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BOTH. The one and the other; the two without the exception of either. Lower Indian Creek Drainage and Levee Dist. of Cass County v. Vallery, 343 Ill. 49, 174 N.E. 842, 843. All of two, United States v. Bachman, D.C.Pa., 246 F. 1009, 1011. The term likewise has a meaning which excludes more than two mentioned subject matters. In re Turner's Estate, 171 Misc. 78, 11 N.Y. S.2d 800, 802. "Either," may mean "both." Kibler v. Parker, 191 Ark. 475, 86 S.W.2d 925, 926.

2 coordinating used preceding words, phrases, or clauses joined by and, used to emphasize that not just one, but also the other of the joined elements is included   both Ellen and Keith enjoyed the play, both new and exciting  

The ordinary meaning of "and," which § 3553(f)(1) uses to join the three subsections, is conjunctive. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. [**5]  Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 116-25 (2012). "Or" is disjunctive. Conjunctive/disjunctive canon, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("[I]n a legal instrument, and joins a conjunctive list to combine items, while or joins a disjunctive list to create alternatives."). Palomares points to this straightforward linguistic rule and insists that because Congress used the word "and," the government would need to prove that her criminal history included all the sub-sections, (A), (B), and (C). Or stated differently, because her criminal history only included (B), she is eligible for this sentencing relief. We cannot agree.

{¶ 25} As stated above, Marsy's Law requires that a victim be both "directly and proximately" harmed by the criminal act. The word "and" is conjunctive, while the word "or" is disjunctive. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 116–25 (2012) ("Under the conjunctive/disjunctive canon, and combines items while or creates alternatives."); Conjunctive/Disjunctive Canon, Black's Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019) ("[I]n a legal instrument, and joins a conjunctive list to combine items, while or joins a disjunctive list to create alternatives."). In other words, when "or" is used, the words joined by "or" are alternatives. In re Estate of Centorbi, 129 Ohio St.3d 78, 2011-Ohio-2267, ¶ 18; Scalia & Garner at 116. But when "and" is used, both of the words joined by "and" must be satisfied. Judy v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 100 Ohio St.3d 122, 2003-Ohio-5277, ¶ 14; Scalia & Garner at 116. Because Marsy's Law defines a "victim" as a person who is both "directly and proximately" harmed by the criminal act, it is not enough that there be merely a causal connection between the criminal act and the harm ultimately sustained by a third-party such as an insurer. The resulting harm must not only be the "proximate" result of the criminal act but must also be the "direct" result of the criminal act.

I cannot agree that the plan's clear and simple language is reasonably susceptible of the interpretation offered by the defendants. Plain as day, the plan provides that the valuation date shall be on "the last day of each calendar quarter and, as the Administrative Committee elects, any other day of the Plan Year." Pan American World Airways, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (Pan Am ESOP), at I-4, Excerpts of Record (ER) at 3 (emphasis added). This language is not in the least ambiguous: It can only be interpreted to mean that the Administrative Committee has the authority to select valuation dates in addition to the four already provided by the plan. The Administrative Committee has nevertheless taken the position that it may do away with the quarterly valuation dates altogether, and substitute a single valuation date in their stead. I can think of only one way to derive that interpretation from the quoted provision: by substituting the disjunctive "or" for the conjunctive "and." Unlike the majority, I am unable to approve as reasonable an interpretation that requires us to perform such radical surgery on a document's plain language.

I see two obstacles [**10] barring the majority's conclusion, one linguistic, the other structural. As a linguistic matter, "and" and "or" are not synonyms; indeed, they are more nearly antonyms. One need only start the day with a breakfast of ham or eggs to be duly impressed by the difference. While "and" and "or" are both small words, and are occasionally seen joined with a slash, when they stand alone, they have substantially different meanings with dramatically different effects. We give our language, and our language-dependent legal system, a body blow when we hold that it is reasonable to read "or" for "and." While I don't foreclose the possibility of substituting the two words for each other where it is necessary to avoid a patent absurdity or correct a drafting error, see, e.g. Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 Yale L.J. 1855, 2021 (1985); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 775-77, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752 (1985), I can't agree that the substitution is permissible in ordinary circumstances.

33. The impact of tax and expenditure policies on redistribution should be evaluated jointly. Although both taxes and spending can have redistributive implications, the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution will usually differ. Therefore, where the efficiency cost of redistribution through taxes is relatively large, this suggests that these taxes should focus on raising revenue to finance other redistributive instruments. For instance, an increase in regressive taxes can still be the best approach to supporting redistribution if the public expenditures they finance are highly progressive.

