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2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Affirmative DA Unity Answers › No NATO Unity / Cohesion

NATO not united on Ukraine

Carpenter 22 – senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Ted Galen, MARCH 23, 2022, CATO institute, “Just How United Is NATO (and the World) against Russia?” ER]

Moscow’s aggression also has triggered a sense of alarm and a more serious attitude in multiple European countries about doing more for NATOs collective defense mission. That shift has been especially evident in Germany, where Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government approved an emergency fund to boost Berlin’s military budget by 100 billion Euros. The latter move would finally fulfill Germany’s longstanding pledge (along with all other NATO members) to spend at least 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product annually on defense. Berlin had repeatedly procrastinated about carrying out that commitment. A far more militant posture by the Scholz government also was apparent when it stated an intent to ship weapons to Ukraine to bolster that country’s military resistance. Previous German governments would have considered such involvement in a raging war unthinkable. Numerous other NATO members, including the United States, already are pouring weapons into Ukraine.

Nevertheless, it is easy to overstate the degree of unity regarding policy toward Russia even among NATO members, much less within the broader international community. Indeed, some cracks already are beginning to form in NATO’s solid front. When Poland’s Vice Premier, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, suggested that the Alliance send an armed peacekeeping force to Ukraine to provide humanitarian aid, the reactions were widely divergent. Estonian Defense Minister Kalle Laanet said that a proposed peacekeeping mission was “one of the possibilities” NATO should consider, but several other governments pushed back. We’re “still in too early stages to talk about that,” said Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren, adding that such a deployment would need the backing of the United Nations Security Council—a requirement that made the plan a nonstarter, since as a permanent member of the Council, Russia holds veto power.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Affirmative DA Unity Answers › No NATO Unity / Cohesion

NATO still facing several obstacles that undermine cohesion --- disagreements over strategic concept and political and military weaknesses

Lucas, 22 --- nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (JUNE 7, 2022, 5:31 AM, Edward, “NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date; With the bloc’s unity over Ukraine showing cracks, NATO needs an overhaul,” , JMP)

Yet look a little more closely, and the picture is far less rosy. Notwithstanding its apparent unity of purpose since the start of Russia’s war, NATO looks out of shape and out of date. In the run-up to their summit, the allies have been furiously haggling over the language in their new strategic concept, which will frame the alliance’s mission for the coming years and will be unveiled in Madrid. What will it say about Russia? About China? What sacrifices and risks are the member states really willing to accept? Are they willing to pool sovereignty in order to streamline decision-making?

Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a semi-authoritarian state that flirts with Russia and fumes at what it considers European meddling over human rights. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is taking a different but downward path, fusing wealth and power into a new system of control at home and undermining U.S. and European attempts to put pressure on Russia and China. Macron’s relentless posturing and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s foot-dragging create constant obstacles and distractions. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: Scholzen is a German neologism for “dither,” while makronic in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.”

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Affirmative DA Unity Answers › No NATO Unity / Cohesion

Cohesion fraying now --- Turkey and Hungary blocking NATO priorities

Bloomberg Editors 22 [June 20, 2022, “Western Unity Is More Essential Than Ever”, , acc 6/19/22, NB]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine has made the West — in this context, NATO and the European Union — more united than it’s been in a long time. Unfortunately, that cohesion is now at risk, as the Russian invasion turns into a grinding war of attrition. To deter Putin from escalating and to keep him from winning, Western leaders must focus on the two weakest links in their alliance: Turkey and Hungary.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey — a member of NATO but not the EU — says he will block the accession of Sweden and Finland to the transatlantic alliance unless he’s given a series of unrelated concessions. If he actually follows through, he would not only leave both countries more vulnerable to Russian aggression, but also render NATO weaker than it should be in defending its Baltic members. Gratuitously, Erdogan is also increasing tensions with Greece, another NATO ally.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › Turkey Key to NATO

Turkey important to NATO – has significant military capacity to assist the alliance

Coşkun, 22 – senior fellow at CEIP and former director general for int-security affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 24, 22; Alper Coşkun; “Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorne their relationship”; , AI)

With seventy years under its belt, Turkey is among NATO’s older members. It boasts a strong legacy, having been a bulwark against communism during the Cold War and a frontline player in many regional crises that erupted later, including in the South Caucasus, Balkans, Iraq, and, most recently, Syria. In contrast to most other Alliance members, this incessant state of conflict around its borders has denied Turkey any peace dividend.

