2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › NATO Distrusts USA
De Luce and Bradley, 20 (Dan De Luce, reporter for the NBC News Investigative Unit, and Matt Bradley, Foreign Correspondent for NBC News, “After Trump, foreign allies wonder whether they can trust America, say former officials,” November 15, 2020, ) (NBOYLE/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)
America's partners around the world are mostly relieved that the end of 's chaotic presidency is near, but they harbor lingering doubts about Washington's reliability and are wary of the country's polarized politics even under new leadership, former foreign and U.S. diplomats say. "There's a feeling that if it can happen once, it can happen again," said James Bindenagel, a retired career U.S. diplomat who is a senior professor at Bonn University in Germany. Although governments in Europe[s] and Asia in particular are reassured by 's experience on the world stage and his vow to shore up U.S. alliances, their confidence in America's ability to deliver on its commitments has been deeply shaken, and Trump's departure won't automatically restore their faith, former diplomats said. Trump's imposition of tariffs and his talk of abandoning the NATO alliance, the foundation of trans-Atlantic ties, stunned Europeans. In talking to German officials, Bindenagel said the question he hears again and again is: "Can we trust the Americans?" As a result, Biden will have to do more than merely voice support for NATO and trans-Atlantic cooperation, Bindenagel said. "The question becomes: Can we re-establish trust? You can't do that overnight, and you can't do it with a declaration. You have to prove it," he said. Bindenagel said one way to begin to restore trust with European allies would be for Biden to reverse Trump's decision this year to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany, a move that blindsided Berlin. Biden's team has said he will review the decision. Doubts about America's staying power predate Trump. Foreign ministries now see protectionist, populist currents as permanent features of the U.S. political landscape, with Americans increasingly questioning alliance arrangements, troop commitments and the benefits of global trade. According to a 2019 Pew Research Center survey, "we should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate more on problems here at home." When Trump lost the presidential election, "you could hear the biggest sigh of relief in human history," said , Singapore's former ambassador to the United Nations and dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. But governments in Asia know that it's not possible to turn the clock back and that a deeply divided America can't guarantee that a deal reached today will still hold in four years when another president might take over, Mahbubani said. "That's the problem. That's why people will hedge their bets," he said. "There's a very high possibility that he [Trump] will get in again." Mahbubani also said American's struggle to contain the coronavirus has dented the country's image, making it look inept and incapable of managing its problems. Trump's refusal to concede defeat has also reinforced doubts about America's political health. Mindful of China's growing power, Southeast Asian countries would like Washington to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the regional trade pact that was brokered by President Barack Obama and was promptly dumped by Trump in 2017. But they recognize that's unlikely given opposition to the trade deal in the U.S. on both the left and the right, Mahbubani said. Margot Wallström, Sweden's former foreign minister, said Biden will be widely welcomed in foreign capitals as a familiar figure who will work in cooperation with other countries on climate and other common threats. "We can relax a bit in Europe and the rest of the world, because this is a person we can talk to. And everything starts with that in diplomacy and in the multilateral context," said Wallström, who was Sweden's top diplomat from 2014 to 2019.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › NATO Distrusts USA
Walt, 18 (Stephen Walt, a columnist at Foreign policy and the Robert and Renee Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard university, “NATO Isn’t What You Think It Is,” July 26, 2018, ) (NBOYLE/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)
There’s no question that Trump’s handling of NATO has been deeply disruptive, to no good purpose. After all, if you want to get tough with China on trade and do more to constrain Iran’s activities in the Middle East, a smart strategist would get Europe on your side and work constructively with them toward these ends. Trump has done precisely the opposite: tearing up the nuclear deal with Iran, starting trade wars with everyone he can think of, insulting European leaders, and driving his own image (and that of the United States) down to in years. That might suit some of America’s adversaries, but it is hard to see how it advances any of the country’s core interests or even Trump’s own stated goals. Even so, NATO’s present problems predate Trump and are largely the result of long-term structural forces. In the absence of a common, clear, and present danger, sustaining an elaborate multinational alliance was always going to be difficult, and it is in some ways a testimony to past diplomatic artistry that NATO has kept going as long as it has and despite the failures in Afghanistan and Libya and the divisions that erupted over the war in Iraq. Even if Trump had stuck with the status quo, reaffirmed the U.S. commitment, and played nicely with Europe’s leaders, it would not have reversed the gradual erosion of the trans-Atlantic partnership. A better course would have been to start a gradual, constructive, and if possible amiable decrease of the U.S. security role in Europe, making it clear to U.S. allies that Washington no