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2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 2AC---Genome Sequencing Bad

Genome Sequencing Creates a New and more deadly Type of Warfare

Foley 13. (Mackenzie Foley (?). “Genetically Engineered Bioweapons: A New Breed of Weapons for Modern Warfare.” Dartmouth Journal of Undergrad Science, March 10, 2013. Applied Sciences Winter 2013. . Last Accessed: June 28, 2022. shARK.) 

Genome sequencing has given rise to a new generation of genetically engineered bioweapons carrying the potential to change the nature of modern warfare and defense. Introduction: Biological weapons are designed to spread disease among people, plants, and animals through the introduction of toxins and microorganisms such as viruses and bacteria. The method through which a biological weapon is deployed depends on the agent itself, its preparation, its durability, and the route of infection. Attackers may disperse these agents through aerosols or food and water supplies (1). Although bioweapons have been used in war for many centuries, a recent surge in genetic understanding, as well as a rapid growth in computational power, has allowed genetic engineering to play a larger role in the development of new bioweapons. In the bioweapon industry, genetic engineering can be used to manipulate genes to create new pathogenic characteristics aimed at enhancing the efficacy of the weapon through increased survivability, infectivity, virulence, and drug resistance (2). While the positive societal implications of improved biotechnology are apparent, the “black biology” of bioweapon development may be “one of the gravest threats we will face” (2). Limits of Past Bioweapons. Prior to recent advances in genetic engineering, bioweapons were exclusively natural pathogens. Agents must fulfill numerous prerequisites to be considered effective military bioweapons, and most naturally occurring pathogens are ill suited for this purpose (3). First, bioweapons must be produced in large quantities. A pathogen can be obtained from the natural environment if enough can be collected to allow purification and testing of its properties. Otherwise, pathogens could be produced in a microbiology laboratory or bank, a process which is limited by pathogen accessibility and the safety with which the pathogens can be handled in facilities. To replicate viruses and some bacteria, living cells are required. The growth of large quantities of an agent can be limited by equipment, space, and the health risks associated with the handling of hazardous germs (1). In addition to large-scale production, effective bioweapons must act quickly, be environmentally robust, and their effects must be treatable for those who are implementing the bioweapon (3). Recent Advances. As researchers continue to transition from the era of DNA sequencing into the era of DNA synthesis, it may soon become feasible to synthesize any virus whose DNA sequence is known (4). This was first demonstrated in 2001 when Dr. Eckard Wimmer re-created the poliovirus and again in 2005 when Dr. Jeffrey Taubenberger and Terrence Tumpey re-created the 1918 influenza virus (1). The progress of DNA synthesis technology will also allow for the creation of novel pathogens. According to biological warfare expert Dr. Steven Block, genetically engineered pathogens “could be made safer to handle, easier to distribute, capable of ethnic specificity, or be made to cause higher mortality rates” (2). The growing accessibility of DNA synthesis capabilities, computational power, and information means that a growing number of people will have the capacity to produce bioweapons. Scientists have been able to transform the four letters of DNA—A (adenine), C (cytosine), G (guanine), and T (thymine)—into the ones and zeroes of binary code. This transformation makes genetic engineering a matter of electronic manipulation, which decreases the cost of the technique (4). According to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “the emerging gene synthesis industry is making genetic material more widely available […] A crude but effective terrorist weapon can be made using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology.” (5) Techniques to Enhance Efficacy of Bioweapons Scientists and genetic engineers are considering several techniques to increase the efficacy of pathogens in warfare. 1. Binary Biological Weapons This technique involves inserting plasmids, small bacterial DNA fragments, into the DNA of other bacteria in order to increase virulence or other pathogenic properties within the host bacteria (2). 2. Designer Genes according to the European Bioinformatics Institute, as of December 2012, scientists had sequenced the genomes of 3139 viruses, 1016 plasmids, and 2167 bacteria, some of which are published on the internet and are therefore accessible to the public (6). With complete genomes available and the aforementioned advances in gene synthesis, scientists will soon be able to design pathogens by creating synthetic genes, synthetic viruses, and possibly entirely new organisms (2). 3. Gene Therapy Gene therapy involves repairing or replacing a gene of an organism, permanently changing its genetic composition. By replacing existing genes with harmful genes, this technique can be used to manufacture bioweapons (2). 4. Stealth Viruses Stealth viruses are viral infections that enter cells and remain dormant for an extended amount of time until triggered externally to cause disease. In the context of warfare, these viruses could be spread to a large population, and activation could either be delayed or used as a threat for blackmail (2).5. Host-Swapping Diseases Much like the naturally occurring West Nile and Ebola viruses, animal viruses could potentially be genetically modified and developed to infect humans as a potent biowarfare tactic (2). 6. Designer Diseases Biotechnology may be used to manipulate cellular mechanisms to cause disease. For example, an agent could be designed to induce cells to multiply uncontrollably, as in cancer, or to initiate apoptosis, programmed cell death (2). 7. Personalized Bioweapons In coming years it may be conceivable to design a pathogen that targets a specific person’s genome. This agent may spread through populations showing minimal or no symptoms, yet it would be fatal to the intended target (4). Biodefense In addition to creating bioweapons, the emerging tools of genetic knowledge and biological technology may be used as a means of defense against these weapons. 1. Human Genome Literacy As scientific research continues to reveal the functions of specific genes and how genetic components affect disease in humans, vaccines and drugs can be designed to combat particular pathogens based on analysis of their particular molecular effect on the human cell (2). 2. Immune System Enhancement In addition to enabling more effective drug development, human genome literacy allows for a better understanding of the immune system. Thus, genetic engineering can be used to enhance human immune response to pathogens. As an example, Dr. Ken Alibek is conducting cellular research in pursuit of protection against the bioweapon anthrax (2). 3. Viral and Bacterial Genome Literacy Decoding the genomes of viruses and bacteria will lead to molecular explanations behind virulence and drug resistance. With this information, bacteria can be engineered to produce bioregulators against pathogens. For example, Xoma Corporation has patented a bactericidal/permeability-increasing (BPI) protein, made from genes inserted into bacterial DNA, which reverses the resistance characteristic of particular bacteria against some popular antibiotics (2). 4. Efficient Bio-Agent Detection and Identification Equipment Because the capability of comparing genomes using DNA assays has already been acquired, such technology may be developed to identify pathogens using information from bacterial and viral genomes. Such a detector could be used to identify the composition of bioweapons based on their genomes, reducing present-day delays in resultant treatment and/or preventive measures (2). 5. New Vaccines Current scientific research projects involve genetic manipulation of viruses to create vaccines that provide immunity against multiple diseases with a single treatment (2). 6. New Antibiotics and Antiviral Drugs Currently, antibiotic drugs target DNA synthesis, protein synthesis, and cell-wall synthesis processes in bacterial cells. With an increased understanding of microbial genomes, other proteins essential to bacterial viability can be targeted to create new classes of antibiotics. Eventually, broad-spectrum, rather than protein-specific, anti-microbial drugs may be developed (2). Future of Warfare The revolution in molecular biology and biotechnology can be considered as a potential Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA),” states Colonel Michael Ainscough, MD, MPH (2). According to Andrew Krepinevich, who originally coined the term RMA, “technological advancement, incorporation of this new technology into military systems, military operational advancement, and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict” are the four components that make up an RMA. For instance, the Gulf War has been classified as the beginning of the space information warfare RMA. “From the technological advances in biotechnology, biowarfare with genetically engineered pathogens may constitute a future such RMA,” says Ainscough (2). In addition, the exponential increase in computational power combined with the accessibility of genetic information and biological tools to the general public and lack of governmental regulation raise concerns about the threat of biowarfare arising from outside the military (7). The US government has cited the efforts of terrorist networks, such as al Qaida, to recruit scientists capable of creating bioweapons as a national security concern and “has urged countries to be more open about their efforts to clamp down on the threat of bioweapons” (5). Despite these efforts, biological research that can potentially lead to bioweapon development is “far more international, far more spread out, and far more diverse than nuclear science […] researchers communicate much more rapidly with one another by means that no government can control […] this was not true in the nuclear era,” according to David Kay, former chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq (7). Kay is “extraordinarily pessimistic that we [the United States] will take any of the necessary steps to avoid the threat of bioweapons absent their first actual use” (7). “There are those who say: ‘the First World War was chemical; the Second World War was nuclear; and that the Third World War – God forbid – will be biological’” (2).

