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2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Realism

Realism’s exclusive focus on nation-states and its belief in the universal rules governing their affairs masks the imperialist nature of international relations and re-entrenches Eurocentrism in IR

Tarak Barkawi in 2010

Department of International History, The London School of Economics and Political Science; Empire and Order in International Relations and Security Studies; International Studies; https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-164

As a consequence, security studies and IR lack a coherent and developed body of inquiry on questions of empire (Barkawi and Laffey 2002). There is little in the way of an ongoing conversation traversing older and contemporary scholarship on which a review essay conventionally can report. This is an astonishing but also constitutive absence. For many, the modern world took shape around the imperial encounter between Europeans and the Americas, Africa, and Asia (Said 1993; Wolf 1997; Bayly 2004). From this perspective, a social science of “international relations” that failed to address empire and imperialism, or in significant measure orientate inquiry around hierarchy and domination, is not adequate to the experiences and histories of most of the peoples and places on the planet (cf. Buzan and Little 2000). Alternatively, such a social science is written by and for the powerful (Hoffman 1977). IR and security studies scholars, and their university departments, research centers, thinktanks, journals, and publishers, are mostly located in the West, and chiefly in the US, shaping perspectives in manifold ways (cf. Tickner and Waever 2009). Considering the heavy traffic in the US between the academy and thinktanks, policy planning staffs, and government, there are power/knowledge problems yet to be fully understood or confronted (Simpson 1998; Amadae 2003; Gilman 2003; Oren 2003; Laffey and Weldes 2008). Unlike anthropology, IR and security studies have not come to terms with their own implication in imperial power and what this might mean for how they understand the world (Asad 1973; Fabian 1983). Postcolonial critiques of Eurocentrism in social and political inquiry do not have wide currency in the discipline (Chatterjee 1986; Chakrabarty 2000; Slater 2004; Barkawi and Laffey 2006). Of course, it is all in how one defines “international relations.” The absence of empire and hierarchy is constitutive in that inquiry is oriented around sovereignty and anarchy instead. The central problematic in the discipline is that of a system of independent wills, figured as sovereign states, relating to and competing with one another in the absence of higher authority. “None is entitled to command; none is required to obey” (Waltz 1979:88). This problematic requires “units” that are “formally” alike, in that they are sovereign entities, even if they differ in their relative power and capabilities. The inattention to hierarchy is principled and systematic, not inadvertent (cf. Lake 2009). A consequence in IR and security studies is that Westphalian terms of reference often occlude and distort imperial relations. One purpose of this essay is to reveal these moments of misidentification and misconception, especially in the form of broad suppositions at work in the literature, and in so doing to open new spaces for research. The central focus of IR situates discussion of imperialism and hierarchy outside the core of the discipline, and on its fringes where scholars from other disciplines engage with IR and security studies literature. Similarly, in respect of security studies in particular, the focus is mostly on major war between great powers, not “small wars” between the strong and the weak. When “small wars” are considered, as well as other conflicts in the global South, inquiry is all too often informed by sovereign conceptions of the international system, as in many studies of civil war and in the democratic peace literature (Licklider 1995; Ray 1995). In a framing engendered by the idea of the sovereign state, “civil war” in the global South is primarily conceived as an internal phenomenon (e.g., Holsti 1996:25–26). This is so despite the past and present role of former imperial powers, the activities of international organizations, states, and commercial enterprises, as well as the global economic relations that help produce and sustain “civil wars” (Reno 1998; Duffield 2001; Mamdani 2001; Nordstrom 2004; Gleditsch 2007). Alternatively, much literature on “counterinsurgency,” “counterterror,” and other conflicts involving Western powers is baldly written from the perspective of “how to do it better”; that is, from the point of view of imperial power, a policy science for the powerful (Pape 1996; Johnson and Mason 2008; cf. Al-Qaeda n.d.; Mao 1937). Such studies are not generally placed within an overall account of international hierarchy or the long run of imperial conflicts and histories. Yet defeating indigenous armed resistance and determining the conditions under which foreign peoples are governed is the stuff of imperial power. So another task for this essay is to situate existing literature on “small wars,” “civil wars,” and “low intensity conflict” within a framework of imperialism and international hierarchy, rather than the formal juridical categories of the sovereign state system. Forgetting empire is often a function of Eurocentrism, of the unreflective assumption of the centrality of Europe and latterly the West in human affairs. In IR this often involves placing the great powers at the center of analysis, as the primary agents in determining the fate of peoples. Too easily occluded here are the myriad international relations of co-constitution, which together shape societies and polities in both the global North and South. For how else would we be able to address the impact generated by a war in far-off Vietnam on the US, and its subsequent role ever since in shaping American society, politics, and foreign interventions? Vietnam was neither the first nor the last “small war” to have such big consequences, but understanding how and why requires an “imperial turn” in IR (Doty 1996).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO Human Security

Even seemingly benign calls for NATO to focus on “human security” only serve to obfuscate the alliance’s role in spreading militarism and securing a US led imperial order

Acheson ’21 (Ray Acheson, Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, represents the organization on the International Steering Group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for highlighting the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and working with governments to negotiate and adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, has an Honours BA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Toronto and an MA in Politics from The New School for Social Research; 2/21, “The patriarchal militarism of NATO’s reflection group”, Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 A response to the official NATO Reflection Group, NATO Watch 2021, page 17, DOA 6/21/22)//nm

The NATO reflection group report has a patriarchy problem. Given that NATO is primarily a military alliance, this is not surprising. But for a report that is looking ahead for the next decade, it offers retrogressive views not just on human security and the so-called Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, but also in terms of how it addresses concepts such as “cohesion” what it considers to be the biggest threats to NATO, and how it thinks the alliance should best deal with those challenges. Overall, the report embraces patriarchal approaches to “security”, dissention within NATO and where the alliance should go from here. The recommendations further entrench NATO members in a militarist pursuit of dominance, rather than true community and cooperation either internally or internationally. NATO members should reject this approach. The abolition of NATO would be the most straightforward way to allow its individual members to pursue genuine collective security with others. In the interim, NATO members that authentically care about peace, justice, international law, human rights and dignity, and cooperation need to renounce the violent masculinities1 espoused in this report, including by rejecting nuclear weapons and working to remove all weapons of mass destruction from NATO’s doctrine. They could also withdraw from NATO and adopt feminist foreign policies, finding common ground with other members of the world community for the nonviolent pursuit of peace and justice. NATO, WPS and human security A one-page section in the 67-page report deals with “Human Security and Women, Peace and Security” (WPS). These subjects come across as an afterthought of the report’s authors, who were perhaps seeking to check the ‘gender box’ that is increasingly a staple of checklists within many intergovernmental agencies. This suspicion deepens when reading the text, in which NATO both simultaneously positions itself as a progressive leader in respecting “human dignity” while making it clear that any efforts within these agenda items are exclusively for public point-scoring, not for serious policy development. The report urges NATO members to promote the alliance’s “work” on human security by including it in public messaging, especially to the “younger generation”. It suggests NATO should “leverage existing partnerships with civil society organisations” in order to “build a group of emissaries for its work in human security and in WPS, including female role models from countries where NATO has made a positive contribution”. It goes on to assert, “The personal stories, experiences, and engagement of such a group would provide NATO with a strong asset in ongoing efforts to raise awareness of the Alliance’s constructive role in promoting stability and addressing drivers of conflict” (p.43). Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 18 February 2021 Note that it doesn’t suggest NATO actually address drivers of conflict—just that it should spend more time telling people that it does. However, NATO does not address root causes of conflict. NATO members themselves drive many of the ongoing conflicts in the world. Their individual and collective policies of militarism, and the violent masculinities these policies reflect and further entrench, are part of the root causes of conflict. Rather than working within the human security and WPS agendas in order to prevent conflict, or seek nonviolent, non-militarised solutions to conflict, NATO reflexively turns again and again to weapons, war, aggression, and threats in order to promote and protect its interests. The challenges posed by institutionalising WPS The WPS agenda has, to a large extent, become about strategically instrumentalising women’s participation in order to legitimise existing practice. Academics Marie Bell and Milli Lake have well-articulated this problem, noting that “Adding certain excluded groups into existing institutions will ultimately reinforce the same patriarchal, capitalist, and militarist logics of hierarchy and exclusion that denied those groups access to power in the first place”.2 While women’s participation—and gender diverse people—is imperative and should be automatic, the way that the WPS agenda has been implemented over the past twenty years unfortunately has reinforced rather than challenged or changed the underpinnings of militarism throughout security discourse and practice. Rather than challenging the patriarchal structures and systems that have created the militarised world order, once inside these systems, most women tend to actively maintain it in order to maintain their positions. Nor do many of these women believe they should have to “carry the burden” of changing policies or structures. In a study from New America about women’s participation in the US nuclear weapon complex, for example, several women interviewed felt they were dismissed by male colleagues on the assumption that they would favour weapon cuts or disarmament. They had to prove, as former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller said she sought to do, that “women aren’t afraid of nuclear weapons”.3 As feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe says, “You can militarise anything, including equality”.4 You can also apparently whitewash anything, including NATO’s role as an aggressor in international politics. In its section on human security and WPS, the reflection group’s report asserts that “emphasising the value of human dignity and security differentiates NATO from authoritarian rivals and terrorist groups, which are among the world’s human rights abusers” (p.43). Yet NATO members have led and been involved in bombing raids that have killed civilians and destroyed cities and towns leaving civilians without housing, hospitals, food, schools, or basic water and sanitation.5 NATO members are also, for the most part, hostile towards or lacklustre about the current international political process to end the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which is essential for protecting civilians and achieving human security.6 In keeping with this position, the report recommends that NATO continue to prioritise “military necessity” over protecting civilians. It admits that NATO forces could perhaps improve in terms of their “sensitivity to the need to protect vulnerable populations and sites” (p.43), but falls far short of suggesting that NATO stop bombing populated areas, or that its members stop leading wars of aggression, carrying out extrajudicial killings through drone strikes, or allowing their soldiers and military contractors to commit war crimes with impunity.7 If NATO wants to legitimately incorporate human security and WPS into its strategy, it cannot remain a military alliance. Human security cannot be achieved through militarism and violence. It is built through equity, justice and safety for all; through investments in housing, education, food, water and sanitation, and environmental protection; it is built through initiatives to end racism, sexism, homophobia and ableism.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO

NATO is a tool for neolib expansion through free market reforms

Levytskyy ‘11

(Andriy Levytskyy, DePaul University college for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences; “Security misread: A critical analysis of Ukraine's debate on NATO”, DePaul University, 11/11, DOA 6/21/22)//nm

NATO as a Dutiful Agent of Neoliberalism While the IMF and World Bank have been the most powerful advocates of neoliberal reforms in the developing world over the last three decades, NATO, WTO and the European Central Bank joined the race to spread neoliberalism shortly after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. If Central and Eastern Europe‟s integration into the Western Alliance‟s institutional framework was recently accomplished and consolidated, Ukraine‟s reorientation has attained an advanced stage in the economic and political spheres. Rachel Epstein argues that international institutions have had a significant influence on post communist countries which have set themselves on a free market reform trajectory.405 According to Epsein, the liberal, or as I call it neoliberal, worldview that currently prevails in the minds of political and economic elites of Eastern and Central Europe is supported “by a perception of where authority is grounded.” 406 For most parts of Eastern and Central Europe, the transition to political pluralism and free market enterprise “has been marked by a shift from domestic sources of authority, such as historical experience and nationalist striving to international sources of authority, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Bretton Woods institutions.”407 Epstein‟s claim that “Domestic actors view international institutions as authoritative sources of information and, as a consequence, seek their approbation,” is very persuasive.408 International institutions not only exercise power over policymaking elites and consequently determine an international orientation of states, they also influence the “domestic balance of power among groups in society.” 409 International institutions, whose main priority is to develop new policy programs, persuade and shape the actions of domestic actors and should be viewed as active agents of domestic and global change.410 While I realize that a number of different theoretical approaches can be relevant for the evaluation of the role of the state in today‟s internationalized world and extremely useful for our understanding of how international institutions and regimes can transform political dynamics, this section attempts only to highlight the point that international organizations have promoted consensus around the neoliberal policy manifestations in the countries undergoing transition. More important, the point is that multilateral institutions play a key role in regional and global processes of monitoring and implementation of free market-oriented knowledge structure while disciplining alternative knowledge, ideas, policy options, and practices. As previously mentioned, for Ukraine, Euro-Atlantic integration means not only being a member of collective security system, but fostering of economic development through a neoliberal political and constitutional framework. If for Walt, Ukraine‟s participation in the transatlantic cooperative security arrangement can increase the state‟s strength in relation to Russia and enhance its regional influence, according to Brett Leed‟s and Andrew Long‟s hypothesis, Euro-Atlantic integration means more for Ukraine than just being an associate of military organization.411 Leeds and Long assert that military allies unconditionally have positive economic consequences, and members of the collective security system are expected to facilitate economic growth, development and trade.412 For scholars, the security externality and the reaction of commercial institutions are the main motives and explanations for intensive engagement in mercantilism. Leeds and Long conclude that “When firms feel secure that conflict between their state and that of their trading partners is unlikely to occur and that the states will work together to promote commerce between their respective businesses, they are more likely to invest in trade.”413 As determined by the liberalist theoretical perspective of international relations, Ukraine‟s membership in NATO will provide a well-balanced and secure framework for regional and international economic activity, and thereby will encourage close trading relationships and reassure the international community that economic cooperation remains safe. Namely, the liberal view with its ideas of complex interdependence and functionalism ascribes to NATO a crucial role in driving states to collaborate in a much more widespread way than they had done before. Liberal explanations for the incorporation of Ukraine into NATO derive from the idea that all states are bound to benefit from interdependency and cooperation. This argument stresses that while NATO reduces the threat for nascent democracies and thereby promotes and extends the liberal community, the Alliance also continues to play a security role. Liberal scholars see NATO as one of many multilateral mechanisms to promote security and transnational cooperation through reinforcing democracy and free market economies. In fact, my point is that the only arguments which demonstrate security advantages for Ukraine joining NATO seem to rely more on particular Wilsonian liberal internationalism or constructivist notions about the constitutive role of alliances rather than realist conventional wisdom. According to Epstein, countries who are not even members of the Alliance yet, but have joined the path to its membership, already demonstrate their devotion to Western political and economic models. Through the Partnership for Peace, a program directed at creating trust between NATO and non-members, a process of denationalization of defense planning and foreign policy in majority of countries of Eastern and Central Europe has already taken place.414 Furthermore, while the partnership commits to extend defense cooperation between a non-member state and the Alliance, it pushes a cooperative non-member state to transform power relations from an executive-led model to a model of democratic civil-military relations.415 One of the main focuses of NATO has always been the establishment of “a system of check and balances in which the executive, government, parliament, and society, through the media and nongovernmental organizations would share in oversight.”416 Moreover, particular transformations in defense will not only lead to further distributional consequences, but signify a transformation of “previously contested ideas into commonly held assumptions.”417 It follows, therefore that NATO uses its membership requirements not only to regulate the behavior of societies, but also to define new tasks, create new categories of actors and shape social reality in ways that favor a market-oriented approach. Alexandra Gheciu‟s book NATO in the “New Europe” The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War is an analytical examination of NATO‟s role in building of construction of Western liberal norms and practices in former Communist states. While analyzing the practices of NATO in Eastern and Central Europe, Gheciu argues that NATO has been deeply involved in socializing “Central and Eastern European political, military, and functional elites into adopting Western-defined liberal democratic norms and building corresponding institutions in their states.”418 Through NATO‟s involvement in the numerous processes of domestic politics, the organization has “played an important role in post-Communist efforts in Central and Eastern Europe to (re) draw boundaries between reasonable/unacceptable definitions of national identity and interests”419 While Gheciu unifies a great number of arguments that are useful for my study, the claim that NATO has been deeply engaged in a relatively broad set of activities aimed at projection of a particular kind of liberal state identity in Central and Eastern Europe, “while simultaneously rejecting alternative norms and institutions as inherently flawed” is important. 420

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO

NATO reinforces militarism, committing international war crimes along the way

Trippe No Date, (Clara Trippe, an intern with CODEPINK, "NATO Should Indeed Be Obsolete: 70 Years of Militarism is Enough," CODEPINK - Women for Peace, Mayer

