Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Case › 1NC Frontline

That causes nuclear war

Tønnesson 15 - Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Case › 1NC Frontline

Rate hikes would be detrimental to the economy – stock market, bonds, and mortgage loans prove.

Curry 23, (Ben is the Retirement and Investing Editor for Forbes Advisor. With two decades of business and finance journalism experience, Ben has covered breaking market news, written on equity markets for Investopedia, and edited personal finance content for Bankrate and LendingTree) “What Happens When The Fed Raises Interest Rates?," Forbes Advisor, 6/21/23, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/fed-raises-interest-rates/ // EE

Higher market interest rates can have a negative impact on the stock market. When Fed rate hikes make borrowing money more expensive, the cost of doing business rises for public (and private) companies. Over time, higher costs and less business could mean lower revenues and earnings for public firms, potentially impacting their growth rate and their stock values.

“If the cost of borrowing money from a bank increases, the opportunity to expand investment in capital goods by a corporation stalls,” says Dan Chan, a Silicon Valley investor and a former pre-IPO employee of PayPal. “The interest rate may be so high that many companies will not be able to afford to grow.”

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Case › 1NC Frontline

Universal Basic Income inevitably drives demand higher than supply – creates a vicious cycle of rate hikes and inflation

CFI Team 20, (CFI is the leading global provider of training and productivity tools for finance and banking professionals. CFI delivers the skills, certifications, CPE credits, and resources to help anyone—from beginner to seasoned pro—drive their career in finance & banking.) “Universal Basic Income (UBI): An agreed-upon minimum income given to an individual to cover the the basic cost of living”, 6/16/20, // EE

A UBI system is still a theoretical approach, one that comes with good intentions and noble goals. Still, widespread financial equality and independence offer the potential to cause some serious economic issues.

One major issue with a universal basic income, raised by those who oppose such a practice, is inflation. It’s easy to see how the institution of a UBI may fuel inflation.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Case › 1NC Frontline

Growth is sustainable is sustainable and humanity’s only hope against catastrophic climate change.

Shi-Ling Hsu 21, D'Alemberte Professor of Law at the Florida State University College of Law, Sept 2021, Capitalism and the Environment, Cambridge University Press, p. 50-52

