2022
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Thumpers
George Allison, 6-27-2022, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/nato-increases-high-alert-force-from-40000-to-300000-troops/, "NATO increases high alert force from 40,000 to 300,000 troops," UK Defence Journal (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)
The Ukrainian government and people continue to resist Russia’s brutal war of aggression. Their courage and commitment are an inspiration. And I welcome that President Zelenskyy will join us at the NATO Summit. NATO and Allies have provided substantial support to Ukraine since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Including with military and financial aid. And training for tens of thousands of Ukrainian forces. All of this is making a difference on the battlefield every day. And since the invasion in February, Allies have stepped up even more. With billions of euros’ worth of military, financial, and humanitarian assistance. At the Summit, we will agree a strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. This will include substantial deliveries of support. In areas like secure communications, anti-drone systems, and fuel. Over the longer term, we will help Ukraine transition from Soviet-era military equipment, to modern NATO equipment. And further strengthen its defence and security institutions. At the Summit, we will also take decisions to continue adapting NATO.”
2022
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Thumpers
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the West has imposed stinging sanctions, disrupting the Russian economy and forcing the Kremlin to burn through its financial reserves. Major Russian banks have been disconnected from SWIFT, the international system that facilitates financial transactions, while some oligarchs have been sanctioned. Many allies and partners have provided massive financial and material aid—in the form of funding, as well as anti-tank and air-defense systems and other military equipment—to bolster Ukrainian resistance. This assistance has helped to stiffen an already stout Ukrainian defense, which has inflicted heavy losses on the Russian military. Vladimir Putin now faces the real possibility of a stalled offensive, or even outright defeat.
2022
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Thumpers
Alexander Korolev, 2-24-2022, U-NSW Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the theory of strategic alignments with special reference to the China-Russia alignment. https://iai.tv/articles/only-neutrality-can-save-the-geopolitical-deadlock-auid-2140, "," IAI TV - Changing how the world thinks (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Finally, the expansion of NATO into Sweden and Finland has poignantly demonstrated that despite the war, Ukraine remains a third-rank citizen in the West. Sweden and Finland were warmly welcomed by NATO even before they formally applied. Ukraine, in turn, despite all its efforts to join NATO, was designated by Boris Johnson on 6 March 2022 as the country that “had no serious prospects of NATO membership in the near future.” This was echoed, on 11 March 2022, by Josep Borrell, who reflectively admitted with regards to Ukraine’s NATO membership that “it’s a mistake to make promises that you can’t keep.”
The limits of the West’s support of Ukraine are crystal clear to Putin and the rest of the world. Regardless of what Russia does in Ukraine, there will be no NATO membership and no collective security guarantees for Ukraine. Moreover, this round of NATO expansion brings the “enemy” to the gate of Russia and corroborates Putin’s besieged-fortress ideology. Thus, Putin has managed to create the world he has been warning Russians and Russia’s allies about: the West is indeed fully out to encircle Russia. This self-fulfilling prophecy shores up Putin’s rhetoric within Russia and signals to China that the West does pose a danger to Russia and is more interested in harming Russia’s geopolitical interests than helping Ukraine. This recognition strengthens China-Russia alignment which will further buttress Russia’s capacity to carry on in Ukraine.
2022
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Thumpers
RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, 6-19-2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-syevyerodonetsk-belarus-arms-nato-putin-zelenskiy/31901661.html, "NATO Says Ukraine Fighting Could Last Years As Russians Pound Eastern Cities," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
NATO's secretary-general has warned that the war in Ukraine could go on for years and urged the supply of state-of-the-art weapons to Kyiv even if "costs are high," as Ukraine's allies sought to preempt any international "fatigue" nearly four months into Russia's unprovoked invasion.
The cautions came as Russia stepped up its offensives against Syevyerodonetsk and other eastern Ukrainian cities, and with the European Union readying for a recommendation next week to make Ukraine a candidate to join the bloc.
2022
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › Middle East Mod
Lantier 19, PhD @ Geneva (Alex, “Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria,” )
The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War.