It’s unfortunate that Trump has focused on military spending, jettisoning his original—and correct—notion that NATO should be obsolete. NATO was originally founded by the US and 11 other Western nations as an attempt to curb the rise of communism in 1949. Six years later, Communist nations, led by the Soviet Union, founded the Warsaw Pact and through these two multilateral institutions the entire globe became a field for the warring interests between the US and the Soviets. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, but NATO continued to exist and in fact expand--growing from its original 12 members to 29 member countries. While claiming to be a force of peace, it is clear from NATO’s origin and continued actions that the organization was created to expand Western influence using military intervention. To this day, NATO plays a key role in military conflicts and commits human rights violations around the globe under the pretense of peacebuilding. In 1999, NATO engaged in military operations without UN approval in Yugoslavia. Its illegal airstrikes during the Kosovo War left hundreds of civilians dead. NATO has continued illegal military actions, including attacks on civilians, torture of prisoners, and unauthorized airstrikes, particularly in the Middle East region. NATO has been waging war in Afghanistan since 2001. In 2011, it illegally invaded Libya, destabilizing that country and creating a failed state. Even though NATO’s bombing of Libya caused masses of people to flee, NATO refused aid to desperate migrants on the Mediterranean, causing thousands to die. NATO’s actions continue to destabilize the regions they occupy, mainly through indiscriminate attacks that regularly kill civilians. In more recent years, NATO has exacerbated Cold War-era tensions as it has expanded to Russia’s borders, despite earlier promises not to move eastward. In response, tensions between Western powers and Russia have been rising. This has led to multiple close calls between military forces. It has also led both US and Russia to bolster their nuclear arsenals, spurring a new arms race. While organizations like Amnesty International have accused NATO of war crimes, the organization avoids accountability because of the shared power of its member countries. It’s impossible to say that NATO has conformed to its original premise to increase freedom and security around the globe. Instead, its role has been one of increasing conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. In a world where people are desperate to end war and are anxious to see a transfer of public funds from the military to human needs , NATO should indeed become a relic of the past. Seventy years of militarism is enough.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO

NATO is a tool of U.S. imperialism – increases U.S. military sales and provides excuses to maneuver armies

Hassan 08 (Ghali Hassan is an independent writer living in Australia. “NATO: A Tool Of U.S. Imperialism,” 8/25/8, https://countercurrents.org/hassan250808.htm)

The U.S.-controlled North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has lost its purpose to continue as a defence alliance. However, its aggressive expansion is endangering world peace and the survival of the planet. Despite its irrelevant role, NATO has become part of the U.S. military. Instead of dismantling the once defence alliance, the U.S. pushed to enlarge NATO and expand its boundaries. The U.S. has lured most European nations, including former Warsaw Pact members, the so-called “New Europe”, to join its military. Poland, Hungry and the Czech Republic joined in 1999; Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuanian, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania in 2004, others are waiting in line. Becoming a NATO member proves to be a profit bonanza for U.S.-Israeli weapon industries and arm dealers. All new recruits into NATO are obliged to increase their “defence” budgets to modernise and enlarge their military arsenals at the expense of vital public services. It is important to bear in mind that the U.S.-NATO demands for expansion have met with opposition from Russia, China – with a legitimate concern against unprovoked threat – and nations such as Germany, the Netherlands and France. Almost all new mini-dictators supported the illegal U.S. aggression against the Iraqi people. They are in complete complicity in the war crimes committed by the regime of George Bush despite overwhelming majority of their citizens’ opposition to U.S. aggression. From the criminal U.S. aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the ongoing murderous occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, the new European armies have become U.S. foot soldiers serving U.S. imperialist interests. Engineering and using crisis in Europe and elsewhere, the U.S. cancelled the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in order to locate ABMs and to lure more nations to sign up for the system, including Australia, South Korea and Japan. Under the fraudulent pretext of defence against “rogue” states, the U.S. has just signed a “deal” with Poland to station on Polish soil U.S. “interceptor missiles”. The provocative deal is seen by Russians as a dangerous opportunity for the U.S. to expand its military presence and threat across the world. Poland hailed the deal as a counter to Russian “threat”. Of course Poland is fully aware that the missiles are against Russia not Iran, as the U.S. continues to mislead the public. After Poland, the U.S. is planning to build a twin anti-missile radar system in the Czech Republic. Many Poles as well as Czechs are against the deals and rightly believe their countries are becoming vassal states of a dangerous U.S. militarism. Since the end of the so-called “Cold War”, the U.S. aim has always been a quest for imperialist domination of the globe through U.S. militarism, including the establishment of U.S. military bases in strategic areas of the world. The U.S. policy of destabilising Russia and undermining Russia’s integration with Europe is aimed at controlling Eurasia’s natural resources . The events of 9/11 provided the U.S. with a pretext to justify the U.S. war on Islam and a global imperialist expansion. It is hard to believe that the recent unprovoked aggression by Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili against the semi-independent district of South Ossetia wasn’t engineered by the U.S. ruling class in Washington. The aggression came at the time when Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was at the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony and President Dmitry Medvedev on holiday. Georgian air force and heavy rocket and artillery indiscriminately attacked the town of Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia at midnight destroying schools, hospitals, homes, and even the University, leaving much of the city in ruins. Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed in the first hours of the attack. Saakashvili’s U.S.-Israeli trained Special Forces shot 10 Russian peacekeepers stationed there under an international peace agreement. Saakashvili’s aim was to take control of South Ossetia and ethnically cleanse it of its majority Russian inhabitants. Saakashvili thought that destroying Tskhinvali and terrorising the population may go well with his plan to please Washington and joins NATO as a new U.S. proxy army. Meanwhile, the aggression provides the U.S. and its vassals with a pretext to use “humanitarian aid” deliveries to Georgia as cover for a military build-up in the Black Sea. Whatever the outcome, Saakashvili (like Bush) must be suffering from lack of rational thinking. Saakashvili’s aggression may have enhanced U.S. anti-Russian propaganda, it has encouraged a rethinking among many European heavy weight nations (who rightly see Russia as an important part of Europe), that playing with fire close to Russia’s border is not a very good idea. With several European countries – France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Norway, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg and Portugal – still have their doubts, Georgia’s bid to join NATO may have suffered a terminal setback as a result of Saakashvili’s war crimes in South Ossetia. Russia has a legitimate right to protect its citizens. Most Ossetians are Russian citizens and do not want to be dominated by a racist Georgia. Russia’s response to Saakachvili’s aggression was swift and in full compliance with international laws. Saakashvili’s army of mercenaries – trained and armed by the U.S. and Israel – has suffered a deserving humiliating defeat that should be a lesson to all those “new” European vassals who think they can participate in U.S. war crimes and count on U.S. help. Yet despite Georgia’s unprovoked aggression, Western-Zionist mainstream media led by the BBC, CNN, NBC, Fox News, New York Times and Washington Post turned the aggressor into a victime. In a grotesque display of distortion and dishonesty, Western media lauded Saakashvili as “democrat” defending democracy against the “Russian Bear”. Of course, forgotten are the U.S.-staged rigged elections that brought Saakashvili to power, Saakashvili’s corrupt authoritarian rule, the banning of news broadcasts, mass arrests of dissidents and Georgian police and masked thugs firing on peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi and the imposition of marshal law. Playing on the prejudice and ignorance of their populations, Western media is demonising Russia in order to create an enemy and divert the public from ongoing war crimes perpetuated by Western governments. The ongoing anti-Russian propaganda is reminiscent of Nazis propaganda during World War II to manipulate the people and create an anti-Russian sentiment. All of this is in accord with U.S. quest for an imperialist control of the planet and the application of Neocons-fascist ideology of global hegemonic control. Meanwhile, George Bush (speaking on behalf of the “West”) unashamedly condemned Russia’s legitimate response to Georgia’s unprovoked aggression as “disproportionate”, and added: “[It] is unacceptable in the 21st Century”. The hypocrisy and double standards continued: “This is not 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia where Russia can threaten a neighbour, occupy a capital, overthrow a government and get away with it”, ranted Condoleezza Rice, the tireless Secretary of Travelling. Did Bush and his Rice forget the U.S. premeditated and illegal invasion of and destruction of the Iraqi state, including the murder of members of Iraq legitimate government? Before criticising Russia, the U.S. ruling class should take a hard look at U.S. history of massive atrocities and serious war crimes committed around the world. Indeed, the U.S. government is the only government who get a way with any crime it commits. Hence, the U.S. ruling class and their complicit media must be suffering from the contagious diseases of moral bankruptcy and classic hypocrisy. The U.S. ruling class, the Bush regime in particular, has no moral standing whatsoever to criticize Russia for protecting Russian nationals and defending South Ossetia against unprovoked aggression. After more than five years of murderous Occupation, the Bush regime is directly responsible for the premeditated killing of more than 1.3 million innocent Iraqi civilians. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians are imprisoned and tortured on regular basis, and at leas 5 million Iraqis have been displaced as refugees living in appalling conditions. The entire sovereign nation of Iraq is destroyed in a premeditated act of aggression justified by outright lies. Moreover, despite the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people’s opposition to the Occupation, the Bush regime refused to withdraw U.S. troops and mercenaries from Iraq and end the murderous Occupation of their nation. Finally, it is obvious that Western governments and their mainstream media are demonising Russia even if Russia is not the aggressor. As Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister told the media: “NATO is trying to make a victim of an aggressor and whitewash a criminal regime - save a collapsing regime - and is taking a path to the rearmament of the current leaders in Georgia”. Saakashvili as perpetrator of war crimes has become the victime by embarking on an ill-advised act of aggression not dissimilar from U.S. recent acts of aggression. World peace is greatly served by multilateralism and international institutions without an aggressive U.S. military expansion. The transformation of NATO into a tool of U.S. imperialism is endangering the survival of the planet.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO

NATO is a tool for US imperial expansion- it secures global resources for American based companies

Leonard 19

(Tom Leonard. Head Librarian and Professor of Journalism at Berkeley. "Imperialism and NATO at 70". 12-3-2019. International Socialists. https://www.socialist.ca/node/3987. 6-21-2022.)-cg

Two contradictions between the ideals professed in the Washington Treaty and actually existing reality were present right from NATO’s birth. The professed commitment to democracy was belied by the fact that the original signatories included Portugal, at that time ruled by the quasi-fascist police state of Antonio Salazar. Portugal did not become democratic until Salazar’s Estada Novo was overthrown by a popular revolution in 1974, twenty-five years after NATO’s founding. NATO member Greece, which joined the alliance in 1952, was ruled by a military junta from April 1967 through its overthrow in 1974, but NATO supported the junta throughout. The commitment to peace is likewise questionable. Consider that NATO is the most powerful military organization on the planet, and has been since it was founded. NATO member countries collectively spent more US$900 billion on military expenditures in 2016 (roughly US$600 billion of which was spent by the United States), more than half of the approximately US$1.7 trillion spent globally on the military that year. Even in its founding year 1949, the twelve NATO members collectively spent an estimated US$116 billion (in year 2000 US$) on military expenditures, compared with the estimated US$84 billion spent by their principal opponent the USSR. From these figures, it is clear that NATO has enjoyed military superiority over its rivals since its inception. When one adds to this the approximately US$218 billion spent collectively on the military by close NATO allies Saudi Arabia, India, Japan and South Korea in 2016, the military dominance of the alliance becomes even clearer. NATO members and these four countries accounted for two-thirds of global military spending in 2016, compared with the US$66 billion spent by Russia (approximately 4% of the global total). To put Russia’s military spending into perspective, NATO member the U.K., hardly a great power any longer and completely incapable of launching a war on its own, spent more than US$60 billion on its military that year, which is 90% of the Russian figure. The U.K. is one of 29 NATO members and not the largest military spender in the alliance, by an order of magnitude. There is simply no comparison between the military capacity of NATO and the military capacity of Russia. China comes closer, but the US$228 billion spent by China (approximately 13% of global military spending) is still dwarfed by the amounts spent collectively by NATO members. Even if the massive spending of the United States is removed from the equation, NATO members still collectively spent substantially more than China did on its military in 2016, and approximately four times what Russia did. The alliance now directly touches Russia’s borders in the Baltic, and if Ukraine and Georgia were to join, would add thousands of kilometres of shared border in Russia’s west and south. This at a time when the Russian state probably controls less territory than at any point in history since the reign of Catherine the Great. As has been noted elsewhere, NATO has now achieved what neither Hitler nor Napoleon were able to – the encirclement of a territorially reduced Russia by a hostile military alliance. This policy of enlargement is not an accident, but rather a reflection of the wider dynamic of competition in the international state system. In a capitalist economy, individual firms compete with each other for greater shares of a given market, and thus greater profits. The dynamic of competition in the economy compels individual firms – units of capital – to constantly seek technological innovations so as to produce their goods more cheaply and undercut their competitors. Those firms that fail to innovate go bankrupt, with their assets bought up by other firms. So there is a tendency in a competitive economy for individual firms to become smaller in number but greater in size over time. Eventually, a given market becomes dominated by a small number of very large firms. Think about internet search, for instance – after proliferation of different search engines in the 1990s, a very small number of firms dominate today, with one of them, Google, being preponderant. This market ‘maturation’ compels firms to seek out new markets elsewhere as they can no longer grow their profits in their home market. So successful firms tend to grow beyond the borders of the state in which they’re based. This brings them into competition with firms (capitals) based in other states, internationalizing the economic competition between units of capital and compelling national states to compete with each other, each defending the interests, markets and profits of their ‘own’ firms. So, the economic competition between capitalist firms tends to become political competition between capitalist states. This political aspect of capitalist competition is conducted with all the means at a state’s disposal - trade deals and regulations, tariffs, alliances both economic and military, and the threat of or actual use of military force. The expansion of NATO is best understood through this lens. Russia and China are capitalist societies, just as are the United States and its allies, including Canada, and the other states mentioned here, such as Saudi Arabia and India. All of them are locked in a system of competitive rivalry as each tries to out-maneuver the other to gain a strategic advantage. There may very well be differences of approach between this or that state, different conceptions of what the ‘national interest’ is and how best to pursue it at a given moment, and different conceptions of the ideal end-state to which they all strive. But all of them are locked in a competitive system of imperialism, ultimately driven by the dynamics of capitalist competition.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO

NATO is the key force in American militarism and imperialism- it’s a tool to expand US dominance in an effort to prevent the rise of other economic powers

Hearse in 2022

Phil Hearse is a member of Anti*Capitalist Resistance and joint author of both Creeping Fascism and System Crash; NATO, Imperialism and the War; Socialist Project, The Bullet; https://socialistproject.ca/2022/03/nato-imperialism-and-the-war/

Raising the slogans of ‘No to NATO Expansion’ and ‘No to Nuclear War’ is clearly correct for the anti-war movement, but cannot be the central demands, which remain Russian troops out and stop the war. Nonetheless, NATO’s role in Eastern Europe since the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been pernicious. American President George Bush Sr. absolutely refused to respond to the demise of its military enemies in Russia and Eastern Europe by disbanding NATO or responding to Mikhail Gorbachev’s project of a ‘Common European Homeland’ of states outside military pacts. Disbanding NATO would have disrupted the key instrument of American military, and hence political, control. Moreover, the United States has insisted on expanding the boundaries of NATO right up to the borders of Russia in every case. This of course is something that the United States – the inclusion of Mexico or Canada in a hostile military alliance on US borders – would never accept. The iron grip of NATO is designed to ensure American dominance, and hence, loyalty in inter-imperialist conflicts of European states to the United States. It is no wonder then that the question of NATO has become a key line of a divide as far as the Keir Starmer leadership in the Labour Party is concerned. Starmer and his parliamentary whips threatened to exclude 12 Labour MPs from the Parliamentary Labour Party if they spoke at a rally with an anti-NATO message. Starmer has repeatedly stated Labour’s complete loyalty to NATO, a message to the British capitalist class that under him Labour can be trusted. Technically, any member of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) could be excluded from the Labour Party because of the campaign’s anti-NATO position, although, for the moment, this is unlikely to be implemented. In the context of Starmer’s prostration before NATO and British capitalism, it is strange to find a left-wing website attacking Jeremy Corbyn for making ‘an anti-NATO speech. In the context of the present war, it is utterly cynical for Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to excuse atrocities committed by Russian forces by reference to what the West did in Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘If you can commit anti-civilian atrocities, then so can we’ is unlikely to be a convincing argument as far as world public opinion is concerned. Even worse, Russian commentators on Channel 4 News merely say ‘war is hell, this is war’. The death, pain, suffering, and misery imposed on the Ukrainian people cannot be justified by any reference to the crimes of the West, whether the leading Western states were wearing their NATO hats or not. The central slogans of the Left and all progressive forces have to be against the Russian war, for a ceasefire and a withdrawal of all Russian troops. In Britain, there is an enormous mobilisation of ordinary people and even whole communities to give material aid to refugees from Ukraine. Polish centres up and down the country, as well as Ukrainian community centres, are awash with donations of money, clothes, sleeping bags, and other necessities that refugees might need for their onward journeys. Of course, this outburst of social solidarity is promoted by the awful scenes of carnage and destruction in Ukraine. It’s true that the incredible brutality of the Western-backed and organised bombing campaign by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has not produced such an outpouring of solidarity because it has been barely covered in the mass media, and because Ukrainians are ‘people like us.’ Nonetheless, people who collect support for Ukrainian refugees, and millions more, are rightly horrified by the Russian attacks and their dreadful consequences. The anti-war movement cannot turn its face away from these people but should participate, to the best of our ability, in such actions. We must encourage people to give material aid and demand refugees be admitted to Britain. Because of the ongoing inter-imperialist conflict, there are competing narratives about what is happening on a world scale. The overwhelming narrative in the Western media is about the defence of democracy against Russian and Chinese dictatorship and aggression. But in reality, there is a huge and developing inter-imperialist conflict, in which the United States is a major source of militarisation and aggression. Regrettably, a lot of people on the Left internationally do not clearly condemn the Russian invasion and champion the right of the Ukrainian people to self-defence. It is easier, as they see it, just to take sides with one imperialist camp or another. This we should refuse to do. Our understanding of the role of NATO and the United States cannot lead us to downplay or in any way excuse the Russian attack. On the morning of February 24, within minutes of hearing the news of the invasion, I posted on Facebook condemning the attack as an act of criminal brutality and irresponsibility; I said thousands would die in the initial fighting. It is this attack that must remain the target of left-wing mobilisation and protest, despite our understanding of the developing global inter-imperialist conflict.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO

NATO is the pinnacle of US militarist and imperial aggression- it diverts resources toward military endeavors and engages in offensive operations to secure US interests, making war inevitable

Nick Wright in 2014

NATO: Imperialism’s key military tool; 21 Manifesto; https://21centurymanifesto.wordpress.com/2014/08/28/nato-imperialisms-key-military-tool/

It was described as “the war to end all wars,” but today, a century later, the military potential to destroy lives and a liveable environment is at a terrifying level and continues to rise. Everyday, all over the world, people suffer from armed conflicts, military build-up, occupation, acts of intimidation and aggression, modernization and proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The capitalist economic crisis is further aggravating peoples’ life while profits of the war industries are growing. The ground for military aggressions and imperialist wars was never determined by accidental events or personal decisions. The centenary of World War One should be a moment for reflection, for strengthening peace and for encouraging international friendship and solidarity on the basis of equality and respect for the sovereignty of the peoples.. It must be directed toward ending economic domination of the monopolies and multinational corporations as well as towards aggressive military alliances. Therefore, we should act against NATO, the number 1 war machine in the world. The World Peace Council, founded shortly after the end of the World War II under the slogan “No more War-No more Fascism” underlines the need to draw conclusions from the period which led to the Nazi invasion to Poland on 1st September 1939 and the beginning of the second World War. The growing imperialist ambitions of Nazi Germany then met with the imperialist agenda of other forces, who did not oppose the German expansion to the East in the beginning. The glorious resistance of peoples against Fascism and Nazism in combination with the struggle and the tens of millions of victims of the USSR, led to the liberation of Europe from fascism and the victory of the peoples. The post war international situation, the foundation of the UN and its charter created a new situation for the peoples and their strive for freedom and sovereignty. All this is being fiercely challenged and overthrown today, efforts to substitute often the UN by NATO are at place, neo-fascist forces are on the grow in many parts of Europe serving reactionary ideologies and plans against the peoples. The WPC opposes the growing militarization of international relations, the imperialist plans for the “Great Middle East”, the “Pivot of USA to Asia”, and the interference in the sovereign affairs of peoples and nations in Latin America. NATO: Imperialism’s key military tool- 65 years of crimes against humanity NATO is the largest, strongest and most aggressive military alliance in the world today. Firmly dominated by US-imperialism, NATO is also a pillar of the European Union’s defense strategy. NATO currently has 28 member states across North America and Europe. Another 22 countries are engaged in the so-called Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Next to this another 19 countries are engaged with NATO through programs such as the “Mediterranean Dialogue”, the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” or the “Partnership for Peace” across the globe. Since 1991, NATO’s has aggressively expanded its membership and theatre of operations. This fact alone reveals its fundamental purpose: to be a key tool of Western imperialist domination of the globe. NATO is an enemy of peace. NATO is committed to the doctrines of first strike and pre-emptive strikes. As an offensive military alliance it stands ready to intervene before diplomacy has been given a proper chance, if such is in the interest of Western imperialism. NATO’s expansion and provocations – as the current crisis in Ukraine demonstrates – are directly responsible for destabilization, unrest, violence and war. NATO is an enemy of the peoples. When it intervenes, its members regularly use toxic weapons containing depleted uranium or white phosphor. Moreover, NATO considers nuclear weapons to be a fundamental part of its defense strategy. The alliance aggressively pursues and promotes military provocation and intervention all around the globe, and the results are always increased destruction, displacement, and death. The examples of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the creation of the protectorate of Kosovo, in Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the aggression against Syria, all bear witness to the disastrous humanitarian impact of NATO’s intervention. In Iraq, where NATO took on part of the reconstruction effort, it brought neither peace nor democracy. NATO is an enemy of peace and of the peoples. Without any public debate, NATO’s European member states are hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory. In 2010 a secret agreement on the deployment of modernized versions of B61 warheads extended this presence by several decades, not leaving any space for democratic debate on the matter. Through its Article 5 as well, the NATO alliance imposes obligations on member states that are incompatible with the sovereign right of states to decide on peace and war. The coming summit of NATO in Wales will adopt and further develop the Lisbon summit decisions (2010), will use old and new pretexts for its role as “world sheriff” securing markets, energy resources and spheres of influence, to the detriment of the peoples rights and needs. The dissolution of NATO must be a priority for those defending peace, social justice and progress, along with the right of every people to struggle for the disengagement from it.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › External Threats

Policy justifications resting on external threats serve to obfuscate the structural nature of violence and reinforce the power of militarism over society

Booker and Ohlbaum in 2021

Salih Booker, president & CEO, Center for International PolicyAnd Diana Ohlbaum, senior strategist and legislative director, foreign policy, FCNL; Dismantling Racism andMilitarism in U.S. Foreign Policy; Center for International Policy;

If the Racism-Militarism Paradigm were merely a body of beliefs, narratives, myths, dogmas, or principles, it could be more easily countered or rejected. Its power lies not only in its ability to remain hidden, avoiding full scrutiny and interrogation, but in the manner in which it is propagated and reinforced by economic, political, and social-cultural institutions. At the level of people and personnel, it operates through the twin strategies of exclusion and exploitation. Particularly in the national security space and at the highest levels, the influential voices are overwhelmingly white, male, and upper class—educated at Ivy League institutions and removed from the daily challenges facing most Americans. Only a select group of elites who accept the paradigm’s basic precepts is admitted to the rooms where consequential decisions are made. Adding to this exclusivity is the revolving door of lobbyists, policymakers, and government contractors who ensure that the narrow interests of the arms, extractive, and related industries are kept front and center. Among the professions that intersect meaningfully with foreign policy makers— academia, media, business, law—conformity with the basic precepts of the paradigm is equally ubiquitous. In this environment, women and people of color rise in proportion to their willingness to accept the Racism-Militarism Paradigm. Their credibility as experts and the relevance of their experience is judged by their adherence to traditional ways of thinking. Diversity is accepted, and more recently even promoted, as long as the rules of the game are preserved. Under a system of white supremacy, Black, brown, and Indigenous people are trapped at the bottom of the economic and social order. Without an adequate social safety net, worker protections, a living wage, universal health care, quality education, and affordable childcare, tens of millions of Americans (nearly half of whom are white) are mired in debt and chronic poverty. The Racism-Militarism Paradigm helps perpetuate these conditions by politicizing fear, directing it externally, and demanding ever-expanding resources for organized violence. The ruling class relies upon this atmosphere of fear to guarantee its continued control over the levers of government.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Experts/Think Tanks

Think tanks, armed forces, and contractors work in conjunction to naturalize and expand military domination

James M. Cypher in 2022

Emeritus Research Professor at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico, and Emeritus Professor of Economics at California State University, Fresno, USA; The Political Economy of Systemic U.S. Militarism; The Monthly Review; https://monthlyreview.org/2022/04/01/the-political-economy-of-systemic-u-s-militarism-2/

After what seems a couple of decades of near quietude, Dwight Eisenhower’s bête noire, the military-industrial complex, is again fashionable. We see it in the 2021 outpouring of articles and books, a (now rare) U.S. Senate hearing, and even an extended encyclopedia entry.1 A more accurate and meaningful term, which could lead the inquisitive to the structural roots of U.S. militarism, would be the industrial-military-congressional complex. Nonetheless, it must come as some relief to those who leverage the Pentagon, and did so with the better-named U.S. Department of War (1789–1947), that the focus is on the military in the first instance and not on the industrial interests that usually determine (or steer) the larger dynamics of procurement, geostrategic diplomacy, and military strategy.2 An adequate encapsulation is the iron triangle, with (1) military contractor corporations forming one side (the base) of the equilateral triangle; (2) the military forces, intelligence agencies, expedition-ready National Guard units, mercenary private security companies, and veteran organizations forming another side; and (3) the civilian national security state (headed by the chief executive, the secretary of state, the National Security Council, congressional members of key arms and security committees, NASA, and military-/contractor-funded but seemingly independent Washington DC think tanks) on the remaining side. The complex interdependent dynamics of the iron triangle take form as strategy, political-economy factors, and international affairs shift and drift—with constant, but varying, pressure (particularly from its base and both sides) to expand the resources it commands.3 Certainly, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has provoked a bit of reflection that sometimes leads to reprising the structural interests and embedded powers that keep military expenditures rising, or never falling much for long. But normally a bit of dismaying information regarding Pentagon “waste, fraud, and abuse” is as far (and as deep) as critics care to go. Lodged in U.S. historical memory, the military-industrial complex at best provides a hazy, often misleading, construct. As U.S. military spending in the fiscal year 2022 reaches $1.6 trillion for the broadly defined military sector, there is more—much more—to consider.4

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Data/Digital Infrastructure

Data collection is now a form of capital used to fuel digital capitalism

Sadowski 19, (Jathan Sadowski, Senior Research Fellow in the Emerging Technologies Research Lab // Department of Human Centred-Computing // Faculty of Information Technology // Monash University. January 7, 2019 “When data is capital: Datafication, accumulation, and extraction” Sadowski, Mayer

The goal of transforming everything into data and the search for new sources of data echoes imperialist modes of accumulation (Luxemburg, 1951; Thatcher et al., 2016). In short, as capitalism faces crises of accumulation, there is a need to find new sources of value and new places to offload goods. ‘Old strategies of accumulation are re-attempted in new spaces and new strategies are crafted through trial and error in the never-ending quest to surpass or displace the internal contradictions which lead to crisis’ (Greene and Joseph, 2015: 224). This could mean subjecting previously noncommodified and non-monetised parts of life to the logic of capitalism or colonising new territories so they are brought into the global capitalist web as sites of extraction (Moore, 2015). We can see this dynamic of ‘data colonialism’ when technology corporations like Facebook and Google move into territories like India and Africa (Thatcher et al., 2016). They do so under the guise of providing subsidised services that connect marginalised people to the Internet, yet the companies also benefit greatly by opening markets, locking people into their platforms, and tapping sources of data (Solon, 2017). These new places with new people provide new opportunities for data accumulation. The same imperialist tactics are being replayed now, but updated for the digital age. As we can see, this growing body of research on critical data studies (Dalton et al., 2016) has shown how the production, distribution, and use of data is situated within an emerging political economy that has wide-ranging implications across society: from the restructuring of cities and the state (Kitchin et al., 2015; Leszczynski, 2012), to the (re)development of electrical and computational infrastructure (Levenda et al., 2016; Pickren, 2018). Equipped with the findings of this literature, this paper can be seen as a call to go back to basics by further analysing foundational questions in the political economy of data: What is the economic form of data? How can value be derived from data? Importantly, these characteristics of data capital mean it can be continually captured and circulated, thus data collection is driven by the logic of capital accumulation as described by Marx. ‘The circulation of money as capital is an end in itself, for the valorization of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The movement of capital is therefore limitless’ (Marx, 1990: 253). This unending accumulation of capital, represented by M-C-M0-C-M00-C-M-. . . , is a defining feature of capitalism. In digital capitalism, data is not a substitute for money, but is rather elevated and put ‘on the same level as financial capital,’ as a report by Oracle and MIT Technology Review Custom (2016: 2) states. The imperative, then, is to constantly collect and circulate data by producing commodities that create more data and building infrastructure to manage data. The stream of data must keep flowing and growing. Ultimately, continuing the cycle of data capital becomes an intrinsic motivation, a driving force, for firms. As Marx explains, ‘Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single transaction. His aim is rather the unceasing movement of profit-making’ (Marx, 1990: 254). The same can be said of data. The capitalist is not concerned with the immediate use of a data point or with any single collection, but rather the unceasing flow of data-creating. This point is illustrated by the fact that data is very often collected without specific uses in mind. Indeed, the practice of collecting data first and figuring it out later is increasingly a core part of how businesses and government bodies operate. ‘It does not matter that the amounts [of data] collected may vastly exceed a firm’s imaginative reach or analytic grasp. The assumption is that it will eventually be useful, i.e. valuable’ (Fourcade and Healy, 2017: 13). At a public talk in early 2017, Andrew Ng, an artificial 4 Big Data & Society intelligence researcher who has held top positions at Google, Baidu, and Coursera, was candid about this prevailing logic of data accumulation: ‘At large companies, sometimes we launch products not for the revenue, but for the data. We actually do that quite often ... and we monetize the data through a different product’ (Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2017). The conditions needed to convert data capital into economic capital may never arrive, but that does not stop the cycle of accumulation.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Data/Digital Control

Data capitalism is driving millitarism – locks in war from lack of understanding of this system

Sadowski 19 [Studies the political economy and social impacts of digital technologies, focusing on smart systems that are data-driven, networked, and automated. A Senior Research Fellow in the Emerging Technologies Research Lab // Department of Human Centred-Computing // Faculty of Information Technology // Monash University. “When data is capital: Datafication,accumulation, and extraction” May https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053951718820549]

