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2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Popular constitutionalism Bad

Radical Change requires leadership form those affect by law

John et al. '21 [Christina; 08/15-16/2021; Christina John, New Jersey Appellate Division Law Clerk; " SUBVERSIVE LEGAL EDUCATION: REFORMIST STEPS TOWARD ABOLITIONIST VISIONS," FORDHAMLAW REVIEW, Vol. 90 Issue/No. 5 p. 2117-2120//JJB]

Democracy requires a democratic and participatory approach to determining who has the power to participate in the legal system. To fully accomplish that goal—for people more generally to understand and harness the power of the law—we must abolish our system of licensing the privileged few. Instead, it should be replaced with a system that opens the legal system to advocates with a wide range of training and expertise, much like the organic jurists and community legal advocates we highlight. Gerald López, who coined the term rebellious lawyering and inspired community and progressive lawyering, has long argued for the value of legal advocates without law degrees.138 Drawing on the work of information economists who maintain that “[c]ontributing to and drawing upon what we collectively know . . . can . . . transform the . . . way we govern ourselves,”139 López opines, “No longer would our democracy honor more often in the breach than in the observance of the claim that decisions reflect the input of everyone—including ‘ordinary folks’ of all races, cultures, genders, and income levels.”140 Consider parent advocates, a type of peer advocate trained to help parents procure solutions at the agency level and facilitate community organizing.141 An example of parent advocate training is the Child Welfare Organizing Project’s (CWOP) Parent Leadership Curriculum, “a [six]-month training program for parents with child welfare experience to learn about the child welfare system, to learn how to effectively advocate for themselves, and to learn how to help other parents advocate for themselves.”142 CWOP-trained parent advocates were hired to work at CWOP, foster care agencies, and family defense practices.143 The Bronx Defenders, viewing parents as collaborators and coequal problem solvers, similarly created the Parent Liaison Institute, “a community-based twelve-week advocacy training program”:144 Former and current clients, social workers, criminal defense lawyers, family defense lawyers, doctors, psychiatrists, and community activists jointly created the curriculum . . . . The goal was for all of the participants to bring knowledge and skills back to their neighborhood, and . . . to become employed as parent advocates in local child welfare agencies.145 This model recognizes community and lived experience, decentering lawyers in empowerment and knowledge production. This community-built and community-led program informed by lived experience did not rely on institutional measures of expertise. Salmanova’s discussion of the Peer Defense Project also illustrates how individual offices can provide training for impacted individuals to analyze their lived experiences through a legal framework. The Peer Defense Project created mechanisms for youth litigants to participate in their own advocacy and understand how their experiences in the New York City educational system illustrate the legal violations by city and state actors. The Peer Defense Project models this approach from the beginning by reviewing the retainer agreement as an exercise for facilitating dialogue where youth litigants can ask questions and share knowledge with their licensed advocates. The Peer Defense Project developed the “First Five” to facilitate meetings and utilized platforms such as Instagram to translate various aspects of litigation, exemplifying a collective approach not limited to those already involved, inviting others in. For Archer and Pines, learning the law was not simply a means of understanding legal strategy as clients but a means of representing themselves in court. Both underscore the importance of self-determination and helping peers learn and understand the law. The case studies are not geared solely toward individual and collective empowerment. This is a radical departure from formal legal education and licensing that focuses on individual development. Community legal advocates and organic jurists learn the law to become proficient in translating legal concepts for their community and translating lived experience into legal advocacy. Rather than relying on sources purely from the academy, community legal advocates create knowledge with and for the community in order to democratically build legal power. Community legal advocates share a perspective with the community that is extremely underrepresented in traditional spaces. To democratize legal power, the requirements of law school and bar admission must be abolished.146 Our case studies demonstrate the success of sharing legal knowledge in service of exercising legal power. The Peer Defense Project created a civil procedure workshop for youth litigants to understand how their case would move through the court system. Incarcerated folks, even in harsh conditions with limited resources, learn and teach the law, representing themselves and others. Until the introduction of unauthorized practice laws of the early twentieth century, transactional legal representation was unregulated. Until the creation of the organized bar in the late nineteenth century and the accompanying uniform and restrictive admissions requirements, bar admission required only a few questions by a judge. Many low-cost law schools providing the opportunity for legal education to students from low-income backgrounds existed early in the twentieth century.147 Some did not require high school degrees, and none required a college education. In response, the ABA and the Association of American Law Schools tightened requirements, and these schools declined. Scholar Henry Drinker viewed “Russian Jew Boys” as the greatest threat to professional ethics, requiring deterrents like college.148 From our modern perspective, there is little justification for the requirements that too many uncritically embrace today.149 C. The Pedagogy of “Nothing About Us Without Us” In a democratic legal regime, the people are central to the legal narrative. This understanding should shape teaching and scholarship. Unfortunately, as our case studies highlight, the prevailing legal narrative is one created by lawyers for lawyers. In a law school classroom or in court, lawyers and judges write for the most part about those outside their group. Rarely do those impacted by the law have a role in shaping that narrative, in teaching and writing about law, or in constructing legal opinions. As a White space, the legal profession is not a representative or democratic space. Tarnavska has shared an antidote to otherizing those impacted by law. “Nothing about us without us” demands that impacted individuals engage as active participants in their own advocacy. Through this lens, law cannot be understood without the participation and perspective of those who experience it. Similarly, when legislators who had never experienced incarceration visited his prison, Archer and other incarcerated men stressed that plans about them should not be devised without them; legislators who had never experienced incarceration would not get it right without working with those who had lived experience. As Archer says, “subversive legal education must include directly impacted individuals not only as authors but also as legal practitioners.”150 Access to subversive legal education for those most subject to the legal system constitutes a major step toward equality, diversity, and inclusion. Abolishing legal education as it exists cannot happen without leadership from those impacted by the law and the effects of legal education. Those directly impacted are our educators; more than simply being invited to the space within law school walls, they must be seen as educators who will lead the practice of abolition through visioning and imagination, within and beyond the walls of law school.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Popular constitutionalism Bad

The 1AC spotlights the importance of competing Constitutional interpretations. While the question of Puerto Rico's status in it of itself should be for Puerto Ricans and Puerto Ricans alone, we argue that the US has a responsibility to shape the American Constitutional order to give them the autonomy to make whatever choice is necessary. The plan rejects conservatism and cramped originalism and in favor of a living constitutionalism.

Bayonet 22[Gabriel Prats; 2021-2022; The author is a third year law school student from the Inter American School of Law. ; "Vaello-Madero: Putting on Hold Equal Rights for Territorial Citizens," Revista Juridica de la Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico 56, no. 1 (2021-2022): 39-71//JJB]