2022
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › Middle East Mod
Arman Mahmoudian, 6-3-2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/03-06-2022/, "Russia-Ukraine war: Implications for the RSII coalition," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Since the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, speculation over the cost of this war for Moscow has been the topic of discussion among experts and scholars. The financial losses in the aftermath of Western sanctions, diplomatic isolation, military personnel casualties, and the severe damages to Russia’s war machine were the main objects of speculation. As the Russo-Ukrainian War escalated, so did the complexity of its dimensions. However, the long-term implications of the war for Russia appear to be even more perplexing. The complexity of these implications was heightened when, in mid-March 2022, several media outlets reported that Russia started to withdraw some of its troops from Syria, while also drawing thousands of fighters from the Syrian army and allied militias[1] to bolster the military operation in Ukraine and step up its offensive in the east of the country. Immediately after, Middle Eastern media outlets claimed that Iran would fill the vacuum of power created by the Russian withdrawal by increasing the presence of its troops and Shia militants in Syria.[2] This could shift the balance of influence in Syria in favor of Tehran.
Russia’s military operation in Ukraine has already started to affect Syria, so one might ask what the implications of Russia’s war in Ukraine would be for the Russia-Syria-Iran-Iraq (RSII) security coalition. This is a coalition that the Kremlin has been building in the Middle East with the help of Iran and its Shia allies. The Russo-Shia cooperation reached its peak in 2015, when the RSII security coalition, with two headquarters in Baghdad and Damascus, was officially formed.[3] The RSII coalition, since its formation, has been holding annual meetings in Baghdad to exchange intel and discuss recent regional developments, the last of which was held on February 25th, the day after Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.[4] However, since then, many things have changed. Russia’s recent gradual withdrawal from Syria, and the fact that the war in Ukraine might not result in Moscow’s favor, indicates that the Kremlin might have to shift its attention to deal with the growing escalation with NATO. Thus, it is very likely that Russia’s policy toward the Middle East and the RSII will change. In this context, Russia might choose to escalate tensions in the Middle East by sending Iran new advanced weapons that could potentially alter the balance of power in the region, or it might encourage Syria’s Assad to launch a new offensive against Turkish-backed rebels in the north or the US-backed SDF. Russia might find further escalation in the Middle East beneficial since it can force the West to divert its attention from Ukraine to the Middle East. Thus, it is vital to understand the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for the RSII coalition. To do so, we must first analyze the implications of the war individually for each member and then for the coalition as a whole.
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › Plan A Mod
Ellen Ioanes and Dave Mosher, 01-23-2020, (Ellen Ioanes is the Military & Defense Editorial Fellow at INSIDER. She is a graduate of Columbia Journalism School and Davidson College. Her work appears in the Guardian, the Center for Public Integrity, the Daily Dot, HuffPost India, and more. Dave Mosher reports news and features stories about science and technology, with human and robotic spaceflight as the primary focus of his 15-year multimedia journalism career.), “A terrifying new animation shows how 1 'tactical' nuclear weapon could trigger a US-Russia war that kills 34 million people in 5 hours”, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/tactical-nuclear-weapons-escalation-us-russia-war-animated-strike-map-2019-9/ceng
More than 91 million people in Russia, the US, and NATO-allied countries might be killed or injured within three hours following a single "nuclear warning shot," according to a terrifying new simulation. The simulation is called "Plan A," and it's an audio-visual piece that was first posted to to YouTube on September 6. (You can watch the full video at the end of this story.) Researchers at the Science and Global Security lab at Princeton University created the animation, which shows how a battle between Russia and NATO allies that uses so-called low-yield or "tactical" nuclear weapons — which can pack a blast equivalent to those the US used to destroy Hiroshima or Nagasaki in World War II — might feasibly and quickly snowball into a global nuclear war. "This project is motivated by the need to highlight the potentially catastrophic consequences of current US and Russian nuclear war plans. The risk of nuclear war has increased dramatically in the past two years," the project states on its website. The video has an ominous, droning soundtrack and a digital map design straight out of the 1983 movie "WarGames." The Cold War-era movie, in which a young Matthew Broderick accidentally triggers a nuclear war, "was exactly the reference point," simulation designer Alex Wellerstein told Insider. But while simulations can be frightening, they can also be incredibly helpful: governments can use them to develop contingency plans to respond to nuclear disasters and attacks in the least escalatory way, and they can also help ordinary citizens learn how to survive a nuclear attack. "Plan A" comes as tensions between Russia and NATO allies ratchet up. Both Russia and the US are testing weapons previously banned under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, often called INF. Russian bombers have also cruised into US airspace repeatedly, and the US recently sent its B-2 Spirit stealth bomber on a mission in the Arctic — right in Russia's backyard. This is how a NATO-Russian confrontation could quickly escalate into nuclear war. The simulation starts with a conventional war between NATO and Russian troops. Conventional warfare — namely all conflict short of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons — escalates into