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 1AC

The Aff solves – banning use of germline means that equipment and ease of access severely decreases

Barry Pavel and Vikram Venkatram , 21, (Barry Pavel, Barry Pavel is the senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Barry Pavel was a career member of the Senior Executive Service in the Officer of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for almost eighteen years. From October 2008 to July 2010, he served as the special assistant to the President and senior director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, serving both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Prior to this, Pavel was the chief of staff and principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities. From October 1993 to November 2006, Pavel also led or contributed to a broad range of defense strategy and planning initiatives for both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. In this capacity, Pavel supported post-9/11 deterrence policy (including deterrence of terrorist networks and regional nuclear powers); strategies for reducing ungoverned areas; and a long-range planning construct that accounts for trends and “strategic shocks” that could significantly change Department of Defense’s role in national security. Vikram Venkatram is a Young Global Professional in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Forward Defense at the Atlantic Council. He is a recent graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, where he studied Science, Technology, and International Affairs with a minor in Biology. He is also currently a second-year graduate student in Georgetown’s Security Studies Program. Originally from San Jose, California, his main interests lie in biosecurity issues, ranging from pandemic preparedness to emerging biotechnology to environmental security to bioethics., 9-7-2021, Atlantic Council, Facing the future of bioterrorism, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/facing-the-future-of-bioterrorism/, 7-1-2022) SCade

However, greater access to cheap but powerful biotechnology tools—and a reduced need for expertise in operating those tools—also is making it easier for malicious actors to utilize that technology for ill. Terrorist groups could use synthetic biology to craft bioweapons, using data to manufacture dangerous pathogens or modifying easily accessible pathogens to make them more virulent. At present, there are still some barriers to entry that prevent such actors from operating with free reign, as widespread access to certain pathogens, tools, and data is still limited. But these barriers will only continue to recede over the next decade. In evaluating the future of terrorism and counterterrorism, one must consider: How should the United States and its allies prepare to face the growing threat of bioterrorism?

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 1AC

Biological weapons are just as destructive as nukes but are enormously easier to develop – extinction

Yelena Biberman, 21, (Yelena Biberman, Fall 2021, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “The Technologies and International Politics of Genetic Warfare”, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-3/Biberman.pdf, 6-30-2022) SCade

Biological weapons have always been more accessible than nuclear ones. However, with genetic engineering increasingly solving the problems of weaponization, delivery, and precision, Ebola expert Karl Johnson predicts that “any crackpot with a few thousand dollars’ worth of equipment and a college biology education under his belt could manufacture bugs that would make Ebola look like a walk around the park.”88 Predictions about genetic warfare would benefit from identifying the closest parallels and then adjusting and synthesizing the ensuing models. Genetic weapons have the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, but their ease of development is akin to cyber weapons. Both genetic and cyber warfare require inexpensive equipment and only a college-level understanding of these fields. Unlike nuclear weapons that demand enormous engineering expertise, a small team can develop and hone cyber and genetic weapons using common equipment.89

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 1AC

And Human bioengineering resolves agent and delivery issues

Yelena Biberman, 21, (Yelena Biberman, Fall 2021, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “The Technologies and International Politics of Genetic Warfare”, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-3/Biberman.pdf, 6-30-2022) SCade

Delivery problems have made biological weapons tactically unappealing.51 Effective delivery requires the deadly agent to reach its target. Doing so requires a robust agent and a reliable delivery mechanism. New technologies are enabling both. Most bacterial and viral agents struggle to maintain their virulence when confronted with common environmental factors, such as sunlight and humidity, and high temperatures or radical temperature changes. They also evolve and mutate. Genetic instability is typical for microorganisms. With increased transmissibility often comes reduced virulence. Production of virus molecules involves passage through host organisms. As the virus is not subject to any evolutionary pressure to maintain virulence during this scaling-up process, it tends to accumulate mutations that generate an attenuated strain. Similarly, bacteria cultured in laboratories tend to lose virulence.52 Gene editing and synthetic biology research are making strides in overcoming the problem of genetic instability. A study published in 2019 presented a new system, CRISPR-BEST. It created mutations in actinomycetes (bacteria that produce a wide variety of industrially and medically relevant compounds) without creating genetic instability and forcing them to rearrange and even delete large parts of their chromosomes.53 Synthetic biology is also increasingly embracing genetic instability rather than trying to suppress or compensate for it. With improved understanding, it is expected to design devices that incorporate genetic instability as a parameter.54 Such devices would be “a true frontier in biological engineering.”55

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 1AC

And the US is insufficiently prepared to deal with bioterror threats – COVID proved

Dr Pin Lean Lau, 21, (Dr Pin Lean Lau, Dr Pin Lean Lau is a Lecturer in Bio-Law at Brunel University London, 11-15-2021, Brunel University London, Zombie apocalypse? How gene editing could be used as a weapon – and what to do about it, https://www.brunel.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/articles/Zombie-apocalypse-How-gene-editing-could-be-used-as-a-weapon-%E2%80%93-and-what-to-do-about-it, 6-29-2022) SCade

It has been over a year since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic. And perhaps the most important lesson is that we were completely unprepared to face the debilitating virus. This raises some scary thoughts. What if the threat wasn’t COVID-19, but a gene-edited pathogen designed to turn us into zombies – ghost-like, agitated creatures with little awareness of our surroundings? With recent advances in gene editing, it may be possible for bioterrorists to design viruses capable of altering our behaviour, spreading such a disease and ultimately killing us. And chances are we still wouldn’t be sufficiently prepared to deal with it. A zombie apocalypse may sound far-fetched, reserved for the annals of graphic novels, immersive gaming experiences and popular culture. But there are examples of “zombification” in nature. Perhaps the most well known is rabies, which can cause aggression and hallucination and is almost always fatal once symptoms appear. But there are others. A recently discovered kind of wasp, for example, can turn a particular species of spider (Anelosimus eximius) into “zombies” by laying eggs on their abdomen. The resulting larvae then attaches itself to the spider, feeding on it, while the spider, once a social individual, leaves the colony and prepares to die alone. Other zombification examples from nature include the African sleeping sickness, a fatal neurological condition created by insect-borne parasites, and the Ophiocordyceps unilateralis fungus, which changes the behaviour of carpenter ants before killing them and sprouting out of their heads.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 3 - Bioterrorism › 1AC

United States action with NATO is necessary to create international norms banning the use of bioengineering

