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2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Interoperability

Interoperability is key to NATO’s success- ensures efficient and precise action

Easley ‘22 (Mikayla is a journalist, writer, and researcher with experiences working in local news, magazine, and trade publications. She’s currently working as the managing editor of the , a pop-up newsroom covering climate change in Missouri.¶ “WEB EXCLUSIVE: Ukraine Invasion Prompts Plea from French Official to Speed Up NATO Tech Integration”; National Defense Buissness and Tech Magazine; March 9, 2022 ¶ )

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlights the need to speed up NATO interoperability, he said. The ability for weapons and other military systems to communicate and share information among NATO allies is one of the most important aspects for the alliance’s success in future fights, Burkhard said during a fireside chat hosted by the Center for New American Security. Collective interoperability is not currently the standard, he noted. For example, Burkhard has witnessed communication issues with the increased deployment of the F-35 joint strike fighter into various NATO ally’s air forces. “The F-35 is designed as a very effective and efficient system,” he said. “It has great qualities, but its design is a very closed system and I think this is a mistake.” NATO militaries must play a decisive role in ensuring network interoperability standards across the alliance, he added. France is also working to improve interoperability within its own armed forces in an effort similar to the U.S. Defense Department’s joint all-domain command and control, or JADC2, which aims to link sensors and shooters at the tactical edge. France’s internal campaign to achieve interoperability is part of its Scorpion program, which “aims at digitalizing all land forces in order to be able to extend information very quickly and also improve [our] operational pace in order to be able to impose our will on opponents,” he said. A document — Burkhard’s Strategic Vision for 2030 — is not unlike modernization plans made by the United States and the United Kingdom to move away from operations against nonstate actors and prepare for potential conflict with adversaries such as China and Russia. An exception the U.S. and U.K. militaries’ desires to shrink the size of its land forces. France will be focusing its attention on upgrading its Army by the year 2030, he noted. This includes the development of two new ground vehicles for the French army to replace the service’s aging vehicles and systems: the Griffon, a multi-role armored vehicle, and the Jaguar, an armored reconnaissance and combat vehicle. Burkhard said the ability of these vehicles and other new capabilities to connect and share information across domains is “the true driver” for success. Russia’s operations — which have not gone to Moscow’s plans — signal the true amounts of effort required for high-intensity operations. “It doesn’t mean that we are not able right now ready to engage in a high-intensity conflict, but not with all the assets that were identified or the level of training we [expected] to reach by 2030,” he said.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Unity

Exposing Russian cyber campaigns alone is not enough- only persistent cooperation and coordination among NATO members can forge the political unity necessary to deter Russian attacks

Oscar Jonsson in 2021

scholar of strategy, emerging technology and Russia who is founder of Phronesis Analysis and Researcher at Swedish Defence University; FROM EASTERN FLANK TO WESTERN ELECTIONS: RUSSIAN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE EU AND NATO; The Center for European Policy Analysis; https://cepa.org/the-evolution-of-russian-hybrid-warfare-eu-nato/

The most immediate lesson for Western governments from the U.S. elections in 2016 was not to be quiet about Russian influence operations. The biggest benefit of exposing Russian operations is increasing public awareness of the threat and the determination to devote sufficient time and resources to countering it, which will in the long run change the cost-benefit calculus.38 Moreover, Bellingcat’s investigative journalism has served to expose Russian intelligence operations and has become a headache and source of embarrassment for the Russian leadership. Nonetheless, “naming and shaming” should not be seen as sufficient for deterring Russian operations. After the U.S. elections in 2016, the poisoning of former Russian-British double agent Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018, and the poisoning of Navalny in August 2020, it has become clear that the Russian leadership is not too worried about some of its high-profile operations becoming known to the public. On the contrary, the Skripal poisoning was intended to send a signal to other intelligence officers in Russia and also to the West. As “Putin and his inner circle appear to believe that they are in nothing less than a political war, [naming and shaming] will at best influence tactics, not strategy.”39 With the Russian leadership committed to the idea that it is in a political war against the EU and NATO, more is needed than simply exposing its malign behaviors. So far, the Western approach has been to primarily rely on sanctions in lieu of stronger policy measures. Sanctions are an alternative to escalation. They satisfy the urge to “do something” rather than fix the underlying problem.40 Moreover, inflicting economic pain is only effective to the extent that economic development is a priority for the Russian leadership. Nonetheless, it is demonstrably subordinate to regime security and great-power status. The EU is responsible for the political response to the challenge from Russia, including sanctions, and has since 2014 taken a wide range of measures to increase preparedness against hybrid threats. These include creating sectoral strategies, establishing expert bodies (Hybrid Fusion Cell, Center of Excellence for Hybrid Threats), creating information-sharing mechanisms, conducting exercises and simulations, partnering with NATO, and increasing investments in cyber defense.41 Most notably, the EU adopted an Action Plan against Disinformation42 and set up an EU versus Disinformation initiative in 2015. In July 2020, the EU also imposed its first-ever sanctions (asset freeze and travel ban) in response to cyberattacks on individual GRU officers and the responsible center at the GRU.43 These are all important steps to improve the infrastructure, but the core problem for the EU and NATO is still political and about unity. Both the EU and NATO have viewed Russian hybrid warfare as more of a nuisance than a fundamental challenge. NATO is primarily responsible for the military instrument, but also has a key role maintaining political unity. The lack thereof was evident when Macron called for a rapprochement with Russia in 2019 while failing to grasp the fact that Russian aggression is premised on the predictability of the West to always return to the negotiating table even though the fundamental problem has not been addressed. Indeed, between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Macron’s call for better relations, Russia had not only impacted the U.S. and French elections, it had also used chemical weapons on NATO soil to try and assassinate Skripal, an attempt that resulted in the death of a British citizen.44 Western actions have underlined that the West is unwilling to accept economic pain for geopolitical gain, in a failure to invest more into military and nonmilitary capabilities or impose tougher sanctions. Governments alone cannot solve the problem of Russian influence operations. Big technology companies provide an important arena for these operations. These firms have come a long way since their 2016 laissez-faire approach to beefing up their defenses. Facebook is now more aggressive about taking down coordinated inauthentic behavior, Twitter has banned all political advertising, and Google, Facebook, and Twitter have signed onto the EU’s Code of Practice, which sets a wide range of commitments, including transparency in political advertising and the closure of fake accounts. However, as methods for exposing disinformation are disclosed, Russian strategists will seek to circumvent them.45 The task for the EU and NATO is Sisyphean. Just days before the 2020 U.S. elections, the New York Post ran a story based on leaked (or fake) information against Biden. Twitter was quick to block the story, and Facebook posted warning labels next to it.46 Regardless of the wisdom of those actions, it does show the increased awareness of the big social media companies that staying away from acting is not a strategy. Russia is constantly adapting its hybrid warfare in response to its adversaries’ actions and technological change. As automated bots and hack-and-leak operations are exposed, Russian operations have changed to create more organic-looking means of influence that blend international and domestic issues. The key lesson for Russian strategists so far has been that their operations carry low costs and have potentially very high rewards. As long as this calculus remains in place, these operations will continue. The political unity of the West is fragile and already under great domestic strain — a reality that Russia seeks to amplify and exploit. The fundamental challenge for the West is maintaining political unity to counter Russian operations and successfully deter the most significant ones, including election meddling or the use of chemical weapons on NATO territory. Many other operations, however, such as run-of-the-mill disinformation, cannot reasonably be deterred given the Russian leadership’s conviction that it is in a political war with the West. Such operations will need to be countered with hardened defenses, public-private cooperation, and dedication.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Unity

Data sharing is key to promoting NATO unity – resolves longstanding challenges and reunites member states over common threats.

Kris Osborn 6-18 [Kris Osborn is the Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. “A New NATO: Common Data Sharing Systems Coming Soon”. June 18, 2022. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/new-nato-common-data-sharing-systems-coming-soon-203082]

Interoperability and rapid deployment reinforce one another. The more a multinational force is able to share sensitive information in real-time using common standards, interfaces, or interoperable data links, the faster a NATO force can move into position and conduct joint multi-domain operations. Improving interoperability has been a long-standing challenge for NATO forces. Radio frequencies need to be aligned, computing protocols need to enable data exchanges, and datalinks between separate countries need to operate with interfaces to ensure information transmission. Common command and control systems, fortified by uniform technical standards, can ensure NATO members are increasingly able to act seamlessly in warfare formations on the eastern flank. One clear advantage to this effort can be found in the F-35 stealth fighter, as the aircraft uses a common data link for all F-35s across multiple nations. The F-35s Multifunction Advanced Datalink (MADL) enables F-35s from any country to interact with and share information across a multinational formation of fifth-generation aircraft. The alliance is likely working to move beyond this existing synergy and connect drones, aircraft, ground vehicles, and surface ships from multiple countries in real-time using a common framework. This would allow an F-35 from Poland to send targeting detail to U.S. Abrams tanks positioned to defend Finland or to NATO surface ships in the Baltic Sea trying to disrupt Russian maritime supply lines. NATO will likely seek to build upon the existing framework of its NATO Standardization Agreement 4586 (STANAG 4586) to enable drones from different countries to exchange information in a common format. STANAG 4586 could perhaps be upgraded to reduce latency, prevent hacking, or expanded to other platforms using compatible technical standards, message formats, and protocol. NATO’s ability to rapidly respond relies to a large extent on the alliance’s capacity for common command and control and data exchange, or else forces from different member nations will be alienated from one another in combat environments. Given the number of breakthroughs the U.S. military is achieving with joint information networking, it makes sense that Austin would emphasize ongoing efforts to extend this kind of real-time connectivity among NATO members.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Resilience

NATO must develop Resilient Cybersecurity Architectures and Active Cyber Defenses- they will make it more difficult for advisories to attack

Kramer et al ‘20

D. Kramer; Distinguished fellow and board director at Atlantic Council. Expert in cybersecurity, defense policy, and non-traditional threats; Lauren M. Speranza; Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA); Conor Rodihan; Associate director at Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; NATO needs continuous responses in cyberspace; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-continuous-responses-in-cyberspace/