longer believed it needed to maintain a security presence there and that it planned to be either completely or nearly out in five to 10 years. The United States might conceivably remain a formal member of NATO, but it would no longer station forces there, no longer insist that the supreme allied commander in Europe be a U.S. officer, and no longer expect the Europeans to fall obediently into line whenever Washington barked orders. Trade, investment, and tourism would continue, and U.S. arms manufacturers would be free to sell to European buyers if these states decided to bolster their defenses. Meanwhile, the United States would be free to focus on other problems. Contrary to what you might think, I’m not anti-European, let alone anti-NATO. The alliance was a bold achievement for its time and one that served both the United States and Europe well in the past. But as I back in 1998: “[N]othing is permanent in international affairs, and NATO’s past achievements should not blind us to its growing fragility. Instead of mindlessly extending guarantees to every potential trouble spot, and instead of basing our foreign policy on a presumption of permanent partnership, it is time for Europe and the United States to begin a slow and gradual process of disengagement. This is going to happen anyway, and wise statecraft anticipates and exploits the tides of history rather than engaging in a fruitless struggle to hold them back.” It was true back then and is even truer today.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › NATO Distrusts USA
Keck, 13 (Zachary Keck, former Managing Editor of The Diplomat, former Deputy Editor of e-International Relation, author of The Pacific Realist, and former staffer at the Center for A New American Security and in the US Congress on defense issues. “Why Don’t Allies Trust the US?,” October 29, 2013, ) (NBOYLE/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)
A series of events in recent weeks has created a widespread narrative that the U.S. is an unreliable ally and a weak partner. First, the U.S. government shutdown forced President Barack Obama to a couple of Asia summits. Then, new Edward Snowden leaks revealed that the National Security Agency has been spying on up to 35 world leaders, like German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Both events take place against a backdrop of concerns about U.S. credibility from top Middle East allies, most notably Israel and Saudi Arabia. Both countries are fearful that Washington over its nuclear program, and have taken exception to the on its various threats against the Assad regime in Syria. Taken together, the general sentiment was summarized succinctly by former Vice President Dick Cheney, when “our friends no longer count on us, no longer trust us and our adversaries don’t fear us.” Current circumstances provide a good test case into how nations calculate other countries’ credibility in general, and how the U.S. maintains and loses credibility with its allies in particular. U.S. foreign policy has often been formulated on the belief that nations will calculate U.S. credibility based almost entirely on its past actions. Indeed, huge strategic blunders like Vietnam were predicated on the arguments that the U.S. couldn’t withdraw from the fiasco without greatly concerning its other allies around the world. America’s current credibility crisis does not support this notion of credibility. Indeed, America’s post-WWII record of supporting allies in these regions is remarkable. In the Middle East, the U.S. has unflinchingly backed Israel since at least the late 1960s. Notably, when Israel faced an existential threat during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the U.S. quickly organized an arms resupply to Tel Aviv that helped empower the Israeli Defense Forces to defeat their adversaries. It also immediately approved credits to ensure Israel could pay for the weapons. It did so despite knowing full well that the Gulf States were likely to retaliate with their oil reserves. Despite the immense costs it paid for supporting Israel in 1973, America’s commitment to allies in the region has endured. Indeed, less than two decades later when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and seemed poise to continue on to Riyadh, the U.S. organized a rapid response in the form of Desert Shield. It later ejected Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and restored the royal family there. U.S. support for Western Europe in general, and Germany in particular, has been equally remarkable. Following WWII, the U.S. quickly went to work helping to repair the continent’s ravished economies. It also organized NATO to protect Western Europe from the seemingly imminent Soviet military threat. Although it has continuously prevailed on Europe to shoulder a larger burden in providing for its self-defense, its pleas have been rebuffed each and every time. The U.S. nonetheless continues to underwrite the continent’s security nearly a quarter century after the Soviet threat disappeared. The U.S. has expended considerable resources on Germany in particular. The Berlin Crises of the early Cold War were among the closest the U.S. and the Soviet Union ever came to war during their decades-long rivalry. After the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the U.S. played an integral role in helping West Germany smoothly absorb East Germany. The U.S. has an equally strong record in Asia, particularly when it comes to protecting countries that face a threat from China or its allies. Despite declaring South Korea outside of America’s security umbrella shortly before North Korea’s invasion, Washington led a UN-effort to repel Pyongyang’s attack on South Korea and restore the latter’s sovereignty. Similarly, despite long ago reaching a rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. has continued to protect Taiwan’s territorial integrity. It has done so at great