMCC/EMC ) capacity is key to surge against future pandemics, but vaccine response needs to move from just-in-time focus to long term planning

Rico Maderthoner, 11-21-2021, Commander J.G. (OF-3) Germany Navy, https://military-medicine.com/article/4175-m3-eps-a-surge-capacity-concept-for-pandemics-crises.html, "M3-EPS: A Surge Capacity Concept for Pandemics and Crises," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)

In late 2019, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 was first identified and has since led to the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. This pandemic has highlighted the lack of rapidly deployable reinforcement elements and systems as well as the benefits of stockpiles of medical equipment. A differentiation must be made between non-expendable medical supplies (i.e. medical devices1) and individually issued expendable medical supplies. The need for both expendable and non-expendable medical supplies could not be sufficiently satisfied in all areas as manufacturing nowadays is based on just-in-time practices without contingency stockpiling.

Production losses and market contractions as well as the concentration of production facilities in countries outside of Europe have in recent years frequently led to supply shortages across Europe for various drugs (including antibiotics, cytostatic agents, and vaccines). What is more, the pressure to reduce costs has in recent years led to a considerable reduction in civilian and military stockpiles of medical materials, including non-expendable medical supplies, in favour of just-in-time production.

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Solvency

NATO vaccine cooperation is vital to resilience – this approach avoids trade offs with other parts of the core mission

Giovanna De Maio 2020 visiting fellow at GWU George Washington University, former visiting fellow Center for the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201028_nato_covid_demaio-1.pdf, "," Brookings Institution (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)

So far, NATO has set up a Lessons Learned Steering Group (LLSG)66 on COVID-19, which collects inputs by agencies, divisions, and delegations to help the alliance design a strategy for both future waves of this coronavirus and for future pandemics. Stemming from the inputs of the LLSG and from the reflections of officials interviewed for this paper, the following recommendations to the alliance focus on resilience and readiness in crisis management.

● Resilience: NATO must remain vigilant against malign exploitation of crises. Under whatever circumstances may arise, the Atlantic alliance should not shift its focus away from its main objectives of pushing back against adversaries through deterrence and response-readiness.67

2022 SDI Affirmative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff › Case › Solvency

The plan builds NATO resilience to contain all global threats – Article 3 and current agencies prove they say yes

Jaclyn Levy, 6-10-2021, Millennium Leadership Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the director of public policy at the Infectious Diseases Society of America https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-best-defense-why-nato-should-invest-in-resilience/, "The best defense: Why NATO should invest in resilience," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)

The COVID-19 pandemic has magnified not only the successes and failures of the world’s health systems but also the importance of multilateral partnerships in biosecurity. Preparing for the next pandemic will require adaptation, interconnectivity, and resilience—the capacity to resist and recover quickly from major infrastructure shocks. Intergovernmental alliances like NATO can play a critical role in the relationship- and capacity-building necessary for a healthy global biosecurity sphere, which ensures a more secure world.

There are many lessons from the last fifteen months, but among them is a time-honored proverb: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Many public-health and security crises are a product of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, but an expanded focus on resilience in developing a global security strategy can prevent the next crisis. Responding to emergencies such as pandemics is far more expensive than preventing them and creates additional costs such as strained political cohesion and waning support for public institutions. Policies emphasizing resilience should fundamentally aim to minimize damage, restore stability quickly, and generate improved strategies for similar issues. To this end, there are several steps NATO can take to build a preventive, resilience-based approach to emerging global challenges.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ptx

Domestic pushback to plan guts US leadership – turns case

T.J. Pempel 6-15-2022, Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

I want to turn back to the question of how this Ukraine-Russia interaction plays out in terms of state strategies vis-a-vis economics. We’ve seen a lot of economic cooperation, but at the heart of some of the questions you’ve been asking is this notion that nation-states are going to be predisposed to look for national economic security, which will mean developing a capacity for relative strength—independent strength—vis a vis global changes. The difficulty is that most states can’t do this, and there’s a strong impulse toward economic cooperation along the technological gradient that will allow states to make up for their potential deficiencies. We’ve talked at this conference about semiconductors and it seems pretty clear that no state, even if it does make major moves in that direction, is going to be capable of complete autarky in a whole host of these high-tech areas.

The second piece of this relates to domestic politics in the U.S. What we’re seeing in the United States is a growing resistance on the part of segments of the Republican Party to the development of international support for Ukraine. We’re seeing resistance to U.S. aid for the military, and we’re seeing much broader isolationism that goes back to the MAGA mentality. This has a ripple effect in terms of how other states will perceive their capacity to rely on the United States economically. The idea of the U.S. as a reliable economic and security partner is very much at risk.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › No Middle East War

No Mid East escalation

Imran 19 – Myra, writer for The News International. Citing the international seminar on “Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East”. “Seminar on ‘Strategic dimensions of peace and conflict in South Asia, Middle East’”, The News, , 02-06-2019

Islamabad : There is a need to study the causes of proxy wars, and what are the potential impacts of such wars on the overall conflict. These thoughts in a daylong international seminar on ‘Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East,’ organised by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank, participated by prominent national and international scholars.

Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Deakin University, Australia, argued there is significant gap in the literature on non-state actors. He called for empirical research, along with concrete policy suggestions, on the topic, so as to mitigate the conflicts in the region, in particular South Asia and Middle East.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Russia Won’t Retaliate

Russia badly weakened by Ukraine war

ISA, 6-24-2022, Institute for Strategic Analysis (in Azeri: Strateji Təhlil İnstitutu) http://strati.az/news/3727.html, "Russia’s Perceptional Loss Of Global Stature Post-Ukraine Invasion," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

Summing-up Russia’s military losses in its Ukraine Invasion it is starkly evident that Russian overwhelming conventional military power has been militarily ineffective, Russian Army’s military prowess resting on massed use of firepower is questionable and so also is questionable the ‘fighting will’ of Russian Army.

Economically, Russia’s economic strength and resilience stands emasculated by US & Western sanctions applied post-Ukraine Invasion. Russian economy will be more strangled by Western sanctions if Russian President Putin persists in ‘Turning Defeat into Victory’.