2.8 CHOOSING CAPITALISM TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT: LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENT Finally, a third reason that capitalism is suited to the job of environmental restoration and protection is its ability to undertake and complete projects at very large scales. In keeping with a major thesis of this book, construction at very large scales should give us a little pause, because of the propensity of capital to metastasize into a source of political resistance to change. But some global problems, especially climate change, may require very large-scale enterprises. For example, because greenhouse gas emissions may already have passed a threshold for catastrophic climate change, technology is almost certainly needed to chemically capture carbon dioxide from ambient air. But carbon dioxide is only about 0.15% of ambient air by molecular weight, and a tremendous amount of ambient air must be processed just to capture a small amount of carbon dioxide. This technology has often been referred to as "direct air capture," or "carbon removal." Given that inherent limitation, direct air capture technology must be deployed at vast scales in order to make any appreciable difference in greenhouse gas concentrations. There is certainly no guarantee that direct air capture will be a silver bullet. But if it is to be an effectual item on a menu of survival techniques, it will more assuredly be accomplished under the incentives of a capitalist economy. Capitalism might also help with the looming crisis of climate change by helping to ensure the supply of vital life staples such as food, water, and other basic needs in future shortages caused by climate-change. In a climate-changed future, there is the distinct possibility that supplies of vital life staples may run short, possibly for long periods of time. Droughts are projected to last longer, with water supplies and growing conditions increasingly precarious. Capitalist enterprise could, first of all, provide the impetus to finally reform a dizzying multitude of price distortions that plague water supply and agriculture worldwide. Second, capitalist enterprise can undertake scale production of some emergent technologies that might alleviate shortages. Desalination technology can convert salty seawater into drinkable freshwater.54 A number of environmental and economic issues need to be solved to deploy these technologies at large scales, but in a crisis, solutions will be more likely to present themselves. A technology that is already being adopted to produce food is the modernized version of old-fashioned greenhouses. The tiny country of the Netherlands, with its 17 million people crowded onto 13,000 square miles, is the second largest food exporter in the world,55 exporting fully three-quarters that of the United States in 2017.56 The secret to Dutch agriculture is its climate-controlled, low-energy green-houses that project solar panel-powered artificial sunlight around the clock. Dutch greenhouses produce lettuce at ten times the yield57 and tomatoes at fifteen times the yield outdoors in the United States58 while using less than one-thirteenth the amount of water,59 very little in the way of synthetic pesticides and, of course, very little fertilizer given its advanced composting techniques. Sustained shortages in a climate-changed future might require that a capitalist take hold of greenhouse growing and expand production to feed the masses that might otherwise revolt. 2.9 CHOOSE CAPITALISM Clearly, the job in front of humankind is enormous, complex, and many-faceted. The best hope is to be able to identify certain human impacts that are clearly harmful to the global environment, and to disincentivize them. Getting back to notions of institutions in capitalism, what is crucial is aligning the right incentives with profit-making activity. What capitalism does so well — beyond human comprehension — is coordinate activity and send broad signals about scarcity. Information about a wide variety of environmental phenomena is extremely difficult to collect and process. If a set of environmental taxes can help establish a network of environ-mental prices, then an unfathomably large and complex machinery will have been set in motion in the right direction. Also, because of the need for new scientific solutions to this daunting list of problems, new science and technology is desperately needed. Capitalism is tried and true in terms of producing innovation. Again drawing upon the study of institutions, it is not so much that individuals need a profit-motive in order to tinker, but the prospect of profit-making has to be present in order for institutions, including corporations, to devote resources, attention, and energy towards the development of solutions to environmental problems. Corporations can and should demonstrate social responsibility by attempting to mitigate their impacts on the global environment, but a much more conscious push for new knowledge, new techniques, and new solutions are needed. Finally, the scale of needed change is profound. Huge networks of infrastructure centered upon a fossil fuel-centered economy must somehow be replaced or adapted to new ways of generating, transmitting, consuming, and storing energy. A global system of feeding seven billion humans (and counting), unsustainable on its face, must be morphed into something else that can fill that huge role. About a billion and a half cars and trucks in the world must, over time, be swapped out for vehicles that must be dramatically different. This is a daunting to-do list, but look a bit more carefully among the gloomy news. Elon Musk, a freewheeling, pot-smoking entrepreneur shows signs of breaking into not one, but two industries dominated by behemoths with political power. Thanks to California emissions standards, automobile manufacturers have developed cars that emit a fraction of what they did less than a generation ago. Hybrid electric vehicles have thoroughly penetrated an American market that powerful American politicians had tried to cordon off for American manufacturers only. At least two companies have developed meat substitutes that are now widely judged to be indistinguishable from meat, and have established product outposts in the ancient power centers of fast food, McDonald's and Burger King. The tiny country of the Netherlands, about half the size of West Virginia, exports almost as much food as the United States, able to ship fresh produce all the way to Africa. At bottom, all of these accomplishments and thousands more are and were capitalist in nature. While they collectively repre-sent a trifle of what still needs to be accomplished, they were also undertaken without the correct incentives in place, and thus also represent the tremendous promise of capitalism.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Case › 1NC Frontline

No backsliding—statistical analyses prove a trend of increasing democratization.

Doorenspleet 19 [Renske Doorenspleet, Award Winning Scholar, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Warwick, Director, Centre for Studies in Democratization, PhD in Political Science from Leiden University, Postdoctoral Fellowship Completed at Harvard University, “Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective” The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, Chapter 2, Palgrave Macmillan, Springer International, 2019] EAY

