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2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › Ethical Framework

An AI ethical framework solves

Lockman and Trabucco 22 (​Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University and a PhD in Law at iCourts Center of Excellence in International Courts at the University of Copenhagen. “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” March 2022, ,https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69)ZK

Introduction The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) as a general-purpose technology has prompted analysts and researchers to reconsider the implications for warfare. As this Handbook edition illustrates, AI has, and will continue to, shape global dialogue, policy, and governance structures in international politics, including for future military operations. In this chapter, we explore a role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the emerging military AI governance architecture. NATO (or the Alliance) is a military and political alliance among 30 contributing member states that are committed to collective security. Much of NATO’s original purpose and current core tasks arguably leave the Alliance’s role uncertain in international governance regimes contending with the impact of emerging technology on international politics.1 As global powers compete for the economic and military capabilities that AI can offer, the Alliance has the enormously challenging task of navigating varying political realities and capabilities of Allies, all while effectively recalibrating strategic relationships in the coming years. Recognizing technological change as a key variable, NATO has begun to adapt its organizational composition and strategic footing to increase the Alliance’s capacity to meet emerging security challenges for military capability development trends of both its own members and those of competitors or adversaries. New power distributions around AI and adjacent dual-use technologies are among the motivating factors causing the Alliance to reconsider whether its technological superiority may be threatened in the years ahead, as reflected in the 2019 Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) Roadmap2 and, more recently, the NATO 2030 process.3 NATO navigates these changes and then approaches AI-accelerated changes to the international security environment in a highly political context. Notably, in 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron surprised many European counterparts by declaring NATO “brain-dead,” a warning wrapped in an even larger warning of trans-Atlantic security divisions.4 The critique that NATO is a “brain-dead” or “irrelevant” institution has existed in some form since the end of the Cold War.5 As NATO combats global perceptions of organizational irrelevance, there is a reason to push for bureaucratic adaptation to better manage technology-driven changes in the future. As such, despite some warnings to the contrary, Allies have an incentive to keep NATO a relevant military institution and ensure that it adapts to emerging threats and for future military contexts. The comment from President Macron helped prompt the NATO 2030 agenda, which is currently taking shape to increase the Alliance’s role as a political actor and as an organization with a greater focus on EDTs.6 As NATO bodies and Allies prepare for the impact of AI on future military operations, the Alliance has its own responsibility to steward AI in ways that, inter alia, promote cohesion between democratic countries, prevent risks, shore up interoperability, project deterrence, and ensure stability.7 To achieve these aims, cooperation and alignment are critical for the Alliance to maintain a competitive edge and promote further innovation in alignment with shared values. With these incentives, we argue that an examination of NATO as a governance stakeholder is due to complement other literature on how humans, social structures, and institutions impact how technology develops. More specifically, this chapter borrows from two fields of scholarship that set the theoretical foundations for how institutions such as NATO impact technological trajectories, and thus have a responsibility to govern the technology accordingly. The two fields—science, technology, and society (STS) studies and military innovation literature—have different parameters, but both explore key questions that help establish the ways in which institutions exert their influence on the development, deployment, and diffusion of technologies like AI. We argue that this influence is a form of institutional power, building on Seth Lazar’s definition of governance in this handbook. Lazar writes that governance is “the use of power to make, implement, and enforce the constitutive norms of an institution.”8 In the context of this definition, this chapter examines AI governance as an instrument of power linking NATO’s responsibility and capacity to shape the future security environment in parallel to its own organizational interests. To be sure, NATO is far from the only institution that impacts military AI governance and its security implications. Indeed, international technology governance is inherently complex because it includes diverse stakeholders in a system of “organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures” with a shared interest and responsibility in a given issue-area of world politics.9 Existing discussions of the impact of AI on international security have looked to nation-states, regional institutions like the European Union (EU), or international bodies like the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) for discussions on the military governance of AI.10 Without expanding on the role of these other stakeholders, this chapter begins to explore pressing questions for NATO and international relations scholars that illustrate NATO’s role in AI governance, which has not had a comprehensive analysis.11 To begin to fill this gap, the analysis in this chapter centers on two AI governance mechanisms that NATO has at its disposal, and subsequently explores the Alliance’s capacity to use these mechanisms to exert its influence in key pillars of AI governance. Of the many possible AI governance mechanisms for NATO, this chapter offers a deeper assessment of two: (1) strategic and policy planning and (2) standards and certification. We fashion these mechanisms as primary components that connect NATO technology governance measures and responsible AI use.12 To illustrate NATO’s capacity to govern AI, we then examine three pillars, or foundational issue areas, which we believe represent critical elements of technology governance. We argue that, within each pillar, NATO is uniquely situated to facilitate cooperation via its governance mechanisms, with a view to shaping the future of AI for the Alliance and maintaining a competitive edge. Each pillar—(1) ethics and values, (2) legal norms, and (3) security and safety—is an area where researchers and analysts have acknowledged significant governance challenges, both at a national level and for international organizations like NATO. Each pillar, discussed in depth below, illustrates NATO’s potential as a governance stakeholder that can encourage multinational alignment on policy and standards for safer and better outcomes in future operations. The rest of this chapter continues as follows. First, we establish how STS studies and scholarship on military innovation focus on different aspects of technological advancement and governance outlooks. Second, this theoretical basis is applied to NATO to provide readers with an understanding of the institution’s entities and responsibilities related to AI governance. Next, the chapter discusses ways that NATO can leverage these mechanisms to ensure responsible use of AI in military operations based on ethics, law, safety, and security. Finally, the chapter concludes with reflections on NATO’s AI governance tools and, more broadly, roles for international organizations in the AI governance space. AI Governance and Military Affairs: Tensions in Existing Literature Academic literature has long grappled with the intersection of emerging technology and security organizations.13 Two branches of literature that tackle core questions of technological trajectories and its relationship to human and social structures—a critical question of governance for military technology—are STS studies and military innovation scholarship. Although the theoretical approaches in STS and military innovation studies differ, they both share the important assumption that technology does not have its own innate logic, and instead measure technological change by its impact on social structures and interactions with humans. In other words, both fields treat technology as an enabler in broader structures. The term technology is ubiquitous enough that it does not have a single definition, but it is often defined in relation to human intention and purpose. Alex Roland describes technology as a “purposeful human manipulation of the material world” to “serve some human purpose.”14 If extending this basic idea of technology to technological innovation, then both STS studies and military-innovation scholarship lend relevant criteria. Both academic fields are also relevant because, in the policy space, AI governance stakeholders are pursuing responsible research and innovation (RRI), which comes from STS studies, and defense stakeholders are similarly focused on responsible innovation and responsible use. More traditionally, the direct study of military adoption of technology is considered in the separate scholarship of military innovation, which includes a school of thought that focus on cultural and organizational factors. Between these two fields, an interdisciplinary approach is helpful here to carry STS approaches to AI governance, including RRI, over to the space of military innovation. However, this is complicated by the reality that military organizations that see technological superiority as a core element of deterrence and defense, including NATO, engage in forms of technological determinism that STS scholars squarely reject. Respective views on technological determinism—which considers that technology shapes society as a largely autonomous process with limited human agency—thus creates a tension for governance prospects.15 To spotlight the aspects of military innovation related to governance, this section briefly expands on the overlaps and tensions between STS and military innovation literature. Science, technology, and society (STS) studies STS studies is helpful to understand how technologies such as AI develop relative to the human, social, and political structures that shape it, rather than as an independent entity to which humans have to adapt.16 In this vein, AI is not just a computational process involving software, hardware, and data,17 so much it is a socio-technical system that encompasses “human, social, and organizational factors.”18 Together, these factors enable a focus on the trajectory of technological development relative to social structures and power dynamics. STS scholars have also helped develop RRI frameworks that seek to guide technological development in anticipatory, participatory, and adaptive frameworks to achieve desirable outcomes and prevent undesirable ones.19 RRI is a structured approach to innovation in which stakeholders identify and act on their “collective commitment of care for the future through responsive stewardship of science and innovation in the present.”20 It drives civilian AI ecosystems for NATO Allies that will also indirectly affect NATO.21 Responsible stewardship, or governance, of science and technology (S&T) requires stakeholders to change their approaches to technological development as the circumstances themselves change.22 In his book The Social Control of Technology, David Collingridge identified the double bind that makes technology governance (what he then referred to as social control) difficult: exerting social control or governing nascent technology is easy, but impossible because its evolution and eventual impacts are unknowable, and by the time the technology matures and its impact is realized, entrenched decisions will make future control more difficult.23 For now, AI remains a relatively immature technology, meaning circumstances will change as knowledge emerges and norms progressively develop. Collingridge also suggested the necessity of “corrigibility of innovation,” which refers to the “capacity to change shape or direction in response to stakeholder and public values and changing circumstances.”24 When applied to current RRI frameworks, the concept of corrigibility obligates governance stakeholders to shape the trajectory of a technology’s development and impact in ways based on social structures, both in anticipation of change and in response to decisions made in error.25 In short, stakeholders have to adopt corrigible practices to responsibly govern technology as it develops, and thus must claim their agency in guiding innovation even as technological development appears increasingly entrenched in previously made decisions and their subsequent outcomes. This is important for AI governance because technological advancement is making AI-accelerated risks clearer, including in the military space. Risks—especially as related to AI-enabled autonomous systems, poisoning of information environments, cyberattacks, unpredictable failure modes, and emergent behavior—will evolve in form and scale as the technology matures and diffuses. If AI evolution means more entrenchment and less corrigibility, the STS foundations remind governance stakeholders how to course-correct and adapt to changing risk assessments and the overall impact of AI in the international system.26 Nevertheless, while STS scholars study how decision-making that shapes the trajectory of technological innovation becomes entrenched, the field largely rejects the premise of technological determinism. Maintaining the centrality of human agency, as exerted also through social structures and institutions, is antithetical to determinist perspectives on technology developing on its own path independent of intervention. As Allan Dafoe, another contributor to this Handbook, has argued, the STS academic community’s refusal to engage with technological determinism severely limits STS applicability to empirics.27 As discussed below, this has implications for the ability of the STS field to impart responsibility to governance stakeholders in an area such as AI and international security. Military innovation literature The scholars that examine the way that military stakeholders manage technology and shape its development trajectory predominantly write on military innovation.28 These scholars measure technology adoption in changes to doctrine, organizational structures, and operational concepts, rather than seeing the technology as an end in and of itself.29 From this perspective, technology subsequently shapes human and social structures and organizations. To take an example similar to Roland’s definition of technology, Jonathan Shimshoni’s concept of “military entrepreneurship” involves the active manipulation of technology, doctrine, and war plans.30 In this sense, new technology adoption has tangible and observable effects on the operational environment. Similarly, Thomas Mahnken illustrates that military services shape technology to their respective purposes, rather than the other way around.31 The purpose that this manipulation, or molding, of technology serves is the creation, and ideally sustainment, of a comparative military advantage.32 Still, the way that this military advantage is defined is relevant here because metrics of success differ from other scholarship dealing with innovation. Military innovation importantly constitutes the relationship and social structures that form between technology and military bureaucracies. Yet as a field, it does not necessarily extend these relationships to their status as stakeholders in wider technology governance regimes.33 For instance, in his review of the different schools of military innovation, Adam Grissom offers a consensus definition of military innovation that inherently links it to effectiveness in the battlespace.34 Grissom clarifies that “measures that are administrative or bureaucratic in nature, such as acquisition reform, are not considered legitimate innovation unless a clear link can be drawn to operational praxis.”35 This reinforces the idea that technology on its own does not constitute an innovation if it is not observable in military operational practice or in battlefield advantage. The relatively narrow operational focus of military innovation scholarship means that management structures miss out on some of the uses of military power implicit in the governance of military technology. This means that both the bureaucratic entrenchment of technological advancement and the literature focusing on it do not necessarily address governance as an instrument of power in the military context. This may make sense for purely military technologies, but whether it discounts the agency that military bureaucracies have in governance of a pervasive, general-purpose technology like AI is worth separate consideration. As such, the operational measurement of the adoption and diffusion of technology as an instrument of military power likewise limits an understanding of how military technology management structures relate to governance. Implications for military AI governance Overall, STS offers much of the necessary groundwork for governance mechanisms and the impact of social structures on technology governance; however, it refuses to engage with technological determinism, or the independent influence of technology, that is often a driving force in military innovation. Recognizing that a comprehensive governance regime also needs to transpose to stakeholders that are engaged in the practices of governing AI, this study on NATO sees military innovation scholarship as a helpful complement to apply these STS foundations to practitioners’ perspectives. But scholarship on military innovation also has its own flaws, in that it looks at the management of technology exclusively formulated to exploit a comparative operational advantage. Measuring military innovation in relation to operational praxis makes sense to detect how military adoption of technology impacts operational excellence and upstream impacts on military strategy, but also makes it challenging for the empirics to apply to non-operational ways that military organizations exert their influence. Non-operational influence includes governance, the core topic that this chapter addresses. Despite differences, borrowing from the layered frameworks in STS and military innovation studies still helps contextualize innovation trajectories. Indeed, select scholars have attempted to bridge the gap between the social constructivist angle in STS studies and the technologically “optimistic”36 assumptions that frame technologically deterministic undercurrents, as seen in case studies on military innovation.37 Thomas Hughes examined these undercurrents in the defense sector as part of his theory of “technological momentum,”38 which argued military organizations are subject to inaction in S&T decision-making because the entrenchment of previous investments and decisions constrain the course of future technological development. Steven Fino expands on Hughes with the idea that “technological dislocations,” are an alternative reconciliation mechanism that acknowledges that technological determinism may operate beneath the surface of a technology’s maturation trajectory, while still allowing for socially driven perturbations that “dislocate” the “otherwise logical evolutionary patterns” of that technology.39 Dafoe similarly attempts to widen the scope of technological determinism by placing it as an endpoint on a spectrum, with social constructivism on the other end. The purpose of this spectrum is to create the space for engagement with disciplines that heavily emphasize power dynamics, including military affairs and business in what he terms “military-economic adaptationism.”40 Unfortunately, both Fino and Dafoe concede that attributing agency and causality to technological developments are best “conducted after the fact”41 or “on longer timescales,” respectively.42 AI governance cannot benefit from such hindsight, as it is fundamentally a question of how to project and adapt to forces of ongoing change. For governance, this inertia places military organizations at odds with the responsiveness required to guide responsible technology governance frameworks. Our aim is not to reconcile these differences in this chapter, but rather to highlight how they frame one current governance challenge for military stakeholders such as NATO: how can they engage with the socio-technical foundations in RRI frameworks to shape, adapt to, and respond to technology-accelerated changes, while simultaneously pursuing their traditional aims of adopting technology to deter and defend? On this note, it is worth mentioning that NATO itself has historically convened scholars from both STS and military innovation backgrounds to understand socio-technical changes to their operating environment.43 The Alliance also takes socio-technical factors into account in its S&T work on emerging technologies—including human–systems integration, technology monitoring, and forecasting work.44 This interest in socio-technical systems relating to effectiveness suggests scope for the Alliance to leverage technology governance as an instrument of its influence, as picked up in the next section. NATO’s Mechanisms to Govern AI NATO’s increasing interest in EDTs introduces the need to consider how governance priorities can help reinforce the Alliance’s influence. The STS and military innovation literature provide the theoretical foundations for NATO’s stewardship of AI as they place attention on “the role that institutions play in shaping technological trajectories.”45 As AI development continues, the actions that NATO and its members take will have important implications for their capacity to adopt, respond to, and shape their future operating environment. Particularly for democracies, this confers to military stakeholders a dual responsibility to prevent and manage risks, as well as to proactively shape their approach to technological development anchored in democratic values and security. As a multinational alliance with an incentive to drive cooperation and alignment, NATO is situated to define and operationalize norms, as well as promote standards that help shape the contours of future military effectiveness and technological competition. In a RRI framework, not only is this an institutional role, but it also becomes an institutional responsibility. To apply this responsibility to NATO’s stewardship of AI, the institutional interplay between technology, structure, and concepts is a form of socio-technical system with important implications for AI governance because they link the ways that an institution uses its power to adopt and shape AI trajectory to its respective ends. Already, several mechanisms are built into military bureaucracies to ensure that technology is adopted in alignment with responsible engineering practices and responsible state behavior.46 The Alliance is organized to harmonize between Allies so that their contributions enhance military effectiveness and political cohesion between like-minded democracies. We argue that these effectiveness-centric mechanisms likewise empower NATO to exert its influence in technology governance. More specifically, this entails the Alliance helping steward technological development for a more predictable strategic environment and enhanced democratic clout around the exploitation of technology reinforcing rule of law. For NATO, we focus on strategic and policy planning, as well as standards and certification because they reflect the Alliance’s particular strengths and interests in S&T. These practices are relevant to governance insofar as they exemplify an institution’s power to shape the trajectory of technological development—but this selection is by no means exhaustive.47 Instead, our aim is to explore how these mechanisms are operationalized at the Alliance level. In this vein, Table 69.1 dissects the role that its various bodies play in managing technology, promulgating and operationalizing standards, and leading change through policy. The role of NATO in this equation is largely shaped by its members’ own approaches to technology, and member-state-driven processes are complemented by “policy entrepreneurs” and technical experts in the International Staff and related bodies.48 Table 69.1 does not list the ways that AI affects the various functions of NATO, but rather spotlights the entities that together operationalize AI governance through cumulative processes on policy and standardization. Strategic and policy planning NATO structures around strategic and policy planning both set Allied ambitions and priorities and have the competency to implement them through its many consultative bodies, coordination formats, and albeit to a lesser extent, technology foresight capacities. NATO has facilitative power among Allies, both for defense planning and for the conduct of operations. A cornerstone in modern architecture of international security is coalition warfare—or, more broadly, joint operations. Working with military partners has become a critical feature of modern security policy, where there is more power in enhancing numbers, but also in having allies that lend political and practical legitimacy to deterrence and operations.49 NATO is vital to that effort for many reasons, but also because NATO’s facilitative power is significant to promote coordination and cooperation. Simply put, partners and allies are a necessary feature of modern military behavior, and strategic and policy planning are necessary functions to encourage and underpin cohesion in alliance settings. This is important for AI governance because the nature of AI poses new strategic challenges and will require multilateral approaches and some degree of cohesion to effectively incorporate RRI frameworks in policy planning. As such, the necessity of working with security partners extends to the AI-policy frontier. A number of NATO entities carry out strategic and policy planning, recognizing the importance of policy alignment to sustain political strength and military effectiveness. As relates to S&T, allies’ representations to NATO, defense ministries, and policy entrepreneurs from the relevant entities summarized in Table 69.1 support and negotiate how the Alliance approaches EDTs. NATO’s strategic documentation and forward-looking policy analysis incorporates hints of technological determinism, including noting how technological change inevitably shapes the future strategic and operating environment. Further, the connections between technology and competitive advantage over adversaries and competitors are embodied in the Alliance’s desire to maintain its “technological edge” as the “foundation upon which NATO’s ability to deter and defend against potential threats ultimately rests.”50 This places technology squarely within NATO’s core purpose of deterrence and defense—and while this signals NATO’s express commitment to technology through these channels, this reliance on technology also obscures whether NATO’s governance capacity will be adaptive, anticipatory, or participatory. This position of technological determinism may result in more limitations for AI governance. Standards and certification To maintain its relevance in a security architecture increasingly concerned with the way that technology shifts power dynamics and scales threats to international security, NATO has an incentive to foster cooperation, promote standards of practice, and incentivize Allied AI harmonization. It is strategically salient to facilitate a dialogue and engagement among Allies on AI, but it is practically important to use NATO’s position to facilitate Allied cooperation regarding standards to project the Alliance’s ability to interoperate in future operations. NATO standards aim to enhance interoperability among partners and successful implementation of strategy. More specifically, standards and certification are used to establish and implement requirements aligned with safe development and responsible use of technology. In addition to purely technical standards, NATO has operational standards that specify “conceptual, organizational or methodological requirements to enable materiel, installations, organizations or forces to fulfil their functions or missions.”51 In line with the definitions from STS and military innovation scholarship, standards can thus be seen as a mechanism to translate responsibility-derived state and organizational AI policy into actionable functions. In fact, NATO has set certain standards for the Allies and these standards subsequently become the norm. Within NATO, it is the NATO Standardization Office (NSO) that coordinates thousands of experts to align technological development with military requirements that can help enhance effectiveness, interoperability, and cohesion.52 While the NSO is primarily responsible for setting standards, other NATO entities—including in the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)—play important roles in implementing them and coordinating between national approaches.53 Certification frameworks and the promulgation of best practices can similarly help incentivize the transposition of RRI into military organizations, even if standardization is by no means a purely military governance tool. Both mechanisms, strategic policy planning and standards and certification, provide options for NATO to participate in AI governance regimes focusing on international security. NATO’s operationalization of these tools may hold important implications while implementing successful AI governmental regimes for Allies and other defense stakeholders. In the next section, we consider each mechanism within foundational issues, or pillars, to illustrate NATO’s role in AI governance. NATO and Technological Change: Three Pillars of AI Governance This section considers three pillars where NATO has procedures and competency to operationalize AI governance through both mechanisms of policy alignment and standards, and enhance security in the international environment. The pillars reflect foundational issue areas constitutive of governance but are also issue areas where previous scholars have cautioned as particularly challenging in the AI governance space. The three pillars—(1) ethics and values, (2) legal norms, and (3) safety and security—are meant to illustrate three conditions for NATO to facilitate policy and standards harmonization. Importantly, these pillars are not exhaustive areas in which NATO will need to consider governance structures to responsibly implement AI technology, but rather highlight particular issues that researchers and analysts acknowledge as significant hurdles in navigating AI governance (see Table 69.2).54 The first pillar considers NATO’s role in the evolution of ethical and values-driven AI. One ongoing debate regarding AI as a military technology is the ethical implications and baseline values the Allies, and others, want infused in the development and adoption of AI. The Allies themselves lack uniform consensus on numerous, substantial ethical questions on the use of AI, as most clearly seen in the adjacent area of the ethics of autonomy in weapons systems including lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). In this discussion, we spotlight NATO’s role in facilitating and shaping ethical harmonization as an operational requirement to ensure successful future missions. The second pillar examines legal norms as a domain wherein legal uncertainty regarding AI has tangible implications for Allied legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability. Thus far, the legal debate regarding AI has been largely fixed on the issue of a treaty banning the use of LAWS. In this section, we advocate for a more nuanced legal picture in which NATO can facilitate legal coordination and tackle some of the foundational legal issues which will prevent successful legal interoperability in future operations. The third pillar identifies safety and security of AI systems as prerequisite to trustworthy and responsible AI in any context, but especially so for the conduct of military activity. At the NATO level, Allied forces must ensure their systems interoperate safely and predictably both to ensure effective command and control (C2) internally, and to prevent disruptions from attacks. It is a foundational facet of coordination that shows the overlap between NATO interests in military effectiveness and incentivization for responsible innovation.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › Misinformation

