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Sam Fraser, "Why US hegemony is incompatible with a ‘rules-based international order’," Responsible Statecraft, 7-21-2023, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/08/29/why-us-hegemony-is-incompatible-with-a-rules-based-international-order/-- 嘉玮

Never mind that some of the heroic interventions McTague cites — like the Korean War — were in fact atrocity-ridden debacles that could not credibly be presented as defenses of democracy at the time they actually took place, his larger case is also unpersuasive. Outside of the U.S. and Europe, what he calls the “necessary myth” of American benevolence has been hemorrhaging credibility, and the hypocrisy at the heart of the liberal international order is not a means to its perpetuation, but rather to its steady undoing.

Yes, the thing that Washington has to wake up to, and that I’m worried that it will not because it has incentives not to, is that the requirements of peace and primacy are deeply at odds with each other. Peace requires a certain degree of economic interdependence, regional cohesion, inclusivity in various ways, and above all, military restraint. Primacy requires the opposite of all of that. It requires the formation of rivalry and geoeconomic blocs. It requires containment against your rising rival, arms racing, and weapons proliferation.

It’s patently obvious that by pursuing primacy, we’re making ourselves the enemy of what remains of the Asian peace. It’s that insistence on primacy, coated rhetorically as openness, that is undermining the sources of the Asian peace. The preservation of stability the past 44 years is something that we somewhat take for granted in Washington, and we shouldn’t because it’s eroding rapidly, and Trump was simply a very vibrant data point along a larger trend line. And so, we’re not on a good track.

Alison’s work captured the attention of leaders in both Washington and Beijing. As a confidence-building measure, China laid out the concept of ‘New Type of Great Power Relation’ in 2013 based on cooperation; respect to each other’s core interests; and dialogue between Washington and Beijing. The concept emphasizes that the United States and other neighboring countries should respect the core interests of China, in other words acknowledging Beijing’s territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.25 The United States distanced itself from Beijing’s proposed framework as Washington realized giving recognition to Beijing’s “core interest” would tantamount to legitimizing China’s disputed territorial claims as well as giving away lopsided concessions in East Asia.26 While United States is well within its right to protect its interests, China views Washington’s skepticism as arrogantly holding on to its primacy in the international system and denying a rising China her rightful place. China claims such attitude “dangerous or even irresponsible” because it can exacerbate both countries’ progress towards the apocalyptic Thucydides’s Trap, thereby, exploiting “perceptions of the trap by blaming the United States for trying to keep China down.”27 One of the reasons for China’s ability to peddle such a narrative is due to U.S. foreign policy stubbornly holding on to a hegemonic grand strategy even in a multipolar world. Christopher Layne defined U.S. hegemonic grand strategy as a “strategy of preponderance”–in simple terms–a strategy to maintain primacy in the world through preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power.28 With China already an established pole, Beijing expects Washington to share the economic-security dual leadership of the world. The key implication here is that China’s outward-facing policies will inevitably clash with United States’ preponderance or hegemonic status. In 2008, U.S. National Intelligence Council report argued that America should adjust its international ambitions and forgo continued primacy in favor of accommodating the rising powers in the interest of greater global governance.29

For the United States, there are many problems with a strategy based around trying to stop China’s rise. One is that on a basic level, it will not work. There is no reason to believe that spending over a trillion dollars modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal or selling submarines to Australia will cause China to do anything but continue arming itself as quickly as possible. China has spent years preparing for a techno-containment strategy from the United States, launching its “Made in China 2025” initiative in 2015 precisely to guarantee that it has a strong domestic technology industry. And the rest of Asia is not willing or able to isolate Beijing under current political conditions.

What maintaining U.S. primacy will instead do is menace the Asian peace. The massive military investments needed to ensure the United States remains the Indo-Pacific’s dominant power require outarming China in areas of its highest capability, close to Chinese shores and far from the U.S. homeland. It is an impossible task. Consider, for instance, the steps Washington must take to fight a war over Taiwan. China has the natural, massive advantage of being close to the island’s coasts, all of which fall within range of Chinese air defenses. To repel a PLA attack against Taiwan, the United States would need absurd levels of modern weaponry—meaning a blank check for the Pentagon. It would have to engage in what the sociologist C. Wright Mills once called “the idiot’s race”: amassing missiles and crafting military positions that stoke jingoism on both sides, heighten instability, and lead each state to adopt the most malign interpretations of the other’s intentions. One must squint quite hard to discern a theory of stability in a strategy that demands a favorable imbalance of military power, the active proliferation of weapons platforms, and muscle flexing in the name of signaling resolve.

