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¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar; it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

re·solved Audio Help /rɪˈzɒlvd/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[ri-zolvd] –adjective firm in purpose or intent; determined.

There is a trend in many areas towards attention to ‘big’ risks. Financial regulation has become increasingly concerned with so‐called systemic risks. Others, and not just Hollywood blockbusters, have been attracted to the study of civilization‐destroying catastrophic risks. Indeed, the OECD has become increasingly interested in ‘high level’ risks and ways in which different national governments seek to prepare for and manage actual events, such as the aftermath of major earthquakes, or the response to a terrorist attack. The notion of ‘existential’ risk might be adding to the cacophony of emerging ‘big’ risk concerns. However, existential risk deserves special attention as it fundamentally adds to our understanding of particular types of risks, and it also challenges common wisdom regarding actions designed to support continued survival.

What is existential risk? We can approach this question by looking at several attributes. The first attribute is what, in fact, is at risk. One set of existential risks are those that threaten survival. These are the acute catastrophes, i.e. the idea that particular events’ impacts are likely to extinguish civilization. Such risks have been identified when it comes to asteroids, nuclear war, and other largescale events that undermine the possibility for survival in general, or, at least, in large regions. A second set is based on the idea that existential risks are not just about physical survival, but about the survival of ways of life. In other words, certain risks are seen as threatening established ways of doing things, cultures, social relationships, and understandings of the ‘good life’. There is, of course, much disagreement about what the good life constitutes, and therefore there will always be disagreement as to what exactly an existential risk constitutes.

While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation, I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation.10 As Bull argued, given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it.""¶ In any event, rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.¶ Of course, it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change. Nonetheless, while the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains, the political power concentrated in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis. Given that the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power.¶ Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16 In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings. The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment. In short, although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, there are still few social institution that can match the same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17

A limitation of current regulations is that they focus on technologies known to pose a risk to human life. Entirely new innovations or obscure technologies receive far less attention. If a particle accelerator might inadvertently set off a chain reaction that destroys all life, only their internal safety process and self-preservation instincts prevent them from taking risks on behalf of everyone. There is no international process for ensuring a new technology won’t end up being a black marble.

Avoiding black marbles is both a coordination problem and an uncertainty problem. In the long term, it’s not enough to get 90% of creators to refrain from exploring dangerous territory. Absent strong coordination mechanisms, future technological development suffers from the unilateralist’s curse. Even if no individual creator has ill-intent, those who believe their technologies prevent little risk will forge ahead, biasing the overall population of creators towards unsafe exploration.

Pilot projects are incredibly helpful when it comes to lowering the risk of implementing new tools and tech. Let’s take a closer look at what a pilot project is, plus how and why you should run one.

What is a pilot project?

(Colleen V. Chien, Justin D'Atri Visiting Professor of Business Law, Columbia Law School; Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; 2013-2015 White House Senior Advisor, Innovation and Intellectual Property, “Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, July, 2019, “104 Iowa L. Rev. 2313,” pg lexis//um-ef)

In the government, fear of making a Type 1 or "false positive" error - taking a mistaken step - leads to an overabundance of Type 2 or "false negative" errors - failing to take a productive step. At root, however, is the problem of "what [the] government doesn't know," regarding what changes to law or policy to consider taking, what the impact of such changes might be, and which among several potential changes is most likely to achieve a policy goal, 11all topics about which there may be many opinions, but little relevant evidence. Uncertainty about whether a law or policy change will achieve its intended purpose, fear of making a mistake in the face of this uncertainty, and institutional inertia all contribute to status quo bias - whether in favor of preserving regulations that don't work or failing to adopt new policies that do. 12

The oil and gas industry already has plenty of land and ocean ready to be used

The oil industry can decide to produce more oil whenever it wants. In fact, the oil industry already possess more than 9,000 approved—but unused—drilling permits on federal lands. Nearly 5,000 of those permits were approved in 2021 alone—the highest figure since the second Bush administration.