AI can be used to influence public ideology- control of online interaction

Kirdemir 19(Can Kasapoğlu, Bariş Kirdemir. Director of Security and Defense Studies at EDAM and Eisenhower fellow at NATO defense college."Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Conflict". 11-28-2019. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/artificial-intelligence-and-future-of-conflict-pub-80421. 6-22-2022.)

New technologies encourage people, groups, and states to conduct influence operations and manipulation at scale. Intelligent machines can identify susceptible groups of people and “measure the response of individuals as well as crowds to influence efforts,” according to Rand Waltzman, deputy chief technology officer at RAND Corporation. Cognitive hacking, a form of attack that seeks to manipulate people’s perceptions and behavior, takes place on a diverse set of platforms, including social media and new forms of traditional news channels. The means are increasingly diversified, as distorted and false text, images, video, and audio are weaponized to achieve the desired effects. Cognitive security is a new multisectoral field in which actors engage in what Waltzman called “a continual arms race to influence—and protect from influence—large groups of people online.” AI could cause drastic changes in hybrid warfare, which is a major concern for NATO. States and nonstate actors can use cyberspace to influence large groups of civilians and opposing forces. From reconnaissance activities and the profiling of target audiences to the weaponization of distorted or fake information and psychological operations, AI broadens the potential of information operations. In addition, human-machine interactions will likely become a part of military engagements, with ethical and legal implications that remain unclear and unexplored. The introduction of this technology needs oversight to prevent potential abuses and unintended consequences. Another focus for NATO should be the values that the alliance has been defending for decades. As the use of AI in everyday life grows, biases and discrimination inherent in AI, the management of sensitive personal data, and malicious online behavior will change societies in ways that are only beginning to be understood.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › China Authoritarianism

China’s authoritarian ascendence will cause its downfall – the US will outcompete

Kroenig 20 (Matthew Kroenig is a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, and the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China,” The Atlantic, 4/3/2020, MP

National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government, regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Yes, democratic governments are obligated to answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan, even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the the current, rules-based international system by providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies, the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups or civil wars. Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors. They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt in The New York Times, “Chinese leaders stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many that China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and that China’s model of state-led capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao only to nearly with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and abroad. But President Xi Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his whims, and back again. , he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily, from neighbors in the South China Sea and with Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new “quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and war. China’s “5,000” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the and Xinjiang—the CCP than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow, for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United States altogether. Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of economic growth over the long term. Autocrats are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but the momentum of America’s successful grand strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries have joined the alliance on his watch, including . The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading many people into the familiar trap of in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s attempts at international “disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually the numbers of COVID-19 infections and in China, and European nations have and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits. The great political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli considered a similar line of thinking in the 16th century, about whether republics or dictators charted a more stable course. He wrote, “I, therefore, disagree with the common opinion that a populace in power is unstable [and] changeable … The prince … unchecked by laws, will be more … unstable, and imprudent than a populace.” The U.S. political system certainly has problems. But democracy is the best machine ever invented for generating enormous power, wealth, and prestige on the international stage.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › NATO Solves