Fiscal redistribution can usually most efficiently be achieved through direct instruments that tax or provide benefits based on income. Fiscal redistribution, by its very nature, involves transferring resources from higher-income to lower-income households through taxes and transfers. On the tax side, personal income taxes, for example, are often preferable for achieving redistribution than taxes on consumption because they directly take account of the ability of households or individuals to pay. On the spending side, cash transfers to poor households are usually superior to indirect methods such as price subsidies. Better targeting of transfers reduces their fiscal cost and the tax levels required to finance them, thus achieving distributional objectives in a more efficient manner. Targeting, however, is not without efficiency costs and must be designed carefully (see below)

Evaluating the redistributive impact of fiscal policies requires a comparison of incomes after taxes and transfers with those that would exist without them. In principle, assessments of the incidence of fiscal policies should incorporate information on consumers’ and producers’ behavioral responses to taxes and transfers and their impact on market incomes.12 In practice, most studies do not incorporate this aspect, since sufficient data on behavioral responses are often unavailable. In these studies, the incidence of commodity taxes is typically assumed to fall on consumers, factor taxes are assumed to fall on factor suppliers (labor and capital), and transfers to beneficiaries do not lead to changes in factor supplies.13 The evidence below is drawn from such studies. In econometric studies, on the other hand, behavioral responses are captured—Box 3 provides a summary of recent empirical literature evaluating the distributive impact of fiscal policy based on econometric analysis of cross-country panel data.

A bounty of research also addresses the relationship between income inequality and political outcomes, especially fiscal redistribution. As I have explained, these works almost always conceptualize and measure inequality at the individual level, aggregated to one national indicator. I focus additionally on the relationship between interregional inequality and fiscal redistribution. I define fiscal redistribution as the efforts made by the government through taxes and spending to equalize income. In Figure 1.2, I show a snapshot of the relationship between interregional inequality and fiscal redistribution in 2010. Fiscal redistribution is measured by the percentage reduction in the national Gini coefficient of individual income inequality that results from government policies (Solt 2014). The relationship is quite clearly negative; that is, countries with higher interregional inequality also tend to have lower fiscal redistribution. This statistical relationship is very strong, as I will discuss in detail in the next chapter. This book is an effort to link the empirical observations in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 to a theory of political representation.

Income distribution depends on a complex array of factors, including the design of fiscal policy instruments. According to the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), the market-income Gini coefficient (before taxes and transfers) in China increased by 82 percent between 1980 and 2013, whereas the net Gini coefficient (after taxes and transfers) increased by 90 percent (Figure 19.1). This difference indicates that the redistributive impact of fiscal policy is eroding. Fiscal redistribution—defined as the difference between market-income and net Gini coefficients—amounted to an average of 1.7 Gini-index points in the 1990s, but it turned negative during the period 2000-13, averaging -1.1 Gini-index points. Fiscal policy, however, can matter not just for redistribution, but also for market-income inequality. Redistribution is, of course, a function of the level and composition of taxation and spending as well as their distribution across income groups. The distribution of taxes in China, for example, remains regressive, with taxes accounting for 10.8 percent of annual income among the bottom decile of households (and 13.3 percent among the bottom 5 percent) compared with 8.7 percent among the top decile of households.

Most of America’s historic foreign policy blunders were driven by threat inflation. From fake attacks on ships in Havana Harbor or the Gulf of Tonkin, to falling dominos in Southeast Asia and WMD in Iraq — the response to these “dire threats” is often a costly quagmire. In the Cold War it was phony bomber and missile “gaps” that sparked a precarious and ultimately pointless nuclear confrontation. Today a new “icebreaker gap” could fuel an Arctic arms race.

For over a decade, defense hawks have been sounding the alarm about Russia’s supposed “militarization” and “dominance” of the Arctic. More recently, China has joined the list of “aggressors” allegedly threatening vital Western economic and strategic interests in the High North. The Obama administration resisted calls for a major Arctic buildup coming from a mix of armchair analysts, defense contractors, and special political interests. Notably, the U.S. Navy has never joined this chorus. Nobody denies , but these are for Coast Guard missions — not the remote warfighting scenarios hyped by Arctic hawks. Theirs is classic threat inflation, built on equal parts exaggeration and ignorance, that makes it irresistible to a Trump administration happy to overturn yet another Obama legacy. And so, with a recent series of provocative words and deeds, America’s Arctic policy has taken an abruptly belligerent turn.