The second half of Table 2.3 shows the percentage of countries, classified as ‘free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’.37 There is little or no evidence of a democratic recession. To the contrary, the world is far freer today than it was in 1975. Overall, countries are nowadays considerably freer than in 1990, while there has been no clear decline since the mid- 2000s, which is often seen as the beginning of the democratic recession (Levitsky and Way 2015). An analysis of the period between 1995 and 2005 shows that from the ‘partly free countries’ roughly a similar number became ‘free’ on the one hand and ‘not free’ on the other hand (see also Merkel 2010: 28–29). There is a small decline in free countries, as well as an increase in unfree countries after 2005. Still, the number of 41.7% countries which can be classified as ‘free’ in 2015 is very impressive compared to 25.3% free countries 40 years earlier. If we rely on the Polity IV data instead of the FH data, similar patterns can be detected. The upper half of Table 2.3 shows the percentages of different types of political systems over time (1975–2015). This information shows that the proportion of democracies has clearly increased since 1975, while the proportion of dictatorships has clearly decreased. The proportion of hybrid systems has remained quite stable at the global level (see also Fig. 2.1). If we focus on the overall proportion of democracies in the world, the data suggest a positive trend since 1975 (supporting the first view), with stagnation and stability since 2005 (supporting the third view). A global democratic recession or backsliding seems to be an exaggeration, and ‘can neither be supported by figures nor by arguments’ (Merkel 2010: 29); the second view can thus be rejected as a myth or illusion (see Levitsky and Way 2015). The average level of democracy went gradually up from −2.3 in 1975 to 2.6 in 1995 and 4.3 in 2015. Slowly but surely a clear trend towards more democracy can be seen after 1975. So why have so many scholars recently supported the second pessimistic approach? A first answer to this question can probably be found in the excessive optimism after the fall of the Berlin Wall, expecting countries to become democratic overnight, not just in Eastern Europe but also in other parts of the world. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union generated a widespread perception that liberal democracy was the ‘only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996). As Levitsky and Way (2015: 45–46) explained it well, those ‘early post–Cold War transitions generated unrealistic expectations that, when not realized, gave rise to exaggerated pessimism and gloom’. If dictatorships went through periods of crises or instability, then it was seen as signs of democratization processes, but there is no foundation—neither theoretically nor empirically—to assume such an outcome. It is true that the collapse of a dictatorship creates opportunities for democratization. Historically, most endings of dictatorships have not led to democratization though, let alone a stable democratic system (Svolik 2012). Breakdowns may result in different outcomes, ranging from the formation of a new dictatorship (e.g. Iran after 1979), or to state collapse and anarchy (e.g. Libya after 2011). Sometimes, it generates a transition to a minimal democracy (e.g. South Africa and Chile in the early 1990s), but we should not assume that this will necessarily, automatically happen. When the democratization boom in the 1990s is seen as an exceptional phenomenon, the recent developments around the world can be assessed in a more realistic way—not through rose-tinted glasses anymore, but with less expectations regarding successful transitions to democracy. Such a more realistic approach would make us less pessimistic about the recent political developments around the world. The excessive scholarly attention to democratic developments in the USA, particularly recently, might also explain the current pessimistic mood around democratic trends. This focus might be caused by the fact that most influential—and highly cited—democracy scholars are still American or based at American universities, or it might be caused by the fact that the USA is still seen as one of the most important democratic world powers. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the pessimistic approach emphasizes the increasing lack of democratic quality in established democracies. Larry Diamond, for example, wrote that ‘the most worrisome dimension of democratic recession has been the decline of democratic efficacy, energy, and self-confidence in the West, including the United States’ (Diamond 2015: 152). Lower popular trust in government, decreasing rates of voter turnout and the receding of democracy promotion as a priority of US foreign policy are all ‘additional signs’ of ‘democratic ill health’ according to this approach, while ‘the world takes note of all this’ giving dictators ammunition to ‘discredit democracy in general and immunize authoritarian rule against US pressure’ (Diamond 2015: 152). While this might be true to a certain extent, this pessimistic approach conflates the analyses of the proportion of democracies around the world on the one hand, with democratic quality on the other hand. There are certainly signs that the democratic quality of some established democracies is in decline; still, there is no clear reverse trend with numerous transitions away from democracy, and in this regard, the second pessimistic view cannot be supported. Despite increasingly unfavourable conditions in recent years—not just in democracies such as the USA, but also globally, the new democracies have remained strikingly robust (Levitsky and Way 2015).

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Case › 1NC Frontline

The aff can’t solve unproductivity.