US multilateral coop solves – allows for innovation and responsible use

Mahoney 4-30 [Casey Mahoney, Casey Mahoney is a U.S. Institute of Peace–DoD Minerva Peace & Security Scholar and a Ph.D. Candidate in political science at the University of Pennsylvania. He served as a Nunn-Lugar Fellow in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and in AT&L from 2013 to 2017. , 4-30-2022, accessed on 6-26-2022, The National Interest, "Shared Responsibility: Enacting Military AI Ethics in U.S. Coalitions", https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/shared-responsibility-enacting?page=0%2C1]//PJ

In March 2021, Google’s Eric Schmidt and former Department of Defense (DoD) deputy secretary Bob Work wrote in their preface to the 756-page report of the bipartisan National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), “America is not prepared to defend or compete in the AI era.” As chair and vice-chair of the NSCAI, respectively, they summarized the commission’s solution: “America needs to enlist its oldest allies and new partners to build a safer and freer world for the AI era.” Though the U.S. military is taking pains to ensure AI does not erode its ideal to fight wars ethically, it cannot afford to leave its allies and partners behind in this endeavor. DoD is working to ensure the U.S. military can deter and fight AI-infused armed conflicts as part and likely leader of future coalitions using ethical, or “responsible,” AI. Efforts have focused on establishing broad principles for AI development and use and have targeted the technical enablers of multinational uses of AI, like standardizing data-labeling processes and pursuing data-sharing agreements with partners. This is not enough. On the coalition battlefield, the ethics of military AI come down to the choices leaders and commanders make about how to use AI-enabled weapons. But it is not clear that coordination and joint decisionmaking practices at the political and operational levels used in U.S.-led coalitions to date are well-suited to operations in an AI era. How will coalitions manage a more complex decision space, where different nations’ AI systems pass algorithm outputs to operators and analysts across a coalition? Will decisionmaking outcomes be consistent with our ethical ideals? AI is making human judgment in war more, not less, important. This means the United States and its allies and partners will need to innovate together, focusing on more than broad ethical principles and technical solutions. The U.S. defense enterprise can take three concrete steps I describe below to ensure its own and its partners’ technology and ideals align with the organizational structures—that is, in coalitions—in which AI-enabled weapons will be put to use. Foundations of AI Responsibility in U.S. Alliances and Partnerships Because the United States fights in coalitions in most armed conflicts, focusing on developing partnerships to integrate military AI is a prudent approach. The NSCAI charged the DoD with achieving broad military AI readiness by 2025, including by “promoting AI interoperability with allies and partners,” and the Pentagon is heeding this call. In September 2020, DoD had already convened representatives from thirteen countries from NATO, non-NATO alliances, and other defense partnerships to socialize its ethical principles for AI and coordinate on military AI ethics policy. This AI Partnership for Defense (AIPfD) aims to “promote the responsible use of AI, advance shared interests and best practices … establish frameworks to facilitate cooperation, and coordinate strategic messaging.” Since then, engagement with international defense partners has broadened and deepened. By June 2021, AIPfD had added three additional member states to the group; in March 2022, it convened its fifth international dialogue. AIPfD cooperation has deepened from high-level conversations to discussions on AI-use scenarios, marking progress toward a key NSCAI recommendation the DoD focus on specific AI use-cases in exercises and wargames. In addition, in October 2021, NATO adopted an alliance-wide AI strategy focused mostly on responsible use. Biden administration initiatives in the Indo-Pacific in 2021—reinvigorating the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with Australia, India, and Japan and concluding the Australia-U.K.-U.S. (AUKUS) technology-sharing agreement—also targeted AI cooperation. Early work in the Quad has included collaboration on AI technical standards more generally, while AUKUS members are cooperating on capabilities for use in contested military environments. Finally, U.S. military services have also begun incorporating new AI systems into multinational operational exercises, experimentation that can help foresee and overcome the technical and operational challenges of using novel technology in coalitions. Important early steps like these help enact standards, like keeping humans in AI systems’ decision loops and having strong technology-policy review processes, meant to avoid worst-case scenarios where uncontrolled, unvalidated systems are fielded in armed conflict. But, the Department has more to do to avoid the misuse or failure of AI-enabled weapons in future coalition operations. Whether the employment of any weapons system in armed conflict is “ethical” or “responsible” ultimately depends on the assessments commanders and political leaders make. In multinational operations with AI tools at the “tip of the spear,” non-U.S. leaders and commanders will also be faced with choices that determine whether they use such tools to enact values, like proportionality and discrimination, in fighting alongside U.S. forces. It is in the U.S. interest that they do this. Guaranteeing that they do, however, is difficult. Strength In Diversity? Many of the national AI strategy documents of NATO allies and U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific prioritize responsible governance over AI in and, in some cases, AI-enabled warfighting. This apparent, high-level harmony notwithstanding, public polling data from 2019 and 2021 suggest that among U.S. security partners, specific concerns about the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems vary widely. Data from this year show that the public’s trust in AI more generally varies from quite high among some partners, as in India and Turkey, to quite low, among traditional NATO allies and Japan. U.S. leaders should thus not assume their allies will be reading from an identical political or ethical playbook in future coalition operations with AI in the mix. Once shooting begins, coalition members frequently find they actually disagree about the policies and strategies that should guide operations. Domestic politics are often what shape the scope and limits of coalition members’ contributions to operations, and they can impact leaders’ strategic decisions in complex ways. This makes it worth thinking carefully about the benefits and risks of working in a coalition where views about military AI use and governance vary. Intuitively, a diversity of perspectives is useful for creative problem-solving. In plotting a course for research and development on military AI, DoD set the goal of building “a robust national and global [responsible AI] ecosystem” among partner government, private sector, and academic institutional partners to maximize creative potential and interoperability. In operational contexts, however, the stakes of navigating differences of the ethical frameworks and policies that inform leaders’ and commanders’ decisions are much higher. Without appropriate ways of managing coalition contributions, unforeseen mismatches in the skill levels and specialized capabilities of partner forces can have major negative effects on military effectiveness. National political differences about whether AI collaboration should be civilian- or military-focused, varied timelines over which militaries are adopting AI, and incompatibilities in legal and regulatory structures could all present challenges to U.S.-led coalitions cohesively enacting shared notions of military AI ethics. Is there a way to find operational strength in this diversity? A Responsible AI Coalition It is in the U.S. interest to leverage the creative potential of a diverse AI “ecosystem.” However, it is also necessary to establish habits that mitigate the risk that political, cultural, and organizational differences among future coalition partners might undermine collective, responsible AI use. To do this, the Defense Department can take steps now to increase the reliability with which future coalitions will operationalize the foundations of international cooperation on military AI. The DoD should pursue the three objectives and consider specific actions to pursue them. Building these goals into the charter of the DoD’s new Office of the Chief Data and AI Officer (CDAO) that Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks directed be prepared by June 1, 2022, would help align institutional incentives to accomplish them. Despite China’s efforts to lead in setting international AI technical standards, it is clearly in the U.S. interest to pursue its own standards under which it collaborates with military partners. The DoD should task the CDAO to oversee a process to identify what resources would be necessary to engage partners to develop and baseline U.S. programs around a technical glossary for AI. Doing so would set the terms of debate among the international partners DoD seeks to recruit to the responsible AI ecosystem it seeks to establish. Without shared language, communicating about partners’ capabilities and intent to use AI responsibly will be difficult, posing risks for the strategic effectiveness and political cohesion of future coalitions. Until now, the department has not needed to understand how its vast network of partner governments and militaries are absorbing a general-purpose technology like AI. A February 1 DoD memorandum identifies roles the CDAO and the undersecretaries for Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), and Research and Engineering (R&E) will play in international cooperation on AI. But, DoD lacks a cross-cutting process for collecting technical and policy knowledge derived from these international interactions and integrating it into coalition policy, planning, or technical cooperation efforts on a country-by-country or weapons system-by-system basis. The DoD should task the CDAO, Policy, A&S, and R&E offices to create one. These offices should establish metrics in R&D, TEVV, and acquisitions processes that incentivize the bureaucracy to prioritize technical and organizational interoperability and consider unique requirements that might arise from ethical or policy questions likely to arise in multinational use scenarios. This would help channel international partner input to relevant points of contact across the department, optimizing the value of the international “responsible AI ecosystem” to U.S. coalition efforts. As China and Russia continue to use AI tools to enhance authoritarian control at home, it is becoming commonplace to argue that the values America and its allies share for responsible AI can represent a competitive edge of soft power. This might well be the case. Only if America and its allies are capable of enacting these values on the AI-infused battlefield together, though, will this advantage serve to help legitimize U.S.-led operations in the world’s eyes. A coalition’s ability to uphold the laws of armed conflict is ultimately bounded by the capability and willingness of its least able members to do so.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › NATO Solves

US cooperation with allies on AI key to democracy

Andrew Imbrie et al 20, Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service is a research organization focused on studying the security impacts of emerging technologies, supporting academic work in security and technology studies, and delivering nonpartisan analysis to the policy community. February. "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" //pipk

The United States has long benefited from its network of allies and partners that contribute forces, specialized capabilities, and legitimacy to U.S. leadership in the world. In recent years, however, this network has come under strain. Disputes over burden sharing and mutual recriminations have raised questions about the cohesion and durability of existing alliance structures. Recent U.S. policy shifts and withdrawal from certain international agreements have deepened fears that the United States no longer sees its allies and partners as central to U.S. strategic objectives and national security. America’s alliances are weakening at a time of growing competition between democratic nations and authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes are surviving longer and becoming more adept at using AI-enabled surveillance and censorship technologies to export their values abroad.5 China and Russia present a significant challenge to liberal democratic societies.6 A world in which China and Russia deploy AI to widen the net of information controls is a world of diminished rights and protections for the individual, fewer safeguards for privacy and the rule of law, more data exploitation, and limited opportunities for judicial redress or public dissent.7 Despite the importance of alliances in promoting democratic values and protecting against a mounting authoritarian challenge, the United States lacks a strategic approach for cooperating with allies and other like-minded partners on AI.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Cooperation Advantage › NATO Solves

NATO AI cooperation is key to preserve democracy

Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk

The ongoing technological transformation has not only renewed great powers’ longforgotten competition in areas like technology, with the so-called AI race,330 but it has also given rise to new instruments for political competition and influence.331 The effect of these instruments is particularly subtle, because they undermine the very principles and institutions – such as democracy, freedom of speech and free markets – on which NATO is built and which, as an Alliance, it tries to promote. Propaganda, disinformation, deception and counter-intelligence have always existed. However, the possibility of applying emerging technologies with disruptive potential to these domains is relatively unprecedented.332 For instance, forensic evidence related to popular digital platforms like WeChat and TikTok shows that specific hashtags, accounts or information have been suppressed by foreign actors or governments, likely for political reasons.333 Similarly, in the past few years, autocratic regimes have recurrently relied on chatbots, troll farms and diffusion of disinformation through Facebook or Twitter with a view to altering political competition within, and outside, NATO. Second, key technologies related to AI, ML and BD, such as facial and speech recognition software, provide new opportunities for autocratic rulers to curtail individual freedoms, impose human rights abuses and implement societal control measures which would be deemed unacceptable within NATO. However, some countries are exporting those technologies around the world, thus making undermining democracy and freedom not only at home but also abroad.334 Last but not least, while economic competition and economic intelligence have long characterized statecraft and international relations, in an age when technology yields accelerating returns, adversaries and competitors can (and do) exploit free markets and open societies so as to steer chaos and appropriate foreign technology. This has nefarious implications for competitiveness as well as national security, given the dual nature of many technologies at hand.335 These are issues on which NATO and its Allies are in a sense caught unprepared. The dominant consensus has long held that digital technologies would undermine autocratic rule, and that that state-sponsored economic activities would struggle to keep pace with free markets.336 Recent history has proved both assumptions wrong. Firewalls can permit autocratic countries to control their internal flow of information. ML and BD can increase, rather than undermine, societal control. Free markets and open societies are vulnerable to uncompetitive and unfair measures and, such as theft of intellectual property or illicit transfer of technology, as well as to disinformation and propaganda, which are made more effective by digital platforms. Whether these are examples of hybrid threats is an important discussion, which cannot be addressed here.337 NATO Allies, however, have important issues to discuss. Anti-fake software. We are all potential victims of disinformation. The evolution of disinformation, thanks to the development of generative adversian networks and the emergence of so-called deepfakes – videos that create artificial speeches over video clips of notable public individuals – is particularly worrying. For NATO, deepfakes could represent an existential threat as trust in political and social institutions could be dramatically undermined. One layer of defence for NATO could consist in promoting the development and adoption of an anti-fake software – i.e., one that can be easily installed on anyone’s phone or desktop as an alert system against seemingly illegitimate content. This could be funded as a pilot project or through a Grand Challenge. The goal would be to enable all individuals to be protected from disinformation attacks. Self-evidently, the software, its code as well as its parameters must be sufficiently open and transparent to enable public scrutiny.338 Algorithmic principles. NATO Allies have a strong interest in agreeing on, and setting out, a series of principles and actions to stop their companies supporting, even unintentionally, the rise of digital authoritarianism. In particular, it is important to ensure that their technologies or services be prevented from enabling the use of AI for purposes which go against NATO values and principles, such as mass societal control or suppression of free speech. Cyber security and investments screening. Cyber attacks, theft of intellectual property as well as well illicit transfer of technology, including through mergers and acquisitions of foreign companies, have grown exponentially in recent years. Such tactics undermine economic competition and are extremely perilous from a security perspective, given that they make it possible to bypass measures such as technology export control regimes. NATO and its Allies have a strong interest in strengthening the cyber defence of their companies. This may imply, for start-ups and small and medium enterprises, various incentives to build up their cyber security, as well as direct government support. At the same time, a NATOwide effort towards the screening of foreign companies’ investments and acquisitions is important to counter illicit transfer of technology: cooperation with the European Union would be important in this respect.339 A technological alliance of democracies. As highlighted in previous sections, the challenge facing NATO and its Allies is massive, sudden, subtle and multidimensional. In some areas, intra-Alliance cooperation and coordination combined with powerful initiatives will not suffice, as close work with the private sector and with external partners will be necessary. This is why a group of prominent researchers have proposed a technological alliance of democracies, to better address the threats and challenges we are facing.340 The role of NATO outside its borders – and the Euro-Atlantic area more generally – is admittedly a sensitive issue, on which multiple perspectives and sensitivities co-exist. However, there is room for the Alliance to play a more proactive role around the world in upholding, mostly through diplomacy, the very principles on which it is based: democracy, free markets, rule of law and human rights.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › AT: Deterrence Turn

AI systems are vital to overall deterrence postures and replacing conventional systems with reliable second-strike and self-isolating military capabilities.