China’s approach shows that in times of power shifts in global politics, much depends on the extent to which the international order can allow rising powers to see themselves as equal to established powers. This phenomenon is neither uniquely Chinese nor uniquely contemporary. Historically, rising powers—including the United States itself in the nineteenth century—have been more cooperative in international systems that make room for them at the global high table. By contrast, exclusion and inequality have been powerful sources of conflict.

The United States should take these lessons to heart if it wants the fundamentals of the current order to endure. In institutions in which China’s status is secure, the United States should ask more of Beijing. China should be called upon to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the UN Security Council; to support the expansion of the council to include new permanent members that may be friendlier to the United States, such as Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan; to work harder to maintain its WTO commitments and avoid unfair trade practices; and to collaborate with the West to pressure North Korea into acting as a responsible nuclear power. Washington is better positioned to make these demands because China values its status within these institutions and is more likely to shoulder the burdens necessary to preserve it. Washington may also find that its requests are more likely to be successful if they are made in return for Beijing’s desired improvements in its status in the international order.

Thomas Meisenhelder, "Declining American Hegemony Could Be A Good Thing," Common Dreams, 10-11-2020, https://www.commondreams.org/views/2020/10/11/declining-american-hegemony-could-be-good-thing-- 嘉玮

So, it is very likely that the declining global hegemony of the United States will be an opportunity to build better lives everywhere. If the new global "role models" are places like Denmark, Norway, or Costa Rica, surely the world would be headed towards fewer threats to peace, less military spending, fewer attacks on local democracies, more concern for human rights, less environmental destruction, more environmental protection, and more democracy. And, if America uses this opportunity to change what we spend on and how we care for each other, life will be better here at home too.

By virtue of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the hegemon is an important element in creation and maintenance of the international system. As stated earlier, open trade benefits all participants, even the rising challengers that are accommodated in the system. In contemporary world politics, China is the fastest rising power and it is also reaping the benefits of the open economic order created by the US. By participating in the globalized economy, China has earned a comparative advantage in labor-market and its economy has been growing. On top of that China is an export-based economy and thus, it has very little incentive to jeopardize this benefit by engaging with the hegemon and thereby disrupting the order. In his article, Artur Stein has argued that decline in hegemony does not bring about a complete collapse of the trade regime as long as hegemonic power is committed to economic openness. Taking these two points in consideration, it can be argued that it is not in the interest of China to challenge US hegemony. On account, likelihood of war is averted. [5]

Robert Keohane and Institutionalist Approach In After Hegemony, Robert Keohane uses an institutional approach to explain inter-state cooperation. He posits that states have common interest and in order to realize it requires achieving mutually beneficial agreements which is where international regimes come in. These regimes foster cooperation by making it easier to reach mutually beneficial inter-state agreements. They help overcome the problem of lack of qualitative and asymmetrical information, through institutional embeddedness reduces transaction costs, legal costs reduce incentive to cheat thereby reducing uncertainty and building confidence among states. Since hegemonic leadership is required to create regimes in the first place, even after the erosion of hegemony, they have high stakes and play important role in fostering cooperation (US role in the IMF and WTO). Because cooperation fosters absolute gain, all participants are benefitted. [6] By this approach, states see cooperation more beneficial than conflict. Thus, it can be argued from institutionalist approach that international regimes foster cooperation thereby reducing likelihood of conflict in the event of hegemonic decline.

Werrell and Femia 18- Werrell is Co-Founder and Senior Advisor for The Center for Climate and Security and The Council on Strategic Risks and Femia is the CEO of the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR), and Co-Founder of the Center for Climate and Security.