The prima facie legal interpretation of these cases, particularly in Puerto Rico, invariably leads to the discussion of the island's territorial status and the intense debate over the most plausible political path that can be taken to improve the Commonwealth's current state of self-governance. This is a mistake, not because the island's status is not important, but rather it dismisses the importance of these cases from a constitutional point of view. Whether it be statehood, an improved Commonwealth, or independence, the question of Puerto Rico's future status in relation to the U.S. must be decided amongst Puerto Ricans. It is not within the Court's province to decide Puerto Rico's ultimate political status. Yet, these cases highlight fundamental questions of how Congress should treat U.S. citizens residing in the territories, and the interplay of constitutional law with modern standards of equity and fairness, which are vastly different from those present during the time of the Insular Cases. Even considering the conflicting internal political views of the current members of the Supreme Court, one would expect that the American legal system would recognize that a change for the better is warranted. These cases represent legal milestones in the pursuit of equitable treatment for U.S. citizens living in the territories through an expansion of the frontiers of federalism. However, the cases also represent a curtailment of territorial power, such as the power to establish territorial bankruptcy procedures or to prosecute criminal acts. After the Vaello-Madero hearing, it was apparent from the variety of issues argued that the outcome would most likely come down to how the Supreme Court justices interpret the Territorial Clause and the power it delegates to Congress. In other words, there was a growing idea that the case would be decided on the merits by either an originalist analysis of the Territorial Clause or by using a Living Constitution approach to conform with the reality of territorial policy. Ultimately, the latter was discarded. A. Originalism Originalism is the legal doctrine that holds that the Constitution should be interpreted as originally understood at the time it was adopted by the Founding Fathers adopted it.134 Originalism has historically taken many routes in the constitutional analysis of legal texts. However, modern originalism can best be 134 Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 909, 910 (1998). 2021-20221 63 REVISTA JURiDICA U.I.P.R. attributed to conservative Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.1 35 In the words of Justice Scalia himself. Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system, for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself. And the principal defect of that approach that historical research is always difficult and sometimes inconclusive will, unlike nonoriginalism, lead to a more moderate rather than a more extreme result. The inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they would like it to be will, I have no doubt, cause most errors in judicial historiography to be made in the direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern values so that as applied, even as applied in the best of faith, originalism will (as the historical record shows) end up as something of a compromise. Perhaps not a bad characteristic for a constitutional theory. Thus, nonoriginalists can say, concerning the principal defect of originalism, "Oh happy fault." Originalism is, it seems to me, the librarian who talks too softly.1 36 In matters relating to Equal Protection under the Constitution, Justice Scalia understood that: [T]he function of this Court is to preserve our society's values regarding (among other things) equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on our own authority, progressively higher degrees. For that reason it is my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to devise, they cannot supersede and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect those constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the people's understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts. 137 B. Living Constitutionalism On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Living Constitution perspective distances itself from originalism by arguing that the provisions of the Constitu135 Id. at 910-11. 136 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 849, 864 (1989). 137 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 64 [vol. LVL 1:39 VAELLO-MADERO tion should be interpreted to conform to present societal needs.1 38 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., renowned for his progressive constitutional interpretations, stated that: [T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.1 39 The Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause have been a particular target for living constitutionalists, but this has been the very subject of external and self-criticism of the doctrine altogether. As Professor Ernest A. Young put it: [I]t is essential that living constitutionalists understand the downside risks that come with any evolutionary model of constitutionalism. Living constitutionalism needs a cultural shift, based on a sense of tragedy, to temper its progressive optimism. Progress can and does happen, but it is by no means inevitable, and sometimes constitutional law goes to hell in a handbasket. That is what happened in the Fourteenth Amendment's first seventy-five years.14 0 In regards to Due Process, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a known swing voter during his time on the Supreme Court,14 embraced the notion that: Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom. 4 2 138 Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Constitution," 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1456, 1457 (2001). 139 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 140 Ernest A. Young, Boden Lecture: Dying Constitutionalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 952 (2019). 141 Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's Move Away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 25 (2007). 142 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). See also Id. at 60-61. 2021-20221 65 REVISTA JURiDICA U.I.P.R. This doctrine is usually linked with judicial activism or "judicial legislation," 143 a phenomenon many argue is justified ever since the days ofMarbury v. Madison,144 when the Court said: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is." 145 C. The clashing doctrines in the Vaello-Madero decision The Vaello-Madero case presented a clear instance where both of these doctrines of constitutional interpretation were adopted, as Justice Sotomayor's dissent drastically changed the approach on how equal protection is viewed in the territories. The present Supreme Court is undoubtedly a conservative one, thus it was foreseeable that the approach that was most likely going to prevail is the originalist doctrine. As the doctrine stipulates, the majority approached the text of the Territorial Clause and how it interplays with the Due Process provision of the Fifth Amendment with respect to an unincorporated territory of the Union. Though, this question leads to much deeper queries, as Justice Gorsuch observes in his concurrence, 146 the Supreme Court rested on Congress' rationale to exclude Puerto Rico from SSI benefits for mostly economic reasons, barely elaborating on the fundamental right of due process when it applies to U.S. citizens living in the territories. In other words, the majority adopted an originalist approach more focused on the political backlash of extending these federal benefits to Puerto Rico vis-a-vis the criticism that other States of the Union might raise towards Congress in response. While the living constitution doctrine seemed like a viable alternative to resolve this case, considering the historical underpinnings of the Insular Cases, it cannot be denied that those particular cases were a prime example of judicial activism in the early 20th century. These were times when the prevailing societal views of national and ethnic minorities were significantly different, as the priorities of the U.S. government were purely set on expansionist policies. It can be argued that the Insular Cases were essentially seals of approval for both the Executive and Legislative branches to validate the disparate treatment of the minority groups that lived on the recently acquired territories. The doctrines of territorial incorporation from Downes and express incorporation from Balzac had nothing to do with the textual interpretation of the Constitution. Nowhere in the Consti143 Eliot T. Tracz, Doctrinal Evolution and the Living Constitution, 42 DAYTON L. REV. 257, 262 (2017). 144 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 145 Id. at 177. 146 Vaello-Madero, --- S.Ct. at 14 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 66 [vol. LVL 1:39 VAELLO-MADERO tution is there an instruction guide to determine when a territory is destined for incorporation and how that affects the interpretation of how fundamental rights ought to apply differently to American citizens living in these territories. 14 7 Thus, just as the Court incorporated these doctrines via judicial activism under the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, the present Vaello-Madero case should have been decided utilizing the same route, only this time applying the modern standards of fairness and justice. Yet, this was not the case. Justice Sotomayor's dissent was a textbook example of what the opinion would have looked like if this approach was followed. The legislative intent on excluding Puerto Rico from the SSI program cannot be rationally based on the Territorial Clause, a clause that the very Insular Cases interpreted bestow only temporary powers upon Congress to take the necessary measures to organize them:1 48 in particular, as Justice Sotomayor conveys, in a territory with no voting power in Congress.149

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Popular constitutionalism Bad

Popular Constitutionalism help workers – Providing them freedoms.

Beienburg and Frymer '16 [First; 02/19/2016; Sean Beienburg: is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lehigh University and Paul Frymer: is a Professor of Politics and Director of the Law and Public Affairs Program at Princeton University; " The People Against Themselves: Rethinking Popular Constitutionalism," Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 41, Issue/No. 1, p. 242-266//JJB]

Arizona and Roosevelt's challenge to many of the core principles of judicial autonomy and the' US political order in 1912 is just one of many moments in US history of leading public figures promoting the cause of popular constitutionalism (Ackerman 1993; Kramer 2004; Siegel 2008; Thomas 2008, Milkis 2009; Eskridge and Ferejohn 2012; Yarbrough 2012). As it is typically invoked, popular constitutionalism has tended to mean more direct interpretations and understandings of the nation's legal structure, which in turn means weakened courts and chastened judges who ought to be prevented from asserting judicial review over popular opinion, particularly when that opinion is passionate, sustained, and mobilized. Given the politics specific to the early twentieth century, a time that pitted progressives proposing economic regulations on behalf of the working classes against judges defending the economic rights of corporations and other economic elites, popular constitutionalism was frequently valorized by those representing workers and criticized by those defending constitutional formalism and fundamental economic freedoms (Gillman 1992).