Horowitz 19 (Michael C. Hororwitz is a former Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Technology and National Security Program at CNAS. Michael C. Horowitz is Richard Perry Professor and the Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. His research interests include technology and global politics, military innovation, the role of leaders in international politics, and forecasting.) May 2019 “Artificial intelligence and nuclear stability” THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK Volume I Euro-Atlantic Perspectives p.60-70 ) // ZX

Nuclear-armed states, and also non-nuclear-armed states, could use machine learning and autonomy in non-nuclear applications with a strategic effect. Machine learning methods could significantly improve the targeting capability of conventional defensive systems. Missile and air defence systems have relied on automation for decades. The first automatic air defence system, the Mark 56 gun fire-control system, was invented during World War II.24 Since the 1970s, air defence systems have been using an AI technology known as automatic target recognition (ATR) that can detect, track, prioritize and select incoming air threats more rapidly and more accurately than a human possibly could. However, the progress of the target-identification capabilities of these systems has been slow, particularly due to the difficulties associated with the development of target libraries (i.e. the database of target signatures that an ATR system uses to recognize its target). With traditional AI programming methods, the designers of an ATR system have to upload a large and representative sample of data about the target in all conceivable variations of its operating environment (i.e. background and weather conditions). This is a challenging task for many target types and operational situations.25 Advances in machine learning, particularly deep learning and generative adversarial networks (GANs), could significantly simplify that process.26 With deep-learning methods, engineers could make ATR systems capable of learning independently not only the differences between types of target but also the differences between military and civilian objects (e.g. a commercial aeroplane and a strategic bomber).27 With GANs, engineers could generate realistic synthetic data on which an ATR system can be trained and tested in simulation. An ATR system trained with these machine learning techniques would perform comparatively much better than an ATR system trained with traditional methods. Equally, autonomous systems offer new defensive tools against incoming threats. Autonomous unmanned vehicles can be deployed as decoys or flying mines to complement traditional air defences.28 Advances in autonomy for swarming and for multi-vehicle control could also enable autonomous unmanned systems to operate in a coordinate way and conduct advanced A2/AD manoeuvres.29 Such systems would increase deterrence against both conventional and nuclear attack as they would increase the risks for an attack by manned platforms (e.g. combat aircraft and manned bombers) and make the outcome of an attack with unmanned systems (including missiles) more uncertain.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Impact – Russia

Russia war causes extinction

Owen Cotton-Barratt et al. 17 - PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,”

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Impact – Russia

Nato is key to deterring Putin--- collapse causes global insecurity.

Ilya Timtchenko 03-21-2022 [Ilya Timtchenko is studying public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and is chair of the Ukraine Caucus, a student organization at the Harvard Kennedy School. He was previously an editor at the Kyiv Post, Atlantic Council, “Fear of provoking Putin is leading the Western world toward disaster,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fear-of-provoking-putin-is-leading-the-western-world-toward-disaster///ZW]

The conventional wisdom in Washington is that NATO should refrain from enforcing a No-Fly Zone over Ukraine due to the risk of an all-out NATO-Russia war. This view reflects a decades-long misunderstanding of both Russia and Ukraine, and is mired in appeasement thinking. While the window to impose a No-Fly Zone has likely closed, there are still alternatives that could work. The West should implement them without delay. After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the US hastily abandoned the post-Soviet world and moved on to other international challenges. Ironically, this disinvestment meant that it stopped maintaining and developing the very expertise that had allowed America to triumph over the USSR in the first place. Over the intervening three decades, appeasement has replaced expertise. Whether it was Russia’s brutal wars in Chechnya, the 2008 war with Georgia, or the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the West’s approach has frequently been shaped by fear of provoking an already aggrieved Russia. This has led the West to misread Putin’s Russia again and again. It also caused Western leaders to misinterpret developments in Ukraine. We overestimate Putin and underestimate Ukraine due to limited understanding of the fast-changing dynamics in the post-Soviet region. The West’s dangerous disregard for the threat posed by a revanchist Kremlin explains why the democratic world did not maintain its advantage over Russia when the latter was most vulnerable. The fall of the Soviet Union provided a golden opportunity for rapid NATO expansion, including into Ukraine. While it is fashionable to claim NATO enlargement went too far, in the current circumstances it makes far more sense to argue that it did not go far enough. Thankfully, it is not too late for the West to learn from its mistakes. While Russia has significantly greater military power today than in the 1990s, it is still no match for NATO, and Putin will not fight if challenged by the collective might of the West. NATO could coordinate with non-NATO nations to protect Ukraine’s skies, especially as the Biden Administration has demonstrated its ability in recent weeks to unify the world against Russia. America could theoretically mobilize a broad coalition to protect Ukraine. In the current extreme circumstances, there is no reason why the global community cannot adopt a creative approach to save a country that has been blatantly attacked by a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has stunned the world with its heroism. Retired four-star General in the United States Air Force Phil Breedlove has stated that a No-Fly Zone must be on the table. He also suggested an alternative: a humanitarian No-Fly Zone. This is a potentially attractive idea that could serve as a compromise between advocates of a cautious policy towards the Kremlin and those who believe Russia will not ultimately escalate into open war with NATO. While Western leaders have so far been unambiguous in ruling out direct intervention, they are also providing Ukraine with enhanced anti-aircraft capabilities. Such measures need to be significantly speeded up and bolstered by the parallel provision of fighter jets and anti-missile defense systems. In less than four weeks of war, Russia has fired more than a thousand missiles at Ukraine and reduced entire Ukrainian cities to rubble. While the civilian death toll remains unconfirmed, many thousands are already feared dead. Despite the obvious urgency of the situation, the West is still acting in half-measures and contemplating if arming Ukraine could be interpreted as provocative by Putin. If Western leaders maintain their current cautious approach towards Russian aggression, the watching world will witness an unfolding genocide of the Ukrainian people. This will be joined by a rapidly escalating global food crisis. Russian tanks will not stop at Ukraine’s western borders. On the contrary, Putin will be emboldened to expand his wars of imperial aggression and will inevitably turn his attention to Moldova and the Baltic States while also seeking to destabilize Central Europe and the Balkans. Meanwhile, China and other authoritarian powers will take note of Putin’s success and act accordingly. They will forge closer ties with a resurgent Russia and will seek to expand their own spheres of influence in a similar manner. The entire world will enter into a new era of global insecurity that will reverse much of the progress made since World War II. Rather than remaining reactive and paying an even greater price in the near future, NATO should act decisively now and dramatically increase its support for Ukraine. To do otherwise is not only immoral; it is against the core strategic interests of the entire Western world.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Impact – Russia

Unless stopped, Putin will escalate – extinction

Dokoupil 22 – Tony Dokoupil is an American broadcast journalist and author, known for his work as a co-anchor of CBS Mornings. He was also a news correspondent for CBS News and MSNBC. (Tony Dokoupil, "Conflict in Ukraine triggers fear of nuclear warfare," CBS, 4-29-2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/conflict-nuclear-warfare-ukraine-russia/, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

The threat of a global nuclear war doesn't feel as distant as it did a few weeks ago. A recent CBS News poll found that 70% of adults are worried Russia's invasion of Ukraine could lead to fighting with nuclear weapons. Many are curious as to what a nuclear war would look like — so Alex Wellerstein, a historian and professor at the Stevens Institute of Technology, developed a website called "NUKEMAP." It can simulate a detonation anywhere in the world. As in real life, the simulation begins with just the push of a button. CBS News' Tony Dokoupil and Wellerstein simulated a scenario of what Times Square would look like if it was hit with a bomb like the one that struck Hiroshima. "There's a sort of zone that's about here, and... which is pretty hopeless, no matter what," Wellerstein said as he pointed to a large section of midtown Manhattan in the simulation. When larger, more modern bombs were simulated, the website showed a single blast could cause heavy damage throughout the entire metropolitan region and kill millions. Winds can also carry radioactive particles even further. "These are areas where, if you're not taking shelter several hours after the bomb, you could get enough radiation to die," Welllerstein said when referring to cities downwind of New York in the simulation. "You could get enough radiation to get significantly sick." There was a time when Americans were prepared for that kind of attack. In the 1950s and 60s, school children practiced "duck and cover" drills to help survive a blast, and a public campaign educated Americans on surviving the fallout. Office of Civil Defense teams also spent hundreds of millions of dollars building and stockpiling fallout shelters all across the U.S., but a visit to the basement of a public library in Passaic, New Jersey, reveals this threat has fallen into the very back of our minds. In a space that was designed to shelter up to 90 people, decades of dust has settled over the medicine and food — which has long since expired — in the basement. Building supervisor Gary Salvatoriello told CBS News there are no plans for replenishment. Instead, the one-time fallout shelter, like so many others, has turned back into an everyday storage space. George Washington University professor Sharon Squassoni said she's been warning about the risk of nuclear conflict for years. "The lessons of the Cold War seem to have been forgotten," she said. The number of nuclear weapons has decreased dramatically since the Cold War. But Russia and the U.S. each have more than 1,500 weapons deployed and ready to fire. Squassoni said she fears that could happen eventually, either by accident or an intentional attack. "We know from Russian doctrine that they have a plan or they've been thinking about using nuclear weapons to escalate the war, to stop it or deescalate it," she said. The big question is: what would happen after an initial attack? "The world would recoil in horror. And I'm sure there would be a lot of voices demanding for some kind of similar action. But do you really want to trigger the third world war? A third nuclear war?" Squassoni said. "I don't think that Vladimir Putin wants to tangle with NATO," she added. "I don't think he wants to tangle with the U.S. But I also think that we've been misreading him for quite a while. The truth is there is very little standing in the way of an all-out nuclear war. "The only thing that really stands is that... it is not really in the interests of our enemies to have that happen to them either," Wellerstein said. Even though nuclear weapons haven't been used in battle since 1945, Wellerstein said the threat they post never really went away. "We have a long list of stuff to worry about. But I think they should be on the list. I'm not saying they should be the top of the list all the time. But I think if they were on the list, you might get a somewhat different world as a result," he said. "Future problems are brewing, I guarantee it."

