Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Russia Alliance Impact Answers › Russia-China Good Turn

Russia-Chinese alliance key to prevent border conflicts – without dialogue, the tensions would mirror the sino-soviet border wars

Crossley 2/27 [Pamela Kyle Crossley - Collis Professor of History, Dartmouth College, "Are China and Russia Forging a New Ideological Bloc?", https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/are-china-and-russia-forging-new-ideological-bloc, DOA: 6/25/16]

Ambassador Wu's reference to the absurdity of an "ideological bloc" is interesting, and in the sense of “ideology” as sometimes used in policy circles the prospect does seem absurd. But there has been some convergence of strategic conceptualization between the sequence of governments based in Beijing and in Moscow since at least 1689, when they began their own history of diplomatic exchange, and since that time they have successfully negotiated the maintenance of their nearly 3,000 miles of shared borders. It has not been simple or uniformly peaceful, and the idea that two enormous countries sharing centuries of successfully resolved tensions between their ancestral empires without emerging with some common ideas about trade regulation and taxation, environmental management, migration controls and maintenance of security is not entirely credible. Those could amount to an ideology of a positive sort, as contrasted to mere suspicion of and opposition to the United States, a sort of negative ideology. There are clearly grounds for alliance between Russia and China based on stable shared perspectives and interests rather than only a shared opponent. The question of China’s dense population accumulation on one side of the border and Russia’s expanses of lightly inhabited and under-developed territory on the other presents as many possibilities for cooperation as for conflict. The same is true for the faltering of the regime in North Korea, the problems of resource exploitation and transport in Central Asia, the management of sea and air dominance of the western Pacific, the development of programs for exploitation of space and the moon, and financial and commercial initiatives in Europe, among other issues. Russia and China have every reason to explore mutually-disciplined expansion on all fronts at the expense, if possible, of the United States and Japan, and history suggests that the rewards are great enough that both parties will have reason to accept such a program. The possibility of disenchantment on either side will always be present. Each can cite grievances against the other if needed, from the First United Front to the Korean War to the Sino-Soviet split to border disputes. The greatest danger may come not from the complexities of their roles in the wider world but from the relative stabilities of their governments. Slippage by either would raise the question of support from the other, or exploitation of a crisis to in order to sponsor a new and perhaps dependent —or at least obliged— new regime. Their pasts, in other words, look a bit more solid than their futures. Where they seek friendship they could find betrayal. But their history suggests that whether empires or republics they have an underlying understanding of what it is to be expansive on the Asian continent, to be enemies of Japan, and to live in tension with whatever they mean by “the West.” Why they would need “ideology” to further consolidate their affinity is not clear, but realization of what they have in common could be an ideology in itself.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Russia Alliance Impact Answers › Inevitable

China will support Russia regardless of how the Ukraine conflict develops

Blanchette 22(Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The worse things go for Putin in Ukraine, the more China will back him,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2022 at 4:09 p.m. EDT, ) - MP

China has tried to have it both ways since Russia invaded Ukraine a month ago. It abstained from key votes at the United Nations criticizing Russia’s actions, avoided directly labeling President Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine an “invasion,” amplified Russian disinformation and repeatedly laid blame for the war at the feet of the United States and NATO. At the same time, Beijing has also largely complied with sanctions against Russia, made repeated, if vague, calls for a negotiated settlement to the hostilities and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. But make no mistake: The worse it goes for Russia in Ukraine, the more China will step up its support for the Putin regime. Beijing’s uneven diplomatic strategy may seem to stem from a desire to achieve multiple, often conflicting aims, most notably to forestall a deterioration in relations with Europe. Not all objectives are weighted equally, however, and as the war enters a more protracted and destructive phase, China’s primary goal is coming into focus: to ensure that Russia retains its status as Beijing’s key strategic partner, even if this necessitates paying serious economic and diplomatic costs. Beijing will see the prospect of a Russian defeat as a direct threat to its own territorial security and ability to compete head-to-head in the geopolitical rivalry with the United States — and China simply can’t allow that to happen. To see why Beijing has a direct stake in the war’s outcome, it’s critical to understand how its relationship with Russia has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how China views the global security environment evolving over the next three to five years. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia have experienced significant friction and mutual mistrust. The nadir of the relationship came in 1969, when the two communist powers nearly engaged in a nuclear war. Since 1989, however, Beijing and Moscow have systematically addressed the major points of contention in their relationship, including any lingering territorial disputes. In 2001, the countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and after Chinese leader Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, cooperation has expanded to include joint military exercises, efforts to reform global governance and technology sharing. For example, the two countries continue to develop a satellite navigation system to rival the United States’ GPS, and in January, Russia and China, along with Iran, held a series of naval drills in the Indian Ocean. This growing symbiosis was formalized on Feb. 4 in a joint statement issued during Putin’s visit to Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics (Xi’s meeting with Putin then was his first with a world leader since February 2020, when he appeared with the Mongolian prime minister in Beijing). Stretching more than 5,000 words, the joint statement encapsulated a shared worldview between two authoritarian powers and two autocratic leaders. The global order is undergoing “momentous changes,” the statement read, which include a “transformation of the global governance architecture and world order” and “global challenges and threats growing from day to day.” But perhaps more important, the joint statement articulated a shared grievance that the United States and its allies threaten Chinese and Russian interests and global aspirations. NATO, the document states, promotes an “ideologized cold war approach,” while the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategy” endangers the “peace and stability in the region.” Before Russia had even invaded Ukraine, then, Beijing had come to see Moscow as a critical security and strategic partner in the growing power rivalry with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. More to the point, Russia is China’s only real military and strategic partner. Although tensions exist in the bilateral relationship, not least because of the growing economic gap between their economies, the broader geopolitical chessboard draws Moscow and Beijing together. What’s more, Putin and Xi have a close relationship — they’ve met in person or virtually nearly 40 times in the decade that Xi has been in power. Time is running out for China The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly thrown Beijing off balance, and Chinese officials certainly didn’t want Putin to invade in the first place, but the basic math underlying this strategic partnership with Moscow has not changed. Indeed, the war has only consolidated Beijing’s central logic for supporting Russia, given the recent demonstration of Western diplomatic unity, the overwhelming power of U.S.-led sanctions and the reinvigoration of NATO. The former editor of the Chinese nationalist Global Times newspaper, Hu Xijin, argued in recent commentary that “if the U.S. pursues extreme strategic coercion against China, with Russia as a partner, China will not fear a U.S. energy blockade, our food supplies will be more secure, as will [our supplies] of many other raw materials.” In a speech last weekend, China’s vice foreign minister Le Yucheng drew a straight line between NATO in Europe and China’s own security concerns, warning that just as Moscow’s actions in Ukraine were a direct consequence of NATO expansion, any actions by NATO in the Asia-Pacific region would provoke similar consequences, and thus, the “crisis in Ukraine is a stern warning.” Beyond the substantive reasons underlying China’s support for Russia, there is also Beijing’s unwillingness to be seen as submitting to the U.S. demand that it back away from Moscow. As one Chinese Russia expert at the Shanghai International Studies University observed, “If China goes along with the U.S. against Russia, it will not only greatly strengthen the anti-Russian camp, but will also be a huge boost to the U.S. ‘leadership.’ ” The key question now is just how far Beijing will go to support Moscow. While Xi would like to maintain good relations with Europe and avoid a further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship, the fate of Putin and the Russian state directly implicates China’s core security interests. Not only would the prospect of a beaten and broken Russia activate China’s fears of instability along their shared 2,500-mile border, but it would also create uncertainty about the future leadership and geopolitical orientation of the Russian government. If Putin were eventually to fall from power, would his successor remain aligned with Beijing? So the more anxious Beijing becomes about the war and Putin’s personal position in power, the more likely it is to step up support by providing direct economic assistance, mitigating the impact of sanctions and even supplying military equipment. Clearly, China’s preference is to avoid secondary sanctions in response to any support — access to the international market and the U.S. dollar remains critical for China’s economy and its continued rise. But Beijing could pursue means of support that are difficult to track, such as facilitating Russia’s access to U.S. dollars via offshore accounts, or by directing state-owned enterprises and even private companies to increase their purchases of non-sanctioned Russian goods and services. If China does decide to supply Russia with military assistance, it would likely seek to avoid equipment and hardware that would flagrantly violate international law and sanctions or be easily traceable, and instead provide spare parts, ammunition or certain dual-use items that aren’t yet sanctioned. But critically, the decision to provide aid to Russia would be driven primarily by Beijing’s assessment of how Russia is faring in the war, rather than a desire to avoid paying economic or diplomatic costs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing is watching the conflict unfold without growing more nervous by the day: Russia has failed to achieve any of its major military or political objectives. In just the past week, the Russian military has escalated its offensive to include a wider number of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, and President Biden is also now warning of “clear signs” that Putin is considering using chemical weapons. Domestically, Putin has begun to purge his inner circle, arresting some within the security services and senior officials in the national guard. Beijing will see this as a sign that Putin’s grip is weakening, and as the sanctions continue to decimate Russia’s economy, anxiety in China is only likely to grow. Succession plans protect nations. Putin and Xi just threw theirs out. Some analysts suggest that China may well see Russia’s recent weakening in the wake of sanctions as a net positive, as it shifts the balance of power in the relationship in Beijing’s favor. A tangible benefit of such a shift would be Beijing’s ability to demand more favorable terms in buying Russian energy. While it’s true that Beijing leveraged Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 to gain better terms in several large energy deals, the security environment for China in 2022 is far more contentious than it was in 2014, and Moscow’s true value is its ideological orientation and military capabilities as much as its energy stores. Xi does not want a weak Russia for a security and strategic partner. If Beijing turns toward and not away from Moscow as the war grinds on and the extent of human suffering increases, the basic trajectory of China’s relations with the West will undergo a profound shift toward open rivalry. It would be comforting to think that the prospect of such a disastrous turn would be enough to dissuade the Chinese leadership from traveling down this path. Unfortunately, though, Beijing’s geopolitical outlook for the next decade — much like Washington’s — includes conflict and friction as defining features.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Russia Alliance Impact Answers › Impossible