Another significant impact of nationalized oil operations is the use of the "oil weapon" by exporting states in order to influence the behavior of, or possibly inflict economic damage on, consumer countries. There are contemporary examples of this, such as Russia's cessation of oil exports to the Czech Republic on the day that Prague agreed to accept a U.S. radar installation on Czech territory as part of the European Ballistic Missile Defense.21 Consumer states often lack the ability to quickly change sources of oil supply due to the nature of contracts, the difficulty in shifting refinery processes to handle different grades of crude and, in periods of short supply, the dearth of spare global capacity to replace interrupted petroleum shipments. Yet, exporting states can also suffer from their own use of the oil weapon since they often depend on the revenue they obtain from their exports. If they cannot find new buyers, they must have other sources of revenue or can only afford to disrupt their exports for short periods of time.

There has been considerable debate in recent years regarding the longevity of the oil supply, with some analysts suggesting that global peak oil production has already been reached and others suggesting that it will occur at some point during this century.22 The issue of peak oil is outside of the scope of this article, although it is important to understand that the availability of adequate quantities of oil on the market reduces the impact of supply disruptions. A well-supplied market can lessen the degree and longevity of disruptions better than an inadequately supplied one. It seems logical then that states that have nationalized their oil resources might be reticent to interrupt exports for political reasons if the market is well-supplied. This is because, under this circumstance, countries whose supplies are cut will be more able to find alternative sources. However, this is not guaranteed since converting refineries to handle different crude can take some time; therefore, the impact of supply disruptions will still be felt to a limited degree, even when markets are well-supplied.

Nationalization of oil has a negative impact on the market and on the profitability of IOCs by limiting their access to reserves.9 Most of the reserves controlled by NOCs are located in places where oil is more easily—and thus more cheaply—extracted, leaving more challenging and less profitable reserves for the IOCs. These companies generally run much more efficiently than NOCs and would possibly increase the global crude supply or develop spare production capacity if they could access reserves held by NOCs.10 Spare production capacity is vital to reduce the shock of supply disruptions.

Currently, the major oil development opportunities are in the Middle East, Russia, Venezuela, the Canadian oil sands, and offshore Brazil. Of these, only Canada is not a nationalized country and offers access to reserves in a low-risk political environment. The stable political situation in Canada has helped spur investment in oil sands development.11 There has been some speculation that the Arctic might also provide opportunities for IOCs in the near term. However, it seems likely that developments in this region will proceed slowly.12 Thus, IOCs are struggling to compete in a market saturated by NOCs.

HOUSTON (Reuters) - A drive by big oil-producing nations like Venezuela to renegotiate deals with international companies has already hurt global crude production, a trend that could worsen if foreign investment declines further. An oil worker conducts operations at Main Production Platform Urdaneta operated by shell in the middle of Lake Maracaibo 65Km (40 miles) from Maracaibo City in Venezuela, May 28, 2006. A drive by big oil-producing nations like Venezuela to renegotiate deals with international companies has already hurt global crude production, a trend that could worsen if foreign investment declines further. REUTERS/Jorge Silva In nations like Ecuador, Bolivia and major exporter Russia, soaring energy prices have emboldened governments to take a hard line on production contracts, many of which were struck in the 1990s when oil prices were below $20 a barrel. That’s a far cry from the highs near $80 a barrel set last year that left billions of dollars of export revenue on the table for leaders like firebrand Venezuela President Hugo Chavez, who relies heavily on the country’s state-owned oil company to finance his left-wing social agenda. Some of the world's top oil companies, including Exxon Mobil Corp. XOM.N, Chevron Corp. CVX.N, Conoco Phillips COP.N, Statoil STL.OL and BP Plc BP.L, are facing a May 1 deadline to renegotiate deals in Venezuela's Orinoco oil region or have their multibillion-dollar projects seized. In Russia, the Kremlin is also seeking ever-tighter control over its strategic oil and gas reserves where foreign investors like Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell RDSa.L already have only limited involvement. “(Nationalism is) certainly having an impact on supply growth potential,” said Ed Morse, chief energy economist at Lehman Brothers in New York. “In the case of Venezuela it has been either an unwillingness or an inability to attract capital to maintain current production, let alone to grow it.” Venezuela Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez has said the state would seize fields operated by foreign companies in the Orinoco if the May deadline is missed. “The point is that after the host country says ‘do as we say or we will kick you out,’ the oil companies face the question of settling for half a loaf rather than their contractual full loaf,” said Michael Goldberg, a senior partner at Baker Botts LLP and head of its international dispute resolution group. The trend in Latin America could contribute to an overall decline in output from the Americas this year, countering earlier expectations of a rise, experts said. For Ecuador, a go-it-alone strategy has led to output declines and a $2 billion bill to import fuel like gasoline as its own refineries are under-utilized, said Rene Ortiz, a former Ecuador oil industry official who now works at CERA. Ecuador ousted U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Corp. OXY.N last year over accusations that the Los Angeles-based company sold part of a block without approval. Some experts warn that the current path chosen by Chavez and others could have severe negative long-term consequences, not just for oil production, but for the countries themselves. “If prices drop or even remain at the current level and they continue on this course, the host countries are not going to see a lot of new investment and expertise rushing into the countries,” Goldberg said. Many producers are banking on the fact that oil prices will stay high, he added. With high oil prices and a wide field of foreign competitors for projects from China and India, some see a lesser role for international companies. “Many (national oil companies) don’t need the help of big (international oil companies) any more,” said Leonardo Maugeri, a senior vice president at Italian-based Eni S.p.A. Rex Tillerson, head of Exxon Mobil, disagreed. “The international oil company community ... has developed a considerable technical capability, considerable know-how,” he said on the sidelines of the CERA energy conference in Houston. “That’s the role that we will continue to play in working hand in hand with national oil companies, ultimately to allow the country to realize the maximum value of its resources.”

