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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › AT China and Russia
Horowitz and Kahn, 2021 – Senior and Research Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Lauren, The Washington Quarterly 3-19-2021 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” TM]
China and Russia might also have good reasons to sign onto standards that would commit to enhanced military AI safety. Neither country would like to be perceived as not following international standards on military AI safety, because it could undermine support within their AI research communities and ability to keep those researchers. Moreover, if China and Russia did not sign, it would help the United States build international credibility as a responsible AI actor, increasing its attractiveness in the global competition for AI talent.24 Thus, whether China or Russia sign or not, the United States would benefit. Overall, standardization would help to promote best practices concerning safety and ethics in the development and adoption of these technologies, and would help to alleviate some pressure and remove some sources of error during use.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › AT China and Russia
Scharre 2021 – Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Paul, 6/28/21,https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory”, 6/18/22, LND]
The National Security Commission on AI has demonstrated what such an approach might look like in practice. The commission’s 700-plus page report issued sweeping recommendations for enhancing U.S. competitiveness in AI and military adoption, but also dedicated an entire chapter to “Autonomous Weapon Systems and Risks Associated with AI-Enabled Warfare.”70 With regards to safety concerns, the report acknowledged: Russia and China are likely to field AI-enabled systems that have undergone less rigorous TEVV than comparable U.S. systems and may be unsafe or unreliable … The United States should … highlight how deploying unsafe systems could risk inadvertent conflict escalation [and] emphasize the need to conduct rigorous TEVV.71 The commission issued a number of recommendations to mitigate the risks of AI competition, including improving Defense Department TEVV processes and working with allies to develop “international standards of practice for the development, testing, and use of AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems” to reduce the risk of accidents.72 Recently, the Defense Department has taken positive steps toward emphasizing AI safety and improving TEVV processes. In May 2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a memorandum on implementing “Responsible AI.” The memo launched a series of internal bureaucratic structures, including “establishing a test and evaluation and verification and validation framework that integrates real-time monitoring, algorithm confidence metrics, and user feedback to ensure trusted and trustworthy AI capabilities.”73 Additionally, in public comments Hicks emphasized the importance of AI “safety.”74 These are important and valuable steps toward establishing the necessary bureaucratic processes to ensure U.S. military AI systems are robust and reliable as well as setting a constructive tone publicly. The United States has been active in promulgating norms about the responsible use of military AI. A deliberate approach toward acknowledging and mitigating the risks of AI competition need not come at the expense of adopting AI to improve military effectiveness. Ideally, a frank assessment of the risks of AI competition and U.S. transparency about measures it is taking to mitigate these risks would open the door to cooperative measures among competitors. There may be a variety of confidence-building measures that states could adopt to reduce the risks of AI competition.75 “Track II” dialogues among academic experts to better understand these risks and potential cooperative measures are already underway. Future direct government-to-government dialogues could explore whether there is opportunity for common ground. Cooperative measures to reduce risk will depend on other states such as Russia and China engaging in good faith. However, there is no guarantee that they will do so. What the United States can do is improve its own internal processes for AI TEVV and for ensuring human responsibility. The United States should also publicly articulate why it would be in other states’ best interests to cooperate to avoid some of these mutual risks. Even as the United States adopts AI to improve its national defense, it should take measures — and incentivize others to do so as well — to ensure military AI systems are safe and that warfare remains under effective human control.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › DOD Key
Tarraf et. al 2019 - Senior Information Scientist at the RAND Corporation [Danielle with William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, “The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations”, LMSi]
Recommendation S-1: DoD should adapt AI governance structures that align authorities and resources with the mission of scaling AI. 66 The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence As we noted in Chapter Four, DoD’s vision for AI and the scale, urgency, and unity of efforts conveyed in that vision are at odds with the visibility, authorities, and resources it has provided to the JAIC— the focal point of DoD AI. DoD needs to develop governance and organizational structures that align authorities and resources with its vision of scaling AI across DoD. The insights gathered from our industry interviews and the supporting change management literature (see section “Industry: Organization” in Appendix C) lead us to believe there is value in, if not strict necessity of, a centralized effort supported at the highest levels with long-term funding commitments to institute organizational change and scale AI across DoD. Indeed, one of our industry interviewees even noted that centralization at onset was key to their organization’s