James R. Rogers, 10-1-2019, Rogers teaches graduate courses in political institutions and public administration at Texas A&M, “Gift Economies Aren’t So Giving”, Theopolis, //VDR

The question itself assumes a lot. There is, for example, vigorous debate over just how scarce market exchange was in the ancient world relative to gift exchange. Some scholars argue that robust markets systems existed along side gift systems almost from the dawn of history. (See for example Hejeebu and McCloskey’s “,” and Henaff’s . In this essay I do not rehearse the historical argument. Rather I want to take up the substantive comparison, arguing that the social distance between economic distribution by reciprocal gift and distribution by market is less than we often recognize. The irony is that despite the modern re-discovery of the necessarily reciprocal nature of economic distribution in ancient gift economies, moderns still import, even if implicitly, the ideal of pure, unilateral gift into their understanding of gift economies. As a result, modern market production and exchange appears uniquely to treat people instrumentally relative to non-market economic production and exchange in pre-modern times. In setting up the claim, let me add immediately that I am not saying that there is little difference between economic distribution by gift exchange and economic distribution by market exchange. There are many significant differences. These differences reflect themselves in fundamentally different ways peoples and societies experience the distribution of physical goods and in the ways they interact with each other. I am arguing, however, that “instrumental rationality” was just as much a part of exchange in ancient gift economies as it is in market exchange, even as that instrumentalism is reflected and experienced differently in the different economies. Let me start by taking a step back. Radical and postliberal criticisms of “neoliberalism” feature both an economic dimension and a social dimension. The economic dimension of the criticism is well-known: wage stagnation and growing inequality, . The social criticism of neoliberalism, while flowing out of what critics style as market rationality, highlights its impact on human solidarity and dignity. The social criticism contrasts the of people induced by the market with the ostensibly more humane and personal relationships fostered by non-market economic distribution. Importantly, while initiated in and by market relationships, according to the criticism, market rationality is exported analogically into other domains of modern life, structuring and dehumanizing relationships in those domains as well. The standard by which to compare social relationships in market systems with those of non-market systems is usually not taken to be modern forms of bureaucratic socialism. Rather, comparison is more often made with pre-modern economic systems in which the distribution of goods and services ostensibly occurred largely on the basis of “gift.” This is the hallmark, for example, of the much-cited and repeated argument of Karl Polyani’s highly influential book, . It also is important in Karl Marx’s history of pre-market systems. And much of the burgeoning modern scholarship on “gift” draws the same comparison. Hence, the significance of the modern scholarship on ancient gift economies for modern policy debates on economics. Yet as modern scholarship on gift underscores, reciprocity stood as a fundamental aspect of gifting in the pre-modern world. This central facet of ancient gift economies is hugely consequential for understanding and comparing human relationships in gift economies with those in market economies. To the extent that gifts in gift economies are intrinsically reciprocal then they are also necessarily instrumentally rational. While the objects and ends over which instrumental rationality plays may change dramatically in the transition from gift to market, if reciprocity was inherent in pre-modern gift economies, then instrumental rationality in itself did not result of the rise market economies. Barclay notes in his extended survey of modern scholarship on gift: the universal significance of gift-reciprocity, despite large variations in the types and contexts of gifts between human partners . . . the importance of the ties established by gifts, and the expectations of return, explain why it is important for donors to be selective in their distribution of gifts, using some criterion of “worth” to give discriminately and well. The modern focus or understanding of “gift” as unreciprocated invites anachronism when moderns apply this exceptional, distinctly modern conception of gift to the premodern world. “[T]he anthropology of the gift has raised the possibility that the notion of the ‘pure’ gift, a gift without return, is a historically and culturally specific Western invention.” Barclay adds, “Once we understand the ‘pure’ gift as a cultural product, we can resist the modern tendency to take it as a natural or necessary configuration of the paradigmatic gift.” Indeed, creating reciprocal obligations was the essential purpose of the gift in the premodern world. “[Gifts] could fulfill their function as gifts only if they were not unilateral” (emphasis in original). [I]n antiquity it was taken for granted that gifts are accompanied by obligations and should elicit some form of return; even philosophers who disavowed a material return (Aristotle) or scorned utilitas (Seneca) considered gifts/benefactions to be necessarily embedded in reciprocal relations. This does not mean nothing distinguishes gift