First, NATO should require the development and implementation of resilient cybersecurity architectures for itself, its members’ forces, and its key critical infrastructures. A resilient cybersecurity architecture involves an integrated set of capabilities that work as a system to reduce the disruptive effects of cyber adversaries. Key elements of a resilient architecture should include use of private sector cloud technology; zero-trust architecture for effective access management; development of secure hardware capabilities; and machine-learning and artificial-intelligence-augmented cyber defenses. This architecture also needs to be flexible to incorporate emerging technologies as they are developed. NATO itself cannot develop such architectures. It can, however, underscore their necessity and require its members to do so, using the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), acquisition procedures, standards and targets, and innovation from Allied Command Transformation to support a comprehensive research and development effort. In establishing requirements for these resilient architectures, NATO must recognize that one size will not fit all. Not only will requirements differ among military, government, and critical infrastructures operators, but, as has been shown in the development of autonomous vehicles and space capabilities, there are a variety of different approaches that may prove effective. In fact, having diversity within these capabilities will increase resilience by complicating adversaries’ abilities to infiltrate and attack them. Second, NATO, in coordination with its nations, should undertake active cyber defense. Even the best exclusionary capabilities in a cybersecurity resilient architecture can fail due to technical loopholes or human error. As a result, the Alliance needs “active cyber defenses” that can create resilience even when an attacker has breached cyber protections. These capabilities affect only those networks in which operators and owners have installed them and are not for offensive purposes. As the US National Security Agency explains, key elements of active defense capacities include “real-time communications,…sensors that report data on the current state of the network, sense-making analytics to understand the current state, automated decision-making to decide how to react to current state information, and capabilities to act on those decisions to defend the network.” NATO should include such active defense capabilities as a requirement of an overall resilient cybersecurity architecture. As a key element of active cyber defense, NATO must be capable of hunting for adversaries within cyber systems critical to defense. The Alliance should develop highly capable expert hunt teams to review system activities, detect anomalies, and defeat intruders, for example by deleting malware and closing unnecessary ports. NATO can significantly enhance Allies’ active defense efforts by establishing an NDPP requirement for national cybersecurity hunt teams, along with command arrangements for those teams in both hybrid and Article 5 contingencies. It should also establish several NATO Standing Cybersecurity Hunt Teams that would operate with the consent and active partnership of national governments and critical infrastructure network operators. As Microsoft has explained the role of hunt teams, Standing Cybersecurity Hunt Teams, acting in conjunction with national capabilities, can contest the continuous cyber campaigns of Russia and China. According to the US Department of Homeland Security, such hunt teams can conduct deep technical analyses of live networks to identify “previously unobserved threats.” Standing Cybersecurity Hunt Teams, with a focus on active defense, would expand on the capabilities of NATO’s current Cyber Rapid Reaction teams which are limited in numbers and operate reactively. While the cybersecurity of infrastructure and government systems is a national responsibility, a breach of cybersecurity at the national level can have collective consequences. Standing Cybersecurity Hunt Teams can be a capability, as well as connective tissue, to identify and mitigate cyber threats across national boundaries and enhance NATO’s collective defense. Standing Cybersecurity Hunt Teams would be able to utilize information and experience gained from contesting Russian and Chinese cyber-attacks against one ally in the defense of others. A Standing Cybersecurity Hunt Team can also serve in a capacity-building role to help allied nations develop their own cyber capabilities, for example, in conjunction with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Resilience

Intelligence coordination focused on resilience solves cyber offense and defense – the US can lead the way on establishing “safe-to-fail” goals.

Hamilton & Binnendijk ’22 (Daniel S. Hamilton is President, Transatlantic Leadership Network Senior nonresident Fellow, Brookings, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins University SAIS; Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Hans Binnendijk is a Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council Former Senior Director for Defense Policy, U.S. National Security Council “One Plus Four: Charting NATO’s Future in an Age of Disruption,” NATO Task Force Report, Transatlantic Leadership Network, February 16, 2022, https://www.transatlantic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NATO-TF-SC-final-feb-16-2022.pdf)-mikee

c. Bolster Deterrence and Defense Against Hybrid Threats Advancing the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend also means prioritizing ways to deal with unconventional conflicts that might hover below the Alliance’s Article 5 mutual defense threshold. These include some types of cyberattacks, energy intimidation, financial destabilization, election interference, and dis- and misinformation campaigns. NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence Command (CoE STRATCOM) needs creative new steps to detect and counter false information, including real time alerts to Allies on emerging threats and recommended countermeasures. Many relevant competences in Europe fall to national civilian authorities, to the private sector, or to the EU. While NATO can lead in developing and adapting cyber-deterrence and counter-disinformation guidelines and capabilities, better EU-NATO coordination and planning, will be needed. There is greater need to align and intensify action via the Helsinki-based European Center for Countering Hybrid Threats, ensuring there are operational feedin loops to NATO and EU decision-making. NATO and the defense establishments of its members are under constant attack from cyber hackers seeking to penetrate their information systems, extract data and plant viruses that could be used against allies. Digital disruptors target NATO systems, the operational cyber networks needed to execute military missions, and an extensive number of civilian networks that are essential to critical societal functions. Allies have determined that some types of cyber attacks could trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the 2016 Cyber Defense Pledge, allies affirmed their individual responsibilities under Article 3 of the Treaty to enhance their cyber defenses. The 2030 Reflection Group highlighted the need to develop both greater collective defense capacity in cyberspace and a more robust consultation framework to facilitate collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security in the cyber domain.20 These concerns were largely echoed by allies in the 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué.21 Nonetheless, allies have been reluctant to organize operational capabilities via NATO, and only five member states have announced that they will make sovereign cyber effects available to the Alliance.22 Limited measures thus far undertaken include deployment of cyber defense elements with NATO response forces, where continuous coordination and planning of cyber operations is essential. NATO has also gained initial experience through the SHAPE Cyber Operations Center (CyOC).

Box 1. Enhance Cybersecurity Through “Safe-to-Fail” Principles If NATO is to effectively address the broad range of security challenges emanating from the cyber domain, the Alliance could complement its current collective defense efforts by incorporating cyber resilience and “safe-to-fail” principles into the new Strategic Concept.23 Until now, NATO efforts to operationalize collective defense have relied primarily on ‘fail-deadly’ and ‘fail-safe’ logics in cyberspace. Should deterrence fail, ‘fail-deadly’ means the Alliance responds with the use of deadly force, whereas ‘fail-safe’ efforts are intended to ensure that the Alliance and its members can continue to operate safely and securely in the cyber domain.24 While these two approaches are important, they only apply to a limited band of the full spectrum of threats presented by the cyber domain. Fail-deadly deterrence is only likely to succeed in preventing adversarial states from cyber operations that reach the threshold of armed conflict with destructive physical effects that are quickly attributable.25 It is likely to be ineffective with state or non-state actors inflicting lower threshold attacks for which attribution is difficult. These considerations are further complicated by the differing legal restraints individual allies place on offensive cyber operations. Fail-safe measures also face several challenges. Given the sheer quantity of daily network probes experienced by NATO and individual member states, it is unlikely that every intrusion can be successfully countered or even identified. Highly sophisticated cyber operations are also likely to evade most defensive measures. Moreover, computers and systems increasingly rely on commercially available products and non-NATO-based manufacturers. Defensive strategies will have limited utility if hardware or software components have been preloaded with malware.26 The Alliance and its members need to account for a variety of threats and scenarios for which fail-deadly and fail-safe strategies prove ineffective—such as ransomware attacks, distributed denials of service, exploitation of digital supply chains, or operations conducted by non-state actors. To withstand and bounce forward from such disruptions, NATO should ensure that military cyber functions and capabilities are ‘safe-to-fail’ -- that is, they can fail in ways that do not remove their ability to recover at or above original operating capacity. Incorporating safe-to-fail principles would require the Alliance to fill out the full meaning of Article 3, which is not limited to “self-help” but also includes “mutual aid.” It would mean coordinating with the private sector and de-conflicting economic priorities, as provided under Article 2. It would include developing metrics for assessing Allied operational success in cyberspace, and horizon scanning for emerging cyber technologies that could affect Alliance security.27

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Public-Private Info

Partnership programs work but are limited—Nato should prioritize partner programs essential for security cooperation

Lisa Aronsson and Brett Swaney 21;

June 14, 2021; Lisa Aronsson is a research fellow, and Brett Swaney is an assistant research fellow, at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University.; Atlantic Council; “Three priorities for NATO partnerships in a contested world”;