success, and premature decentralization of effort would have likely been detrimental (see section “Industry: Organization” in Appendix C).1 Starting from that premise, we highlight two possible options for organizational and governance structures, and the rationale for them, although noting that other options might be viable as well, subject to further study. The first option would likely require congressional support to execute, while the second can be executed without, as it aligns with current DoD procedures and organizational structures. Option 1: Enhance the visibility and authorities of the JAIC to enable it to carry out its mission of scaling AI and its impact across DoD, including budgetary and workforce authorities over the military services. Option 2: Take a two-pronged organizational approach as follows: • Establish a JAIC council chaired by the JAIC director and consisting of one AI leadership representative from each service.2 1 We note that this comment, and those of other industry interviewees, imply that if the effort to scale AI across an organization is successful, its natural ending point might be the sunset of the centralized entity that drove the transformation as AI capabilities are diffused across the organization. We therefore expect the JAIC’s role to evolve, though we expect that to happen along a longer timeline (ten or more years), based on our assessment of the state of AI technologies in Chapter Three. 2 Regardless of which governance structure is instituted, if any, establishment of a JAIC council, as described, could facilitate coordination between the JAIC and the services. Recommendations 67 • Establish or reinforce a centralized AI coordination and investment organization within each of the services, with appropriate visibility and authorities, to facilitate scaling AI and its impact across the service, and to promote mandated coordination with the JAIC. In either option: • The DSD should provide the JAIC director with opportunities, at least annually, to present and be heard at the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG) forum (or whichever Deputy Secretary–level forum performs the functions of the DMAG). 3 The rationale for Option 1 is as follows: There is evidence to support that DoD has taken the right approach in establishing the JAIC as a centralized focal point for DoD’s AI strategy (see Chapter 4, Organization). The evidence also suggests that the JAIC, pending initial success, will need to continue in that role for several years because of the expected timeline for AI deployment across enterprise, missionsupport, and operational AI (Chapter Three). What DoD needs to do now is continue on that path by providing the requisite high-level support, visibility, and authorities (including directive and budget authorities) to enable the JAIC to enact change. Doing so would ensure that the JAIC has a chance of succeeding at its mandate of scaling AI and its impact across DoD. It would also ensure that DoD’s intent, messaging, and actions are all consistent.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › DOD Key
National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence 2022 [March 19, “NCSAI Final Report 2021 – Chapter 7: Establishing Justified Confidence in AI Systems”, ]
4. Leadership. Responsible development and fielding of AI requires end users and senior leaders to be aware of system capabilities and limitations so that they are not misused. It also requires subject-matter experts to support training, acquisition, risk assessment, and adoption of best practices as they evolve. Today, only the DoD has a dedicated lead for Responsible AI; employees in national security agencies taking on these roles typically do so on a voluntary, part-time basis. Without full-time dedicated staff, agencies will not succeed in fully adopting and implementing these recommended practices. The government should: Appoint a full-time, senior-level Responsible AI lead in each department or agency critical to national security and each branch of the armed services. Such an official should drive Responsible AI training, provide expertise on Responsible AI policies and practices, lead interagency coordination, and shape procurement policies.
DOD leadership on AI safety is essential to engage our allies and maintain an AI advantage – this is critical during the Ukraine conflict
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › DOD Key
Tarraf, Shelton, and Parker 2019 - Senior Information Scientist, Senior Engineer, and physical Scientist at the RAND Corporation [ Danielle C., William, Edward, et al RAND Cooperation, “The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence”, , Acc 6/18/22, M.A.]
The DIB’s Technologies and Capabilities Recommendation 5, cited earlier in this chapter, proposed establishing a centralized, focused, and well-resourced organization to propel applied research in AI and ML forward. The insights gathered from our industry interviews (see section “Industry: Organization” in Appendix C) lead us to believe there is indeed value in, if not strict necessity for, a centralized organization. This organization would have a mandate that goes beyond applied research and would be supported at the highest levels with long-term funding commitments to institute organizational change and scale AI across DoD. One of our industry interviewees noted that centralization at onset was key to their organization’s success, and premature decentralization of effort likely would have been detrimental (see section “Industry: Organization” in Appendix C).7 Based on the premises that (1) the JAIC is the focal point of DoD AI activity; (2) it fulfills the need for a centralized, well-resourced organization to scale AI and its impact across DoD (see above); (3) it will continue in that role for several years because of the expected timeline for AI deployment at scale across enterprise, mission-support, and operational AI; and (4) it needs to be able carry out all the roles it has been tasked with in the current strategy and establishing memo, we identified friction points that we discuss in the following paragraphs. 7 We note that this comment, and those of other industry interviewees, imply that if the effort to scale AI across an organization is successful, its natural ending point is the sunset of the centralized entity that drove the transformation as AI capabilities are diffused across the organization. We therefore expect the JAIC’s role to evolve, though we expect that to happen along a longer timeline (ten or more years) based on our assessment of the state of technology in Chapter Three. DoD Posture for Artificial Intelligence 47