economies from market economies. But it does mean that instrumental rationality is not an invention of the market. Non-pecuniary objectives in ancient gift economies such as “honor” or “status” are not objectives inconsistent with instrumental rationality. The objectives pursued may have been different in gift economies than objectives pursued by many moderns in market economies, but instrumental rationality structured the decisions just as surely. Part of the problem arises because many scholars who study gift in the ancient world have caricatured understandings of modern economics and modern economic analysis. They often seem to think economic analysis is limited to the consideration of cash and market exchanges. Yet this has not been true for at least seventy years. Economists, and rational choice scholars more generally, include numerous non-monetary, non-corporeal items in their “utility functions,” including many of the things or ends that people sought in ancient gift economies. Nor is behavior limited to market exchange. The asynchronicity of exchange, the absence of guaranteed return, the creation of social and political ties, and more, are all easily subsumed within instrumental forms of rationality. Nobel prize winning economist Elenor Ostorm published scores of studies in which different social forms in different cultures nonetheless reflected instrumental rationality. (She summarizes many of these studies in her classic book, .) While Barclay recognizes that “’gifts’ and ‘commodities’ are not mutually exclusive: the two modes of interaction can overlap or interpenetrate . . . and the same items can move from one form of transaction to another,” he nonetheless occasionally draws the distinction between gift exchange and market exchange too sharply. For example, he writes While the boundary between gifts and market sales was not watertight, a distinction between the two models of transaction was normally clear: remuneration for sales was immediate, certain, and calculable, while gifts fostered enduring relations in which the return was uncertain and often not commensurable with the gift. To be sure, “remuneration for sales” at modern grocery stores and gas stations may be “immediate, certain, and calculable,” but this is hardly a ubiquitous feature of market exchange. Consider the significance of contracts over employment, or purchasing a house, or buying stocks and bonds, and much, much more. These market exchanges, while significant both at the individual level as well as the aggregate level, are nonetheless not exchanges that are “immediate, certain, and calculable.” Further, at least in modern society, the domain of non-market transactions cannot be identified as a domain of “enduring [personal] relations.” To be sure, gifts continue to play a significant role in relationships within families, and between friends and tightknit social groups. Yet in other domains, non-market distribution of goods and services is often the epitome of impersonalism in modern life. Think of the bureaucratic impersonalism of the welfare office, let alone in the licensing bureaus of state Departments of Public Safety. The sheer scale of need, along with social commitments to treating all “clients” alike, almost certainly requires these bureaucracies and their impersonalism. Perhaps gift economies of the premodern world could take care of people in need as analysts such as Polanyi claim it did, but modern bureaucratic distribution does not, and cannot, create the “enduring relations” reflected in ancient gift economies. Even the “personalism” of the ancient gift economy’s exchange system does not guarantee more humane, and human, outcomes. There are fewer relationships more dehumanizing than the ancient relationships between masters and slaves or lords and serfs. Yet all of this is included within the domain of the gift exchange, at least at the local level of manor or plantation. The anachronism of reading the modern notion of gift, with its emphasis on unilateral donation, often causes even modern scholars to understate, even sanitize, the instrumentalism of the gift economy. Barclay could hardly put it more strikingly: Gift-giving is thus by no means always an innocent or even a friendly enterprise [in the pre-modern world], but is easily manipulated by those in a position of power: as, “everywhere in the world the indigenous category for exploitation is ‘reciprocity.’” Consistent with this, we may grant the language of “gift” as between equals or near-equals. Yet this presses the language of “gift,” even with reciprocity inhering in the word in the ancient world, to make a dualism of “gift” and “market,” and in so doing to include all forms of hierarchical production and distribution as species of gift economies. Significant segments of these “gift economies” were simply non-market “command economies.” Ignoring this, critics of neoliberalism on both the left and the right have a tendency to romanticize pre-modern, non-market economies. As if humans treating other humans as means rather than as ends in themselves began in the Nineteenth Century. But while perhaps lamentable, instrumental rationality has been a ubiquitous facet of human interaction over the millennia. If in fact markets cause problems in social relations in the modern world, we need to make sure whatever the solution is does not merely reproduce the same problems in a different guise.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Unproductive Expenditure CP › 1NC

Inherent reciprocity nullifies solvency of the gift and increases tensions between the state and the people.