The collection and circulation of data is now a central element of increasingly more sectors of contemporary capitalism. This article analyses data as a form of capital that is distinct from, but has its roots in, economic capital. Data collection is driven by the perpetual cycle of capital accumulation, which in turn drives capital to construct and rely upon a universe in which everything is made of data. The imperative to capture all data, from all sources, by any means possible influences many key decisions about business models, political governance, and technological development. This article argues that many common practices of data accumulation should actually be understood in terms of data extraction, wherein data is taken with little regard for consent and compensation. By understanding data as a form capital, we can better analyse the meaning, practices, and implications of datafication as a political economic regime. Data has become central and essential for increasingly more sectors of contemporary capitalism. Industries focused on technology, infrastructure, finance, manufacturing, insurance, and energy are now treating data as a form of capital. No longer is data just a concern of scientists or a by-product of other processes. Until recently, companies simply deleted data or chose not to collect it because paying for storage did not seem like a good investment (Oracle and MIT Technology Review Custom, 2016). Now, though, companies are clamouring to collect data – as much as they can, wherever they can. For the increasing number of companies participating in the ‘data economy’ or ‘digital economy,’ deleting data because of storage costs would be like burning piles of money or dumping barrels of oil down the drain because renting a warehouse was too much trouble. While data is not the same as profit, they share a similar logic. Just as we expect corporations to be profit-driven, we should now expect organisations to be data-driven; that is, the drive to accumulate data now propels new ways of doing business and governance. It is a key factor in major corporate decisions, such as Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods for $13.7 billion (Stevens and Haddon, 2017), and of government policies such as investment in urban sensor networks (Heinzmann, 2014). Indeed, as The Economist (2017b) has noted, ‘Industrial giants such as GE and Siemens now sell themselves as data firms.’ In short, data – and the accumulation of data – is a core component of political economy in the 21st century. As a paradigm and logic, the idea of data-as-capital affects and transforms many spaces and sectors. Thanks to technologies like the Internet of Things, online platforms, and data analytics the list of things that now count as ‘digital products and services’ – and hence what counts as part of the digital economy – is growing at a rapid pace (Srnicek, 2016). This, in turn, means that data is a foundational form of capital for everything from the ‘smart home’ to the ‘smart city,’ finance to governance, production to distribution, consumer devices to enterprise systems, and much more (Kitchin, 2014). Without data, many of these technologies and organisations would not be able to operate, let alone be able to generate value. This article contributes to the study of data within contemporary capitalism by analysing data as a form of capital. The existing literature on the social, political and economic dimensions of data treats data as a commodity. Whether implicitly or explicitly, analyses in both academic and media outlets typically take this analytical frame as a given. Yet, as this article makes clear, the distinction between capital and commodity is important and we cannot assume data is always a commodity. By understanding data as a form of capital, we can better analyse the nature and dynamics of digital capitalism. Rather than data collection being seen as simply a way of producing and obtaining commodities that are somehow converted into monetary value, datafication takes shape as a political economic regime driven by the logic of perpetual (data) capital accumulation and circulation. Framing data as a form of capital casts new light on the imperatives motivating contemporary organisations, the ways value can be derived from data, and the normative importance of data extraction. There are now a variety of labels that refer to the political economic relationship between data and capitalism, such as ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Foster and McChesney, 2014; Zuboff, 2015), ‘informational capitalism’ (Fuchs, 2010), ‘communicative capitalism’ (Dean, 2005), ‘platform capitalism’ (Srnicek, 2016) and ‘iCapitalism’ (Duff, 2016). These different labels are not interchangeable, but they do share common themes and conclusions. This paper builds on three broad insights from the growing literature on critical political economy of data: (1) data is valuable and value-creating (Arvidsson, 2016; Roderick, 2014; Srnicek, 2016); (2) data collection has a pervasive, powerful influence over how businesses and governments behave (Bouk, forthcoming; Fourcade and Healy, 2017; Zuboff, 2016); and (3) data systems are rife with relations of inequity, extraction, and exploitation (Aitken, 2017; Andrejevic, 2014; Fourcade and Healy, 2013; Poon, 2016; Thatcher et al., 2016). Fourcade and Healy (2017) have argued that ‘modern organisations’ are now driven by a ‘data imperative’ that demands the extraction of all data, from all sources, by any means possible. ‘Storing and studying people's everyday activities, even the seemingly mundane, has become the default rather than the exception’ (Angwin and Valentino-Devries, 2012: n.p.). Fulfilling the data imperative involves more than just passively collecting data; it means actively creating data (IBM, 2014). This entails the (total) datafication and surveillance of people, places, processes, things, and relationships among them (van Dijck, 2014). Cisco, one of the companies building this all-encompassing system, calls it ‘the Internet of Everything.’ Similarly, IBM states that, ‘Everything is made of data these days’ (IBM, 2014). What does it mean to see the world in a way that asserts everything is data? This is not just a neutral observation about the nature or substance of the world. Such statements do not merely reveal or reflect the world. They order and construct the world (Boyd and Crawford, 2012; Kitchin et al., 2015). By operating rhetorically (Rosenberg, 2013), they change how we understand and interact with the world, and they put those with data capital in a position of access and authority. They establish the context through which accumulation and use of data not only occurs, but becomes a driving logic that influences behaviour. They perform the power/knowledge relationship: to know the world is to exercise power over it and to exercise power is to know it – to examine its features and characteristics, to sort it into categories and norms, to render it legible and observable, to exclude other metrics and methods of knowing it (Bowker and Star, 2000). Data mining is a misleading name; a more apt term would be data manufacturing. Data is not out there waiting to be discovered as if it already exists in the world like crude oil and raw ore (Gitelman, 2013). Data is a recorded abstraction of the world created and valorised by people using technology. The framing of data as a natural resource that is everywhere and free for the taking reinforces regimes of data accumulation. A 2014 video by Siemens, a major industrial manufacturer, illustrates the logic of the data imperative: ‘We live in a universe of data that gains not only in volume, but importance, every day. The question of how to generate business value from it becomes more and more essential to us. We need to understand that data is everywhere, and it is generated every second of the day. We need to understand data as an asset – and turn it into a value.’ (2014) It is not a coincidence that data is treated as a universal substance right at the time when there is so much to gain for whoever can lay claim to that data and extract it from every source. Indeed, there is a feedback loop: many control systems rely on the constant gathering and processing of data, and in turn those control systems enable more data to be generated (Sadowski and Pasquale, 2015). Flows of data correspond to flows of power and profit, thus the alchemy of datafication promises to produce infinite reserves of both. At the same time, the rhetoric of universality reframes everything as within the domain of surveillance/platform/digital capitalism. The goal of transforming everything into data and the search for new sources of data echoes imperialist modes of accumulation (Luxemburg, 1951; Thatcher et al., 2016). In short, as capitalism faces crises of accumulation, there is a need to find new sources of value and new places to offload goods. ‘Old strategies of accumulation are re-attempted in new spaces and new strategies are crafted through trial and error in the never-ending quest to surpass or displace the internal contradictions which lead to crisis’ (Greene and Joseph, 2015: 224). This could mean subjecting previously non-commodified and non-monetised parts of life to the logic of capitalism or colonising new territories so they are brought into the global capitalist web as sites of extraction (Moore, 2015). We can see this dynamic of ‘data colonialism’ when technology corporations like Facebook and Google move into territories like India and Africa (Thatcher et al., 2016). They do so under the guise of providing subsidised services that connect marginalised people to the Internet, yet the companies also benefit greatly by opening markets, locking people into their platforms, and tapping sources of data (Solon, 2017). These new places with new people provide new opportunities for data accumulation. The same imperialist tactics are being replayed now, but updated for the digital age. As we can see, this growing body of research on critical data studies (Dalton et al., 2016) has shown how the production, distribution, and use of data is situated within an emerging political economy that has wide-ranging implications across society: from the restructuring of cities and the state (Kitchin et al., 2015; Leszczynski, 2012), to the (re)development of electrical and computational infrastructure (Levenda et al., 2016; Pickren, 2018). Equipped with the findings of this literature, this paper can be seen as a call to go back to basics by further analysing foundational questions in the political economy of data: What is the economic form of data? How can value be derived from data? Why does data collection matter? Opening back up these questions, I argue, productively reframes how we understand the form and dynamics of data.The ‘Big Data strategist’ for Oracle, one of the largest software companies in the world, has said, ‘Data is in fact a new kind of capital on par with financial capital for creating new products and services. And it’s not just a metaphor; data fulfils the literal textbook definition of capital.’ (OracleANZ, 2015). This statement points to an emerging political economic shift in which data is created, collected, and circulated as capital. The previous section described how data has been critically analysed in the context of capitalism – implicitly or explicitly – as a commodity. However, as businesses and government bodies begin treating data as capital, there is a need for examining the characteristics and dynamics of ‘data capital.’ This section aims to do so by first reviewing two theories of capital, from Karl Marx and Pierre Bourdieu, then using them to analyse data. In Capital, Volume 1, Marx describes capital as a relationship between money (M) and commodities (C); namely, the ways they circulate and transform, which he simplifies into two general formulas. The first formula represents consumption, C-M-C: a commodity is sold for money which is then used to buy another commodity. Therefore, C-M-C is the cycle of using money to turn one qualitatively different thing (e.g. labour power) into another qualitatively different thing (e.g. coffee). The cycle of consumption is motivated by the use-value of a commodity and it is completed when money is turned into a commodity. The second formula represents capital, M-C-M′: money is used to buy a commodity which is then sold for more money. ‘The value [of money] originally advanced, therefore, not only remains intact while in circulation but increases its magnitude, adds to itself a surplus-value, or is valorised. And this movement converts it into capital’ (Marx, 1990: 252). The cycle of capital is motivated by exchange-value and the cycle does not complete because capital requires continuous circulation. When money is turned into a commodity for consumption, rather than invested to make profit, it ceases to be capital. In addition to ‘money capital’ (i.e., invested funds), Marx distinguishes between two forms of ‘real capital’ employed in the creation of surplus value. Constant capital is the means of production for commodities (i.e., factories, machinery, raw materials, etc.). Variable capital is the means of subsistence for labour power (i.e., the costs of hiring workers). Expanding on Marx’s foundational analysis, Bourdieu theorized two new forms of capital that are distinct from what he terms economic capital, ‘which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights’ (1986: 242). The other forms Bourdieu theorized, cultural capital and social capital, stand alone in their own right while also being ‘convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital’ (p. 242). They are, at their root, ‘transformed, disguised forms of economic capital’ (p. 251). Cultural capital contributes to a person’s status and success in ways that go beyond the idea of ‘human capital,’ which focuses on monetary investment in education and skills. Cultural capital is a representation of class and tends to be invested by a person’s family and transmitted from a person’s domestic environment. Bourdieu (1986) identifies three types of cultural capital: embodied (e.g. character traits), objectified (e.g. art collection), and institutionalised (university degree). Social capital, according to Bourdieu (p. 248), ‘is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.’ This form of capital accrues by being included in privileged groups, whether that means being inducted through rites of passage (e.g. fraternal orders) or through rites of inheritance (e.g. noble lineage). When people talk about the value of ‘who you know’ and ‘networking,’ they are talking about having and developing social capital. Building from Marx, we can now frame two common analyses of data in terms of a debate about what economic form data represents. On one hand, data is cast as a digital raw material – constant capital – necessary in the production of commodities. It is hard to read media articles and business reports about data without seeing it called ‘the new oil.’ For instance, the cover of a 2017 issue of The Economist (2017b) proclaims ‘The World’s Most Valuable Resource’ above an illustration of offshore oil platforms labelled with the names of major digital platforms like Facebook, Google, and Uber presumably drilling into an ocean of data. On the other hand, data is cast as a commodity produced by the digital labour of people posting on Facebook, clicking on Google, exercising with Fitbits, and all the other things we do that create data and that data is created about (Fuchs, 2014; Till, 2012). The cliché about the ‘free’ services provided digital platforms is that, ‘If you’re not the customer, you’re the product.’1 Through the work of using platforms and devices, people are turned into commodities that take the form of personal data, which is sold to advertisers and data brokers. In the age of mass media, this was termed the ‘audience commodity’ (Smythe, 1981). Now with social media it is called the ‘data double’ among other coinages (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). Therefore, at the risk of oversimplification, these two ways of analysing data – as raw material and as product of digital labour – can be recast as a debate about the relationship between real capital and commodities in the digital economy. Building from Bourdieu, I suggest a better framing of data is as a form of capital that is distinct from, but has its roots in, economic capital. Data capital is more than knowledge about the world, it is discrete bits of information that are digitally recorded, machine processable, easily agglomerated, and highly mobile. Like social and cultural capital, data capital is convertible, in certain conditions, to economic capital. But, as the next section ‘Deriving value from data capital’ shows, not all value derived from data is necessarily or primarily monetary. Data capital is institutionalised in the information infrastructure of collecting, storing, and processing data; that is, the smart devices, online platforms, data analytics, network cables, and server farms. Importantly, these characteristics of data capital mean it can be continually captured and circulated, thus data collection is driven by the logic of capital accumulation as described by Marx. ‘The circulation of money as capital is an end in itself, for the valorization of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The movement of capital is therefore limitless’ (Marx, 1990: 253). This unending accumulation of capital, represented by M-C-M′-C-M″-C-M‴… , is a defining feature of capitalism. In digital capitalism, data is not a substitute for money, but is rather elevated and put ‘on the same level as financial capital,’ as a report by Oracle and MIT Technology Review Custom (2016: 2) states. The imperative, then, is to constantly collect and circulate data by producing commodities that create more data and building infrastructure to manage data. The stream of data must keep flowing and growing. Ultimately, continuing the cycle of data capital becomes an intrinsic motivation, a driving force, for firms. As Marx explains, ‘Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single transaction. His aim is rather the unceasing movement of profit-making’ (Marx, 1990: 254). The same can be said of data. The capitalist is not concerned with the immediate use of a data point or with any single collection, but rather the unceasing flow of data-creating. This point is illustrated by the fact that data is very often collected without specific uses in mind. Indeed, the practice of collecting data first and figuring it out later is increasingly a core part of how businesses and government bodies operate. ‘It does not matter that the amounts [of data] collected may vastly exceed a firm’s imaginative reach or analytic grasp. The assumption is that it will eventually be useful, i.e. valuable’ (Fourcade and Healy, 2017: 13). At a public talk in early 2017, Andrew Ng, an artificial intelligence researcher who has held top positions at Google, Baidu, and Coursera, was candid about this prevailing logic of data accumulation: ‘At large companies, sometimes we launch products not for the revenue, but for the data. We actually do that quite often ... and we monetize the data through a different product’ (Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2017). The conditions needed to convert data capital into economic capital may never arrive, but that does not stop the cycle of accumulation. The shift towards data capital takes advantage of the ideological and regulatory groundwork that has been laid since at least the 1980s to create a political economic landscape conducive to finance capitalism (Konczal and Abernathy, 2015). Under neoliberal governance, financial capital is treated as if it exists in transnational space beyond borders and governance (Major, 2012). The same attitudes are directly applied to data capital. This view was crystallised by Carl Bildt (2015), the former Prime Minister of Sweden and chair of the Global Commission on Internet Governance, in an op-ed for the Financial Times: ‘Barriers against the free flow of data are, in effect, barriers against trade.’ Bildt was rebuking proponents of ‘digital sovereignty’ rules in Europe, which would require non-EU companies to keep data about EU citizens in servers that are geographically based in Europe. Any restraints on the flow of data are said to hinder economic growth and technological innovation (Morozov, 2015). Trade deals like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (aim to) enshrine the free flow of data across countries and continents (Selby, 2017). Like finance, data is now governed as an engine of growth. If financial firms are free to shuttle capital from country to country, then similarly technology corporations must also be free to store and sell data wherever they want. This means, for example, that a company could collect the personal information of Americans, store the data in Taiwan, and sell it in Europe (Rossiter, 2017). The focus on data and datafication should not be seen as usurping financialisation, but rather as adding new sources of value and new tools of accumulation. There is a long history of crossover between innovations in information technology and innovations in finance (MacKenzie, 2018). Far from being in competition with each other, Wall Street and Silicon Valley are converging around data capital as the new frontier of accumulation and circulation.The question of what kinds of data are collected and how they are used is very important. So far, this paper has treated data in a generalised way for the sake of analysing it as a form of capital. Of course, not all data is the same, nor is it used in the same way. The same can be said of capital in general. Similarly, value is derived from data in a number of different ways. Different industries necessarily accumulate different kinds of data to fit their own motivations and goals. The focus is typically put on ‘user data,’ such as from exercise apps that collect data about people’s physical activity, vital signs, and geolocation. But, as the examples below show, value can also be squeezed from many other kinds of data about things like machinery, transportation, and moon phases. A full analysis of different types of data and in-depth theorising of how value is derived from data are both outside the scope of this paper. However, in this section, I provide an outline of five major ways data is used to create value. The list is not meant to be comprehensive. Future work is needed about the increasing number of ways and reasons that data capital is accumulated and valorised, especially by companies, governments, and organisations that are not typically treated as part of the ‘technology sector.’ Data is used to profile and target people. Many business models and services in data capitalism are based on the value proposition that knowing more about people will, in some way, translate to more profit and/or power. Some examples include: Internet-based companies often make their revenue by serving personalised advertisements. Data brokers collate data to create dossiers on individuals and categorise them into market segments. Credit bureaus crunch data so they can assign scores meant to denote a person’s financial risk and trustworthiness. Retailers can charge different prices based on the customer’s characteristics. Political consultants analyse data to decide who is susceptible to certain kinds of messaging and influence. Data is used to optimise systems. Processes can become more efficient by analysing data that reveals how to eliminate waste, improve productivity, and do more with less. This might mean an industrial manufacturer installing sensors on machines to monitor and adjust their operation. Or, city government using algorithmic analysis to assess how public services should be run. This way of deriving value is also the basis for Taylorism, starting with time–motion studies of factory workers in the early 1900s. Now, digital Taylorism is represented by wristbands patented by Amazon that are strapped to warehouse workers to track where their hands are at all times and provide ‘haptic feedback’ when they work inefficiently (Novak, 2018). Data is used to manage and control things. This is a power/knowledge relationship in which data is a digital, mobile, processable form of knowledge. The idea is that by amassing data about a thing, then the ability to exercise power over that thing – and, in turn, extract more data from it – is enhanced. This might be as mundane as a person keeping track of their diet and exercise so they can manage their health. Or, as worrying as police using body-worn cameras and drones equipped with facial recognition and license plate reader software. Or, as complex as an engineer overseeing the traffic patterns of a city so they can manage how millions of people move through space. Such data can be used to inform human decision-making or fed into automated systems that respond in real-time. Data is used to model probabilities. With enough data covering a wide range of variables over a period of the time – fed to the right algorithms and analysts – many companies promise they can predict the future. While these ‘predictions’ are actually probabilities, there is a growing market for data-driven forecasting tools. For example, police departments use ‘predictive’ systems to create ‘heat lists’ and ‘hot spots’ that name who and where has a high likelihood of criminal activity. HunchLab, a predictive policing tool, uses data about ‘dozens of other factors like population density; census data; the locations of bars, churches, schools, and transportation hubs; schedules for home games – even moon phases’ (Chammah and Hansen, 2016: n.p.). Similarly, urban control rooms process a constant stream of data to create simulations of events like disaster response and snapshots of what the city might look like at certain times and days in the future. Data is used to build stuff. Digital systems and services are often built on data. They require data to operate, they use existing stores of data, and they collect new streams of data. As services become platforms and devices become ‘smart’ they also become data-driven and Internet-connected to facilitate the flow of data. For example, Uber would not work without real-time data about drivers and passengers. Many upgrades to consumer goods (e.g. smart homes) and transformations to urban environments (e.g. smart cities) are premised on extracting and exploiting data. Advances in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles also require mountains of diverse data. Data is used to grow the value of assets. Things like buildings, infrastructure, vehicles, and machinery are depreciating assets. They lose value over time as the forces of entropy – or, wear and tear – take their toll. However, upgrading assets with smart technologies that collect data about their use helps combat the normal cycle of deterioration. As financier Stuart Kirk (2018) states, ‘Artificial intelligence combined with the internet of things will result in physical things becoming more adaptive and responsive – thereby extending their useful lives.’ Rather than depreciating, smartified assets can maintain and gain value. Or, if they do not grow value, at least data can slow its decay. Data extraction When we talk about data as being ‘collected,’ ‘gathered,’ or even ‘mined’, the image conjured is one of neutral accumulation, as if data existed out in the world as a distinct thing readily available to be harvested. However, analysing this process in terms of extraction emphasises the people targeted by, and the exploitative nature of, dataveillance. Much of the valuable data capital extracted from the world is about people – their identities, beliefs, behaviours, and other personal information. As Karen Gregory (2014: n.p.) puts it: ‘Big Data, like Soylent Green, is made of people.’ This means that accumulating data often goes hand-in-hand with increasingly invasive systems for probing, monitoring, and tracking people (Schneier, 2016). Surveillance – or, ‘dataveillance’ – capabilities are integrated into everything ranging from consumer goods to civic infrastructure. For businesses, much of the value produced by ‘smart’ technologies does not necessarily come from you buying the good, but rather from you using it. (Or, even just having it around since many smart technologies are always in sense and record mode.) Interacting with smart technologies – especially ones integrated into your everyday, personal life – generates reams of data that would otherwise be out of reach to the companies that want it. And, it seems, to the governments that want that data: In February 2016, the then US director of national intelligence, James Clapper, admitted to a Senate panel that government agencies may treat networked smart technologies as a portal into people’s homes and lives: ‘In the future, intelligence services might use the [Internet of Things] for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials’ (Ackerman and Thielman, 2016: n.p.). A typical example of a smart update to an everyday technology is the refrigerator. The regular refrigerator is a passive object: it just keeps food cold. The smart refrigerator is an active object: it keeps food cold, but it also keeps track of things like your favourite brands, what foods you eat at what times, and when your food is almost out or expired. The smart refrigerator can then take that data and use it, for example, to send targeted advertisements, recommend sponsored recipes, monitor your dietary intake, and purchase replacement food from the grocery store. The smart refrigerator can also be used for other purposes that are far from fridge-like, such as a surveillance device remotely accessed by police who wish to peek into the owner’s house (Butler, 2017). This is how the logic of accumulation works: it transforms the refrigerator into a data producing, collecting and transmitting machine. The same logic is behind the growing stable of smart technologies that are increasingly embedded with sensors, processors and network connections. ‘The genuine Internet of Things wants to invade that refrigerator, measure it, instrument it, monitor any interactions with it; it would cheerfully give away a fridge at cost,’ argues Bruce Sterling (2014: loc. 68). The pushback against business models based on data capital are already starting to play out: In 2017, an American appliance maker, Whirlpool, filed trade complaints that asked the US government to impose tariffs on its Korean competitors, LG and Samsung, because the Korean companies are selling smart appliances at cheap prices, which is eating into the market share of companies like Whirlpool. LG and Samsung are able to do this because they recognize, as The New Yorker observed, ‘the way to win in a data-driven business is to push prices as low as possible in order to build your customer base, enhance data flow, and cash in in the long-term’ (Davidson, 2017: n.p.). While Whirlpool is looking to cash in on the purchase of an appliance, LG and Samsung are banking on the data that comes from people using the appliance. Thus, rather than existing only as a commodity to be sold, a smart device becomes (perhaps primarily) a means of producing data. This logic influences the design of systems ranging from robotic vacuum cleaners secretly mapping users’ homes so the manufacturer can exploit that data (Deahl, 2017) to the methods of urban planning deployed to manage cities (Barns, 2017). Data accumulation drives many key decisions about technological development, political governance, and business models. As Shoshana Zuboff explains, within the context of what she calls ‘surveillance capitalism,’ ‘The logic of accumulation organizes perception and shapes the expression of technological affordances at their roots. It is the taken-for-granted context of any business model. Its assumptions are largely tacit, and its power to shape the field of possibilities is therefore largely invisible. It defines objectives, successes, failures, and problems. It determines what is measured, and what is passed over; how resources and people are allocated and organized; who is valued in what roles; what activities are undertaken – and to what purpose. The logic of accumulation produces its own social relations and with that its conceptions and uses of authority and power.’ (Zuboff, 2015: 77) When data is treated as a form of capital, the imperative to collect as much data, from as many sources, by any means possible intensifies existing practices of accumulation and leads to the creation of new ones. Indeed, following in the footsteps of other extractive enterprises through capitalism’s history such as land grabs and resource mining (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2017), many of the now common practices of data accumulation should actually be understood in terms of the more forceful practice of data extraction, wherein data is taken without meaningful consent and fair compensation for the producers and sources of that data. The terminology used to describe the ways data is accumulated – especially data about people – elides the fact that this data is often acquired in hidden ways for purposes unknown to the targets of dataveillance (Andrejevic, 2014). The question of consent is relatively straightforward. The problematic way technology firms treat consent is no secret; it is an issue raised often by journalists and academics. When companies seek consent to record, use, and/or sell a person’s data, it is typically done in the form of a contract. The most common kind is called an end-user licensing agreements (EULA). They are a hallmark of digital technology and account for most of the contracts we enter into – almost on a daily basis if you use the Internet or software (Thatcher et al., 2016). These are the pages on websites and applications that make you click ‘agree’ or ‘accept’ before you can use the service. EULAs are known as ‘standard-form’ or ‘boilerplate’ contracts because they are generically applied to all users (Zamir, 2014). They are one-sided, non-negotiated, and non-negotiable; you either agree or you are denied access. ‘It is hard, therefore, to consider them to be free and voluntary arrangements since one party has no power to enact their demands’ (Birch, 2016: 124). Companies are routinely caught smuggling dubious clauses into their EULAs; like, for example, requiring users to give up rights to ownership of their data or to restrict what kind of data is collected and how it is used (Hutton and Henderson, 2017). Moreover, EULAs are designed to prevent even the most enterprising person from being informed of the binding terms and conditions. They are long, dense legal documents. One study concluded it would take 76 days, working for 8 hours a day, to read the privacy policies a person typically encounters in a year (Madrigal, 2012). EULAs are the ideal-type of pro forma ‘consent,’ which may be better-termed acquiescence (Pasquale, 2015). That is, EULAs are less a method of consent in any meaningful and more a form of compliance. As Jaron Lanier (2013: 314) argues, ‘The reason people click 'yes' is not that they understand what they're doing, but that that it is the only viable option other than boycotting a company in general, which is getting harder to do.’ Thus, even in many cases where people must actively agree to their data being accumulated, this agreement bears little resemblance to common meanings of consent – let alone robust forms of informed consent. When a thing is taken without consent we call it ‘theft.’ Just because the thing taken here is information about a person, rather than some material object, the ethical relevance should not be nullified. It is extraction nonetheless. The question of fair compensation is more complicated, in large part because it can be difficult to put a fair price on personal information. Different types of data are valued differently by different businesses. The value of data also rises non-linearly in relation to the amount of data. The larger and more diverse a data bank, the more information and uses can be derived from it. So one individual’s data may not be readily converted to economic capital, but the aggregated data of hundreds, thousands, millions of individuals can be immensely valuable. Even though it is difficult to price data, we can judge the fairness of compensation in at least two ways: (1) what kind of compensation, if any, is offered for data and (2) what is the difference between the compensation for data producers and the value obtained by data capitalists? First, compensation most often comes in the form of access to services like Facebook’s platform and Google’s search engine. Rather than charging money to use the service, the owner collects data as payment. Even if we concede that some people think this is perfectly fair compensation, these service providers are outnumbered by the countless companies that collect, use, and sell personal data often without the knowledge of – let alone compensation for – those whose data they possess (Bouk, forthcoming; Crain, 2016). Many companies fail the first test right away: receiving nothing can hardly be seen as fair. Second, the value of data capital is massive. Some of the wealthiest companies in the world, like Facebook and Google, are built on data capital. The data broker industry is estimated to generate $200bn in annual revenue (Crain, 2016). The three biggest data brokers alone – Experian, Equifax and Transunion – each bring in billions of dollars annually. Even for relatively small data brokers, the difference between the value of data and the compensation provided for it is striking (Roderick, 2014). Additionally, other major sectors like finance, insurance and manufacturing are increasingly relying on data capital to generate value. For many of these companies the data they use is primarily about people and created by those people doing things. These companies are accumulating billions of dollars in surplus value from the ‘digital labour’ done by people (Scholz, 2012), while paying little to nothing in return. Thatcher et al. (2016: 994) argue that these extractive practices go so far as to ‘mirror processes of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession that occur as capitalism colonizes previously noncommodified, private times and places.’ When a person does not receive a fair offer for the work they have done or thing they have sold, we call it ‘exploitation’ – and this level of exploitation and inequity is indicative of extraction. Before concluding, it is important to note that not all data extraction is equal. There are crucial issues related to the ways identity and class affect how, what, and why data is extracted. At times, data is disproportionally extracted from certain groups, such as when poor people of colour are subjected to systematic tracking by government agencies and financial institutions (Eubanks, 2018). At other times, certain groups are missing from data sets, such as when facial recognition systems inaccurately identify people of colour because they have been trained with data composed of mostly white male faces – people who look like their programmers (Lohr, 2018). While it is beyond the scope of this article, there is a need for further analysis of the unevenness of data extraction. Such work should build from critical studies of information technology; some relevant, recent books include: Digital Sociologies (Daniels et al. 2016), The Intersectional Internet (Noble and Tynes, 2016), Programmed Inequality (Hicks, 2017), Algorithms of Oppression (Noble, 2018), and Automating Inequality (Eubanks, 2018). My hope is that this article also lends theoretical support to this future work. Conclusion This article has centred data as a core component of political economy in the 21st century. It has analysed the way in which data is collected and circulated like capital and is treated by governments and firms like capital. By applying the theories of Marx and Bourdieu, data is analysed as a form of capital that is distinct from, but has its roots in, economic capital. Data collection is thus driven by the perpetual cycle of capital accumulation, which in turn drives capital to construct and rely upon a world in which everything is made of data. The supposed universality of data reframes everything as falling under the domain of data capitalism. All spaces must be subjected to datafication. If the universe is conceived of as a potentially infinite reserve of data, then that means the accumulation and circulation of data can be sustained forever. The imperative to capture all data, from all sources, by any means possible influences many key decisions about business models, political governance, and technological development. Following this imperative leads to accumulation by extraction in which personal data is taken with little regard for consent and compensation. By analysing surveillance technology and the data economy in terms of extraction, critical work can move beyond focusing (almost exclusively) on privacy and security. As important as these issues are, they elide the systemic issues of inequity and exploitation that are endemic to the contemporary political economy of data (Coll, 2014). Moreover, conceiving of many common practices of data collection as extraction helps lay the normative groundwork for political and legal responses to rampant, invasive data accumulation. Such responses could include regulations – essentially capital controls – on what types of data companies can collect, how they can collect it, where they can send and store it, and how much data a company can possess, both in aggregate and about individuals. It could also include new models of data ownership and governance like, for example, ‘managing crucial parts of the data economy as public infrastructure’ (The Economist, 2017a: n.p.). The fact that a featured article in The Economist would recommend that governments take over parts of the data economy and break up monopolistic firms like Google should be seen as a bellwether for how powerful Big Data (as in Big Oil and Big Finance) has become. This illustrates the need for further critical thought about the political economy of data, as well as reforms and alternatives to data capitalism. The analysis in this paper is not meant to mark a new epoch in political economy wherein – as executives and engineers in Silicon Valley are fond of saying – everything has changed and nothing will ever be the same. Instead, data capitalism is more of a shift in focus; it is a transition toward conceptualising a new kind of capital and new methods of accumulation. This transition follows from one of the dominant socio-economic regimes of the past few decades: finance capitalism (Davis and Walsh, 2017; Krippner, 2005; Konczal and Abernathy, 2015). As this article has shown, there are similarities between financialisation and datafication. Both have significant ‘implications for the production of space, corporate governance, accumulation regimes, and everyday life’ (Fields, 2017: 1). Both seek to maximise value extraction by using innovative methods of capital creation and circulation, whether through complex financial instruments or complex information technologies. Both use technically opaque systems that shield them from oversight (Pasquale, 2015), use their political influence to skirt regulation (Roderick, 2014), and use their powerful capabilities to engage in exploitative and predatory practices (Taylor and Sadowski, 2015). In addition to these similarities, there is direct overlap between the two regimes, such as credit agencies using large sets of personal and demographic data to create hyper-individualised policies and scores (Hurley and Adebayo, 2017) and Wall Street traders using ‘high frequency trading’ algorithms to circulate capital at hyper-speed (Arnoldi, 2016). The institutions leading the way in data capitalism are explicit about the connections between financial capital and data capital. They are not calling for one to replace the other, rather they are arguing that finance and data should be seen as different but equal forms of capital, which supercharge each other. Datafication, like financialisation before it, is a new frontier of accumulation and next step in capitalism. Compared to financialisation, datafication is still in its early days, but the level of wealth and power wielded by data capitalists is already massive and still growing. The theories and methods used to analyse finance capitalism and information technology must now be synthesised and applied to studying the meaning, practices and implications of datafication as a political economic regime.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Data/Digital Control