cost to its relationship with Beijing, including almost coming to blows with China in the mid 1990s. Thus, the current impression in Asia, Europe and the Middle East that the U.S. is not a reliable ally cannot be based on a historical assessment of its reliability. Another theory on how nations calculate credibility comes from Daryl Press. In his book, , Press argues that states calculate the credibility of military threats made against them based on how much the other state has at stake in the dispute, as well as its capabilities to make good on its threat. If the state making the threat has a lot at stake in a dispute, and it has the necessary military capabilities to carry out the threat it has made, then the target state will view the threat as credible. If it doesn’t have much at stake in the crisis and/or if it lacks the ability to carry out its threat at an acceptable cost, then the threat will not be seen as credible. Press’ theory better explains America’s current credibility crisis, especially in the Middle East and Asia. On the one hand, regional allies in the Middle East and Asia view America’s military power as in relative decline. In the Middle East, the U.S. is quite openly trying to eschew large-scale military commitments. U.S. allies are therefore concerned that the U.S. will ultimately accept an Assad victory in Syria and cut a nuclear deal with Iran rather than make a military commitment large enough to forcibly prevent either of these outcomes. In the case of Iran, Tel Aviv and Riyadh also worry the U.S. will reach a rapprochement with Iran in order to reduce the need for a robust U.S. military presence in the region. In East Asia, the concern is that the U.S. is in decline relative to China, or at least is too unstable at home or engaged in the Middle East to make a reliable, long-term commitment to the region. Although the U.S. has never failed to protect an ally from an aggressor in the past, as China rises relative to the U.S., deterring or defending against Chinese aggression will require an ever-greater share of U.S. resources. Leaders in Asian states wonder if the U.S. is stable or committed enough to make this investment. The concern of U.S. Asian allies highlights an inherent difficulty for U.S. credibility. Namely, as a regional hegemon, U.S. allies are inevitably more dependent on Washington than Washington is on them. Furthermore, regional states always have more at stake in regional developments than the U.S. does. To be sure, it is in the U.S. national interest to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon or China from dominating the Western Pacific. However, an Iranian nuclear bomb is by nature a much greater direct threat to Saudi Arabia and Israel than it is to the U.S. The same is true in Asia with China’s rise. Although the U.S. has a strong interest in preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon, it is a much more indirect than the interest U.S. regional allies have. Whereas China’s regional hegemony would mean the subjugation of its neighbors and their loss of sovereignty, for the U.S. it would only increase the potential for China to cause problems in other regions of the globe, including the Western Hemisphere. If history is any guide, and I believe it is, then this indirect threat is enough to keep the U.S. strongly engaged in the Western Pacific. Still, U.S. allies in the region have everything at stake in this game, and they therefore must always fear that the U.S. will decide to retreat behind the enormous protective barrier that is the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. can take various steps to lessen ally concerns about this potential, but it cannot eliminate them entirely. And thus, the U.S. can never be entirely credible in the eyes of its allies.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › External Issues Gut NATO Coop › NATO Distrusts USA
China Daily 12-07-2020 https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202012/07/WS5fcd97f1a31024ad0ba9a417.html, "Difficult for NATO to reach consensus," No Publication (RyleeR/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)
As the European countries are seeking more independence in diplomacy and security issues, the US' leadership in the organization and its ability to balance the interests of relevant parties in it is weakening. No wonder French President Emmanuel Macron once said that NATO is "brain-dead".
Originally, the subject of this video conference was neither the Eastern Mediterranean nor the relationship between Turkey and the United States.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › NATO Fails – Tech Areas › Tensions disrupt tech coop
General Philip Breedlove (U.S.AF, ret.), 2-25-2019, Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 2013 to 2016 and is now a distinguished professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Dr. Margaret Kosal is an associate professor at the Sam Nunn School, where she focuses on technology, strategy, and governance.https://www.hoover.org/research/emerging-technologies-and-national-security-russia-nato-european-theater, "Emerging Technologies and National Security: Russia, NATO, & the European Theater," Hoover Institution (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
With respect for the need to be strategic, this potential barrier reflects the need for effective science diplomacy to reach outside of science. Rarely, if ever, does science and technology itself drive foreign policy; the potential national security, economic, or other national- and international-level consequences of the application of science and technology to human endeavors is where science intersects with policy predominantly. Science and technology can be causal, intervening, or determinant factors. The ability to recognize, communicate, and identify nodes for intervention, change, or influence are strategic requirements for effective science diplomacy.