Nationalization of oil reserves and facilities can contribute to oil market and economic distortions, the politicization/militarization of oil security, and the use of oil revenue in destabilizing ways. However, when countries that nationalize their assets are genuine liberal democracies with transparent revenue generation streams—including effective taxation regimes—and observant of international diplomatic and trade norms, then the impact of oil nationalization on energy security is neutral. Companies in these countries operate similarly to free market oil companies. Norway, with its state-owned Statoil, is a case in point in that it operates virtually the same as publicly traded IOCs. Yet, most of the nationalized countries listed in Appendix A are non-democratic and have limited transparency. Many of these states lack effective taxation regimes so their leaders often treat oil revenues as a primary source of funding for their agendas. Moreover, as detailed below, some of these states have used oil exports as a political weapon in the past and are likely to continue to do so.

In order to appreciate the level of influence that NOCs exert on global oil security it is necessary to understand their market share. Appendix A lists most of the countries that have nationalized their domestic and overseas oil company operations and indicates that they possessed 92.5% of total global proved reserves and accounted for 81.5% of total global oil production in 2008.7 This is not to suggest that all of the production or reserves listed in the appendix were the property of NOCs since, in many cases, IOCs also operate in the listed countries.

Jon Hoffman is a Foreign Policy Analyst at the CATO Institute and holds a Ph.D. in political science from George Mason University. “The US will not gain from Israel-Saudi normalization,” June 19, 2023 dmr