Competition and disagreements between Arctic states are likely to continue. This is “normal” within the international system. Although overly optimistic rhetoric related to “Arctic exceptionalism” may have set up false expectations that the post-Cold War Circumpolar North would be entirely cooperative, this is unrealistic. Seeing every point of friction as a portend that the Arctic regime is unravelling, or misreading every investment in defence and security as an indicator of revisionist designs for the region, tends to perpetuate a bifurcated debate between so-called “realists” and “liberal internationalists” predicated on empirically skewed foundations. Strategic rivalry between Russia and the West (including Canada) may have “spill over” effects on circumpolar security, but we maintain that there is little likelihood of conflict between Arctic states generated by Arctic resources, boundary disputes, or governance issues.84 Similarly, Russian and Canadian investments in defence and security capabilities in the Arctic, when appropriately contextualized, do not fit the criteria for an Arctic “arms race.”

Canada’s June 2017 defence policy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” reiterates longstanding images of the Arctic as a region undergoing massive change. “The Arctic region represents an important international crossroads where issues of climate change, international trade, and global security meet,” the policy describes. Rather than promoting a narrative of inherent competition or impending conflict, however, the narrative points out that “Arctic states have long cooperated on economic, environmental, and safety issues, particularly through the Arctic Council, the premier body for cooperation in the region. All Arctic states have an enduring interest in continuing this productive collaboration.” This last sentence suggests that Russia (described elsewhere in the policy document as a state “willing to test the international security environment” that had reintroduced “a degree of major power competition”) does not inherently threaten Arctic stability given its vested interests in the region. Accordingly, the drivers of Arctic change cited in Canada’s policy emphasize the rise of security and safety challenges rather than conventional defence threats, thus confirming the line of reasoning that has become well entrenched in Canadian defence planning over the last decade.

But, in today’s reality, it is a positive record of common ground, common interests, consistent communication and engaged dialogue in what is now a globalized Arctic. What we have here is a base to build on our troubled relationship. Both nations have stated the Arctic should remain a region of peace, shared importance and cooperation. Although other regional tensions dwarf the actions and dialogues that make these partnerships a reality, they should serve as a call to action. President Trump and President Putin should embrace the call of their Finnish counterpart, President Sauli Niinistö, to include the Arctic when formulating diplomatic strategies following their private talks. In fact, Presidents Trump and Putin should go one step further and reaffirm their shared commitment to the Arctic and direct their applicable agencies to advance other, practical initiatives in both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Build on Arctic cooperation and shared interests. For example, we know global commodity prices drive much of the economic activity in the Arctic, along with related infrastructure development and shipping activity. The wise and measured development of such resources is in everyone’s interest. With nearly 20 percent of Russia’s GDP derived from its Arctic resource base, their Arctic strategy of development, investment and related security efforts along the Northern Sea Route, for instance, is clearly linked to Russia’s future economy. Similarly, Alaska, America’s Arctic, plays an important role in the nation’s energy equation and national security. Both administrations have signaled, in their own way, a vision for the Arctic that includes development. Here we may find commonalities that enhance other related agendas. So how can the U.S.-Russia relationship move forward with enhanced cooperation in Arctic affairs? What opportunities can be jointly pursued and what fruitful strategies might Presidents Trump and Putin entertain after the Helsinki Summit? Clearly the recent agreements on Central Arctic Ocean fishing and research provide pathways for cooperation. Perhaps a joint Arctic marine expedition in the remote Central Arctic Ocean in support of the new fisheries agreement could be proposed? The U.S. and Russia could take the lead in the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (now chaired by Finland) in exploring enforcement issues with the new IMO International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters. Renewed military-to-military cooperation could be feasible if the joint meetings were to focus on Arctic emergency operations, something more likely as shipping and development activities increase. Presidents Trump and Putin could support renewed friendship flights and cultural exchanges between the indigenous communities that border our shared Bering and Chukchi Seas. Coming out of the Helsinki Summit, most observers and analysts will be talking about U.S.-Russian relations in the Arctic about as much as they did on the eve of the meeting: hardly at all. But amid all the concerns and scandal — and perhaps even more so because of them — we shouldn’t forget an area of ongoing positive and productive relations between our two nations. Addressing practical Arctic maritime issues, enhancing collaborative research and linking our two nations to the economic opportunities in the region have merit. The overarching goal is to maintain the Arctic as a peaceful region exemplified by broad cooperation among the Arctic states and perhaps serve as a foundation and framework for inching closer to a more productive relationship elsewhere in the world.