Alan D. Schrift 14 [2014. Alan D. Schrift: M.A., Ph.D., Purdue University B.A., Brown University. "Should Philosophers Still Read Mauss? Thoughts on Contemporary American Politics". https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5325/jspecphil.28.3.0389.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6df8591d4117f5a9d87b13092db6912c&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1. 7-23-2023, Dhilan-GDS]

It appears, however, that this engagement with Mauss among anglophone philosophers is now a thing of the past, and I think that some of the responsibility for this also falls upon Derrida, or at least upon what I would call an insufficient reading of Given Time. That is to say, many readers of Given Time see Derrida’s laying out the fundamental aporia of the gift as an exemplary deconstruction. In what became a paradigmatic deconstructive gesture in his later works on hospitality, forgiveness, and ethics more generally, Derrida’s analysis of the gift reveals that the gift’s conditions of possibility are precisely the conditions of its impossibility. In other words, once the gift is recognized as a gift, it is no longer a gift; insofar as it is recognized as a gift, it obliges its recipient to reciprocate, and in the act of reciprocation, Derrida argues, the gift has been annulled.4 But as I said, a reading of Given Time that stops here is insufficient, for Derrida notes that Mauss’s Essay also “deals with economy, exchange, contract (do et des), it speaks of raising the stakes, sacrifice, gift and counter-gift—in short, of everything that in the thing itself impels the gift and the annulment of the gift,” and as such, Derrida playfully suggests that “Mauss’s Essay on the Gift s,peaks of everything but the gift.”5

We need here follow Derrida no further, although his suggestion that the gift is coextensive with a radical forgetting by both the donor—who will resent the gift until it has been returned—and the donee—who will feel it as a duty to repay until such restitution is discharged—might have ethical and economic implications that should give some of his followers reason to pause before they abandon Mauss to his possible/impossible aporia.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Unproductive Expenditure CP › 1NC

Explicitly acknowledging basic income as a gift turns the case.

Reynolds ‘23 – Jack Reynolds, Professor of Philosophy at Deakin University. “Jacques Derrida (1930—2004)”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy; https://iep.utm.edu/jacques-derrida/ Accessed 07/24/2023 | RN

The aporia that surrounds the gift revolves around the paradoxical thought that a genuine gift cannot actually be understood to be a gift. In his text, Given Time, Derrida suggests that the notion of the gift contains an implicit demand that the genuine gift must reside outside of the oppositional demands of giving and taking, and beyond any mere self-interest or calculative reasoning (GT 30). According to him, however, a gift is also something that cannot appear as such (GD 29), as it is destroyed by anything that proposes equivalence or recompense, as well as by anything that even proposes to know of, or acknowledge it. This may sound counter-intuitive, but even a simple ‘thank-you’ for instance, which both acknowledges the presence of a gift and also proposes some form of equivalence with that gift, can be seen to annul the gift (cf. MDM 149). By politely responding with a ‘thank-you’, there is often, and perhaps even always, a presumption that because of this acknowledgement one is no longer indebted to the other who has given, and that nothing more can be expected of an individual who has so responded. Significantly, the gift is hence drawn into the cycle of giving and taking, where a good deed must be accompanied by a suitably just response. As the gift is associated with a command to respond, it becomes an imposition for the receiver, and it even becomes an opportunity to take for the ‘giver’, who might give just to receive the acknowledgement from the other that they have in fact given. There are undoubtedly many other examples of how the ‘gift’ can be deployed, and not necessarily deliberately, to gain advantage. Of course, it might be objected that even if it is psychologically difficult to give without also receiving (and in a manner that is tantamount to taking) this does not in-itself constitute a refutation of the logic of genuine giving. According to Derrida, however, his discussion does not amount merely to an empirical or psychological claim about the difficulty of transcending an immature and egocentric conception of giving. On the contrary, he wants to problematise the very possibility of a giving that can be unequivocally disassociated from receiving and taking.