Barry Pavel and Vikram Venkatram , 21, (Barry Pavel, Barry Pavel is the senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Barry Pavel was a career member of the Senior Executive Service in the Officer of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for almost eighteen years. From October 2008 to July 2010, he served as the special assistant to the President and senior director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, serving both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Prior to this, Pavel was the chief of staff and principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities. From October 1993 to November 2006, Pavel also led or contributed to a broad range of defense strategy and planning initiatives for both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. In this capacity, Pavel supported post-9/11 deterrence policy (including deterrence of terrorist networks and regional nuclear powers); strategies for reducing ungoverned areas; and a long-range planning construct that accounts for trends and “strategic shocks” that could significantly change Department of Defense’s role in national security. Vikram Venkatram is a Young Global Professional in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Forward Defense at the Atlantic Council. He is a recent graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, where he studied Science, Technology, and International Affairs with a minor in Biology. He is also currently a second-year graduate student in Georgetown’s Security Studies Program. Originally from San Jose, California, his main interests lie in biosecurity issues, ranging from pandemic preparedness to emerging biotechnology to environmental security to bioethics., 9-7-2021, Atlantic Council, Facing the future of bioterrorism, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/facing-the-future-of-bioterrorism/, 7-1-2022) SCade

Given the broad scope and scale of this growing threat, the United States should take a series of actions to mitigate the risks, without unduly stunting the growth of the biotechnology field. To date, bioterrorist attacks have been low-risk, high-impact events. While they have been extremely rare, their frequency will only increase as will their ramifications. However, overregulating the spread of biotechnological tools could stunt innovation and the profound potential of this increasingly important sector. Furthermore, existing methods of preventing bioterrorism may no longer be effective. The government could previously monitor the purchase of expensive and dangerous biotechnology tools and the laboratories that owned them in large quantities. This is no longer possible to the same degree when such tools are increasingly cheap, widespread, and usable in a garage. The FBI is currently attempting to address this risk by building relationships with the iGEM community and with life scientists so that they can report suspicious behavior. These efforts should continue, but are wildly insufficient, since some bioterrorists may have minimal contact with the larger community of biologists and biology hobbyists. The release of a bioweapon by a terrorist, if left unchecked, could spread throughout the globe, just as a naturally occurring pandemic would. Thus, one major step that the United States should take is to establish improved responses to disease outbreaks, particularly learning from COVID-19. This should include building a larger stockpile of PPE and establishing a set of clear step-by-step actions to be taken in the event of an attack. Building resilience in this fashion will not prevent bioterrorism, but it will mitigate its effects, and may slightly disincentivize utilizing bioweapons to cause terror. Beyond this, the United States should secure its laboratories and the data within, as terrorists could leverage that knowledge to build bioweapons. For example, new technology allows pathogens to be synthesized from the data describing their genetic sequences. In a recent controversial study, scientists published a methodology that would allow horsepox virus, a virus very similar to one that causes smallpox, to be synthesized. This research was conducted with a noble goal: understanding how the horsepox virus could be used as a potential treatment for cancer. However, it had significant dual-use implications. Research like this should not be banned outright, but the United States should establish norms to evaluate whether it is worth the risk before such research is conducted, and then ensure that it is conducted and the results published in the most secure ways. Replicability is an important part of science, but the general public should not be able to replicate the most dangerous experiments. Where building resilience would reduce the impact of a bioterror incident, restricting access to dual-use methodologies will reduce the likelihood of one occurring in the first place. Finally, enforcing domestic standards is not enough. Pathogens spread across borders, and the spillover effects of even a targeted bioterrorist attack could kill many unintended victims. Thus, the United States must work with other countries to protect against the bioterrorist threat, monitor the emergence of new viruses and bacteria that could be leveraged for a bioweapon, limit access to the most dangerous pathogens (and data associated with those), and build global response networks in the event of an attack. Importantly, this collaboration should emphasize working with allies, but should also include adversaries: if China or Russia remain unregulated, an attack within their borders would still affect the United States and its allies. Emerging biotechnology will result in new medicines and medical techniques, a greater understanding of how pathogens function and spread (and thus a better understanding of how to combat them), a healthier populace, innovative new capabilities that could transform daily life, and greater engagement with the biological sciences. While ensuring that these benefits are maintained, the United States and its allies and partners must take logical steps to protect themselves from the worst-case scenarios. The risk of bioterrorism is growing, and the United States must be prepared to face the future.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 2 – Extension › Inequality Impacts

Inequality-driven collapse escalates global hotspots, including reactor meltdowns. Its an existential threat.

Mathew Maavak April 2021, Author at Atlas Institute for International Affairs, external researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University in Vilnius, Lithuania, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?,” Salus Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 2-17

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and self- sustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. Methodology An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. Economy According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid-2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. Environmental What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade. Geopolitical The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction- adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 2 – Extension › Inequality Impacts

Inequality furthers global warming – prevents needed action

UN 3 September 2016 https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/wess-policy-brief-the-nexus-between-climate-change-and-inequalities/