US global surveillance reinforces racial and social inequalities- companies decrease user privacy for government intelligence

Michael Kwet 17 Yale University, Visiting Fellow Rhodes University, Ph.D. candidate;Operation Phakisa Education: Why a secret? Mass surveillance, inequality, and race in South Africa's emerging national e-education system; https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/8054;

Today, the United States is at the center of a new, digital global surveillance apparatus. U.S. whistleblowers like William Binney, Thomas Drake, Kirk Wiebe, and Ed Lumis revealed that the U.S. government is conducting bulk surveillance on foreign and domestic populations. Their claims were confirmed by Edward Snowden, who leaked a massive trove of documents to journalists in June 2013. Various leaks and whistleblowers have revealed that the United States government partners with major U.S.-based technology corporations to conduct mass surveillance on domestic and global populations. The National Security Agency (NSA) is at the center of the new surveillance regime (Greenwald, 2014; Granick, 2017). The vast scope of NSA surveillance is indicated by various programs disclosed by whistleblowers. The two primary tools used to conduct surveillance are Upstream (which taps the Internet backbone, often with direct cooperation from U.S. corporations) and PRISM (which gives the NSA access to data from major corporate service providers such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Skype) (Macaskill and Dance, 2013). A program called XKEYSCORE is used to collect “nearly everything a user does on the Internet” and provide them with a Google-like search interface for surveillance targets (Greenwald, 2013; Dorling, 2013). Through BULLRUN, the NSA inserted vulnerabilities into popular protocols like HTTPS, voice-over-IP, and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) (Ball, et al., 2013) [29]. The NSA permits it to store any and all encrypted communications for as long as they wish, in hopes they may one day decrypt the content (Perloth, et al., 2013). The NSA’s new $2 billion facility in Bluffdale, Utah has four 25,000-square-foot data halls to store “rows and rows” of servers (Bamford, 2012). According to NSA whistleblower William Binney, Bluffdale was built to expand the NSA’s data storage capacity. He estimates “just for e-mails and phone calls alone they have approaching 20 trillion transactions of US citizens with other US citizens” (Binney, 2013). Banking, social networking data, and other services add trillions of more transactions. The mass interception and collection of electronic communications demonstrates that the United States and its allies aim to bring nearly all electronic communications under its vast global surveillance net. There are recent examples of Western intelligence agencies spying on South Africans. In June 2014, the Washington Post reported that the NSA provided legal certification “to intercept through U.S. companies not just the communications of its overseas targets but any communications about its targets as well” (Nakashima and Gellman, 2014). One hundred ninety three countries are certified targets, including South Africa (Washington Post, 2014). In 2014, Der Spiegel published slides detailing an NSA program, TREASUREMAP, which aims to provide a “near real-time, interactive map of the global internet” that plots every device connected in “a kind of Google Earth for global data traffic, a bird’s eye view of the planet’s digital arteries” (Müller-Maguhn, et al., 2014). The NSA includes South Africa among its “13 covered servers in unwitting data centers around the globe” (National Security Agency [NSA], n.d.). The data centers help the NSA “perform [DNS] monitoring covertly and to get a more global view on DNS name resolution and service availability” [30]. In 2016, Le Monde reported that Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), an NSA ally, tapped into telecommunications networks by targeting their managers. South Africa-based telecommunications corporation MTN Group was among those under surveillance (Leloup and Utersinger, 2016). The GCHQ also aimed to retrieve the briefings of the South African delegates to G20 and G8 summit meetings (Guardian, 2013). In 2015, the United Kingdom Investigatory Powers Tribunal found the GCHQ unlawfully breached the European Convention on Human Rights for spying on the South African-based Legal Resources Centre (LRC) (RDM Newswire, 2015). The LRC is known for its work protecting human rights. Within South Africa there is suspicion that domestic corporations and the state are conducting bulk surveillance. In 2011, Wikileaks published leaked documents from Stellenbosch-based VASTech SA Pty Ltd. showcasing equipment for bulk communications interception. The content of phone calls and e-mail messages, as well as metadata from telephone and Internet communications, can be swept up by VASTech’s Zebra, Badger, and Satellite Signal Analyser products (Swart, 2016a). The equipment was sold to Muammar Gaddafi, who used it for bulk surveillance of the Libyan population (Sonne and Coker, 2011). In October 2016, The Intercept published a leaked document revealing that VASTech has since developed more powerful “NSA-like” equipment it claims “rivals a government spy agency” (McLaughlin, 2016). During the mid-2000s, VASTech was subsidized by the South African government (Mchunu, 2013). It is not known if the government owns or uses VASTech’s mass surveillance equipment. However, the evidence suggests it desires to conduct bulk surveillance to counter political dissent. In June 2016, investigative journalist Heidi Swart reported contents of a leaked document, “The 2014 National Intelligence Priorities”. According to Swart, “The document states that countering the ‘most serious threats to our national security’ that require ‘immediate and sustained intelligence collection” involves the ‘maximum use of covert human and technical means’.’ The “intelligence gathering is justified by several ‘threats to national security’. For example, one intelligence priority for 2014 centered on national and provincial elections. The SSA Domestic Branch was tasked with investigating and counterplanning for a ‘so-called “Arab Spring” uprising prior to elections’”. “Another area of interest for the SAA,” Swart added, “was investigating and counterplanning for ‘violent industrial action’, with the investigation of ‘inter-union rivalry as a driver of violent industrial action’ high on the agenda. The transport industry was to be watched to allow for ‘counterplanning for violence in the taxi industry’”. Areas of surveillance include “terrorism, espionage, violence against foreign nationals, gangsterism, and the private security industry” (Swart, 2016b). Privacy advocates consider South African communications legislation too weak to adequately safeguard privacy (Right2Know, 2014). Under the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision Act (RICA), telecommunications service providers must deploy infrastructure to allow the monitoring and interception of communications, while Internet service providers are required to store citizen metadata for three–five years. Legislation fails to regulate the most powerful mass surveillance capabilities conducted at the National Communications Centre, and citizens are required to register SIM cards in a national database (Right2Know, 2016). The “2014 National Priorities” document and other facts about surveillance equipment and legislation make clear that all South African inhabitants face the threat of mass government surveillance. As digital technology spreads in South Africa, its inhabitants must also grapple with ubiquitous surveillance captured for big data analytics via the private sector. There are warning signs that this will have deleterious effects on civil rights and liberties. In May 2016, Angwin, et al. published a case study for ProPublica in which the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) computer software created by Northpointe corporation for the U.S. criminal justice system assigned a higher criminal “risk assessment” to blacks than to whites. ProPublica’s study assessed 7,000 people arrested in Florida. They found the risk assessment algorithm used to predict violent crime flagged black defendants as future criminals at twice the rate as white defendants. Northpointe’s algorithm is proprietary. As such, there is no way for the public to understand how it gave rise to this outcome. However, some details were provided to ProPublica. Northpointe does not categorize individuals by race, but they do assess factors correlated to race, such as educational degree and employment status. Northpointe’s founder, Tim Brennan, maintains that categories correlated to race like poverty, joblessness, and social marginalization must be included lest “your ... accuracy goes down” (Angwin, et al., 2016). Their predictive policing software is among the most widely used assessment tools in the U.S. criminal justice system. Commercial surveillance also threatens to reinforce socioeconomic inequality. For example, companies are seeking to exploit novel forms of data to determine credit scores. Social networking services like Facebook seek to determine creditworthiness based on “social credit scores” (data from social networking) (Packin and Lev-Aretz, 2016). A person’s Facebook friends, for example, might better indicate her creditworthiness than her financial history derived from a FICO score. As with Northpointe’s algorithm, facially neutral categories might adversely affect oppressed groups. In the case of race, if having personal wealth and wealthy friends raises your credit score, and white people have more wealth, then the algorithm would favor whites and reinforce race-based inequality [31]. Socioeconomic inequality is all the more prone to insidious reinforcement when race-associated attributes tacitly emerge through data analytics. This is sometimes called “latent trait inference” whereby algorithmic processes are able to accurately infer traits from data even if they are not disclosed. Facebook has been dancing around this issue. For example, their users do not disclose their race (there is no “race” category), but Facebook offers advertisers “ethnic affinity” categories such as African American, Asian American, and Hispanic. Given that any user from any “race” can fall into the category based on “indicators” (e.g., a white person who is a member of the African American Chamber of Commerce will help define their “ethnic affinity”), Facebook states they are not racially profiling (Newtiz, 2016). In March 2016, Business Insider revealed different users received different trailers for the film Straight Outta Compton based on their Facebook affinity group (McAlone, 2016). There were two different Straight Outta Compton trailers delivered to the affinity groups. The trailer shown to white people boxed into their own ethnic affinity group portrayed the film as a “gangster movie” full of violence and conflicts with police. The trailer shown to black people pegged into their respective affinity group portrayed the film as a biopic, with violence contextualized as “‘protest’ imagery created by the very relatable, beloved members of N.W.A.” (Newitz, 2016). In another instance, Facebook was sued by its users over “over alleged discriminatory policies that they say violate the US Federal Housing Act of 1964” (Farivar, 2016). The ethnic affinity grouping allowed marketers to offer housing advertisements that exclude ethnic affinity groups (Angwin and Parris, Jr., 2016) [32]. Under apartheid, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) also provided different media content for its official race categories. Channel TV1 was reserved for whites and TV2/3 was reserved for blacks. Their language policy called for “culturally authentic communication” [33]. English terms like “potato chips” and “toothpaste” were prohibited by TV2/3. There were no corresponding terms in Zulu, Xhosa, or Tswana, so advertisers were forced to describe them as “slice of potato fried in oil” or “the soap that cleans your teeth” [34]. Separate media content was designed to reinforce racial segregation. While big data content delivery does not filter as sharply, discriminatory content delivery via filter bubbles threatens to segregate cultural groups, with adverse effects on oppressed groups and social cohesion. The poor black majority thus has many reasons to worry about government and commercial surveillance. When asked about collection of student data, a high level e-education official, Sipho* said, “There are a lot of contentious problems. It’s very much linked the right to privacy of individuals and so forth”. When asked about the fact that Google and the United States government will be tracking the youth from a young age, Sipho responded that “we are not having such a discussion at the moment” [35].

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Data/Digital Control

US control of digital infrastructure locks in a new imperial relationship that extracts value from the global South

Kwet, Michael 2019 [Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School PhD Candidate, Sociology, Rhodes University; Digital colonialism: US empire and the New Imperialism in the Global South; Race & Class Volume 60, No. 4 (April 2019); Yale University; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3232297;]

Under digital colonialism, foreign powers, led by the United States, are planting infrastructure in the Global South engineered for its own needs, enabling economic and cultural domination while imposing privatized forms of governance. To accomplish this task, major corporations design digital technology to ensure their own dominance over critical functions in the tech ecosystem. This allows them to accumulate profits from revenues derived from rent (in the form of intellectual property or access to infrastructure) and surveillance (in the form of Big Data). It also empowers them to exercise control over the flow of information (such as the distribution of news and streaming services), social activities (like social networking and cultural exchange), and a plethora of other political, social, economic, and military functions mediated by their technologies. The control of code is foundational to digital domination. In Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig (1999/2006) famously argued that computer code shapes the rules, norms, and behaviors of computer-mediated experiences in ways similar to architecture in physical space (e.g. imperial railways designed for colonization).23 As a result, “code is law” in the sense that it has the power to usurp legal, institutional, and social norms impacting the political, economic, and cultural domains of society. This critical insight has been applied in fields like copyright, free speech regulation, Internet governance, blockchain, privacy, and even torts. What has been missed, however, is how US dominance of code – and other forms of digital architecture – usurps sovereignty in foreign countries. The power of the United States over code and other digital infrastructure constitutes a new form of imperialism. Digital forms of power are linked together through the three core pillars of the digital ecosystem: software, hardware, and network connectivity.24 Software is the set of instructions that define and determine what your computer can do. Hardware is the physical equipment used for computer experiences. The network is the set of protocols and standards computers use to talk to each other, and the connections they make. Domination over these three elements – software, hardware, and networks – provides a great source of power over people. Let us consider each in turn. Software is the coded logic that constrains and enables particular user experiences. For example, software determines rules and policies such as whether or not users can post a message anonymously at a website, or whether or not users can make a copy of a copyright-restricted file like an e-book. The rules that a programmer codes into the software largely determines technological freedoms and shapes users’ experiences using their devices. Thus, software exerts a powerful influence on the behavior, policies, and freedoms of people using digital technology. Control over software is a source of digital domination primarily exercised through software licenses and hardware ownership. Free Software licenses allow people to use, study, modify, and share software as they see fit.25 By contrast, non-free software licenses grant a software designer control over users by precluding the ability to exercise those freedoms. With proprietary software, the humanreadable source code is closed off to the public, and owners usually restrict the ability to use the software without paying. In the case of Microsoft Windows, for example, the public must pay for the program in order to use it, they cannot read the source code to understand how it works, they cannot change its behavior by changing the code, and they cannot share a copy with others. Thus with proprietary licensing, Microsoft maintains absolute control over how the software works. The same goes for other proprietary apps, like Google Play or Adobe Photoshop.26 By design, non-free software provides the owner power over the user experience. It is authoritarian software. Control over hardware is a second source of digital domination. This can take at least three forms: software run on third-party servers, centralized ownership of hardware, or hardware designed to prevent users from changing the software. Let us consider each of these in turn. In the first instance, software is executed on someone else’s computer. As a result, users are dispossessed of their ability to control it. This is typically accomplished through Software as a Service (SaaS) in the cloud. For example, when you visit the Facebook website, the interface you are provided executes on third party hardware (i.e. on Facebook’s cloud servers). Because users cannot change the code running on Facebook’s servers, they cannot get rid of the “like” button or change the Facebook experience. “There is no cloud,” the saying goes, “just someone else’s computer.” Corporations and other third parties design cloud services for remote control over the user experience. This gives them immense power over individuals, groups, and society.27 In the second instance, people become dispossessed of hardware ownership itself. With the rise of cloud computing, it is possible that hardware manufacturers will soon only offer low-powered, lowmemory devices (similar to the terminals of the 1960s and 1970s) and computer processing and data storage will be primarily conducted in centralized clouds. With end-users dispossessed of processing power and storage, software and data would be under the absolute control of the owners and operators of clouds.28 In the third instance, hardware is manufactured with locks that prevent users from changing the software on the devices. By locking down devices to a pre-determined set of software choices, the hardware manufacturer determines which software is allowed to run when you turn on your device.29 Thus, hardware restrictions can prevent the public from controlling their devices, granting device manufacturers them power over users. Control over network connectivity is a third source of digital domination. Net neutrality regulation proposes that Internet traffic should be “neutral” so that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) treat content flowing through their cables, cellular towers, and satellites equally. According this philosophy, those who own the pipes are “common carriers” and should almost never be allowed to manipulate the data that flows through them.30 This constrains the ability of wealthy media providers to pay for faster content delivery speeds than less wealthy providers (such as grassroots organizations, small businesses, and common people). More importantly, by treating traffic equally, net neutrality prevents network discrimination against various forms of traffic critical to civil rights and liberties. For example, the Tor browser facilitates anonymous Internet communications, but the use of the Tor network can be detected by Internet Service Providers and throttled (i.e. slowed to a crawl).31 Net neutrality prevents this form of discrimination and protects the end user’s freedom to utilize the Internet as they wish, without third party favoritism, blocking, or throttling. Each of the three pillars of the digital ecosystem – software, hardware, and network – constitute a source of power and control. To illustrate the point, let us consider some concrete examples related to social justice in the Global South. The copyright industry is threatened by the mass sharing of paywalled publications over the Internet (what they derisively label “piracy”). Given that hard drive capacity and Internet speeds will rapidly increase over time, the capacity to share vast libraries of music, movies, books, and other media is steadily increasing. What will be done when each person has a 40 terabyte hard drive and can trade the entire collection of popular music from the last century within an hour? Advances in technology deepen the need for architectural control to police the copyright system. One way to stop file sharing is to control software. The industry built Digital Rights Management (DRM) software, for example, to prevent copyright-restricted publications from playing on a user’s computer unless the user pays to access it first. This works well with proprietary software because people cannot remove the DRM. However, if the DRM software is Free Software – which allows people the freedom to use, study, modify, and share the software – people can remove the DRM code that locks the content. Thus, industry is bolstered by proprietary software as a means to enforce copyright. A second way to prevent sharing is to take control of the hardware. If, for example, people stop running software on their own devices – and instead run their computer experiences through centralized cloud servers – then cloud providers can determine their “access” to copyrighted data. In this scenario, users cannot copy and trade media over the Internet because the data “streams” to their device from a content owner’s platform (e.g. Netflix or Spotify) which provides media content through their servers. Thus, the widespread distribution of storage capacity and broadband Internet threatens the copyright monopoly.32 A third way to prevent sharing media is to control the network. People may own and control their software and hardware, but if they can be spied on by an ISP or government, then they can be fined or arrested for copyright infringement, or have their Internet connection throttled or terminated. People might use privacy protection technologies to conceal their content sharing – such as the Tor network or Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) – but this can be thwarted by ISPs throttling Tor or VPNs. In this scenario, control of the network (ISP discrimination) is used to make anonymous content sharing impractical. Thus, public control of the network threatens copyright enforcement. To bring this back to colonialism, US multinationals have designed digital architecture which, in one way or another, allows them to accumulate vast fortunes based on rent or data extraction. In the case of copyright, control over software, hardware, or the Internet is used to protect the copyright monopoly in the name of intellectual property rights. Given that the marginal cost of producing digital works is near-zero, prominent intellectuals have challenged copyright paywalls in the interest of socioeconomic justice and out of concern that draconian technologies are needed to enforce digital forms of copyright.33 Free access to digital publications for all people on planet earth, irrespective oftheir wealth, could improve education, culture, equality, democracy, and innovation. Western technology has been engineered to block free sharing, which impoverishes poor people’s ability to obtain knowledge and culture and reduces communication between rich and poor. Facebook’s Free Basics service offers another case example of how Big Tech corporations expand empire in the Global South. Free Basics offers a stripped-down version of free Internet services to people with little or no disposable income. Facebook decides which content and websites the poor can access – while of course offering Facebook itself within the app. Free Basics is zero-rated by ISPs, meaning that data transfers inside the app are paid for by ISPs instead of their customers. The ISPs hope that the limited Internet experience will lead to paying customers who, having tasted a free sample, will purchase data for the full experience. Free Basics not only has Facebook playing Internet gatekeeper of the poor, it also violates net neutrality laws: zero-rated offerings place content providers on unequal footing. Several countries have terminated Free Basics, in part due to popular backlash.34 However, Internet.org has put over 100 million users from over 60 countries – including South Africa – into the Facebook platform, which channels them towards the Facebook ecosystem. Integrating platforms like Facebook outside the US does more than drain local advertising revenue: it undermines various forms of local governance. Seventy-five percent of web publisher’s traffic now comes from Google (46%) and Facebook (29%).35 Centralization of services into their hands provides them with centralized control over communications – by way of code. These two firms filter search results and news feeds with proprietary black box algorithms, granting them enormous power to shape who sees which news. Leftist outlets have published data suggesting that Google censors socialist views, while Facebook has been found to favor mainstream liberal media.36 Platforms also regulate freedom of speech and association.37 If an online social network detects certain keywords and forms of speech, they can censor it, or ban the user. Moreover, they can prohibit the right to associate with others in the pursuit of social, political, economic, cultural, and religious ends. This has been carried out against Palestinians (e.g. with the removal of the page for the political party, Fatah), as well as the far-right.38 As private overlords of critical information infrastructure, US multinationals have the power to regulate the press, speech, and association in foreign territories, as they see fit. These examples demonstrate how structural domination of the tech ecosystem undermines local sovereignty through privatized forms of political, economic, and social governance. This helps the US perpetuate copyright paywalls, control information flows, spread their platform monopolies, supplant local autonomy, filter communications, and deepen dependency on the US. In turn, corporations increasingly profit from Big Data surveillance, an exploitative human rights transgression against the Global South. We discuss this element next.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Data/Digital Control