NATO’s Partnerships programs have provided options for cooperation with non-member states for more than twenty-five years. They’ve proven remarkably flexible and adaptable, serving partners’ as well as NATO’s evolving interests. They helped consolidate democratic transitions in Europe, provided support for NATO-led missions and operations, and strengthened collective defense and deterrence. Through Partnerships for Peace, NATO offers a menu of more than 1,400 activities open to all forty partner states around the world. Partners choose the scope, focus, and intensity of their cooperation with NATO. The arrangement has appealed to a diverse group of states, which NATO organized into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and Partners Across the Globe. In the current environment, however, there is mounting pressure to adapt partnerships to ensure they continue to support NATO’s interests. The patchwork of geographic groupings is increasingly incongruent with today’s challenges. The groups have generally failed to promote security cooperation or political consultations at the regional level. They have also inhibited NATO’s ability to set priorities or steer cooperation with partners towards its own objectives. Moreover, the activities that partner states value most—capacity-building and interoperability, or the ability to link up their forces with NATO’s and act coherently—remain underfunded. As NATO reorients to incorporate China into a broader strategic calculus, how can NATO preserve what works for partners and adapt its partnership policies without defaulting to a one-size-fits-all approach? First, NATO should ensure that capacity-building and additional resilience support remain priorities. China is using its economic leverage to expand its security cooperation, and Beijing, along with Russia, is undermining Alliance credibility. Some partners have become testing grounds for hybrid attacks. Capacity-building helps counter that by strengthening partner institutions and resilience, and a sense of shared security. The Partnership Interoperability Initiative protects hard-earned interoperability with some partners, and the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative already supports Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Moldova, and Tunisia. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has recommended more attention to Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and areas with weak institutions or where democracy is undermined. Civil emergency planning through NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre is also valuable. Capacity-building programs are also a path to NATO interoperability for partners, which remains a major driver for cooperation with NATO—even among neutral countries that may never contribute to a NATO military operation. This is because NATO provides internationally recognizable military standards and the ability to plug-and-play into European Union (EU), United Nations, or other multilateral operations. NATO interoperability certification is in demand among partners, as are its robust programs for education, training, and exercises. These activities promote defense and security sector reform, strengthening institutions and transparency. NATO should work to overcome constraints on partner participation in exercises, especially for Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Cooperative security depends on NATO’s centrality as an international standard-setter, a position that cannot be taken for granted. Second, NATO should accelerate internal consultations on China and bring partners in early and often on topics of mutual concern, ensuring NATO decision-making is informed by partners in the earliest stages. This has worked well with Sweden and Finland, but it should work better with NATO’s Indo-Pacific partner states, those along China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and those with high-end cyber or space interests. The old geographic boundaries are being redrawn around these issues. NATO should work to better define mutual expectations and goals with partners and leverage natural groupings around cross-cutting challenges, perhaps by expanded use of 30+N arrangements or revised “framework nation” models, to bypass the gridlock of regional mechanisms. Daniel Hamilton of Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies recommends offering Enhanced Opportunities Partnerships to Japan and South Korea in an effort to improve interoperability, information-sharing, and political consultation. Finally, NATO should forge new frontiers in science and technology (S&T) cooperation with partner states and the EU. The Alliance has interests in achieving dominance in Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) and in setting norms and standards for their incorporation into militaries. NATO boasts renowned research universities and innovation hubs, but so do partner states like Sweden, Finland, Japan, and South Korea, for example. NATO should expand support for S&T collaboration with these partners and others through the Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS). NATO should also explore other avenues to expand research collaboration with select partners and share lessons learned from public-private partnerships. Partners already stand shoulder-to-shoulder with NATO on cybersecurity, for example, and should be brought into S&T Board and other discussions where possible. A more ambitious NATO-EU relationship in this area would be a force multiplier. NATO also has a related interest in leading the global mission to ensure that EDTs are integrated into modern militaries in ways that are consistent with its values and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. So far, the Alliance’s Advisory Group reports that NATO’s EDT strategies are focused internally on harnessing member states’ strengths and building a cohesive Alliance innovation ecosystem that is buttressed by talent development and novel financing initiatives. NATO is expected to release an artificial intelligence (AI) and big data strategy this summer, the first of seven EDT strategies, and it should outline a broader vision that links NATO’s innovation ecosystem with those of its partners. Partners and other like-minded states around the world are already looking to NATO for guidance on AI, codes of conduct for military activity in outer space, and standard-setting for cybersecurity, for example. Looking ahead, NATO partnerships will remain demand-driven, but they should adapt to serve NATO as it grapples with China’s rise while still addressing myriad other challenges. The next Strategic Concept will update the Alliance’s approach to cooperative security. NATO should set a higher level of ambition for partnerships and fund them so that they continue to appeal to such a diverse group of states around the world. Expanding capacity-building to include more resilience support remains paramount, but accelerating political consultations and forging ahead with ambitious S&T cooperation are also important. Failure in these areas risks allowing NATO partnerships to languish and fade into irrelevance at a time when the Euro-Atlantic community most needs a wider network of partners to face a contested world order.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Public-Private Info

NATO must strengthen public private partnerships and information sharing to counter emerging cyber threats and enhance deterrence

Lete & Dege ‘17 [Bruno & Daiga; 2017; senior fellow or security and defense policy in GMF’s security office; trainee in office, “NATO cybersecurity: a roadmap to resilience, ]

The core of NATO cybersecurity efforts lie at the member-state level. NATO is responsible for protecting its own institutional information and communication systems, but it has little say in coordinating how member states develop their national cyber defense capabilities. Despite having signed the Cyber Defense Pledge at the Warsaw NATO Summit, many member states still struggle to implement and evaluate their national cyber-security plans. As a result NATO’s efforts at developing uniform, alliance-wide cybersecurity are undermined by significant inconsistencies across the national level of the member states and NATO’s collective security and deterrence in cyberspace still show serious vulnerabilities against the backdrop of a growing number of attacks. For NATO to operationalize cyberspace as a domain of NATO defense policy and planning — as was agreed at the NATO Warsaw Summit — the Alliance should have authorizations from member states to do more than just provide advice, expertise, training, or education. Similar to how NATO coordinates Allied military forces in the conventional domain, NATO could also be asked to evaluate how member states can develop, synergize, and complement their mutual national cyber defenses. At a minimum, NATO should develop standards and better indicators that allow a standardized measurement of a nation’s annual progress — and should be tasked with testing and measuring members’ capabilities annually. To achieve this objective, a strong cooperation with the European Union is essential. NATO and the EU could work together to design minimum cybersecurity requirements and benchmarks that would also be adopted by the European Defense Agency. Rapid Assessment and Decision-Making Tools The scale, speed, and intensity of today’s cyber-attacks demand a new approach to respond at the political, military, and civilian level. To develop a rapid decision-making process when facing a cyber-attack NATO can take a few effective measures across its organization. First, more resources must be allocated to accurately and quickly detect and define hostile cyber actions. Further work on indications, warnings, and situational awareness is critical. In this context, NATO’s various civil and military intelligence units, inter alia, could have a useful role. In addition, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) could be granted more powers by the North Atlantic Council in authorizing some of the preparatory procedures. At the same time, NATO headquarters should increase the number of exercises that test rapid decisions-making procedures in complex and demanding cyber crisis-conflict scenarios. Much can also be done at the member-state level. Allies and willing partners should continue to work on improving and updating threat assessments, and facilitating closer intelligence cooperation. In this light, Allies should identify information sharing as a clear requirement and task. NATO could also intensify its interaction with national intelligence services and establish supply chain management partnerships with national industries. Cyber threats come in the form of networks and it takes a similarly well-organized network of international and cross-sector cooperation to defeat those threats. Common Rules of Engagement NATO has not commonly defined the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force may apply if one of its member states suffers a cyber-attack. Triggering the authorization to use force in the context of Article 5 may be more obvious if a member state faces a large-scale, devastating cyber-attack where the source of the attack can be clearly attributed. But the need is much more urgent to define when and how NATO must respond against the day-to-day cyber intrusions that fall below the threshold of being perceived as a clear act of aggression. NATO policy still allows for too many gray zones that are being exploited by adversaries who are clever enough not to cross a line that would trigger a common response from the Alliance. Cybersecurity incidents like the alleged Russian hack of the Democratic National Committee’s emails show that the United States and the NATO Allies are still unclear about the conditions and manner to respond in cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual published by the NATO CCDCoE offers a set of guidelines on how states can define rules of engagement, countermeasures, retaliation operations, and other forms of response within the context of the international law if they are to face an act of cyber aggression. But NATO is still far removed from having adopted a common view and interpretation on the subject. The North Atlantic Council would still need to assess each individual cyber-attack case by case without the support of standard measurement tools and indicators that can help NATO formulate a proportionate political or military response. As more cyber policies and laws are taking shape, NATO could demonstrate political, military, and intellectual leadership by clearly defining rules of engagement in cyberspace. Consider Offensive Cybersecurity NATO now recognizes a serious cyber-attack as a potential Article 5 trigger. But the doctrine and crisis management conditions enshrined in NATO’s cyber policy puts the emphasis on a defensive posture only. As such, the Alliance fails to recognize cyber as a force multiplier that could be of importance to the defense of NATO nations. Russia for instance considers offensive cyber capabilities to be an integral part of its military power and especially as a way to make up for its relative lack of conventional forces compared to NATO. The rise in connectivity, smartphone proliferation, cloud computing, growth of application development, and other technological advances open new avenues to attackers and force defenders to cover an ever-increasing number of fields. In the long run, NATO’s defensive approach is not sustainable. It is time for NATO to start a debate on offensive cybersecurity and map the feasibility of coordinating counter strikes, and to establish a significant offensive cyber capability. NATO could center this debate on projecting offensive cyber warfare capabilities as a means of deterrence, similar to the perceived value of nuclear weapons to deter attacks against NATO. Offensive security will allow the Alliance to better control the virtual battlefield. There are valuable cyber capabilities worth attaining, including the ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, intercept communications, or deny resources and access. NATO may find increasing support to have a conversation on offensive cyber security with its allies. As member states are increasingly preoccupied with defense and deterrence issues in cyber-space they will show more receptivity to cooperation with NATO on developing centralized offensive cyber capabilities. NATO and Cyber Industry Cooperation Cybersecurity is largely market-driven. Government intelligence capabilities increasingly find it hard to keep up with the requirements for combating the surge in cyber threats. NATO should play a crucial role in facilitating contacts between those member states that seek stronger links with the private sector and encourage the role that industry can play in cyber threat deterrence and intelligence sharing. Flagship initiatives, such as the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership, are important steps in that direction but there is still a need to build more access and trust between NATO governments and industry. Educating member states and partner nations about the role of the private sector in cybersecurity is key. To make the partnership with the industry more effective NATO could play a more important role in mapping and evaluating what kind of cyber defense technologies and intelligence gathering methods the private sector offers, share lessons learned with the member states and encourage capitals to integrate the best practices into capabilities, policy, and implementation planning. NATO can also play an essential role in improving communications and information sharing between the private and the public sectors. More can be done at the NATO level to identify what kind of information between governments and companies can or cannot be shared, to develop standardized methods and formats for information sharing, and to encourage the use of automated platform capabilities to share this information quickly. Build a Robust Public Diplomacy Campaign The first frontier of cyber defense is the individual. Citizens who are digitally empowered, cyber aware, and cyber educated will display a more responsible behavior and automatically increase NATO’s collective security in cyberspace. NATO needs a narrative on why cybersecurity matters beyond public belief that a major cyber-attack is improbable. What can NATO do in cyberspace that national security agencies cannot do? Which level of cybersecurity is needed rather than which one we can afford? NATO societies should be exposed to debate through parliaments, media, nongovernmental organizations, and academia. Externally, the Alliance must adapt to the reality that countries hostile to NATO will continue to use their own cyber capabilities and massive state propaganda organizations to attack NATO systems and discredit everything the Alliance does. NATO has to be able to engage in and win this information war at the elite decision-maker and opinion-former levels rather than simply raise awareness of its existence and activities among a global public.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Transparency