Turkey’s formidable military capacity and growing expeditionary capabilities, together with its expanding defense industry (particularly in drone technologies) are all critical enablers for NATO. Even as priorities change and global attention shifts to the east, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has proven that building sustainable security in the Euro-Atlantic area is unfinished business. Much to the delight of Turkish officials, this has corroborated Ankara’s continuing geopolitical relevance—something it is betting on, maybe excessively so, in making its demands of Finland and Sweden.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › U.S.-Turkey Relations Solves Conflicts

Strong ties with Turkey are critical to peace in Europe – checks Russian influence and stabilizes Ukraine, Syria, Libya and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Hess, 22 – Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (June 22, 22; Maximillian Hess, “Why the West should make peace with Erdogan now,” , AI)

The democratic West has a long and controversial history of entering alliances of convenience with dictators and strongmen around the world—unsavory but necessary partners in confronting threats to the international order. Denounced as ethically dubious, this sort of stance is also realist, balance-of-power politics par excellence. It enabled the world to unite to defeat Adolf Hitler in World War II and the West to win the Cold War.

Atop the list of unsavory partners the West urgently needs better relations with today sits Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. That he is unsavory is clear: He has actively undermined Turkish democracy, undone decades of liberalization, weaponized migration, terrorized the Kurdish minority both at home and in neighboring Syria, and helped Iran violate U.S. sanctions. Most recently, he has threatened to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. It will take a long time before the West can genuinely trust him.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Finland & Sweden Can’t be Integrated

Sweden and Finland can be integrated smoothly --- they already participate in exercises

Wormuth, 22 --- Secretary of the Army, US Department of Defense (June 2, 2022, Christine Wormuth, moderated by Vivian Salama who serves as a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal “NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth,” , JMP)

VIVIAN SALAMA: There’s a number of Ukraine questions that we’re getting here today. Can you speak to the impact—this is from Michael Hauser, by the way—can you speak to the impact of Putin’s war in Ukraine—that Putin’s war in Ukraine has had on strengthening the relationship between NATO and US Army leadership in Europe? And what is necessary to maintain the strength of that relationship in the decades to come?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Sure. Well, we have very strong relationships with, you know, NATO country—with the armies of NATO countries. General McConville does, you know, counterpart meetings every year. There is an entire land conference for European allies—or European armies, excuse me. So we will try to keep those relationships very, very strong.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Finland Won’t Contribute

Finland is set to continue to increase its military spending

Ossa 22 – Researcher at the Finnish National Defence University [, MAY 9, 2022, War on the Rocks, “WHAT WOULD FINLAND BRING TO THE TABLE FOR NATO?” Acc. 6/23/22 ER]

Maintaining a strong and credible national defense, even in a conscription-based system, is costly. This year’s Finnish defense budget is set at 5.1 billion euros —1.9 percent of GDP. Only two years earlier, defense’s share of GDP was 1.3 percent. This rapid increase can be explained by the purchase of new F-35 fighter aircraft, but the war in Ukraine has prompted demands to further increase the budget. The military will get additional funding of 700 million euros in 2022 and 788 million euros in 2023, bringing its budget up to 2.2 percent of GDP. The readiness and capabilities of the Finnish military have been strengthened in all operational domains. Finland already has one of the strongest artilleries in Europe (1500 systems). The war in Ukraine has showed that even in the 21st century, properly maintaining strong conventional forces remains the key factor in credible deterrence for a non-nuclear state. Still, governments need to find the budget to develop readiness and capabilities in new operational domains too, including the cyber, space, and information domains. Finland is no exception. International cooperation is particularly important in responding to hybrid threats, cyber operations, and information warfare.

