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Second, weak IP will not help the rest of the world in the moderate to long term because it would reduce the incentives and resources needed for innovation to help solve global challenges. Climate change requires much better and cleaner technology. Giving U.S. clean energy IP to developing nation hurts that task, not helps it. The world needs not just drug access, but much better drugs. Weak IP hurts that. Great content—in the form of movies, books, music, photographs, and more—depends on IP.

Arguing that IP is archaic and irrelevant in the digital age and that strong IP hurts the third-world “proletariat” while only helping U.S. “capitalists,” many policymakers have succumbed to a view that supports weakening IPR and opposes expanding existing rights.

Title V of the act contains a number of important amendments to U.S. intellectual property laws that will significantly strengthen protection for authors and investors both domestically and overseas.

The intellectual property provisions are the result of extensive work and cooperation with the office of the U.S. Trade Representative to ensure that the implementing legislation was both reflective of the GATT agreement and responsive to U.S. needs. While I wish the final GATT agreement had required more in the area of national treatment and eliminated European and national content requirements in the area of audiovisual works, these are areas that will be the subject of continuing negotiations. The protection for pharmaceutical products also could have been accomplished in a shorter timeframe. We must not lose sight, however, of the fact that there are many industries and individuals which will benefit substantially from H.R. 5110.

The World Intellectual Property Organization offers a wide range of legal-technical assistance, including expert advisory services and education and training programs, for improving developing country intellectual property laws and administrative systems. Such assistance has resulted in some significant accomplishments. However, due primarily to developing country opposition, this organization has been limited as a forum for strengthening worldwide protection of intellectual property rights through multilateral negotiations. Indeed, over the past decade, the U.S. government has opposed developing country efforts to weaken existing standards m this forum. Recognizing this, recent U S government efforts in the World Intellectual Property Organization have focused largely on supporting its legal-technical assistance efforts, possible U.S. adherence to an existing international copyright convention, and other more specialized matters where there may be less developing country opposition.

The U.S. government has turned to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the primary multilateral trade forum, in its attempts to significantly strengthen national protection of intellectual property rights It has outlined two proposals for consideration by this forum: (1) completion and implementation of an anticounterfeiting code that would require participating countries to interdict counterfeit imports and (2) establishment of an enforceable agreement against trade-distorting practices arising from inadequate protection of intellectual property rights Although the time required to negotiate these agreements will prevent them from having any immediate impact, they may have some long-term beneficial effect, depending on their membership and content.

If a government strengthens laws or measures or if they strengthen, they are made more severe.

Enforcement: In some cases, there's nothing wrong with the law or regulation. The problem is weak enforcement. Government can strengthen enforcement by increasing the number, training, tools, and powers of its regulators.

to make something stronger or more effective, or to become stronger or more effective:

30. There is, so I am driven to conclude, validity in the criticism of the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the new criterion. In its first sentence the reference by the Grand Chamber to “a significant reduction in life expectancy” is interpreted as “death within a short time”. But then, in the second sentence, the interpretation develops into the “imminence … of … death”; and, as is correctly pointed out, this is achieved by attributing the words “rapid … decline” to life expectancy when, as written, they apply only to “intense suffering”. The result is that in two sentences a significant reduction in life expectancy has become translated as the imminence of death. It is too much of a leap.

What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “significant.” 30 F. 4th, at 688. Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar. See supra, at 4, and 4–5, n. 1. “Discriminate against” means treat worse, here based on sex. See, e.g., Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657–658, 681. But neither that phrase nor any other says anything about how much worse. There is nothing in the provision to distinguish, as the courts below did, between transfers causing significant disadvantages and transfers causing not-so-significant ones. And there is nothing to otherwise establish an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “significance” is to add words—and significant words, as it were—to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands something more of her than the law as written. And that difference can make a real difference for complaining transferees. Many forced transfers leave workers worse off respecting employment terms or conditions. (After all, a transfer is not usually forced when it leaves the employee better off.) But now add another question—whether the harm is significant. As appellate decisions reveal, the answers can lie in the eye of the beholder—and can disregard varied kinds of disadvantage. Take just a few examples from the caselaw. An engineering technician is assigned to work at a new job site—specifically, a 14-by-22- foot wind tunnel; a court rules that the transfer does not have a “significant detrimental effect.” Boone v. Goldin, 178 F. 3d 253, 256 (CA4 1999). A shipping worker is required to take a position involving only nighttime work; a court decides that the assignment does not “constitute a significant change in employment.” Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F. 3d 620, 635 (CA10 2012). And a school principal is forced into a non-school-based administrative role supervising fewer employees; a court again finds the change in job duties not “significant.” Cole v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 834 Fed. Appx. 820, 821 (CA4 2021) (per curiam). All those employees suffered some injury in employment terms or conditions (allegedly because of race or sex). Their claims were rejected solely because courts rewrote Title VII, compelling workers to make a showing that the statutory text does not require.2

Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly accepted that words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning, 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable, temporally relevant definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). 101

31. It remains, however, to consider what the Grand Chamber did mean by its reference to a “significant” reduction in life expectancy in para 183 of its judgment in the Paposhvili case. Like the skin of a chameleon, the adjective takes a different colour so as to suit a different context. Here the general context is inhuman treatment; and the particular context is that the alternative to “a significant reduction in life expectancy” is “a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in … health resulting in intense suffering”. From these contexts the adjective takes its colour. The word “significant” often means something less than the word “substantial”. In context, however, it must in my view mean substantial. Indeed, were a reduction in life expectancy to be less than substantial, it would not attain the minimum level of severity which article 3 requires. Surely the Court of Appeal was correct to suggest, albeit in words too extreme, that a reduction in life expectancy to death in the near future is more likely to be significant than any other reduction. But even a reduction to death in the near future might be significant for one person but not for another. Take a person aged 74, with an expectancy of life normal for that age. Were that person’s expectancy be reduced to, say, two years, the reduction might well - in this context - not be significant. But compare that person with one aged 24 with an expectancy of life normal for that age. Were his or her expectancy to be reduced to two years, the reduction might well be significant.

(1) Section 714 prohibits homeowners associations from imposing covenants, conditions or restrictions that effectively prohibit the installation of a solar energy system. (§ 714, subd. (a).) The statute further provides: “This section does not apply to provisions that impose reasonable restrictions on solar energy systems. However, it is the policy of the state to promote and encourage the use of solar energy systems and to remove obstacles thereto. Accordingly, reasonable restrictions on a solar energy system are those restrictions that do not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency or specified performance, or that allow for an alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency, and energy conservation benefits.” (§ 714, subd. (b).) Section 714 defines “significantly” as “an amount exceeding 20 percent of the cost of the system or decreasing the efficiency of the solar energy system by an amount exceeding 20 percent, as originally specified and proposed” for a solar water or swimming pool heating system, and as “an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) over the system cost as originally specified and proposed, or a decrease in system efficiency of an amount exceeding 20 percent as originally specified and proposed” for a photovoltaic system. (§ 714, subd. (d)(1)(A) & (B).)

Significantly means the difference was statistically significant.

The functionality doctrine, as we have said, forbids the use of a product's feature as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is "essential to the use or purpose of the article" or "affects [its] cost or quality." Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. Reports 850 , n. 10, 102 S.Ct., at 2186 , n. 10. The functionality doctrine thus protects competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely their inability reasonably to replicate important non-reputation-related product features. For example, this Court has written that competitors might be free to copy the color of a medical pill where that color serves to identify the kind of medication ( e.g., a type of blood medicine) in addition to its source. See id., at 853, 858, n. 20, 102 S.Ct., at 2188 , 2190, n. 20 ("[S]ome patients commingle medications in a container and rely on color to differentiate one from another"); see also J. Ginsburg, D. Goldberg, & A. Greenbaum, Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 194-195 (1991) (noting that drug color cases "have more to do with public health policy" regarding generic drug substitution "than with trademark law"). And, the federal courts have demonstrated that they can apply this doctrine in a careful and reasoned manner, with sensitivity to the effect on competition. Although we need not comment on the merits of specific cases, we note that lower courts have permitted competitors to copy the green color of farm machinery (because customers wanted their farm equipment to match) and have barred the use of black as a trademark on outboard boat motors (because black has the special functional attributes of decreasing the apparent size of the motor and ensuring compatibility with many different boat colors). See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F.Supp. 85 , 98 (SD Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (CA8 1983) ; Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 , 1532 (CA Fed.1994), cert. pending, No. 94-1075; see also Nor-Am Chemical v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316 , 1320, 1987 WL 13742 (ED Pa.1987) (blue color of fertilizer held functional because it indicated the presence of nitrogen). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adds that, if a design's "aesthetic value" lies in its ability to "confe[r] a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs," then the design is "functional." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17, Comment c, pp. 175-176 (1995). The "ultimate test of aesthetic functionality," it explains, "is whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder competition." Id., at 176.