US control of cyberspace leads to digital colonialism- the US will use data security to exploit the global South

Kwet, Michael 2019 [Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School PhD Candidate, Sociology, Rhodes University; Digital colonialism: US empire and the New Imperialism in the Global South; Race & Class Volume 60, No. 4 (April 2019); Yale University; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3232297;]

Today, a new form of corporate colonization is taking place. Instead of the conquest of land, Big Tech corporations are colonizing digital technology. The following functions are all dominated by a handful of US multinationals: search engines (Google); web browsers (Google Chrome); smartphone and tablet operating systems (Google Android, Apple iOS); desktop and laptop operating systems (Microsoft Windows); office software (Microsoft Office, Google Docs); cloud infrastructure and services (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, IBM); social networking platforms (Facebook, Twitter); transportation (Uber, Lyft); business networking (Microsoft LinkedIn); streaming video (Google YouTube, Netflix, Hulu); and online advertising (Google, Facebook) – among others. GAFAM now comprise the five wealthiest corporations in the world, with a combined market cap exceeding $3 trillion.10 If South Africans integrate Big Tech products into their society, the United States will obtain enormous power over their economy and create technological dependencies that will lead to perpetual resource extraction. As an empirical matter, this point has been understudied. Nevertheless, early research and anecdotes suggest the economic impact of Big Tech intermediaries is detrimental to local African industries. Murphy, Carmody, and Surborg studied the role of ICTs among small, medium, and microsized enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa’s and Tanzania’s wood and tourism industries. They found that ICTs introduced the dominance of information intermediaries. Increased use of ICTs also led to greater worker surveillance in some instances. They concluded that ICT integration is, on balance, benefiting foreign-owned businesses and corporations.1 Similar conclusions can be derived from press accounts of the transportation industry. Since Uber began operating in Johannesburg in 2013, there have been labor strikes and violent clashes in the “South African taxi wars”. Several e-hailing taxi murders have been carried out by metered taxi drivers, who have warned that Uber will “burn” if it remains in South Africa. At the same time, many Uber drivers endure onerous working conditions for low pay.12 Uber has had devastating effects in Africa and beyond.13 The company takes around 25% commission for each trip, in addition to hidden costs,14 leading to an outflow of revenue from the local economy to foreign coffers. Moreover, they are able to undercut local markets by offering artificially low prices: Uber can operate at a loss – to the tune of billions – thanks to funding from Wall Street and other wealthy investors.15 With the backing of corporate finance, it leverages predatory subsidies, network effects, Big Data analytics, and the deregulatory effects of its position as an “intermediary” to stamp out competition and colonize the market. Within just two years, Uber sported a net worth of R1.65 billion (~$125 million) inside SA.16Similar problems have emerged in the media. In April 2017, the online news outlet GroundUp dropped Google Ads from its website. GroundUp’s Nathan Geffen explains the Google advertising model is “broken” for publishers who “have to put up with poor quality, misleading adverts in exchange for small change.” “The problem,” Geffen says, “is that nearly all the power in the online advertising relationship lies with Google.” The ad giant also serves up censorship threats: in one example, Google issued a warning to GroundUp for publishing a picture containing a painted bare breast as part of a protest action.17 In November 2017, Financial Mail’s Anton Harber wrote a feature story deeming Google and Facebook “the biggest threat to South African news media”.18 Google takes 70% of local online advertising, while social media – led by Facebook – takes another 12%. The major SA media groups are left with just 8% of the pie. The Google and Facebook “nemesis” are an expanding duopoloy: they take 77% of online advertising spend in the US and captured virtually all the ad growth in 2016.19 If this continues, Harber exclaims, “the big two could have a devastating effect on the media’s role in defining democracy”.20 These early case examples – the thin integration of ICTs into the wood and tourism industries in South Africa and Tanzania, Uber colonization of taxi markets, and the rising dominance of Google and Facebook in South African media – provide clear instances of digital colonialism whereby foreign corporations undermine local development, dominate the market, and extract revenue from the Global South. As we see next, this power is obtained primarily through the structural domination of digital architecture, which leads to more general forms of imperial control.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Data/Digital Control

US dominance over the digital ecosystem ushers in a new form of colonialism over the global South

Kwet, Michael 2019 [Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School PhD Candidate, Sociology, Rhodes University; Digital colonialism: US empire and the New Imperialism in the Global South; Race & Class Volume 60, No. 4 (April 2019); Yale University; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3232297;]

This paper argues that an insidious new phenomenon, digital colonialism, casts a shadow on the Global South.3 Digital colonialism is a structural form of domination exercised through the centralized ownership and control of the three core pillars of the digital ecosystem: software, hardware, and network connectivity. As we will see, control of these pillars vests the United States with immense political, economic, and social power. As such, GAFAM (Google/Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft) and other corporate giants – as well as state intelligence agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA) – are the New Imperialists in the international community. Assimilation into the tech products, models, and ideologies of foreign powers – led by the United States – constitutes a 21st century form of colonization. The present structure of the tech ecosystem is not written in the stars. There are alternative technologies, models, and ideologies for constructing a digital society aligned with human rights, democracy, and socioeconomic justice. Decentralized ownership and control of software, hardware, and the Internet are necessary prerequisites in this endeavor. Activists, technologists, and intellectuals in the global Free Software community have been at the forefront of this movement, and they have developed some of the alternative technologies that can be used today. This paper proposes a theoretical and conceptual framework for assessing digital colonialism, drawing on South Africa as a case example. In doing so, it makes three contributions to scholarship: (1) it theorizes digital colonialism as rooted in control over the digital ecosystem, (2) it provides a conceptual framework for digital domination in the Global South, and (3) it recommends practical alternatives that societies can pursue.4 Section I of this paper briefly outlines the social context in South Africa. It then highlights similarities with classic colonialism to demonstrate how imposition of the Northern digital ecosystem constitutes digital colonialism. It outlines how the United States exercises economic domination through corporate colonization, imposes imperial control through architectural domination, casts the shadow of global surveillance capitalism over the world, and is expanding imperial state surveillance. Section II proposes a theory of a freedom-respecting digital ecosystem – People’s Technology for People’s Power, or People’s Technology for short – as a necessary antidote to digital capitalism. It discusses different models of infrastructural ownership and control over software, hardware, and the Internet. By contrasting the present ecosystem to People’s Technology, it details how the United States consolidates tech hegemony through ruling class conceptions of technological progress – a doctrine of Manifest Destiny for the digital age. The paper concludes that digital colonialism threatens the Global South, and recommends solutions consistent with human rights, liberty, and equality.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Cybersecurity

Cyber threats are political tools to increase the money received by cyber companies- the result is a corrupt industry that overhypes security risks

Pascal Brangetto, and Mari Kert-Saint Aubyn in 2015

Economic Aspects of National Cyber Security Strategies; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence;

Do we see the emergence of a cyber security industrial complex? Is it comparable to the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower was warning us against during the Cold War? Should we worry? Companies providing cyber security services are making money, as there is a real market worth billions of dollars. Drawing from older examples, there are some real concerns that governments may not be getting what they need for the money they spend. For example, the US Government spent $1 billion on HP telling the Navy what it did on information architecture overhaul and system integration. This is the problem of the revolving door: it is difficult to trust the expertise when people are worrying more about their future job than about national interest. There is also the apt aphorism about the perfect weapon (for example, the case the B-1 bomber) that has 435 parts – one for each congressional district. A third of billboards on the Washington subway advertise defence industries, including cyber security firms. The ideas of ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’ and ‘cyber war’ have been around for a while, used or derided by public figures, but they are clearly serving the interests of cyber security companies. For instance, the private sector is interested in the hack-back capability that a company like Crowdstrike can provide. They also help them deploy honeynets of their own, assist them in the intelligence gathering effort in order to find out who exactly is the attacker. Endgame is probably selling zero-day exploits despite statements to the contrary; there are a number of countries that are buying. Another phenomenon is the porosity between the policy-makers’ world and the corporate world. Everyone sits on everyone’s board. For example, Richard Perle helped establish Palantir in the intelligence community. While, speaking of security rackets, Tiversa is a company which scans P2P networks looking for private files and subsequently offer protection for these files. On another note, can we really frame this issue by declaring ‘private good, public bad’ – ‘innovativeness and efficiency vs. capture and waste’? There can always be the argument in favour of ‘blue skies’ research that might find an immediate application, but some innovations are generated by the cyber security industry. However, can this be sustainable without massive investment? Brand names are established and it is very hard to enter the market. There have been large-scale IT transformations with mergers, and large corporations can be as bad as public sector. The cyber security industry is a bonanza for arms producers. In Europe, traditional security companies are expanding into the cyber security market via acquisitions and partnerships (e.g. BAE and Detica). States are investing in cyber security and companies are making use of their long-term good relationship with states. The defence market is characterised as a monopsony and oligopoly, and the Iron Triangle is also at work here. Critical information infrastructures are largely privately owned and states do not have the capabilities to protect them. The arms market and the cyber security market have several common features: security is a public good; there is a need for trust between the government and the companies providing security; fear is often used as a legitimation of public security policies; and there is an interest in sophisticated tools for both attack and defence. But there are also differences: cyber security is usually not about violence; the structure and composition of the markets are drastically different; and states have to work with the wider ICT industry to make their products safer by design, rather than only with security companies to fix the problems.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Cybersecurity

Calls for increased cybersecurity reinforce the power of the military industrial complex while ceding control of politics to technocratic elites

Benjamin Verdi in 2020

YPFP’s 2020 Cybersecurity & Technology Fellow, and a Global Innovation Manager with Grant Thornton International Ltd.; The Coming Cyber-Industrial Complex: A Warning For New US Administration – OpEd; Eurasia Review; https://www.eurasiareview.com/25112020-the-coming-cyber-industrial-complex-a-warning-for-new-us-administration-oped/

Sixty years ago an outgoing, conservative American president warned both his more liberal successor and his fellow citizens to guard against a worrying trend he saw emerging during his time in office. President Eisenhower’s farewell address made infamous the term “military-industrial complex” as a summation of the rapidly increasing reliance of a peacetime economy on government contracts to develop military-grade machines, weapons, and information systems. He worried that the short-term benefits brought on by increased military investment in the private economy could blind public decision-makers and American society to the perverse incentives of greater, even continuous, involvement in violent conflict. Bidding adieu, Eisenhower asserted “the technological revolution during recent decades” was “akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture.” Ike’s concerns remain relevant at this moment of transition, but in a new domain. Cybersecurity – cyber “defense” – presents a seemingly obvious need in this digital age. As the need for bigger, more connected, and integrated digital systems rises, so too will the risks associated with our reliance on those globally interconnected systems. Responsible governments must develop, promote, and maintain robust capabilities and sound approaches for deploying digital weaponry to defend themselves and their citizens from malicious actors, and they must rely on the aid and leadership of the world’s most innovative companies to do so. Yet we must ask ourselves what kinds of cyber creatures we are comfortable introducing into the digital ecosystem, and whether those are preferable to more traditional forms of deterrence. Fear of vulnerabilities and the risks associated with interconnected networks is understandable, but governments and industry leaders need to take a longer-term view of the implications new cyber capabilities might hold for the future digital landscape. Such a sustained and steady increase in cyber defenses has led to creeping calls from leaders in government and industry for what many trendily term cyber “offense.” Eisenhower might have predicted that those shouting loudest for the advancement of cyber offensive capabilities are the same institutions that view these tools as fundamental to their operational and tactical missions, as well as their budget lines. It should be clear that these short-term motivations are entirely logical, but solutions to near-term problems should not be our only guides when it comes to strategic decisions about the cyber-industrial future. A truly global cyber war would be more devastating than any traditional war ever could because it would not be confined to a physical battlefield. It might literally be waged on the devices in our pockets. Encouragingly, some thought-leaders are already pushing back on the race toward cyber “offense,” or are calling for a more intentional balance between the two functions. That said, their arguments are not necessarily any more tailored to the cyber realm than those they might normally make to oppose interventionist strikes on land, air, or sea. Framing the discussion of cyber “offense” along these familiar lines loses sight of what Eisenhower called “the total influence – economic, political, even spiritual” that peacetime economic dependence on wartime machinery could hold in “every city, every state house, every office of the federal government.” And, ironically, the very desire to pivot toward increasingly diversified digital security capabilities may ultimately leave militaries with fewer tools at their disposal to handle future conflicts. Cyberwarfare may someday become the best option for ensuring national security, but it should never become the only option. Lest this concern be cast as an esoteric matter of federal budgetary priorities, we should return to Eisenhower’s warning that without national attention “public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.” While eyes may roll at the thought of a five-star general and two-term president worrying about the advancement of any too-powerful elite, his worries could just as easily apply to the tools of cyberwarfare as to guns and bombs. While Eisenhower forcefully noted the necessity of military-funded innovation, he also reminded us of the correct order of operations for policy making. We ought to build the tools we want to ensure the security we need, not settle for the best security policy for which our tools allow. Geopolitical strategy aside, the biggest problem with the enthusiasm for cyber “offensive” tools to complement those on cyber “defense” is a technical one. Words like offense and defense make as much sense in cyberspace as they do describing the relationship between a plug prong and an outlet. Many if not most of the world’s most devastating cyber attacks have been propagated by bad actors who used tools initially developed for defensive purposes in offensive ways. A standard “ransomware” attack, for instance, involves a bad actor (often depicted wearing a black or red hat) using a form of encryption to steal data and hold it “ransom” from its rightful owner. Encryption in this case is an “offensive” capability, but it is generally a form of “defense” in most contexts. That is, encryption is the primary way in which systems prevent data from falling into the wrong hands. Thus even the simplistic, familiar dichotomy of “offense versus defense” breaks down in cyberspace, where tools are perpetually utilized beyond their intended purposes. Indeed, the internet and computers themselves – originally military innovations – are now used to perpetrate more heinous global crimes than any other tools in existence. Foraging through other traditional frameworks to formulate global strategy is similarly unrewarding. Isolationism versus interventionism, realism versus idealism, and all the other lenses through which we might consider national security, allude to, but fall short of, a clear framework for the cyber age. Without picking sides, and more to illustrate the uselessness of these outmoded spectra, a true cyber “isolationist” would need a lot of home-grown servers to simply get through the day, and a cyber “idealist” would make a most juicy target for any number of phishing or social engineering hacks and scams. And yet, perhaps the best guide to governing our current acceleration of cyber capabilities is still the sage advice of a 20th century president who was born in the 19th. In the same address in which President Eisenhower cautioned against the influx of military funding into US manufacturing and academia, he also noted: “Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.” If digital weaponry cannot be so easily classified into the formal categories of offensive or defensive, good or bad, then we must begin with labels like “understood,” or more simply, “accounted for.” Moreover, if cyber tools are the world’s newest weapons, then cyber talent is the world’s newest, most valuable resource. Only through the education and cultivation of prepared, informed, and responsible digital citizens will the future of cyberspace be the secure, liberated, and prosperous world so many have fought so hard to make this one.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Biotechnology

