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2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Solvency

Direct “dual use biotech” fails – 22 agents/models are key – aff will miss some

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

In the military field, “dual-use” biotechnology refers to both civilian and military technology [1]. In the civilian field, it refers to a legitimate scientific purpose that yields information or technologies that may be misused to pose a threat to public health or other aspects of national security [2]. Dual-use biotechnology has benefits (such as promoting scientific progress or improving public health) but also has the potential for malicious abuse or misuse (such as bioterrorism). At present, internationally recognized dual-use biotechnology consists of technology used for acquiring new types of biological or molecular materials (combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening, DNA shuffling, and directed evolution), directed design technologies (protein engineering, virus genome synthesis, standardization in synthetic biology), technologies for manipulating biological systems (development of psychoactive drugs, synthesis of peptide bioregulators, immune regulation, personal genomics, RNA interference, transcranial magnetic stimulation), and technologies for the packaging and delivery (chemical micro-processing equipment, gene therapy, aerosol vaccine). Tucker lists three characteristics of dual-use: (1) its technical attributes, including availability, abuse susceptibility and potential harm caused by abuse; (2) its controllability, including concretization (the materialization of technology), maturity, convergence, development speed and international diffusion; and (3) the reducibility to the state, institutional, individual, product and knowledge levels [3]. However, due to its ubiquity, it is difficult to manage the risks of all dual-use biotechnologies. Therefore, NSABB has adopted a strategy of determining a limited scope of knowledge, products or technologies produced by life science research that is most likely to be misused to threaten national biosafety. This part of research is referred to as “dual-use research concerns”, and encompasses 15 key biological agents or toxins and seven types of dual-use research [4].

2022 SDI Negative
MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg › Biotech › Solvency

No solvency for dual use biotech regulation – information asymmetry turns the aff

Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)

2.1. Predicament 1: The Information Asymmetry Risk of Dual-Use Biotechnology Keeps the

Traditional Self-Governance Model in the Field of Biotechnology from Playing Its Role In contrast to the field of nuclear technology, in the biological sciences, the autonomy of stakeholders is important [30]. The biotechnology industry has a long tradition of self-governance, and there are many historical success stories. However, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology has caused problems for the traditional model of industry self-governance.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---Heg Defense

No prolif impact

Mueller 19 – John, Senior Research Scientist and Adjunct Professor at Mershon Center for International Security Studies. “Exaggerated Alarm and Destructive Excursions: Antiproliferation Policy and The Case of North Korea” Prepared for presentation at the First World Congress of Security Studies Hosted by the Research Institute for National Security Affairs, Korean National Defense University, , 08-12-2019

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than predicted, and this seems to be because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their possessor. Dozens of technologically capable countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so. A key reason for this is that the possession of such expensive armaments actually conveys in almost all cases rather little advantage to the possessor. In the main, they are difficult to obtain, militarily useless, a spectacular waste of time, money, and scientific talent, distasteful, and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult to obtain for administratively dysfunctional countries.9 Moreover, the consequences of what little proliferation has taken place have been substantially benign. Those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, they have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. Nor have the weapons proven to be crucial status—or virility—symbols, although Pakistan and Russia do probably garner more attention that they would if they did not have nuclear weapons. But how much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or would anybody pay much less if they had none? Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth? Or with its Olympics? Proliferation alarmists may occasionally grant that countries principally obtain a nuclear arsenal to counter real or perceived threats, but many go on to argue that the newly nuclear country will then use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” the area. That argument was repeatedly trotted out with dramatic urgency before 2003 for the dangers supposedly posed by Saddam Hussein, and it is now being applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination business is to be carried out is never made clear.10 But the notion, apparently, is that should an atomic country rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would supinely bow to its demands. Far more likely, any threatened states will make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries against the threatening neighbor—rather in the way they coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---Heg Defense

Alternative explanations for stability outweigh.

Fettweis 20 – Christopher J, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", CATO Institute, , 06-03-2020

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

*only read if they read the SCS scenario*

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---Heg Defense

No leadership impact – empirics.

Fettweis 20 – Christopher J, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", CATO Institute, , 06-03-2020

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability. Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend. Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---LAWS Don’t get bought

DOD policy means they can’t even buy LAWS

Gregory C. Allen, 22, (Gregory C. Allen, Director, AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, 6-6-2022, Center for Strategic and International Studies, DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread, 7-3-2022) SCade

The DOD recently announced that it is planning to update DODD 3000.09 this year. Michael Horowitz, director of the DOD’s Emerging Capabilities Policy Office and the Pentagon official with responsibility for shepherding the policy, praised DODD 3000.09 in a recent interview, stating that “the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems.” While not making any firm predictions, Horowitz suggested that major revisions to DODD 3000.09 were unlikely. In general, this is good news. The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons, such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems, are already in widespread and broadly accepted use by dozens of militaries worldwide. It also allows for the possibility that future technological progress and changes in the global security landscape, such as Russia’s potential deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons in Ukraine, might make new types of autonomous weapons desirable. This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar. In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles, proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under secretary of defense for policy; and the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics certify that the proposed system meets 11 additional requirements, each of which require presenting considerable evidence. Getting the signatures of the U.S. military’s highest-ranking officer and two under secretaries in a formal senior review is no easy task. Perhaps the strongest proof of the rigor required to surpass such a hurdle is the fact that no DOD organization has even tried.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB Link Defense

Distinction between military and civilian innovation – the plan doesn’t hurt the bulwark of the DIB

Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen 2017 “MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS” November 2017 Stockholm International peace research institute https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_systems_1117_1.pdf