Climate change and inequality are two of the most important challenges currently faced by the international community. An extensive review of the evidence in the World Economic and Social Survey 2016: climate change resilience, an opportunity for reducing inequalities suggests that the impacts of climate change and structural inequalities are locked in a vicious cycle. Large inequalities in access to physical and financial assets; unequal access to quality health services, education and employment; and inequality with respect to voice and political representation aggravate the exposure and vulnerability of large population groups to climate hazards. Better understanding of the links between climate change impacts and inequalities will help to improve the design and implementation of policies able to simultaneously address climate change hazards and socioeconomic inequalities. Climate change and inequality: a vicious cycle The scheme in figure 1 presents the climate change-inequality vicious cycle. It shows that multidimensional inequalities lead to increased exposure and vulnerability of the disadvantaged groups to climate hazards. As a result, the disadvantaged groups suffer disproportionate loss of income and assets (physical, financial, human and social) when these hazards actually hit them. Consequently, inequality worsens, and the cycle perpetuates with greater force. Multiple sources of inequality exacerbate the risk to climate change The more detailed analysis presented in WESS 2016 shows that inequality (i) increases the exposure of the disadvantaged groups of society to climate hazards; (ii) increases their susceptibility to the damages caused by climate hazards, and (iii) decreases their ability to cope with and recover from the damages caused by climate hazards. Analysis also shows that various forms of economic, political and social inequalities play an important role in exacerbating the impact of climate change on people and communities. In addition to inequality with respect to income and wealth, inequality regarding gender, age, ethnicity, race, religion and geographical location play a role in determining the exposure, susceptibility and ability of various groups within the population to cope with and recover from climate hazards. Empirical evidence shows that exposure to the adverse effects of climate change is largely determined by the location where people choose or are forced to live. Both lack of income (a consequence of economic inequality) or lack of rights (a consequence of political inequality) may compel many disadvantaged people to live in locations prone to climate hazards, such as coastal low-lying areas, along river banks, or at the bottom of hills that experience mudslides. Of the people living in the same area—thus having similar exposure—the disadvantaged households generally prove to be more susceptible to damages caused by climate hazards. Again, both economic and non-economic inequalities play a role in this regard. For example, among the people living in flood-prone areas, those in houses made of flimsy material (because of their limited means) are more susceptible to damage caused by floods than those in sturdy houses. Occupation is another factor determining susceptibility. Lack of assets often forces disadvantaged people into hazardous occupations such as artisan fisheries and crop cultivation in flood-prone areas. As a consequence, they become more susceptible to damages caused by adverse effects of climate change. Age and gender also play an important role in determining susceptibility. For example, young children and the elderly suffer more from health damages caused by climate hazards. Similarly, women who have to fetch fuel and water for their households are more exposed and susceptible to climate hazards. Inequality also limits the access of disadvantaged groups to the private, communal, and public resources necessary to cope with and recover from the damages caused by climate hazards. For example, while higher income households may buy insurance that provides compensation for losses, people living in poverty cannot afford such insurance and thus have to absorb the entire loss, further undermining their asset position. Certain groups are often able to exercise control over common property, based on their social position vis-à-vis other marginalized groups. The existence of entrenched inequalities in the access to voice, power and political representation often leads to public policies that perpetuate large inequalities in access to public resources such as health, education and infrastructure. Policy implications of the climate change-inequality vicious cycle The reality of the climate change-inequality vicious cycle has significant policy implications. The international community is committed to mitigating both climate change and inequality. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide a framework for the implementation of policies to address the underlying causes of poverty, vulnerability and the risk to climate change simultaneously. SDG 10 calls for the reduction of inequality and SDG 13 calls for actions towards climate change mitigation and strengthening adaptive capacity and resilience to climate hazards. Interlinkages between climate change and inequalities are well reflected in most of the SDGs in recognition of the fact that it will be much harder for countries to make substantive development progress in key areas (such as poverty eradication, food security, healthy lives, among many others) unless people and communities are resilient to the negative impacts of climate hazards. Achieving these goals is not easy, however. While the challenges posed by climate change gained prominence in more recent years, the challenge of reducing the many dimensions of inequality is long-standing. The persistence, and often widening, of multiple inequalities testifies to the difficulty involved in dealing with this problem. Inequalities of different types are interrelated. Structural inequalities—such as inequalities with respect to assets, income, voice and political participation—are the underlying source of many other forms of inequality. The criterion that may guide policymakers through this maze of interrelationships is feasibility, both political and economic. However, what is important to realize is that the space of feasible actions towards reduction of inequality has expanded, owing to the urgency of climate action—perhaps a silver lining in the otherwise dark cloud of climate change! Many adaptation and mitigation measures have become unavoidable. Policy actions, however, must be consistent to make sure efforts to build climate change resilience properly address the underlying cause of inequality. Otherwise, mitigation and adaptation measures may have unintended consequences on inequality. For example, in expanding insurance for people to better cope with and recover from climate hazards, care must be taken to include the disadvantaged groups. This will help them to build assets and raise income. Similarly, in designing a programme to promote salinity resistant crops (an adaptation effort), efforts must be made to cover small and low-income farmers, who so far might have been deprived of necessary agriculture extension services. This may help them raise output and thus increase their income and assets. Similarly, in expanding health services to help local populations better withstand the health consequences of climate hazards, efforts must be made to ensure that people usually excluded will also have access to quality public health services. This will help them to build human capital. In extreme cases, when population groups need to be relocated, efforts must be made to ensure land distribution that is more egalitarian in the new location than it was in the old. There are numerous examples of ways in which adaptation and mitigation measures create opportunities to reduce inequality. Addressing the root causes of inequalities enables adaptation and the building of resilience to climate hazards, but it requires a continuum of well-designed and integrated policies, including (i) immediate assistance in the wake of climate hazards and disaster risk reduction; (ii) support to facilitate adaptation to a changing climate, entailing, for example, introduction of new crop varieties and water management techniques; (iii) policies centred on ecosystem management and on income diversification; and (iv) sound development policies focused on reducing inequalities to achieve poverty eradication and social inclusion. These specific measures will be most effective in reducing climate change vulnerability when they are part of longer-term transformative strategies which embrace coherent policies across the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Awareness of the interrelations between climate change resilience and the structural determinants of inequality will help to identify opportunities to break the vicious cycle between climate change and inequality and turn it into a path of inclusive and climate resilient development.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 2 – Extension › Link Ext – Economic inequality

The market will jack prices of genetic engineering creating inequal access

Alison Irvine is a science writer at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center. She has a special interest in the ethical implications of emerging biotechnologies, and has written about biodesign and bioethics for venues including Popular Science Magazine and The Center for Genomics & Society. Alison was an artist in the IGI’s 2019 CRISPR (un)commons residency program. December 16 2019 https://www.statnews.com/2017/06/26/crispr-insurance-companies-pay/