nuclear warfare when Russia launches a nuclear "warning shot" from a base near Kaliningrad to stop NATO advancement. Russia doesn't have a "no first use" policy — it dropped it in 1993. NATO forces respond by launching a tactical nuclear strike. The US already has tactical nuclear weapons, such as B61-12 gravity bombs, and more planned under US President Donald Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Included in the plan is a low-yield warhead intended for use in a submarine-launched ballistic missile, as well as a sea-launched cruise missile. These kinds of weapons are designed for targets on the battlefield, like troops or munitions supplies, as opposed to long- or intermediate-range nuclear missiles that are fired from one country to another, for example, targeting an enemy's bombers and ICBM silos — or even cities. Tactical nuclear strikes up the ante. If the nuclear threshold is crossed, the simulation finds, then both the US and Russia would respond with tactical nuclear weapons. Russia would send 300 warheads to NATO targets, including advancing troops, in both aircraft and short-range missiles — overwhelming force that would obliterate tanks, fortified positions and soldiers unlike anything ever seen in battle before. Supporting forces and civilians not immediately killed would be susceptible to painful and even fatal radiation exposure. NATO would respond by sending about 180 tactical nuclear weapons to Russia via aircraft in equally devastating retaliation. The simulation was constructed using independent analysis of nuclear force postures in NATO countries and Russia, including the availability of nuclear weapons, their yields, and possible targets, according to the Science and Global Security lab. The tactical phase of the simulation shows about 2.6 million casualties over three hours. Instead of the tactical weapons de-escalating the conflict, as proponents claim they would, the simulation shows conflict spiraling out of control after the use of tactical weapons. Russia's tactical weapons would destroy much of Europe, the simulation posits. In response, NATO would launch submarine- and US-based strategic nuclear weapons toward Russia's nuclear arsenals — 600 warheads in total. Strategic nuclear weapons have a longer range, so Russia, knowing that NATO nukes are headed for its weapons cache, would throw all its weight behind missiles launched from silos, mobile launchers, and submarines. The casualties during this phase would be 3.4 million in 45 minutes. This leads to 85.3 million additional casualties in the final phase of the nuclear war simulation. In the wake of previous attacks, both Russia and NATO would launch warheads toward each other's 30 most populous cities in the final stage of of the scenario, using five to 10 warheads for each city depending on its size. This phase would cause 85.3 million casualties — both deaths and injuries. But the total casualty count from the entire battle (of less than 5 hours) would be 34.1 million deaths and 57.4 million injuries, or a combined 91.3 million casualties overall. But that's just the immediate conflict: The entire world would be affected by nuclear disaster in the months, years, and decades to come. The radioactive fallout from the nuclear disaster would cause additional deaths and injuries. Studies also suggest that, even with a limited nuclear engagement, Earth's atmosphere would cool dramatically, driving famine, refugee crises, additional conflicts, and more deaths.
2022
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › A2 Ukraine Turns
Laxman Kumar Behera 6-15-2022, Research Fellow at IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)
This war has many implications for India’s strategic posture. Ideally, India would have liked a normal relationship between Russia and the West. The war has created a lot of economic difficulties, particularly through the hike in oil prices and through its cascading impact on general inflation, and this is a big concern for the government which is going to face the general election in the two years’ time. The government is taking it very seriously and is trying to contain the inflation through subsidies, but obviously it has implications on the fiscal balance.
The second implication is on India’s defense preparedness, which has been affected in two ways. One is through sanctions. There are sanctions on Russian banks, and so the Indian government has difficulty in paying for Russian defense supplies.
2022
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › A2 Ukraine Turns
Arman Mahmoudian, 6-3-2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/03-06-2022/, "Russia-Ukraine war: Implications for the RSII coalition," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
On a regional level, the second Russo-Ukrainian war could potentially be an opportunity for Tehran. The war could create a rift between Russia and Israel, despite Israel’s efforts to remain seated on the fence. However, the increasing number of Ukrainian Jews fleeing to Israel has put Israeli officials in an uncomfortable position, driving many of them to take a stand against Russia, including Israel’s Foreign Minister, Arie Lapid, who condemned Russia’s aggression in Ukraine saying that the Kremlin’s decision had no “justification” and that “the ground [of Ukraine] is soaked with the blood of innocent civilians.”[12] Russia promptly responded to Lapid’s comment by summoning Israel’s ambassador and accusing Israel of using the war in Ukraine to “distract” international attention from the Palestinian issue.[13]
If the current Russo-Israeli conflict escalates further, Iran might find itself in an advantageous position with regard to the future of its military cooperation with Russia, especially since Israel, prior to these events, always played a central role in Moscow’s considerations when it came to arms deals with Iran. Prior to the Russo-Ukrainian war, at the request of Israel, Russia refrained, multiple times, from suppling Iran with offensive weapons that could disrupt the balance of power between Iran and Israel.[14] But now that events in Ukraine have shaken Russo-Israeli relations, it would be reasonable for Iran to hope that Russia has liberated itself from the “Israeli factor” with regard to Russo-Persian arms deals.
