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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › AT: Russia Not a Threat
Gramer MacKinnon 22 – diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy [6/7/22, “NATO Allies Are Rethinking Russia’s Supposed Military Prowess But Russia’s early military failures in Ukraine don’t make it any less dangerous, military analysts warn.”, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/ukraine-nato-allies-rethinking-russia-military-prowess/ //TJ]
There are two major assumptions that defense planners in major NATO capitals got wrong for years, former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in an interview with . First, Rasmussen said, “we have overestimated the strength of the Russian military. Despite huge investments in military equipment and the reopening of old Soviet bases, we have seen a very weak Russian military.”
“The other miscalculation is we have underestimated the brutality and the ambitions of President [Vladimir] Putin,” Rasmussen added.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc Turns China and Iran
Malinowski & Lohsen 22 – vice chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, AND **fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies [ 2/28/22, Representative Tom Malinowski (D-NJ), Andrew Lohsen, “Democracy In Danger: The Russian Threat To Ukraine”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/democracy-danger-russian-threat-ukraine, access date 6/19/22 //TJ]
Rep. Malinowski: There will be bipartisan support for whatever needs to happen. The president simply needs to ask, and I think that will be provided. You know, we’ll have to see how the crisis unfolds, what the needs are. Certainly, we want to continue to provide military support to the Ukrainians. And if the president needs any additional preparations to enable that to happen, I’m sure that that will be forthcoming from Congress. We are ready to act and I think united on the principles, no matter what the partisan talking points may be on cable news.
Mr. Lohsen: I think that’s really reassuring to know, for those of us who care about Ukraine, and for the Ukrainians who are experiencing the conflict firsthand and in real time. One of the questions that I keep asking myself is how to kind of communicate why this is important to ordinary Americans who simply think that this is a conflict that’s far away from home, that the U.S. doesn’t have a dog in the fight, that it’s better just to stay out and let the Europeans handle it themselves. How do you respond to that? How is this an issue that Americans should care about?
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc Unity Prevent Miscalc
Stoltenberg, 22 – NATO Secretary General [Antony J., Jens; 6/1/22; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg At a Joint Press Availability”; ; accessed 6/21/22; Lowell-DC]
SECRETARY GENERAL STOLTENBERG: Thank you so much, Secretary Blinken, dear Tony. It’s great to see you again, and thank you for your strong personal engagement for our transatlantic bond in this pivotal time for our security. And this is very much reflected in your frequent visits to Brussels. You are welcome back there again, but now I really appreciate this opportunity to meet with you here in Washington.
The United States is playing an indispensible role in our response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, let me commend the United States for your very significant support to Ukraine, which is making a difference on the battlefield every day. I also welcome the latest package of military assistance announced by President Biden this morning. This is a demonstration of real U.S. leadership. The strong support provided by NATO and Allies helps ensure that President Putin’s brutal aggression is not rewarded, and that Ukraine prevails.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc Unity Key to Defeat Russia
Malinowski, 22 – vice chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee [2/28/22, “Democracy In Danger: The Russian Threat To Ukraine”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/democracy-danger-russian-threat-ukraine, access date 6/19/22 //TJ]
People ask, why is Putin doing this? I’m sure we’ll talk about that a little bit. And I think it’s also become pretty clear. The mask is off this man. It has nothing to do with any kind of legitimate concerns he has about Ukraine joining NATO. There’s no military threat from Ukraine to Russia. Little-known fact of recent history, Ukraine actually promised not to join NATO in 2010. They passed a resolution in their parliament, a resolution of neutrality, that they would join no military blocs, whether led by Russia or by the United States. And four years later, in 2014, Russia invaded them anyway, because – well, because they had overthrown a corrupt Putin-type, Putin-style leader, and established a much more healthy and vibrant democracy.
That’s what threatens Putin above all, that these people who do share a lot of kinship with Russians and a lot of history, who are very close by, who he believes are part of his sphere of influence, have set an example for the Russian people that you can boot out a corrupt and authoritarian leader, because they’re choosing to align themselves with Europeans. They want to be part of the European Union. That is actually much more threatening to Putin than NATO membership. And so he’s just decided that Ukraine doesn’t have a right to exist, unless it’s completely subjugated by Russia. That’s what he’s fighting for here.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Impacts › 2nc NATO Unity Prevents Great Power War
Garamone, 6/16/22 – Reporter at the Department of Defense [Jim; 6/16/22 U.S. Department of Defense; “NATO Defense Leaders Set Stage for Alliance Decisions at Madrid Summit”; accessed 6/23/22; Lowell-DC]
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III joined 29 other NATO defense ministers in Brussels to set the stage for the alliance's Madrid Summit that will start June 29.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the Madrid Summit of NATO heads of state and government will be a transformative event "at a pivotal time for our security."