The ruckus over the CRISPR gene-editing system hides a dark reality: its high cost may make it unaffordable and questions remain whether most insurance companies will pay for it. As CRISPR begins to move forward in clinical trials, there are some signals about how it may — or may not — be received commercially. Other types of gene therapies carry a price tag that is likely to induce sticker shock. If adopted, these therapies will add striking new cost burdens to our health care system. “The cost isn’t coming down,” said Mark Trusheim, director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s NEW Drug Development Paradigms, a think tank working on the problem of how we will pay for expensive new drugs. “Companies will say, ‘We are developing these medicines, just pay us’; insurers will say, ‘We can’t afford it.'” A few years ago, Dutch drug company uniQure set up a plant in Lexington, Mass., to make a gene therapy called Glybera, at the time the most expensive drug in the world. It used viruses to slip copies of a gene into human cells to restore an enzyme needed to break down fats. The cost? $1.4 million per patient. The company eventually abandoned its bid to bring Glybera to the U.S. and, after having sold it just once in Germany, recently withdrew it from European markets, rendering it a commercial failure. Spark Therapeutics of Philadelphia is vying to bring the first gene therapy to market in the U.S. to treat a rare genetic eye disease called Leber congenital amaurosis 2. Analysts said it could cost a half-million dollars per eye. Like Glybera, Spark’s treatment is a form of traditional gene therapy, which makes use of viruses to get bits of restorative code into our cells. CRISPR will allow us to alter our existing genes. But it often relies on using viruses to shuttle the molecular gene-editing systems into our cells, and can be as expensive as other gene therapies. Editas Medicine plans to use CRISPR-Cas9 to treat various diseases, including Leber congenital amaurosis. “Enthusiasm is great for interventions in the eye,” New York University bioethicist Arthur Caplan told me. “They permit trying one eye at a time and it is easy to tell if anything positive happens. Safety is much easier to ensure.” But in its annual report, Editas noted “significant uncertainty” on whether payers would cover the treatment. In fact, a handful of insurance companies (VantageBlue from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island, Select Health, and VIVA Health) have issued policy documents that exclude gene therapy from coverage, a move that experts say establishes policy against paying for CRISPR-based therapeutics. The Institute for Clinical and Economic Review released a report in March stating there are 12 to 14 gene therapy candidates that are expected to be among the first for commercial approval. “With payer budgets already stretched, and reining in the costs high on the agenda, both public and private payers will likely balk at the cost of some of these gene-based treatments,” the American Journal of Managed Care wrote in a reflection on the report. “Europe has the lead in approved gene therapies, and the first such drug to be approved had a launch price of $1.4 million. Can the US health care system absorb the cumulative impact of such prices, considering that 10 percent of the population has a rare condition linked to a genetic defect?” Five major gene therapy companies went public last year, suggesting that investors are ready to bet on the commercial prospects. Editas signed a deal with Juno Therapeutics that could be worth up to $737 million. The companies would combine CRISPR with other tactics to trick the immune system’s T cells to fight cancer. Those tactics could include disabling genes in T cells that prevent cancer cells from shutting down a T cell response, and adding bits of genetic code to engineer new receptors into T cells to let them attach to abnormal proteins in cancer cells called neoantigens. Gene and cell therapies that run into the six figures and beyond are poised to heighten the cost of cancer treatments, which not everyone may be able to afford. In fact, oncologist Dr. Siddhartha Mukherjee, author of the bestselling “Emperor of All Maladies,” gave a speech this month at the annual American Society of Clinical Oncology meeting that warned about dividing the world “into the rich who can afford personalized cancer treatment and the poor who cannot.” Tania Bubela, a law and policy expert, and Chris McCabe, a health economist, both at the University of Alberta, will be holding a workshop in late June in Banff, Canada, to explore how to enable access to high-priced technologies. According to Bubela, gene-editing systems such as CRISPR-Cas9 promise to heighten the tension around health care policy. One idea for easing the tension is for regulators to permit drug makers to get reimbursed from insurers before their gene therapy gets FDA approval, while requiring drug makers to collect more data before charging full price — a kind of price control. “Companies will charge whatever the market will bear,” Bubela told me. “I’m not even sure that many of these gene therapies will work, and not all medicine is worth the price.” But if these technologies become broadly used, especially in altering T cells for cancer, payers won’t meet the demands of steep prices, and Bubela predicts that “the system implodes under its own weight.” I believe that part of the problem lies in financial dealings. The Broad Institute, for instance, holds patents to gene editing tools such as CRISPR-Cas9 and CRISPR-Cpf1 and has issued exclusive licenses to Editas to use these tools for medical purposes. It could issue more-affordable CRISPR licenses one gene at a time, say directly to Juno Therapeutics, which now accesses them through its multimillion dollar deals with Editas. But that would cut Editas investors out of the loop. Such deals tend to inflate drug prices, since venture and public investors in Editas demand a cut on each CRISPR application. As investors engage in layers of transactional deals along the top of the food chain, the costs of gene therapies go up while the financiers may shift blame for a lack of patient coverage to insurance companies. Dr. Stuart Orkin, a pediatric oncologist at Boston Children’s Center, and Dr. Philip Reilly, a partner at Third Rock Ventures, an Editas funder, coauthored a paper in Science magazine saying that sticker shock shouldn’t halt commercialization. It can cost $300,000 a year to treat a single hemophilia patient with existing standard treatments and $25,000 to treat a single sickle-cell patient. Given costs like those, one-time gene therapy treatments running into the six figures may be comparatively affordable if an insurer makes payments to a drug-maker over a decade that are tied to the drug’s continued performance. In fact, the idea of spreading payments over years as annuities originated with corporate-friendly FDA commissioner Scott Gottlieb in a 2014 paper he co-authored for the American Enterprise Institute. Other performance-based models are being tested. GlaxoSmithKline, for example, is trying to bring a $665,000 gene therapy to the U.S. to treat an immune system disorder. The company said it will tie the cost of the drug to its performance in patients — with a money-back guarantee. “The reality is it’s very tough, and it doesn’t come easy,” said Jonathan Appleby, a chief scientific officer for the company’s rare disease unit. Orkin and Reilly also like the idea of using U.S. government funds from the Orphan Drug Act, established in 1983, to pay gene therapy companies for their commercial products. Another idea for keeping gene therapy, including CRISPR-based therapies, affordable is that investors could ask insurance companies to buy in bulk. MIT’s Ernst Berndt, inspired in part by volume purchases of vaccines in Africa, has proposed “advanced market commitments” through which insurance groups commit to buying a bunch of expensive drugs. That model that could be applied to gene therapies, but the insurers may not go for it without a bit more give. In 2009, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act created a pathway for approving generic biologics, also known as biosimilars. It may apply to CRISPR-based biosimilars, but generic gene-editing — and thus competition to drive down prices — is unlikely to appear for decades. Cathryn Donaldson, a spokesperson for American’s Health Insurance Plans, noted that a lack of generic forms of CRISPR means “drug makers may charge whatever they want for their branded medication. “ In 1968, Garrett Hardin argued in his now-classic essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” that a shared-resource system will tend to be depleted by self-interested individuals. He also argued against exponential growth — to which we could add today the growth of biotech valuation. Health care is a limited shared resource, and expensive new technologies could add pressures resulting in unequal access, especially to cancer therapies. Given the aggressive drive for money, and without new approaches in thinking, we are headed for disaster. One of two things will happen: either we will embrace a national health care system with broad access but that severely limits expensive new drugs, gene therapies, and CRISPR-based biologics; or these treatments will be available to only the wealthiest among us who can pay for them, a dystopian vision which is perverse but perhaps more realistic considering the pressures for a return on investment.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 2 – Extension › Link Ext – Economic inequality

Germline engineering locks in inequalities and freezes social mobility

Sam Pizzigati, 8-2-19  Sam Pizzigati spent two decades directing the publishing program at America’s largest union, the 2.8-million-member National Education Association, and before that edited the national publications of three other U.S. trade unions. “Can the Wealthy Hardwire Inequality into Our DNA?”  Accessed 6/30/22 T.T

But what if wealthy parents had the ability to give their kids that athletic talent? What if our nation’s rich could use emerging 21st-century “gene-enhancement technology” to make their kids physically bigger, stronger, or faster? What if they could even use that same technology to make their kids smarter? Would they? The answer the college admissions scandal makes plain: Many of the richest among us will stop at nothing to perpetuate their privilege. Spend a fortune to make their kids genetically superior? Of course they would. Should we be aghast at this prospect? Of course we should. What used to be pure science fiction — the ability to edit our DNA — has now become science reality. A generation ago our hippest young programming hotshots were working in computer code. Now the high-tech hip are busy working to reprogram our genes. Worried senior scientists,  historian Walter Isaacson, have begun talking “about the need for a moratorium on making edits that can be inherited.” They have plenty of reason to worry. In our deeply unequal world, grand private fortunes have much more of a capacity to shape how gene-enhancement technologies evolve than our scientists and ethicists. “Look at what parents are willing to do to get kids in college,”  MIT neuroscientist Feng Zhang. “Some people will surely pay for genetic enhancement.” Should these super rich, asks Erik Sontheimer, a University of Massachusetts expert in molecular medicine, simply “be allowed to buy the best genes they can afford?” The genetic pioneer Zhang certainly doesn’t think so. Think of what that would do, he urges, “to our species.” Think about our societies, too. A “free market” for genetic enhancement, suggests historian Isaacson, might well encode our world’s current inequities on a permanent basis.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 2 – Extension › Link Ext – Economic inequality

Germline genetic engineering increases economic inequality

Scott J. Schweikart, Global Regulation of Germline Genome Editing: Ethical Considerations and Application of International Human Rights Law, 43 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 279 (2021). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol43/iss3/6

The ethical principle of justice is derived from concepts of what is fair and equitable.45 Issues of justice are of concern for both somatic and germline genome editing. Consider the example of germline genome editing that would confer a benefit (such as a modification to help confer immunity):46 if such an “enhancement is available only to the upper classes, it can further widen the already existing gap between the more advantaged and less advantaged members of society and thus exacerbate injustices.”47 Ethically, the “benefits of heritable genome editing should not preferentially accrue only to the affluent individuals.”48 Indeed, there is a human rights aspect with regard to social justice, as “[t]he potential for discrimination against genetic groups increases dramatically as genetic testing and [germline manipulation] techniques become less expensive, more reliable, and more widely available.”49 Maha Munayyer explains that “[germline manipulation] provoke[s] discrimination based on genetic status while simultaneously providing the means to alter that status.”50 An additional concern is that the price of the technology is yet another way that inequality may spread, as “editing is likely to be expensive” and “[g]enetic disease, once a universal common denominator, could instead become an artifact of class, geographic location, and culture.”