China will never create a full alliance with Russia because it needs US markets to sustain growth

Brækhus and Øverland 07 — Kyrre Elvenes Brækhus and Indra Øverland, Brækhus is a Mandarin Language Scholar at Tsinghua University, Beijing, Øverland is Director of the Energy Program at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway, 2007 (“A Match Made in Heaven? Strategic Convergence between China and Russia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, May 2007, Available Online at , Accessed 07-05-2016, SP)

Institutionalization of the Beijing–Moscow relationship remains low, but a pattern of regular consultation between top leaders has evolved. Russia and China also meet annually for bilateral military and technical co-operation talks, and have continued to develop the Shanghai Cooperation Organization founded in 2001. China–Russia strategic convergence is a discernible trend which will gain further momentum. However, strategic convergence should not be confused with an alliance, and China and Russia are not perfect strategic partners. Developments inside China and Russia are crucial to how the relationship develops. Key questions are whether political stability will prevail and whether rapid growth can be sustained. Trenin argues that a Sino–Russian alliance could occur only as a result of “exceptionally short-sighted and foolish policies on China and Russia are not pro-Western, but neither are they definitively anti-Western. Western policymakers who are worried about the implications of Sino–Russian strategic convergence would do well to pursue a policy of engaging both Moscow and Beijing, and put pressure on Tokyo to resolve the dispute over the Kurile Islands. Paradoxically, if an alliance, or something resembling an alliance, were to be formed this could lead to a breakdown of the relationship in the medium to long term. China and Russia both command sufficient resources and sophistication to be significant global powers in their own right, and they certainly consider themselves as such. China was unwilling to subordinate itself to Russia for more than a brief period after the Communists came to power in 1949, and Russia would refuse to subordinate itself to China. The most likely scenario is Sino–Russo strategic convergence based on a relationship of mutual self-interest. The evidence presented in this article indicates that trade and investment between China and Russia are set to continue to grow rapidly, particularly in the energy sector, further enhancing the significance of the relationship. While Beijing and Moscow have common interests in placing restraints on the power of the United States, the creation of a full-fledged anti-Western alliance is unlikely to prove viable in the short term. Russia and especially China are both dependent on open access to Western markets to sustain growth.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Hege Impact Answers › China Revisionist

Western encirclement, aging populations, and attempted expansion prove China is a volatile revisionist power on the verge of lash-out

Beckley and Brands 21– *Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, associate professor at Tufts University; **resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. (*Michael and **Hal, January 1, 2021, “Into the Danger Zone - Coming Crisis in US-China Relations," American Enterprise Institute, Targeted News Service, ProQuest via UMich Libraries, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27632?seq=1)//KH

Red Flags Most debate on America's China policy focuses on the dangers of a rising and confident China.3 But the United States actually faces a more complex and volatile threat: an already powerful but increasingly insecure China beset by internal problems and a brewing international backlash. China already has the money and muscle to challenge the United States in key areas. Thanks to decades of rapid growth, China boasts the world's largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity), manufacturing output, trade surplus, financial reserves, navy by number of ships, and conventional missile force. Chinese nationals lead four of the 15 United Nations specialized agencies.4 Chinese investments and loans span the globe, and Beijing is pushing for primacy in key technologies such as 5G telecommunications and artificial intelligence (AI).5 Add in that the American-led world order has experienced four years of geopolitical disarray under President Donald Trump and that much of the world has suffered through many months of a crippling COVID-19 pandemic, and it is hardly surprising that Beijing is testing the status quo everywhere from the South China Sea to the border with China. But China's geopolitical window of opportunity may be closing as fast as it opened. Since 2007, China's annual economic growth rate has dropped by more than half, and productivity has declined by nearly 10 percent, meaning that China is spending more to produce less.6 Meanwhile, debt has ballooned eightfold and is on pace to total 335 percent of gross domestic product by the end of 2020.7 No country has racked up so much debt so fast in peacetime. China has little hope of reversing these trends, because it is about to suffer the worst aging crisis in history. Over the next 30 years, China will lose 200 million working-age adults and gain 300 million senior citizens./8 Any country that has aged, accu-mulated debt, or lost productivity at anything close to China's current pace has lost at least one decade to near-zero economic growth. And as economic growth falls, the dangers of social and political unrest rise./9 China's leaders are well aware of these trends./10 President Xi Jinping has given multiple internal speeches warning party members of the potential for a Soviet-style collapse./11 China's gov-ernment has outlawed negative economic news, and Chinese elites are moving their money and children out of the country en masse./12 Meanwhile, China faces a rising wave of foreign hostility. According to leaked Chinese government reports and independent Western analyses, nega-tive views of China have soared to highs not seen since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989./13 This surge of anti-China sentiment is a response to Beijing's internal repression and external assertiveness, and it is now manifesting in ways that threaten to crush China's geopolitical ambitions. Nearly a dozen countries have suspended or canceled their participation in Belt and Road Initiative projects./14 Another 16 countries, including eight of the world's 10 largest economies, have banned or severely restricted use of Huawei products in their 5G networks./15 India has been turning hard against China, since a clash between the two countries killed 20 soldiers in June. Japan has ramped up military spending, turned amphibious ships into aircraft carriers, and strung missile launchers along the Ryukyu Islands near Taiwan, where a record number of citizens now identify solely as Taiwanese, not Chinese./16 The European Union has labeled China a "systemic rival," and Europe's three great powers--France, Germany, and the United Kingdom--are sending naval patrols to counter Beijing's expansion in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean./17 These intensifying headwinds will make China a less competitive long-term rival to the United States but a more explosive near-term threat. Simply put, it is hard to see how a country facing so many severe challenges can ultimately outpace America and its many allies. Yet whereas a rising China could afford to shelve disputes and deescalate crises--confident that its wealth, power, and status were growing and that the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) legitimacy was secure--a slowing and increasingly encircled China will be eager to score geopolitical wins while it still can. There is no mystery about what China's ambitions are, because the CCP has enshrined them in national law: to make the Chinese nation whole again; reunite Taiwan with the mainland; control the East and South China Seas, thereby turning the western Pacific into a Chinese lake; and restore China's status as a great power. The looming danger is that China will act more aggressively to achieve them as its future prospects dim. History Rhymes If China goes down this ugly path, it wouldn't be the first great power to do so. We tend to think that rising revisionists pose the greatest danger to the existing order. "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable," Thucydides wrote. But historically, the most desperate dashes have often come from dissatisfied powers that had been on the ascent but grew worried that their time was running short./18 World War I is the classic example. The growing German challenge to the United Kingdom provided the strategic background to that conflict. Yet in the foreground in the run-up to 1914 were nagging German fears of decline. The growth of Russian military power and strategic mobility was menacing the eastern flank. New French conscription laws were changing the balance in the west. A tightening Franco-Russian-British entente was leaving Germany surrounded. If Berlin did not act quickly, its military strategy--based on fighting a two-front war--would collapse, its dreams of world power and geopolitical greatness would vanish, and the internal strains caused by intensifying political clashes might become unmanageable. This was a principal reason Berlin acted so recklessly during the July crisis--by issuing its "blank check" to Austria-Hungary and then enacting its plan for a rapid, two-front war--despite the obvious peril, as Chief of General Staff Helmut von Moltke acknowledged, of a continental war that might "annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come."/19 The same decision-making dynamics were present in other cases. Imperial Japan made its fatal gamble in 1941, after the US oil embargo and naval rearma-ment made it clear that Tokyo's window to dominate the Asia-Pacific was closing fast./20 In the 1970s, Soviet global expansion peaked as Moscow's military buildup matured and the slowing of the Soviet economy created an impetus to lock in geopolitical gains sooner than later. Even the United States once fit this pattern. The flurry of American expansion and the buildup of US naval power in the 1890s came after an economic slump that exacerbated internal tensions and amid a global upsurge of imperial aggran-dizement that left some US strategists concerned that Washington would be left behind by emerging European mega-empires. In some of these instances, it was economic dis-tress following a long period of growth that stoked anxious aggression. In others, it was the onset of strategic encirclement, often self-provoked, by rival powers. In all cases, an upsurge in a revisionist state's power gave it the means to challenge the status quo, but an apparent downturn in its future prospects gave it the motive to do so boldly, even violently. Given that China is currently facing both a grim economic forecast and tightening strategic encirclement, the next few years may prove partic-ularly turbulent./21

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Hege Impact Answers › China Revisionist

China is revisionist – territorial expansion, 5-year plans, and anti-democratic innovation on all fronts

Beckley 22 – Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, associate professor at Tufts University (Michael, March/April 2022, "Enemies of My Enemy," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-02-14/china-new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy)//KH