Most international legal and regulatory approaches to technologies and to emerging technologies—robotics, biotechnologies, synthetic genomics, gain of function research, nanotechnology, cognitive neurosciences, hypersonics, AI—are still driven by 20th-Century (or earlier) conceptions and institutions. Past methods for other technologies that do not take into account the international nature of the science and the industry are not adequate. Any international regime or approach must be interdisciplinary in focus, cognizant of the multi-polar post-Cold War world, and appreciate the role of private funders, commercial development, and transnational corporations. To be clear, there’s a lot of good in the arms control and nonproliferation existing institutions. Rather, these challenges are primarily political rather than technical. Being able to navigate and affect policy at the interface of science and international affairs is where we have immense value.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › NATO Fails – Tech Areas › LAWS Disputes
Brian Michelson, 2-23-2021, "Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards," CEPA, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc:6-28-2022)
While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.“ While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have of how to handle them. NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of authority. The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were . Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wrong? If this framework is not thoroughly established ahead of time, not only is it likely that commanders may hesitate to use this capability, the risk-aversion inherent in bureaucracies may limit the development of autonomous weapons that will be needed in future conflicts. In the emerging field of lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO’s capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › NATO Fails – Tech Areas › LAWS Disputes
Joe Hernandez, 6-1-2021, "A Military Drone With A Mind Of Its Own Was Used In Combat, U.N. Says," NPR.org, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)
Military-grade autonomous drones can fly themselves to a specific location, pick their own targets and kill without the assistance of a remote human operator. Such weapons are known to be in development, but until recently there were no reported cases of autonomous drones killing fighters on the battlefield. Now, a United Nations report about a March 2020 skirmish in the military conflict in Libya says such a drone, known as a lethal autonomous weapons system — or LAWS — has made its wartime debut. But the report does not say explicitly that the LAWS killed anyone. "If anyone was killed in an autonomous attack, it would likely represent an historic first known case of artificial intelligence-based autonomous weapons being used to kill," Zachary Kallenborn in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The assault came during fighting between the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord and forces aligned with Gen. Khalifa Haftar, according to the by the U.N. Panel of Experts on Libya. "Logistics convoys and retreating [Haftar-affiliated forces] were subsequently hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 ... and other loitering munitions," the panel wrote.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › NATO Fails – Tech Areas › LAWS Disputes
Jamie Dettmer, 6-7-2021, "Possible First Use of AI-Armed Drones Triggers Alarm Bells ," VOA, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)
A report by a United Nations panel of experts issued last week that concluded an advanced drone deployed in Libya “hunted down and remotely engaged” soldiers fighting for Libyan general Khalifa Haftar has prompted a frenetic debate among Western security officials and analysts. Governments at the United Nations have been debating for months whether a global pact should be agreed on the use of armed drones, autonomous and otherwise, and what restrictions should be placed on them. The U.N.’s Libya report is adding urgency to the debate. Drone advances have “a lot of implications regionally and globally,” says Ziya Meral of the Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, a defense think tank. “It is time to assess where things are with Turkish drones and advanced warfare technology and what this means for the region and what it means for NATO,” he said at a RUSI-hosted event in London. According to the U.N. report, Turkish-made Kargu-2 lethal autonomous aircraft launched so-called swarm attacks, likely on behalf of Libya’s Government of National Accord, against the warlord Haftar’s militias in March last year, marking the first time AI-equipped drones accomplished a successful attack. Remnants of a Kargu-2 were recovered later. The use of autonomous drones that do not require human operators to guide them remotely once they have been programmed is opposed by many human rights organizations. There were rumors that Turkish-supplied AI drones, alongside remote-guided ones, were used last year by Azerbaijani forces in their clashes with Armenia in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding territories.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › NATO Fails – Tech Areas › LAWS Disputes
Melissa Heikkilä, 3-29-2021, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)
The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.”