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › US Key
Garcia, 2021 - Vice-chair of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control [Denise, May 13, 2021, Nature.com, “Stop the emerging AI cold war,” ., 6/18/22 MD]
A race to militarize artificial intelligence is gearing up. Two years ago, the US Congress created the Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI). This March, it recommended that the must accelerate artificial-intelligence (AI) technologies to preserve national security and remain competitive with China and Russia. This will undermine the United States' ability to lead emerging global norms on AI. In April, the European Commission published the first international legal framework for making AI secure and ethical; in January, the European Parliament issued guidelines stating that military AI should not replace human decisions and oversight. By contrast, the NSCAI recommendations advocate "the integration of AI-enabled technologies into every facet of war-fighting". Enhancing AI war-fighting capacity will decrease security in a world where the biggest threats are instability -- political, social, economic and planetary. The NSCAI should heed the research community. Some 4,500 AI and researchers have declared that AI should not make the decision to take a human life -- aligning with the European Parliament guidelines and the European Union regulation. The NSCAI resurrected disastrous ideas from the cold war and framed its report in terms of winning a competition for AI-enabled warfare. During the cold war, the drive to stay ahead in the technological race led to the accumulation of 70,000 nuclear weapons and today's global arsenal of 13,100 warheads. This brought extortionate costs: US$70 billion is spent annually to maintain nuclear weapons globally. Other threats demand similar investments: in 2019, climate-induced natural disasters displaced 25 million people, and decentralized conflicts forced 8.6 million to move. Still more threats affect infrastructure, such as the ransomware attack on 8 May that shut down a 8,850-kilometre US fuel pipeline. The NSCAI does not prioritize international cooperation to create new regulations. Indeed, it speaks against a global ban on autonomous weapons, saying that other countries cannot be trusted to comply. But an AI-militarization race would be profoundly destabilizing. Unlike nuclear arms, AI is already ubiquitous in civilian spheres, so the dual-use risks of, say, flying drones or computer night are much higher. Since 2014, I have been an observer and adviser at United Nations meetings, and I testified in 2017 as part of the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons. In my view, rather than focusing on counting weapons or on particular weapons systems, policies should specify human intention and human-machine interaction, obligating countries to maintain human control over military force. Other agreements could mitigate malicious uses of AI, such as using facial recognition to oppress citizens or biased data to guide decisions about employment or incarceration. The world's people need protection from cyberattacks to infrastructure -- such as those on US hospitals in 2020 or those that hit national electrical grids. The NSCAI report calls for international standards for AI-enabled and autonomous weapons systems, arguing that if these systems are properly tested and designed, humans can use them to make the decision to kill, consistent with international humanitarian law. This is misleading: it's difficult to make machine learning's 'black box' nature fully interpretable, or to ensure that AI systems perform as expected after deployment. These systems learn from their environment, and the real world is never as simple as the laboratory. The NSCAI argues that the United States should seek commitments from Russia and China against autonomous nuclear weapons, even as it argues against treaties regulating other autonomous and AI weapons. Instead, the United States should negotiate decreases in nuclear arsenals and establish standards to keep humans in meaningful control. The NSCAI is too dismissive by discounting cooperation. The Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the 1987 Montreal Protocol are examples of accountability on which all the major powers worked together. The United States and Russia established the International Space Station by cooperating closely. Most nations want governance that controls the use of AI in war. In June 2020, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence was created by the Group of Seven industrialized countries (G7) and called for human-centric development and use of AI. The partnership brings scientific and research communities together with industry and government to facilitate international cooperation. This is the path that the United States should take -- with scientists, researchers and industry alike. The relentless pursuit of militarization does not protect us. It diverts resources and attention from nearer existential threats, such as extreme weather events. With the world reeling from COVID-19 -- the shock of the century -- now is not the moment to hasten towards worldwide confrontation. In 2019 alone, climate disasters displaced almost one million people in the United States. China, too, is extremely vulnerable to global warming. This common ground could pave the way to cooperation, including stopping the emerging AI cold war. This is no time to embark on an exorbitant and ineffective race.