A competitive defense industry is another important piece in the national defense puzzle. Finland’s defense industry is highly specialized, which is why the country procures a great deal of materiel and equipment from abroad and is actively involved in procurement cooperation with other Nordic and European partners. The Finnish defense industry plays a crucial role in supplying and maintaining the Finnish military, but about 40 to 60 percent of its products are exported, including communication systems, vehicle systems, vessels, and protective equipment. In 2020 the export volume was 43 percent. The defense industry consists predominantly of small and medium-sized privately owned companies, with total turnover within the defense, aerospace, and security sectors of 1.84 billion euros in 2020. With a few exceptions such as Patria, producer of the Armored Modular Vehicle and NEMO mortar system, there are no large industrial players

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Finland Won’t Contribute

Finland is constantly improving its defense with new military equipment and has a large defense force

Ossa 22 – Researcher at the Finnish National Defence University [, MAY 9, 2022, War on the Rocks, “WHAT WOULD FINLAND BRING TO THE TABLE FOR NATO?” Acc. 6/23/22 ER]

Finland has always assumed a pragmatic, hands-on approach to national defense. When the Cold War ended, most European countries shifted their focus to expeditionary operations, reduced their defense spending, and developed smaller but highly professional and specialized military forces. Finland chose a different path — not least because of its 800-mile border with Russia. Helsinki maintained a strong national defense posture, the cornerstones of which are conscription and a large, well-trained reserve. The relatively cheap conscription system and having a large reserve instead of a large active-duty force allowed Finland to maintain a credible defense even when the share of GDP spent on defense was lower than desirable. In the late Cold War, Finland spent approximately 1.6 percent of its GDP on defense, and in the early 1990s this figure saw a rapid increase to 1.9 percent are to the purchase of 64 F-18s from the United States in 1992. After that Finnish defense budgets kept declining and were at their lowest in 2001 (1.1 percent of GDP). Since then, defense spending began to rise until 2012, when the Finnish military began a three-year period of reform that included defense budget cuts from 1.4 percent to 1.2 percent of GDP and the dissolution of several military bases, resulting in significant gaps in readiness that need patching up.

Still, while other countries sold their military equipment, Finland purchased new systems and updated existing capabilities. Along with the F-18s, other major purchases include AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles from the United States (2012), Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks from the Netherlands (2014), K9 armored howitzers from South Korea (2017), and most recently F-35 fighter jets from the United States (2021). The navy modernized its Hamina-class vessels a few years ago, and underwater warfare capabilities were improved with the integration of the Variable Depth Sonar system and torpedoes. Currently, Finland is in the process of replacing several older vessels with four modern multi-role corvettes, capable of effectively conducting a range of tasks at sea all year round. Along with the defense of national territory and airspace, maintaining a capable navy (in close cooperation with Sweden) is particularly important for Finland, whose trade and security of supply depend on the open sea lines of the Baltic Sea.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Finland Won’t Contribute

Finland already has connections with NATO and has a strong military to contribute – joining alliance is the next step

Orpo, 22 – chair of the National Coalition party in Finland [Petteri, 14 March, Financial Times, Russia’s invasion shows it is time for the next chapter on Finland and Nato, , Acc 6/18/22, HO]

A lasting detente or a return to multilateral co-operation with the current Russian government seem very unlikely right now. While Finland is not facing direct military threats, it has become evident that we need to re-evaluate our relations with the country next door. While we have advocated good neighbourly relations in the past, Russia’s current aggression and statements regarding our possible Nato membership show how even the principles of good relations are subject to rapid change.

As Russia openly threatens peace in Europe, we need to look at all available means to improve our own security as well as that of Europe as a whole. There is a broad consensus in Finland that this situation has changed permanently at the same time as our potential Nato membership is on the table.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Expansion Hurts NATO

Finland and Sweden would substantially help with military

DESIDERIO 22 – congressional reporter [ANDREW, 05/19/2022, “Senate on track to approve NATO bids of Finland and Sweden” , Acc 6/21/22 ER]

“Finland and Sweden are impressive and capable countries, with military capabilities that surpass many existing NATO allies,” said Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, who traveled to Helsinki and Stockholm last weekend after meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv. “As new members, they would more than pull their weight.”