ENTER THE DRAGON There has never been any doubt about what China wants, because Chinese leaders have declared the same objectives for decades: to keep the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, reabsorb Taiwan, control the East China and South China Seas, and return China to its rightful place as the dominant power in Asia and the most powerful country in the world. For most of the past four decades, the country took a relatively patient and peaceful approach to achieving these aims. Focused on economic growth and fearful of being shunned by the international community, China adopted a “peaceful rise” strategy, relying primarily on economic clout to advance its interests and generally following a maxim of the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping: “Hide your strength, bide your time.” In recent years, however, China has expanded aggressively on multiple fronts. “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy has replaced friendship diplomacy. Perceived slights from foreigners, no matter how small, are met with North Korean–style condemnation. A combative attitude has seeped into every part of China’s foreign policy, and it is confronting many countries with their gravest threat in generations. This threat is most apparent in maritime East Asia, where China is moving aggressively to cement its vast territorial claims. Beijing is churning out warships faster than any country has since World War II, and it has flooded Asian sea-lanes with Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels. It has strung military outposts across the South China Sea and dramatically increased its use of ship ramming and aerial interceptions to shove neighbors out of disputed areas. In the Taiwan Strait, Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than 50 combat aircraft, prowl the sea almost daily and simulate attacks on Taiwanese and U.S. targets. Chinese officials have told Western analysts that calls for an invasion of Taiwan are proliferating within the CCP. Pentagon officials worry that such an assault could be imminent. China has gone on the economic offensive, too. Its latest five-year plan calls for dominating what Chinese officials call “chokepoints”—goods and services that other countries can’t live without—and then using that dominance, plus the lure of China’s domestic market, to browbeat countries into concessions. Toward that end, China has become the dominant dispenser of overseas loans, loading up more than 150 countries with over $1 trillion of debt. It has massively subsidized strategic industries to gain a monopoly on hundreds of vital products, and it has installed the hardware for digital networks in dozens of countries. Armed with economic leverage, it has used coercion against more than a dozen countries over the last few years. In many cases, the punishment has been disproportionate to the supposed crime—for example, slapping tariffs on many of Australia’s exports after that country requested an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19. China has also become a potent antidemocratic force, selling advanced tools of tyranny around the world. By combining surveillance cameras with social media monitoring, artificial intelligence, biometrics, and speech and facial recognition technologies, the Chinese government has pioneered a system that allows dictators to watch citizens constantly and punish them instantly by blocking their access to finance, education, employment, telecommunications, or travel. The apparatus is a despot’s dream, and Chinese companies are already selling and operating aspects of it in more than 80 countries.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Hege Impact Answers › AT: Multipolarity

Multipolarity fails—it generates violent fill in and risks nuclear war

Kagan 19—(Robert Kagan, Senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World”, Alfred A. Knopf)//ND

At the root of such thinking is the belief that there is an escape from power or that it is possible to wield power without error and without failure. Americans, blessed by their favorable geography and wealth, still believe they have a choice between engaging the world and letting the world fend for itself. There has been no shortage of realists, idealists, progressives, and conservatives telling them that substantially disengaging from our alliances and overseas commitments is possible and cost-free. But the real choice we face is not between the good and the bad but between the bad and the worse. It is between maintaining the liberal world order, with all the moral and material costs that entails, or letting it collapse and courting the catastrophes that must inevitably follow. What is likely to follow is a return to the multipolar power struggles that brought so much devastation to the world before the United States redirected the course of history. That is where the deep ruts lead, back to the state of the world prior to 1945. Only this time, the powers competing and clashing will be armed with nuclear weapons. It is ironic that some of those who spent the Cold War warning that America’s hawkish foreign policies would result in nuclear holocaust do not seem “democracies would result in nuclear holocaust do not seem to fear nuclear war in the competitive multipolar world that may be our future. We have yet to test the question of whether nations with nuclear weapons can go to war, because so far the United States and the liberal world order have prevented such wars. But if history is any guide, to count on the horror of new weaponry alone to maintain the peace is a most risky bet. Had you cast that bet before the two world wars, you would have lost. These days some experts tell us it was the existence of nuclear weapons that prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from coming to blows, but few at the time had any confidence that nuclear weapons were a guarantor of peace. Throughout much of the Cold War there were those who simply assumed that the world was heading inevitably toward Armageddon. They were wrong that it would come as a result of American Cold War policies, but in the long run they may still prove right.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Hege Impact Answers › AT: China Leadership Good

Letting China surpass the US ensures geopolitical chaos and great-power war.

Glickman, 18 — Gabriel Glickman is a nonresident associate fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. (2-12-2018; "Back to the Future: The Potential of Great-Power Conflict;" National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/back-the-future-the-potential-great-power-conflict-24464; //GrRv)

What does the DOD mean by “order?” In the field of international relations, the terms “revisionist state” and “status-quo state” are used to describe, respectively, countries that seek to change the current international system and those that uphold it. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the international system has been defined by American hegemony and the spread of Western liberal democracy rather than its challengers—notably, fascism and socialism. This is commonly referred to as the liberal world order.

Under that world order, the United States is the most powerful country in the world. It often intervenes in international conflicts at a high cost, thus keeping dissatisfied nations from overturning the system. The NDS, however, refers to a recent shift in the current world order with an observation that, “We are facing global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order.”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Hege Impact Answers › Impact – Laundry List

A receding US deterrent is a catalyst for great-power conflict — decline causes transition wars and miscalculation.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 7: Rediscovering Tragedy; Published by Yale University Press; //GrRv)

Moreover, if discussions of “international order” can quickly take on an abstract quality, the consequences of collapse—the lives lost or ruptured, the prosperity destroyed, the moral depravities committed—can be frighteningly concrete. Thucydides had it right when he described what happens in such a vacuum of security and morality: “Death thus raged in every shape … there was no length to which violence did not go.”3 This is all indisputably depressing, but it should not be the least bit surprising. If it were possible to construct an international system that was truly universal in its appeal; if it were possible to freeze global power relationships at that moment of creation; if it were possible for states to put aside the very human ambitions, emotions, and fears that drive their behavior: then, perhaps, the world could permanently escape the competitive impulses that make international orders impermanent and their demise so traumatic. But none of this has ever been possible. International orders, even the most inclusive ones, create winners and losers because they benefit states unequally. The power balances that underpin a given system shift over time, encouraging new tests of strength. And although the human desire for peace and prosperity is strong, countries also remain motivated by ideological passion, greed, and insecurity. The most successful orders can mitigate the effects of these dynamics; they can suppress the sources of conflict and upheaval. But they cannot eliminate them entirely. This point is essential in considering the trajectory of the post-1945 order. It is tempting for individuals in nearly every geopolitical era to believe that their world is somehow different—that it is immune to the dangers of conflict and collapse. It is alluring to think that progress can be self-sustaining, and that liberal principles can triumph even if liberal actors are no longer preeminent. To do so, however, is to fall prey to the same ahistorical mindset that so predictably precedes the fall. Yes, the American order is exceptional in the level of stability, prosperity, and liberal dominance it has provided, and in the level of consent it has generated from countries around the world. Yet it is not so exceptional as to be exempt from the dangers of decline and decay. As the Greeks surely would have realized, in fact, it is precisely when one succumbs to the illusion that tragedy is impossible that tragedy becomes all the more likely. II This leads to a second component of a tragic sensibility—an appreciation that tragedy is once again stalking global affairs. The U.S.-led system is undoubtedly strong and resilient in many respects, as shown by the simple fact that it has survived as long as it has. Yet what endured in the past is not destined to endure in the future, and today the structure is groaning as the stresses mount. Long-standing principles such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation are being undermined from Eastern Europe to the South China Sea. International predators like North Korea and radical jihadist groups are using creative, asymmetric strategies to cause geopolitical disruption out of all proportion to their material power. The democratic wave has receded amid the growing prevalence and power of authoritarianism. Revisionist autocracies are reshaping regional environments in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, and waging sophisticated assaults against the political systems and geopolitical positions of their competitors. These countries are building privileged spheres of influence in critical areas of the globe; they are casting ever longer shadows, both strategic and ideological, across the international landscape. Meanwhile, the countries with the most to lose should the current system crack are too often divided and demoralized; their strategic torpor and distraction are creating vacuums that the revisionists are all too happy to fill. The protectors of the post-1945 order seem stuck in neutral, or even reverse, as the attackers push forward. This has historically been a dangerous combination. Faced with this daunting panorama, some analysts will take refuge in the hope that these challenges will simply exhaust themselves, or that revisionist powers will be satiated once their regional ambitions are fulfilled. Yet most systems tend toward more, rather than less, entropy over time, meaning that more, rather than less, energy is required to stabilize them. And revisionist powers rarely reach some natural point at which their aspirations subside; those aspirations often grow with each success.4 Today, the dissatisfied dictatorships, especially Russia and China, see themselves as being locked in a form of geopolitical conflict with the United States; they are already using force and other types of coercion to chip away at the American order. Should they succeed in claiming regional primacy and reestablishing a spheres-of-influence world, the result would be not to dampen but to inflame international conflict. Competition among the great powers would intensify as hostile spheres rub up against one another; the security of the global commons—the foundation of international prosperity—would be threatened by escalating geopolitical rivalry. The prospects for self-determination and liberalism would fade as small states fall under the sway of stronger, authoritarian neighbors. And crucially, as Daniel Twining notes, regional dominance could serve as a “springboard for global contestation”—for the renewed clashes for systemic dominance that Americans thought they had left behind with the end of the Cold War.5 It is impossible to predict precisely when the pressures on the existing order might become unbearable, or to know how close we are to that critical inflection point at which the dangers metastasize and the pace of decay dramatically accelerates. One can only speculate what the terminal crisis of the system will look like if and when it occurs. What is clear is that the telltale signs of erosion are already ubiquitous and the trend-lines are running in the wrong direction. The first step toward recovery is admitting you have a problem. Having a tragic sensibility requires seeing the world for what it is and where it is going, especially when the outlook is ominous. III If the international order is under strain, however, it does not follow that its collapse is unavoidable. Here a third aspect of a tragic sensibility is vital: the ability to reject complacency without falling into fatalism. Nietzsche defined tragic pleasure as the “reaffirmation of the will to live in the face of death.”6 It was just such a rejection of fatalism—of the belief that the next great global crackup was inevitable—that motivated U.S. policymakers to create the post-1945 order and sustain it through the crises that followed. Today, it is true enough that the grandest aspirations of the post–Cold War era are unlikely to be fulfilled anytime soon. Given the instability and revisionism roiling the international environment, it is simply beyond America’s power—if it was ever possible in the first place—to create a truly global order in which liberal values are universal, geopolitical competition has ceased, and authoritarian rivals have been fully pacified and converted into “responsible stakeholders.” Yet the existing international order, incomplete and threatened as it is, still constitutes a remarkable historical achievement. The creation of a global balance of power that favors the democracies, the prevention of unchecked aggression and intimidation by predatory powers, and the promotion of a prosperous and an integrated world in which liberal values have achieved great prevalence are all triumphs worth preserving. A more reasonable goal, then, would be to defend this existing order against the depredations of those attacking it, and America undoubtedly has the power for this essential undertaking.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Hege Impact Answers › Impact – Laundry List

Primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; //GrRv)

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Hege Impact Answers › Growth Link

Slowing Chinese economic growth is vital to preserving US hegemony

Mearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

There is a small possibility China will eventually become so powerful that the United States will not be able to contain it and prevent it from dominating Asia, even if the American military remains forward deployed in that region. China might someday have far more latent power than any of the four potential hegemons the United States confronted in the twentieth century. In terms of both population size and wealth—the building blocks of military power—neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union came close to matching the United States. Given that China now has more than four times as many people as the United States and is projected to have more than three times as many in 2050, Beijing would enjoy a significant advantage in latent power if it had a per capita GNI (gross national income) equivalent to that of either Hong Kong or South Korea. All that latent power would allow China to gain a decisive military advantage over its principal rivals in Asia, especially when you consider that China would be operating in its backyard, while the Unites States would be operating more than 6,000 miles from California. In that circumstance, it is difficult to see how the United States could prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon. Moreover, China would probably be the more formidable superpower in the ensuing global competition with the United States. But even if China’s GNI does not rise to those levels, and it ends up with not quite as much latent power as the United States, it would still be in a good position to make a run at hegemony in Asia. All of this tells us the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead. That outcome might not be good for American prosperity, much less for global prosperity, but it would be good for American security, which is what matters most.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Hege Impact Answers › AI Link

Chinese AI decks U.S. heg—superior UAVs and unrestricted exports threaten U.S. AI leadership.

Li ’22 (Ms. Li is currently a part-time researcher at Chengdu Institute of World Affairs, China. She graduated from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University with a master’s in international relations. She was a PhD candidate at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, “Artificial Intelligence Technology and China’s Defense System,” ) -lf