The upshot is that, where a color serves a significant nontrademark function—whether to distinguish a heart pill from a digestive medicine or to satisfy the "noble instinct for giving the right touch of beauty to common and necessary things," G.K. Chesterton, Simplicity and Tolstoy 61 (1912)—courts will examine whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient. That examination should not discourage firms from creating aesthetically pleasing mark designs, for it is open to their competitors to do the same. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 , 343 (CA7 1985) (Posner, J.). But, ordinarily, it should prevent the anticompetitive consequences of Jacobson's hypothetical "color depletion" argument, when, and if, the circumstances of a particular case threaten "color depletion."

“Significantly” means that the difference was large enough to be very unlikely by chance. When the testing period was complete, the rate of polio incidence was 28 per 100,000 children in the vaccinated communities and 71 per 100,000 children in the control communities. Statisticians were able to calculate that the probability of this great a difference happening by chance was less than one in a million. Thus they concluded that the vaccine had been effective. Due to the Salk and later Sabin vaccines, polio has today been eliminated in most of the world.

Title V of the act contains a number of important amendments to U.S. intellectual property laws that will significantly strengthen protection for authors and investors both domestically and overseas.

The intellectual property provisions are the result of extensive work and cooperation with the office of the U.S. Trade Representative to ensure that the implementing legislation was both reflective of the GATT agreement and responsive to U.S. needs. While I wish the final GATT agreement had required more in the area of national treatment and eliminated European and national content requirements in the area of audiovisual works, these are areas that will be the subject of continuing negotiations. The protection for pharmaceutical products also could have been accomplished in a shorter timeframe. We must not lose sight, however, of the fact that there are many industries and individuals which will benefit substantially from H.R. 5110.

The Patent Eligibility Restoration Act is designed to completely overhaul the law around patent eligibility by eliminating judicial exceptions to Title 35 of the U.S. Code, Section 101. [1] The bill asserts that these judicial exceptions have rendered an increasing number of inventions ineligible for patent protection, and that patent practitioners and courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, have for years requested greater clarity on Section 101 patent eligibility. The proposed Patent Eligibility Restoration Act would eliminate these judicial exceptions to patent eligibility and replace them with newly crafted statutory exceptions.

to make something stronger or more effective, or to become stronger or more effective:

And there’s historical precedent for your concerns about extremism. There is. I think the history of the 1930s and the example of Italy, Germany, and Japan should not be forgotten. Economic dissatisfaction creates dangerous opportunities for political extremism. In the face of financial crisis, Germany turned to the Nazi Party, and German monopolists and industrialists played an important role in consolidating the power of Adolf Hitler and his hold over the German state. So should we consider ourselves warned? I hesitate before comparing President Trump to the dictators of the thirties, but there’s no question that we are in a similar time. Trump rode a wave of economic dissatisfaction and anti-corporate populism to the presidency. He promised to make the country great again, to fight enemies foreign and domestic. In power he has shown a different stripe. He’s erratic, random, and personal, which doesn’t make him the greatest candidate to be a trustbuster.

President Andrew Jackson, unhappy with a Supreme Court decision, is said to have retorted: "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." His remark reminds us of a central fact of American democracy: judicial policies do not implement themselves. In virtually all instances, courts that formulate policies must rely on other courts or on nonjudicial actors to translate those policies into action. Inevitably, just as making judicial policies is a political process, so too is the implementation of the policies - the issues are essentially politics, and the actors are subject to political pressures.

Ironically, it is Trump who has sought to politicize the judiciary, with strong support from Senate Republican leadership, who have pushed through far-right nominees—despite often strenuous objection from the civil rights and legal communities. He has referred to his judicial appointees as “my judges” and pledged during the 2016 campaign that they would rule along a far-right ideological line. True to his word, Trump has put increasing numbers of his own former political aides on the bench. Many of these aides-turned-judges went straight from Trump’s White House to the bench: For example, Gregory Katsas, who advised Trump on some of the administration’s cruelest anti-LGBTQ policies, and Steven Menashi, who worked with Stephen Miller as the administration carried out anti-immigration policies that have left children dead in U.S. facilities and turned away individuals in need of help at America’s borders, both serve as U.S. circuit court judges. And Neomi Rao, another former aide now on the bench, wrote an opinion arguing that Trump should be able to avoid virtually any congressional oversight, voicing a legal theory that legal experts say could invoke a “constitutional crisis.” Underscoring just how intent Trump and his allies are on bending the judiciary to their own ends, less than an hour after the Senate voted to acquit President Trump, allowing him to avoid consequences for bribing another country to interfere in the 2020 elections, they were moving forward yet another of Trump’s judicial nominees: Andrew Brasher, who managed criminal justice policy for the president as part of his 2016 transition team.

Congress and the public react to judicial decisions