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Cyber › OCO Link
Lonergan and Montgomery 1/25/22 (Dr. Erica Lonergan (née Borghard) is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. She is also a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Erica previously served as a senior director on the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, US Navy, is the senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mark previously served as the executive director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. “PRESSING QUESTIONS: OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS AND NATO STRATEGY” ) //AB
Additionally, the reality is that several NATO members are already speaking publicly about offensive cyber operations below the level of warfare and their statements and actions have an effect on the entire alliance. In particular, NATO member nations have not reached a political consensus about the role of offensive cyber operations. In 2018, the US Department of Defense and US Cyber Command issued new and policy that articulated a role for the military in conducting offensive cyber operations below the level of armed conflict outside of US-controlled cyberspace (part of the “defend forward” strategy), and there has been some reporting about US offensive cyber operations. For instance, in the United States disrupted the Russian-linked Internet Research Agency from interfering in the midterm elections. And, more recently, in General Paul Nakasone, commander of US Cyber Command, publicly acknowledged that the military played a role in disrupting ransomware groups targeting critical infrastructure. The United States has also worked with other NATO allies, such as and , to conduct “hunt forward” cyber operations on allied and partner networks to uncover and disrupt malicious cyber activity.
Other NATO allies have also been more transparent about offensive cyber operations. In 2020, the announced a significant investment in its National Cyber Force, its organizational arm for offensive cyber operations, and its emphasized the role of offensive cyber operations. In November 2021, General Nakasone and the director of Government Communications Headquarters—the UK government’s principal signals intelligence agency— jointly that the two governments were collaborating to “impose consequences” in cyberspace to disrupt adversary operations. The Netherlands has also publicly to conducting offensive cyber operations.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Cyber › Cyber Link – Turkey Specific
Elisabeth Braw 20, Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, et al., “Judy Asks: Is NATO Paralyzed Over the Greece-Turkey Conflict?”, Carnegie Europe, 9/3/2020, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/82643 [language modified]
When Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, they did so based on NATO members’ assumption that the two countries’ membership of the alliance would pacify their behavior toward each other.
China was invited to join the World Trade Organization in 2001 on the same premise.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Cyber › Cyber Link – Turkey Specific
Yotam Gutman 20, Marketing Director at SentinelOne and Retired Lt. Commander in the Israeli Navy, “Battle for Supremacy | Hacktivists from Turkey and Greece Exchange Virtual Blows”, Sentinel One Blog, 1/21/2020, https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/battle-for-supremacy-hacktivists-from-turkey-and-greece-exchange-virtual-blows/
Tensions between Greece and its neighbor, Turkey, are nothing new. Conflict in the Aegean extends back to the days of Homer, who described how a Greek army decimated the town of Troy, located near Hisarlik in Turkey. The animosity between these nations may date centuries into the past, but the weapons and tactics used in the conflict today are cutting edge cyber tools.
Greece and Turkey are now engaged in a diplomatic conflict focused on the maritime boundaries surrounding the Greek island of Crete. The row comes after Turkey and the Libyan government agreed to seek to map out a boundary that would potentially reduce Greece’s maritime territory. This conflict raises patriotic tensions on both sides, some of which have become manifest in cyberspace.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Cyber › 2nc Cyber Link
Dr. Jarno Limnéll 16, Professor of Cybersecurity, Aalto University, Finland, and Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Senior Research Fellow, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Challenge for NATO – Cyber Article 5”, Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies, June, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1119569/FULLTEXT01.pdf
Formulating clear doctrines is frequently preferred by militaries, while politicians and diplomats prefer flexibility in message and response. The Alliance has two paths it can chose in creating the doctrine regarding cyber. It can either chose a public approach, rather similar to its approach when creating its most recent strategic concept. In such a document it could generally describe what constitutes an attack that would qualify for the invocation of Article 5, and what would be an accepted retaliatory action. The other path is to maintain strategic ambiguity, recognizing that formulating clear redlines would invite potential adversaries to push up to the red line. In this case developing the doctrine is still important, but would then be for internal use only. This non-public approach may reduce the objective of improving the Alliance´s cyber deterrence. The pace of development in the field would argue against an overly specific set of guidelines or doctrine, lest it require too frequent and politically challenging updates.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Cyber › 2nc Cyber Link
Thomas E. Ricks 17, “NATO’s Little Noticed but Important New Aggressive Stance on Cyber Weapons”, Foreign Policy, 12/7/2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/07/natos-little-noticed-but-important-new-aggressive-stance-on-cyber-weapons/
Not many people noticed it, but last month, NATO made a dramatic change in its cyber policy announced by the NATO Secretary General that arguably was the alliance’s biggest overall policy shift in decades. Having led the policy discussions in several NATO committees for the past four years on the use of cyber capabilities and cyber weapons, I can tell you this was the most hotly debated and contentious decision during my tenure at NATO.