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Impacts – AI Good

AI key for future NATO deployment and training-visualization, analyzation, integration, equipment protection

Husain et al. 18(Amir Husain, August Cole, and Wendy R Anderson. CEO of Spark Cognition & Board of Adivisors for UT Austin’s Department of Computer Science & Member of Council on Foreign Affairs, Senior fellow of Scowcroft Center on Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council & Fellow of Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity at Marine Corps University. " As Budget Polemic Drives Headlines, Do Not Lose Track of NATO’s Approach to AI". 07-27-2018. Royal United Services Institute. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/155282/WendyRAnderson_RUSIArticle.pdf. 6-22-2022.)-cg

Indications and Warnings of Crisis Readiness at an Alliance level depends on the synchronized sharing of high-quality data to inform intelligence assessments and general situational awareness. One way to accomplish this is to establish AI-focused all-source data processing that is centralized by NATO headquarters but produced by, and available to, member states. An electronically shared view of the operational environment, frequently referred to as a common operating picture, can be developed in seconds, not days, to aid overloaded human analysts. Data sources must be expanded beyond conventional defense-related sources, to include open-source and commercially available imagery, metadata, and social media. Existing machine-learning systems already make this possible, but their use is nascent. The current generation of analytical software tools are a step in the right direction, but plenty of unprocessed data is not transformed into national and Alliance-level actionable intelligence reports due to a shortage of human analysts. This causes gaps in the intelligence picture, which can be exploited by an adversary. Taking full advantage of AI can smooth out the escalation of a crisis by combining the analytic efforts of NATO command organizations and member states to ascertain how, and when, a scenario will develop. Machine-learning crisis simulation systems offer improved visibility into the causes and drivers of a crisis that might otherwise be overlooked by conventional analysis, which can be too narrow to capture the true complexity of a situation. Integrating AI into coalition operations is a global challenge, not only for NATO, but also its supporting allies, many who, in the hyper war era, may not be organized militaries. In a hybrid, multi-domain context, a real-time common operating picture – that draws upon simulations but is also predictive – must extend into the information domain, including modelling peacetime public narratives. The volume and velocity of information during the early phases of a crisis will be nearly overwhelming. Anything other than an AI system has little hope of success in keeping up, while paring away irrelevant information to ensure that human decision-makers are tracking the right information. As with the assessment phase, AI-driven simulations and scenario planning offer substantial insights. With those insights, such systems can create a comprehensive picture of force readiness and logistical imperatives to inform NATO’s response options. AI-driven analysis can process massive amounts of unstructured data, maintenance logs, reports, and logistical information to create a detailed and accurate picture of force readiness. Machine-learning systems can also fold-in data from civilian, commercial-sector and non-governmental sources in order to produce a more accurate ‘whole of society’ capabilities view than what is currently possible. Employing this approach across the 29 NATO states is especially critical in the context of high-intensity conflict scenarios that, although unlikely, would be potentially catastrophic. Additionally, being able to include civilian resources and infrastructure as part of this response option analysis is something that AI systems are better suited to do than conventional database analysis. In addition to readiness driving response options, another major consideration is developing plans and evaluating their effectiveness. In more tactical scenarios, such as in the development of mission optimized auto-pilot capabilities for fighter aircraft, AI techniques such as reinforcement learning are already proven in creating optimized operational plans for a single platform in a similar way that can be applied for entire combat elements. The operational execution of a plan by NATO forces is currently dependent on mere assumptions of the consistency of training, resources, and the joint force’s ability to accomplish their mission. AI, particularly when combined with virtual- and augmented-reality visualization, can play a significant role in providing advanced training and pre-deployment unit-level preparation for NATO-led forces during peacetime, to ensure a rapid yet smooth transition into conducting operations. During those operations, autonomous software can be used to assist with maintenance, logistics management, and targeting of offensive and defensive systems. It can also ensure that a NATO force is successfully integrated with autonomous, unmanned ground, air and sea vehicles to provide a standardized, and ever increasing, level of operational competence and consistency of execution. During operations, machine-learning systems can use sensor data, entire technical libraries, and advanced models to accurately predict and then prevent equipment failure; given the danger now posed by improvised explosive devices and precision munitions to supply lines, such efficiency has profound strategic importance. In more tactical scenarios, such as in the development of mission optimized auto-pilot capabilities for fighter aircraft, AI techniques such as reinforcement learning, which allows machines to share their experiences and optimal solutions among themselves, have shown their utility. Adversarial AI systems running within a simulator can assist in the evolution of a highly optimized, robust mission intelligence that is effective at fulfilling defined objectives. In a similar vein, adaptations of these tactical AI-driven simulator frameworks can be used to gauge likely public reactions to proposed response options. What all of these approaches permit is to potentially identify – and address – operational pitfalls before they actually occur. Given the importance of public opinion and political support for NATO, what happens after a crisis is as important as the operations undertaken during it. Disengagement is likely to be an ongoing real-time competition over information and digital narratives, as contested as an operation’s military elements. The AI tools will be familiar, not unlike the machine-learning algorithms that today automatically run behind the-scenes markets placing political ads or marketing campaigns onto social media feeds.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Impacts – AI Good

AI will transform warfare – failure to effectively, and quickly, adopt AI platforms crushes NATO military readiness – cooperation now is key.

Christou ‘21 (George, Professor of European Politics and Security, University of Warwick. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. 01/03/2021 https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/978195445000.pdf)

Just like with the commercial and public sector, then, technological progress has allowed militaries and security sector professionals to gather large amounts of data, and a number of countries (governments and armed forces) are in the process of constructing and implementing governance models to ensure the benefits of Big Data in terms of real time intelligence, enhanced decision-making, situational awareness and overall competitive edge against increasingly capable opponents. The synergy between Big Data, ML and AI is particularly important in this context when it comes to all aspects of combat readiness, with experts agreeing that AI and its application in the armed forces is “present in all domains…and all levels of warfare” (Svenmarck et al., 2018) with the potential to have a transformative impact on national security technology (Allen and Chan, 2017; see also Tonin, 2019). Many, however, are at an early stage in the development of any BDA strategy. Thus, the lessons from other sectors – and indeed leading governments and security organizations – can provide guidance on best practice as they move from their ‘data’ governance models to ‘Big Data’ governance frameworks that will give them the ability to ensure maximum value and advantage is extrapolated from the BDA life-cycle. The first lesson or best practice relates to having a clear rationale, goals and guiding principles in place to ensure effective governance of Big Data in the organization. This includes strategically assessing the type of model required, based on current capabilities, resources and future needs, i.e. decentralized/centralized/hybrid. More importantly, governments and security organizations need a clear understanding of the value of Big Data across different domains (land, sea, air) and landscapes (human, physical, information) so that high quality, usable, real-time information can be delivered through AI and ML at strategic, tactical and operational levels. This is certainly recognized in the NATO context, with a Dutch Position Paper highlighting that, in terms of Big Data and AI, “the focus should be on assessing and…demonstrating the added value that innovations can provide to NATO military theatres” (Smallgange et al., 2018). This is critical, so that the full possibilities of influencing the three landscapes – through situational awareness and effective command and control – can be developed in a broader way than that offered by traditional military means. This way, there is also a recognition that in order to take full advantage of the data-centric technologies (BDA and AI), a data-centric methodology is required, so that effective support can be offered at different levels (Blunt et al., 2018). In the second place, related to the first lesson learned, in a military and security context where there is often a unified command in combination with tiered formal hierarchy that tends towards specialization, there can also be structural inefficiencies in the flow of information; operating jointly can thus often come at a high cost (Zelaya and Keeley, 2020). When considering any data-driven methodology, then, much thought has to be given to the organizational data management life cycle – including how to integrate the use of BDA and new technologies (e.g. AI, ML) with human decision-making, control and communication of information. Indeed, it has been argued that whilst BDA and associated technologies offer significant advances in rapidly collecting, processing and deciphering complex forms and varieties of data for the purposes of action, the human element is still critical in contextualizing any such data and offering insights on the complexity and “shades of grey” that might be missed by BDA (Van Puyvelde et al., 2018: 1414; see also Desclaux, 2018: 9). To this end, thought has already been given to the implementation of the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop to determine the type of decision support required and how meaningful human control can be enabled. The OODA perspective or approach, it is argued, represents “the life cycle from data acquisition to decision making and also reflects how sophisticated a technology should be in order to provide value” (Smallgange et al., 2017: 6). An important element within this loop is giving full consideration to any legal, ethical and moral questions that arise in relation to action and particularly the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). The third best practice relates to buy-in from the organization as a whole. That means not just having the technology, tools and mechanisms in place within a data driven environment that ensures access to and use of Big Data for all team members, but also: a) Leadership from those at the top (Commanders) and within the different echelons of command within and across domains, landscapes and levels through to data engineers, analysts, assessors, translators – and the ability of the various communities of interest to use data communicated to them in an effective way; b) The creation of an organizational (big) data-driven culture and data-centric paradigm – including ensuring that all relevant staff are data literate, have the requisite skills, literacy and readiness, and are provided with the education, training and skills to operate effectively. To this end, NATO has identified a key capability gap when it comes to literacy and readiness and has also recognized that in terms of recruiting AI specialists, engineers and data scientists the pool of talent is shallow and it can be difficult to compete with Big Tech companies. Here, leading national governments in developing their Big Data strategies have sought to ensure the requisite investment is in place going forward for developing a (resilient, secure and trusted) technology architecture and recruiting the right talent. They have also, alongside leading security organizations such as NATO, recognized that partnerships (in particular with industry) and contracted services, as well as in-house expertise, that will be needed to deliver and sustain the necessary skills and understanding for assessing, interpreting and communicating information in an effective way (Tonin, 2019; Blunt, 2018; Defence IQ, 2020; Big Data for Defence, 2019). Finally, the non-defense commercial/industry sector will not just be important in terms of the skills and expertise element, but also for technological adaptation and integration, given that many innovations stem from commercial companies; the UK government, for example, has awarded IBM a GBP 3.8 million deal for the development of an AI-powered military software platform prototype (Defence IQ, 2020). More broadly, governments and security sector organizations will have to overcome certain hurdles – organizational, cultural, and incentive structures – to ensure that new technologies are adapted so they can bring advantages across strategic, tactical and operational levels (Kostopoulos, 2019: 9) and allow efficient and effective decision-making when needed. Conclusions This chapter has highlighted the central ways in which commercial organizations have been successful in constructing and executing a BDA strategy, and discussed the main pitfalls that organizations should seek to avoid in embarking on any such strategy. In this context it is clear that there are many lessons to be learnt and best practices that can be adapted by the security sector in relation the integration of BDA into existing strategies. Indeed, a cursory look at the leading nations with regards to Big Data strategies – and security organizations such as NATO – demonstrate that their central objectives have been developed (and appropriately adapted) with commercial best practice in mind in relation to data management, governance and analytics. To this end, there are general principles for success that are underpinned by a need for a clear rationale, goals and strategy, a strong leadership, an agile, resilient, secure and adaptable technical infrastructure, a data-centric approach and methodology, and a data culture that permeates the whole organization. Of course, this chapter did not have the space or scope to discuss the micro-level BDA requirements within the security sector in relation to all dimensions, and in particular innovative hardware and software architectures or indeed process techniques and challenges. What is clear going forward, however, is that the security sector will face challenges of a technical and nontechnical nature that will require financial investments in AI systems and human talent, as well as cooperation and collaboration with industry and leadership, if BDA strategies are to deliver the advantages expected to those engaged at strategic, tactical and operational levels. In this, lead nations and organizations, whilst not starting from scratch, have clearly started to negotiate the steep learning curve when it comes to Big Data and decision-making (Street et al., 2019). They are at a formative phase of development with regards to constructing and implementing strategies and governance frameworks, and indeed modelling and simulation environments, tools and techniques to allow them to derive maximum value from Big Data. The journey ahead, however, whilst entailing certain risks, is also an opportunity – if objectives and goals are clearly defined, strategies grown and adapted according to ever-changing needs, data and technological environments, and data governance and management practices enabled by strong leadership are underpinned by a philosophy of date-centric methodology, technology and clear legal and ethical code of conduct. Testing (through exercises, simulations, etc.), failure and the ability to reflect are important components of evolving and (re)defining BDA governance so that real value can be extracted in real time, with trustworthy and accurate data, and systems, technology and skills required to exploit data all the way through the decision-making process are sustained.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Hypersonics Internal

Hypersonics destabilize defensive capabilities and cannot be blocked by missile defense. Future development could lower costs and see use in conjunction with nuclear warheads.

Boyd 4/15 (Iain D. Boyd is the H.T. Sears Memorial Professor in the Department of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, and Director of the Center for National Security Initiatives at the University of Colorado. He received a Ph. D. in aeronautics and astronautics (1988) from the University of Southampton in England. He worked for four years at NASA Ames Research Center in the areas of aerothermodynamics and space propulsion.) “How hypersonic missiles work and the unique threats they pose – an aerospace engineer explains” April 15, 2022 ZX

Russia against a Ukrainian arms depot in the western part of the country on March 18, 2022. That might sound scary, but the technology the Russians used is not particularly advanced. However, next-generation hypersonic missiles that Russia, China and the U.S. are developing do pose a significant threat to national and global security. I am an who studies space and defense systems, including hypersonic systems. These new systems pose an important challenge due to their maneuverability all along their trajectory. Because their flight paths can change as they travel, these missiles must be tracked throughout their flight. A second important challenge stems from the fact that they operate in a different region of the atmosphere from other existing threats. The new hypersonic weapons fly much higher than slower subsonic missiles but much lower than intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. and its allies do not have good tracking coverage for this in-between region, nor does Russia or China. Russia has claimed that some of its hypersonic weapons can carry a nuclear warhead. This statement alone is a cause for concern whether or not it is true. If Russia ever operates this system against an enemy, that country would have to decide the probability of the weapon being conventional or nuclear. In the case of the U.S., if the determination were made that the weapon was nuclear, then there is a very high likelihood that the U.S. would consider this a first strike attack and respond by . The hypersonic speed of these weapons increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any last-minute diplomatic resolution would be severely reduced. It is the destabilizing influence that modern hypersonic missiles represent that is perhaps the greatest risk they pose. I believe the U.S. and its allies should rapidly field their own hypersonic weapons to bring other nations such as Russia and China to the negotiating table to develop a diplomatic approach to managing these weapons. The primary reason nations are developing these next-generation hypersonic weapons is how difficult they are to defend against due to their speed, maneuverability and flight path. The U.S. is starting to develop a layered approach to defending against hypersonic weapons that includes a constellation of sensors in space and . This approach is likely to be very expensive and take many years to implement. With all of this activity on hypersonic weapons and defending against them, it is important to assess the threat they pose to national security. Hypersonic missiles with conventional, non-nuclear warheads are primarily useful against high-value targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Being able to take out such a target could have a significant impact on the outcome of a major conflict. However, hypersonic missiles are expensive and therefore not likely to be produced in large quantities. As seen in the recent use by Russia, hypersonic weapons are not necessarily a silver bullet that ends a conflict.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Hypersonics Internal

Hypersonic development occurring right now and both China and Russia leads the race. AI implementation drastically improves targeting and potentially opens up pre-emptive nuclear strikes against other states.