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Expansion Hurts NATO

NATO expansion to Finland and Sweden is key to transatlantic solidary and bolstering democratic governance in the alliance

Beitsch, 22 (4-16-2022, Rebecca, "Russia pushes Finland, Sweden into NATO’s arms," Hill; DOA: 4-18-2022, , SMTX//BSA)

Finland and Sweden appear to be edging closer to joining NATO, a move that leaders and experts see as the best way to confront Russia as it escalates its rhetoric on nuclear weapons.

The conflict in Ukraine has forced the two Nordic nations to reconsider their absence from the alliance forged after World War II, which commits members to defending one another if attacked.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Expansion Hurts NATO

Finland’s military has international experience – can significantly help NATO

Ossa 22 – Researcher at the Finnish National Defence University [, MAY 9, 2022, War on the Rocks, “WHAT WOULD FINLAND BRING TO THE TABLE FOR NATO?” Acc. 6/23/22 ER]

Although military defense is its main task, the Finnish Defence Forces have taken an active role in international crisis management too. Being an active and cooperative partner is of course important, but ultimately the underlying reason for participating in international operations is to ensure Finland’s safety. Finland currently has a total of 300 crisis management and peacekeeping troops deployed in Lebanon, Kosovo, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. By participating in international operations since the 1950s, Finland has proved its willingness to play its part in international security. Moreover, the experience gained in such operations has had a positive impact on Finnish forces’ ability to cooperate with partner countries even in demanding environments.

As Finland has thus far chosen to remain outside of NATO, it has looked for other forms of defense cooperation, the most important of which is the bilateral relationship with its western neighbor Sweden. Finland and Sweden have no mutual defense obligations but have agreed on cooperation in areas ranging from host-nation support to combined joint military operations, and from the common use of resources to territorial surveillance. Trilateral cooperation with Sweden and Norway is also gaining new significance. Strong Nordic defense cooperation is advantageous for NATO too. Should Finland and Sweden join the alliance, not only would NATO’s presence in Baltic Sea region be strengthened, but also the same would be true in the Arctic.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Expansion Hurts NATO

Finland and Sweden will productively contribute to NATO by performing important functions

Poast 22 – associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago [Paul Poast, June 7, 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “What NATO Needs to Do Before Finland and Sweden Join” , Acc 6/18/22 ER]

Finland and Sweden have now applied for NATO membership, and the process of bringing them on as full members of the alliance is accelerating into what may become the quickest turnaround ever. Research by international relations scholars (including me) suggests that the alliance needs to work out and agree on a military plan for defending them as soon as possible—before the two Nordic countries join.

On the one hand, there are plenty of reasons why the two nations have a strong case to join the alliance. Finland brings much to the NATO table. Prior to the war in Ukraine, Finnish defense spending, as a percentage of GDP, was already moving toward NATO’s 2 percent target, with further increases planned. Finland also has a conscription policy, which is often seen to demonstrate to allies a strong commitment to self-defense against a potential Russian attack. Similarly, Sweden has long worked with NATO, including covert cooperation during the Cold War and assistance with peacekeeping operations thereafter. Since the defense of Finland is a pillar of Sweden’s defense policy, it also is sensible for Stockholm to follow its neighbor into the alliance. Since both nations are EU members, one could argue that they essentially gave up their military neutrality long ago. Moreover, both nations are strong democracies, a core principle of the alliance (if not always followed in practice).

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc Expansion Improves NATO Air / Maritime / Cyber

NATO expansion allows alliance to defend interests in air, maritime and cyber domains

Lesser, 22 – vice president and executive director of GMF's Brussels office [5-19-2022, GMF, “A Strategic Plus—with a Few Political Twists,” , accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

The prospect of NATO membership for Finland and Sweden is an operational blessing for the alliance. Both countries bring substantial military assets and expertise. Their membership would create much needed strategic depth, essential to the defense of the Baltic states and the air and maritime space in the region. As longstanding NATO partners, interoperability will not be an issue. By virtue of their history and geography, Stockholm and Helsinki have always been well placed as centers for intelligence and analysis on Russia. One of the many lessons of the Ukraine war so far has been that formal security guarantees matter. Having Finland and Sweden “in” removes any ambiguity about their place in Europe’s collective defense.