Caitlin E. Werrell and Francesco Femia, "Climate change raises conflict concerns," UNESCO, 02-xx-2018, https://en.unesco.org/courier/2018-2/climate-change-raises-conflict-concerns-- 嘉玮

Devon Ryan, "Does climate change cause armed conflict?," Stanford News, 6-12-2019, https://news.stanford.edu/2019/06/12/climate-change-cause-armed-conflict/-- 嘉玮

Intensifying climate change will increase the future risk of violent armed conflict within countries, according to a study published today in the journal Nature. Synthesizing views across experts, the study estimates climate has influenced between 3% and 20% of armed conflict risk over the last century and that the influence will likely increase dramatically.

Thom Woodroofe, "A Partnership to Save the Planet," Foreign Policy, 12-15-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/19/china-united-states-climate-change-cooperation/-- 嘉玮

The reason a formally established framework is important is because it creates trust and an evidence base, which then lays the groundwork for practical cooperation. In the Obama era, that working group came over time to have nine work streams (vehicles; smart grids; carbon capture, utilization, and storage; energy efficiency measures; emissions data; forests; cities; fuel switching; and green ports and vessels), and both sides were supported by research agencies. In the case of the United States, that was the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and for China, the Energy Research Institute. These agencies helped ensure eyes remained squarely on the substance and not the politics. In 2023, agricultural policy, food-waste management, and electric vehicles should be added to that list at least. By identifying specific new projects, initiatives, or other areas for cooperation across these fields, both countries will be free to focus on the essence of the problem rather than the politics.

David G. Victor, "Rebuilding US-Chinese cooperation on climate change: The science and technology opportunity," Brookings, 08-28-2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rebuilding-us-chinese-cooperation-on-climate-change-the-science-and-technology-opportunity/-- 嘉玮

Averting global climate catastrophe depends in large part on progress by the world’s two greatest powers and emitters: the United States and China. However, relations between these two countries—particularly on climate action—have deteriorated over the past four years. With a new presidential administration set to enter the White House in January 2021, there is an opportunity for the US and China to build trust and cooperation on climate change in a way that supports a cooperative and dynamic bilateral relationship more broadly.

A. Trevor Thrall, Jordan B. Cohen, and Michael Klare, Cohen is a Ph.D. candidate at George mason University and Klare is professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and is a senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. "New arms sales send the wrong signal on Taiwan," Defense News, 8-17-2021, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-on-taiwan/-- 嘉玮

The Biden administration recently approved its first arms sale to Taiwan for $750 million worth of howitzers and high-tech munitions kits. Proponents incorrectly argue that this sale will enhance stability in the region by sending a strong signal to China of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security and by complicating any Chinese plans for an invasion of the island. In fact, the sale will accomplish nothing of the sort. To avoid enflaming tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. needs to halt sales of weapons to Taiwan.

Li Nan [author of letter below], "Debating North Korea: US and Chinese perspectives," Brookings, letters compiled by Susan A. Thornton, Li Nan, and Juliet Lee, 08-27-2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debating-north-korea-us-and-chinese-perspectives/-- 嘉玮

As to what stability would look like in China’s view, the first priority is “no chaos and no war.” After the “Fire and Fury Crisis” in 2017, China wondered whether the U.S. could have a consistent policy towards the Korean Peninsula and the DPRK, and whether it prioritized stability on the peninsula as China always has. China believed war could be imminent. Thus, China sees the U.S. as the one trying to destabilize the Korean Peninsula, similar to how the U.S. currently sees China as the destabilizer in cross-Taiwan Strait relations. Also, a unified Korea resulting from the absorption of North Korea by South Korea will probably lead to turmoil. Many North Koreans cannot accept the ROK’s system, and there is the chance that a conservative South Korean government may seek revenge when unified with the North. Therefore, China hopes to achieve unification based on peaceful self-determination, and an end-of-war declaration and peace agreement are critical.

Edward Wong, Keith Bradsher and Alan Rappeport, Bradsher is the Pulitzer Prize-winning Beijing bureau chief and Rappeport is an economic policy reporter at The New York Times, “Biden Bets High-Level Diplomacy Can Cool Fiery Relations With China," No Publication, 7-10-2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/10/us/politics/biden-china-diplomacy.html-- 嘉玮

The diplomacy has done nothing to address the single thorniest issue between the two nations — the status of Taiwan — and China’s military ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, which are incompatible with U.S. military dominance there. When Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Mr. Xi in June, the Chinese leader refused to even acknowledge there needed to be a framework for the rivalry.