In short, NATO embraced the use of cyber weaponry in NATO operations. This is a marked departure from NATO’s historical stance of using cyber only defensively, mainly to ward off incursions against its own networks. The more aggressive approach was intended as a strong message, primarily to Russia, that NATO intends to use the cyber capabilities of its members to deter attacks in the same way it uses land, sea, and air weaponry.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Cyber › 1nc Cyber Link
Arts ’18 [Sophie; December 13; senior program coordinator for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund; "Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s Cyber Policy," https://www.gmfus.org/publications/offense-new-defense-new-life-natos-cyber-policy]
While the United States’ announcement that it would contribute its capabilities could help lend credibility to NATO’s cyber deterrence, further clarification is needed within NATO, particularly when it comes to its command structure in the cyber domain. Without clarity on this front, it is hard to imagine that the 29 NATO allies who have different threat perceptions, and face issues of cohesion and trust, could agree on effective response scenarios in a crisis situation. This is particularly critical, because cyber operations will be subject to political approval by the NATO allies.
The new Cyber Operations Center, which should be fully operational in 2023, could play an important role in that respect, but the lack of operational authority may pose a significant challenge.37 According to NATO, the center aims to “strengthen cyber defenses and integrate cyber capabilities into NATO planning and operations.”38 But as the U.S. declaration on its potential cyber support to NATO confirms, it appears at this point that the center will serve to coordinate rather than oversee operations. This, coupled with allies’ unwillingness to share intelligence that may be critical to NATO’s strategic efforts, makes it difficult to envision the center as an effective tool in implementing a coherent top-down cyber strategy in the near future.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AT: Turkey Doesn’t Use Autonomous Weapons
Gurcan, 21 --- served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser from 2002 to 2008 (June 8, 2021, Metin Gurcan, “Turkish drone sets off international buzz over 'killer robots'; The appearance of Turkish artificial intelligence-controlled drones in Libyan skies has rekindled questions on how lethal autonomous weapons will affect regional geopolitics and whether they should be banned,” , JMP) ***Note – STM =Turkey’s state-owned company who manufactured the Kargu-2 kamikaze drone
While such technologies sound like a revolutionary step in warfare, a global debate has been simmering since the early 2000s on whether lethal autonomous weapon systems should be regulated or banned, given ethical concerns over their ability to select and hit targets without human intervention. The release of the UN report on Libya has rekindled the debate, which had been largely hypothetical thus far.
Another aspect of the debate is how and to what extent autonomous systems will change the character of war. The US journal Popular Mechanics draws a comparison to how the atomic bomb served as a divider between eras, saying the events in Libya “may similarly divide the time when humans had full control of weapons, and a time when machines made their own decisions to kill.”
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AT: Turkey Doesn’t Use Autonomous Weapons
Gurcan, 21 --- served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser from 2002 to 2008 (June 8, 2021, Metin Gurcan, “Turkish drone sets off international buzz over 'killer robots'; The appearance of Turkish artificial intelligence-controlled drones in Libyan skies has rekindled questions on how lethal autonomous weapons will affect regional geopolitics and whether they should be banned,” , JMP)
Turkey’s flourishing drone industry is back in the international spotlight following a UN report suggesting that Turkish-made artificial intelligence-based drones might have been used to kill enemy troops in Libya last year. If confirmed the incident would mark the debut of “killer robots” in the global theater of war.
The report by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya indicates that a Kargu-2 kamikaze drone manufactured by Turkey’s state-owned company STM was likely used in March 2020 in clashes between the forces of the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army of eastern warlord Khalifa Hifter following the latter’s besiegement of Tripoli. Logistics convoys and retreating Hifter forces “were hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 and other loitering munitions,” the report says. “The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect, a true ‘fire, forget and find’ capability,” it noted without specifying whether anyone was actually killed.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc Turkey LAWs Reduce Civilian Casualties
Tekingunduz, 21 --- BA focused in International Relations and Political Science from Boğaziçi University (3 JUN 2021, Alican, “A series of autonomous drones gives Turkey a military edge,” , JMP)
Defense Technologies and Trade Inc. (STM), a Turkish company that manufactures Kargu-2 drones and supplies them to the Turkish military, told the media last year that their drones also have facial recognition technology, which gives a major advantage to the Turkish security forces in identifying individual targets so they could be neutralised without deploying forces on the ground.
Murat Ikinci, the former CEO of STM, was quoted in Turkish media in 2019 as saying that the main advantages of Karagu-2 swarms is that their sheer number can overwhelm targets and they can evade the GPS jammers.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc Autonomous Weapons Link – Turkey Specific
Forrest & Marson, 21 (4 June 2021, Brett Forrest, James Marson, Dow Jones Institutional News, “Armed Low-Cost Drones, Made by Turkey, Reshape Battlefields and Geopolitics – WSJ,” Factiva database, JMP)
A soldier idles by a Russian-made T-72 tank. A moment later, a missile fired from a drone slams into the vehicle, exploding in an orange flash, blowing the man off his feet and leaving the tank a smoldering wreck.