EA Times 21 (The EurAsian Times Desk (ET Desk) comprises authors, reporters, interns, newswires, etc who directly work under the Editorial Desk of The EurAsian Times and senior Editors of the media house.) “Powered By ‘On The Fly’ Algo, China Says Its AI-Controlled Hypersonic Missiles Can Hit Targets With 10 Times More Accuracy” October 18, 202 1https://eurasiantimes.com/china-says-its-ai-hypersonic-missiles-can-hit-targets-with-10-time-more-accuracy/ // ZX

When it comes to hypersonic weapons, the US’ near-peer rivals Russia and China seem to be ahead in the race. This fact, coupled with the understanding that Beijing has been betting big on Artificial Intelligence (AI) for the modernization of its military leads to a whole new possibility — the potential use of AI for providing accuracy to hypersonic weapons. that “China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August that circled the globe before speeding towards its target, demonstrating an advanced space capability that caught US intelligence by surprise.” The report quoted unnamed sources “briefed on the intelligence.” However, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian said the August test was “a spacecraft, not a missile.” Earlier this year, US Strategic Command chief Charles Richard, speaking at the annual symposium on space defense, that Russian hypersonic technology will provide the Russian Navy with an undeniable advantage. “Our current ground-based and space-based sensor system may not be able to cope with the detection and tracking of these missiles. I must admit that Russia is the world’s leading country in hypersonic technology. And if the enterprises of our defense industry in a short time do not figure out how to resist them, the ships of the fleets of the NATO countries will become vulnerable,” Richard said. China has been aggressively developing hypersonic weapons. It currently has two lethal hypersonic missiles – the Dong Feng-17 (DF-17) and the DF-ZF Hyper Glide Vehicle (HGV). The former is a medium-range missile or MRBM system equipped with an HGV. It can carry conventional as well as nuclear weapons and has a reported range of 1,800-2,500km and a launch weight of 15,000kgs. The second is the DF-ZF HGV that can travel at speeds between Mach 5 and 10. It is apparently capable of performing “extreme maneuvers” to evade enemy defenses. The DF-17 has been designed to work specifically with the DF-ZF, exponentially amplifying both these weapons’ powers. In addition to developing these advanced weapons, researchers from the PLA have reportedly made some changes to the software, enabling them to land Now, its researchers are looking at the integration of AI with these ultra-fast munitions. China’s military leadership has recognized that AI (artificial intelligence) and similar technologies including machine learning, neural networking, human-machine teaming, and autonomous systems (also referred to as ‘intelligentised weapons’) are crucial for achieving a headstart in next-generation warfare. President Xi Jinping has mandated a “full modernization” of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by 2035. His government aims to put the Chinese military on par with the US military by 2050. To that end, the PLA is making headway into the for military utilization. Several laws and initiatives have been put in place to aid this endeavor. For instance, the National Security Law (2015) and National Intelligence Law (2017) compel all Chinese organizations and citizens to help facilitate the establishment’s efforts. Meanwhile, the Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) aims to make use of the resources and research capabilities of the country’s privately-owned companies, universities, and research institutions to the defense forces’ advantage. that PLA missile scientists had said the accuracy of hypersonic weapons could be improved by more than 10 times if control is given to a machine. Xian Yong and Li Bangjie, professors at College of War Support, Rocket Force Engineering University, said more decision-making power would be handed to the smart weapon. This would leave its human controllers with no clue as to how the weapon would behave after it had been launched. However, they claimed that overall positioning accuracy “would increase by one to two orders of magnitude”. Their paper proposes using AI to write the weapon’s software “on the fly”, while it moves at hypervelocity, through a unique flight control algorithm. Using their method, the AI would start calculating immediately after launch, even before the weapon reaches hypervelocity, to compute its position using the signal from the GPS. These results would then be compared with the results generated by the onboard sensors to evaluate the actual condition of the hardware. Relying on this new information, the AI would create a unique positioning algorithm for the weapon’s flight control program even before it entered the cruising stage of hypersonic flight.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Russia Internal

Russia’s trying to jump ahead in technological warfare

’20 (Katarzyna Zysk; Katarzyna Zysk is a professor of international relations and contemporary history at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), which is part of the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) in Oslo; “Defence innovation and the 4th industrial revolution in Russia,” Taylor Francis Online, December 8 2020; )-amc

The Russian General Staff attaches critical importance to winning and holding information superiority and influencing the cognitive-psychological domain, seen as key in any contemporary conflict. Influence operations and other forms of AI-enabled and AI-augmented ‘information confrontation’ (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo) exploiting new forms and roles of information and social interaction are set to play an increasingly prominent role in Russia’s military strategy. Sergei Chvarkov, professor at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, points that cyber weapons have several critical advantages and in some cases may be many times more effective than physical destruction by conventional weapons; moreover, threats and attacks in the information sphere are hard to retaliate against. The exploitation of big data is likely to play a significant role in enhancing existing and creating new means of confrontation. It requires creating an infrastructure and conditions for big data harvesting, considered by the Russian authorities? a key factor in AI development. To this end, the Russian national AI strategy clearly states that priority in accessing big data will be given to state actors. Russia has also demonstrated interest in combining new technologies, such as AI and drones, in order to augment traditional methods of influence operations such as disinformation, demoralisation and propaganda. Specially developed Russian drones and cell site simulators have been able to impersonate cell phone towers with the objective of intercepting, jamming, spoofing or broadcasting tailored content on civilian mobile phones belonging to the opposing side. Russia has tested such systems in operations in Eastern Ukraine and Syria by delivering content to cell phones of opposing fighters. Based on information harvested from the smartphones, the projected content was intended to harass, intimidate and undermine morale, for instance by revealing seemingly compromising details about the adversary’s commanders or divulging knowledge about soldiers’ own families. Such methods have also been used against NATO soldiers deployed in the Baltic republics as a part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, apparently for similar influence operation purposes. Furthermore, Russia has been investing in counter-network capabilities that could disrupt or degrade the backbone of the US and NATO information technology-enabled warfare, critical infrastructures (C4ISR), including space-based systems, command and operational networks, and other complex technological warfare enablers that developed countries depend on. The Russian Aerospace Forces, created in 2015, integrate the previously separated offensive and defensive capabilities, including air defence, missile defence, offensive electronic warfare, anti-space capabilities (such as anti-satellite missiles and manoeuvring space robots), and directed energy weapons, such as the abovementioned Peresvet. They are likely to play key role in crisis and conflict, including regional war scenarios.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › Russia Internal

Russia developing AI to challenge NATO – they will engage in new security cooperation and disruptive strategies

Jankowski 21 [Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think-tanker and social media aficionado. Currently he serves as Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Previously he served as Chief Specialist for Crisis Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014-2016), Expert Analyst and Head of the International Analyses Division at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland (2010-2014), Senior Expert at the J5-Strategic Planning Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2009-2010) as well as foreign policy expert at the President Aleksander Kwasniewski “Amicus Europae” Foundation (2007-2010). NATO in era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns. “NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge.” Pp 90-96. March 19, 2021. Lublin Publications, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-1.pdf#page=82]//PJ

Russian EDTs Development Russia has been closely monitoring the United States as well as China’s technological priority areas while evaluating their long-term consequences and searching for means to counter them. According to Michael Raska, the current Russian EDTs strategy has been based on two elements. First, the strategy must counter the third offset strategy with the first offset strategy, which means prioritizing the development of a wide array of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems: “In Russian strategic thought, maintaining a variety of sophisticated nuclear weapons can invalidate any conventional advantages of the United States, NATO, and China. Ensuring that Russia remains a nuclear superpower is the basis of all Russian security policies. Moscow has never ceased the development of strategic and tactical weapon systems even during the darkest days of 1990s, and indeed accelerated research and development during the period of swift economic growth in the 2000s.”15 Indeed, for Russia nuclear weapons are the most cost-effective pillar of strategic deterrence. Second, Russia began to counter numerous U.S. and Chinese technological initiatives using similar indigenous programs, although more narrowly focused and smaller in scale. In October 2012, Russia established the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF).16 As emphasized by Michael Raska, “the ARF focuses on R&D of high-risk, high-pay-off technologies in areas that include hypersonic vehicles, artificial intelligence, additive technologies, unmanned underwater vehicles, cognitive technologies, directed energy weapons, and others. While Russian technologies are at the early stages in some areas, in key areas such as directed energy weapons, rail gun, hypersonic vehicles, and unmanned underwater vehicles, programs are progressing into advanced stages, backed by considerable financing for many years prior to the ARF.”17 However, the challenge for Russia remains sustained resource allocation to transform these disruptive technologies into actual military capabilities. Due to its current relationship with the West, one should expect that Russia will try to establish new industrial partnerships with major non-Western countries, primarily India and China. The goal of the potential cooperation will be to secure financing and technological cooperation on these projects. In fact, “Russia has already had a positive experience with India (BrahMos cruise missile joint production venture), and has embarked on two major joint programs with the Chinese – a wide-body passenger aircraft and advanced heavy helicopter programs. The interest in establishing the new joint programs with the Chinese is especially strong in the Russian space industry. The purchase of Chinese space-grade microchip production technology in exchange for RD-180 liquid-fuel rocket engine technology is under negotiation and may start a new stage in Sino-Russian cooperation.”18 The results of the Russian Science and Technology Foresight – a full-fledged study targeted at the identification of the most promising areas of science and technology development in Russia as it nears 2030 – revealed that in numerous areas Russia is lagging behind the world leaders. Foresight 2030 covered seven priority areas: Information and communication technologies Biotechnology Medicine and health New material and nanotechnologies Rational use of nature Transportation and space systems Energy efficiency and energy saving19 In information and communication technologies, Russia occupies advanced positions in areas like “New data transfer, networking, and content distribution technologies.” However, it lags behind global leaders in most fields, in particular “Computer-aided element base design technologies” or “New data transfer technologies.”20 With regard to biotechnology, the most advanced areas of applied research in Russia identified in the study include “High-performance techniques for genome, transcriptome, proteome, and metabolome analysis,” as well as “Systematic and structural biology.”21 When it comes to medicine and health, Russia has as yet made only modest progress in human organs regeneration. Nevertheless, according to Gokhberg, et al., Russia’s best chances to achieve sound practical results are in such fields as “Biocompatible biopolymeric materials” and “Techniques for fast identification of toxic substances and pathogens.”22 Unlike most of the other priority areas, the level of research and development in new material and nanotechnology in Russia is assessed as high, particularly in such fields as “Nano-size catalysts for deep processing of raw materials” and “Nano-structured membrane materials.”23 Finally, in transportation and space systems, the research and development fields with the highest domestic competitive advantage include “Development of research models to study transport situation in the Arctic and subarctic areas” and “Development of air- and spacecraft to launch suborbital small-size space satellites.”24 At the same time, Russia is speeding up its work on artificial intelligence. President Vladimir Putin has said on numerous occasions that the leader in the field of AI would become “the master of the world.” In October 2019, Russia adopted a National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Through 2030. According to Elena Chernenko and Nikolai Markotkin, Sberbank president German Gref was the driving force behind the strategy, and the stateowned bank prepared a roadmap for developing AI in Russia.25 In November 2019, the internet giants Yandex and Mail.ru Group, along with Gazprom Neft energy company, MTS, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund, formed a structure known as the AI Russia Alliance which is tasked with promoting Russia’s AI-based technologies. The alliance is expected to coordinate the efforts of the business and scientific communities to achieve the objectives set forth in the national AI strategy. Therefore, as Elena Chernenko and Nikolai Markotkin emphasize, in the near future the driving force behind Russian AI technologies will be commercial investment, with large IT companies – rather than start-ups – being in the driver’s seat. Still, the military sector is one of the strongest in terms of developing Russian AI. Increasingly, Russian military specialists in the field of AI applications are making advances in the use of such technologies, primarily in the maritime context. As Roger McDermott underscores, “Moscow’s interests in the use of AI to further develop maritime military capabilities relates to the future development of surface and sub-surface platforms that will be fully roboticized. Alongside this longer-term ambition is the use of situational analysis technology to ensure that naval commanders gain an advantage in time and space over a potential adversary by using the AI system to foresee the development of any situation within an operational environment, thus helping to gain the initiative. However, this is taking place within a much wider context of Moscow’s increasingly proactive interest in using AI technologies, which is changing the face of its conventional military capability and will do so for years to come.”26 The extent to which Moscow has prioritized, developed, and continued to plan future advances in applying AI within the military has to a large degree been underestimated by the West. With the introduction of AI in the fields of maritime security, engine production, or in enhancing command and control, there is no doubt that AI is finding expanding roles in the Russian Armed Forces. In this context, one should stress that Russia is a technologically advanced country in the design and development of armaments, even if its manufacturing and budgetary capacity has seldom matched its strategic ambition. Indeed, it is important not to underestimate the strength and resilience of Russia’s scientific community and innovation potential. Russian advantage is its ability to match technology with the applicable operational concepts and force and command structures. In fact, Russia has been able to use both symmetrical and asymmetrical means and methods of warfare. As Katarzyna Zysk emphasizes, “the objective has been to undermine or circumvent the opponent’s military-technological superiority and exploit its vulnerabilities, preferably in a cost-effective manner politically and economically.”27 Therefore, disruptive technologies should not be seen in isolation from disruptive strategies. In fact, technologies enable strategies. With Russia, one needs to consider not only advances in high technology for traditional military applications, but also innovations and uses below the level of declared war. Russia’s premier disruptive strategy is intimidation – to instill the awe and terror of war in adversaries in order to weaken and fracture them, all while using technology as an enabler. In peacetime, they intimidate opponents through various psychological methods, from disinformation to targeted nuclear exercises. In wartime, they use surprise and deception and are prepared to undertake asymmetric operations to destabilize, overwhelm, and fracture the adversary. Indeed, Philip Breedlove and Margaret E. Kosal insist that “understanding Russian approaches to technology development would not be complete without acknowledging the role that dezinformatsiya, disinformation, and maskirovka, military deception, play in interactions with external actors.”28