Transparency is key- NATO should be clear about capabilities to bolster cyber deterrence

Susan Davis 19, general reporter of NATO, “NATO IN THE CYBER AGE: STRENGTHENING SECURITY & DEFENCE, STABILISING DETERRENCE”, STC, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-09/148%20STC%20Davis%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE%20-%20fall%20revision%20-%20clean%2011.9.19.pdf

If one only looked at the bad cyber news flooding media outlets, policymakers could easily lose hope. However, this report’s in-depth analysis of Allied and NATO cyber strategies, policies, and activities has shown that NATO is strengthening cyber security, defence, and deterrence along all dimensions. The new cyber space doctrine to be adopted by the end of 2019 will be another crucial step. This progress should not lead to complacency. NATO must remain laser-focused on cyber attacks that could threaten an Ally’s territorial integrity, political independence, or national security and could, thus, lead them to invoke Article 5. The NATO PA resolution the Rapporteur will present for adoption at the Annual Session will represent the Assembly’s overall cyber policy recommendations. However, the Rapporteur would like to propose the following set of recommendations for the Committee’s endorsement. She urges the Committee to closely follow progress on these recommendations through all instruments available. The Alliance should continue to complement cyber security and defence measures with strategies of cyber deterrence. NATO should maintain a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. The Alliance should not set thresholds for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack as well as for what the possible collective response would be if that threshold was crossed. Allies and NATO should continue to signal their resolve and credibility to deter cyber attacks. NATO should therefore remain as transparent as possible when it comes to its cyber capabilities. In areas where public disclosure is not an option, communicating with potential opponents through non-public channels should happen as frequently as possible.The Alliance should continue to seek to reduce escalatory risks through clear diplomatic messaging and engagement, a high level of transparency on cyber capabilities and policies, and support to norm-development and confidence-building measures in cyber space.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Info Sharing

Rebuilding information networks through organized sharing is vital – effective information sharing shields from cyberattacks

Daniel & Kenway ’20 (Michael Daniel currently serves as President and CEO of the non-profit Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Joshua Kenway is a Cybersecurity Associate at the Cyber Threat Alliance and a Research Fellow with the Algorithmic Justice League. “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO,” in Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, December 2020, )

These incorrect assumptions have undermined information sharing as an effective tool against cyber threats, yet policies, structures, and processes must be based on assumptions about the overall environment in order to function. As a replacement for the faulty assumptions explained above, this chapter proposes four alternative presumptions to enable effective information sharing. First, cyber threat information consists of multiple information types across different levels, with distinct value to different consumers, meaning that information sharing needs to be tailored and nuanced. Second, for this reason, relevance and comparative advantage should drive sharing activities. Third, effective information sharing efforts must overcome context-specific technical, economic, legal, and cultural barriers; and fourth, trust is a necessary component of information sharing. The rest of this section will explore these alternative presumptions in greater detail. A. Types of Cyber Threat Information Chismon and Ruks (2015) assembled a useful taxonomy of cyber information categories based on the kind of decisions the information informs. A modified version of their taxonomy is shown in Table I. As detailed in Table I, different categories of information, from technical to strategic, are intended for different consumers. However, information across the four levels—technical, tactical, operational, and strategic—is interrelated. For example, technical and tactical information can be combined to generate operational cyber threat information to improve organisational understanding of an impending attacker’s methods and capabilities (Chismon & Ruks, 2015). Similarly, post-incident analysis of technical cyber threat information often provides the foundation for the implementation of a tactical level decision. A holistic assessment of technical, tactical, and operational inputs drives the output of strategic cyber threat information. Despite these complex relationships, this taxonomy provides a useful way to think about cyber threat information and is indicative of why technical data-sharing should not be the sole focus of information sharing programmes. Smaller or less mature organisations are unlikely to find much utility in technical or tactical information sharing, while even larger organisations may miss out on key operational or strategic information insights if they focus exclusively on the technical information. For this reason, the Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA), which includes established cyber security vendors and related enterprises, shares a total of ten types of actionable cyber threat information across these four categories, as recalled by the authors and detailed in Table II. Understanding the value of these various forms of cyber threat information requires taking a more mature and nuanced view than the simplistic assumption that more information sharing means better security. This expanded conceptual framework for cyber threat information sharing reflects the diversity of information that industry leaders already know must be shared to strengthen defences. Each type informs a different aspect of cyber security and has a different value in different situations. Broad adoption of this (still high-level) extension to the framework provided by Chismon and Ruks (2015) would enable cyber security practitioners to develop more nuanced and useful policies for information sharing. B. Relevance and Comparative Advantage in Information Sharing In other disciplines, from finance to health to politics to sports, organisations do not produce and consume the same information equally. Instead, wide variation occurs based on relevance to business models, missions, and perceived benefits. Cyber security practitioners and policymakers should expect cyber threat information sharing to behave similarly. Different organisations should produce and consume different types of information based on two principles: relevance and comparative advantage. These two concepts should drive who should be sharing what information with whom, in what detail, and at what periodicity. 1) Relevance of Information Companies, non-profit organisations, and government agencies all have goals or missions and employ specific business models to achieve those goals. Information sharing should relate directly to an organisation’s goals and business model. Thus, a cyber security vendor should share technical cyber threat information at speed and at scale continuously because it is directly relevant to their business model. Conversely, a medium-sized manufacturer primarily needs strategic and operational level cyber threat information— strategic warnings, best practices, and tactical warnings (e.g., if a government learns that the business or its industry is being targeted)—all of which need only to be updated when a change has occurred. Technical cyber threat information provided at scale to this business would simply not be useful. 2) Comparative Advantage of Information Sharing Even if some organisations can produce certain information types, others might be more efficient at that work. For example, although governments can use their intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to collect, process, and produce technical cyber threat information, they do not have a comparative advantage in that information type. Private sector companies can perform that function just as efficiently. However, governments have a comparative advantage in other categories, such as attribution of cyber attacks, strategic warnings, and tactical warnings, which benefit from nation-state-level intelligence capabilities and authorities. As in other activities, the principle of comparative advantage should determine which organisations should be collecting, processing, sharing, and consuming different types of information. C. Technical, Economic, Legal and Cultural Barriers At first glance, the barriers inhibiting information sharing seem quite varied. However, a closer review shows they fall into four categories: technical, economic, legal, and cultural. While their specific manifestations and relative significance will vary across sharing contexts, these barriers can combine in various ways to create a formidable obstacle to sharing. Technical barriers prevent information from moving rapidly at scale or in easily consumable formats. For example, inconsistent definitions and terminology and difficulty in achieving interoperability and automation remain significant obstacles (Zibak & Simpson, 2019). In turn, these barriers often inhibit the usability or reliability of shared information (ENISA, 2017). Economic barriers stem from the inability to identify a clear return on investment from sharing activities. Organisations ‘participate in sharing networks when their return is more than the cost to participate’ (Vázquez et al., 2012: p. 432). This problem can be compounded by first-mover disadvantage, given that ‘establishing threat intelligence sharing infrastructure is expensive … [while] in the long run, intelligence sharing could help bring down the overall security cost’ (Zibak & Simpson, 2019: p. 7). Absent a clear and immediate prospect of a return on investment, proponents often have difficulty making the business case to establish, invest in or sustain sharing activities. Legal barriers come from uncertainty about what information can be shared under what circumstances or unanswered questions about liability, fines, or prosecution. These uncertainties deter organisations from sharing. Privacy laws can hinder sharing by inadvertently classifying certain cyber threat information as private and thereby limiting how it can be used or distributed (Panda Security, 2018). These legal concerns require sharing organisations to undertake extensive consideration of their potential implications (Borden et al., 2018; Albakri et al., 2019). Finally, cultural barriers can also impede sharing (Luiijf & Kernkamp, 2015). For cyber security companies, it can be hard to overcome the idea that retaining unique data yields a competitive advantage. For other organisations, it can be hard to overcome sentiments such as ‘no one would target me’, ‘cyber security is too complex for executives and non-technical employees to understand’, or ‘falling victim to hackers is inevitable, so why bother?’ For governments, long-standing views about the appropriate respective roles of the public and private sectors get in the way of cooperation and sharing. The good news is that, over the last twenty years, practitioners have developed ways to overcome these barriers. The bad news is that none of these methods is frictionless or cost-free. For example, adopting technical standards for information sharing may require organisations to adjust business processes or infrastructure; high initial costs may need to be met with loans that are paid back by future sharing participants; legal consultations may be needed to shape sharing rules; and reluctant executives may need the benefits of information sharing to be explained in bottom-line terms. Across the board, information sharing requires organisations to expend resources, either money or time. These costs can decrease but do not disappear. Yet, to be worthwhile, information sharing needs to be sustained and organisations have to pay a long-term, regular cost for engaging in information sharing activities. This requirement, in turn, means that information sharing requires incentives to achieve the scope, scale, and speed required for effective cyber defence. Such incentives can range from the individual (avoiding the costs of a cyber incident) to the public (government grants) to the avoidance of sticks (fines or penalties for not engaging in appropriate sharing). Regardless, information sharing laws, policies, programmes, and structures should assume that information sharing is resource-heavy and requires sustained investment to occur. D. Trust as a Necessary Component of Information Sharing Experience from previous initiatives and programmes demonstrates that information sharing only occurs when the providers and recipients have a degree of trust. As noted by Wagner et al. (2018), trust ‘plays a critical role in sharing’ (p. 5). The European Network Information Agency (ENISA) observes that in situations where trust between members of the community is diminishing or non-existent the value of information shared is undermined (ENISA, 2013). For information sharing to work, it is necessary to ‘foster confidence for stakeholders that the provided information will be acted upon as intended’ (Wagner et al., 2018: p. 5). Information providers have to understand who will receive their information, what they will do with it, and what level of information sharing-related risk to expect, while information recipients want to know where the information came from and its reliability. To reach this level of confidence, information sharing organisations should ‘provide control mechanisms to specify what information is shared, how much of it and with whom’ (Sauerwein et al., 2017: p. 845). According to ENISA (2012, cited by Vázquez et al., 2012: p. 433), the use of intentionally carefully designed trust-building mechanisms, such as ‘the policies, membership rules, requirement for security clearance and interaction type’ can be beneficial in the context of information sharing and will support the creation of trust. Absent trust, information sharing will not occur no matter what structures and incentives are put in place. Trust does not require that the participants all like each other, nor does it mean they share everything. Trust means that participants have a reasonable belief that all other participants will adhere to the agreed rules.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Info Sharing