The innovation ecosystem that is driving the advance of autonomy in weapon systems is diffuse, chiefly because the technologies, academic disciplines and industry sectors involved in the development of autonomous capabilities may vary greatly depending on the type of application and systems at issue. Nevertheless, three general observations can be made. First, much of the fundamental research in the fields of AI and robotics that could feed the advance of autonomy in weapon systems is dual-use. The divergence between civilian and military innovation generally emerges towards the development end of the R&D cycle because civilian and military products often need to meet different performance criteria. Hence, should CCW delegates eventually engage in a formal discussion on the monitoring or regulation of R&D efforts that could lead to the development and production of LAWS, they should focus on the development end of the R&D cycle, as this is where the actual capabilities of LAWS will be definitively created. Attempting to monitor and control R&D at the more basic research level would be challenging from a practical perspective and possibly problematic as it could threaten civilian innovation. Second, the barriers to entry to the development of robotic systems are very low. Nearly all hardware components that might serve the development of autonomous robots are commercially available. It is even possible to acquire off-the-shelf low-cost robotic systems that feature advanced autonomous capabilities. These may be adopted, modified and weaponized by states but also, and more worryingly, by non-state actors seeking, for instance, to conduct terrorist operations. This scenario has not yet received great attention within the CCW discussions on LAWS, despite the fact it represents an imminent humanitarian risk. While it falls outside the traditional scope of the CCW, it would be prudent for the GGE to allocate some time to this issue in 2018. It could start a discussion on the options that are offered outside the CCW to control or limit the diffusion and malevolent use of key technologies. This could include discussing the possibilities offered by export control mechanisms and self-control by the industry. Third, future discussions on the development and control of autonomy in weapon systems could usefully benefit from further exchanges of experience with the civilian sector, especially companies developing safety-critical applications of autonomy (e.g. aerospace companies, carmakers and medical robot companies), considering that a number of issues that are central to discussion on LAWS have already been, or are currently being, actively addressed within the civilian sphere. These issues include the following. 1. How to define and measure autonomy? This question has been the concern of standardization and regulatory bodies for a long time. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission have had multiple projects aimed at generating an official definition of robot-associated terms, including ‘autonomy’ (ISO 8373:2012). In addition, the US National Highway Traffic Safety Association has adopted the Society of Automotive Engineers’ levels of autonomy for self-driving systems, ranging from complete driver control to full autonomy.110 2. How to operationalize meaningful human control? Civilian industry sectors that produce safety-critical systems (e.g. aerospace, automotive and medical robotics) are facing the same human control dilemmas as the defence sector. They too are dedicating their efforts to finding a model of the human–machine command-and-control relationship that will maximize safety. 3. How to test the safety and predictability of autonomous technologies? The commercial aerospace sector has procedures to test and verify advanced automated systems. Inviting experts from this community to talk about existing procedures would help to identify possible best practices for testing and evaluating weapons with advanced autonomous capabilities in the context of Article 36 reviews.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB Link Defense

Precautionary policies good

Maciej Kuziemski 05-01-2018 [Published in Project Syndicate; Data program adviser at the Ditchley Foundation], “A Precautionary Approach to Artificial Intelligence,” Cut By: m.jam

Even without reliable data, decision-makers must move forward with AI governance. And, as the world waits for scientific certainty (which may never arrive), there is an existing solution that can guide us into the unknown: the “precautionary principle.” Adopted globally in 1992 as part of the United Nations on sustainable development, and later incorporated into one of the , the precautionary principle states that a lack of certainty cannot be a basis for failing to protect human health or the environment. That seems like a suitable way to address the uncertainty of a tech-driven future. The precautionary principle is not without its detractors. But while its merits have been debated for years, we need to accept that the lack of evidence of harm is not the same thing as evidence of lack of harm. This simple idea has been applied to – from public health to infant mortality. There are three good reasons why AI should be next. For starters, applying the precautionary principle to the context of AI would help rebalance the global policy discussion, giving weaker voices more influence in debates that are currently monopolized by corporate interests. Decision-making would also be more inclusive and deliberative, and produce solutions that more closely reflected societal needs. The , and at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government are already spearheading work in this participatory spirit. Additional professional organizations and research centers should follow suit. Moreover, by applying the precautionary principle, governance bodies could shift the burden of responsibility to the creators of algorithms. A requirement of explainability of algorithmic decision-making can change incentives, prevent blackboxing, help make business decisions more transparent, and allow the public sector to catch up with the private sector in technology development. And, by forcing tech companies and governments to identify and consider multiple options, the precautionary principle would bring to the fore neglected issues, like environmental impact. Rarely is science in a position to help manage an innovation long before the consequences of that innovation are available for study. But, in the context of algorithms, machine learning, and AI, humanity cannot afford to wait. The beauty of the precautionary principle lies not only in its grounding in international public law, but also in its track record as a framework for managing innovation in myriad scientific contexts. We should embrace it before the benefits of progress are unevenly distributed, or, worse, irreversible harm has been done.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB UQ

Americans Believe the U.S. is Falling Behind in Innovation

Gholz & Sapolsky 21 (Eugene Gholz & Harvey M. Sapolsky (2021) The defense innovation machine: Why the U.S. will remain on the cutting edge, Journal of Strategic Studies, 44:6, 854-872, DOI: . shARK)

The United States is the most powerful nation in the world. It has the most powerful military, the biggest economy, and the most dominating culture. It is the world’s leader in science, engineering, and medicine. Its universities are the most admired. Its corporations are the richest and most successful. People eat Big Macs, drink Coca Cola, fly on Boeings, use their iPhones, and watch Hollywood movies around the globe. Everyone knows the name of the American president, what the CIA does, and who you should call if there is trouble on your border. The United States is also a very secure country. It is surrounded by two big oceans and two unthreatening neighbors. Its surveillance systems scour the globe looking for dangers. It has nuclear weapons, a Navy and Coast Guard on constant patrol, an Air Force on high alert and with a global reach, and an Army and Marine Corps second to none in capability and recent combat experience. But many Americans believe that this is all slipping away, that America is becoming vulnerable and losing its power and dominance. They cite internal and external sources of the vulnerability. American power, they claim, is being frittered away by a dysfunctional Congress, an incompetent president, and a bloated, slow moving, gold-plating acquisition bureaucracy that cannot keep up. Indecision and gridlock have seemingly become the American Way of government. Meanwhile, some fear that agile rival nations, specifically including China, can tap fast moving commercial technology to build modern weapons that will defeat the United States. Here we examine these concerns that the American military advantage in the Post-Cold War era has dissipated in large part because the Defense Department lags behind in developing advanced technologies. Our judgment is that the American defense research and development system, as honed during the Cold War and expanded since, is fully capable of handling any military challenge. It is a gigantic technology-generating, innovation-producing, war-fighting machine. U.S. ‘hard’ innovation capabilities – ‘input and infrastructure factors’ like R&D facilities, human capital, access to foreign technology, and availability of funding – far outstrip those of its potential rivals, even though those factors are the ones often thought of as easier for catch-up countries to obtain. Despite warnings that the United States no longer spends enough on R&D and that Chinese R&D spending is surging, the reality is that the United States dramatically leads in military innovation investment. In functional terms, the United States dominates all other countries, including China, in ‘input factors,’ starting with resource allocations to defense research and development. More important, we believe that the American defense technology system is pushed toward innovation by specific contextual factors, the ‘soft’ categories of attributes and capabilities, that cannot readily transfer to likely rivals. 