Speaking at a conference hosted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee on June 5, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated the Biden administration is committed to brokering formal diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi, arguing that “the United States has a real national security interest in promoting normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia…We believe we can and indeed we must play an integral role in advancing it.” Blinken is wrong. The U.S. has little to gain and may incur large costs by trying to broker an Israel-Saudi normalization. Blinken’s statement followed a visit by White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to Saudi Arabia last week to discuss the issue with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). There are reports the Biden administration is allegedly pushing for Israel-Saudi normalization by the end of 2023 before entering into a contentious election year. In return for normalization with Israel, Saudi Arabia is pressing the Biden administration for more formalized security commitments, as well as help with developing their civilian nuclear program — namely the ability to independently enrich uranium. These rumors of possible Israel-Saudi normalization are not new, nor are efforts by the Israeli government and the Biden administration to try and bring Saudi Arabia into the fold of the so-called “Abraham Accords” — the series of diplomatic agreements signed under the Trump administration that involved the formal normalization of relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain (and were later expanded to include Morocco and Sudan). The Biden administration has repeatedly expressed its desire to expand upon the Abraham Accords, and Israeli public opinion polls demonstrate Saudi Arabia remains by far the most important Arab country with which they desire to normalize relations. President Biden himself centered his dual visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia in 2022 on this issue. The Biden administration has things backward here. There is no strategic incentive for the U.S. to grant policy concessions and/or increase security commitments to Saudi Arabia for formally normalizing relations with Israel. Informal Israel-Saudi ties have grown considerably over the past two decades. The strategic interests of Saudi Arabia and Israel have increasingly converged, especially following the Arab uprisings and growing shared fears over preserving regional status quo. The shared strategic interests of political elites within these countries has ushered in dramatic new levels of cooperation, under the aegis of what has been referred to as “implicit normalization.” Saudi Arabia does not require an incentive to formally normalize relations with Israel. Though Israel and Saudi Arabia do not formally maintain diplomatic relations, this has not prevented the two from working together towards shared strategic objectives. It has been in their own strategic interest to do so. In that case, though, Saudi Arabia seeks to pressure the U.S. into providing policy concessions and increased security commitments for Riyadh in return for formally normalizing relations with a country with which they are already strategically aligned. This is part of a deliberate strategy by Saudi Crown Prince MbS to exploit growing fears in Washington that the U.S. is losing influence in the Middle East, particularly as other actors such as China are expanding their own regional presence. This is despite the fact Saudi Arabia continues to pursue policies that are in direct conflict with the interests (and values) of the U.S. Such reckless caving to Saudi demands would likely embolden Riyadh’s repressive and aggressive domestic and foreign policies, particularly as the country is currently taking a hard turn toward an overt form of hypernationalism. MbS hopes to hold out for as many concessions possible, knowing that officials in Washington are desperate to chalk up perceived wins in the region. Instead of advancing U.S. interests, though, such increased security commitments to Saudi Arabia for normalizing relations with Israel would further solidify U.S. support for the underlying sources of regional instability within the Middle East. As I have argued elsewhere, the Abraham Accords represent the formalization of a coercive political, economic, and security order designed to maintain the status quo in the region. The Accords are a top-down mechanism designed to advance the interests of regional political elites and, presumably, the United States. Previous normalizations between Israel and other Arab states have been rooted in advancing the shared interests of political elites within these countries, all of whom were granted considerable policy concessions for joining the Abraham Accords without any serious debate as to whether such tradeoffs are in the interests of the U.S. The Abraham Accords framework has rapidly emerged as the new framework for U.S. policy in the Middle East. However, as the Saudi case demonstrates, Washington must not pay the costs of normalization and sacrifice our own interests in the process. The U.S. must fundamentally reassess its strategic interests within the Middle East and reorient its regional policies toward objectives that advance the interests of the American people.

Mitchell Plitnick is the president of ReThinking Foreign Policy. He is the co-author, with Marc Lamont Hill, of Except for Palestine: The Limits of Progressive Politics. Mitchell's previous positions include vice president at the Foundation for Middle East Peace, Director of the US Office of B'Tselem, and Co-Director of Jewish Voice for Peace. “Biden push for Saudi-Israeli normalization reflects misreading of domestic and international politics,” May 28, 2023 dmr

The most important question is how badly Biden is misreading the political map, and, therefore, how willing he is to accommodate MBS’ demands. A true military alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, as MBS desires, is a pipe dream, but upgraded access to U.S. weapons is a real possibility. That would be dangerous, and a nuclear program in Saudi Arabia that could produce a weapon would surely spur a competition with Israel and Iran, regardless of the improvements in relations between them and the Saudis. Is Biden so deluded about the political significance of Israeli-Saudi normalization that he’d do such things? It’s hard to put it past him, given his horrific performance in the Middle East thus far. It makes far more sense for the United States to play a longer game, get MBS to reduce his military demands from Washington and, with a potential future Israeli government that might have some stake in finding some diplomatic steps with the Palestinians, supplant those demands with tangible gains for the Palestinians, such as ending the siege of Gaza. Such thinking is both much too long-range and far too thoughtful and clever for Biden. The more likely outcome is that the United States will fail to understand that Saudi normalization with Israel is one of the last levers they have to press Israel to recognize Palestinian rights, and Washington will instead squander it for some short term, perceived political gain that will further entrench Israeli apartheid, make the region more dangerous, and possibly even draw the U.S. right back into the middle of regional conflict. Par for the course for U.S. Middle East policy.

As Saudi Arabia and Israel flirt with establishing diplomatic ties, Iran is watching with concern and determined to prevent a greater convergence of Persian Gulf Arabs and Israel. 