2022
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Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › US Key
Middendorf, 2021 - Former Secretary of the Navy [J William “Opinion: Artificial Intelligence’s Military Risks, Potential” , BK]
AI technologies are now widely used in tactical warfare situations, such as target acquisition for missiles launched from drones. But the actual command to fire the missile is reserved for the human operator. What might happen if the decision time is reduced from minutes to seconds, removing the human operator from the process entirely? And might that scenario be adopted by one of our less responsible adversaries? Or might it just happen accidentally — an accident far more plausible than ever before. A global leader in AI will emerge in the near future, achieving enormous international clout and the power to dictate the rules governing AI. The world will be safer and more peaceful with strong U.S. leadership in AI.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › US Key
Horowitz and Kahn, 2021 – Senior and Research Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Lauren, The Washington Quarterly 3-19-2021 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” TM]
Leveraging US Leadership Advances in artificial intelligence, driven by machine learning methods and related approaches, are already reshaping international politics. Economics, societies, and now militaries are adapting, with various degrees of speed. As it is early in the age of AI, there is still significant uncertainty about the specific ways that AI and machine learning will impact military behavior and the future of war. One significant concern involves the potential for AI-enabled military applications to increase the risk of accidents, unintentional conflict, and inadvertent escalation. Poorly programmed, trained, or deployed algorithms could be subject to accidents and their uses could be misinterpreted by adversaries. Even if algorithms work as intended and give militaries an advantage, the increase in the speed of warfare from their use could create pressure for escalation in a crisis or early in a conflict. In the midst of competition with China and Russia, the United States can simultaneously benefit and be at risk from military applications of AI. Given its economic, military, and scientific leadership, the United States has a unique opportunity to shape the global AI landscape through the promotion of norms and CBMs that could decrease the risk of unintentional conflict and escalation. Only the United States has the convening power to bring allies and adversaries to the table, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, for dialogue around areas of shared interests—the areas most likely to be building blocks for cooperation. Key areas for potential cooperation include AI safety standards, dialogue on AI and strategic stability, commitments to keep humans in the loop for the use of nuclear weapons, and an Autonomous Incidents Agreement. All require further conversation. Through proposals that involve shared commitments to standards and policies that the United States would be willing to pursue unilaterally, the United States can increase global AI safety without revealing information that would compromise US capabilities or undermine US military adoption of AI. The United States can therefore leverage AI to ensure future military superiority and simultaneously decrease the risk that military uses of AI will have disastrous unintended consequences.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › NATO Key
Stanley-Lockman and Christie, 2021 - Innovation Officer in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO and former Deputy Head of Innovation in NATO’s International Staff [Zoe and Edward, NATO Review, October “An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO” , BK]
To be sure, the implementation of accelerated, principled, and interoperable AI adoption depends not just on technology, but equally on the talented and empowered people who drive the technological state-of-the-art and integration forward. NATO has also dedicated attention to other AI inputs, notably through the development of a NATO Data Exploitation Framework Policy. With actions to treat data as a strategic asset, develop analytical tools, and store and manage data in the appropriate infrastructure, the Data Exploitation Framework Policy sets the conditions for the AI Strategy’s success. In addition to the interrelationships between data and AI, ensuring coherence between NATO’s efforts on AI and other Emerging and Disruptive Technologies such as autonomy, biotechnology, and quantum computing will be vital. As Allies and NATO seek to fulfil the aim of this AI Strategy, the linkages between responsible use, accelerated adoption, interoperability, and safeguarding against threats are critical. Indeed, these linkages will also apply to NATO’s follow-on work on other Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, including the development of principles of responsible use. More broadly, this entails further coherence between the work strands on these technologies, understanding that NATO’s future technological edge – and threats the Alliance will face – may depend on their convergence. As such, not only does the NATO AI Strategy apply to this foundational technology, but it also sets the stage for NATO’s and Allies’ ambitions with regards to other Emerging and Disruptive Technologies. For each of them, the future strategic advantage that comes with NATO innovation efforts will derive from the connections between ethical leadership, iterative adoption, and integration that prizes flexibility, interoperability, and trust.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › NATO Key
Stanley-Lockman and Christie, 2021 - Innovation Officer in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO and former Deputy Head of Innovation in NATO’s International Staff [Zoe and Edward, NATO Review, October “An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO” , BK]