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB UQ

The DIB got a failing grade in industry health -- The industry is down bad

Stephen Losey 02-11-2022 [Air warfare reporter at Defense News; previously reported for Military.com, covering the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare; Before that, covered U.S. Air Force leadership, personnel and operations for Air Force Times], “COVID drags defense industrial base down to failing grade,” https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2022/02/11/covid-drags-defense-industrial-base-down-to-failing-grade/

WASHINGTON — The National Defense Industrial Association gave the defense industrial base an overall failing grade for the first time ever, as the continues to upend the sector. In its third annual Vital Signs report released Feb. 2, NDIA gave the industrial base a health and readiness score of 69 out of 100, which it deems an unsatisfactory and failing grade and “cause for real concern.” NDIA, which worked on the report with decision science company Govini, scores categories on a 100-point scale, and scores below 70 are considered failing. The association based most of its study on data sources from 2020, the first year of the pandemic and before vaccinations began, so some of these results are lagging indicators. NDIA said the two of the eight key categories it uses to measure the health of the defense industry — the and companies’ production capacity and ability to surge if necessary — have deteriorated significantly, “almost certainly” due to the pandemic’s effects. Three other categories — industrial security, innovation and production inputs — also received failing scores in 2021, though production inputs and industrial security saw slight improvements over the previous two years. And with the pandemic continuing, the association added, it is crucial for the nation to figure out how to sort out these problems. However, NDIA said it opted not to offer policy recommendations, support specific legislative or regulatory changes, or call for investments in the report.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
AFF ANSWERS › 2AC---DIB UQ

The Ukraine confilct has exposed weakness in the DIB and Bidens budget doesn’t leave room for growth in the industry

Clark, Maiya. “The War in Ukraine Continues; Can the U.S. Defense-Industrial Base Keep Up?” The Heritage Foundation, 2019, www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-war-ukraine-continues-can-the-us-defense-industrial-base-keep.

To some degree, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has served as a stress test for the West’s defense industrial base. From that has come a growing recognition that, for too long, America has underestimated the amount of munitions and platforms required in modern warfare. Due to the complexity and time required to manufacture today’s precision weapons, we must start thinking now, before a war breaks out, about whether America has enough weaponry to sustain a conflict. Last month President Biden released a defense budget request that does not even keep up with the rate of inflation, much less provide for any growth to meet our own needs. It’s a recipe for weakness at a time when the free world desperately needs strength.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › A2 China

Won’t escalate channeled into diplomatic proxy conflicts instead

Tierney 21 – Dominic, a professor of political science, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “The Future of Sino-U.S. Proxy War”, Texas National Security Review, Vol. 4, Issue 2, , xx-xx-2021

Strategic doctrine in both the United States and China has downplayed the possibility of a clash in a foreign internal conflict and in the U.S. case in particular, focused on the potential for a conventional interstate war. However, the odds that the United States and China will engage in an interstate war are extremely low due to a number of factors, including nuclear deterrence, regime type, trade relations between the two countries, and international institutions. Military competition is much more likely to take the form of a proxy war in which Washington and Beijing aid different actors in an intrastate conflict because of a systemwide shift away from interstate war and toward civil war, continued American hyper-interventionism, and growing Chinese interventionism. In the coming years, internal conflicts in countries like Venezuela, Pakistan, Myanmar, or North Korea could become battlegrounds for great-power rivalry. Such U.S.-Chinese proxy wars will likely be much subtler than the heavy-handed proxy conflicts of the Cold War and involve diplomatic initiatives, economic aid, cyber war, propaganda, and competition within international institutions. Indeed, Washington and Beijing may compartmentalize a particular proxy campaign — sparring in one civil war while steering clear of each other or even cooperating in another internal conflict. U.S. analysts often characterize the global system in terms of a shift from the counter-terrorism paradigm of the post-9/11 era, which was focused on insecure states and nonstate actors, to the great-power competition paradigm of today’s era, which prioritizes U.S. relations with China and Russia. However, these two paradigms are less distinct than sometimes thought: Future great-power competition, like earlier counter-terrorism efforts, may occur within insecure states and feature alliances with nonstate actors. The question remains whether a Sino-U.S. proxy war could spiral into an interstate war. The barriers to direct hostilities make this outcome unlikely, but proxy conflicts could still escalate in unexpected and costly ways. The United States and China may try to manipulate civil wars in far-flung lands they do not understand. Washington has a history of wading into strife-torn countries, like Afghanistan and Iraq, with alien cultures and languages, leading to strategic failure. Beijing is even less prepared to comprehend or shape the contours of foreign civil wars due to a lack of capabilities and experience. Because of the psychological dynamic of loss aversion, these two great powers may be willing to ratchet up their commitment in a given proxy war to avoid the defeat of a favored actor. In addition, local surrogates could act independently in ways that might escalate a conflict.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › A2 China

No escalation of SCS disputes – all sides show restraints

Bo 20 – Hu, Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Research and Research Professor at the Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University. He is also Director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI). His most recent publications include China’s Sea Power in the Post Mahan Era by China Ocean Press (2018) and Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century by Routledge (2019). “China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction”, The Diplomat, , 06-12-2020

The China-U.S. rivalry in the South China Sea is certainly growing, but war is still some way off. There are several maritime encounters between the two sides every day, and thousands every year. Most of them are professional and safe; only a few have involved some risks. The recent pandemic has made both countries and militaries more sensitive, which, to some extent, has heightened the tension of the situation.