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Plan Expensive

SSI benefits help economy – they reduce poverty

Sánchez, '21[Maricarmen Rivera;11-3-2021; ; "Access to Supplemental Security Income is Positive for Local Economy," ]

The possibility of Puerto Rico having access to Supplementary Security Income (SSI) benefits, as of 2024, is positive for the island’s economy and would help reduce the number of people who are living in poverty.

According to economist José Caraballo Cueto, the SSI program will help the neediest sectors. “It seems to me that it is good news because the SSI would reduce the poverty rate in Puerto Rico by seven percentage points,” he said.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Plan Expensive

Plan only cost $2 billion

Hurley '22 [Lawrence; 04-21-2022; Washington-based reporter covering legal affairs with a focus on the U.S. Supreme Court, a Pulitzer Prize winner for team project on how the defense of qualified immunity protects police officers accused of excessive force.; "U.S. Supreme Court allows Puerto Rico's exclusion from welfare program," ]

The justices ruled 8-1 in favor of President Joe Biden's administration, reversing a lower court's ruling that a 1972 decision by Congress to exclude Puerto Rico from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program violated a U.S. Constitution requirement that laws apply equally to everyone.

The ruling denies the welfare benefits to an estimated 300,000 people on the Caribbean island who otherwise might qualify. The federal government has said an expansion covering Puerto Rico would have cost $2 billion a year.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Insular Cases Moot

The Insular Cases are alive and well – the Lower Courts consistently use them to justify disparate treatment.

Eastling et al. ’20 - Constitutional Law student at Yale

Kyla Eastling, Danny Li, and Neil Weare, 20 - ("The Supreme Court Just Passed Up a Chance to Overrule Appallingly Racist Precedents," Slate Magazine, 6-1-2020, accessed 7-16-2023,

With this collective inaction and silence, the Supreme Court missed an important opportunity to announce what should already be obvious: The Insular Cases, like Korematsu, were gravely wrong the day they were decided, have been overruled in the court of history, and have no place under the Constitution. (Disclosure: One of us filed an amicus brief in this case urging the Supreme Court to overturn the Insular Cases.)

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Legal Focus Bad

Continuing to allow stare decisis in the context of cases akin to Plessy v. Ferguson is ethically unjustifiable and instrumentally unwise.

Rice 22 – Assistant Professor of Law U of A (also duke but)

Daniel B. Rice, Expert on Constitutional Law and impact of shifting cultural paradigms on US legal precedent, "Repugnant precedents and the court of history," Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2022): 577, 7/17/23, pp. 618-25 https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11248&context=mlr //MS

Note: Brackets represent outdates language.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Hollow Hope

The 1AC spotlights the vital importance of competing modes of Constitutional interpretation. The question of Puerto Rico's status should be for the Puerto Ricans, but struggles over what the American Constitutional order ought to look like and be like are essential. The plan rejects conservatism and cramped originalism and in favor of a living constitutionalism.

Bayonet 22[Gabriel Prats; 2021-2022; The author is a third year law school student from the Inter American School of Law. ; "Vaello-Madero: Putting on Hold Equal Rights for Territorial Citizens," Revista Juridica de la Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico 56, no. 1 (2021-2022): 39-71//JJB]

The prima facie legal interpretation of these cases, particularly in Puerto Rico, invariably leads to the discussion of the island's territorial status and the intense debate over the most plausible political path that can be taken to improve the Commonwealth's current state of self-governance. This is a mistake, not because the island's status is not important, but rather it dismisses the importance of these cases from a constitutional point of view. Whether it be statehood, an improved Commonwealth, or independence, the question of Puerto Rico's future status in relation to the U.S. must be decided amongst Puerto Ricans. It is not within the Court's province to decide Puerto Rico's ultimate political status. Yet, these cases highlight fundamental questions of how Congress should treat U.S. citizens residing in the territories, and the interplay of constitutional law with modern standards of equity and fairness, which are vastly different from those present during the time of the Insular Cases. Even considering the conflicting internal political views of the current members of the Supreme Court, one would expect that the American legal system would recognize that a change for the better is warranted. These cases represent legal milestones in the pursuit of equitable treatment for U.S. citizens living in the territories through an expansion of the frontiers of federalism. However, the cases also represent a curtailment of territorial power, such as the power to establish territorial bankruptcy procedures or to prosecute criminal acts. After the Vaello-Madero hearing, it was apparent from the variety of issues argued that the outcome would most likely come down to how the Supreme Court justices interpret the Territorial Clause and the power it delegates to Congress. In other words, there was a growing idea that the case would be decided on the merits by either an originalist analysis of the Territorial Clause or by using a Living Constitution approach to conform with the reality of territorial policy. Ultimately, the latter was discarded. A. Originalism Originalism is the legal doctrine that holds that the Constitution should be interpreted as originally understood at the time it was adopted by the Founding Fathers adopted it.134 Originalism has historically taken many routes in the constitutional analysis of legal texts. However, modern originalism can best be 134 Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 909, 910 (1998). 2021-20221 63 REVISTA JURiDICA U.I.P.R. attributed to conservative Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.1 35 In the words of Justice Scalia himself. Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system, for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself. And the principal defect of that approach that historical research is always difficult and sometimes inconclusive will, unlike nonoriginalism, lead to a more moderate rather than a more extreme result. The inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they would like it to be will, I have no doubt, cause most errors in judicial historiography to be made in the direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern values so that as applied, even as applied in the best of faith, originalism will (as the historical record shows) end up as something of a compromise. Perhaps not a bad characteristic for a constitutional theory. Thus, nonoriginalists can say, concerning the principal defect of originalism, "Oh happy fault." Originalism is, it seems to me, the librarian who talks too softly.1 36 In matters relating to Equal Protection under the Constitution, Justice Scalia understood that: [T]he function of this Court is to preserve our society's values regarding (among other things) equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on our own authority, progressively higher degrees. For that reason it is my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to devise, they cannot supersede and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect those constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the people's understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts. 137 B. Living Constitutionalism On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Living Constitution perspective distances itself from originalism by arguing that the provisions of the Constitu135 Id. at 910-11. 136 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 849, 864 (1989). 137 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 64 [vol. LVL 1:39 VAELLO-MADERO tion should be interpreted to conform to present societal needs.1 38 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., renowned for his progressive constitutional interpretations, stated that: [T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.1 39 The Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause have been a particular target for living constitutionalists, but this has been the very subject of external and self-criticism of the doctrine altogether. As Professor Ernest A. Young put it: [I]t is essential that living constitutionalists understand the downside risks that come with any evolutionary model of constitutionalism. Living constitutionalism needs a cultural shift, based on a sense of tragedy, to temper its progressive optimism. Progress can and does happen, but it is by no means inevitable, and sometimes constitutional law goes to hell in a handbasket. That is what happened in the Fourteenth Amendment's first seventy-five years.14 0 In regards to Due Process, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a known swing voter during his time on the Supreme Court,14 embraced the notion that: Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom. 4 2 138 Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Constitution," 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1456, 1457 (2001). 139 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 140 Ernest A. Young, Boden Lecture: Dying Constitutionalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 952 (2019). 141 Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's Move Away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 25 (2007). 142 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). See also Id. at 60-61. 2021-20221 65 REVISTA JURiDICA U.I.P.R. This doctrine is usually linked with judicial activism or "judicial legislation," 143 a phenomenon many argue is justified ever since the days ofMarbury v. Madison,144 when the Court said: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is." 145 C. The clashing doctrines in the Vaello-Madero decision The Vaello-Madero case presented a clear instance where both of these doctrines of constitutional interpretation were adopted, as Justice Sotomayor's dissent drastically changed the approach on how equal protection is viewed in the territories. The present Supreme Court is undoubtedly a conservative one, thus it was foreseeable that the approach that was most likely going to prevail is the originalist doctrine. As the doctrine stipulates, the majority approached the text of the Territorial Clause and how it interplays with the Due Process provision of the Fifth Amendment with respect to an unincorporated territory of the Union. Though, this question leads to much deeper queries, as Justice Gorsuch observes in his concurrence, 146 the Supreme Court rested on Congress' rationale to exclude Puerto Rico from SSI benefits for mostly economic reasons, barely elaborating on the fundamental right of due process when it applies to U.S. citizens living in the territories. In other words, the majority adopted an originalist approach more focused on the political backlash of extending these federal benefits to Puerto Rico vis-a-vis the criticism that other States of the Union might raise towards Congress in response. While the living constitution doctrine seemed like a viable alternative to resolve this case, considering the historical underpinnings of the Insular Cases, it cannot be denied that those particular cases were a prime example of judicial activism in the early 20th century. These were times when the prevailing societal views of national and ethnic minorities were significantly different, as the priorities of the U.S. government were purely set on expansionist policies. It can be argued that the Insular Cases were essentially seals of approval for both the Executive and Legislative branches to validate the disparate treatment of the minority groups that lived on the recently acquired territories. The doctrines of territorial incorporation from Downes and express incorporation from Balzac had nothing to do with the textual interpretation of the Constitution. Nowhere in the Consti143 Eliot T. Tracz, Doctrinal Evolution and the Living Constitution, 42 DAYTON L. REV. 257, 262 (2017). 144 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 145 Id. at 177. 146 Vaello-Madero, --- S.Ct. at 14 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 66 [vol. LVL 1:39 VAELLO-MADERO tution is there an instruction guide to determine when a territory is destined for incorporation and how that affects the interpretation of how fundamental rights ought to apply differently to American citizens living in these territories. 14 7 Thus, just as the Court incorporated these doctrines via judicial activism under the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, the present Vaello-Madero case should have been decided utilizing the same route, only this time applying the modern standards of fairness and justice. Yet, this was not the case. Justice Sotomayor's dissent was a textbook example of what the opinion would have looked like if this approach was followed. The legislative intent on excluding Puerto Rico from the SSI program cannot be rationally based on the Territorial Clause, a clause that the very Insular Cases interpreted bestow only temporary powers upon Congress to take the necessary measures to organize them:1 48 in particular, as Justice Sotomayor conveys, in a territory with no voting power in Congress.149