In broader strategic terms, too, the benefits of this new enlargement are clear. The alliance does acquire a much longer border with Russia. But set against the heightened ability to defend alliance interests in the air, maritime, and cyber domains, including in the high north, the net exposure should not be a concern. And transatlantic partners were already stakeholders in Finland’s territorial defense.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc NATO Expansion Stabilizes Europe & Improves Hybrid Threat Response

Finland and Sweden accession improves NATO on total defense and hybrid threats – will make Baltics and all of Europe more stable

Berzina, 22 – senior fellow and head of the geopolitics team at the Alliance for Securing Democracy [5-19-2022, GMF "What Can NATO Learn from Finland and Sweden?” https://www.gmfus.org/news/finland-and-sweden-apply-join-nato-whats-next, accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

Finland and Sweden’s decisions to seek NATO membership are tremendous developments in European security, but also long-overdue steps to codify a security and defense position that has been emerging for decades. Russia may want to portray the northern Baltic in Cold War terms of neutrality, as standing apart from NATO. But Finland and Sweden are EU member states, have been close partners of NATO for years, and are members of the United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force that as recently as this year has exercised together. Finland, Sweden, and NATO view the world in very similar terms, and on many aspects of total defense and hybrid threats, the two countries have much to teach the alliance.

Why is there this alignment in security outlook? The history of Russia’s aggression is not forgotten, especially in Finland, where the success of the Winter War protected the country from the occupation that befell its southern Baltic neighbors. Russia’s threats and heavily armed presence are still very much present in the Baltic region. It may be uncomfortable for those NATO allies who focus on threats in the south, like Spain and Italy, to think about Russia’s forces and missiles in Kaliningrad, wedged between NATO members Poland and Lithuania, and to ponder the very small distance separating this Russian territory from Gotland in Sweden. But Finland and Sweden have faced down this threat for decades, vowing to protect themselves and building capabilities to counter this ever-present, untrusted neighbor.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc Expansion Solves Russian War

Ukraine conflict limits Putin’s likely response to NATO membership --- signs of aggression will just solidify NATO

Mitchell, 22 – senior advisor for the Russia and Europe Center at USIP [A. Wess, May 26,United States Institute of Peace, “Putin’s War Backfires as Finland, Sweden Seek to Join NATO; The Russian autocrat aimed to check NATO’s expansion but has instead strengthened the alliance,” , Acc 6/23/22, HO]

Aside from immediate measures and threats (e.g., cutting off energy supplies to Finland, Putin’s threat of a “technical military” response), how do you expect Putin to respond if Finland and Sweden formally join NATO?

Putin’s dilemma is that he has to respond in some way to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO moves to avoid seeming weak, yet he has few obvious or effective response options. For years he has threatened both countries that joining NATO would lead to negative consequences, so he can’t afford to not respond in some fashion. The easiest response is to cut energy exports, as he has done. But both countries can diversify energy sources without excessively straining their economies. Militarily, Putin’s usual response would be to send Russian conventional forces to the border with Finland and to deploy Russian planes and ships to the eastern Baltic. But he needs all the military power he can get in Ukraine.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc Expansion Solves Russian War

NATO expansion challenges Russian anti-democratic moves – need to act now

22 – former press secretary and policy adviser to the president of the Czech Republic and visiting professor at New York University Prague [2/25/22, “The Real Reasons Putin Feels Threatened by NATO”, The Bulwark, , accessed 6/18/22 //TJ]

Another well-known reason for Putin’s attack is his fear that Ukraine might have evolved into a stable, prosperous democracy and as such would be a role model for the pro-Western democratic opposition in Russia. He acts now based on what to him is a rational calculation of his own interests in his own political survival: He does not want to end up in prison, or even blindfolded standing against a brick wall.