Because of COVID-19, China and the United States are more concerned and anxious about each other. In addition to maintaining daily operations in the western Pacific, both sides have some new worries. The United States is concerned that China would take advantage of the temporary power vacuum; thus it has deliberately shown more force and given China more diplomatic pressure. China feels that Washington’s South China Sea policy is increasingly desperate to the point that, even during the pandemic, the United States has not forgotten to provoke China. Beijing is also convinced that the U.S., motivated by power competition, is focusing on China’s activities and ignoring the actions of other claimants.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › A2 China

No SCS escalation - nukes, interdependence, and power disparity

Norrlöf 21 – Carla, Visiting Professor at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, Senior Fellow at The Atlantic Council and at Massey College, Associate Professor at the University of Toronto, and Research Associate at The Graduate Institute of Geneva. “The Ibn Khaldûn Trap and Great Power Competition with China”, The Washington Quarterly, , 03-23-2021

However, the analogy mismatches international hierarchy and regime type. In classical times, the incumbent land power, Sparta, was the authoritarian power who feared the rise of the democratic maritime power, Athens.3 This incongruity is not even the biggest problem with the analogy. In order for the Thucydides Trap to apply, China would have to significantly narrow the power gap with the United States. While China has caught up with the United States in important respects, it has not caught up with the United States in terms of the logic and networks that inform dominance in the key economic and security areas required for power transition.4 Apart from the obvious inhibiting factors of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence, the United States and China are nowhere close to the power parity likely to spark a major power war between them. The Thucydides Trap is a powerful analogy for bellicose dynamics between a hegemonic power and a rising power, but in the near term, war between the United States and China for the reasons proposed in the Thucydidean analogy is highly unlikely.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › A2 China

NATO securitization against China is a self-fulfilling prophesy – leads to US-China war and extinction

Achcar 22 Achcar, Gilbert. Gilbert Achcar is a professor at SOAS, University of London. His new book, The New Cold War: The United States, Russia and China from Kosovo to Ukraine, will come out in early 2023. “NATO from Bad to Worse.” The Nation, 23 June 2022, www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-china-russia-us/. Accessed 4 July 2022.

But the most dangerous novelty at the Madrid summit consists of a major qualitative extension of NATO’s purpose. Originally founded as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union and its subordinate states, NATO has mutated after 1991 into a “security organization”—meaning that it has been involved in military actions (NATO as such did not formally engage in any war in the USSR’s days)—and redefined its purpose in ostracizing post-Soviet Russia by expanding toward its borders. The NATO-Russia Council created in 1997 was a meager consolation given to Moscow in lieu of inviting it to join the alliance. Nobody was fooled. From tacit, NATO’s hostility to Russia became explicit after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The forthcoming Madrid summit is going to directly involve NATO in open hostility to China, far beyond the alliance’s original area of relevance. This area is defined in the 1949 treaty constitutive of NATO as comprising “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” NATO’s post-1991 mutation led it to intervene beyond its members’ territory—first in the Balkans, then much further from its original area, in Afghanistan, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Participation in the organization’s meetings has nevertheless remained restricted to Europe and North America. No longer. Japan, along with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea have been invited to attend the Madrid summit as NATO “partners” in the Asia-Pacific region—a very serious provocation to Beijing. It can only interpret this invitation as a step toward the consolidation of US-led alliances in a single global network opposed to both Russia and China. After the preliminary meeting of NATO’s defense ministers held on June 16, the organization’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, declared that the new NATO Strategic Concept that will be adopted at the Madrid summit will set out the alliance’s position “on Russia, on emerging challenges, and for the first time, on China.” From the perspective of Washington’s drive to perpetuate its hegemony over most of Europe and the Asia Pacific by portraying Russia and China as enemies—a grand strategy that has been followed by all successive post-1991 US administrations—the new escalation to be confirmed in Madrid makes full sense. While resolutely supporting Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion, President Biden has multiplied provocative gestures toward Beijing, including his statement, prior to a summit meeting in May of the anti-China alliance known as the Quad (Japan, Australia, and India along with the United States), that the United States would defend Taiwan militarily. The statement was quickly watered down by the State Department, which had in May removed from a Taiwan Fact Sheet on its website the statement “we do not support Taiwan independence” and reinstated it in June. From the perspective of Europe and the Asia Pacific, acquiescing to this de facto extension of NATO’s role is equivalent to being herded like Panurge’s sheep toward throwing themselves into the sea. Antagonizing China is not in Europe’s interest, nor is it in the interest of any of the states invited to the Madrid summit. Even if the European governments believed that Russia has now irreversibly become a threat to their security, it would be utterly counterproductive for them to push Beijing toward consolidating an alliance with Moscow. These developments bring the world closer to a conflagration that could dwarf the ongoing war in Ukraine and endanger the future of humankind. It is urgent to rebuild a global peace movement opposed to all military alliances, demanding their dissolution, a movement opposed as well to the ongoing massive increases in military budgets. It is high time to return to global disarmament under the aegis of the UN, as foreseen in the UN Charter. This charter is the cornerstone of international law whose role must be renewed against the ongoing drift toward the law of the jungle. The huge and ever-growing amounts that are spent on armament and destruction would be wisely reallocated to the only wars that are truly in humanity’s interest: the wars against poverty and climate change.‌

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › A2 Europe

Europe is VERY anti war right now. And no draw in

Steven Erlanger, June 14, 2019, [Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels.], Distrusting Both Iran and U.S., Europe Urges ‘Maximum Restraint’, New York Times, , Xoxo 6/7/2020

BRUSSELS — European governments may believe Iran is to blame for the attacks this week on fuel tankers in the Gulf of Oman, but their distrust of the Trump administration and its hawkish policy toward Tehran have led them to measure their words and call for de-escalation and “maximum restraint.” Mindful of Washington’s exaggerations and outright misrepresentations of intelligence leading up to the Iraq war, European leaders are asking the Trump administration for hard evidence. The last thing they want is to be asked to support another American war in the Middle East that would be highly unpopular with voters. Europeans are no fans of the Iranian government or its policies in the Middle East, but they are concerned by what they see as the Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran — thus their use of maximum restraint. Many critics believe Mr. Trump is succeeding only in creating maximum pressure among hard-line factions in Iran to respond with carefully calibrated attacks that send a message, like those against tankers in a vital passageway for global oil supplies. Germany wants a careful investigation of the attacks, insisting that “a spiral of escalation must be avoided.” The European Union, in the words of the spokeswoman Maja Kocijancic, has “said repeatedly that the region doesn’t need further escalation, it doesn’t need further destabilization, it doesn’t need further tension.” Ms. Kocijancic said that European foreign ministers would discuss Iran and other issues at a regular meeting on Monday.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › A2 Europe

NATO has a long history of military failures – especially in Europe

Harikumar 22 Harikumar, Aakrith. Student at the Jindal School of International Affairs. His research interests include International Security, Diplomacy, and Economic Development. “NATO: Operational Failures and Challenges in the 21st Century.” Diplomatist, 21 May 2022, diplomatist.com/2022/05/21/nato-operational-failures-and-challenges-in-the-21st-century/. Accessed 4 July 2022. //dre