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › NATO Fails – Tech Areas › Biotech
NPA, 7-4-2021, NATO Parliamentary Assembly https://www.nato-pa.int/news/virtual-visit-france-nato-parliamentarians-discuss-space-security-biotech-advances-and-nato-st, "NATO PA," In virtual visit to France, NATO Parliamentarians discuss space security, biotech advances and NATO S&T cooperation | NATO PA (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
lisande Nexon, Senior Research Fellow at the French Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), noted that the international community has witnessed how biotechnology can help address healthcare issues in the context of COVID-19. Similar impacts, she argued, could be seen in areas like agriculture, environmental industries, or the materials industry. Still, she said, the stakes are high, as there are a variety of risks inherent in biotechnology, including laboratory leaks, environmental spill over effects and ethical issues.
Both experts cautioned against a blanket approach to the banning of certain biotechnologies or the prevention of their development as a whole. An appropriate approach would instead be to focus on legislation and multilateral cooperation**,** the Committee was informed. Ms Nexon emphasised that “we need to promote international cooperation and information exchange,” adding that difficulties exist because, “there are significant differences between states – whether national interests, regulations, views on [human rights], and financial resources.” The promotion of information exchanges, emphasis on improved transparency, and a general effort to raise awareness with the public of potential risks inherent in biotechnologies are all valid lines of action, she argued. To that end, NATO Allies should “train, regulate and encourage scientists to adhere to these approaches, and to evaluate risks and threats regularly with academia and scientists. It is important that we are able to recognise whether [an incident related to biotechnology] was accidental or deliberate, and whether we can attribute responsibility to a human actor […].”
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › NATO Fails – Tech Areas › Biotech
Michael Moran, 2012, Professor Emeritus of Government, University of Manchester – Chair, Nuffield Council on Bioethics https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/Emerging_biotechnologies_full_report_web_0.pdf, " Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good" Nuffield Council on Bioethics (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
4.12 Different cultures and religions have found ways of ordering living beings so as to express their relative importance but also, significantly, their continuity as a class (i.e. the relatedness, by intermediate steps or degrees of genetic similarity, of all living beings). The ‘great chain of being’ developed in medieval Christianity, for example, with God at its head and other beings arranged in descending degrees of perfection, has its roots in Plato and Aristotle; Darwinian evolution, and modern genetics similarly emphasise both continuity and difference in their theories of descent and inheritance. The distinctive autonomy of living beings is apparent in the often complex ways in which living things interact with and transform themselves and their environment, and by their powers of reproduction, allowing natural purposes – or ‘ends’ – to be imputed to them. Notions of a natural order, harmony and ends are deeply engrained in almost all cultures and bind groups and societies powerfully together. The term ‘the wisdom of repugnance’ has been coined to evoke and enjoin a shared sense of distaste for certain biotechnological practices that appear ‘contrary to nature’ in this sense.260 This notion is close to what, from a less sympathetic perspective, is often referred to as the ‘yuck factor’.261 Where such sentiments are widely shared they can form a powerful basis for moral restraint and, indeed, for positive legislation262; however, where there are moral disagreements, moral arguments can quickly reach an impasse (since my sentiment towards a given action does not logically contradict your different sentiment).
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › NATO Fails – Tech Areas › Best 1NC Ev
Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, Dec 2020, is the Executive Director of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship and the Future of Diplomacy Project at Harvard Kennedy School David Sanger is an Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and Senior Fellow in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; National Security Correspondent at The New York Timeshttps://www.belfercenter.org/publication/stronger-together-strategy-revitalize-transatlantic-power, "Stronger Together: A Strategy to Revitalize Transatlantic Power," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
More importantly, the Europeans have largely been unable to bridge policy divides at home—among member states and between NATO and the EU. Rather than cooperate internally, and with the U.S. on how to use an array of new technologies to defend NATO nations, Europeans have been doggedly focused on protecting the privacy of Europeans—highlighting a difference in cultural values across the Atlantic. While a critical concern, it has often replaced a laser-like focus on the competitiveness of Europe’s own civilian technology sector. Meanwhile, Americans have focused intently on limiting China’s technological reach, but have done so unilaterally, without taking the time to bring Europeans along as full partners in the development of a strategy. It has been a bad combination. Late to the realization of the scope and ambition of China’s strategic deployment of technology, surveillance and disinformation, Europe is only now beginning to consider a common strategy to address these interlinked issues.