Through the adoption of principles of responsible use, NATO and Allies are sending a deliberately public message to their domestic populations, to Allied forces, and to other states, reiterating the Alliance’s enduring values and commitments under international law. More than just an obligation, this democratic commitment is also a pre-condition for common policy bases among Allies – and for partnership with non-traditional innovators across the Alliance. Accelerating principled and interoperable adoption With the ethical aspects of adoption that the principles underscore, NATO has the chance to signal – and follow through on – responsibility at the core of its outreach efforts. This includes engagement with start-ups, innovative small and medium enterprises, and academic researchers that either have not considered working on defence and security solutions, or simply find the adoption pathways too slow or restrictive for their business models. In contrast to the development of traditional military platforms, AI integration entails fast refresh cycles and requires constant upgrading. This requires a change of mind-set for iterative, adaptive capability development, in contrast to sequential development cycles that take years to deliver small numbers of highly sophisticated platforms. With hostile state and non-state actors increasing their investments in Emerging and Disruptive Technologies including AI, this more flexible approach to adoption is all the more urgent. In this context, with its focus on TEVV and collaborative activities, the AI Strategy sets the framework for technological enablers to out-adapt competitors and adversaries. With more of a focus on agility and adaptation, NATO can make defense and security a more attractive sector for civilian innovators to partner with, while also allowing them to maintain other commercial opportunities. In doing so, efforts to bolster the transatlantic innovation ecosystem can also serve as a bulwark against undesirable foreign investment and technology transfers. NATO’s experience not only in operations, but also in trials, exercises, and experimentation provide several avenues in which Allies and NATO can test principles against intended use cases. This is further reinforced by NATO’s scientific and technical communities, which have worked on issues such as trust, human-machine and machine-machine interactions, and human-systems integration, among many others. This work requires coordination across the NATO Enterprise. Indeed, several stakeholders across the NATO Enterprise are already involved in the development of AI-related use cases, concepts, and programmes. With the AI Strategy, these activities can gain coherence to ensure the proper connections exist between all innovation stakeholders, including operational end-users.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › NATO Key
Stanley-Lockman and Christie, 2021 - Innovation Officer in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO and former Deputy Head of Innovation in NATO’s International Staff [Zoe and Edward, NATO Review, October “An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO” , BK]
One does not have to look far to see how Artificial Intelligence (AI) – the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence – is transforming the international security environment in which NATO operates. Due to its cross-cutting nature, AI will pose a broad set of international security challenges, affecting both traditional military capabilities and the realm of hybrid threats, and will likewise provide new opportunities to respond to them. AI will have an impact on all of NATO’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. With new opportunities, risks, and threats to prosperity and security at stake, the promise and peril associated with this foundational technology are too vast for any single actor to manage alone. As a result, cooperation is inherently needed to equally mitigate international security risks, as well as to capitalise on the technology’s potential to transform enterprise functions, mission support, and operations. The continued ability of the Alliance to deter and defend against any potential adversary and to respond effectively to emerging crises will hinge on its ability to maintain its technological edge. Militarily, futureproofing the comparative advantage of Allied forces will depend on a common policy basis and digital backbone to ensure interoperability and accordance with international law. With the fusion of human, information, and physical elements increasingly determining decisive advantage in the battlespace, interoperability becomes all the more essential. Further, as competitors and potential adversaries invest in AI for military purposes, ensuring that Allies develop common responses to ensure their collective security will only become more urgent. With the formal adoption of the NATO AI Strategy, Allies have committed to the necessary cooperation and collaboration to meet these very challenges in both defense and security, naming NATO as the primary transatlantic forum. The aim of NATO’s AI Strategy is to accelerate AI adoption by enhancing key AI enablers and adapting policy, including by adopting Principles of Responsible Use for AI and by safeguarding against threats from malicious use of AI by state and non-state actors. By acting collectively through NATO, Allied governments also ensure a continued focus on interoperability and the development of common standards. Overall, with innovation ecosystems implicating different actors and faster technology lifecycles than typically included in traditional capability development systems, the NATO AI Strategy is also a recognition that exploitation of AI will require new efforts to foster and leverage the Alliance’s innovation potential, including through new partnerships and mechanisms. Taken together, these efforts will in turn strengthen the Alliance’s ability to pursue cooperative security efforts and to engage with international partners and other international organizations on matters of international security.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – Life Cycle Testing
Haugh, 2018 - project leader for the Institute for Defense Analysis [Brian A., September “The Status of Test, Evaluation, Verification, and Validation (TEV&V) of Autonomous Systems,” , 6/23/22 MD]
6. Elevated safety concerns and asymmetric hazard Traditionally, TEV&V personnel have relied on the training and common sense of equipment operators to provide many kinds of safety assurance, both in the field and on the test range. Autonomous systems potentially take many of the decisions underlying routine safety out of the hands (and minds) of operators, and depend instead on complex software that allows the system to “operate” itself. During Developmental Test and Evaluation and into Operational Test and Evaluation, it is likely that the software will still contain major bugs and that the algorithms and training data being used might not be the final choices. This creates a potential for various kinds of mischief—especially for weapon systems, highly-mobile systems, or other systems that could be dangerous in the hands of an unreliable operator. Similarly, the most striking successes of AI, machine learning, and autonomous systems to date have occurred in contexts where the cost of error is low. For autonomous military systems, this will not generally be the case—designating incorrect targets, responding to spurious cyber attacks, misidentifying 2-3 individuals or objects, crashing unmanned vehicles into obstacles, and other potential failure modes of autonomous systems are all potentially very costly. Apart from driverless car efforts, there are few active research programs today for applications with highly asymmetric hazard functions.