Introduction The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began as an alliance during the Cold War to oppose the Soviet Union. Despite the fall of the USSR in 1991, NATO’s continuity has led to much debate among scholars as to its purpose and relevance today. An organization that started with only 12 member states, has grown to a become a strong network of 30 members, with more states acting as important global partners. While NATO represents some of the biggest western powers, it is also marked by operational failures and internal disparities. Now the question for this research essay is: has NATO truly been a success? This question is worth exploring from different angles. To find an answer, one must look at the military interventions and activities that NATO has carried out since 1991. This paper will primarily look at NATO’s three most significant interventions in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan. While two of these have been successes in the larger picture, the large opportunity costs are often overlooked. And that is what this piece seeks to explore. NATO: Origins and Objectives While countering Soviet expansion is its main goal, NATO member states have also highlighted two other priorities: (1) revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent and (2) encouraging European political integration. Communism was becoming a threat in Europe as governments like that of the Czech Republic were overthrown by rebels. Considering many factors, it was time for a more integrated and like-minded organization of nations to uphold democratic values. The North Atlantic Treaty was enforced in 1949 and mainly laid the foundation for military and political cooperation between its member states. A fundamental aspect of the treaty lies in Article 5, which states that an attack against one member is an attack against all . But NATO has also shown the same level of support for nations expressing their desire to become member states. For instance, the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict has seen strong participation by NATO members as Ukraine aspired to join it. Moreover, the conflict threatened the stability of Europe as a whole, thereby prompting a response from NATO. NATO’s Operations: A List Marked By Failures? NATO has a long list of military interventions in other states with hits and misses. This section will look at four major NATO interventions and their consequences. The Yugoslavian Bombing, (1999) The conflict in the Balkans worsened as Serbia increased its embargos on Kosovan separatists and Albanian civilians. NATO established the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999 as a part of UNSC Resolution 1244 which mandated international presence in the region to mitigate the conflict. As the Yugoslavians resisted, NATO carried out a 78-day air bombing, formalizing the KFOR’s entry into the region. The biggest debate here is whether NATO’s actions were humane. Although it achieved its larger goal of stopping Milosevic and separating Kosovo (de facto), the air bombing caused more than 500 civilian deaths. There was an exodus of refugees and the fundamental pillars of the Responsibility to Protect were broken because the people did not receive complete protection. Determining whether NATO’s actions in Kosovo were truly a success or failure depends on what an individual considers more important: the ends or the means. However, in the 21st century, when international organizations are seen as important bodies that represent major interests at a global level, concerns must be solved through dialogue, with force only being used as a last resort. In that sense. NATO’s mistakes in Kosovo seem to overshadow its successes. The War in Afghanistan, (2001-2021) The intervention in Afghanistan is arguably one of NATO’s most important ones. After the 9/11 attacks, the US sent forces to Afghanistan to capture Osama Bin Laden and bring the nation back to democracy after five years of Taliban rule. The US, along with its NATO allies, sent forces to Afghanistan under a UN Security Council mandate. Despite fulfilling both goals of overthrowing the Taliban regime and killing Bin Laden, NATO (primarily US) troops continued to stay in Afghanistan till 2021. Interestingly, the US government published an official document of a Congress hearing on ‘The U.S. Lessons Learned in Afghanistan’, which entailed a list of its intelligence and political failures that led to withdrawal. Despite its fragility, the only reason that the Afghan government was able to sustain itself was because of the support of NATO forces. Things took a turn for the worse when then-president Donald Trump signed an agreement with the Taliban in 2020 to withdraw troops by 2021. While Donald Trump’s actions may be justified from a ‘US national interest’ perspective, the larger interests of the Afghan people were compromised. American and NATO soldiers had indeed been there for twenty years, only to be brought back during the country’s toughest time. The withdrawal of troops led to an immediate fall in the Ghani government which had to concede defeat instantly. Despite twenty long years, one of the most powerful alliances was brought down, leading to its NATO biggest and most shocking security failure. The Intervention of Libya, (2011) While there is much debate on whether the NATO intervention in Libya was a success, it is important not just to look at the conflict itself, but its aftermath as well. Muammar Gadaffi’s Libya was an epicentre of tyranny and human rights violations. As a part of the Responsibility to Protect, the international community had to act. Once again, the result was the victory of NATO forces and the fall of the Gadaffi regime. But the US-led NATO which was supposed to be a ‘beacon’ of democratic values, was not entirely true to its purpose of protecting the civilian population of Libya. While NATO’s main target was the Gadaffi regime, it did not emphasize enough combating rebel groups which were equally dangerous. Libyan rebel groups were responsible for many civilian murders, robberies, and war crimes. The rebels even killed civilians who merely supported the Gadaffi regime but did no crime. As per the first pillar of the R2P, protection applies to the ‘population’ of a nation, which includes every individual residing in the nation. The UN and NATO forces failed to protect a large section of the population. Therefore, while NATO managed to protect those fighting against Gadaffi, it still failed in other areas, leading to another civil war despite an end to Gadaffi’s regime.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › A2 Europe

Tensions already high within NATO with European countries – foster conflict through inequalities

ANDREW DESIDERIO and PAUL MCLEARY 06/27/2022 04:30 AM EDT An alliance, if you can keep it: NATO meets in shadow of Russia-Ukraine war https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/27/nato-russia-ukraine-biden-00042421

Already, tension is building within NATO as powers such as Germany and France deliver amounts of weapons and aid at a pace slower than their economic power suggests they’re capable of. Tiny countries with fresh memories of Russian occupation such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all opened their armories to provide for Ukraine’s defense. Estonia, in particular, has already donated the equivalent of one-third of its annual defense budget this year. Lithuania has risked the Kremlin’s wrath by cutting off railway resupply to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, and Poland has become the jumping-off point for the global effort to arm and supply Ukraine, along with donating more than 200 tanks and other weapons. Warsaw has also focused on getting Ukrainian agricultural products out of the country.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › A2 Europe

Internal issues gut NATO’s effectivity – further US action furthers Europe’s dependence on faltering American support. Even popular plans can fail amid political chaos

Ashford 22 Ashford, Emma. Dr. Ashford is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who writes extensively on international security and American foreign policy. “Opinion | Europe Has an America Problem.” The New York Times, 28 June 2022, www.nytimes.com/2022/06/28/opinion/nato-europe-united-states.html. Accessed 4 July 2022. //dre