The results are obvious. Rather than focus on the connections between technology and the risks to liberal democracy, common goals in artificial intelligence, data protection or the proper use and limits on offensive cyber weapons, allies have spent their time arguing about taxes, regulatory differences, antitrust and standard-setting. No structured, strategically organized transatlantic dialogue currently exists to map joint goals in emerging technologies, from artificial intelligence to autonomous vehicles and factories, aerospace, biotechnology or Fifth Generation networks.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Econ defense
Clary 15 (Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)
Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles.
2022
SDI
Disadvantage
Affirmative Answers › Econ defense
Caldara and Lacoviello 18 – Dario, Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Matteo, Federal Reserve Board of Governors. “Measuring Geopolitical Risk”, International Finance Discussions Papers, , 02-xx-2018
We identify the structural shocks by using a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the VAR reduced-form residuals, ordering the GPR index first. The ordering implies that the GPR index reacts contemporaneously only to its own shock. Hence, any contemporaneous correlation between the macro variables and the GPR index reflects the effect of the GPR index on the macro variables. The characteristics of the GPR index discussed in Section 2—as well as the comparison to the EPU index in Section 3—lend support to this assumption. For instance, Jackson and Morelli (2011) list religion, revenge, ethnic cleansing, and bargaining failure over resources as the main reasons for armed conflicts. Although recessions, lower commodity prices, or dismal economic performance might in some cases have exacerbated existing geopolitical tensions, it seems reasonable to assume that movements in economic variables within a month have little bearing on geopolitical risks. Nonetheless, in Section A.4 in the Appendix we explore robustness to an alternative Cholesky ordering, as well as to alternative specifications of the baseline VAR model.
The solid lines in Figure 9 show the median impulse responses to an exogenous increase in the GPR index of 167 points, while the light- and dark-shaded areas represent the corresponding 68 percent and 90 percent pointwise credible bands, respectively. The size of the shock equals the average change in the index following the nine episodes of largest increases in the GPR index.29 The rise in the GPR index induces a small and short-lived increase in the EPU index and a decline in consumer sentiment. Intuitively, geopolitical risk can induce some economic policy uncertainty on items such as national security and the fiscal budget and negatively weigh on consumer sentiment. On the real side, IP declines quickly, bottoming out at negative 0.9 percent after about 6 months, before reverting back to trend. The deterioration in labor market conditions is substantial but more gradual, with payroll employment reaching a trough of negative 0.4 percent a year after the shock. Gross trade also drops, with U.S. imports and exports falling nearly 2 percent relative to the baseline. Figure A.7 in the Appendix plots the response of private investment to a GPR shock, based on an extension of the baseline model estimated on quarterly data. The economically significant decline in investment following a GPR shock, together with the decline in employment, is consistent with models of investment under uncertainty a la Dixit and Pindyck (1994).30
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Affirmative Answers › Econ defense
Liao 19 – Jianan, Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School, China. “Business Cycle and War: A Literature Review and Evaluation”, Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, International Symposium on Social Science and Management Innovation, Vol. 68, , 02-xx-2019
Academic researches on the relationship between business cycle and war are particularly rich, all of which can be divided into two major categories. One is the relationship between economic rise and war, and the other is the relationship between economic recession and war. Through the simple description and comparison of the two types of standpoints, the author divides economic upturn into recovery phase and expansion phase, and economic recession into recession phase and crisis phase, all of which have motivations as well as conditions enabling wars to break out. Therefore, the outbreak of war shall never be simply attributed to either economic rise or recession.
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Affirmative Answers › Econ defense
Walt 20 – Stephen M, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, Foreign Policy, , 05-13-2020
One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term. To be sure, I can’t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days. So there is no guarantee that we won’t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting. But given that it’s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history, I’m going to hope I’m right about this one.
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Affirmative Answers › BizCon not key
Bagrie ’18 [Cameron; 8/9/18; Managing Director @ Bagrie Economics; “Business Confidence Is a Hopeless Indicator. But That Doesn’t Mean the Economy Isn’t in Trouble”; https://thespinoff.co.nz/business/09-08-2018/business-confidence-is-bullshit-but-that-doesnt-mean-the-economy-isnt-in-trouble]
The good news is that business confidence is hopeless as an economic indicator. The correlation with economic growth is poor and I largely ignore business confidence readings. Changes in direction can provide some insightful information – whether things are picking up or slowing down, but not the levels.