NATO should increase their information sharing among organizations – organizations can develop better practices and defensive measures

Daniel & Kenway ’20 (Michael Daniel currently serves as President and CEO of the non-profit Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Joshua Kenway is a Cybersecurity Associate at the Cyber Threat Alliance and a Research Fellow with the Algorithmic Justice League. “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO,” in Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, December 2020, )

The new information sharing presumptions proposed in this chapter—careful consideration of information type and relevance, comparative advantage in information production, how to overcome existing context-specific bar- 188 riers, and how to create and maintain trust—make the cyber threat information sharing landscape far more complex than most people envision. Yet, this very complexity provides an opportunity for simplification: rather than everyone trying to share everything all the time, organizations can concentrate on the information types most relevant to them. Information sharing architectures, policies, and systems should assist organizations in focusing their information sharing activities. Although identifying all the implications is beyond the scope of this chapter, some more prominent ones are worthy of mention. Few organizations will share every type of cyber threat information. Most organizations should focus on the types of information most relevant to their business model. For example, under this paradigm, only organizations with strong technical capabilities would share technical cyber threat information: cyber security providers, telecommunications companies, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs), and large, multinational companies in critical industries. Government agencies would focus less on producing stand-alone technical indicators of compromise (IOCs), which industry has in abundance, and more on combining that information with strategic and tactical warning about specific threats, since their comparative advantage lies in their intelligence and law enforcement capabilities. Most citizens, businesses and organizations would primarily consume information about best practices and defensive measures. The focus of information sharing programs should change. Since most organizations do not need to produce or consume technical cyber threat information, government cyber security initiatives should reflect this. These programs should instead encourage most organizations to hire a cyber security vendor or MSSP. Those service providers would consume the technical, contextual, vulnerability, and exploitation information and use it to make security adjustments such as updating blacklists or prioritizing patches. Most organizations would primarily consume updates to best practice and strategic or tactical warnings. This change would make information sharing programmed more relevant and cost-effective. Information sharing programs need to build trust. Since trust is a key component for effective information sharing, programs, structures, and architectures need to build trust over time. Policies and structures should include operational processes designed to enhance confidence and trust when personal rapport among stakeholders may be lacking, particularly when programs are starting (see Sauerwein et al., 2017; Sillaber et al., 2016; Vázquez et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2019). For example, CTA’s information sharing rules specify the nature and scope of the sharing commitment, how members should handle shared information, and what enforcement mechanisms and penalties will be applied for violating those rules. Such clarity and consistency help new members trust that other members will treat their information properly. 189 Information sharing products can incorporate more than one information type. Since the different information types are interdependent, any given sharing product can contain more than one type. For example, CTA members share technical indicators and tactical context (and occasionally attribution) through the same automated system and standard format (Cyber Threat Alliance, 2020). A more rigorous conceptual framework for information sharing does not require a rigid division among the information types from a software or process flow perspective. Reducing the number of organizations expected to share technical information would make achieving speed and scale easier. Abandoning the idea that all organizations everywhere should engage in technical cyber threat information sharing makes overcoming the barriers to technical sharing easier. Under this assumption, the number of organizations with the combination of willingness, relevance, and capability to engage in technical cyber threat sharing decreases to a large but manageable number (Aspen Cybersecurity Group, 2018). At this size, having most of these organizations participating in formal information sharing groups becomes a reasonable goal. The information sharing burden would decrease while the value would go up, increasing the likelihood that organizations voluntarily participate in such activities. By focusing sharing activities on the most relevant information types, the time and monetary investment for most organizations would decrease. At the same time, the connection between shared information and the organization’s mission or business model would become clearer, thereby increasing its value, and making that value easier to assess. The decreased burden and increased value would expand the number of organizations that participate in sharing activities. Additional standard formats for non-technical information types would emerge, along with systems to share those formats with increasing degrees of automation. On the technical side, several standard formats now facilitate automated information sharing, such as the STIX (MITRE Corporation, 2012) and MITRE’s Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) frameworks (MITRE Corporation, 2020). More rigorously dividing cyber threat information into different types would encourage other formats to emerge and organizations to adopt them. Standard formats make consumption of information easier for the recipient. Increased automation would increase speed and scale, making sharing more effective. Effective cyber threat information sharing requires planning, long-term investment, and sustained commitment. For example, technical cyber threat information sharing is not merely a matter of adopting a technical standard and installing software. It takes engineering and analytic time on an ongoing basis as well as maintenance of the technology and processes. Similarly, consuming cyber security best practices is not a one-time endeavor; organization’s must incorporate regular review and implementation into their business processes. Absent a long-term commitment from organizational 190 leadership, sharing usually withers after an initial burst of enthusiasm. Cyber security should take on the same status as other business enablers, such as accounting, legal affairs, and communications; like these areas, cyber security should be a function that all organization’s budget for and sustain over the long-term.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Info Sharing

Status Quo Information Sharing Is Lacking – technical data is not the only form of information that is valuable

Daniel & Kenway ’20 (Michael Daniel currently serves as President and CEO of the non-profit Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Joshua Kenway is a Cybersecurity Associate at the Cyber Threat Alliance and a Research Fellow with the Algorithmic Justice League. “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO,” in Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, December 2020, )

The assumption that cyber threat information is equivalent or primarily composed of technical data severely limits the potential value of information sharing. Technical data, while necessary, is not the only form of information that can provide value. For example, a warning from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that a specific Chinese cyber group is targeting a US company with cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property would be a useful piece of non-technical intelligence for that company. Written advisories about vulnerabilities and associated patches are critical to organisations using vulnerable software or hardware; in fact, such information is far more useful to most organisations than technical data on one of the many variations of the LockerGoGo malware. The most common interpretation of information is too narrow. B. Every Organisation Should Produce and Consume Technical Data If the underlying assumption is that information sharing means technical information, then it logically follows that most policies, infrastructure, and programmes for sharing are built around the idea that most organisations should produce and consume technical information. If everyone were to collect, share, and consume such data, the thinking goes, security would improve across the ecosystem. The problem with this logic is that most organisations are lousy at collecting, producing, and consuming technical data—and always will be. Most companies do not have the capability to identify a malware binary, analyse it, and use the resulting information, nor would they know how to handle a malicious domain name. As a practical matter, this situation will not change; no country will have enough cyber security professionals for every organisation to have this capacity. Small and medium businesses do not and will not have the resources to collect, process, share, and consume technical data regularly. This limitation does not mean such organisations would not benefit from cyber threat information sharing; rather they need different information. Neither is this approach economically efficient. Most organisations do not need access to technical data in real-time. Despite the rapidly changing nature of cyber threats in a technical sense, for most organisations, cyber security requirements and best practices do not change much from day to day. 2 For example, see the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Division N, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015) and the Automated Indicator Sharing Program (DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 2020). 182 In addition, not every business has in-house technical accounting or legal skills—why should cyber security be different? Current practice does not sufficiently differentiate between organisations in terms of what information they should share under what circumstances and how frequently. C. Information Sharing is Easy In January 2008, the US government started the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), formalising it in National Security Presidential Directive 54 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (The White House, 2010). ‘Connect the Centers,’ one of CNCI’s twelve lines of effort, focused on information sharing with the goal of linking the US government’s cyber centres into one common operating picture; over the long-term, it was intended to incorporate the private sector. Everyone assumed that this element would be the easiest to implement and the first to be completed. However, thirteen years later, this element is arguably one part of the CNCI vision that remains unrealised as the cyber security centres are not seamlessly connected and many silos remain stubbornly in place. A similar situation has played out in the private sector with the creation of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). The assumption was that companies would eagerly join these organisations, share what they knew and consume the information shared by others. Yet, more than twenty years after the concept was formalised into national legislation, many sectors are just now forming an ISAC and, even in the most successful of them, the percentage of participants that actively share information is widely understood within the industry to remain low. Public sector efforts to share information with the private sector have suffered analogous problems. The US government created the Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) programme as a free service for general businesses, but few organisations have signed up and even fewer contribute to the programme (Marks, 2018). This is unsurprising if we look at what is being shared; a US government report from 2018 suggested that just two or three out of the 11,447 indicators submitted to AIS by the Department of Homeland Security were ‘malicious and related to cyber incidents [… while] many of the indicators received were false positives or redundant information’ (DHS Office of Inspector General, 2017: p. 15). The three examples highlight that information sharing is difficult for a variety of reasons. Simply creating programmes and establishing sharing mechanisms is insufficient without addressing obstacles to sharing actionable information. These include underlying factors such as over-classification, reputational risk, and legal concerns, as well as operational hurdles around validation, standardisation, timeliness, and automation (Zibak & Simpson, 2019).

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Info Sharing

Information sharing is the lynchpin to effective NATO cybersecurity.