The Final Report released by the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence in 2021 describes China as a “competitor,” if not a leader, to the United States in terms of AI development. A basic understanding of the US-China AI competition is established in the report: “. . . we must win the AI competition that is intensifying strategic competition with China. China’s plans, resources, and progress should concern all Americans. It is an AI peer in many areas and an AI leader in some applications. We take seriously China’s ambition to surpass the United States as the world’s AI leader within a decade.”5 The report also foresees China’s determination to surpass the United States in AI leadership with its talent and technological development. This section demonstrates the area of China’s AI development and applications. Before digging into the military aspects, the reason China has been devoted into AI should be explained. In 2015, China issued the document Made in China 2025 and two years later in 2017, China released the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. These two documents proved that China’s central government officially confirmed the importance of developing AI technologies. The primary purpose of China’s AI development is for domestic use. First, advanced technologies are the major driving force for the economic and commercial development in China. To maintain its rapid growth, China encourages high technologies research and development, including AI, thus many private firms and research institutions have entered this field. Second, AI has been adopted domestically to improve the overall well-being, for example, payment using facial recognition, online AI-driven medical diagnosis, and security cameras that are designed to enhance safety. China's determination of developing AI technologies is not supported only by documents but also practice. The Ministry of National Defense has established research institutions—the Artificial Intelligence Research Centre and the Unmanned Systems Research Centre—to focus on AI and unmanned systems research and development. The key military think tank, the Academy of Military Science (AMS), has also updated its doctrine to cope with the AI technological development: “The revamped AMS is tasked with driving defense innovation and ensuring that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) warfighting theory and doctrine fully capitalize on disruptive technologies like AI and autonomous systems.”6 In addition to the government-backed official organizations, a number of private institutions have also invested considerable sums of money to conduct related research. The central government of China uses the term “intelligentized” warfare to refer to the innovations in military technologies.7 Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy analyzed more than 300 AI-related equipment contracts of the PLA regarding the adoption of AI technologies, and the result of their research shows that around 2 percent of PLA contracts are related to AI in the half year from April to November 2020. The research also predicted that China would continue to invest in AI technologies and may create vulnerabilities for the United States. Moreover, to quickly transfer technologies from the private sector to the public, China also launched a national strategy, the military-civil fusion, to create a favorable research and development environment.8 Among all the AI technologies, China places the top priority on unmanned combat systems and equipment along with other advanced military innovations.9 Unmanned technology has been profoundly changing the face of warfare, and unmanned equipment is one of the first options for future combat equipment. Since President Xi Jinping took office, he has emphasized the importance of unmanned systems on various occasions. For example, in 2017, when Xi Jinping visited the training of unmanned operations, he said to the sergeant that “UAVs are important combat forces for the modern battlefield. You must carry out your duties well and cultivate good personnel.”10 Another example was in 2020, when Xi met students at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Aviation University, he declared, “Drones are profoundly changing war scenarios. It is necessary to strengthen drone combat research, education and training, and accelerate the training of drone pilots and commanders.”11 The capacities of unmanned combat systems include effectively reducing casualties, achieving accurate reconnaissance, striking, resupplying, configuring flexible activities, and significantly improving combat effectiveness—to list only a few of many such advantages. With the development of unmanned technology, human warfare places more and more value upon information, which AI and unmanned systems excel at procuring. China’s development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) began in the late 1950s.12 In 1959, it had basically figured out the law of self-pilot takeoff and landing of two types of aircraft, namely the An-2 and IL-28. In the mid to late 1960s, China had been investing in the development of UAVs and formed a series of target aircraft such as the Changkong-1 radio-controlled target UAV, the DR-5 high-altitude photo reconnaissance aircraft, and the D4 small remote-controlled aircraft. Moreover, in August 1958, the first unmanned aircraft developed by Northwestern Polytechnic University flew successfully, and in 1984, the university established the UAV Research Institute with the approval of the former Ministry of Aviation Industry. In the1970s, China developed ChangHong high-altitude high-speed unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, T-6 general-purpose unmanned aircraft, Z-5 series unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, ASN series unmanned aircraft, and so forth. Dozens of these target and reconnaissance UAVs have been mass-produced and deployed alongside troops. The emergence of a large number of Chinese military UAVs began in 2006, when a number of military UAV designs appeared publicly in the limelight, such as the “Xianglong” high-altitude high-speed unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, whose body design is very similar to the US “Global Hawk” high-altitude long-endurance reconnaissance UAV; the “Skyhawk-3” unmanned helicopter that can hover, take off, and land vertically; and the “Dark Sword” UAV shaped like a US-made stealth bomber, which can burst into the enemy’s airspace with its stealth and high-speed performance and conduct suppressive attacks on the enemy’s air defense forces.13 The PLA is equipped with at least four types of medium and large UAVs, namely the EA-03 Xianglong, the Attack 1 (Wing Dragon 1), the JWP02 (ASN-206), and the BZK-005 UAV. EA-03 Xianglong is China’s most advanced high-altitude long-endurance unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in service. With a status similar to that of the US RQ4 global-use UAV, it is mainly adopted for high-altitude strategic surveillance reconnaissance. The aircraft has an overall length of 14.33 meters, a wingspan of 24.86 meters, a normal takeoff weight of 6,800 kilograms, a mission load of 600 kilograms and an effective flight range of 7,000 kilometers. It can conduct continuous aerial surveillance for 10 hours at an altitude of 18,000 meters from 2,000 kilometers away. The front and rear wings are connected in a diamond shape, which greatly strengthens the stiffness of the wings with a certain stealth capability.14 During the standoff in DongLang in the in last year between China and India, three Xianglong aircraft had appeared at Shigatse airport, and this confirmed that troops have been equipped with the aircraft. The Attack-1, improved from Chengfei Institute's Yilong-1 (sometimes call the Wing Loong), was unveiled at the 2014 Zhuhai Airshow and was the first active PLA inspection and fighter UAV that was made public at the airshow. Its shape is similar to that of the US UAV MQ-9, while its size is similar to that of the MQ-1 Predator. It has a maximum takeoff weight of 1.2 tons, a length of 9 meters, a wingspan of 14 meters, a payload of 200 kilograms, a maximum lift of 5,300 meters and a range of 4,000 kilometers. The latest Yilong-2 has a major improvement in both size and performance, with a length of 11 meters, a wingspan of 20.5 meters, a maximum flight altitude of 9,000 meters, a maximum speed of 370 kilometers per hour, a maximum takeoff weight of 4.2 tons, and an external hang-up capacity of 480 kilograms. It is equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) as well as laser-guided missiles and GPS-guided bombs and is able to perform continuous missions for 20 hours. To date, there has been no news that the Yilong-2 has been put into service.15 The JWP02 UAV (ASN-206) was developed by the Xi’an Aisheng Group of Northwestern Polytechnic University and won the first prize of the National Science and Technology Progress Award in 1996. It is rumored that it had received technical support from Israel. The aircraft applies solid rockets in assisting flight, zero-length launch, parachute landing and recovery, and can be used multiple times. It has a maximum takeoff weight of 222 kilograms, mission equipment weight of 50 kilograms, practical lift of 6,000 meters, range of 150 kilometers, and endurance of four to eight hours. The aircraft, which was developed earlier than Attack-1 UAV, currently serves as the mainstay of China's tactical unmanned reconnaissance aircraft along with the Attack-1 UAV.16 BZK-005 UAV has certain stealth capability and is a medium and high-altitude long-range unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. It has a maximum lift of 8,000 meters, an endurance of 40 hours, a maximum takeoff weight of 1.25 tons and a maximum carrying weight of 150 kilograms. Early models are equipped with photoelectric pods, while the latest models are equipped with SAR and other electronic reconnaissance equipment. The media reported that the aircraft has been on a patrol flight mission in the East China Sea. The TYW1 Skyhawk UAV, which was developed on the basis of the BZK-005, rolled off the production line on November 14, 2017. It is reported that the maximum takeoff weight of the TYW-1 has increased to 1.5 tons, with a maximum bomb load of 300 kilograms.17 UAVs play three important roles in military applications, the first of which is reconnaissance and surveillance.18 UAVs can penetrate hundreds of kilometers or more behind enemy lines and are configured at high, medium, and low altitudes. They can provide important reference for strategic decision-making and battle command in large-scale military operations through scanning reconnaissance and close-in reconnaissance to obtain highly accurate intelligence information. The latter is very suitable for PLA military, divisional, and brigade-level forces of the PLA Marine Corps to conduct battlefield reconnaissance surveillance, target search and location, as well as battle results assessment. UAVs can also work with satellites and skywave over-the-horizon radar to search and track enemy maritime targets and transmit back target information in real time. In this way, military UAVs can become an important part of the “kill chain” in antiaircraft-carrier warfare. The second is electronic jamming.19 Electronic-jamming UAVs can fly over the enemy, emitting electromagnetic waves through their airborne equipment and the application of interference foil, and so forth to implement interference on the enemy’s air defense radar, fire control radar, early warning systems, and other electronic equipment to cover China's aircraft defense and ground attack. The third role is firepower destruction. In addition to antiradiation UAVs that can destruct the enemy’s radar and other electromagnetic equipment, attack UAVs, inspection and fighter UAVs, and so forth can also carry out effective firepower destruction against the enemy. Acquisition of UAV technologies has enhanced China’s confidence to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance tasks to protect claimed territory. In the early 2010s, China for the first time sent a UAV to the Diaoyu Dao/ Senkaku Island disputed area.20 It was able to easily avoid the detection of Japanese ground radar, which surprised the Japanese coast guard. It was only a short and tactical victory that the Chinese UAVs exploited the loopholes in Japan's air defense system and reached the Diaoyu Islands for cruising with an ultra-low-altitude blind spot; it did not change the strategic pattern of the Japanese side’s effective control over the Diaoyu Islands. The most common unmanned aircraft to cruise the Diaoyu Islands is the BZK-005 unmanned reconnaissance aircraft—equipped with a rear-propelled engine, a dual-tail brace structure and an under-nose photoelectric/infrared detection device—first unveiled at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2006 and capable of flying continuously for 40 hours at an altitude of 26,000 feet.21 The BZK-005’s primary detection system is an electro-optical pod under the nose, which is equipped with a forward-looking infrared detection system, CCD cameras, and a laser range/target designation system. Wave-transparent materials are applied in the BZK-005 UAV; thus, it can be determined that it has a satellite communication system that can transmit information to the rear over radio range, which also indicates that the BZK-005 should have an activity radius of more than 1,000 kilometers. The application of the BZK-005 UAV has effectively enhanced the capability of China's naval maritime integrated surveillance system. At present, the quantity and quality of China's naval maritime surveillance aircraft are insufficient, and the application of the BZK-005 can improve the capability and coverage of China's naval target detection and indication system, especially for accurate detection and identification of targets in the middle and near sea, which helps China to comprehensively grasp the real-time situation in the relevant sea areas and provides support for relevant decision making. For nearly a decade since China sent the BZK-005 to the Diaoyu Island area without alerting Japan, Japan has been cooperating with the United States to equip itself by importing UAVs. Early this year, Japanese media reported that the United States and Japan are currently discussing a military deployment against China. According to the report, the United States and Japan plan to deploy MQ-9 UAVs near Kagoshima, a move designed to “respond to China's” regular military operations.22 UAVs are characterized by high speed and high altitude. The MQ-9 made its first flight in 2014 after improvements were made, and then it was used by the US military. It is understood that the UAV deployed in Kagoshima is a reconnaissance type and it is also the first time the United States deployed this high-altitude type of UAV in Japan. With the US pivots in Asia, tensions between the two giants, namely China and the United States, have been inevitable. Located in the southwestern tip of Japan, Kagoshima has a very special geographical location in that, if the United States deploys the MQ-9 UAV on the island, it will obtain the information about the activities of the Chinese naval fleet. In other words, the MQ-9 UAV is the US “eye” planted in the vicinity of China for receiving information. In addition, the specific location of the US deployment of the MQ-9 UAV is also thought-provoking, for the reason that to the further south of Kagoshima, there are the Okinawa Islands, followed by the Miyako Strait waters. This area is the “treasure land” that is of great military importance. When the United States and Japan intervenes in the Taiwan Strait conflict, should it occur, the Miyako Strait waters are the shortest cut they must go through. Obviously, China is also aware of this problem. Therefore, China should pay close attention to the Miyako Strait when the cross-strait unification attack commences, if this is the only way. In this context, the US UAVs deployed in Kagoshima are the main means of reconnaissance for the United States and Japan. The UAVs must not only watch out for the moves of the Chinese side, but also conduct reconnaissance of Chinese defense networks. UAVs are not only used in the East China Sea area, but also the South China Sea area. Even in the border conflicts between China and India, UAVs were also applied. Despite that there has not been any offensive action taken by UAVs in the mentioned areas, one cannot deny the potential there. Considering the unstable situation in the Indo-Pacific, states either focus on AI technologies research, including UAVs, or import arms and technologies from others. It is still unknown that whether the applications of AI technology will eventually arouse an arm race. Concerns The advanced AI technologies that are applied in the military field can exert great impact on deterrence and warfare in the future. Meanwhile, China’s rapid development of AI technologies and applications in its military are cause for increasing concern by the United States. Despite the success of China’s AI in commercial areas, no clear evidence has indicated that China’s military has plans to apply AI in any lethal systems. In the short term, weaknesses still exist despite China’s preexisting foundation on AI commercial applications. Allen points out that China has disadvantages in top talents and technical standards, as well as in software frameworks and platforms.23 For example, the case of restrictions on ZTE and Huawei clearly reveals that China heavily depends on imports of critical products, which means that China still has a long way to go until it becomes fully independent in vital sectors, such as semiconductors. AI technology itself is not offensive, but it is likely to play an irreplaceable directorial role in warfare if it is applied to automating weapons, especially nuclear weapons. To avoid unwanted jeopardy to any nations, the top priority is to ensure human intervention is involved in AI that are applied in security-related areas. AI actually lowers the threshold of offensive military actions because of the limited casualty risk. States, including China and the United States, should cooperate on preventing the abuse of AI. According to the China Global Television Network, China is the first nation that has submitted the position paper to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons for regulating the application of AI technologies in military field in December 2021.24 In other words, as with the control of nuclear weapons, norms and regulations are needed to limit the use of AI armaments. The United States is concerned about the global proliferation of unmanned systems and other AI weapons since China lacks export restrictions. China’s purposes of exporting unmanned arms, such as UAVs, include but are not limited to protecting overseas Chinese and investment security, establishing and consolidating diplomatic relations, and creating commercial profits.25 The United States is concerned about the unrestricted export for not only security reasons, but also economic ones. To prevent China from occupying the international market of unmanned systems, previous president Donald Trump reinterpreted the Missile Technology Control Regime to boost the export of UAVs. The Biden administration is willing to continue Trump’s policy, which made the export more flexible.26 Therefore, if both superpowers obtain unmanned technologies and export the arms mainly for commercial purpose, it is unnecessary for the United States to raise high concern. Future As for the future development of China’s AI technology applications in the military area: First, high-altitude long-endurance will be a primary focus of UAV development. Previous UAVs have a small carrying capacity, inadequate power supply, and little endurance, which may result in a small area of reconnaissance, failure to continuously obtain information for a long time, and even “blind spots” in intelligence, thus it is difficult for them to adapt to the needs of future warfare.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Growth Impact Answers › Growth Bad – BioD

Chinese growth causes massive species extinction in China—extinction

Nagle 9 [John Copeland, prof at Notre Dame Law School, “The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law,” Spring, 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. Law 203]