Businesses tend to be more upbeat regarding general confidence about the economy under a blue flag as opposed to a red one. Business confidence averaged minus 18 between 2000 and 2007. The economy (measured by real gross domestic product) grew on average by more than 3.5% per year. Yep, confidence was negative, but growth was positive. So, we ignore business confidence as an economic indicator. This is nothing new. It’s surprising headline business confidence figures receive so much attention.
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Affirmative Answers › BizCon not key
Cameron Bagrie 18, Managing Director of Bagrie Economics, “Business confidence is a hopeless indicator. But that doesn't mean the economy isn't in trouble,” Spinoff, 8-9-2018, https://thespinoff.co.nz/business/09-08-2018/business-confidence-is-bullshit-but-that-doesnt-mean-the-economy-isnt-in-trouble/
The good news is that business confidence is hopeless as an economic indicator. The correlation with economic growth is poor and I largely ignore business confidence readings. Changes in direction can provide some insightful information – whether things are picking up or slowing down, but not the levels.
Businesses tend to be more upbeat regarding general confidence about the economy under a blue flag as opposed to a red one. Business confidence averaged minus 18 between 2000 and 2007. The economy (measured by real gross domestic product) grew on average by more than 3.5% per year. Yep, confidence was negative, but growth was positive. So, we ignore business confidence as an economic indicator. This is nothing new. It’s surprising headline business confidence figures receive so much attention’
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Affirmative Answers › Thumpers
IHS Markit 3/29, (IHS Markit (Nasdaq: INFO) is a world leader in critical information, analytics and solutions for the major industries and markets that drive economies worldwide, 3-29-2022, 3-29-2022, < https://seekingalpha.com/article/4498323-ukraine-war-hits-business-confidence-drives-price-pressures-to-new-highs > Blucas
While Russia's invasion of Ukraine had only a minor adverse impact on business output across the four largest developed economies in March, its impact was more evident on business confidence. Across the G4, business expectations of output in the coming 12 months slumped to the lowest since December 2020, sliding in all four economies but most notably in the eurozone. Future expectations hit 17-month lows in both the eurozone and UK, with 14- and five-month lows recorded in Japan and the US respectively. Anecdotal evidence from the surveys revealed that the invasion had exacerbated existing concerns over supply chains, prices and a potential slowing of economic growth as the pandemic rebound faded.
Ukraine war crushes business confidence
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Affirmative Answers › Thumpers
Melanie C. Nolen, 6-13 (Melanie C. Nolen, 6-13-2022, ChiefExecutive.net, CEO Confidence Falls To Decade Low, But Few Predict Recession, https://chiefexecutive.net/ceo-confidence-falls-to-decade-low-but-few-predict-recession/, 6-15-2022) SCade
Nearly 300 U.S. CEOs participated in Chief Executive’s CEO Confidence Index poll in June, sharing their prospect of the U.S. economy and business landscape. While their ratings of current business conditions remained flat month-over-month, at 6.4 out of 10, their forecast for business 12 months from now dropped another 6 percent, down to 5.6/10 from 5.9/10 in May. That reading is now 20 percent off where it was at the beginning of the year, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when CEOs told us they were increasingly hopeful that persistent issues in the supply chain and growing inflation—and even Covid-19—would wind down this year. It is the lowest level it’s been since January 2013, on the heels of the “Fiscal Cliff” drama in Washington and ahead of further debt ceiling negotiations. CEOs say it’s the uncertainty of the situation more than specific issues that is driving their forecast down, although the list of concerns they shared continues to grow each month. Among those: market volatility, a chaotic geopolitical scene, uncontrolled inflation, record-high oil prices, and continued labor and supply chain shortages are all adding to the mix fueling doubts over the future. “The economy runs on oil, and until we get more, things are not getting better,” said Darrel Box, CEO at Lafayette Regional Health Center in Lexington, Missouri, who also lists labor and supply costs and shortages as reasons for his 4 out of 10 rating of business conditions 12 months from now (considered “Weak” according to our 10-point scale points). “Supply chain issues remain and do not seem to be getting any better,” said the CEO of an electronic component manufacturer participating in the poll. “Finding people is another major problem, so even if we find the parts, we will still have issues executing.”