International Crisis Group, "Risky Competition: Strengthening U.S.-China Crisis Management," International Crisis Group, 5-20-2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china-united-states/risky-competition-strengthening-us-china-crisis-management-- 嘉玮

In the spirit of reinforcing reliance on existing tools, the two sides should also recommit both internally and bilaterally to making regular use of the Defense Telephone Link, which proved to be an effective crisis prevention mechanism when concerns about a potential U.S. attack in the Spratlys emerged in Beijing in 2020. As noted above, each side is supposed to provide 48 hours’ advance notice before a requested call and respond within 24 hours of receiving the notice. Beijing and Washington might try enhancing the crisis prevention utility of the telephone link by abbreviating these intervals, perhaps halving the advance notice requirement period to 24 hours and the response time to twelve hours. Efforts to create new hotlines are unlikely to produce results or to be useful during a crisis, because of the limitations previously raised.

Kim Coghill, "China says it resolutely opposes US military sales to Taiwan," Reuters, 7-04-2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-it-resolutely-opposes-us-military-sales-taiwan-2023-07-05/-- 嘉玮

BEIJING, July 5 (Reuters) - China resolutely opposes U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and has lodged stern representations to Washington, China's defence ministry said on Wednesday.

Li Nan [author of letter below], "Debating North Korea: US and Chinese perspectives," Brookings, letters compiled by Susan A. Thornton, Li Nan, and Juliet Lee, 08-27-2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debating-north-korea-us-and-chinese-perspectives/-- 嘉玮

China’s strategic interests in the Korean Peninsula are to maintain amicable relations with both Koreas and to ensure a stable and nuclear-free peninsula. China is seriously concerned about the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs, and that it might encourage other countries in the region to develop its own nuclear programs, which is against China’s security interests. There is no doubt that China takes a strong stance on this issue, as demonstrated by the four China-DPRK summits held since 2018. It is also why China has not conducted military exercises with the DPRK and has never provided military assistance to the DPRK, in contrast with the U.S.-ROK alliance. And much to the DPRK’s dissatisfaction, China’s Ministry of Commerce still enforces sanctions that prevent the exports of chemicals and metals considered “strategic assets” to the DPRK.

Li Nan [author of letter below], "Debating North Korea: US and Chinese perspectives," Brookings, letters compiled by Susan A. Thornton, Li Nan, and Juliet Lee, 08-27-2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debating-north-korea-us-and-chinese-perspectives/-- 嘉玮

China has also been frustrated with prospects for cooperation with the U.S. due to the deteriorating bilateral relationship. China believes the U.S. is not willing to solve the North Korean nuclear issue, and is thus prepared to tolerate the DPRK threat for the sake of building up its alliance against China. Washington, on the contrary, believes Beijing is not willing to address the nuclear issue because it is using Pyongyang as leverage against America and its allies. Because of these different views, plus mutual suspicion of each other’s intentions, China and the U.S. have not had any impetus to make real progress on cooperation.

Susan A. Thornton [author of letter below], "Debating North Korea: US and Chinese perspectives," Brookings, letters compiled by Susan A. Thornton, Li Nan, and Juliet Lee, 08-27-2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debating-north-korea-us-and-chinese-perspectives/-- 嘉玮

I have heard Chinese interlocutors argue in favor of U.S.-China cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, in favor of a road map for denuclearization that would outline a step-by-step approach, and for a simultaneous dual track on denuclearization and addressing North Korean security concerns. You indicate that Pyongyang, while regressing in terms of internal repression and state control of the economy, will be more motivated by economic enticements from the outside once it comes out of the pandemic and that this presents an opportunity. I hope you are right; we are still waiting to see. The problem has always been, though, that such economic enticements pale in comparison to what Pyongyang sees as its existential security shield: nuclear weapons capability. The DPRK has shown incredible resilience in the face of sanctions and has even gone as far as to close its border with China, further isolating itself during the pandemic. It is also the case that such economic enticements are exceedingly difficult to offer and bestow, given the objectionable practices of and low trust in the North Korean regime.

Hans Binnendijk, "#74: Create An “Incidents-At-Sea” Agreement Between the United States and China," Atlantic Council, 4-3-2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/100-ideas-for-the-first-100-days/74-create-an-incidents-at-sea-agreement-between-the-united-states-and-china/-- 嘉玮

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