What foreign policy realists do not understand—or do not want to understand—is that even if NATO had not been enlarged to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, there would be a very good chance that Putin would still behave the way he does today. There would be one difference—his political playground in Central Europe would be larger than it is today. Corruption would be an order of magnitude higher, instability would deter foreign investment, and the living standard of citizens of Warsaw, Prague, Vilnius, Bratislava, and Budapest, which is now close to Western standards (the Czechs are richer than the Spaniards and the Portuguese, and are quickly catching up to the Italians), would have been significantly lower, essentially similar to today’s Ukraine, which never got the chance to integrate with Europe.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc Expansion Solves Russian War

NATO expansion is the only way to prevent Russia expansion

22 – former press secretary and policy adviser to the president of the Czech Republic and visiting professor at New York University Prague [2/25/22, “The Real Reasons Putin Feels Threatened by NATO”, The Bulwark, , accessed 6/18/22 //TJ]

The most prominent pretext Vladimir Putin has used for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine is the . Putin has said again and again that NATO is a threat to Russia, and demanded, in December and again in his pre-war ultimatum this week, that the alliance roll back its troops to where they were in 1997, two years before NATO expanded to Central Europe. In this, he is in a way supported by some respected American foreign policy commentators—Tom Friedman, John Mearsheimer, and others—who have dusted off their mid-’90s realist arguments against enlarging NATO, and are claiming vindication today. To support his case, Friedman  the late George Kennan’s well-known opposition to accepting new members into the alliance, quoting things Kennan told him . None of these critics, of course, approves of Russia’s aggression, but there is an I-told-you-so element to their argument.

Here is why they are wrong.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc Expansion Solves Russian War

NATO expansion will generate internal pressure on Putin to change course and moderate its foreign policy

Mitchell, 22 – senior advisor for the Russia and Europe Center at USIP [A. Wess, May 26,United States Institute of Peace, “Putin’s War Backfires as Finland, Sweden Seek to Join NATO; The Russian autocrat aimed to check NATO’s expansion but has instead strengthened the alliance,” , Acc 6/23/22, HO]

What are the short-term implications of NATO expansion, specifically for the war in Ukraine? Could it prolong the war or compel Putin to take desperate measures, like deploying WMDs?

The decision by Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership demonstrates the unintended consequences for Putin of his war in Ukraine. While his immediate objective was to defeat and subjugate Ukraine, he also wanted to create a kind of demonstration effect of Russian strength and, as the pre-war Russian diplomatic note made plain, push NATO back from Russia’s borders. The war has achieved exactly the opposite. Now, Russia will have even more NATO presence on its borders, both through the addition of hundreds of miles of NATO territory to the Russian frontier, and through the deployment of Western troop presence in Central Europe. So, the war is backfiring for Putin not only militarily but geopolitically.

2022 MNDI Disadvantage
DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Ukraine Will Lose Inevitably

There is still hope for Ukraine to win against Russia

Engelbrekt, 6/3/2022 --- military expert and professor at the Swedish Defense University in Stockholm (June 03, 2022 05:50 GMT, Interview by Reid Standish of Kjell Engelbrekt, “Interview: What's Next For Finland, Sweden's NATO Bids?” , LKK)

RFE/RL: Changing the subject now to Ukraine, what’s your assessment of where things currently stand? Russia is making some steady gains in the Donbas, but can they hold these new areas and should we expect some Ukrainian counteroffensives at some point? Engelbrekt: I think it's a matter of priority for the Ukrainian side. Russia announced in February before it invaded that it would formally recognize the administrative areas of the two so-called people's republics in Donetsk and Luhansk and they would try to capture them. So if I were in Kyiv right now I might give higher priority to consolidating my positions in the south and if I do counteroffensives, I'd do them there. So it's a matter of priorities -- military and political -- for the Ukrainian side. Looking ahead, manpower issues loom large for both Kyiv and Moscow. Troops in each army are exhausted, but the morale on the Ukrainian side still appears to be very high. So I think it will be possible for the Ukrainians to train fresh troops and move them in. But that looks to be a more difficult challenge for the Russians, especially in the longer term. I think morale is really low on the Russian side. If there are continued deliveries of Western military equipment to the Ukrainians, they may at some point have the wherewithal to challenge Russian positions. But again, I think it's an issue of priorities for them. They would probably try and mop up the Russian forces in the north and then they would want to move in and around Kherson in the south before they make a move on Luhansk and Donetsk, where it seems like there is also a deep political commitment from Moscow to capture and hold those positions.