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Hollow Hope

Even if our aff can’t result in perfect social reform, an overturn is important insofar as the IC dilute and harm the power of the constitution.

Rice 22 – Assistant Professor of Law U of A

Daniel B. Rice, Expert on Constitutional Law and impact of shifting cultural paradigms on US legal precedent, "Repugnant precedents and the court of history," Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2022): 577, 7/17/23, pp. 618-25 //MS

These generalizations will often hold true; and when they do, passivity may well be the better approach, all things considered. But a blanket attitude of noninterference risks devolving into complacency. Precedents can be worth phasing out even if they are not actively generating unsavory policies. This Section identifies a range of factors to consider in deciding whether formal repudiation would be the wisest course for any particular decision. For these purposes, I distinguish between ongoing harms and ongoing risks of harm. The latter grouping builds upon Justice Jackson’s evocative warning that Supreme Court precedents can “lie[] about like a loaded weapon,”311 supplying ready-made judicial sanction for tragic or misguided governmental actions.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Antisubordination EPC Read = Bad

Turn: By Endorsing an Antisubordination Reading of EPC rather than the current Anticlassifcation read we better solve for Indigenous Violence.

Nurse '14 [Abagail; April 2014; Nurse is a lawyer in the civil rights division of the Justice Department in Washington. She graduated from the University of Michigan and received a law degree from N.Y.U. ; " ANTI-SUBORDINATION IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: A CASE STUDY," NYU Law Review, Vol. 89, p. 294-334//JJB]

Many scholars strongly believe that anti-subordination is a more accurate and preferable method of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause because of its emphasis on history and context.58 Engaging with historical context is important because history informs the present. It does this by “fram[ing] matters in such a way as to expose the real issues and thus be more likely to lead to the correct decision . . . .”59 This situation occurs because social identities, like race, are in part defined by their histories—we must engage the past in order to address the conflicts in the present.60 Anti-subordination principles allow equal protection jurisprudence to maintain its mission of equal treatment under the laws by incorporating the inequitable realities that exist in our society.61 Anti-classification fails to acknowledge the role that historical institutional and structural barriers play.62 As a result, that approach fails to acknowledge any difference in the discrimination felt by white people as compared with discrimination felt by people of color.63 Furthermore, an anti-subordination approach to the Equal Protection Clause acknowledges that individuals are grouped by hierarchical64 social categories (like race) that continue to have an impact on the lives of individuals in those groups.65 As a result, antisubordination is more appropriate because it takes into account an individual’s group identity.66 If it were the case that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to protect individuals, without attention to the groups they are in, then perhaps anti-classification would be appropriate. However, the precise purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect not merely individuals, but individuals who are also in social identity groups. 67 As discussed above, the Court is attentive to the prejudices against groups of people—including people of color and religious minorities—in Carolene Products and Korematsu. 68 Consequently, interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause should be attentive to the groups of which the individuals are a part.69 The biggest failure of the anti-classification approach is its efforts to ignore race and be “colorblind,” or “neutral.” The problem with purported neutrality is that the world is not neutral: Hierarchies continue to shape everyone’s existence, regardless of whether they are acknowledged or not.70 Therefore, an approach that attempts to impose neutrality will maintain the problematic power structures that are currently in place—the status quo will go uninterrupted.71 Instead, courts implementing the Equal Protection Clause should seek to improve the status of marginalized groups. To do this, given that each group comes from a different place in the hierarchy, classifications must not all be treated the same.72 Treating everyone alike perpetuates existing institutional barriers.73 An anti-subordination approach to the equal protection doctrine is a flexible solution to make laws more equitable.74 As discussed above, an anti-subordination approach provides a searching inquiry into the effects and context of a particular law. This is important because discrimination and racism change form over time.75 Antisubordination provides better guidance when discrimination and racism are unconscious76 or when a law is “benign.”77 Anti-subordination accomplishes this by allowing for a nuanced analysis so that one can determine when something may be “unfair” (for example, a white woman not getting into her university of choice)78 or “group disadvantaging” (for example, standardized tests having implicit biases that disadvantage people of color and low-income people)79. 80 Something that is “unfair” may not need the protection of the Equal Protection Clause in the same way as something that is “group disadvantaging.” That means, though, that not all harms will be remedied.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Antisubordination EPC Read = Bad

Anti-Subordination account for forms of discrimination

Nurse '14 [Abagail; April 2014; Nurse is a lawyer in the civil rights division of the Justice Department in Washington. She graduated from the University of Michigan and received a law degree from N.Y.U. ; " ANTI-SUBORDINATION IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: A CASE STUDY," NYU Law Review, Vol. 89, p. 294-334//JJB]