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › A2 Ukraine Turns
IDN, 6-23-2022, InDepthNews offers news analyses and viewpoints on topics that impact the world and its peoples. IDN-InDepthNews serves as flagship of the International Press Syndicate Group, partner of the Global Cooperation Council. https://www.eurasiareview.com/23062022-theres-no-need-for-war-with-russia-oped/, "There’s No Need For War With Russia – OpEd," Eurasia Review (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Now the West is supporting an unnecessary war, playing with fire as it builds up Ukrainian firepower, a country whose leadership, if it finds itself losing badly, would probably have no qualms about using NATO weapons to fire into Russia, thus provoking a Russian attack on nearby NATO members. That could lead to a Third World War. To his credit, Biden would not tolerate such a Ukrainian offensive.
If only Zelensky had said in the days leading up to the Russian invasion, “Ukraine has no attention of applying for NATO membership”— 9 words—which in fact is the de facto position of NATO—there would have been no Russian invasion. By his refusal to do this he has created a situation where parts of whole towns have been destroyed—in the case of Mariupol, totally destroyed. Ukraine has no money to rebuild its country, and it should be aware of the likelihood that the West will never give it anything like the full amount of what it will need.
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › Ukraine Lashout Mod
Philip Wasielewski, 6-9-2022, Templeton Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/06/the-evolving-political-military-aims-in-the-war-in-ukraine-after-100-days/, "The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › Ukraine Lashout Mod
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Transitioning the conflict in Ukraine into a frozen conflict lasting years, as has been done in the Donbas since 2014, may be Putin’s best option now. A resolute Ukrainian government and highly motivated Ukrainian forces will continue to fight to reassert sovereignty over the national territory. Continued Western support will enable Ukrainian forces to grow stronger, though it may not be possible to retake the areas newly controlled by Russia without more armor and combat aircraft. In this scenario, Putin will have to consider more extreme and high-risk strategies to stave off defeat, prevent economic collapse, divert public opinion, and stay in power. Even more than success in Ukraine, regime survival will become the overriding priority.
With this in mind, what escalatory options could Putin choose?
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › Ukraine Lashout Mod
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Further cutting lines of communications and supply. At the operational level, Russian commanders in this phase will be seized with the importance of cutting ground lines of communication in western Ukraine used to resupply Ukrainian forces and keep the war going. Surprisingly effective Ukrainian air defense has inflicted heavy losses on Russian aircraft, which often launch their weapons from Belarus or Russian airspace. Aerial and missile fires can be employed against fixed sites like storage or transshipment points, but, at present, the Russian army does not have a strong ground presence in western Ukraine. Instead, more highly trained special-operations units may be used to interdict ground convoys. As the campaign unfolds, sustained foreign assistance will mount in importance. As Russian desperation increases, Putin will attempt to signal that continued use of Polish and Romanian territory to supply Ukraine will have drastic consequences. Painful cyberattacks, covert and deniable intelligence operations, and other hybrid methods may be used for this purpose, including in the United States. In this phase, Putin will not order direct attacks on neighboring NATO countries for fear of bringing the Alliance into the war.
Raising the specter of nuclear attack. As the crisis worsens for Russia, the role of nuclear weapons will loom larger. In this phase of escalation, more strident threats to employ them will be accompanied by the overt display of tactical and strategic systems, publicized “drills,” repositioning of nuclear systems, and other activities intended to frighten and intimidate. Use of primitive chemical agents like chlorine will become more likely if campaign success eludes Russian forces. A demonstration or “test” using a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon in a remote area near the Ukrainian border could occur to add weight to these threats. Russian journalists, academics, and retired military and intelligence officers with contacts in the West will be enlisted to convey a determination to escalate further, if necessary, though such measures will carry extreme risk.