China offers the best and the worst of biodiversity protection. China is a vast, varied nation that hosts an incredible range of ecosystems and species. "China's biodiversity ranks eighth in the world and first in the northern hemisphere." n67 Over 100,000 species of animals and nearly 33,000 plant species exist in 460 different types of ecosystems. Those ecosystems include forests, grasslands, deserts, wetlands, seas and coastal areas, and agricultural ecosystems. China hosts 212 different types of bamboo forests alone. China also has an unusual number of ancient and relic species because of its protection from historic geologic events such as the movement of glaciers. Most famously, it is the only home of the giant panda, the symbol of many efforts to protect biodiversity throughout the world today. Such species and ecosystem diversity is complemented by an unsurpassed collection of genetic diversity. "The richness of China's cultivated plants and domestic animals are incomparable in the world. Not only did many plants and animals on which human survival depend originate in China, but it also retains large numbers of their wild prototypes and relatives." n68 A 2005 report estimated that China's biodiversity is valued at nearly five hundred billion dollars. n69 China is also the home for more than 1.25 billion people. The rapid economic growth that China has experienced since 1980 strains the nation's ability to preserve ecosystems, species, and genetic resources. But the biodiversity of China has encountered countless threats for thousands of years, including the cultivation of more and more land for agriculture and the consequences of numerous wars. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to 1960, [*216] Mao Zedong targeted the "Four Pests": rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes. The attack on sparrows enlisted schoolchildren to knock down nests and to beat gongs so that the sparrows could not find a place to rest. Only after sparrows were virtually eliminated throughout China did the country's leaders recognize the value of the birds in controlling insects. China faces many of the same threats as biodiversity in other countries, with the notable addition of the country's notorious air pollution. Habitat loss is the biggest threat to biodiversity in China. As in many other countries, rapid economic development and continued population growth exert relentless pressure on previously undeveloped areas that offered habitat to a diversity of wildlife and plants. The overgrazing of rangelands, erosion, and the adverse effects of tourism and mining further compromise the condition of ecosystems and species throughout China.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Growth Impact Answers › Growth Bad – Japan

A Chinese-Japan war is only an incident away and goes nuclear

Kazianis 2016 - Senior Fellow (non-resident) for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest as well as a Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Potomac Foundation Harry, "Get Ready, America: Are China and Japan Destined for War?," Jan 22, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-america-are-china-japan-destined-war-14991?page=2

While your Twitter and Facebook feed these days might be filled with stories about Iran, North Korea and ISIS, as well as the South China Sea, 2016 could be the year of a deadly clash between China and Japan—and the stakes could not be any higher for the United States. A recent article in Foreign Policy sets the stage for such a clash—and shows how America could get sucked in. After a relatively peaceful year—if such a thing exists in the East China Sea—Beijing and Tokyo are once again warning each other to back off claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. With the rhetoric heading up, Foreign Policy reporters Dan De Luce and Keith Johnson headed over to the Rand Corporation for a war game that pitted China vs. Japan and eventually the United States. In the simulation, Tokyo’s treaty ally pledged to defend the island nation, including the disputed islands, from attack. The scenario for the wargame was frighteningly realistic to say the least: “A group of renegade Japanese ultranationalists wade ashore on a barren islet they call Uotsuri-shima. It’s the largest of a cluster of uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks known as the Senkakus, or the Diaoyu in Chinese, the unlikely locus of a long-running territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing. The activists plant the Japanese flag, declaring that the islands are inalienable Japanese territory; their YouTube video threatens the Chinese navy with destruction if it dares to seize the islands. “Caught off guard, Tokyo is slow to respond, but eventually disowns the ultranationalists and their stunt. By then, though, China has condemned the move as a hostile act and has dispatched armed coast guard and naval vessels to the relatively shallow waters around the Senkakus. Chinese marines arrest the 14 activists and vow to bring them back to China for prosecution. “The next day, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is dispatched to the area, accompanied by a squadron of Japanese F-15 fighters. China maintains its naval ships around the islands and insists that it will not withdraw from the area. As the two militaries appear headed on a collision course, Tokyo informs Washington that it is finally invoking the mutual defense treaty the two nations have had since 1951. Now the White House has a decision to make.” While it is well worth your time to read all the twists and turns, here is the ultimate of spoilers: “The United States sends humanitarian aid and disaster-response teams to Japan to bolster its homeland defense and dispatches the carrier at a safe distance in flight range of the Senkakus. It also launches targeted, precision strikes on a handful of Chinese missile sites on the coast, clearly explaining to Chinese leadership the limited nature of the measures.” And into hell we descend: “U.S. missiles rain down on the Chinese homeland; Japanese commercial freighters explode on the high seas; China’s shiny new navy is quickly shrinking under relentless undersea attacks. In reprisal, Chinese forces obliterate Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and take a potshot with a carrier-killer missile at the George Washington, damaging it and forcing it out of the area. The casualty toll is appalling on all sides, with thousands dead.” Feel a sense of déjà vu, National Interest readers? It seems good minds think alike, as I explored a very similar scenario back in June of 2014: “Picture it: It's March 1, 2015. Tokyo and Beijing are headed towards what was once the unthinkable. “Over the last several months China has instituted daily non-naval maritime patrols around the hotly disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Beijing is even sending fully-fledged naval assets within the islands' 12 mile exclusion zone while its aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, exercised only 50 miles away from the islands back in February — truly the end of Beijing's small-stick diplomatic strategy. “But on 1 March the plot thickens. Two Chinese SU-27 fighters come within 25 feet of a Japanese P-3 Orion surveillance plane just 10 miles west of the Senkakus (sound familiar?). The Japanese pilot gets nervous. A slight tweak at the controls and the Japanese plane collides with one of the Chinese fighters. Both aircraft crash into the ocean, with no survivors. "Naturally each side blames the other. Beijing accuses the Japanese pilots of violating Chinese sovereign airspace and violating its Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ. Japan claims the Chinese pilots acted recklessly, flying so close. The media in both countries fan the flames of nationalism. Just 72 hours later, a group of twenty Chinese nationals land on one of the disputed islands under the cover of darkness. Rumors swirl that Beijing knew of the voyage but did nothing to stop it. A Japanese naval task force carrying a small detachment of soldiers is dispatched. Their goal: remove the only residents of the disputed five-island chain. “Beijing threatens force if its citizens are harmed. As Japanese naval forces come within 20 miles of the islands a Chinese J-10 fighter jet buzzes the task force. On its second pass it comes dangerously close to a Japanese destroyer. In a perceived act of self-defense, the destroyer shoots down the aircraft. “Hours later, as Japanese forces begin operations to remove the Chinese nationals from the Senkakus, Beijing fires a warning shot, a DF-21D or “carrier-killer” missile which hits the ocean just 10 miles away from the Japanese task force. Undeterred, Japanese forces press ahead. Domestic pressure on Chinese leaders becomes intense. They feel they have no choice but to escalate, launching a massive saturation strike with ballistic and cruise missiles against the Japanese task force. Three vessels are hit with heavy loss of life. Global media coverage of the burning hulks and bodies in the water reaches a fever pitch. Prime Minister Abe urgently phones President Obama formally requesting America's help under the terms of the US-Japan alliance — a 3am call no president would ever wish to receive. War in Asia seems imminent.” So what to make of all this crazy block quoting? Simple: a conflict in Asia—which would make problems like ISIS seem like mere child's play—is only an incident away. And make no mistake about it, such a conflict, considering that the United States and China are armed with nuclear weapons, would be a frightening affair. Food for thought as we contemplate other pressing national security challenges—for if Asia was ever to be engulfed in the flames of great power war only bad things would result, with millions of lives in the balance.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Growth Impact Answers › Growth Bad – Japan

Chinese economic decline prevents Sino-Japan war and cements US leadership

Glaser and Funaiole, 15 – *senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS AND fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Bonnie and Matthew, “Geopolitical Consequences of China’s Slowdown” 11/16, http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Glaser_Funaiole_Geopolitical.pdf

Similarly, China’s economic slowdown could offer Japan an occasion to gain leverage in the Sino-Japanese relationship, creating the possibility to tamp down tensions in the East China Sea and stabilize bilateral ties that remain a fragile, but critically important, component of the regional security landscape. Perhaps most significantly, a Chinese economic slowdown affords the United States an opportunity to buttress its political, economic, and military position in the Asia-Pacific, and assuage worries that the United States lacks sufficient strategic vision and political commitment to the region. The outcome relies on how Washington plays its hand, but the result could be the strengthening of a rules-based, U.S.-led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region for years to come.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Growth Impact Answers › AT: CCP Collapse

No internal link --- the economy is not directly reflected in legitimacy --- ideology outweighs

Zeng, 16 – PhD in Politics and IR, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and Lecturer in Politics and IR at Royal Holloway, University of London [Jinghan, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” Oct 29, 2015 Palgrave Macmillan Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, Academia]