The scene is one of dozens of aerial videos that were posted online in Azerbaijan last year showing off a new weapon. Over six weeks, it helped the nation regain territory in the Nagorno-Karabakh region that had been held by Russian-backed Armenian forces for more than two decades. The videos show attacks on tanks, trucks, command posts, mortar positions and radar installations.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 1nc Autonomous Weapons Link – Turkey Specific
Trager & Luca, 22 --- *associate professor and graduate student in political science respectively at UCLA (MAY 11, 2022, 1:46 PM, Robert F. & Laura M., “Killer Robots Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them; Once lethal autonomous weapons systems begin to spread, they will be difficult to control,” , JMP)
Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this).
Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 1nc Autonomous Weapons Link – Unity Specific
HEIKKILÄ, 21 (March 29, 2021 4:14 pm, MELISSA HEIKKILÄ, “NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics; Big differences over how to treat autonomous weapons could undermine NATO’s drive,” , JMP)
On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way.
The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Heikkilä, 21 (3-29, Melissa, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO; DOA: 6-17-2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/) SMTX//BSA Senior Reporter for AI at TechReview, Formerly Politico Europe and The Economist. Forbes 30 Under 30.
The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context.
The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
54 The French imperative to maintain technological independence is stronger than any other European ally, and largely motivates French defence industrial policy as well as the political agenda of “strategic autonomy” and “digital sovereignty” at the national and European levels. Other documents that reinforce this include those referenced in footnotes 47 and 49, as well as the 2019 Defence Innovation Orientation Document (2019) and the Ministry of Armed Forces Digital Transformation: Key Concepts (2020). 55 AI Task Force, Artificial Intelligence in Support of Defence, 10. 56 This strong language intends to set the political tone for adoption, and is not purely about ethics. Further, while the “stranglehold” motivates sovereignty, there are few specifics in the strategy about hardware components or cloud capabilities, beyond the recognition that these are not French or European strengths. Auditability is only tied, here, to models and data. AI Task Force, Artificial Intelligence in Support of Defence, 10, 24.
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP › Artificial Intelligence › 2nc AI Link – Unity Specific
Pepe, 20 – Senior Coordinator for Research and Conflict, Security and Development Analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (November 14, 2020; Erica Pepe; “NATO and Collective Thinking on AI”; , AI)
By the end of 2020, NATO may have in place broad thinking on artificial intelligence (AI) as part of a wider implementation strategy on how to benefit from emerging technologies. The Alliance could play an important role in establishing interoperability standards along with supporting norms of use in the military application of AI. NATO, however, has not always been successful in establishing standards, nor in getting member states to comply. This makes the recently set-up NATO Innovation Board, and its intended year-end emerging-technologies implementation strategy, potentially all the more important. An AI White Paper, including a proposed five-year roadmap, is already with Alliance governments, having been submitted in July. This could lead to a more detailed NATO AI strategy emerging sometime in 2021. The AI challenge The Alliance has the advantage of having 30 members spending some US$1 trillion (2020) on defense. Its wide membership, however, is also a possible weakness if even a top-level common approach to AI cannot be agreed. The Innovation Board’s chair, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană, has the task of coordinating ongoing AI-related work across the Alliance in attempting to shape a shared vision of how to utilise AI. This will include working to identify capability needs and potential projects for collaboration. NATO already has some AI-related projects under way, including the Military Uses of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and Robotics project and the NATO Data Science Centre. The former project is part of the United States-led Multinational Capability Development Campaign and is intended to look at possible applications in areas such as air and missile defense. The Data Science Centre’s aim is to bring together existing data-science expertise within NATO under one structure. The Alliance views AI as one of several of what it calls ‘emerging and disruptive technologies’, which it considers will likely have the greatest impact in combination. NATO’s March 2020 ‘Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040’ report pointed to the mix of autonomy, big data and AI, for example being used to generate decision-relevant information from vast quantities of raw data, as having far-reaching implications for defense and security. The report also identified an array of ‘serious challenges’ that NATO faces in managing AI, including policy, legal, ethical and interoperability issues. It further identified the need for a common approach to how the performance of AI-software-based systems is verified, and in turn how the verification process is itself validated. In some ways NATO might seem a natural forum for these deliberations, not least in a transatlantic context. It also has a lot of experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces: not only 30 members with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and potential adversaries may hold significant advantages. Interoperability issues may be thorny, but they need to be resolved if AI-dependent capability gaps between members are not to widen. Early discussions regarding the establishment of common technical standards on the design and development of military-applicable AI would at least reduce this risk.