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MSDI Russia DA › Impacts › Prediction K of the aff
Mohammed Cherkaoui, 6-26-2022, GMU professor of Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy at George Mason University in Washington and Joaan Bin Jassim Academy for Defence Studies in Doha. https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/russia-nato-four-political-variants-under-review, "Russia-NATO: Four Political Variants under Review," Al Jazeera Center for Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
The aftermath of the Ukraine war, as a protracted complex conflict, has revealed how the Russia-West geopolitical rivalry has entered uncharted territories with an asymmetrical war and unparallel weaponry: hard power versus sanctions and other tools of political economy, or sticky power. It seems to be a misguided venture of power dynamics: bullets and rockets versus economic and financial warfare, perpetuating a long hurting stalemate for all stakeholders. This paper addresses how the standoff between Putin's Russia and Western powers may amount to a new geopolitical paradigm shift and raises questions about the validity of certain conceptual frameworks: the renewal of ‘the Cold War’, the imposition of a ‘New World Order’, and the (im)balance of an assumed ‘Balance of Power’. These post-World War II mechanics of Détente were prolonged, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, into the 21st century. The ‘post’ prefix endures the challenge of forecasting what would come after a three-decade prolongation of several concepts ushering to several unknowns of the Ukraine war postgame.
The ongoing dilemma of economic wars, besides the struggling armed confrontation inside Ukraine since 24 February 2022, has implied the need for a tabula-rasa re-conceptualisation of alternative frameworks in international relations. Moreover, another puzzle has emerged: is it a ‘sixth-generation war’ if we consider the disparity of weapons: Russia’s hard power and military tools versus the West’s sanctions and other restrictions of the political economy and dominance of sticky power? The question of a possible sixth-generation war builds on the differences of the fifth-generation warfare (5GW), which is conducted primarily through non-kinetic-military action, such as social engineering, misinformation, cyberattacks, along with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and fully autonomous systems. (1)
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MSDI Russia DA › Links › Link Magnifier –Strategic Concept
Atlantic Council, 6-16-2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/visualizing-the-nato-strategic-concept/, "Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance's future," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
At the upcoming NATO Summit in Madrid, the Alliance’s attention will be on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked and illegal war is transforming how the Euro-Atlantic—not to mention global—community views its security environment. The war is having a profound effect on NATO’s strategy, which is due for a refresh at the summit with Alliance members set to agree on their new Strategic Concept—a critical document that will guide NATO’s political and military development for the foreseeable future
Yet even before the invasion, NATO faced a dramatically changing security landscape. The systemic challenge from China, the existential threat of climate change, the emergence of disruptive technologies, the use of cyberattacks as a core instrument of power, supply-chain problems, democratic backsliding among allies and partners, questions about adequate defense investment, and more all combine to present a complex and unsettling future for the Alliance.
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MSDI Russia DA › Links › Strategy Link
Alexander Korolev, 2-24-2022, U-NSW Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the theory of strategic alignments with special reference to the China-Russia alignment. https://iai.tv/articles/only-neutrality-can-save-the-geopolitical-deadlock-auid-2140, "," IAI TV - Changing how the world thinks (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
These are immediate implications of the West’s response to the Ukraine war. In the long run, economic sanctions, support for the Ukrainian military, and NATO expansion might eventually drag Putin down. But the opposite scenario might also be true. The Western unity might fail to sustain the stress-testing of the war. The sanctions are costly for Russia, but so they are for Europe. The European population might grow tired of skyrocketing fuel prices, which undermine the competitiveness of Europe’s industries, and the impending food crisis, which will affect large swathes of the population. A new generation of politicians might come to power and start reconsidering their relations with Russia and NATO. In any scenario, the conflict seems to have passed the point of no return and morphed into a long-term open confrontation between Russia and the West, when both sides are more interested in prevailing in the ongoing Ukraine crisis than in preventing it, which is detrimental for Ukraine as an independent state.
In a geopolitical deadlock like this, the only workable proposal that both Russia and the West could accept without looking like a losing side should have explicit humanitarian grounds – a common denominator for negotiations. In other words, the goal of saving lives in Ukraine should explicitly prevail over the geopolitical logic of weakening Russia. The West should work with Kyiv and Moscow to broker an internationally-guaranteed neutrality status for Ukraine. Such an agreement must go beyond just Moscow and Kyiv and involve multiple stakeholders including the United States, some of its European allies, and also China – a de facto ally of Russia. The key to success is to institutionalise the agreement by making it nested in the existing networks of multilateral security agreements, which will make breaking the agreement by either Russia or Ukraine more difficult.