Economic performance is the most frequently mentioned element of performance legitimacy. The conventional wisdom of Western scholar- ship holds that economic achievement is a principal (if not the sole) pillar of legitimacy in contemporary China (Krugman, 2013; Laliberté and Lanteigne, 2008b; Perry, 2008; Shambaugh, 2001; Wang, 2005a; Wang, 2005b; Zhao, 2009; Yang and Zhao, 2014). In a major textbook on Chinese politics, Tony Saich (2004: 347) argues that “[CCP] legitimacy is currently based on the capacity to deliver the economic goods.” Economic performance is absolutely important. However, empirical studies show that while economic performance matters, there is no strong evidence to prove that it is the sole, let alone the principal, pillar of legitimacy (Chu, 2013; Lewis-Beck, et al., 2013; Munro, et al., 2013; Yang and Tang, 2013). In addition, if economic prosperity leads to high levels of popular support for the government, why do not other coun- tries that enjoy economic prosperity – such as India and Brazil – also have high levels of support, as China does (Tang, et al., 2013)? Based on a 2010 national survey in China, Dickson (2013) finds a negative rela- tionship between economic development and popular support. In addition to economic performance, social stability is another essen- tial element of government performance, and it has also been widely accepted as a fundamental pillar of the CCP’s legitimacy (Breslin, 2009; Dickson, 2011; Laliberté and Lanteigne, 2008b; Shue, 2004; Sandby- Thomas, 2011). Shue (2004), for example, argues that the CCP “stakes” its legitimacy on its ability to maintain social stability. Needless to say, social stability and economic growth are interdependent. Without a stable social order, the economy cannot grow rapidly; conversely the welfare materials delivered by economic growth might help to enhance social stability. This interdependence suggests that the rules of modern states are based on different combinations of legitimacy sources rather than on any one pillar. Legitimacy by nature has many dimensions, and its sources are often interrelated. Ideology in particular plays a crucial role in influ- encing other sources of legitimacy. Arguably, a fatal weakness of the performance legitimacy approach is its insufficient attention to ideo- logical factors. As mentioned, the mainstream approach overempha- sizes economic growth, and many assume that market reform has also rendered ideology obsolete. This misguided view has underestimated the role of ideology in contemporary China. Legitimacy generated from government performance is not directly through government performance per se but from citizens’ subjective perceptions of this performance. Ideological factors play a crucial role in shaping those perceptions. Thus, economic performance – crisis or growth – is not directly reflected in legitimacy (Gilley and Holbig, 2010); the performance will be framed by ideological factors and transformed by conductive ways into people’s subjective perceptions of economic performance. If economic performance became the sole legitimacy pillar in China, then economic deterioration would unavoidably lead to political crisis. However, the financial crisis of 2008 enhanced rather than weakened the CCP’s rule (Holbig, 2011). By using the Chinese media to highlight the good performance in coping with the financial crisis domestically and the disaster this crisis caused in other countries, the CCP managed to manipulate this debacle as an opportunity to gain legitimacy and achieve its political purposes – such as marketing its then-official ideology, the “Scientific Outlook of Development” (Holbig, 2011).

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Growth Impact Answers › AT: CCP Collapse

Growth or decline doesn’t matter --- it’s how the regime frames the issue, which proves it’s resilient

Zeng, 16 – PhD in Politics and IR, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and Lecturer in Politics and IR at Royal Holloway, University of London [Jinghan, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” Oct 29, 2015 Palgrave Macmillan Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, Academia]

As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, there is no empirical evidence to prove that the CCP’s legitimacy solely relies on economic success. Arguably, there are two major problems in the relevant literature: the exclusion of ideological factors and the narrow focus of government performance. The major problem with the socioeconomic performance approach lies in its exclusion of ideological factors, which leads to many problematic arguments and predictions. The performance legitimacy approach implies a problematic relationship between economy and politics (White, 1986). The argument – that legitimacy of the CCP primarily relies on economic performance – implies that economic crisis or the slowdown of economic growth would lead to some kinds of legitimacy crises or major disasters in China. This is also explicitly warned by many who argue that economic deterioration will unavoidably lead to political crisis (Krugman, 2013; Zhao, 2009). This kind of argument implies that economic factors are the independent or dominant variables, while political factors are subordinate or dependent variables. It is flawed to contend that the regime is helpless in an economic crisis. This book endorses White’s assertion (1986) on the primacy of politics – that proper political actions can fill the deficit in legitimacy created by economic difficulties. As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, legitimacy directly comes from neither economic crisis nor economic growth per se (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). Ideological factors will transform economic performance into people’s subjective perceptions of economic performance, and regime legitimacy is based on “those perceptions” rather than on economic performance per se. As such, an economic crisis is not a direct threat to a regime – its impacts on political legitimacy depend on people’s perceptions of the crisis and the regime; thus, how the government frames this crisis is crucial (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). In other words, how political actors use ideological factors to frame people’s perceptions of the crisis (i.e., discourse) is key to deciding the impact of the crisis on legitimacy. Proper political actions and effective crisis management will contribute to minimize legitimacy loss or even sometimes enhance legitimacy. As discussed below, there is much room to manipulate people’s dependency on the government and on its irreplaceable role during a crisis. This is especially true in China, where people’s dependency on the government is more obvious because of historical traditions (Tong, 2011). The CCP has abundant experience and the capability to market its authoritarian rule through information control and powerful propaganda campaigns. In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the Chinese government actually won, rather than lost, legitimacy credits. The regime strategically manipulated this crisis as an opportunity to achieve its political purposes including the promotion of Scientific Outlook of Development (Holbig, 2011). The Chinese media highlighted China’s good performance in coping with the financial crisis domestically in contrast with the disaster that this crisis caused in other countries, and the official media also made efforts to project international recognition onto China’s crisis management. By using those propaganda strategies, the CCP successfully transformed its performance during this crisis into positive perceptions, thus legitimacy (Holbig, 2011).

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Growth Impact Answers › AT: Diversionary War

No diversionary wars --- social instability is too dangerous

Levi and Economy, 16 - both Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations *PhD, David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the CFR **PhD, C.V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Elizabeth, “Economic and Geopolitical Fallout From China's Slowing Growth” February 25, 2016, Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations]

...But Beijing Is Unlikely to Wage War if the Economy Crashes

By the same token, analysts should probably discard the notion that a crash of the domestic economy would provoke a Chinese military adventure abroad in order to distract Chinese people from upheaval at home. This “wag the dog” scenario may gain currency with screenplay writers and conspiracy buffs, but it is not borne out by history. Although it is true that strife-torn countries often get embroiled in external wars, it is rarely because their leaders set out to generate a diversionary activity for their restive populace.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Growth Impact Answers › Growth Resilient

Chinese growth is resilient – reforms ensure that small dips won’t stick

Liu 16 – (Chinese ambassador to the UK, “The Chinese economy is still full of power”, 2/27/16, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12175115/The-Chinese-economy-is-still-full-of-power.html)//EO

A glass is filled halfway with water. Pessimists would say it’s half empty, while optimists would say it’s half full. The same is true when it comes to the Chinese economy. Quite a few pessimists have been forecasting doom and gloom since the beginning of the year. However, they have failed to see the country’s resilience and the new driving forces that have emerged. In fact, . This is therefore the “new normal”: we are seeing slower yet better quality growth helped along by proactive and deeper reforms. Of course, China’s growth rate could easily have exceeded 7 per cent if the energy- and- pollution-intensive industries had been given free rein, or if massive stimulus measures had been applied. China, however, chose not to opt for this kind of unsustainable growth – because it would come with a huge cost and would sacrifice the long-term development of China and the world. Instead, China has chosen to focus on the following five key areas: addressing excess capacity, downsizing property inventories, expanding effective supply, helping enterprises reduce cost and guarding against financial risks. This approach, like losing weight, won’t be without its discomforts or pain. But just as perseverance will see one through a diet – to less fat, stronger muscles and a healthier body – so it is with the Chinese economy. Despite the moderation in growth, the fundamentals of the Chinese economy remain strong. While the stock and foreign exchange markets have their own patterns, the key is to look at the bigger picture. It is true that the 6.9 per cent growth in 2015 was the lowest for China in 25 years. But this was achieved by an economy that is 10 trillion dollars in size. The actual increment is equivalent to the yearly GDP of a medium-sized country and it is larger than the amount generated by double-digit growth years ago. In other words, against the background of the sluggish world economy, China remains one of the fastest-growing major economies – and it contributes over one quarter of global growth. Consumption now accounts for two thirds of China’s growth and the service sector now makes up more than half of GDP. China’s solid material foundation, abundant human resources and vast market potential will continue to provide a sound basis and condition for sustained economic growth. The gap between the eastern and western regions, and between the urban and rural areas, indicates ample spaces and untapped potentials for further development. Moreover, the ongoing process of new industrialisation, IT application, urbanisation and agricultural modernisation is generating strong driving forces for growth. China’s fiscal deficit and government debt is also secure and much lower than that of the US, Europe and Japan, leaving enough room for further positive regulation. Going forward, five new engines will drive forward China’s economy. The first engine is the 13th Five Year Plan. With its five key development concepts – innovation, balanced growth, a green economy, opening up and inclusive development – this Plan will map out the way for China to get over the “middle-income trap” and join the high-income economies. The second engine is supply-side reform. Rather than being a copy of Reaganomics or Thatcherism, China’s supply-side reform is a response to the economic “new normal” in China. Its core mechanism is to replace ineffective and low-end supply with effective and high-end supply, which will increase competitiveness. The third engine is open development. China will continue to improve its domestic business environment in terms of legal, international and business-friendly practices. The fourth engine is China’s active involvement in global economic governance and in providing public goods. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, officially inaugurated last month, is just one example of this. The fifth engine is innovation-driven development. China will optimise the allocation of key resources in order to stimulate innovation, to create new demands and new supply, and to give rise to new businesses. Since the financial crisis, China has made an outstanding contribution to global growth. It is widely recognised as the world’s economic powerhouse and has fulfilled its responsibility as a key global player. Make no mistake: that engine is still full of power and will continue to bring opportunities and benefits to the world. “Although Zhou was an ancient state, it had a reform mission.” This line from a 3000-year-old Chinese work, the Classic of Poetry, best portrays the country’s commitment to reform. Today, reform and innovation remain the source of confidence and strength for China. There is every reason to look to a world-embracing China for steady progress and for a promising economic future.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Answers › Russia Alliance Turn

The more Russia loses (the aff), the more China will support them. Worst case, everything is balanced.