The anti-subordination doctrine suggests that heightened scrutiny should be applied when a classification creates hierarchies, rather than solely when legislation classifies a group.32 When scholars discuss antisubordination principles, three key themes emerge: (1) the existence of a group status that perpetuates subordination, (2) group history that includes discrimination or subordination, and (3) group political powerlessness. The remainder of this Subpart will discuss each of these prongs. The first prong, the existence of a group status that perpetuates subordination, is central to anti-subordination.33 This prong is predicated on an understanding that socially constructed identity groups, like race, categorize individuals.34 These groups exist on hierarchies whereby some are more valued than others.35 Anti-subordination theories analyze these hierarchies to “ask[ ] whether certain status hierarchies exist that are so unjust that the Constitution demands their disestablishment.”36 For example, people of African descent in the United States are classified by their racial identity (“Black”) and are disadvantaged by this group status. Anti-subordination principles urge equal protection doctrine to focus on the very groups whose statuses are harmed.37 When a law categorizes people based on race and other social identities, further inquiry into the effect of such classification is essential.38 The relevant inquiry is whether the categorization subordinates individuals in the group. The second prong, closely linked to the first, is a history that includes discrimination or subordination. One must not only assess the subordination associated with a group’s categorization in current times but also look to the past for a demonstrated history of discrimination against the group.39 For instance, the current status of Black people in the United States is relevant, as is that the group has “occupied the lowest rung for several centuries.”40 Under antisubordination, a group’s status as the “perpetual underclass” makes it necessary for the Court to step in and to protect it under the Equal Protection Clause.41 An analysis consistent with anti-subordination will focus “heavily on factual and historical contexts, and in particular, on the laws and social mores that prevail in a given society at a given moment in history.”42 The seminal equal protection case, Korematsu v. United States,43 provides a useful illustration of how the Supreme Court has considered both a classification that perpetuates subordination and a history of discrimination in its equal protection doctrine.44 The Korematsu Court upheld the power of Congress, at behest of the U.S. military, to exclude certain individuals from being in certain areas, severely limiting the locations where Japanese Americans could reside.45 The Court emphasized that a suspect classification was not per se unconstitutional. Instead, a suspect classification depended on whether the law “curtail[ed] the civil rights” of the group.46 In dissent,47 Justice Murphy emphasized that the classification was unconstitutional because it resulted from “racial and economic prejudices” that existed “for years.”48 Finally, the third prong of the anti-subordination principle is a group’s political powerlessness.49 This prong refers to the sheer size of the group as compared to other groups, as well as the group’s “political status.”50 One interpretation of political status is whether the group is being used as a scapegoat in the political sphere.51 The group may be “the object of ‘prejudice’—that is, the subject of fear, hatred, and distaste that make it particularly difficult for them to form coalitions with others . . . and that make it advantageous for the dominant political parties to hurt them, or use them as a scapegoat.”52 It is also linked to socioeconomic status, which makes the group disadvantaged when lobbying the legislature for protection.53 Footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products provides the doctrinal foundation for the protection of politically powerless groups.54 The Court suggested that laws that limit the rights of individuals based on their classification in different social identity groups (as opposed to only classifying without limiting rights) should be analyzed more closely than laws that do not.55 The Court explicitly noted that it was worried about “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” out of concern that this may “seriously . . . curtail the operation of . . . political processes.”56 As a result, courts have come to review these laws differently, in a more “searching” manner.57

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Antisubordination EPC Read = Bad

Anti-subordination readings aid disadvantaged minorities

MAZRUI '21 [KIM FORDE; MM/DD/2021; Mortimer M. Caplin Professor of Law

Director, Center for the Study of Race and Law; "A WHY THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT WOULD ENDANGER WOMEN’S EQUALITY: LESSONS FROM COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 33-35//JJB]

Many ERA supporters would likely applaud my prediction that the Court would apply strict scrutiny to state-sponsored sex discrimination because that would make such discrimination against women even more constitutionally vulnerable than under the current intermediate scrutiny standard.138 If strict scrutiny would apply only to laws that harm women’s equality, support for the ERA would be justified. The danger for women’s equality, however, is that the Court would likely interpret the ERA to apply strict scrutiny even to laws and policies designed to support women. The Court has interpreted equality rights for decades139 in a formalistic, symmetrical way that views any benefit to one group as discrimination against the group not benefited. For example, consider race. The Court views affirmative efforts to increase minority representation in higher education, government contracting, employment, and political participation as discrimination against whites.140 The Court thus applies strict scrutiny to all race-conscious government decision-making even when intended to advance racial equality.141 The effect, essentially, is that government must largely ignore race and racial inequality—it must be “color blind.” The Court’s skeptical view that laws designed to benefit racial minorities are as “suspect” as laws designed to benefit whites reflects the Court’s anti-classification approach to equal protection. The anticlassification approach views the constitutional problem as classifying people by their race.142 By contrast, the anti-subordination approach views the constitutional problem as the impact of laws on historically subordinated groups.143 The anti-subordination approach would permit race-conscious laws designed to benefit historically disadvantaged minorities significantly more than does the anti-classification approach. With respect to sex discrimination, the Court would likely interpret the ERA in accordance with the anti-classification approach, i.e., subject all sex-motivated laws to strict scrutiny even if designed to benefit women. First, the text of the ERA does not distinguish between men and women suggesting that men would have the same right to complain about laws or policies designed to benefit women as women would have to complain about laws or policies designed t o benefit men. Second, under equal protection doctrine, the Court follows an anticlassification approach with respect to the level of scrutiny it applies to all classifications, whether suspect, such as race,144 quasi-suspect, such as sex,145 or non-suspect, such as age.146

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Antisubordination EPC Read = Bad

FG Insular cases reinforces the “subject” status of colonized people

Charlton and Fadgen '22 [Guy and Tim; 2022; Guy C. Charlton is an Associate Professor of Law at University of New England (Australia) and Adjunct Professor at AUT (New Zealand) and Curtin University (Australia). He holds a PhD (University of Auckland);J.D. (University of Wisconsin); and MA (Toronto). He is admitted to the Wisconsin Bar. Tim Fadgen is a Senior Lecturer in Public Policy at University of Auckland. He holds a PhD (University of Auckland) and J.D. (University of Maine). He is admitted to the Maine Bar and was a past member of the American Samoa and Western Samoa Bar, former Assistant Attorney General in American Samoa, and former Special Assistant to Samoa's Attorney General.; " CASE NOTE: FITISEMANU V. UNITED STATES: U.S. Citizenship in American Samoa and the Insular Cases," PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 39, Issue/No. 1, p. 41-42//JJB]

The underlying ethos of the Insular Cases is beyond the scope of this note. However, it is evident that using the Insular framework to argue that Samoan self-determination is enhanced inappropriately conceptualizes the notion of self-determination. First, it inappropriately equates the Territory's governmental autonomy and organizational capacity with the individual rights of native-born American Samoans. Given the plenary authority of Congress and the Executive over the territory which enables Federal Government can alter the constitutional structure and rights of the population of American Samoa as it deems fit, it is arguable that a grant of citizenship is likely more important to the "dignity" and "autonomy" of individuals in the territory than local autonomy subject to Congressional oversight. The precariousness of American Samoan rights 62. Article 3 states, "Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007), 63. These concepts are reflected in the seminal American Indian cases Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) written by Chief Justice Marshall. For a recent discussion of the relationship, see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) and United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct.1638 (2021). 64. Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 870 (10th Cir. 2021). 65. Jeffrey B. Teichert, Resisting Temptation in the Garden of Paradise: Preserving the Role of Samoan Custom in the Law of American Samoa, 3 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 35, 41-42 (2000). 2022 41 PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL under the Plenary Power doctrine, rather than exhibiting self-determination and dignity, seemingly reinforces the "subject" status of American Samoans as colonized peoples.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Case › AT: Antisubordination EPC Read = Bad