Daniel & Kenway ’20 (Michael Daniel currently serves as President and CEO of the non-profit Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Joshua Kenway is a Cybersecurity Associate at the Cyber Threat Alliance and a Research Fellow with the Algorithmic Justice League. “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO,” in Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, December 2020, )-mikee

Cyber threat information sharing has bedevilled the cyber security community for at least two decades. Faulty assumptions have prevented this fundamentally sound concept from achieving its potential. But while information sharing is a tough problem, it is not an insoluble one. If the cyber security community adopts different underlying assumptions for information sharing then the volume, quality, and utility of the exchanged information can increase. In turn, more effective, relevant information sharing will enable defenders to better understand and anticipate adversaries, develop mechanisms to disrupt adversary activities more strategically, and raise the level of cyber security across the digital ecosystem. Under these circumstances, cyber threat information sharing can finally live up to its promise to enable better cyber security for everyone. For NATO, updating programmes to reflect these revised information sharing assumptions would require significant changes to current operations. First, overcoming the technical, economic, legal, and cultural barriers to sharing relevant, actionable information across member countries and economic sectors will require sustained attention, prioritisation, and funding from NATO’s senior leadership. Absent such attention, the barriers will likely prove insurmountable. Second, NATO should build on its existing MISP [Malware Information Sharing Platform] use to create a more comprehensive system of information sharing that broadens the types of information shared and widens the number of recipients. Third, NATO should consider how to better leverage industry for technical information, while enriching that information with government-derived information about context, attribution, and intent. If NATO shifted its approach to information sharing as suggested, the Alliance would have the opportunity to assume a leadership position in this area. If not, NATO will continue to struggle to make information sharing live up to its promise.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Impact – Solves China

NATO cohesion key to US hegemony- frees up resources and provides support for global operations

Ben Hodges in 2018

Lieutenant General (ret.) Ben Hodges, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies, Center for European Policy Analysis, Former Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe; Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO; The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF); is a non-partisan policy organization committed to the idea that the United States and Europe are stronger together; https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato

A war between China and the United States is not inevitable, but the next 15 years could see the eruption of such a conflict. While this may not reach the threshold of full-scale war or a nuclear conflict, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have set their country on a trajectory that will lead to a strategic situation that may result in sustained armed conflict, potentially stretching across the Pacific region, in all domains. Furthermore, the combination of China’s huge population, export-oriented economy, and lack of natural resources could generate an inexorable push towards conflict. The CCP leadership has emphasized the development of military capabilities that could deny the U.S. Navy access to the South China Sea, including long-range air and missile defense and anti-ship capabilities. This anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability does not depend on a large Chinese navy but instead uses well-protected, land-based systems. The creation of artificial islands in the region, most of which are already being armed and garrisoned with A2AD capabilities, are violations of international law and agreements that clearly demonstrate the CCP’s strategy and intentions. Enforcement of freedom of the seas and recognized international waters by the United States and others is necessary to counter these policies. In one recent demonstration of CCP intent, there was a near-collision incident between Chinese and U.S. Navy ships, caused by unsafe and unprofessional behavior by the Chinese one. Statements by the China’s minister of defense during his recent visit to the Pentagon, including demands that the U.S. forces stay away from the articifial islands, indicate that his country will continue to push aggressively its territorial claims. Meanwhile, in Europe China has become an increasingly significant and potentially divisive influence in a variety of aspects; especially in infrastructure, technology transfer, and trade. The Belt and Road Initiative has resulted in dramatic increases in Chinese investment in Europe, control of hundreds of European companies, and ownership or control of more than 10 percent of Europe’s ports. These developments, and the CCP’s strategy and behavior, are cause for concern about the potential for conflict with China within the next 15 years. They also show why the United States must prepare for this eventuality. During the Cold War, the United States used a “two and a half wars” framework for force structure. This was not a strategy, but rather a mechanism meant to assess how much capability and capacity its armed forces needed to deter effectively and, if necessary, win simultaneous conflicts in two different operational theaters and “hold” in a third, minor theater at the same time, for as long as necessary. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the United States can no longer exercise this capability and capacity. Therefore, in the event of conflict with China, it will need a strong, cohesive NATO as well as partnerships around the world in order to continue deterring a revanchist Russia and to carry on counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East while the majority of U.S. forces and capabilities are operating in the Pacific.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Impact – Solves China

NATO cohesion is key to maintain US hegemony and influence globally against a rising China

Ben Hodges in 2018

Lieutenant General (ret.) Ben Hodges, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies, Center for European Policy Analysis, Former Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe; Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO; The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF); is a non-partisan policy organization committed to the idea that the United States and Europe are stronger together; https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. The interests and responsibilities of the United States are global, with freedom of navigation on the seas and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat, most notably in the South China Sea and with China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. The threat from China is real and growing, and if it materializes the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater. The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Impact – Democracy

Democracy solves extinction

Carla Zoe Cremer & Luke Kemp 21, The Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Cambridge. "Democratising Risk: In Search of a Methodology to Study Existential Risk" //pipk

There is an intimate and neglected relationship between existential risk and democracy. Democracy must be central to efforts to prevent and mitigate catastrophic risks. It is also an antidote to many of the problems manifest in the TUA. Do those who study the future of humanity have good grounds to ignore the visions, desires, and values of the very people whose future they are trying to protect? Choosing which risks to take must be a democratic endeavour. We understand democracy here in accordance with Landemore as the rule of the cognitively diverse many who are entitled to equal decision-making power and partake in a democratic procedure that includes both a deliberative element and one of preference aggregation (such as majority voting)45,115. Decision-making procedures are not either democratic or non- democratic, but instead lie on a spectrum. They can be more or less democratic, inclusive, and diverse. We posit three reasons for why we should democratise research and decision-making in existential risk: the nature of collective decision-making about human futures, the superiority of democratic reason, and democratic fail-safe mechanisms. Avoiding human extinction, or crafting a desirable long-term future, is a communal project. Scholars of existential risk who take an interest in the future of Homo sapiens are choosing to consider the species in its entirety. If certain views are excluded, the arguments for doing so must be compelling. Democracy will improve our judgments in both the governance and the study of existential risks. Asking how our actions today influence the long-term future is one of the most difficult intellectual tasks to unravel, and if there is a right path, democratic procedures will have the best shot at finding it. Hong and Page116,117 demonstrate both theoretically and computationally that a diverse group of problem-solving agents will show greater accuracy than a less diverse group, even if the individual members of the diverse group were each less accurate. Accuracy gains from diversity trump gains from improving individual accuracy. Landemore115, builds on this work to advance a probabilistic argument that inclusive democracies will, in expectation, make epistemically superior choices to oligarchies or even the wise few. This is supported by promising results in inclusive, deliberative democratic experiments from around the world 118. In the long run, democracies should commit fewer mistakes than alternative decision-making procedures. If this is true, it should improve the accuracy of research efforts and decision-making. We are more likely to make accurate predictions about the mechanisms of extinction, probable futures, and risk prevention if the field invites cognitive diversity, builds flat institutional structures, and avoids conflicts of interest. Thereare many ways to consider the interests of the many. Democratic assemblies could allow global citizens to deliberate about the futures they prefer, citizens could be surveyed, and the field of ERS itself could be diversified. At the moment, the field is, as many academic disciplines are, unrepresentative of humanity at large and variably homogenous in respect to income, class, ideology, age, ethnicity, gender, nationality, religion, and professional background. The latter issue is particularly true of existential risk, which, despite being an inherently interdisciplinary endeavour, is at the highest levels dominated by analytic moral philosophers. We need to be vigilant to what perspectives are not represented in the study of existential risk. An awareness of bias will go some way towards mitigating its negative effects. To get close to replicating the cognitive diversity found among humans, we must begin by inviting different thinkers with different values and beliefs into the field. Democracies can limit harms. Any approach to mitigating existential threats could create response risks, and the TUA seems particularly vulnerable to this. Despite good intentions and curiosity-driven research, it could justify violence, dangerous technological developments, or drastically constrain freedom in favour of (perceived) security. If we hope to explore ideas but minimise harms, democracies can be used to moderate the measures taken in response to harmful ideas. It seems, for example, vanishingly unlikely that a diverse group of thinkers or even ordinary citizens would entertain the idea of sacrificing 1 billion living, breathing beings for an infinitesimal improvement in reaching an intergalactic techno-utopia. In contrast, the TUA could recommend this trade-off. The democratic constraint of extreme measures may simply be a form of collective selfinterest. Voters are unlikely to tolerate global catastrophic risks (GCRs), which incur the death of a sizeable portion of the electorate, if they know they themselves could be affected. We expect that scholars who do not support sacrificing current lives in the name of abstract calculations, but would still like to explore the use of expected value theory in existential risk, will be in support of democratic fail-safe mechanisms. Empirically, this fail-safe mechanism seems to work. Even deeply imperfect democracies, like the ones we inhabit now, often avert detrimental outcomes. Democracies prevent famines 119 (although not malnutrition)120. They make war — a significant driver of GCRs — less likely 121. The inclusion of diverse preferences in democracies, such as those achieved through women’s suffrage, further decreases the likelihood of violent conflict 122. Citizens often show a significant risk aversion in comparison to their government. While surveys are notoriously difficult to collect and interpret, existing data suggest that the public has little support for nuclear weapons use 123–125, but strong support for action against climate catastrophe 126–128. We can further show that when citizens deliberately engage with the subject at hand, their concern and readiness for action often increases 118. For example, citizen assemblies on climate change have recommended widespread policy-changes across sectors, amendments to incentive structures and laws against ecocide to reach emissions targets 129. Indeed, many lament that when it comes to genetically modified organisms and nuclear power, citizens are far too riskaverse130 . The problem is not that the public is riddled with cognitive biases that make them unconcerned about global catastrophes. Democratic debate cannot be an afterthought. Navigating humanity through crises will involve many value-laden decisions under deep uncertainty. Democratic procedures can deal with such hard choices. Greater cognitive diversity should be represented amongst scholars of ERS. Recommendations on policies that would reduce risk should be passed through deliberative assemblies and await the approval of a wider pool of ordinary citizens, as they will be the ones who will bear this risk. A homogenous group of experts attempting to directly influence powerful decision-makers is not a fair or safe way of traversing the precipice.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Impact – Laundry List