2022
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Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – Life Cycle Testing
National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence 2022 [March 19, “NCSAI Final Report 2021 – Chapter 7: Establishing Justified Confidence in AI Systems”, ]
3. Testing and Evaluation, Verification and Validation (TEVV). Having justified confidence in AI systems requires assurances that they will perform as intended, including when interacting with humans and other systems. The TEVV of traditional legacy systems is not sufficient at providing these assurances. As a result, agencies lack common metrics to assess trustworthiness that AI systems will perform as intended. To minimize performance problems and unanticipated outcomes, an entirely new type of TEVV will be needed. This is a priority task, and a challenging one. The federal government will need to increase R&D investments to improve our understanding of how to conduct AI and software-related TEVV. Toward this end: DoD should tailor and develop TEVV policies and capabilities to meet the changes needed for AI as AI-enabled systems grow in number, scope, and complexity in the Department. This should include establishing a TEVV framework and culture that integrates continuous testing; making TEVV tools and capabilities more readily available across DoD; updating or creating live, virtual, and constructive test ranges for AI-enabled systems; and restructuring the processes that underlie requirements for system design, development, and testing.6 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) should provide and regularly refresh a set of standards, performance metrics, and tools for qualified confidence in AI models, data, and training environments, and predicted outcomes. NIST should lead the AI community in establishing these resources, closely engaging with experts and users from industry, academia, and government to ensure their efficacy.
The DOD must improve TEVV by extending testing for the life cycle of the system – this is essential for AI which evolves over time.
2022
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Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – Arms Race
Sharre, 2018 - director of the technology and national security program at the Center for a New American Security [Paul, 12 September, “Ultrafast computing is critical to modern warfare. But it also ensures a lot could go very wrong, very quickly.” ST]
Militaries around the globe are racing to build ever more autonomous drones, missiles, and cyberweapons. Greater autonomy allows for faster reactions on the battlefield, an advantage that is as powerful today as it was 2,500 years ago when Sun Tzu wrote, “Speed is the essence of war.” Today’s intelligent machines can react at superhuman speeds. Modern Chinese military academics have speculated about a coming “battlefield singularity,” in which the pace of combat eclipses human decision-making. The consequences of humans ceding effective control over what happens in war would be profound and the effects potentially catastrophic. While the competitive advantages to be gained from letting machines run the battlefield are clear, the risks would be grave: Accidents could cause conflicts to spiral out of control. Consider what has already happened with stock markets, where computers use algorithms to make decisions so quickly that microseconds make a difference of millions of dollars. Such trading has made brokers huge amounts of money—but has also produced extreme flash crashes that can send markets tumbling in minutes. Regulators have managed these risks by installing circuit breakers that can take a stock offline if the price moves too quickly, but battlefields lack these fail-safes. Flash crashes are bad enough; a flash war would be downright disastrous. Humans have already ceded control to machines in certain military domains. At least 30 countries—with Israel, Russia, and the United States leading the pack—employ human-supervised autonomous weapons to defend bases, vehicles, and ships. These weapons systems, such as the ship-based Aegis combat system, can detect incoming rockets and missiles and, if human supervisors do nothing, respond on their own by firing to eliminate the threat. Such automated responses allow the systems to defend against what are known as saturation attacks, in which salvos of missiles or rockets are launched at a target with such little notice that they could overwhelm human operators. For the time being, autonomous weapons such as these are used purely to protect human-occupied installations or vehicles. Humans supervise the weapons’ operation in real time and can intervene if necessary. Future autonomous weapons could lack these safeguards, however. A number of advanced militaries—including those of China, France, Israel, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are currently developing stealth combat drones intended to penetrate an adversary’s airspace. Once deep behind enemy lines, these drones might find their communications jammed, so they’re being designed to ensure they can continue to operate on their own. Most countries have not explained how their drones will operate under such circumstances and what rules of engagement they will follow. Countries could require their drones to get human authorization before launching any attacks. Doing so would allow the drones to bomb preapproved fixed targets but would require them to report back and get permission before attacking any newly discovered quarries. Such an approach sounds good in theory, but the problem is that these days many high-priority targets, such as air defense systems and ballistic missile launchers, are highly mobile. This mobility will increasingly tempt military planners to delegate lethal decision-making authority to machines, since doing so could give them an edge in reaction time. No battlefield is static, and the ability to rapidly react to a dynamic environment is critical to mission success—whether in the air, on the ground, or in cyberspace. Air combat strategists call this the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) loop in dogfighting. In the OODA loop paradigm of combat, pilots win dogfights not simply because they enjoy the best hardware but because they assess and react to their situations faster than their opponents, although better sensors and maneuverability might help shorten reaction times. Since machines can react faster than humans, automation will offer tremendous advantages in this competition. That means that the same competitive pressures that led to the creation of systems such as the Aegis could soon be introduced on a wider scale.