BRUSSELS — President Biden is in Europe, and talk of unity fills the air. At the Group of 7 meeting in Bavaria, Germany, leaders congratulated themselves for their decisions over the past few months and restated their support for Ukraine. They even took time for a “family picture,” the often awkward group shot of world leaders. At the NATO summit in Madrid, which begins on Tuesday, we can expect more of the same. The self-congratulatory atmosphere is quite new. Just three years ago, NATO — frayed by failed interventions in Libya and Iraq, internally divided over its future and buffeted by Donald Trump’s derision — was declared “brain-dead” by President Emmanuel Macron of France. Now the picture is completely different. Four months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO stands as a re-energized bulwark against Russian aggression. European leaders across the continent, determined to come together, speak confidently of common purpose. Yet for all the talk of European resolve, the past few months have in fact underlined something else: the continent’s dependence on the United States to resolve its security problems. That’s nothing new, of course. In many ways it’s the role America has played since the end of World War II, ensuring — even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 — that Europe operated under America’s military umbrella. But while this approach might save leaders from politically difficult choices in the short term, it’s ultimately a losing proposition. America, embroiled in domestic problems and ever more focused on the challenge from China, can’t oversee Europe forever. And Europe, facing a hostile and revisionist Russia, needs to look after itself. These criticisms might sound counterintuitive. After all, Europe has made some major strides on defense in recent months. This is most visible in Germany, where the government has pledged to spend 100 billion euros, or $106 billion, more on defense over the next few years — a change so profound that the German press has adopted Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s description of it as a “Zeitenwende,” or turning point. Other countries, including Italy, Romania and Norway, have also pledged to substantially increase spending. These shifts strike at the common complaint that European states, pusillanimous and miserly, are “free riders” relying on America’s military largess for protection. Yet if European states are reducing their free-rider problem, they have something perhaps more intractable: a collective-action problem. Simply put, the individual interests and inclinations of the European Union’s 27 members, whose countries encompass several thousand miles of territory, make it difficult to forge a common course of action. That’s true for many issues, among them economic reform and the role of the judiciary, but it’s perhaps especially acute for military and defense policy. That applies both to NATO, of which all but six E.U. countries are members, and the European Union’s own Common Security and Defense Policy. Indeed, one core disagreement revolves around whether a buildup in the E.U.’s defense capabilities will actually undermine, rather than strengthen, NATO. To head off such concerns, many favor a division of labor — either by geography or based on specific military capabilities. Yet the precise relationship between the two remains an open question. More profoundly, there are major differences in the perception and prioritization of threats. Central and Eastern European states closest to Russia logically view it as the biggest threat. From farther away, other problems loom larger. Germany and Northern European countries worry about terrorism, France focuses on extremism and unrest in former African colonies like Mali, while Greece and Italy are preoccupied by refugee policy and maritime security in the Mediterranean. One might think that a major geopolitical shock like the war in Ukraine would have allowed for a Europe-wide “Zeitenwende”: a moment to reckon with these difficult questions and hammer out concessions that would allow progress to be made. And in the early weeks of the war in Ukraine, many of these divisions were indeed blotted out by shock and horror, with states largely united in their response to the war. In the months since, however, these divisions have re-emerged, making themselves felt in new ways. Some countries — particularly France, Italy and Germany — are talking about ways to find a peace settlement in Ukraine, even as they continue to send weapons and funds. Yet polling in Poland suggests that it will not countenance peace until Russia is properly punished. The European Union, slowed by the need to reach a consensus, has struggled to keep up. Its much-anticipated Strategic Compass, a strategy paper released after the war started, is a buzzword-filled document that promises a “quantum leap forward” in defense — but does little to address these divisions in practice. In the absence of continental consensus, the glue that continues to hold together European security is the United States. Since February, the trans-Atlantic relationship has slid back into a comfortable groove: The United States provides significant personnel and high-tech weaponry, forestalling the need for other NATO members to commit substantial resources or make tough choices about joint defense. Politically, America’s presence reassures NATO members in Eastern Europe — who have become painfully aware since February that Western European states aren’t as willing to take a hard line on Russia — while allowing Germany to lead Europe without bearing too great a financial and military cost. The underlying disagreements haven’t gone away. But for as long as American troops and hardware are on the continent, European states can have their cake and eat it, too. It’s understandable that European leaders don’t want to engage in punishing political fights at a difficult time. And it is perhaps easy to assume, with 100,000 American troops in Europe, that the U.S. commitment to European security is inviolable. Yet the Trump years should not be so easily forgotten. America’s commitment to Europe’s defense, overseen by Mr. Biden, may seem secure today. But with growing threats in Asia and turmoil in America’s domestic politics, it is most likely a matter of time before that changes. Should he return to the presidency, Mr. Trump may well follow through on his threats to withdraw the United States from NATO. Even some of his less extreme compatriots are questioning America’s role in European defense; in May, 11 Republican senators voted against sending further military aid to Ukraine. There is also a growing consensus in Washington that the United States is urgently needed in the Indo-Pacific to handle the threat from China. Even the best-case scenario — an administration in Washington that remains committed to Europe — carries the risk that a crisis elsewhere could result in a hurried retreat, leaving European states high and dry. American and European leaders may well spend the next days lauding the miraculous recovery of the trans-Atlantic alliance. Yet far from a panacea, America’s support amounts to a Band-Aid covering Europe’s biggest disagreements on defense. To be truly united, European leaders should start the hard work of resolving these differences and rip off the Band-Aid.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › ILO Mod

LIO prevents great power war and key to solve all global problems---creates norms of restraint and cooperation

G. John Ikenberry 2011 – Princeton University Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs "The Future of the Liberal World Order," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:133hPS7EjVUJ:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-05-01/future-liberal-world-order+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