The Insular Cases perpetuate inequality despite intentions in Tuaua

HLR 17

[HLR (Harvard Law Review), Harvard Law School student-run journal of legal scholarship, "American Samoa and the Citizenship Clause: A Study in Insular Cases Revisionism," Harvard Law Review, April 10, 2017 ] /RS

Do We Want a Pluralist Constitution? — Even if there is a potential role for the Insular Cases to play in protecting territorial culture, it does not necessarily follow that we should want to go where that road would lead. Judge Juan Torruella, for instance, decries the Insular Cases as creating “a regime of . . . political apartheid”172 and notes “racial biases” as a factor underlying judicial responses to the statutory granting of citizenship, by the 1917 Jones Act, to Puerto Ricans.173 Other judges have similarly lamented the continuing influence of this “thoroughly ossified set of cases marked by the intrinsically racist imperialism of a previous era of United States colonial expansionism.”174 Such critiques suggest that the Insular Cases revisionism of Tuaua, however well meaning, may in truth serve to perpetuate an unequal and untenable status quo.

2023 DDI Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Puerto Rico

Maintaining the cases risks abuse of Constitutional precedent to fit political motivations.

Rice 22 – Assistant Professor of Law U of A (also duke but)

Daniel B. Rice, Expert on Constitutional Law and impact of shifting cultural paradigms on US legal precedent, "Repugnant precedents and the court of history," Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2022): 577, 7/17/23, pp. 618-25 //MS

As a nation, we are not on a constant upward trajectory. “Memory is short, political leaders change, and history may repeat itself.”330 Perhaps the most acute danger posed by repugnant precedents is that governmental actors will convert artifacts of legal history into tools of ongoing oppression. This concern should not be overstated—ethical shifts do real deterrent work, conditioning most elected officials not to stray from America’s deepest unwritten commitments. But politicians also play an active role in shaping and reshaping those commitments. As our political marketplace continues to coarsen, policies that had become unthinkable may regain traction in public discourse.331 Even cherished norms can erode—especially if persons seeking to undermine them can claim a grounding in positive law. In this way, surviving Supreme Court precedents may enable malefactors to redraw ethical boundaries by downplaying those boundaries’ very existence.332 And it takes only a single nonconformist actor to make these risks a reality.

2023 DDI Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Puerto Rico

Express overrule is key. Keeping cases of this kind results in continuing harms--socially, legally, and ethically--even when they are allegedly "overruled in the court of history."

Rice 22 – Assistant Professor of Law U of A (also duke but)

Daniel B. Rice, Expert on Constitutional Law and impact of shifting cultural paradigms on US legal precedent, "Repugnant precedents and the court of history," Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2022): 577, 7/17/23, pp. 618-25 //MS

In many respects, the moral makeup of long-dead generations is virtually unrecognizable today. Yet through the medium of precedent, lapsed cultural values continue to enjoy legal authority in the present. This Part explores the complex relationship between doctrinal stasis and ethical change. In doing so, it first highlights the continuing harms that repugnant precedents can cause. It then proposes specific methods of implementing well-grounded conceptions of aversive ethos.310 These recommendations may not satisfy proponents of strict judicial modesty. But they respect the Court’s conventions of repudiation—unlike the court-of-history approach—and would facilitate far more satisfying “ethical” overrulings than would rigid adherence to the canonical stare decisis factors.

2023 DDI Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Puerto Rico

Our legal orientation, while not directly abolitionist, is a prerequisite to meaningfully actualizing abolitionism.

John et al. '21 [Christina; 08/15-16/2021; Christina John, New Jersey Appellate Division Law Clerk; " SUBVERSIVE LEGAL EDUCATION: REFORMIST STEPS TOWARD ABOLITIONIST VISIONS," FORDHAMLAW REVIEW, Vol. 90 Issue/No. 5 p. 2120-2121//JJB]

This Essay begins with reformist steps and ends with abolition of the existing system in favor of a democratic and participatory model of legal education. Our reformist steps join with Bennett Capers in opening the doors of law schools and ending law school as a White space. 151 At minimum, the discriminatory outcomes that pervade legal education and bar admission require rethinking every step in the established process. Or, rather than seek facially neutral justifications for racist policies, we should reject them altogether in favor of anti-racist policies that promote equality among racial groups. But reformist steps are only a temporary step toward a just society. Subverting injustice requires a world where the walls of law school and the organized bar do not obscure and monopolize legal knowledge and power. We do not claim to offer a blueprint for democratizing legal knowledge and power. It would be misguided to expect a law review essay-of all the available tools-to be such a vehicle. We imagine legal education beyond the existing walls of law school and the gates of the legal profession. We do seek to abolish law school as the only location for education and the profession as the only avenue for advocacy. 150. See supra Part II. 151. See Capers, supra note 14. 2120 [Vol. 90 SUBVERSIVE LEGAL ED UCATION Abolition requires "work in solidarity with others toward the world as they wish for it to be," 152 so we imagine building together. We imagine those traditionally viewed as experts sharing their platforms with those who are not. We imagine many more articles coauthored by lawyers passionate about social justice issues and those most directly impacted who have gained expertise through lived experiences. This is the pedagogy of "Nothing About Us Without Us"-all teaching and scholarship of law must include the participation and wisdom of those impacted by the law. As we model, abolition is a gradual, collaborative process requiring many perspectives, particularly of those most acutely impacted by racist and oppressive punishment mechanisms. Historically, the abolitionist movement has been a movement of growth away from morally unsustainable practices. 153 The abolitionist movement is concerned with repair, restoration, 154 and hope. 155 Abolition without addressing the social illswithout implementing creative, imaginative reforms to build alternative systems that prioritize healing and potential and that we create hand-in-hand with those most impacted by social ills-is irresponsible, only making already existing harmful mechanisms look all the more desirable. We imagine a world where other locations for legal education besides law school are robustly supported. So that police officers are not giving children their first lesson in the law, we imagine a cumulative development of legal education in grades K-12, when youth are taught their rights and discuss questions of accountability and repair. We imagine a world where legal education is well resourced in prisons and jails for as long as the carceral state exists. We imagine a system of legal knowledge that empowers community legal advocates, litigants partnering with trained legal services providers, and pro se litigants. To achieve abolition, we must practice imagination. With imagination, the master's tools can be repurposed; they can be democratized to be reclaimed as the people's tools. 156 152. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, The Emerging Movement for Police and Prison Abolition, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2021), https://www.newyorker.con/news/our-columnists/theemerging-movement-for-police-and-prison-abolition [https://perma.cc/JRH4-K4UZ]. 153. See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1161 (2015) (defining prison abolition as "a transformative goal of gradual decarceration and positive regulatory substitution wherein penal regulation is recognized as morally unsustainable"). 154. See Taylor, supra note 152. 155. Id. ("Hope is a discipline. We must practice it daily." (quoting Mariame Kaba)). 156. See Lorde, supra note 4, at 1-2. Lorde's famous quote, "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house," is often misinterpreted to mean that the tools of institutions cannot be repurposed to achieve something other than what the master intended. Id. Using the master's tools in the way the master intended would mean that "only the most narrow parameters of change are possible and allowable." Id. But if the master used differences to "divide and conquer" and we instead used differences to "define and empower," we would find use for the tools. Id.