2022
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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – CBMs
Horowitz and Scharre 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]
The Role of Confidence-Building Measures AI potentially generates risks for international security due to ways AI could change the character of warfare, the limitations of AI technology today, and the use of AI for specific military missions such as nuclear operations. Especially given the uncertain technological trajectory of advances in AI, what are options to reduce the risks that military applications of AI can pose to international stability? To advance the conversation about ensuring that military AI adoption happens in the safest and most responsible way possible, this paper outlines a series of potential confidence-building measures aimed at mitigating risks from military uses of AI. We introduce these ideas as preliminary concepts for future research, discussion, and examination, rather than to specifically advocate for any of these options. But progress in mitigating the risks from military AI competition requires moving beyond the recognition that risk mitigation is important to the hard work of suggesting, evaluating, and examining the benefits and drawbacks of specific mechanisms. This paper focuses on confidence-building measures, a broad category of actions that states can take to reduce instability risks. CBMs include actions such as transparency, notification, and monitoring designed to reduce various risks arising from military competition between states. They generally encompass four areas, as Marie-France Desjardins describes: Information-sharing and communication Measures to allow for inspections and observers “Rules of the road” to govern military operations Limits on military readiness and operations Confidence-building measures are related to, but distinct from, arms control agreements. Arms control encompasses agreements states make to forgo researching, developing, producing, fielding, or employing certain weapons, features of weapons, or applications of weapons. The set of possible actions states could take is broad, and this paper will focus on the potential benefits and drawbacks of specific AI-related confidence-building measures. Arms control for military AI applications is a valuable topic worthy of exploration, but beyond the scope of this paper.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – CBMs
Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]
Militaries around the world believe that the integration of machine learning methods throughout their forces could improve their effectiveness. From algorithms to aid in recruiting and promotion, to those designed for surveillance and early warning, to those used directly on the battlefield, applications of artificial intelligence (AI) could shape the future character of warfare. These uses could also generate significant risks for international stability. These risks relate to broad facets of AI that could shape warfare, limits to machine learning methods that could increase the risks of inadvertent conflict, and specific mission areas, such as nuclear operations, where the use of AI could be dangerous. To reduce these risks and promote international stability, we explore the potential use of confidence-building measures (CBMs), constructed around the shared interests that all countries have in preventing inadvertent war. Though not a panacea, CBMs could create standards for information-sharing and notifications about AI-enabled systems that make inadvertent conflict less likely.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – CBMs
Horowitz, 2021 - Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania [Michael Horowitz, 1-26-2021, , Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "How Joe Biden can use confidence-building measures for military uses of AI” https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2020.1860331 accessed on 6-18-2022]
Autonomous naval ships, algorithms to interpret drone video footage – the US military and other armed forces around the world are thinking about how to incorporate applications of artificial intelligence systems into their operations. The Biden administration has an opportunity to foster international cooperation on military AI to reduce the risk of inadvertent conflict while still pursuing US military leadership. Perhaps no technology holds global imagination concerning the future of military power more than artificial intelligence (AI), in both positive and negative ways. Anticipating the impact of AI systems on the security environment, in 2018, the United States Department of Defense launched the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). The JAIC is one of several US military initiatives designed “to seize upon the transformative potential of Artificial Intelligence technology” (DOD 2019) and assist the American military in preparing for future wars filled with autonomous systems and algorithms. While it is still true that most military uses of AI are closer to concept than reality, many countries, including Russia and China – competitors seeking to challenge US conventional military superiority – are seeking to incorporate ever-greater levels of autonomy into their military operations. It will be a busy four years on the military AI front. President-elect Joe Biden’s administration will have to make critical choices about what strategy to pursue regarding the international governance of military AI. These choices will be key to ensuring that, even as the US military invests heavily in AI, these investments promote, rather than undermine, global stability. Competition for AI leadership is inevitable, and it is important not to exaggerate the potential for cooperation, but countries should have shared interests in preventing accidents or inadvertent war emerging from uses of AI. Confidence-building measures, best known from the Cold War, such as an AI equivalent to the Incidents at Sea Agreement, could decrease the likelihood that military uses of AI increase the risk of conflict.