Biotechnology only works to reaffirm the power of commodities over individuals- it’s use to implement control over other countries as the ideology of imperialism is instead presented as a question of science and objectivity

Jasanoff ’06 (Sheila Jasanoff, Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School, has authored more than 130 articles and chapters, founded and directs the security technology and sciences Program at Harvard, served on the AAAS Board of Directors and as President of the Society for Social Studies of Science, holds AB, JD, and PhD degrees from Harvard, and honorary doctorates from the Universities of Twente and Liège; 2006, “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and Science”, JSTOR, DOA 6/25/22)//nm

Legibility Advertisements for agricultural biotechnology frequently show fields of grain laid out in neat parallel lines, illustrating both the fertility and the increased control that genetic modification can allegedly deliver. One could hardly find more compelling images of the “legibility” described by Scott. Intrusive weeds, barren patches, unruly growth have all been eliminated in favor of healthy, predictable, quantifiable yields— achieved through the precision of genetic control. However, just as the midcentury grand planners’ dreams of legibility were achieved at a cost, so legibility in modern GM agriculture demands unseen labors of standardization, and consequent elimination of ambiguity, to achieve its surface regularity. Four dimensions of standardization are worth noting: ontologies, epistemologies, socio-ecologies, and forms of life. All four maintain traditional relations of power between center and periphery, and all can be illustrated through the case of “golden rice,” the poster crop for a new generation of nutrient-enriched GM crops to feed the developing world.60 The name was given to a strain of rice bioengineered to produce beta-carotene, which colors the grain a pale gold; when ingested, it converts to vitamin A in the body and protects consumers against vitamin deficiency leading to possible blindness. For the products of GM agriculture to locate themselves securely in global markets, there has to be broad agreement on what these entities actually are. This ontological question may seem straightforward at first—proponents of golden rice, for instance, claim that it is nothing more than a more nutritious plant variety—but food crops straddle too many categorical boundaries for their identity in the political domain to be anything but hybrid. There are, to begin with, regulatory classifications. Should a crop engineered to produce ingredients of medicinal value be considered a food or a drug? Even if such issues can be settled by formal administrative definitions, the North-South debate surrounding GM crops shows how difficult it is to achieve ontological closure around a commodity that is at once a natural kind (a plant with specific genes and traits) and a social kind (a product of particular economic and political orderings, and a potential reorganizer of society).61 How one should know the properties of GM crops is similarly open to question. U.S. authorities have insisted that the only proper basis on which to evaluate the impacts of these novel entities is through science-based risk assessment. Yet, as the dispute between the United States and Europe at the WTO graphically illustrates, vast disagreements persist about the epistemological status of risk assessment. Is it a “science” at all, in the sense of being a well-demarcated, uncontroversial, paradigmatic (in a Kuhnian sense) method of representing the world; or is it instead a patently political and culturally constructed instrument for managing the uncertainties that inevitably accompany large projects of reconfiguring nature or society?62 To accept producers’ contention that crops such as golden rice are “safe,” one has to buy the former, not the latter, characterization. If, however, risk assessment is an expression of political culture by other means, then one should not be surprised if that form of analysis does not travel friction-free across political and cultural boundaries.63 GM crops are developed in the laboratory, usually in science-rich Western nations, tested in the field, and transported thence for commercial propagation in both naturally and socially variable environments. Monsanto, in this respect, is like the Kew Gardens of the nineteenth century: a metropolitan “center of calculation”64 from which standardized products flow out to take root in the world’s economic and political peripheries. Key to sustaining this mode of production is the assumption that socioecologies are as standard as the crops grown within them—put differently, that social and ecological circumstances at the periphery are not so radically different from those at the metropolitan center as to defeat the project of global technology transfer. Yet accidents occurring even within the boundaries of single nation-states show that transfers from the laboratory to the field can bring unpleasant surprises. For example, in one costly U.S. episode, ProdiGene, a GM corn variety containing an insulin precursor, trypsin,65 was planted in an unmarked field in rural Iowa. The manufacturer agreed with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which approved the field trials, that the field would be quarantined the following year so as to remove any volunteer plants.66 In fact, the fields were not properly isolated and an undetermined quantity of the GM crop was harvested along with about 500,000 bushels of soybeans during the following season. Similar failures resulting from unforeseen couplings of technology, environment, and human behavior are all the more probable when transfers occur across disparate cultures of farming and of hazard control. Expanding on this point, it has become clear that complex technological systems are forms of life, uniting human and nonhuman components in a common purposive framework, as much as they are targeted attempts to improve upon aspects of human life by physical or biological means. Thus, transportation systems do not only move people about from place to place. They remake social structures and self-understandings. A car culture, for example, gives rise to different visions, and valuations, of time, distance, autonomy, community, environmental quality, and the cost of life than a culture dependent chiefly on bicycles or public transportation does. Similarly, industrial agriculture is organized and managed on different principles from small family farms; the two systems of production rest on different economic, social, and technological infrastructures, and their impacts on human solidarity and on the environment are correspondingly divergent. Conventional risk assessment methods take little or no account of the social and ethical ramifications of technological systems, including the threats they pose to long-settled patterns of living. This blindness to technology’s disruption of established forms of life, underwritten by the allegedly scientific power of risk assessment, has fueled much of the criticism of agricultural biotechnology in the global South.67 Identity and Community Empires, no less than nation-states, engender and depend on feelings of belonging. Devices for producing imperial imagined communities have included, besides the grand, polarizing, ideological discourses of the cold war, mundane practices such as performing national celebrations,68 teaching a common language, training administrative and judicial élites, and building infrastructures for commerce and communication. Science and technology, we have seen, have long served as agents of imperial governmentality, helping to produce the mission consciousness and the associated forms of knowledge and skill that serve as instruments for extending power. Modern biotechnology, similarly, provides a discourse of development that continues colonial traditions, although the agents, recipients, and specific mechanisms of the development project have been partially reconfigured in modern times. The discovery of Africa as a site for biotechnological development, through the propagation of crops such as golden rice, offers perhaps the clearest illustration. In the rhetoric of development specialists, and the scientific and industrial institutions that serve them, Africa is represented through tropes of crisis and charity that render the continent’s condition as dire and the offers of scientific and technological solutions as salvationary.69 In one instructive example, Gordon Conway, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, and a colleague wrote an article in the prestigious journal Science on biotechnology’s capacity to help Africans. Though presented as scientific, the article merged the empiricist register of science with a narrative register that was little short of missionary. At the center of the discussion was a fictional African housewife, “Mrs. Namurunda,” who the authors said was not a real person but “a composite of situations existing in Africa.”70 The story begins with Mrs. Namurunda, a farmer and single mother, eking out a hard-scrabble existence on fields infested with every form of insect blight, under adverse conditions of drought and soil degradation. It ends with scientific biotechnology solving her problems, enabling her to turn a profit and secure a brighter, better educated, more enlightened future for her children. This script follows Foucault’s delineation of biopower with uncanny precision. An entire continent becomes a medicalized body, requiring urgent therapeutic intervention, both as a collective and for its individual members. The fictional person of Mrs. Namurunda, unveiled in the pages of one of the world’s leading scientific journals, becomes a symbol for Africa’s “composite” ailments. Advanced societies’ power to develop and deliver the requisite treatments offers them the right, indeed the obligation, to engage in a new mission civilisatrice—built on a biomedical ethic of cure rather than, as in earlier times, a religious model of grace. But, this time, eschewing the forceful, state-led constellations of power that undergirded colonial rule, the neoliberal state works through a lightly regulated global industry and a largely selfregulating scientific community. Their expansion into new territories carries the promise of better jobs and higher incomes back in the home country, thereby allowing the economically more powerful state to justify itself where votes are counted, in its own national community of citizens. The sick and incapacitated recipient, however, has little or no say in either the diagnosis or the treatment of the alleged pathology

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Biotechnology

The 1AC’s new biotech is merely a rearrangement of US domination—the drive for metaphysical innovations are justified by fears of the uncertain states which must be controlled by the technologically developed US empire

Jasanoff ’06 (Sheila Jasanoff, Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School, has authored more than 130 articles and chapters, founded and directs the security technology and sciences Program at Harvard, served on the AAAS Board of Directors and as President of the Society for Social Studies of Science, holds AB, JD, and PhD degrees from Harvard, and honorary doctorates from the Universities of Twente and Liège; 2006, “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and Science”, JSTOR, DOA 6/25/22)//nm

PLANTS FOR THE PLANET: THE EMPIRES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY Apart from occasional radical social misfits such as the so-called Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski,43 few any longer question the vital role of science and technology in human development. Even opponents of particular technological projects—large dams,44 for example, or genetically modified (GM) foods45—rarely dismiss technology outright; rather they favor smaller, more transparent, or more locally governable technological systems. The question that preoccupies students of science and technology, then, is not whether, but how, to integrate innovation into people’s lives so as to make a positive difference. Years of research in the social psychology of risk perception46 and public understanding of science47 have established that popular fear or rejection of new technology often rests, at bottom, on an uneasiness about the ways in which technology is managed or, more accurately, governed. What do these observations imply for an industry with global ambitions, like agricultural biotechnology? How, more specifically, does biotechnology contribute to ways of political worldmaking beyond the nation-state, and what implications do the engagements between biotechnology and global politics have for democratic governance? In reaching for answers, it is useful to think of biotechnology operating politically in several different registers. It is, of course, most plainly a material technology: it makes new instruments for warding off harm and disorder, such as plants that resist insects, weeds, or drought, and it redesigns pieces of nature, such as genes, to perform new tasks in new environments. In this respect, biotechnology is, concurrently, a metaphysical device; it brings new entities into the world and through that process reorders our sense of rightness in both nature and society.48 At the same time, biotechnology is a discourse: to some, of progress and improvement, beneficence and utility; to others, of risk, invasiveness, and domination from afar. Proponents of agricultural biotechnology tell particular stories about a world in which plant genetic modification is possible, and these stories carry political and cultural weight. Lastly, biotechnology is an institution of governance; it shapes forms of social life by influencing how people choose to, or are able to, live with the products of bio-industry. Each of these registers, as we see below, has been activated in the global politics of biotechnology. The Resisting Multitude In May 2004, a scientific journal reported that German researchers were keeping secret the locations of some thirty sites planted with GM corn for fear that anti-GM activists would destroy the crops, as they previously had elsewhere in Germany.49 Failure to disclose these locations was contrary to the EU Directive 2001/18, which requires GM crop sites to be publicly registered. Noncompliance with European law in traditionally law-abiding Germany may have been newsworthy, but the threat to GM crops was anything but novel. From the late 1990s onward, attacks on field trial sites began evolving into a form of international protest that seemed to epitomize Hardt and Negri’s thesis about an emerging, assertive, global multitude: in Britain, hundreds of demonstrators dressed in decontamination suits uprooted GM plants in test fields in 1999; in India and Brazil, farmers’ unions organized similar protests; in France, José Bové, the charismatic head of the radical Confédération Paysanne (Peasant Confederation), became a folk hero by orchestrating the destruction of thousands of GM plants, as well as a partially built McDonald’s outlet, in 1999. His subsequent trial, fine, and terms of imprisonment left him and his supporters undaunted, indeed ready to resume battle as much as five years after their initial transgressions. Field trial sites were not the only theater of protest against GM agriculture. Antiglobalization activists early identified biotechnology as a symbol of the environmental, economic, and cultural homogenization they wished to resist. Demonstrations against Monsanto and GM corn (or maize), together with evocations of risks to nontarget species such as the monarch butterfly, were part of the repertoire of street protest during the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999. In this and similar episodes, representatives of a loosely networked global citizenry asserted their right to debate technological futures in terms other than those conventionally used by nation-states and their expert advisers: the formal discourses of law, molecular biology, economics, risk assessment, and bioethics. At stake was who had power to determine how much global harmonization there should be and which scientific, technological, and economic innovations should be allowed to diffuse throughout the world. Those opting for more local, bottom-up visions won a salient victory when Monsanto decided, under rising public pressure, to withdraw its plans to develop sterile seed technology, through use of the so-called Terminator gene;50 later, citing a drop in global demand, the company also announced that it would put on hold its plans to market genetically modified Roundup Ready wheat.51 Ideology and Enforcement Not everyone saw the antiglobalization movement as the promising vanguard of planetary resistance against an outmoded, corporate-dominated, neoliberal world order. Using the classical ordering machinery of science and the law, proponents of agricultural biotechnology sought to promote their visions of social and technological progress, stifling opposition and dissent. At the February 2000 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond, Republican from Missouri, Monsanto’s home state, was openly dismissive of the Seattle protest. He represented it as a struggle between scientific expertise and the misguided, if exuberant, ignorance of youth: “The scientific debate is not being controlled by Ph.D.s but apparently by young people with a proclivity for street theater. . . . It’s coming to the point that scientists are going to have to get dressed up as corncobs to get the attention of the media.”52 At the same meeting, Madeleine Albright, President Clinton’s secretary of state, also cast the conflict as one between reason and unreason. “But science,” she said, “does not support the ‘Frankenfood’ fears of some, particularly outside the United States, that biotech foods or other products will harm human health.”53 Both speakers, from different political parties, enlisted science as their ally in defending biotechnology against its critics. This invocation of scientific authority in support of technological innovation is a marker of America’s commitment to a particular ideology of technoscientific progress.54 A look across the ocean at contemporaneous UK debates on biotechnology helps bring into relief the ideological dimensions of the American position. The term “Frankenfood” was widely used in the British tabloid press to reflect and, some said, reinforce public anxieties. But concerns were not restricted to the media and the ignorant public. The British scientific community had all along expressed greater uncertainty about the safety of GM crops than its American counterpart, particularly with respect to the environmental consequences of commercial use.55 These doubts led British experts to reject the official U.S. position that the process of genetic modification carries no special risks; all that matters for regulatory purposes is the end product. Scientific and public opinion in Britain united behind a more cautious approach, demanding more experimentation—for example, through farm-scale trials56— before authorizing the commercialization of GM crops. As doubts intensified, Tony Blair’s government decided on a highly unusual three-pronged review of the science, economics, and public acceptability of these products to reevaluate the case for their introduction.57 The immediate outcome of this process was a decision to approve the commercialization of only one variety of GM corn, at least to start. Thus, while American neoliberalism treated biotechnology as just another stream of products, adequately controlled by the market except for assessments of their safety to human health and the environment, Britain’s more cautious and communitarian political culture granted the public some say in deciding which products they wanted to allow into the market. Whereas consultative procedures such as Britain’s GM debate and referenda in countries such as Denmark and Switzerland sought to defuse public opposition, elsewhere legal sanctions were employed to beat down what biotechnology promoters saw as unacceptable acts of intransigence. Thus, demonstrators such as José Bové who destroyed GM crops were prosecuted for damaging property in several countries. At the international level, the United States brought a case against the EU at the WTO for imposing an allegedly illegal moratorium on the importation of GM crops and foods. Foundational to the U.S. case was the argument that there were no good scientific reasons for keeping these products off the European market, and that the moratorium therefore amounted to illegal protectionism.58 Intellectual property law, too, has been invoked in safeguarding the investments made by multinationals such as Monsanto in GM crops. Particularly interesting were the prosecutions brought against farmers in the United States and Canada who were found to be growing GM crops patented by Monsanto without a license. In the best known of these cases, a seventy-three-year-old Saskatchewan farmer named Percy Schmeiser was sued for growing genetically modified Roundup Ready canola, which he claimed had blown into his fields from neighboring farms. A 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld Monsanto’s patent infringement claim, saying that Schmeiser’s unlicensed use of seed containing Monsanto’s patented gene was sufficient to constitute infringement.59 In a Solomonic turn, though, the Court awarded no damages to Monsanto, on the ground that Schmeiser had not benefited economically from his unlawful act; equally, Schmeiser was not required to pay Monsanto’s court costs. The case warned GM crop producers that, under Canadian law, they would have a difficult time collecting damages for patent infringement; at the same time, they could be subject to potentially unlimited liability if their seeds accidentally contaminated, and thus damaged, the products of certified GM-free organic farms.