Blanchette 22 (Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The worse things go for Putin in Ukraine, the more China will back him,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2022 at 4:09 p.m. EDT, ) - MP

China has tried to have it both ways since Russia invaded Ukraine a month ago. It abstained from key votes at the United Nations criticizing Russia’s actions, avoided directly labeling President Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine an “invasion,” amplified Russian disinformation and repeatedly laid blame for the war at the feet of the United States and NATO. At the same time, Beijing has also largely complied with sanctions against Russia, made repeated, if vague, calls for a negotiated settlement to the hostilities and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. But make no mistake: The worse it goes for Russia in Ukraine, the more China will step up its support for the Putin regime. Beijing’s uneven diplomatic strategy may seem to stem from a desire to achieve multiple, often conflicting aims, most notably to forestall a deterioration in relations with Europe. Not all objectives are weighted equally, however, and as the war enters a more protracted and destructive phase, China’s primary goal is coming into focus: to ensure that Russia retains its status as Beijing’s key strategic partner, even if this necessitates paying serious economic and diplomatic costs. Beijing will see the prospect of a Russian defeat as a direct threat to its own territorial security and ability to compete head-to-head in the geopolitical rivalry with the United States — and China simply can’t allow that to happen. To see why Beijing has a direct stake in the war’s outcome, it’s critical to understand how its relationship with Russia has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how China views the global security environment evolving over the next three to five years. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia have experienced significant friction and mutual mistrust. The nadir of the relationship came in 1969, when the two communist powers nearly engaged in a nuclear war. Since 1989, however, Beijing and Moscow have systematically addressed the major points of contention in their relationship, including any lingering territorial disputes. In 2001, the countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and after Chinese leader Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, cooperation has expanded to include joint military exercises, efforts to reform global governance and technology sharing. For example, the two countries continue to develop a satellite navigation system to rival the United States’ GPS, and in January, Russia and China, along with Iran, held a series of naval drills in the Indian Ocean. This growing symbiosis was formalized on Feb. 4 in a joint statement issued during Putin’s visit to Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics (Xi’s meeting with Putin then was his first with a world leader since February 2020, when he appeared with the Mongolian prime minister in Beijing). Stretching more than 5,000 words, the joint statement encapsulated a shared worldview between two authoritarian powers and two autocratic leaders. The global order is undergoing “momentous changes,” the statement read, which include a “transformation of the global governance architecture and world order” and “global challenges and threats growing from day to day.” But perhaps more important, the joint statement articulated a shared grievance that the United States and its allies threaten Chinese and Russian interests and global aspirations. NATO, the document states, promotes an “ideologized cold war approach,” while the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategy” endangers the “peace and stability in the region.” Before Russia had even invaded Ukraine, then, Beijing had come to see Moscow as a critical security and strategic partner in the growing power rivalry with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. More to the point, Russia is China’s only real military and strategic partner. Although tensions exist in the bilateral relationship, not least because of the growing economic gap between their economies, the broader geopolitical chessboard draws Moscow and Beijing together. What’s more, Putin and Xi have a close relationship — they’ve met in person or virtually nearly 40 times in the decade that Xi has been in power. Time is running out for China The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly thrown Beijing off balance, and Chinese officials certainly didn’t want Putin to invade in the first place, but the basic math underlying this strategic partnership with Moscow has not changed. Indeed, the war has only consolidated Beijing’s central logic for supporting Russia, given the recent demonstration of Western diplomatic unity, the overwhelming power of U.S.-led sanctions and the reinvigoration of NATO. The former editor of the Chinese nationalist Global Times newspaper, Hu Xijin, argued in recent commentary that “if the U.S. pursues extreme strategic coercion against China, with Russia as a partner, China will not fear a U.S. energy blockade, our food supplies will be more secure, as will [our supplies] of many other raw materials.” In a speech last weekend, China’s vice foreign minister Le Yucheng drew a straight line between NATO in Europe and China’s own security concerns, warning that just as Moscow’s actions in Ukraine were a direct consequence of NATO expansion, any actions by NATO in the Asia-Pacific region would provoke similar consequences, and thus, the “crisis in Ukraine is a stern warning.” Beyond the substantive reasons underlying China’s support for Russia, there is also Beijing’s unwillingness to be seen as submitting to the U.S. demand that it back away from Moscow. As one Chinese Russia expert at the Shanghai International Studies University observed, “If China goes along with the U.S. against Russia, it will not only greatly strengthen the anti-Russian camp, but will also be a huge boost to the U.S. ‘leadership.’ ” The key question now is just how far Beijing will go to support Moscow. While Xi would like to maintain good relations with Europe and avoid a further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship, the fate of Putin and the Russian state directly implicates China’s core security interests. Not only would the prospect of a beaten and broken Russia activate China’s fears of instability along their shared 2,500-mile border, but it would also create uncertainty about the future leadership and geopolitical orientation of the Russian government. If Putin were eventually to fall from power, would his successor remain aligned with Beijing? So the more anxious Beijing becomes about the war and Putin’s personal position in power, the more likely it is to step up support by providing direct economic assistance, mitigating the impact of sanctions and even supplying military equipment. Clearly, China’s preference is to avoid secondary sanctions in response to any support — access to the international market and the U.S. dollar remains critical for China’s economy and its continued rise. But Beijing could pursue means of support that are difficult to track, such as facilitating Russia’s access to U.S. dollars via offshore accounts, or by directing state-owned enterprises and even private companies to increase their purchases of non-sanctioned Russian goods and services. If China does decide to supply Russia with military assistance, it would likely seek to avoid equipment and hardware that would flagrantly violate international law and sanctions or be easily traceable, and instead provide spare parts, ammunition or certain dual-use items that aren’t yet sanctioned. But critically, the decision to provide aid to Russia would be driven primarily by Beijing’s assessment of how Russia is faring in the war, rather than a desire to avoid paying economic or diplomatic costs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing is watching the conflict unfold without growing more nervous by the day: Russia has failed to achieve any of its major military or political objectives. In just the past week, the Russian military has escalated its offensive to include a wider number of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, and President Biden is also now warning of “clear signs” that Putin is considering using chemical weapons. Domestically, Putin has begun to purge his inner circle, arresting some within the security services and senior officials in the national guard. Beijing will see this as a sign that Putin’s grip is weakening, and as the sanctions continue to decimate Russia’s economy, anxiety in China is only likely to grow. Succession plans protect nations. Putin and Xi just threw theirs out. Some analysts suggest that China may well see Russia’s recent weakening in the wake of sanctions as a net positive, as it shifts the balance of power in the relationship in Beijing’s favor. A tangible benefit of such a shift would be Beijing’s ability to demand more favorable terms in buying Russian energy. While it’s true that Beijing leveraged Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 to gain better terms in several large energy deals, the security environment for China in 2022 is far more contentious than it was in 2014, and Moscow’s true value is its ideological orientation and military capabilities as much as its energy stores. Xi does not want a weak Russia for a security and strategic partner. If Beijing turns toward and not away from Moscow as the war grinds on and the extent of human suffering increases, the basic trajectory of China’s relations with the West will undergo a profound shift toward open rivalry. It would be comforting to think that the prospect of such a disastrous turn would be enough to dissuade the Chinese leadership from traveling down this path. Unfortunately, though, Beijing’s geopolitical outlook for the next decade — much like Washington’s — includes conflict and friction as defining features.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Link Answers › No AI Link

US-China AI competition is not zero-sum – collaboration with clear goals solves.

Sullivan 21 (Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan is an Army pilot by trade, who lived and studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar. He was one of just five Army officers selected that year. Ryan has taken his experience in and knowledge of China and combined that with graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence. “US China AI Competition Factors,” 10/04/21 , p9)ZK

The U.S. and China remain the two nations best positioned to benefit from the increasing adoption of AI across society. Competition over AI is not zero-sum, in that both nations will derive value from AI growth, but the benefits are not shared equally. China’s substantial advantages in data and the size of its market lead experts to predict that China will account for nearly half of the estimated $15.7 trillion that AI will add to the global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030, and almost double the expected growth in North America.23 AI’s economic benefits are undeniable, but AI competition with China goes beyond GDP growth and centers on the global diffusion of Chinese values, norms, and standards for AI utilization. That environment is very much undecided, as the international community struggles with challenges over data privacy, the role of AI-empowered multinational companies, and critical choke points in supply chains that impact the AI industry and threaten national security interests. This paper seeks to recognize that collaboration occurs between the U.S. and China and identifies efforts to address security concerns, collaborations, and even cooperation in areas of trans-national challenges that benefit all of humankind. The deteriorating bilateral relationships and mistrust likely prohibit bilateral cooperation in many areas. However, in working with like-minded nations with shared values, the U.S. can promote multilateral collaboration and cooperation opportunities for AI. Such engagements should not exclude China by design. However, the criteria for engagement must clarify that the values shared by democratic nations will help address the ethical concerns over AI and the adoption of technical standards. The current political environment and U.S. actions taken against universities and companies with ties to the PLA leave very little room for military-to-military (mil-to-mil) collaboration on AI, nor did research for this paper discover any indications from Chinese sources of a desire for mil-to-mil engagements. Nevertheless, in focusing on our allies and promoting interoperability, the Department of Defense (DoD) entities must remain aware that collaboration opportunities might arise in various areas of responsibility (AOR) and prepare appropriate guidance and safeguards for units based on current policies.