There is no longer any question: wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue that the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal. Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away, they say, but so, too, is the open and rule-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s. In this view, newly powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. The hallmarks of liberal internationalism -- openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries. The fact that today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis has tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the United States to act as the global economic leader. For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century. THE LIBERAL ASCENDANCY China and the other emerging powers do not face simply an American-led order or a Western system. They face a broader international order that is the product of centuries of struggle and innovation. It is highly developed, expansive, integrated, institutionalized, and deeply rooted in the societies and economies of both advanced capitalist states and developing states. And over the last half century, this order has been unusually capable of assimilating rising powers and reconciling political and cultural diversity. Today's international order is the product of two order-building projects that began centuries ago. One is the creation and expansion of the modern state system, a project dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In the years since then, the project has promulgated rules and principles associated with state sovereignty and norms of great-power conduct. The other project is the construction of the liberal order, which over the last two centuries was led by the United Kingdom and the United States and which in the twentieth century was aided by the rise of liberal democratic states. The two projects have worked together. The Westphalian project has focused on solving the "realist" problems of creating stable and cooperative interstate relations under conditions of anarchy, and the liberal-order-building project has been possible only when relations between the great powers have been stabilized. The "problems of Hobbes," that is, anarchy and power insecurities, have had to be solved in order to take advantage of the "opportunities of Locke," that is, the construction of open and rule-based relations. At the heart of the Westphalian project is the notion of state sovereignty and great-power relations. The original principles of the Westphalian system -- sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention -- reflected an emerging consensus that states were the rightful political units for the establishment of legitimate rule. Founded in western Europe, the Westphalian system has expanded outward to encompass the entire globe. New norms and principles -- such as self-determination and mutual recognition among sovereign states -- have evolved within it, further reinforcing the primacy of states and state authority. Under the banners of sovereignty and self-determination, political movements for decolonization and independence were set in motion in the non-Western developing world, coming to fruition in the decades after World War II. Westphalian norms have been violated and ignored, but they have, nonetheless, been the most salient and agreed-on parts of the international order. A succession of postwar settlements -- Vienna in 1815, Versailles in 1919, Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, and the U.S., Soviet, and European negotiations that ended the Cold War and reunified Germany in the early 1990s -- allowed the great powers to update the principles and practices of their relations. Through war and settlement, the great powers learned how to operate within a multipolar balance-of-power system. Over time, the order has remained a decentralized system in which major states compete and balance against one another. But it has also evolved. The great powers have developed principles and practices of restraint and accommodation that have served their interests. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, where post-Napoleonic France was returned to the great-power club and a congress system was established to manage conflicts, and the UN Security Council today, which has provided a site for great-power consultations, are emblematic of these efforts to create rules and mechanisms that reinforce restraint and accommodation. The project of constructing a liberal order built on this evolving system of Westphalian relations. In the nineteenth century, liberal internationalism was manifest in the United Kingdom's championing of free trade and the freedom of the seas, but it was limited and coexisted with imperialism and colonialism. In the twentieth century, the United States advanced the liberal order in several phases. After World War I, President Woodrow Wilson and other liberals pushed for an international order organized around a global collective-security body, the League of Nations, in which states would act together to uphold a system of territorial peace. Open trade, national self-determination, and a belief in progressive global change also undergirded the Wilsonian worldview -- a "one world" vision of nation-states that would trade and interact in a multilateral system of laws. But in the interwar period of closed economic systems and imperial blocs, this experiment in liberal order collapsed. After World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt's administration tried to construct a liberal order again, embracing a vision of an open trading system and a global organization in which the great powers would cooperate to keep the peace -- the United Nations. Drawing lessons from Wilson's failure and incorporating ideas from the New Deal, American architects of the postwar order also advanced more ambitious ideas about economic and political cooperation, which were embodied in the Bretton Woods institutions. This vision was originally global in spirit and scope, but it evolved into a more American-led and Western-centered system as a result of the weakness of postwar Europe and rising tensions with the Soviet Union. As the Cold War unfolded, the United States took command of the system, adopting new commitments and functional roles in both security and economics. Its own economic and political system became, in effect, the central component of the larger liberal hegemonic order. Another development of liberal internationalism was quietly launched after World War II, although it took root more slowly and competed with aspects of the Westphalian system. This was the elaboration of the universal rights of man, enshrined in the UN and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A steady stream of conventions and treaties followed that together constitute an extraordinary vision of rights, individuals, sovereignty, and global order. In the decades since the end of the Cold War, notions of "the responsibility to protect" have given the international community legal rights and obligations to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states. Seen in this light, the modern international order is not really American or Western -- even if, for historical reasons, it initially appeared that way. It is something much wider. In the decades after World War II, the United States stepped forward as the hegemonic leader, taking on the privileges and responsibilities of organizing and running the system. It presided over a far-flung international order organized around multilateral institutions, alliances, special relationships, and client states -- a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics. But now, as this hegemonic organization of the liberal international order starts to change, the hierarchical aspects are fading while the liberal aspects persist. So even as China and other rising states try to contest U.S. leadership -- and there is indeed a struggle over the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the leading states within the system -- the deeper international order remains intact. Rising powers are finding incentives and opportunities to engage and integrate into this order, doing so to advance their own interests. For these states, the road to modernity runs through -- not away from -- the existing international order. JOINING THE CLUB The liberal international order is not just a collection of liberal democratic states but an international mutual-aid society -- a sort of global political club that provides members with tools for economic and political advancement. Participants in the order gain trading opportunities, dispute-resolution mechanisms, frameworks for collective action, regulatory agreements, allied security guarantees, and resources in times of crisis. And just as there are a variety of reasons why rising states will embrace the liberal international order, there are powerful obstacles to opponents who would seek to overturn it. To begin with, rising states have deep interests in an open and rule-based system. Openness gives them access to other societies -- for trade, investment, and knowledge sharing. Without the unrestricted investment from the United States and Europe of the past several decades, for instance, China and the other rising states would be on a much slower developmental path. As these countries grow, they will encounter protectionist and discriminatory reactions from slower-growing countries threatened with the loss of jobs and markets. As a result, the rising states will find the rules and institutions that uphold nondiscrimination and equal access to be critical. The World Trade Organization -- the most formal and developed institution of the liberal international order -- enshrines these rules and norms, and rising states have been eager to join the WTO and gain the rights and protections it affords. China is already deeply enmeshed in the global trading system, with a remarkable 40 percent of its GNP composed of exports -- 25 percent of which go to the United States. China could be drawn further into the liberal order through its desire to