In a global context of financial turmoil, rising inequality and environmental uncertainty, the question of how cities overcome crises has become increasingly prominent on the scientific and political agenda. Understanding urban resilience requires a dynamic view of the economic structure of cities and questions simple logics of urban development as a finite process. By asking how cities continuously re-invent themselves and create new growth paths, we challenge urban policy to explore geographies of creative-destruction in which sustained growth rests upon the abandonment of obsolete sectors, modes of work organization and institutional practices.

Cities that fail to adapt and change, those that get locked-in to specific practices, ultimately decline. Resilient cities, on the contrary, are able to maintain their essential functionality through short-run shocks and over the long run. For many cities this functionality has evolved over time. Once sites of protection for the local population, cities today play a critical role as centers of knowledge production and innovation. As they agglomerate in space, individuals and firms exchange information, learn from each other and recombine knowledge more easily. Major technological-hubs in the United States such as San José, Boston and Austin host large numbers of creative individuals and are responsible for a large share of the nation’s new technologies. These cities are also among the richest, fastest growing metropolitan areas of the country.

Trade agreements are powerful tools to prevent international conflict and foster collaboration among nations. Instead of blaming them for America's wavering job market, policymakers must embrace them as tools that stabilize and pacify international politics.

Free trade is a powerful peacekeeping force. The logic is simple: When a country's prosperity is dependent on trade with other nations, it is far less likely to get into wars that disrupt the flow of commerce. Instead, trading countries often opt for more peaceful methods of dispute settlement.

While there is considerable existing research on the effects of trade and war, much of it has looked at bilateral relationships. This model focuses on multilateral interactions and considers various incentives for countries to attack, form alliances with, and trade with one another. In an attempt to understand what's necessary to achieve a stable network with no incentive for war, Jackson and Nei first explored an alliance scenario based solely on military defense considerations, excluding trade. "The fundamental difficulty we find is that alliances are costly to maintain if there's no economic incentive," says Jackson. So networks remain relatively sparse, a condition in which even a few shifting allegiances leaves some countries vulnerable to attack. "Stability is not just a little bit elusive; it's very elusive."

Economic trade, however, makes a significant difference. "Once you bring in trade, you see network structures densify," he says. Nations form a web of trading alliances, which creates financial incentive not only to keep peace with trading partners, but also to protect them from being attacked so as not to disrupt trade. "In the context of the alliances we have analyzed, trade motives are essential to avoiding wars and sustaining stable networks," the authors wrote in their paper, Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade.

History provides ample evidence that trade problems have heightened tensions among nations. Such fights lead to economic crises, and trigger political and social crises and, finally, trigger wars.

A full-blown trade war often features the combination of a tariff war and currency war. In practice, exporting countries will, in response to imposed tariffs, resort to currency manipulation, moving to cheapen their money to offset the impact of the tariffs.

Why does protectionism lead to conflict and why does free trade help prevent it? Learn about the connection between peace and free trade.

Frédéric Bastiat famously claimed that “if goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will.”

The opening up of the shipping route connecting East Asia with Northwestern Europe through the Arctic Ocean promises to be a major disruptor. Most trade goes by sea – in tonnage terms more than 90 percent – and the northern route is expected to cut roughly 30 to 40 percent off the time and distance between the continents. Since time is money, this makes it very attractive to shippers.

Polar caps in the Arctic are receding, creating access to new trade routes for parts of the year. The routes are valuable short cuts for global trade but the waterways are precarious to navigate with unpredictable weather, the need for specialized icebreaking ships, and the necessity to operate at slower speeds, all of which make the routes less commercially reliable and partially offset the savings in time and fuel. But the waterways are highly strategic economically, politically, and militarily, which is why the United States Navy is updating its Arctic Strategy, why China has drawn up a Polar Silk Road whitepaper, and why Russia seeks to solidify its control of, and successfully monetize, the route that traverses 3,000 nautical miles along its northern coastline. Here’s your Arctic Trade 101 on the opportunities and challenges ahead in expanding use of the Arctic waterways.

Trans-Arctic routes