Germline gene editing further entrenches economic inequality

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › No War

nuclear deterrence checks the impact of any disad

Tepperman 09 — Jonathan Tepperman, Deputy Editor of Newsweek, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, now Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, holds a B.A. in English Literature from Yale University, an M.A. in Jurisprudence from Oxford University, and an LL.M. in International Law from New York University, 2009 (“Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” The Daily Beast, August 28th, Available Online at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.print.html, Accessed 01-27-2012)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › No War

Distrust their evidence - their authors have political motives to fearmonger

Zenko & Cohen 12 (Micah Zenko, fellow at the Center for Preventative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations AND Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March/April 2012, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91(2))

The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threat-mongering results from a confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited from attacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against GOP attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government -- defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › Precautionary principle

Precautionary principle is the best organizational method for decisionmaking

Nancy Myers, Science and Environmental Health Network, 2002 “The Precautionary Principle Puts Values First”, Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, Vol. 22, No. 3, June 2002, 210-219, http://www.sehn.org/pdf/putvaluesfirst.pdf

Activists’ and advocates’ responses to the principle and their explanations of why it has become important and useful to them vary. Almost universally, however, they see it as an exercise in something beyond caution, or even precaution. It is not just a matter of buying up gas masks, so to speak, or reinforcing cockpit doors. They nearly always describe it instead in positive terms. Activists who have become discouraged by the Sisyphean task of trying to protect the Earth and the health of communities in the face of out-of-control technologies and damage often say that the precautionary principle gives them hope. They say it is something positive to work for and that it embodies common sense. Organizers and policy advocates alike express gratitude for a unifying idea that makes sense of everything they are trying to work for and that removes some important barriers to that work, at least in their own minds. Inevitably, values creep into these discussions. A typical range of responses came from a group of ecosystem scientists and advocates assembled by SEHN in May 2001 in Leavenworth, Washington, to discuss how the principle might apply to decisions related to ecosystems. After more than a day of discussion that went straight to the principle’s practical implications, the group was asked, Is the precautionary principle indeed of use to you? Some of their answers had an equally practical tone: By using precaution you articulate uncertainties that are already there. It is better to think out consequences. It is important science, but it is also an important public education tool. It helps people understand what to do with uncertainty. It is an organizing principle in theory—it takes our ideas and make sense of them—and in practice: it can galvanize a movement.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › Precautionary principle

Caring for the future of human kind is an overwhelming duty in a technological civilization.

Roberto Andorno 2022 Human Dignity, Life Sciences Technologies and the Renewed Imperative to Preserve Human Freedom https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roberto-Andorno/publication/360729946_Human_Dignity_Life_Sciences_Technologies_and_the_Renewed_Imperative_to_Preserve_Human_Freedom/links/628cecf0d4e5243d9b9624f7/Human-Dignity-Life-Sciences-Technologies-and-the-Renewed-Imperative-to-Preserve-Human-Freedom.pdf

The notion that we have duties towards future generations has been supported by several scholars, following very different approaches.36 However, few authors have explored this notion in such depth and more engagingly than Hans Jonas. In his influential Imperative of Responsibility, he proposed a new “categorical imperative” for our technological civilization that runs, “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life: or expressed negatively: Act so that the effects of your action are nor destructive of the future possibility of such life.” 37 In other words, “caring for the future of humankind is the overruling duty of collective human action in the age of a technological civilization that has become ‘almighty,’ if not in its productive then at least in its destructive potential.” 38 This is why, according to Jonas, the present generation has a “metaphysical responsibility” of preserving nature and the human species.39

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › Ableism

Germline engineering is the new frontier for reproductive and disability discrimination

Emily Galpern, 1-30-2020, Emily Galpern, MPH, is a consultant with more than 20 years’ experience coordinating policy coalitions and campaigns; facilitating groups of adults and young people; planning and leading trainings and conferences; and developing materials for educational and advocacy purposes. She has worked extensively with women, young people, immigrants, people of color, workers, LGBTQ people, and people with disabilities. Areas of expertise include the intersection of bioethics with reproductive health rights and justice; building bridges between social justice movements; as well as health disparities and inequities in public health and youth development. Clients and partners have included community-based organizations, movement-building organizations, universities, government agencies, policymakers, health systems, and unions. She received her BA in Women’s Studies from the University of California at Santa Cruz and her MPH from San Francisco State University. "Germline Modification Could Be New Frontier of Reproductive and Disability Oppression", Center for Genetics and Society, https://www.geneticsandsociety.org/biopolitical-times/germline-modification-could-be-new-frontier-reproductive-and-disability, 6-28-2022, //ms

This week, CGS and released materials articulating a perspective against human germline modification. The infographic and fact sheet situate the development of germline modification within the context of historical attempts to control the reproductive lives of women, trans, and nonbinary people. Most media accounts and scientific debates ignore the fact that germline modification would likely exacerbate reproductive, racial, and disability injustice. The reproductive justice movement is rooted in an understanding of how people’s lives are affected by the multiple contexts in which they live and the ways intersecting oppressions affect people’s reproductive lives. Thus, reproductive justice advocates are uniquely positioned to change the conversation about germline editing in mainstream media, public conversation, and policymaking. Change-making strategies identified in the new materials include: a call for political, economic, and social transformation rather than technological fixes; challenging the advance of a high-tech eugenic future in which some people’s genes are deemed more valuable than others’; and challenging ableist assumptions in discussions about the prospect of germline modification.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › Ableism

Germline gene editing is discriminatory & ableist

Dr Calum Mackellar, 11-14-2017, "Why germline genome editing may be discriminatory • PET", PET, https://www.progress.org.uk/why-germline-genome-editing-may-be-discriminatory/, 6-27-2022, //ms

On the 20th anniversary of the 1997 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention), the Council of Europe Committee on Bioethics organised an international conference entitled 'Relevance and Challenges' last month in Strasbourg, France. At this meeting, delegates discussed the reasons behind Article 13 of this convention, which prohibits intentional procedures. Article 13 indicates that: 'An intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any in the of any descendants.'(1) This means, according to paragraph 91 of the Explanatory Report to this convention, that: 'Interventions seeking to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants are prohibited. Consequently, in particular genetic modifications of or for are not allowed.'(2) During the event, there was repeated questioning of how the fundamental equality in worth of all human beings could be protected if Article 13 was deleted or amended. However, no clear answer was given. This was unfortunate because the selection of future human beings, based on their possible quality of life, is at the very core of germline procedures. For example, when a one-cell , or sperm and cells before they are used in conception, are edited, a new individual who would not otherwise have existed is being brought into being. Indeed, any change, no matter how small, to the variables in the creation of an individual results in a very different person coming into existence.(3) In other words, with most germline procedures one is not treating someone who exists, but making sure only certain persons, and not others, are brought into existence. This is the important non-identity dilemma which has not really been addressed, to any extent, by any of the wide-ranging reports studying the ethical consequences of , such as the one prepared in 2017 by the US National Academies of Sciences and Medicine.(4) However, this dilemma needs to be addressed since making sure that only certain kinds of children are brought into existence, based on their possible quality of life, may also suggest that there is such a thing as a 'life unworthy of life' in society. Of course, it is possible to argue, as does the 2017 US Academies' report, that 'unconditional love for a disabled child once born and respect for all people who are born with or who develop disabilities are not incompatible with intervening to avert disease and disability prior to birth or conception'.(4) But that report does not explain how or why any deliberate selective discrimination can be seen as acceptable before birth or conception while suddenly becoming unacceptable when a person is present.(5) As the Dutch ethicist Hans Reinders at the Free University of Amsterdam argues: 'In any given case, the only reasonable answer to the question of why a disabled child should not be born is by reference to what one thinks about the lives of people living with the same disorder.'(6) This means that if parents decide not to have a child with a serious based solely on reasons and not other factors, such as a lack of societal support for disability in a country, there is a very real sense that they are doing so because they would prefer one possible future child over another. In other words, this decision contradicts the important principle that the lives of all human beings have the same worth and value, regardless of their state of health.(7) It is also inevitable that the indirect message being given with such a view is that had one known, with hindsight, that someone was going to be affected by a certain kind of disability then one would have selected to create another individual. This, however, can clearly be considered discriminatory and would undermine the inherent equality in value of all persons in society. To be sure, a lot has already been written about this objection, called the 'expressivist argument'.(8) What is more, for some people, including a number of individuals affected by disability, this message may not be problematic. But for others, it may be seen as extremely offensive and discriminatory.(9) It is, moreover, no answer to simply state that these people are misguided or mistaken in being offended by such a message. More fundamentally, it is only possible to select between persons, including possible future persons, on purely genetic reasons if all ethical reasoning is reduced to consequentialist perspectives. But the Council of Europe does not do this. Instead, it recognises the equality of value and worth of every human life, regardless of whether it is short and difficult or long and pleasurable. This is one of the founding principles of the Council of Europe. Accordingly, if all persons, including all possible future persons, are considered to be fundamentally equal in value and worth, how can a choice between any of them ever be made? This also means that Article 13 cannot be amended or only a moratorium on germline procedures accepted, without undermining the radical equality between all human beings, which is the very basis of civilised society. The Council of Europe must, therefore, continue to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, which recognises in its preamble that 'the inherent dignity and...equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world'.