2023 DDI Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Puerto Rico

The experience of peoples in US territories highlights the essential role of the Constitution in struggles for rights. Specifically, Guam shows that instead of simply being weaponized to support imperial violence, legal claims can also be radically reclaimed to push for change. The 1AC rejects the premise that the judiciary has independent control over the Constitution’s meaning, instead embracing popular constitutionalism rooted in anti-colonial principles.

Dardani '23 [Ross; 05/15/2023; Ross Dardani, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, PA, United States.; " Popular Constitutionalism in the US Empire: The Legal History of US Citizenship in Guam," Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 00, Issue/No. 00, p. 2-4//JJB]

In this article, I argue that the campaign by members of Guam’s Congress to secure US citizenship for Guamanians is an example of popular constitutionalism in the context of US empire. The ambiguity over the status of citizenship in the territories acquired by the United States after the Spanish-American War created a space for constitutional contestation in which Guamanians made claims to US citizenship rooted in principles of loyalty, justice, fairness, “American” ideals, and equality. The struggle for US citizenship in Guam thus provides a powerful example of popular constitutionalism used by a colonized population to assert inclusion and practical rights within an imperial system of subordination and authoritarian control. Ross Dardani, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, PA, United States. Email: rossdardani@muhlenberg.edu The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback. The author would also like to express gratitude to Charles Venator-Santiago, Jane Gordon, Fred Lee, Cathy Schlund-Vials, and Jason Oliver Chang for their contributions to this article. Law & Social Inquiry Volume 00, Issue 00, 1–25, 2023 © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Bar Foundation. 1 Law& Social Inquiry https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2023.19 Published online by Cambridge University Press At the same time, US naval leaders and lawmakers transformed the liberatory constitutional claims Guamanians made for citizenship into a tool to legitimize US imperialism. Thus, this article demonstrates the multifarious, sometimes oppositional, uses of popular constitutionalism. While Guamanians were able to engage in popular constitutionalism to protest for formal inclusion within the US polity, US political and legal actors developed an understanding of the Constitution that allowed for the extension of citizenship to Guam while still preserving and protecting US imperialism in the Pacific. The first section of the article provides an overview of popular constitutionalism. The second section gives a brief history of Western colonialism and imperialism in Guam before the United States formally annexed the island after the SpanishAmerican War of 1898. Next, the article provides an overview of the early years of US rule over Guamanians by analyzing the Insular Cases, which were decided shortly after the United States formally claimed sovereignty over Guam and established the contours of US governance in territories annexed after 1898. The Insular Cases are important for understanding Guam’s status as an unincorporated territory under the plenary authority of Congress, its relationship the federal government, and why US citizenship, birthright or statutory, did not automatically apply to Guamanians. The fourth section of the article analyzes the early decades of authoritarian US rule over Guam, which led members of Guam’s Congress to protest in the 1920s and 1930s that US lawmakers should pass legislation to make Guamanians US citizens. Naval opposition prevented passage of this legislation, however. The last section of the article explains the conferral of US citizenship to Guam through the passage of the 1950 Organic Act. This event marked the culmination of decades of Guamanian efforts to advance their own reading of the Constitution, one in which they were equal citizens within the US polity. The legal history of the movement for US citizenship in Guam provides an example of the indeterminate, indefinite, and interactive process of how the meaning of the Constitution is shaped and created by both legal and extrajudicial actors in the context of US empire. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM At its core, popular constitutionalism is a simple yet powerful idea: that interpreting the Constitution and the process that generates its meaning has never been and should never be only for the judiciary (Schmidt 2018, 67). Scholars of popular constitutionalism are particularly interested in ways that actors outside the formal judicial realm, from ordinary citizens to members of Congress to the president, have engaged in their own ways of thinking about the Constitution and helped to produce its meaning (Kramer 2004; Post and Siegel 2004; Tushnet 2006; Siegel 2008; Schmidt 2011, 2018; Ackerman 2014; Beienburg and Frymer 2016). In his formative work on the origins of popular constitutionalism in US political culture, Larry Kramer (2004, 7) explains that for the founding generation, the “Constitution remained, fundamentally, an act of popular will: the people’s charter, made by the people ::: [I]t was ‘the people themselves’ ::: who were responsible for seeing that it was properly interpreted and implemented.” According to Kramer, the belief that the judiciary would function as the final or sole arbiter of the Constitution only emerged over time, especially after 2 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2023.19 Published online by Cambridge University Press Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and Cooper v. Aaron (1958). The basic theory of popular constitutionalism is that through an interactive, constitutive, dialogical process of constitutional contestation between ordinary people, organized groups, elected officials, and the judiciary, the meaning of the Constitution is produced (Tushnet 2006, 999–1001; Schmidt 2011, 528; Beienburg and Frymer 2016). In this article, I argue that the movement for US citizenship in Guam offers a powerful example of this interactive process “of the development of constitutional principles in the distinctive realm of extrajudicial contestation” (Schmidt 2018, 90). Members of Guam’s Congress influenced US naval leaders and lawmakers to interpret the Constitution in a way that extended citizenship to Guamanians. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that people and groups engaging in forms of popular constitutionalism have interpreted the Constitution in ideologically diverse ways. While theories of popular constitutionalism have mostly been connected to liberal scholars and progressive causes, especially as a critique against the conservatism of the Roberts Court, recent scholarship has explored how in contemporary American politics, right-wing, libertarian movements organized around principles of deregulation and small government may be better positioned to mobilize around popular constitutionalism, with a focus on interpretations of the Second Amendment and an individual right to bear arms (Siegel 2008) and the Tea Party Movement (Schmidt 2011). Others have argued that popular constitutionalism is healthy for US democracy (Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha 2019) and can be a source to generate novel and expansive progressive civil rights claims (Goluboff 2007; Lovell 2012). Sophia Lee (2014) has demonstrated that both liberals and conservatives mobilized around popular constitutionalism at various points throughout the twentieth century in the area of workers’ rights, making arguments about whether the Constitution applies in places of private employment and what this means for right-to-work laws, the right to organize, and the New Deal labor regime. Mary Ziegler (2015, 2023) has explained how leaders of the religious right and various groups in the antiabortion movement, and members of the reproductive freedom movement, have all generated their own influential understandings of what the Constitution means for abortion rights that are far removed from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade (1973). Scholars have also emphasized that popular constitutionalism does not exist in opposition or as a dichotomy to judicial power, as people engaging in forms of popular constitutionalism can create meanings of the Constitution that demand a more powerful and autonomous judiciary (Shugerman 2012; Beienburg and Frymer 2016). Thus, “[p]opular constitutionalism is temporally and contextually bound, reflected in different forms and forums at different times in US political history and always dependent on the interactions between ::: institutions” (Beienburg and Frymer 2016, 242). While there has been rich scholarship on popular constitutionalism, it has yet to be applied to extrajudicial actors mobilizing against US empire. Members of Guam’s Congress understood naval rule as despotic and a violation of foundational constitutional principles, and they mobilized around their own “aspirational” interpretation of the Constitution (“a claim ::: without a solid footing as a matter of court-defined constitutional law” [Schmidt 2018, 66]), one in which they were automatically US citizens once the United States claimed sovereignty over Guam, making this an example of popular constitutionalism in its “purest” form (Schmidt 2011, 530). The Supreme Popular Constitutionalism in the US Empire 3 https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2023.19 Published online by Cambridge University Press Court’s rulings in the Insular Cases left unclear whether citizenship automatically extended to people living in unincorporated territories after 1898 or if the extension of citizenship would require congressional action. This ambiguity enabled a space of constitutional contestation in which Guamanians were able to protest for US citizenship through a form of popular constitutionalism that demanded Guam’s equal inclusion within the US political system. This ultimately led to Congress extending citizenship to Guam, demonstrating how Guamanians were able to participate in the interactive, contested process of “giving meaning to the nation’s founding document” (Schmidt 2018, 67). While Guamanians based their moral and constitutional arguments on the theory that citizenship should have automatically extended once the United States formally annexed Guam (regardless of congressional action), Congress used the passage of an organic act in 1950 to make Guamanians citizens based on the precedents set in the Insular Cases. This is an example of how the meaning of the Constitution is contested and generated through an interactive process involving not only the courts, but also actors operating in extrajudicial settings. The legal history of US citizenship in Guam illuminates how popular constitutionalism can exist as a form of resistance to US empire, and thus “expands[s] the terrain of actors and complicate[s] the ways in which democratic decision making through the purview of the Constitution takes place” (Beienburg and Frymer 2016, 261).