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MSDI Russia DA › Links › Navy Link
Murad Jandali, 6-28-2022 Al-Estiklal Staffwriter https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/14082/will-kaliningrad-ignite-the-spark-of-confrontation-between-nato-and-russia, "Will Kaliningrad Ignite the Spark of Confrontation Between NATO and Russia?," Al-Estiklal Newspaper (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Kaliningrad is located between Lithuania and Poland, on the southern coast of the Baltic Sea, and the exclave receives many supplies via trains that pass from Lithuania and Belarus.
However, Moscow can still supply it by sea without being subject to EU sanctions.
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MSDI Russia DA › Links › AI + Cyber link
Wayne Schroeder , 6-16-2022, nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for resource planning and management. Atlantic Councilhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/visualizing-the-nato-strategic-concept/, "Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance's future," (ermo/sms, Acc:7-2-2022)
Moscow’s war against Ukraine has altered the European security environment. As allies reorient NATO’s focus back toward collective defense in the Strategic Concept, it is time for the Alliance to get serious about defense spending and move the discussion beyond rhetoric and toward measurable contributions to defense and deterrence. As this graphic indicates, though a number of allies already spend above 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, if all allies were to meet or exceed the pledge (agreed to in 2014), they would have nearly one hundred billion dollars more to invest where it’s needed most: readiness, capabilities, and capacity. Not to mention what Finland and Sweden can bring to the Alliance.
Readiness
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MSDI Russia DA › Links › Cyber Links
Paul Gebhard 6-16-2022, nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a vice president at the Cohen Group in Washington, DC, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/visualizing-the-nato-strategic-concept/, "Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance's future," (ermo/sms, Acc:7-2-2022)
It is a common saying among cyber practitioners that there are two types of victims: “those who know that they have been hacked and those who have, but don’t know it yet.” Attribution of an attack through cyberspace requires technical information and the willingness to name names. Attribution can be tricky, though it happens with increasing frequency in hints and outright statements from governments as well as a sea of claims from private sector firms. To establish attribution, analysts might try to determine if the cyberattack looks like—or originated from similar places in cyberspace—as attacks on other targets, if the software program used in the attack shares similarities with others, or even the language and time zone of the program (as simple as that may sound).
While government attribution against other states is more common now than even five years ago, it is still seen as a significant action in part because of the political will necessary to publicly decry offending states. This map identifies the NATO governments that have attributed an incident of cyber espionage and reconnaissance to Russia. As can be seen, the majority of NATO governments have publicly attributed cyber operations targeting sensitive official files and government personnel to Russia in recent years. In particular, the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland have all reported breaches, and in some cases a multitude of them. Russia’s continued efforts to spy on the computer networks and classified systems of NATO governments, even when revealed in public, would suggest that the Kremlin is impervious to “naming and shaming” for these activities in cyberspace.
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MSDI Russia DA › Links › Cyber Links
Michael John Williams, 6-16-2022, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and director of the international relations program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Natalie Petit is a graduate student in international relations at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/visualizing-the-nato-strategic-concept/, "Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance's future," (ermo/sms, Acc:7-2-2022)
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has helped to sharpen the focus on the threat posed by the Kremlin, but it is not the only security challenge confronting NATO. To discern the diversity of allied threat perceptions and how the next Strategic Concept should address them, we studied the security strategies (produced before Russia’s war in Ukraine) from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United States, and the United Kingdom to see what the word count in each strategy might say about each country’s perceived greatest threats (e.g. words like China and cyber) as well its priorities (e.g. words like Europe/European and NATO).
Geographical concerns abound with Poland rather focused on Russia, Germany very Europe-centric, Italy biased towards the Mediterranean, and France particularly invested in Africa. France and the United Kingdom made the only mentions of the Arctic among the group. China was of some concern to all these allies, with the United States and France most invested in Indo-Pacific security–which reinforces why France was so bruised following the AUKUS agreement, as the region is a definite priority for Paris. Germany made the most mentions of NATO, alliances, and Europe, and its strategy very much reflects the long-held standard of a Federal Republic nestled at the heart of Europe and multilateral institutions. The challenge with the NATO Strategic Concept will be for drafters to reconcile US interest in the Asia-Pacific region against the more local interests of other allies. What role, if any, does NATO have regarding great-power competition in Asia? How exactly does the Alliance square the circle of requirements from the Artic to the Mediterranean?