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › Ableism

Human germline gene editing stigmatizes imperfection and drives toward eugenics

Carol Padden and Jacqueline Humphries, 2020, Carol Padden works at the Department of Communication, University of California, San Diego. Jacqueline Humphries works at Amyris, Inc., Emeryville, CA, “Who Goes First? Deaf People and CRISPR Germline Editing", Johns Hopkins University Press, https://muse-jhu-edu.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/article/748050, 6-27-2022, //ms

The surprise announcement in November 2018 that a Chinese researcher had implanted and brought to term two gene-edited embryos, resulting in the birth of twin girls, had the effect of galvanizing a debate that goes back decades (Begley 2018; Evans 2002; Kevles 1985). Should we make heritable changes in our children’s DNA? Until recently, this was hypothetical only, and the easy response was to say it is too uncertain and too unnecessary to be tolerated. Suddenly, however, the possibility that there might be real uses for mitochondrial DNA replacement or for germline editing has led to a more nuanced debate, ranging from calls to double-down on prohibiting this technology to discussions of how to permit it for a limited range of conditions, under strict oversight (Baltimore et al. 2015; NAS 2017; UNESCO 2015). Often lacking in this debate has been an effort to look back at debates surrounding earlier advances in reproductive technologies, most of which have been accompanied by fears of eugenics, the loss of human dignity, and the disruption of parent-child relationships. While these advances have each had pockets of abusive uses, they have been integrated into modern life without bringing about wholesale destruction of society. A true prohibition of germline editing already exists in a number of countries, by virtue of their signatures to an international instrument. A number of international efforts focus on human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the European Social Charter. But it is the 1997 Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, better known as the Oviedo Convention, that was written specifically to address the intersection of human rights and biomedical developments, and aimed to protect the “dignity and identity of all human beings” (Council of Europe 1997). Article 13 reads: “An intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants” (emphasis added). In other words, even if done with the best of intentions, to ward off devastating—even lethal—conditions, the Convention admits of no alterations that are meant to affect descendants, though this position has not been without its critics (Council of Europe 2017; Cyngell, Douglas, and Savulescu 2017; De Wert et al. 2018; Hasson 2018). Debates around germline editing focus on multiple concerns. With regard to physical harm to individuals living in the future, this involves a risk-benefit analysis that is complicated by the multigenerational potential of the change (Baylis 2018; Rubeis and Steger 2018). This alone introduces questions about the stability and durability of the alteration, its effect under future (presumably different) environments, and the ever-increasing number of generations between the person affected and the person initially giving consent. A different objection goes directly to how we understand autonomy. As noted in the July 2018 report by the UK Nuffield Council, one might argue that “choosing someone else’s genetic endowment . . . offends against the essential dignity and nature of the person as a free and independent human being.” In essence, this argument is that germline editing interferes with a child’s “right to an open future” (Feinberg 1980, 1992). But one response has been not only that parents make many momentous decisions affecting their children’s lives, but that the acceptability of parental choices rests on whether they serve to expand or narrow a child’s prospects, and whether the changes were made for the welfare of the future child, such as preventing serious disease and disability (NAS 2017; Nuffield Council 2018). Of course, it should be noted that many in the deaf community and the community of little people would not define those conditions as disabilities, but rather as varieties of the human community. But this is the exception, and other groups with shared disabilities have not refused the designation, although they often argue the degree of impairment is as much a function of social and physical context as it is anything intrinsic to the body. Other concerns about germline editing revolve around fear that it will lead to intolerance of imperfection, turning children into commodities rather than the subjects of parental love, and that it will result in stigmatization of those who are disabled (Thiessen 2018).

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › Ableism

Genetic engineering undermines social acceptance solidarity toward disability

United Nations, 2-28-2020, "New eugenics: UN disability expert warns against ‘ableism’ in medical practice", OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/02/new-eugenics-un-disability-expert-warns-against-ableism-medical-practice, 6-25-2022, //ms

GENEVA (28 February 2020) – "Current developments in medical research and practice may revive eugenic ideas if safeguards for those affected are not ensured," today said the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas, during the presentation of her to the UN Human Rights Council. The UN expert explained that developments in gene therapy, genetic engineering and prenatal screening experienced enormous growth, increasing our power to repair the body and prevent disease, but cautioned about "eliminating" human characteristics deemed undesirable. "People with disabilities are genuinely concerned that these developments could result in new eugenic practices and further undermine social acceptance and solidarity towards disability - and more broadly, towards human diversity," she said. In her report, Devandas also expressed her concerns on the impact of euthanasia and assisted suicide for persons with disabilities. "If assisted dying is made available for persons with health conditions or impairments, but who are not terminally ill, a social assumption could be made that it is better to be dead than to live with a disability," the expert warned. "People have the right to live and to die with dignity, but we cannot accept that people choose to end their lives because of social stigma, isolation or lack of access to personal assistance or disability-related services." Another major concern, Devandas stressed, is the absence of persons with disabilities in crucial debates on medical research and practice. "Without their experiences directly informing those debates, narratives suggesting that living with disabilities should be prevented become reinforced and socially validated." The Special Rapporteur explained that "ableism" is at the root of the problem. "If the life experiences of people with disabilities continue to be undervalued, no progress will be made." "What we need is a profound cultural transformation on the way society relates to the difference. That is a commitment to embrace disability as a positive aspect of human diversity. States must combat all forms of discrimination based on disability," the human rights expert concluded. Devandas also reported back to the Human Rights Council on her visits to , and .