2023 DDI Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Puerto Rico

A rights framework is key - Rights-oriented litigation, like the plan, is an indispensable political strategy. Legal challenges both allow for reform and provide a basis for more expansive, extra-legal approaches.

Pelet del Toro 18 - Judicial Law Clerk United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

Valeria M. Pelet del Toro, written while at Yale Law, Editor-in-Chief, Yale Law & Policy Review, "Beyond the critique of rights: The Puerto Rico legal project and civil rights litigation in America's colony," Yale LJ 128 (2018): 792, //ms

The history of Puerto Rico and the Project stand at odds with the critique of rights theory and its resistance to engaging with an inherently defective court system. Working in a context of legal, political, and social repression, Puerto Ricans were forced to ask not simply whether they should use courts, but instead, “[h]ow do we defend our movements that are under attack?”296 The question facing progressive and independentista advocates in the 1970s complicated whether they could continue to afford prioritizing anticolonial principles when their causes were effectively being shredded by repressive colonial apparatuses. Puerto Ricans thus took a chance on litigation to safeguard their causes from systemic subjugation.

2023 DDI Affirmative
1AC › 1AC – Puerto Rico

That reveals the lie in narratives of American universalism. Absent the aff, liberal redemption will continue to preclude the sweeping changes necessary for substantive freedom. Instead, we must reject the dominant, liberal understanding of "equality" in favor of a view from the standpoint of the dispossessed.

Rana '15 [Aziz; 6-2015; Aziz Rana is an American legal scholar and author who currently serves as Richard and Lois Cole Professor of Law at Cornell University specializing in American constitutional law; " Colonialism and Constitutional Memory," UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW, Vol. 5:263 p. 286-288//JJB]

Today, the Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention has more or less been lost to history. And to the extent that there is any collective memory of black radical efforts to generate a constitutional rupture in the country, these efforts are largely incorporated into a very specific account of black power and of the Panthers in particular. Under this reading, the rise of the Panthers to prominence in the late 1960s—especially given their militant posturing and 114. Id. at 290 (“Reparations should be made to oppressed people throughout the world, and we pledge ourselves to take the wealth of this country and make it available as reparations.”). 115. Id. at 295 (“These tribunals will be decentralized and arise out of the area where the incidents or alleged crimes themselves took place.”). 116. Id. at 290–94, 299–300. 117. Id. at 298–99. 118. For more on the story of the Convention and its aftermath, see Katsiaficas, supra note 109, at 141–55. 2015] COLONIALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEMORY 287 fixation on armed self-defense—embodies the moment when the civil rights and student movements lost contact with mainstream America and instead descended into violence and irrelevancy. Moreover, such views place black radicalism’s anticolonial agenda, and suspicion of the great symbols of American nationhood, at the center of this shift away from the “good” 1960s of desegregation campaigns to the “bad” 1960s of urban riots and left disintegration. As Richard Rorty declared fifteen years ago, rather than “shar[ing] in a national hope”119 of liberal self-fulfillment, black radicals, along with the student activists who followed them, courted marginality and veered between “self-disgust” and “self-mockery.”120 The consequence has been that, even within what remains of politically relevant leftwing groups, the prevailing sentiment is that all reform projects must begin by reaffirming accounts of American civic promise. In a sense, not only has the colonial frame been dismissed, but—to the extent that there is any public awareness of such a frame—disassociating oneself from it is seen, even by leftliberals, as a precondition for being taken seriously in politics. In these final pages, I wish to underscore the straightjacket these developments place on popular self-recognition, not to mention on meaningful reform. The actual history of the sustained shift from settler to civic imagination over the first half of the twentieth century highlights the extent to which civic arguments were constructed by settler elites themselves. Ideas of American exceptionalism and universalism were at root the product of debates about how an essentially completed settler project could transform itself into a global power, especially against the backdrop of a closed frontier at home and both bloody European rivalries and nonwhite political assertiveness abroad. Politicians and policymakers came to embrace an anti-slavery Civil War discourse and, in effect, employed this discourse to lay the ideological foundations for what would become the American Century. In the process, they reimagined the fundamental meaning of the national past while at the same time reaffirming its key markers—from Puritan settlement to revolutionary independence and from constitutional founding to continental expansion. This vision called on all communities within the country—regardless of their own histories of expropriation or enslavement— to participate in an ongoing narrative of American identity, one that read subordination as aberrational and viewed white settlers not as colonizers but as the rightful inheritors of the land. In a sense, the black radical assault on this account was an effort to confront the profound dissonances such civic arguments imposed on marginalized communities. For many African Americans, the experience of living within the United States was that of an internal exile,121 and accepting redemptive stories of 119. See RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 8 (1998). 120. Id. at 6. 121. In fact, Singh and other scholars highlight how many of the key figures in twentiethcentury black politics, including Du Bois, Robeson, C.L.R. James, Richard Wright, and Robert 288 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:263 liberal national purpose did not simply mean allowing dominant presumptions about the country’s basic character to go unchecked. It also meant being forced for all intents and purposes to celebrate such exile and to suppress one’s deep estrangement. Indeed, the majority’s self-conception as the first independent and anti-imperial colony—if anything culturally similar to newly independent societies in the Global South—brought home this dissonance. It told native peoples in the United States that, as a requirement of gaining minimal respect (not even actual sovereignty and political autonomy), one had first to agree to one’s own expropriation as the natural order of things. And similarly, it required blacks to deny that their sustained experience of enslavement and subordination embodied an essential, perhaps irredeemable, truth about the nation’s character. The discursive triumph today of civic nationalism—and with it redemptive stories of American fulfillment—does more than make us all complicit in the perpetuation of such dissonances. It also forces any reform project to proceed exclusively within a framework compelling to the majority self-understanding. As exemplified by the mainstream civil rights movement, historically excluded groups cannot claim equality—let alone meaningful power—except by taking the dominant society’s view of itself as the actual political truth. But what happens to those very real modes of hierarchy that fail to resonate with national selfperception? Even more specifically, what does it mean when a community adopts a postcolonial identity but denies the necessity for any systematic project of decolonization? In a sense, most Americans have accepted successful transformation—an increasingly liberal completion of the nation’s ostensible founding ideals—as the reality of the present, while at the same time rejecting the need for precisely the structural economic and political changes that might in fact produce equal and effective freedom. As for those that remain dispossessed, the lesson is simple: limit one’s own aspirations, objectives, and allies or gain little in return from society at large. The question for the future is whether Americans, both white and nonwhite, are capable or willing once again to imagine other alternatives.