have the yuan become an international currency rivaling the U.S. dollar. Aside from conferring prestige, this feat could also stabilize China's exchange rate and grant Chinese leaders autonomy in setting macroeconomic policy. But if China wants to make the yuan a global currency, it will need to loosen its currency controls and strengthen its domestic financial rules and institutions. As Barry Eichengreen and other economic historians have noted, the U.S. dollar assumed its international role after World War II not only because the U.S. economy was large but also because the United States had highly developed financial markets and domestic institutions -- economic and political -- that were stable, open, and grounded in the rule of law. China will feel pressures to establish these same institutional preconditions if it wants the benefits of a global currency. Internationalist-oriented elites in Brazil, China, India, and elsewhere are growing in influence within their societies, creating an expanding global constituency for an open and rule-based international order. These elites were not party to the grand bargains that lay behind the founding of the liberal order in the early postwar decades, and they are seeking to renegotiate their countries' positions within the system. But they are nonetheless embracing the rules and institutions of the old order. They want the protections and rights that come from the international order's Westphalian defense of sovereignty. They care about great-power authority. They want the protections and rights relating to trade and investment. And they want to use the rules and institutions of liberal internationalism as platforms to project their influence and acquire legitimacy at home and abroad. The UN Security Council, the G-20, the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions -- these are all stages on which rising non-Western states can acquire great-power authority and exercise global leadership. NO OTHER ORDER Meanwhile, there is no competing global organizing logic to liberal internationalism. An alternative, illiberal order -- a "Beijing model" -- would presumably be organized around exclusive blocs, spheres of influence, and mercantilist networks. It would be less open and rule-based, and it would be dominated by an array of state-to-state ties. But on a global scale, such a system would not advance the interests of any of the major states, including China. The Beijing model only works when one or a few states opportunistically exploit an open system of markets. But if everyone does, it is no longer an open system but a fragmented, mercantilist, and protectionist complex -- and everyone suffers. It is possible that China could nonetheless move in this direction. This is a future in which China is not a full-blown illiberal hegemon that reorganizes the global rules and institutions. It is simply a spoiler. It attempts to operate both inside and outside the liberal international order. In this case, China would be successful enough with its authoritarian model of development to resist the pressures to liberalize and democratize. But if the rest of the world does not gravitate toward this model, China will find itself subjected to pressure to play by the rules. This dynamic was on display in February 2011, when Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff joined U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner in expressing concern over China's currency policy. China can free-ride on the liberal international order, but it will pay the costs of doing so -- and it will still not be able to impose its illiberal vision on the world. In the background, meanwhile, democracy and the rule of law are still the hallmarks of modernity and the global standard for legitimate governance. Although it is true that the spread of democracy has stalled in recent years and that authoritarian China has performed well in the recent economic crisis, there is little evidence that authoritarian states can become truly advanced societies without moving in a liberal democratic direction. The legitimacy of one-party rule within China rests more on the state's ability to deliver economic growth and full employment than on authoritarian -- let alone communist -- political principles. Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean intellectual who has championed China's rise, admits that "China cannot succeed in its goal of becoming a modern developed society until it can take the leap and allow the Chinese people to choose their own rulers." No one knows how far or fast democratic reforms will unfold in China, but a growing middle class, business elites, and human rights groups will exert pressure for them. The Chinese government certainly appears to worry about the long-term preservation of one-party rule, and in the wake of the ongoing revolts against Arab authoritarian regimes, it has tried harder to prevent student gatherings and control foreign journalists. Outside China, democracy has become a near-universal ideal. As the economist Amartya Sen has noted, "While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion democratic governance has achieved the status of being taken to be generally right." All the leading institutions of the global system enshrine democracy as the proper and just form of governance -- and no competing political ideals even lurk on the sidelines. The recent global economic downturn was the first great postwar economic upheaval that emerged from the United States, raising doubts about an American-led world economy and Washington's particular brand of economics. The doctrines of neoliberalism and market fundamentalism have been discredited, particularly among the emerging economies. But liberal internationalism is not the same as neoliberalism or market fundamentalism. The liberal internationalism that the United States articulated in the 1940s entailed a more holistic set of ideas about markets, openness, and social stability. It was an attempt to construct an open world economy and reconcile it with social welfare and employment stability. Sustained domestic support for openness, postwar leaders knew, would be possible only if countries also established social protections and regulations that safeguarded economic stability. Indeed, the notions of national security and economic security emerged together in the 1940s, reflecting New Deal and World War II thinking about how liberal democracies would be rendered safe and stable. The Atlantic Charter, announced by Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1941, and the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 were early efforts to articulate a vision of economic openness and social stability. The United States would do well to try to reach back and rearticulate this view. The world is not rejecting openness and markets; it is asking for a more expansive notion of stability and economic security. REASON FOR REASSURANCE Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -- in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism. TIME FOR RENEWAL Pronouncements of American decline miss the real transformation under way today. What is occurring is not American decline but a dynamic process in which other states are catching up and growing more connected. In an open and rule-based international order, this is what happens. If the architects of the postwar liberal order were alive to see today's system, they would think that their vision had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Markets and democracy have spread. Societies outside the West are trading and growing. The United States has more alliance partners today than it did during the Cold War. Rival hegemonic states with revisionist and illiberal agendas have been pushed off the global stage. It is difficult to read these world-historical developments as a story of American decline and liberal unraveling. In a way, however, the liberal international order has sown the seeds of its own discontent, since, paradoxically, the challenges facing it now -- the rise of non-Western states and new transnational threats -- are artifacts of its success. But the solutions to these problems -- integrating rising powers and tackling problems cooperatively -- will lead the order's old guardians and new stakeholders to an agenda of renewal. The coming divide in world politics will not be between the United States (and the West) and the non-Western rising states. Rather, the struggle will be between those who want to renew and expand today's system of multilateral governance arrangements and those who want to move to a less cooperative order built on spheres of influence. These fault lines do not map onto geography, nor do they split the West and the non-West. There are passionate champions of the UN, the WTO, and a rule-based international order in Asia, and there are isolationist, protectionist, and anti-internationalist factions in the West. The liberal international order has succeeded over the decades because its rules and institutions have not just enshrined open trade and free markets but also provided tools for governments to manage economic and security interdependence. The agenda for the renewal of the liberal international order should be driven by this same imperative: to reinforce the capacities of national governments to govern and achieve their economic and security goals. As the hegemonic organization of the liberal international order slowly gives way, more states will have authority and status. But this will still be a world that the United States wants to inhabit. A wider array of states will share the burdens of global economic and political governance, and with its worldwide system of alliances, the United States will remain at the center of the global system. Rising states do not just grow more powerful on the global stage; they grow more powerful within their regions, and this creates its own set of worries and insecurities -- which is why states will continue to look to Washington for security and partnership. In this new age of international order, the United States will not be able to rule. But it can still lead.