NATO is key---it’s a full-spectrum force multiplier and guarantees multilateral logistics

Weinrod 16 - Former Secretary of Defense Representative Europe and Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission NATO (W Bruce, “We Still Need NATO,” The American Interest, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/01/15/we-still-need-nato/)

Not only does NATO remain relevant, but more importantly it continues to support and advance U.S. security interests—though again, often in ways that do not make headlines and that casual observers rarely appreciate in full. Most fundamentally, NATO provides a standing multilateral military capability that can deter or be deployed should a significant security threat arise. Because NATO has a military capability in place, the core elements for mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of substantial multilateral military forces already exist. The ongoing training, exercises, and regular communication among the national militaries of NATO members allows them to jump-start preparations and actions when needed without very lengthy preparatory work. This can allow the U.S. government to proceed in shaping and leading military coalitions more quickly, at less cost and with greater effectiveness, than if NATO did not exist and its functional equivalent had to be invented from scratch at a moment’s notice. While the U.S. government retains the capacity and the right to act unilaterally if and when necessary, it makes sense for it to act with others whenever possible, whether through NATO or ad hoc coalitions of the willing. A multilateral framework can provide both political cover and military resources, and the United States very much can benefit from both. The United States also benefits significantly from NATO’s logistics capabilities. Pontificating about grand strategies sounds impressive, but for military effectiveness and success, logistics capabilities are what really count. For example, while NATO did not formally participate in the 1991 Gulf War, NATO resources, supplies, bases, and other infrastructure provided crucial support prior to and during the U.S.-led coalition military action to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The coalition in effect borrowed NATO capacities already in existence, and benefitted greatly from equipment compatibility and common training and resources. Other coalitions of the willing assembled under U.S auspices and utilizing NATO resources can follow the same approach. In addition, the U.S. government has access to the numerous military facilities and resources that member nations make available to NATO. A good example is Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, now being used against ISIS in what is not a formal NATO operation. As importantly, working through NATO usually makes it relatively routine for host governments to agree to U.S. requests to use facilities within their territory for military-related purposes. Without NATO, in order to fulfill its security responsibilities, the U.S. government would need to develop and maintain a complex network of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and arrangements that would seek to maintain the kind of connectivity and flexibility that NATO already provides. Further, the U.S. government would need not only agreements to access such military facilities but also would likely need to obtain specific approval from the host nation for each use and perhaps even in some cases legislative approval. In general, it is much simpler, faster, and easier politically and otherwise for nations to grant the United States the use of their facilities within a NATO framework than it would be to have to grant permission to the United States on their own. Over recent decades NATO has, as noted above, developed a global security network that reflects formalized relationships with non-NATO nations. For the United States, this brings the advantage that it can work through NATO to develop or enhance security relationships with states that belong to the PFP, the MD, the ICI, and NATO bilateral security relationships. Working through NATO provides an extra dimension to U.S. efforts to enhance the military capacities of friends and allies in various regions who, with training and assistance, can provide supplementary support to NATO or U.S.-led operations. NATO also supports U.S. interests by providing a multilateral framework for a U.S. presence in nations where the U.S. government wishes to help train and also enhance its military contacts, but where unilateral U.S. military involvement might be politically contentious.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Impact – Laundry List

NATO alliance is key to the economy and solve global security issues – terrorism, climate change, and pandemics

Burns, former American NATO ambassador, July 11, 18 (Nicholas, “What America Gets Out of NATO”, ) DR

None of this, of course, is likely to disturb Mr. Trump, who remains steadfast in his belief that whatever benefits the United States gained from the trans-Atlantic alliance in the past, the country no longer profits. But he’s wrong — there are compelling reasons that NATO in particular will be a distinct advantage for America’s security far into the future. First, NATO’s formidable conventional and nuclear forces are the most effective way to protect North America and Europe — the heart of the democratic world — from attack. Threats to our collective security have not vanished in the 21st century. Mr. Putin remains a determined adversary preying on Eastern Europe and American elections. NATO is a force multiplier: The United States has allies who will stand by us, while Russia has none. And while it’s true that most of America’s NATO allies need to increase their defense spending under the treaty, they’re not freeloaders: The United States has relied on NATO allies to strike back against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in the Middle East. European troops have replaced American soldiers in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and contribute the large majority in Kosovo. Our NATO allies are also getting better about contributing their fair share. They have increased their defense spending by a total of more than $87 billion since Mr. Putin annexed Crimea in 2014. Fourteen more allies will reach NATO’s military spending target — 2 percent of gross domestic product — by 2024. Mr. Trump would be smart to claim credit for this at this week’s summit. A second reason for maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance is America’s economic future. The European Union is our country’s largest trade partner, and its largest investor. The United States and the European Union are the world’s two largest economies, and can steer global trade to their advantage if they stick together. More than four million Americans work for European companies in the United States. Forty-five of the 50 states export more to Europe than to China. Mr. Trump is right that the two sides are also economic competitors, and trade disputes are inevitable. His predecessors kept this tension in balance lest there be damaging consequences for American businesses, workers and farmers — a good reminder for Mr. Trump, whose ill-conceived trade war with Canada and Europe risks harming the American economy. Third, future American leaders will find Europe is our most capable and willing partner in tackling the biggest threats to global security: climate change; drug and cybercrime cartels; terrorism; pandemics and mass migration from Africa and the Middle East. And America’s NATO allies will continue to be indispensable in safeguarding democracy and freedom, under assault by Russia and China. Mr. Trump’s campaign to undermine the European Union and diminish America’s leadership in NATO serves none of these interests. He seems driven by resentment about European trade surpluses and low defense budgets, issues that blind him to all the other benefits Americans derive from our alliance with Europe and Canada. Mr. Trump may believe his blistering attacks on Europe’s trade policies and defense budgets are a good negotiating tactic before the summit. But in fact they have already done enormous damage. While he cannot outright kill NATO — the American public and Congress support it too strongly — he has eroded significant levels of trust and good will. As it became clear during my recent visits across Europe, a dangerous breach has opened in the trans-Atlantic alliance — by far the worst in seven decades. Mr. Trump wants Americans to believe that their allies are simply taking advantage of them. On Sept. 11, 2001, I witnessed a far different reality as American ambassador to NATO. Canada and the European allies volunteered within hours of the attacks to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which compels all members to respond to an attack on any single member, for the first time in history. They came to our defense when we most needed them. They sent troops to fight with us in Afghanistan. They are still there with us 17 years later. Are we now going to throw off that mutual protection, and go it alone in a dangerous 21st-century world? That would be a historic mistake. But that is where we may find ourselves if Mr. Trump’s anti-Europe vendetta continues.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Impact – Laundry List

NATO is key to solving the biggest threats to global security

Burns ’18 (Nicholas Burns - a former under secretary of state and ambassador to NATO, teaches diplomacy and international relations at Harvard. “What America Gets Out of NATO.” The New York Times. 7/11/18. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what-america-gets-out-of-nato.html?)

Donald Trump prepared for this week’s NATO summit by doing what no president had done before — making a case that the alliance is a bad deal for the American people. Last week in Great Falls, Mont., he said that he had told Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, “I don’t know how much protection we get by protecting you.” Mr. Trump has been even tougher on the European Union, branding it “as bad as Nafta” and adding, “Sometimes our worst enemies are our so-called friends.” I have visited four European countries during the last two weeks, and it has been shocking to see how far from grace the United States has fallen in the eyes of its allies. European leaders point to Mr. Trump’s support for anti-democratic populists in Hungary, Poland and Italy. They view his recent Twitter attack on Ms. Merkel as a transparent attempt to push her from office. Many fear he may now remove American sanctions against Moscow over its occupation of Crimea after his meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia in Finland next week. Confidence in Mr. Trump has plummeted so much that the German foreign minister, Heiko Maas, recently grouped “Donald Trump’s egotistic policy of America First” along with Russia and China as global concerns. None of this, of course, is likely to disturb Mr. Trump, who remains steadfast in his belief that whatever benefits the United States gained from the trans-Atlantic alliance in the past, the country no longer profits. But he’s wrong — there are compelling reasons that NATO in particular will be a distinct advantage for America’s security far into the future. First, NATO’s formidable conventional and nuclear forces are the most effective way to protect North America and Europe — the heart of the democratic world — from attack. Threats to our collective security have not vanished in the 21st century. Mr. Putin remains a determined adversary preying on Eastern Europe and American elections. NATO is a force multiplier: The United States has allies who will stand by us, while Russia has none. And while it’s true that most of America’s NATO allies need to increase their defense spending under the treaty, they’re not freeloaders: The United States has relied on NATO allies to strike back against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in the Middle East. European troops have replaced American soldiers in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and contribute the large majority in Kosovo. Our NATO allies are also getting better about contributing their fair share. They have increased their defense spending by a total of more than $87 billion since Mr. Putin annexed Crimea in 2014. Fourteen more allies will reach NATO’s military spending target — 2 percent of gross domestic product — by 2024. Mr. Trump would be smart to claim credit for this at this week’s summit. A second reason for maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance is America’s economic future. The European Union is our country’s largest trade partner, and its largest investor. The United States and the European Union are the world’s two largest economies, and can steer global trade to their advantage if they stick together. More than four million Americans work for European companies in the United States. Forty-five of the 50 states export more to Europe than to China. Mr. Trump is right that the two sides are also economic competitors, and trade disputes are inevitable. His predecessors kept this tension in balance lest there be damaging consequences for American businesses, workers and farmers — a good reminder for Mr. Trump, whose ill-conceived trade war with Canada and Europe risks harming the American economy. Third, future American leaders will find Europe is our most capable and willing partner in tackling the biggest threats to global security: climate change; drugand cybercrime cartels; terrorism; pandemics and mass migration from Africa and the Middle East. And America’s NATO allies will continue to be indispensable in safeguarding democracy and freedom, under assault by Russia and China.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Impact – Populism