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › China Internal

China has numerous advantages over the US in AI

Allison ‘20 (Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School Member of the Board, Belfer Center Former Director, Belfer Center Faculty Affiliate, Future of Diplomacy Project,August 2020, )Roho

Drivers of Competititon Culturally, many Chinese embrace what many Americans see as a nightmare “surveillance state.” Even for applications that will clearly improve public health and safety, Americans are evenly split between those who are “very willing” and those who are “very unwilling” to share personal data. In China, the willing outnumber the unwilling five to one.38 As an American-educated Chinese colleague observed, Chinese are as puzzled by Americans’ acceptance of monthly mass shootings as much as Americans are puzzled by Chinese acceptance of a government surveillance that keeps them and their families safe from such horrors. China’s government, laws and regulations, public attitudes about privacy, and thick cooperation between companies and their government are all green lights for its advance of AI. In the United States and Europe, yellow and red lights abound. President Donald Trump’s statements about AI have essentially been rhetorical. In contrast, China’s president gets it. AI is a central pillar in his agenda to “make China great again.” In a process that reminds careful observers of the leadership of Amazon and Google, he has defined key performance indicators for its development, provided massive funding for specific projects, and done whatever possible to create favorable tailwinds. Wherever the Chinese government can protect companies (in its domestic market), support national champions (through subsidies and access to government data) and enable corporations leading AI charge, it does. It is ambitious performance targets that incentivize China’s fifteen cities with populations of more than 10 million and one hundred cities with populations of more than 1 million to compete in deploying sensors in highway systems (that will support driverless cars), cameras in the “sharp eyes” program that surveil public and private properties, and an array of similar collection technologies that create “smart cities.” On each of these fronts, there are, of course, competing considerations. A more comprehensive net assessment would require drilling down at length in each area of competition. On the current path, we expect that, for the next decade, the United States will maintain its lead in enterprise software (e.g. business tools like automatic billing), advanced semiconductors and quantum computing. Nonetheless, assessing the rivalry in the decade ahead, we believe that the United States and China must be recognized as peer competitors. U.S. advantages include its position as first mover (that has allowed Facebook and Google to lead not just in American domestic markets but worldwide); the current cadre of superstars pushing the frontier of research; the ability and determination of Silicon Valley to recruit the 0.0001 percent most capable individuals from 7.7 billion people around the globe; and an ecosystem that actively encourages disruptive invention and innovation. At the same time, American AI faces serious headwinds, including a culture that values privacy over security, distrusts authority and is suspicious of government; it companies wary of working with the U.S. Defense Department and intelligence agencies; dysfunctional public policies inhibiting recruitment and immigration; laws that make it difficult to compile big data sets; and the prospect of further regulations and antitrust action against the companies that are now America’s national champions—and are driving American advances in this arena. In the longer-term competition, China’s advantages begin with its population of 1.4 billion that creates an unparalleled pool of data and talent, the largest domestic market in the world, and information collected by companies and government in a culture that values security over privacy. Its commitment to education creates an army of less expensive labor willing and able to spend substantial amounts of time cleaning data sets. Its universities are graduating computer scientists in multiples of their American counterparts, all of them eager to develop algorithms to solve social problems. Because a primary asset in applying AI is the quantity of quality data, China has emerged as the Saudi Arabia of the twenty-first century’s most valuable commodity.39 The total data created, captured and copied in China is already far greater than in the United States. In addition, the country has hungry entrepreneurs like Alibaba’s Jack Ma and Tencent’s Pony Ma; a government that is leading a whole-of-nation campaign to become the world’s leader in AI; and a national sense that China’s time has come. To the extent that the next decade is an era of implementation, the advantage lies with China. In implementation, the overwhelming competitive advantage is quantity of quality data. Both in collection and in having a cadre of grunts to clean the data, China wins. In contrast, though, if the most significant advances in AI in the next decade come from breakthrough leaps, like the development of deep learning, the advantage lies with the United States.40 Both the fact that half the world’s AI superstars work for American companies and that the United States can recruit from all the world’s people—while inherent insularity restricts China to its own population—provide advantages Beijing cannot match.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › China Internal

China is winning the AI war– Chinese investment and schooling massively increased

Allison ‘20 (Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School Member of the Board, Belfer Center Former Director, Belfer Center Faculty Affiliate, Future of Diplomacy Project,August 2020, ) Roho

China’s AI Surge Though still in their infancy, AI technologies will be drivers of future economic growth and national security. From facial recognition and fintech to drones and 5g, China is not just catching up. In many cases, it has already overtaken the United States to become the world’s undisputed No. 1. In some arenas, because of constitutional constraints and different values, the United States willfully forfeits the race. In others, China is simply more determined to win. China’s AI surge is so recent that anyone not watching closely has likely missed it. As late as 2015, when assessing its international competition, American industry leaders—Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Amazon—saw Chinese companies in their rearview mirrors alongside German or French firms in the third tier. But this changed four years ago—in 2016—when leading AI application company DeepMind fielded a machine that defeated world champion Lee Sedol in the world’s most complex board game, Go.9 Even after several American companies’ machines had bested the chess masters of the universe10, most Chinese remained confident that machines could never beat Go champions, since Go is ten thousand times more complex than chess. Thus, DeepMind’s decisive victory became for China a “Sputnik moment”11—a jolt as dramatic as the Soviet Union’s launch of the first satellite into space that sparked America’s whole-of nation surge in math and science, nasa’s creation and the original “moon shot.” Kai-Fu Lee’s book AI Superpowers offers an insightful summary of China’s engagement in the field. It began with President Xi Jinping’s personal reaction to the defeat of the world’s Go champion. Declaring that this was a technology in which China had to lead, he set specific targets for 2020 and 2025 that put China on a path to dominance over AI technology and related applications by 2030.12 Recognizing that this would have to be led by entrepreneurial companies rather than agencies of government, he designated five companies to become China’s national champions: Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, iFlytek and SenseTime.13 Twelve months after Xi’s directive, investments in Chinese AI startups had topped investments in American AI startups.14 By 2018, China filed 2.5 times more patents in AI technologies than the United States.15 And this year China is graduating three times as many computer scientists as the United States. In contrast to nuclear weapons—where governments led in discovery, development and deployment—AI and related technologies have been created and are being advanced by private firms and university researchers. The military establishments in Washington and Beijing are essentially playing catch-up, adopting and adapting private-sector products. Where do these two competitors stand in the AI race today? Consider leading indicators under six key headings: product market tests, financial market tests, research publications and patents, results in international competitions, talent and national operating environments. Consumers’ choices of products in markets speak for themselves. In fintech, China stands alone. Tencent’s WeChat Pay has nine hundred million Chinese users,16 while Apple Pay only has 22 million in the United States.17 And when it comes to capability, WeChat Pay can do much more than Apple Pay. Chinese consumers use their app to buy coffee at Starbucks and new products from Alibaba, pay bills, transfer money, take out loans, make investments, donate to charity and manage their bank accounts. In doing so, they generate a treasure trove of granular data about individual consumer behavior that AI systems use to make better assessments of individuals’ credit-worthiness, interest in products, capacity to pay for them and other behavior. In mobile payments, Chinese spend $50 for every dollar Americans spend, in total, $19 trillion in 2018.18 U.S. mobile payments have yet to reach $1 trillion. Credit cards are as old-fashioned to Chinese millennials as handwritten checks are to their American counterparts. Mark Zuckerberg has noticed: Facebook’s major moves last year into digital payments,19 including the recent introduction of Facebook Pay, are copying Tencent, rather than the other way around. In facial recognition, the world’s most valuable AI startup is Chinese company SenseTime20—a company whose headquarters Graham visited in October. (While there, Graham also took a tour of Zhongguancun—China’s version of Silicon Valley—guided by Kai-Fu Lee whose hedge fund is one of the leading VC investors in Chinese AI startups.) In 2018’s international competition for facial recognition, Chinese teams claimed the top five places.21 Chinese firms—such as Hikvision and Dahua Technology, which control a third of the world’s security camera market22; Tiandy, whose cameras need light from only a single star at night to capture high-definition color images23; and Wuhan Guide Infared, which specializes in infrared and thermal imaging—are working hand in glove with their government to perfect facial recognition for profit and control. In this domain, there is no U.S.-China contest; the United States has essentially conceded the race because of concerns over the average individual’s privacy, and deep reservations about how this technology could be deployed. Westerners were alarmed in 2017 when researchers at Stanford created an AI algorithm that could detect with shocking accuracy individuals’ sexual orientation simply by scanning a single photo24. It does not take much imagination to consider how less socially liberal governments would apply this technology. So while San Francisco recently banned facial recognition technologies, the Party has given China’s top four facial recognition firms access to its database of over 1.4 billion citizen photos. One well-informed venture capitalist in this arena estimates that Chinese facial recognition firms have 1 million times more images than their U.S. counterparts. In speech tech, Chinese are beating American firms in all languages—including English. The world’s top voice recognition startup is China’s iFlytek. Its user base is seven hundred million, almost twice the 375 million people who speak to Apple’s Siri.25 In system performance competitions, iFlytek regularly beats teams from Google, Microsoft, Facebook, ibm and mit, all in its second language.26 At Stanford’s international challenge for machine reading comprehension, Chinese teams won three of the top five spots, including first place. Baidu developed a human-level speech recognition system a year before Microsoft did. Who was the U.S. Army’s major supplier of commercial drones until 2017—when the United States prohibited purchases for foreign suppliers?27 Shenzhen drone maker DJI, which controls 70 percent of the global market28. Drones would be just miniature hobby helicopters without elementary AI, which gives them computer vision for targeting weeds or weapons, and enables them to operate in swarms. As the recent attack on Saudi Arabia’s principal oil facilities demonstrated, the world has just begun to discover the security consequences of AI-enhanced drones operating literally below the radar. Of the world’s top five commercial drones brands, 3 are Chinese; 1 American.29 5g infrastructure will be the backbone that enables AI to reach further into everyday life, from automated cars to smart glasses. China’s Huawei is the world’s leading supplier of this telecom equipment. Not only does it own the Chinese market, which will be the world’s largest, but its 28 percent global market share nearly equals the combined shares of its two top competitors.30 Of the top four brands that will build 5g infrastructure, two are Chinese and zero are American. Chinese firms own twice as many 5g -essential patents as American firms. While the outcome of the current U.S. government campaign against Huawei remains uncertain, the company is currently delivering 5g systems well ahead of all competitors and is bringing a 5g phone to market a year ahead of Apple, the company that invented the iPhone. Financial markets reflect these realities. Five years ago, two of the world’s twenty most valuable internet companies were Chinese; today, nine are. The “Seven Giants of the AI age”—Google, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent—are split on either side of the Pacific. Of every ten venture capital dollars invested in AI in 2018, five went to Chinese startups; four to American firms.31 Of the world’s top ten AI startups, half are American and half are Chinese. Chinese investments in AI research and development have surged to American levels, and the results are beginning to show it. The blunt truth is that China is laying the intellectual groundwork for a generational advantage in AI. According to the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence’s authoritative assessment, China would overtake the United States in 2019 in the most-cited 50 percent of AI papers. It will take the lead in the most-cited 10 percent this year. And by 2025, the United States will fall to second in the top 1 percent of papers.32 (Fortunately, in breakthrough papers, China remains behind.) In public patents for AI technologies, China passed the United States in 2015, and in 2018 filed 2.5 times more than America.33 In machine learning’s hottest subfield—deep learning—China has six times more patent publications than the United States. (Raw numbers, however, must be taken with a grain of salt, since not all patents are equal.) China is investing heavily in the necessary hardware as well. In 2001, China had none of the world’s five hundred fastest supercomputers. Last year, it had 219 (the United States has 116).34And while China’s supercomputers previously relied on American semiconductors, its top machine today was built entirely with domestically-manufactured processors. Like Olympic athletes, AI researchers are eager to demonstrate their progress and prowess in international competitions. As mentioned earlier, in 2017, DeepMind’s AlphaGo Master defeated the Go world’s top champion Lee Sedol a decade sooner than experts had predicted. Eight months later, Tencent’s own Go program, called “Fine Art,” also beat Sedol. And Fine Art won despite giving Sedol a two-turn head start—a handicap DeepMind has been unwilling to offer.35 Meanwhile, at the International Aerial Robotics Competition, the world’s longest-running university robotics competition, the top three performers last year were all Chinese entries.36 And in the world’s most prestigious computer science competition for secondary school students, the International Olympiad in Informatics, Chinese have won eighty-four gold medals while Americans have won fifty-two. Achieving this success in competitions reflects the investment China has made in cultivating talent. In AI, brain power matters more than computing power. China annually graduates four times as many stem students than the United States (1.3 million vs. 300,000) and three times as many computer scientists (185,000 vs. 65,000). In the U.S. News & World Report ranks, China’s Tsinghua University is number one in the world in computer science. Of every ten computer science Ph.Ds graduating in the United States today, three are American and two are Chinese. Three decades ago, only one of every twenty Chinese students studying abroad returned home. Now, four of every five do.37