US dialogue with allies about AI safety is a confidence building measure that addresses the risk of accidental conflicts and mistaken escalation
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – Global Norms
Horowitz and Scharre 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]
Promoting Norms In 2019, the U.S. Defense Innovation Board proposed a set of AI principles for the U.S. Defense Department, which DoD subsequently adopted in early 2020. While these principles no doubt have domestic audiences in the U.S. defense community and tech sector, they also serve as an early example of a state promulgating norms about appropriate use of AI in military applications. The DoD AI principles included a requirement that DoD AI systems be responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable. (The full set of DoD AI principles is included in the Appendix). Similarly, the DoD’s unclassified summary of its AI strategy, released in 2019, called for building AI systems that were “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.” A focus of the strategy was “leading in military ethics and AI safety.” There is value in states promoting norms for responsible use of AI, including adopting and employing technology in a way that reflects an understanding of the technical risks associated with AI systems. While stating such principles is not the same as putting in place effective bureaucratic processes to ensure their compliance, there is nevertheless value in states publicly signaling to others (and to their own bureaucracies) the importance of using AI responsibly in military applications. While these norms are at a high level, they nevertheless signal some degree of attention by senior military and civilian defense officials to some of the risks of AI systems, including issues surrounding safety, security, responsibility, and controllability. These signals may aid internal bureaucratic efforts to mitigate various AI-related risks, as bureaucratic actors can point to these official documents for support. Additionally, to the extent that other nations find these statements credible, they may help signal to other nations at least some degree of awareness and attention to these risks, helping to incentivize others to do the same. One risk to such statements is that if they appear manifestly at odds with a state’s actions, they can ring hollow, undermine a state’s credibility, or undermine the norm itself. For example, loudly proclaiming the importance of AI ethics while using AI systems in a clearly unethical manner, such as for internal repression or without regard for civilian casualties, could not only undermine a state’s credibility but also undermine the value of the norm overall, especially if other states fail to highlight the disconnect. Following through with meaningful actions to show how a state puts these norms into practice is essential for them to have real value.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – Global Norms
Flournoy, Haines et al 2020 - former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director of National Intelligence [Michèle and Avril, Gabrielle Cheftiz Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October, “Building Trust through Testing Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf Acc 6/23/22 JZ]
7. Develop industry/U.S. government TEVV standards and promote them internationally. DoD, working with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and industry, and building on DoD requirements and processes developed for industry, should develop standards for ML/DL testing for the private sector that can be publicly promoted and help inform private sector development of ML/DL systems. Such standards would focus on a range of issues, including robustness, interpretability, performance metrics, fail-safe design, traceability for data collection and management, privacy, and testability. These should be broad standards that serve as guidance for both government and commercial developers to develop operationally specific design requirements and testing metrics. DoD entities—including the JAIC and R&E—and the IC are already playing a role in the development of U.S. government AI standards, led by NIST and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. NIST’s 2019 plan on U.S. leadership on AI provides an important foundation and calls for the development of standards and metrics for trustworthiness (e.g., accuracy, explainability, resiliency, safety, reliability, objectivity, and security), complexity, domain-specific and context-dependent risk, and uncertainty.35 NIST and the State Department should play a leading role in promoting U.S. government standards for AI and ML development and testing domestically and throughout international standards-setting organizations, such as the International Standards Organization and Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineering, and multilateral institutions, such as the OECD AI Policy Observatory. The promotion of U.S. standards globally will help bolster U.S. economic competitiveness, create a level playing field for U.S. industries who are collaborating with DoD and consequently subject to these standards, incorporate U.S. values and ethical principles into AI and ML development, and ensure that the United States and its allies are interoperable. As we’ve seen in other critical technology areas, the United States must ensure that competitors do not set standards, which make it harder to manage vulnerabilities and hinder U.S. efforts to establish the highest degree of ethics, safety, and risk management.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Solvency › Solvency – Global Norms
Flournoy, Haines et al 2020 - former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director of National Intelligence [Michèle and Avril, Gabrielle Cheftiz Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October, “Building Trust through Testing Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf Acc 6/23/22 JZ]
Third, with an effective TEVV system, the United States can reduce barriers to innovation and facilitate U.S. leadership in ML/DL technologies. As most of the innovation in ML/DL will come from the private sector, unless the U.S. government is able to effectively draw on private sector work in this arena, it will not be able to leverage the best cutting-edge technology. Research on new TEVV methods and organizational reforms to adapt the current system is simply not keeping pace with private sector development. Without urgent reforms and prioritized investment in new research and infrastructure, the Defense Department will lose its chance to shape industry’s approach to ML/DL development in a manner consistent with DOD standards for safety, reliability, and accountability. It will lose the opportunity to take advantage of new private sector developments, while allowing other nations without such standards to adopt the latest innovations. It is critical that the U.S. government not only shape its own U.S. industry standards but also promote compatible global standards and norms.