Populism structurally guarantees more conflict and heightens escalation risks

Drezner 17 – PhD, Professor of Int’l Politics (Dan, “The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy Leader: Real Change or Just Hot Air?, 41 Fletcher F. World Aff. 23, Lexis)

Leaders who rise to power in lower-probability scenarios are also likely to have a greater appetite for risk in foreign affairs. This matters, as Jeff Colgan notes: "risk tolerance leads to aggression in international affairs because it increases the perceived payoff of risky gambles." 17 Populist leaders more closely resemble revolutionaries than more established politicians. And as Colgan warns, "the ambition of revolutionary leaders also contributes to aggression. Ambition makes it more likely that a leader will reject the status quo internationally as well as domestically." 18 We can see this kind of ambition on display among elected populists. Hugo Chávez [*30] persistently proposed radical alternatives to the Washington Consensus. One longtime friend of Viktor Orbán noted, "he has always wanted to upset the status quo, to become a change-maker." 19 Orbán himself, in a meeting with Polish Law and Justice Party head Jaroslaw Kaczynski, proposed a "cultural counter-revolution" in Europe. 20 Donald Trump's inaugural address categorically rejected the postwar liberal order, arguing in favor of an "America First" approach to international relations. Populists are therefore more likely to pursue high-risk, revisionist foreign policies. Populist leaders also care about recognition by others, and will be quick to anger if that recognition is not forthcoming. Populists build their legitimacy on their support from "their" people, but part of that support comes from displays of dominance over others. Russian president Vladimir Putin is well-known for his over-the-top efforts to look strong and powerful. These range from his shirtless photos to videos of him weightlifting to scoring eight goals in an exhibition game with former NHL All-Stars. 21 In Erdogan's first two years as Turkey's president, the government has prosecuted more than 1,800 cases of Turkish citizens insulting him--including a former Miss Turkey. 22 Donald Trump has insulted anyone who has criticized him since he started running for president, ranging from erstwhile GOP rivals to federal judges to media outlets to a former Miss Universe to Meryl Streep. When dealing with domestic rivals and critics, such displays of dominance are an easy strategy for elected leaders to pursue. Populist leaders engage in such behavior to project their strength and mastery over the political fates. It is tricky to do this on the international stage, however. Populist leaders will therefore be more concerned than most politicians about the personal respect afforded to them by others. At the international level, this leads to one of two outcomes: recognition by other heads of state, or a denunciation of leaders who fail to confer such recognition. If populists cannot exploit the respect conferred by others, they will be quick to reject and delegitimize the leaders who spurn them. We can see this kind of pattern at work in how populist leaders have reacted to setbacks on the global stage. Vladimir Putin began his tenure in office with a much warmer attitude towards the West. During the first decade of this century, however, Putin lost an ally during Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and witnessed NATO expanding to Russia's borders. It was at this point that Putin began adopting a more hostile attitude towards the West. After President Obama cancelled a meeting with Duterte, the Filipino president responded with a series of tirades insulting the American president. 23 In Trump's first week as president, he faced pushback from the [*31] Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto on his policies for the southern border. In response, Trump tweeted that Peña Nieto should not bother coming to Washington. The Mexican president responded by canceling his visit. Populists do not possess a monopoly on anger in politics, but most populists tend to project anger as part of their leadership style. Based on their pathway to power and their philosophy of governance, it should not be surprising that they are commonly associated with that emotion. As previously noted, populist parties do particularly well after financial crises. They are adept at exploiting the (often justified) anger that voters possess towards authorities that were in charge when the crisis happened. Former UKIP leader Nigel Farage warned of "political anger" if the United Kingdom did not follow through on Brexit. In a press conference blasting the United States, Duterte said, "If you Americans are angry with me, then I am also angry with you." 24 During one of the GOP primary debates, Donald Trump explicitly stated, "I will gladly accept the mantle of anger." Trump famously refuses to apologize when he makes controversial or problematic statements. 25 Numerous press reports suggest that Trump lost his temper with the Australian prime minister in their first phone conversation. This wave of populist anger reverses a centuries-long western effort to contain that emotion in international relations. 26 Recent scholarship on emotions in world politics suggest that sustained levels of anger carry risks in world politics. Anger was valorized in societies with strong honor cultures and warrior castes, biologically conditioning citizens towards that feeling. Furthermore, as Neta Crawford notes, "threats that evoke anger (if they are associated with perceived insults) tend to decrease the perception of a threat and simultaneously heighten risk-taking behaviors on the part of those who feel angry." 27 This is particularly true if populist leaders find ways to institutionalize anger and resentment through new laws, executive orders, or bureaucratic structures. This tendency towards angry rhetoric can be exaggerated through misperception and mistranslation. Conventional foreign policy leaders are prepped to stay within the lanes of "accepted" diplomatic discourse, so that observers can detect subtle shifts in phrasing as a foreign policy signal. In contrast, populists scorn diplomatic language as exercises in sophistry and hypocrisy. They rely on language designed to appeal to their base, which increases the likelihood that outside observers misconstrue their words. Angry tirades from leaders like Trump, Duterte, or Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have been mistranslated--and usually in a direction that [*32] paints the leader as more bellicose than intended. 28 Populist leaders will be reluctant to correct such misperceptions, because that would require them to engage in the diplomatic discourse they have derided. Displays of righteous indignation might play well with a populist leader's domestic base. The international effect of angry outbursts, however, is to narrow the zone of cooperation between countries. If a leader unleashes an angry tirade against another country, that is sure to gain considerable public attention in both nations. This automatically raises the "audience costs" for both leaders. The larger the audience that is paying attention to any dispute, the greater the political costs a leader can suffer if they back down in that dispute. 29 Displays of temper make it harder for the populist to compromise, but it will also make it more politically difficult for the object of the tirade to make any concessions. Through effects on leaders and populations, provocations make negotiations more costly and conflict escalation more likely. 30 Perhaps the most important intellectual trait that populist leaders share is their tendency to think like hedgehogs. According to the classical Greek poet Archilochus, "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog one important thing." Isaiah Berlin popularized that quote, arguing that intellectuals could be divided into foxes and hedgehogs. This works for decision-makers as well. Foxes will possess the necessary metacognition to adapt to new facts and new circumstances; hedgehogs will rely on their core beliefs, fitting the world into their preexisting worldview. 31 Populists are hedgehogs: the one big thing that they know is to reject the elites and technocrats who heretofore governed their country. As Philip Tetlock observed more than a decade ago, foxes and hedgehogs have different strengths when it comes to thinking about the world. 32 Foxes are much better than hedgehogs in their predictive accuracy about world events; simply put, foxes are better at incorporating new information and updating how they think about the world. Hedgehogs are better than foxes at anticipating big and unexpected events happening in the world, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the 2008 financial crisis. Anticipating those events requires an assuredness about the way the world works that hedgehogs are more likely to possess. The effects of these different intellectual styles on foreign policy are straightforward. As hedgehogs, populists are more likely to have their expectations confounded in world politics. At the same time, populist foreign policy leaders will face psychological and domestic political barriers to admitting error or reversing a failing policy. Any public recognition of a misstep demonstrates a leader's fallibility--which is problematic for leaders [*33] who claim that they can divine the general will of the people. At the same time, as hedgehogs, populists will be reluctant to take any action that deviates from the way that they think the world works. Stepping back, we can proffer some tentative predictions of how populist foreign policy leaders will behave in the coming years. Populist foreign policy leaders are likely to reject the pre-existing liberal international order and espouse a strong form of ethnic nationalism. They might try to create alternative international arrangements to the status quo, but these efforts are likely to be Potemkin efforts, with more pomp and circumstance than substance. Populist leaders will have greater appetites for risk and ambition on the global stage. These heads of state will crave recognition from their fellow world leaders, and be quick to anger if they are spurned in this area. These displays of anger could become institutionalized and will increase the audience costs of all the involved actors, making cooperation less likely. And populists are less likely to correctly perceive how the world works, and more likely to hold firm with policies that are not viewed as working terribly well. One disturbing conclusion to draw from this particular constellation of traits is that populist leaders are more likely to foment international crises. Breaking with pre-existing global governance structures can guarantee a crisis escalation. An international crisis can trigger rally-round-the flag effects within the domestic population and make it easier for a leader to suppress domestic dissent. At the extreme, one could envision populists threatening or launching diversionary wars to appeal to a nationalist base in times of trouble. Vladimir Putin employed this tactic. In early 2014, he was still reeling from protests over his return to the Russian presidency, and a slowdown in the Russian economy. He responded by annexing the Crimea after the fall of his ally in Ukraine, and bankrolling a secessionist conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These efforts caused his public support to skyrocket even though the Russian economy contracted in 2014 and 2015. It should be stressed that these are all probabilistic statements. Many of these traits are hardly unique to populists; other heads of state are likely to display some subset of these leadership traits. Still, this combination of [*34] attributes suggest that the world is experiencing an increase in the number of revisionist, risky, and violent actions in world politics.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Populism Internal

Populism link & internal.

Frederick et al. ’17 — Bryan; Ph.D. in international relations, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; M.A. in international relations and international economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; B.A. in philosophy, Williams College. Other Contributors: Matthew Povlock, Stephen Watts, Miranda Priebe, Edward Geist. 2017; “Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements.”; RAND Corporation; ; //CYang

While we assess that a Russian attack on NATO in the near-term is highly unlikely, it also seems probable that Russia will explore other avenues to signal its displeasure with ongoing U.S. and NATO posture enhancements. Russia has already announced that it intends to adjust its domestic force posture on its western borders to compensate for a larger NATO presence. In the past, Russia has used a variety of mechanisms to respond to U.S. and NATO actions that it perceives as threatening; such mechanisms include withdrawing from multilateral security treaties, sending forces for provocative out-of-area deployments in the Americas, and threatening to base Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, among others. Other options to protest U.S. and NATO enhancements in the near-term could include targeting cross-domain areas of asymmetric concern to the United States and NATO, such as the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, increasing support for far-right Western political parties, and cyber attacks on politically or economically sensitive Western targets