2022 SDI Affirmative
**Human Germline Genetic Engineering** Affirmative › Advantage 1 – Extension › Ableism

The ideology behind gene editing is ableist---people that are disabled reject the practice

Sandy Sufian and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, 2-16-2021, Sandy Sufian is an associate professor of health humanities and history in the Department of Medical Education at UIC School of Medicine and associate professor of Disability Studies in the UIC Department of Disability and Human Development. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson is a professor of English and co-director of the Disability Studies Initiative at Emory University, "The Dark Side of CRISPR", Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-dark-side-of-crispr/, 6-25-2022, //ms

We agree that science should guide policy—except in cases where it wouldn’t assist people to live their lives but would, instead, exclude them. The CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technology, for which biochemists Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, has the potential to do just that. So do other forms of scientific technologies. We should therefore always be aware of the ethical choices these technologies can pose. In the case of CRISPR, those choices are complex. CRISPR has many functions; one of these is that it can be used to treat disease. Yet the far-reaching, more fraught promise of this technology—one about which scientists seem at once excited and cautious—lies in its ability to eliminate from the gene pool what medical science identifies as faulty or abnormal genes that cause difference in individual people. Certainly, goes the logic of CRISPR’s promise, the goal of ridding future generations of terrible diseases that cause suffering and death and deplete resources, seems an unquestionable enterprise. But Doudna herself has recognized that CRISPR carries with it “great risk.” In a New York Times interview on October 22, 2020, she warned of the , cautioning researchers to wait to use CRISPR for these ends. As disability studies scholars and women with genetic differences who are experts in thinking about the consequences this technology will have for actual human beings, we have grave worries that the use of these “genetic scissors” will, in the future, cut people like us out of existence without others even noticing. Scientists who use CRISPR could see editing genes such as ours out of the gene pool as entirely uncontroversial. This attitude, in fact, would be consistent with wider societal views. The idea that ridding society of genetic differences that count as disease or defect is an undeniable “good” continues to be pervasive in our society. Americans generally see no problem with editing genes linked to broad swaths of people like us; after all, supporters of this view may argue, editing out a gene-linked condition is different from editing out a person, and curing disease is an indisputably good thing. But our genetic conditions are not simply entities that can be clipped away from us as if they were some kind of a misspelled word or an awkward sentence in a document. We are whole beings, with our genetic conditions forming a fundamental part of who we are. Still, many Americans—including medical providers and even some people with genetic differences—consider lives such as ours as . Further, the common belief that ridding disease and anomaly from society is an incontrovertible good can lead very quickly from the actual possibilities of science to fantasies of “improving” humanity where we would all become some aspirational version of personhood that is somehow better, stronger, smarter, and healthier. But CRISPR’s tantalizing offer to achieve the supposedly “best” kind of people at the genetic level is an uneasy alert to those who are often judged to be biologically inferior—one we know all too well. People like us whose being is inseparable from our genetic condition would be the first to go. We both have genetic conditions that many people consider serious enough to eliminate from the human gene pool: one of us lives with cystic fibrosis (CF), and the other a form of syndactyly. Both of these conditions have shaped our bodies and our lives. Sandy’s affected lungs require several hours of treatments each day, and Rosemarie’s affected hands limit her manual dexterity. We are among the (15 percent of the population) and (26 percent of all adults) who are considered disabled. We are among the 10 percent of all adults who have a genetic condition. Because we were born with our conditions, we have benefited from learning early on how to live with the characteristics of our particular genetic distinctiveness. Our supportive families saw to it that we accessed good health care and received educations suitable to our talents and interests. Improved medical treatments, social progress, and political equality movements raised our quality of life in ways that people like us in generations prior to ours could not have imagined. When Sandy was born in 1967, people with CF had an average , but during 1970–1990, life expectancy doubled due to new medical therapies. Today’s average life expectancy is 44, but with novel medicines called cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) modulators, people with. These transformations in life expectancy attest to the changing nature of prognosis, one for which CRISPR’s editing. When Rosemarie was born, in the late 1940s, people with physical disabilities like hers were often far from the support of their families. At that time, only one in five children with disabilities were educated in public schools with nondisabled children. Physically disabled children were most often sent to segregated schools where they received inferior education. With the Education for All Act of 1975 (now the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (), however, the federal government guaranteed public education and services for all children with disabilities, thus changing their life trajectories. We learned to thrive with the bodies we have and possess identities and lives that include our genetic diagnostic categories but also go beyond them. Yet stubborn beliefs about “good” genes and “bad” genes nonetheless persist in discriminatory attitudes that affect us both. When Rosemarie was pregnant with her first child, the obstetrician assumed that her major concern was that the baby would have hands and arms like its mother, even though Rosemarie’s biggest concern was finding a good childcare situation that would complement her job responsibilities. When Sandy considered having a biological child, friends and medical providers questioned her decision to consider pregnancy because that meant passing on one copy of her cystic fibrosis gene to a future child. This imagined child would not have had the disease since her husband is not a carrier for CF (CF is an autosomal recessive disease). But some of those in Sandy’s circle still believed pregnancy inadvisable because, to them, producing a child who would carry the CF gene was equally undesirable. Sandy called out their assumption: that her condition was inherently inferior—a point they took as self-evident despite the fact that an estimated. These stories also reveal an enduring ideology about the inextricable, cultural link among disability, reproduction, and suffering. They illustrate the subtle, yet insidious, idea that some genes are inherently bad and contaminate the human gene pool; as such, people who carry them should not propagate and pass those genes on to their progeny so as to make those children either carriers or affected. These ideas also expose an even deeper, ableist assumption: that people with supposedly “bad genes” fundamentally suffer and hold a less valuable place in society than others. This isn’t to say that people with genetic conditions don’t suffer, but we don’t necessarily suffer all the time and we don’t necessarily suffer any more than other people without such conditions. Yet the cultural impulse to assume that people with genetic variations are in a constant state of suffering, and that it blights our lives, is so pervasive that it is even internalized by some with genetic conditions themselves. Such genetic determinism is a new form of eugenic thinking grounded in what the communications studies scholar , a belief system that allows people to simultaneously deny any commitment to distasteful eugenic principles while also holding them up. Common sense ableism permits, even encourages, such injurious attitudes. Utilizing genome manipulation tools and performing genetic selection is tantamount to engaging in what Rosemarie calls “velvet eugenics.” Enforced by laissez-faire commercialism, rather than by the state, velvet eugenics seems like common sense, yet it hides its violence and inequality behind claims of patient autonomy and under a veil of voluntary consent. Ultimately, market-driven velvet eugenics embodies a similar goal of purging unacceptable human variations that campaigns to eliminate the supposedly unfit and inferior have held in the past. Both enact a mandate to . People like us shouldn’t be edited out of existence in some version of a utopian future. This vision of a future without people like us limits our ability to live in the present. Evaluating the quality of life of another person is a complex, highly subjective, and context-dependent task that is morally questionable in a society based on the concept that all people are of equal value regardless of their individual differences. The limitations of human imagination make it questionable, if not unethical, for a person to grasp another person’s (or group of people’s) quality of life fully. Expanding diversity in all its forms, including disability, strengthens the human community ethically and biologically because it opens the public and private sphere to a variety of perspectives, life experiences, ideas, and solutions to live together with mutual flourishing. More important, our shared founding belief in the equal value of all members of a society should remind us that people’s worth should not be determined by social judgments about their contribution. All members of a community contribute to its welfare by existing in their individual distinctiveness. Genome editing is a powerful, scientific technology that can reshape medical treatments and people’s lives, but it can also harmfully reduce human diversity and increase social inequality by editing out the kinds of people that medical science, and the society it has shaped, categorize as diseased or genetically contaminated--people like us who are understood as having bad genes. But we should be reminded that bad genes don’t necessarily lead to bad lives, just as good genes don’t necessarily lead to good lives. If CRISPR is put to use to eliminate rather than to treat genetic difference, we as a society would essentially instrumentalize this moralistic and reductionist assumption.