Current trends are the result of the transition of the world system from a U.S. hegemonic order to a great powers competition in which Washington focuses more on the rise of China and defeating Russia in Ukraine. Thus Washington has shifted from direct intervention in the Middle East to an  “” strategy in which U.S. regional allies are expected to play a greater role in securing the region. 

Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “A Saudi-Israeli Peace Deal Isn’t Worth It” June 27, 2023 https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/27/saudi-israel-biden-blinken-peace-normalization/?tpcc=onboarding_trending

In fact, there are two big reasons why this sudden push makes little sense right now.

Barbara Slavin is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington and a lecturer in international affairs at George Washington University. “Risks and opportunities in an increasingly multipolar Middle East,” June 13, 2023 https://www.stimson.org/2023/risks-and-opportunities-in-an-increasingly-multipolar-middle-east/

China’s growing partnership with the Middle East is significant but not yet a strategic shift away from dominance by a U.S.-organized coalition. Still, there are potential opportunities in China’s growing profile in terms of preventing conflict. The fact that China is the major purchaser of Iranian oil is a disincentive to Iran ever carrying out its repeated threats to close the Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic. China is also likely to urge Iran not to cross the line and build nuclear weapons.

Mitchell Plitnick is the president of ReThinking Foreign Policy. He is the co-author, with Marc Lamont Hill, of Except for Palestine: The Limits of Progressive Politics. Mitchell's previous positions include vice president at the Foundation for Middle East Peace, Director of the US Office of B'Tselem, and Co-Director of Jewish Voice for Peace. “Biden push for Saudi-Israeli normalization reflects misreading of domestic and international politics,” May 28, 2023 dmr

Saudi Arabia in no hurry

1. NORMALIZATION WOULD NOT PROMOTE PEACE OR STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

First, normalization would not produce peace. Proponents of a pattern of Israeli-Gulf normalization argue it will bring regional peace to the “world’s least peaceful region.” However, none of the recent normalization treaties, including a potential Saudi-Israeli one, would address the “fundamental weaknesses” that cause violence and instability in the region, including in Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Saudi Arabia. Over the past decade, the majority of Arab countries (including Saudi Arabia) have witnessed protests against oppressive and corrupt governance. The same has been true in Israel and Palestine. Many of these protests have been followed by state violence, and in some cases civil wars and foreign interventions, but the deep-seated inequities that have driven the protests have never been addressed, with the relative exception of Tunisia. Arab regimes need U.S. and Israeli support to contain, instead of end, instability across the region.

Ross, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and on the faculty of the University of Pittsburgh, and Alex Vatanka, the director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute. “The Middle East Might Be Moving Toward Stability” June 26, 2023 dmr

One theme of the present moment is that countries in the Middle East are making deals based on their own national interests rather than dancing to the tune of outsiders. This independence is paradoxically because of great power rivalry in the region, not despite it. With heightened rivalry between great powers, regional powers have more options and are acting more as free agents than committed allies of global powers. For example, Israel and Saudi Arabia are showing considerable independence from the United States on issues ranging from energy policy to approaches toward Russia’s war in Ukraine. Iran, in the context of its role in supplying drones to Russia for the Russia-Ukraine war, is also feeling more confident. Moreover, while the United States is not withdrawing from the Middle East, its allies in the Persian Gulf have come to question its reliability as a security guarantor and partner. This is having the effect of drawing them closer to, not further away from, Iran. The final straw for Saudi Arabia was the 2019 drone attacks on two oil refineries, Abqaiq and Khurais, owned by state company Aramco. These attacks were widely believed to be Tehran’s work, yet U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration did very little to respond despite its ongoing bluster toward Iran. For the Saudis, the Carter Doctrine, formulated in 1980 as a U.S. commitment to use force to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf, had expired. This development no doubt propelled the Saudis towards amenability to negotiation with Iran. And by 2021, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, too, were in full swing to broaden their dialogues with Iran. There has been a belief in Washington that the Middle East can’t stabilize without U.S. involvement. But in the current environment it is clear the primary impetus to stabilization needs to come from the regional powers. As these recent moves toward dialogue demonstrate, a view is taking hold in the region that stabilization and de-escalation—from the civil wars in Yemen and Syria to problems in Lebanon and Iraq—require cooperation among the regional actors, with or without the United States’ involvement.