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › China Internal

AI dev is in China’s hands which is wildly dangerous – The US is falling behind

Allison ‘20 (Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School Member of the Board, Belfer Center Former Director, Belfer Center Faculty Affiliate, Future of Diplomacy Project,August 2020, )Roho

The US-China Race for Artificial Intelligence Combining decades of experience advancing frontier technologies, on the one hand, and analyzing national security decisionmaking, on the other, we have been collaborating over the past year in an effort to understand the national security implications of China’s great leap forward in artificial intelligence (AI). Our purpose in this essay is to sound an alarm over China’s rapid progress and the current prospect of it overtaking the United States in applying AI in the decade ahead; to explain why AI is for the autocracy led by the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter, the “Party”) an existential priority; to identify key unanswered questions about the dangers of an unconstrained AI arms race between the two digital superpowers; and to point to the reasons why we believe that this is a race the United States can and must win. We begin with four key points. First, most Americans believe that U.S. leadership in advanced technologies is so entrenched that it is unassailable. Likewise, many in the American national security community insist that in the AI arena China can never be more than a “near-peer competitor.” Both are wrong. In fact, China stands today as a full-spectrum peer competitor of the United States in commercial and national security applications of AI. Beijing is not just trying to master AI—it is succeeding. Because AI will have as transformative an impact on commerce and national security over the next two decades as semiconductors, computers and the web have had over the past quarter century, this should be recognized as a matter of grave national concern.1,2,3 Second, China’s zeal to master AI goes far beyond its recognition that this suite of technologies promises to be the biggest driver of economic advances in the next quarter century. For the Party, AI is mission critical. The command of 1.4 billion citizens by a Party-controlled authoritarian government is a herculean challenge. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Americans have been confident that authoritarian governments are doomed to fail—eventually. But AI offers a realistic possibility of upending this proposition. AI could give the Party not just an escape hatch from the “end of history,”4 but a claim to advance a model of governance—a national operating system—superior to today’s dysfunctional democracies. As one former Democratic presidential candidate put it: “China is using technology to perfect dictatorship.”5 It’s a value proposition that resonates with many leaders around the world. As former Google ceo Eric Schmidt has argued: “if the Soviet Union had been able to leverage the kind of sophisticated data observation, collection and analytics employed by the leaders of Amazon today, it might well have won the Cold War.” Third, while we share the general enthusiasm about AI’s potential to make huge improvements in human wellbeing, the development of machines with intelligence vastly superior to humans will pose special, perhaps even unique risks. In 1946, Albert Einstein warned, “the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift towards unparalleled catastrophe.” We believe the same could be said of AI. Henry Kissinger has identified these risks in what we call “Kissinger’s Specter.” In his words, AI threatens an unpredictable revolution in our consciousness and our thinking, and an “inevitable evolution in our understanding of truth and reality.”6 In response to Einstein’s insight, the technologists and strategists who had built and used the bomb to end World War II joined forces to find ways to prevent a nuclear World War III. Meeting the challenges posed by AI will require nothing less. Fourth, China’s advantages in size, data collection and national determination have allowed it over the past decade to close the gap with American leaders of this industry. It is currently on a trajectory to overtake the United States in the decade ahead. Nonetheless, if the United States will awake to the challenge and mobilize a national effort, we believe that it can develop and execute a winning strategy. For many readers, AI is just the latest bright, shiny object on the technology horizon. A brief explainer to provide some further context may be helpful. AI encompasses big data, machine learning and multiple related technologies that allow machines to act in ways humans describe as “intelligent” when we do the same thing.7 For example, consider gps navigation app Waze locating the best route through heavy traffic; Amazon’s eerily relevant product suggestions; or the programmed machines that now regularly defeat world masters in chess. Today’s leading information technology companies—including the faangs (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google) and bats (Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent)—are betting their r&d budgets on the AI revolution. As Amazon’s Jeff Bezos said this year, “We’re at the beginning of a golden age of AI.”8

2022 CNDI Affirmative
AI Projects AFF › Competition Advantage › China Internal

DOD needs allies to stay on top

Ryseff 20 (JAMES RYSEFF, 10-9-20, technical policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation., ) RoHo

As the United States races with China to apply artificial intelligence for military purposes, many experts worry that it may be hampered by a shift in the nature of AI. The conventional wisdom has been that, until now, American technologists could depend on elite researchers and faster computers to outperform their Chinese rivals. However, these advantages are no longer the keys to harnessing AI most effectively. Data is. Chinese AI experts believe that China’s larger population and lax privacy controls give China a durable advantage in collecting the best data sets to teach AI algorithms how to optimize their performance. Kai-Fu Lee, China’s most prominent AI researcher, has dubbed China the “Saudi Arabia of data” and argues that China’s data advantage is expanding by the day. The Center for Data Innovation, an American think tank, agrees, calculating that the Chinese population generates terabytes more information than Americans do. In reality, determining who holds the advantage in data is far more complicated than simply counting how many bytes of information are stored in each country. As a recent Center for Security and Emerging Technology report rightly points out, the quality of data and how well it has been curated and labeled usually matter more than simply how much data one has. Even so, the analysts take for granted that China’s size will ultimately give it the advantage in commercial data, one that may let its corporations overtake their American counterparts in AI. However, these conclusions overlook the primary advantage American technology companies hold over their Chinese counterparts: its global user base. For companies like Google and Facebook, the competition to amass data is not between the digital activities of 330 million Americans against the virtual footprint of over one billion Chinese citizens. Instead, their products hold near-monopolies in the United States, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and most of Asia. In contrast, Chinese equivalents like Baidu and WeChat have only a handful of non-Chinese users. This global reach gives American technology companies an advantage both in the total volume of data they collect and in the diversity of data harvested. Chinese data sets, for now, are still largely blind to conditions outside of China. AI algorithms trained on those data sets would struggle to travel outside its borders. The success of American technology companies illustrates the most promising path for the U.S. military to pursue at the dawn of its own AI age. That does not mean that the Department of Defense should simply copy Silicon Valley’s strategy mindlessly. While data from the commercial sector — such as an individual’s social connections, current employer, or personal finances — will continue to be a gold mine for global intelligence agencies, data relevant to the future battlefield will primarily concern soldiers, vehicles, training exercises, and the like. No organization will have more relevant data for these use cases than the military itself. Fortunately, the Defense Department has positioned itself well to become the globally dominant platform for military data, just as American technology companies dominate the global marketplace in their realms. The United States counts most industrialized nations as military allies and equipment manufactured by the United States or its NATO allies is driven and flown around the world. However, the Defense Department has yet to capitalize on this potential. NATO weapons and vehicles were originally designed to be interoperable in an industrial-age sense, shooting the same bullets or refueling from the same connectors. Unfortunately, NATO has not yet upgraded for the information age. The data generated by U.S. Army tanks cannot easily be accessed or aggregated with data generated by Marine Corps tanks, let alone British ones. Just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act once pushed America’s separate armed services to break out of their isolated battlefield domains, military data must now discover how to operate jointly as well. Three initiatives could be critical to accomplishing this. First, the Defense Department could create a 10-year roadmap for upgrading data interoperability that lays out specific operational objectives to demonstrate improvements. To ensure these objectives are met, they could be incorporated into the major annual exercises conducted with NATO and East Asian allies. For example, American and South Korean units could draw spare parts and other consumables from each other during their annual training exercises. Throughout the exercise, both sides could confirm their logistics databases can combine to present a unified picture of the allied logistical situation and provide projections of future needs as the simulated combat event evolves. Establishing tangible objectives and aligning the timeframe with existing multinational exercises will be the key to success. Militaries invest a great deal of time and effort training their personnel to be ready for the fight. They must now learn how to “train” and prepare their data as well. This can mean many things. When training their personnel, militaries spend some of their time imparting specific skillsets that will be useful in combat. In other cases, soldiers learn how to work together to solve unforeseeable problems as they arise — or simply learn how the operational routines of other units or allied militaries differ from their own. Regardless, commanders recognize their soldiers must routinely practice their skills under real-world conditions if they will be expected to work as an effective team on the battlefield. Data needs the same types of preparation to be ready for its role in the fight. Much as soldiers need to leave the garrison and work through practical exercises in the field, it is not enough to develop a technical specification documenting how two data sets are supposed to work together. Someone needs to actually make the data sets work together. They must be routinely explored, analyzed, and aggregated to solve real problems in order to ensure they will remain interoperable and effective. Similarly, the analysts and engineers responsible for curating data need opportunities to interact with each other in order to develop the operational routines necessary to ensure effective collaboration during a crisis. Without these forcing functions, too much military data will remain isolated and unusable at the scale needed to engineer AI algorithms. Second, the military may need to collaborate with allies to achieve common understandings about when and how to share data. European governments in particular have begun to codify digital norms for the consumer space in frameworks like the General Data Protection Regulation and the establishment of new legal concepts like the Right to be Forgotten. The United States could play a role in shaping the equivalent norms in the national security and public policy space. Otherwise, fragmented data repositories from the United States and its allies may not be able to achieve the critical mass — that is, gather enough data — necessary to compete with China’s data warehouses. Past disagreements between the United States and its allies over norms related to atomic weapons demonstrate how these considerations can ultimately impact military operations. In Europe, the United States managed to forge an agreement that allowed the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of its NATO allies, even in the face of significant domestic opposition in key nations such as West Germany. In contrast, the United States was unable to achieve a similar consensus among its allies in Asia. Both Japan and New Zealand banned the introduction of nuclear weapons into their territory, causing headaches for U.S. Navy operations in the region. While in that case Navy ships could find alternate ports to operate from, a similar divergence in norms would have much greater consequences for the U.S. military’s ability to develop AI. Data withheld is data lost. Most norms about the use of military data will likely be uncontroversial. Unlike Facebook or Google, whose business models depend on precisely targeting ads at their user bases, militaries in democracies have little reason to exchange personally identifiable information or other sensitive details about their citizens. Norms about controversial topics such as autonomous systems may prove more difficult to forge a consensus around. Agreements that data provided by partners would not be used to train these systems without explicit consent could be a compromise acceptable to all parties. Finally, the United States could seek deeper integration and cooperation with its allies who have unique resources to advance specific applications of AI. Many, including the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, have called for the United States to leverage its existing “Five Eyes” alliance and extend it to include cooperation in AI. A complementary approach might be to focus on partners who have unique technical assets to contribute. For example, East Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea have invested heavily in robotics and automation, which makes them attractive partners for developing more capable drones and other autonomous vehicles. They may also have fewer hesitations about deploying these technologies than other potential partners. Similarly, the Israeli government has carefully incubated a world-class cyber security sector, potentially positioning it as a valuable collaborator in training AI-enhanced cyber defenders how to protect critical infrastructure and assets. Ultimately, close collaborators in any AI alliance must pass two tests: They must be able to usefully contribute to the work, and they will also need to be trustworthy enough to share in these cutting-edge technical advancements. While achieving the kind of close collaboration with allies that the United States has enjoyed in other realms may be difficult, it will be essential if the United States hopes to achieve the data dominance needed to succeed in future combat.