The important point is that, for Derrida, a genuine gift requires an anonymity of the giver, such that there is no accrued benefit in giving. The giver cannot even recognise that they are giving, for that would be to reabsorb their gift to the other person as some kind of testimony to the worth of the self – ie. the kind of self-congratulatory logic that rhetorically poses the question “how wonderful I am to give this person that which they have always desired, and without even letting them know that I am responsible?”. This is an extreme example, but Derrida claims that such a predicament afflicts all giving in more or less obvious ways. For him, the logic of a genuine gift actually requires that self and other be radically disparate, and have no obligations or claims upon each other of any kind. He argues that a genuine gift must involve neither an apprehension of a good deed done, nor the recognition by the other party that they have received, and this seems to render the actuality of any gift an impossibility. Significantly, however, according to Derrida, the existential force of this demand for an absolute altruism can never be assuaged, and yet equally clearly it can also never be fulfilled, and this ensures that the condition of the possibility of the gift is inextricably associated with its impossibility. For Derrida, there is no solution to this type of problem, and no hint of a dialectic that might unify the apparent incommensurability in which possibility implies impossibility and vice versa. At the same time, however, he does not intend simply to vacillate in hyperbolic and self-referential paradoxes. There is a sense in which deconstruction actually seeks genuine giving, hospitality, forgiving and mourning, even where it acknowledges that these concepts are forever elusive and can never actually be fulfilled.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › States CP › 1NC

Solves the Aff but avoids violating the Constitution, because it makes the States limited monetary sovereign for purposes of the counterplan without breaking from the federal dollar.

Forstater 18 (Professor in Economics & Research Director of the Binzagr Instituite for Sustainable Prosperity, UMKC Matthew Forstater, “Complementary Currencies in the Solidarity Economy: The Local Job Guarantee,” Full Employment and Social Justice, edited by Michael J. Murray and Matthew Forstater, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 159-167 DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66376-0_7) hx

According to neo-chartalism, a non-convertible floating currency is a monopoly of the issuer. The issuer has not only the power to impose debt obligations, but to designate what is acceptable to settle those obligations, what it will accept at its pay offices. In this way, the issuer can create a demand for otherwise worthless bits of paper, leading to general accept- ability. The monopoly issuer can use its own monopoly money to purchase goods and services, including labor-power. These and related powers con- stitute a menu of instruments that may be used to conduct policy based on the principles of functional finance (Forstater 1999). Under such a system, the issuer's budget may be freely used to promote job creation and other socio-economic goals. Such a system crucially depends on a one-to-one correspondence between money and the issuer, and only with such a strict correspondence does the issuer's debt become truly riskless, enabling the issuer to buy anything for sale and settle any obligation-denominated in the unit of account (Goodhart 1998). When communities forfeit their monetary sov- ereignty and the strict correspondence is severed, as in the current structure of the European EMU, they do face financial constraints, and currency risk is replaced by default risk. In 2012, I visited Italy to speak about the European crisis. The options for real change considered by the panelists included: (1) exit from the EMU by Italy or other individual member nations; (2) radical reform of the structure of the monetary union (or the use of "emergency" measures hidden in the fine print), for example, seriously increasing the deficit-GDP and debt-GDP ratios, zero-interest or low interest (or negative nominal interest!) loans to individual nations; (3) an end to the monetary union and a return to national currencies; and (4) the creation of a fiscal author- ity at the Euro level to work in concert with the ECB, that is, a "United States of Europe" (Kregel 1999). During the discussion period, a young audience member asked, "So, short of waiting for the politicians in our countries or the bureaucrats in the EU to implement changes they lack the will and/or the power to undertake, is there nothing we can do to help the unemployed and their families in our cities and localities?" While a second-best solution, because they will still be operating within the constraints of the monetary union, we proposed communities con- sider issuing a form of complementary currency (CC) quite consistent with neo-chartalist principles, and that a local job guarantee (JG) program be implemented to employ the unemployed in community service jobs. In fact, the general idea of alternative currencies is not one that is new in Europe. In addition, the proposal is one that could be applied in other contexts where a full-blown national JG is not possible, either due to the constraints of some type of fixed exchange rate (whether a peg to another country's currency or a monetary union) or because of political obstacles. In the USA, for example, proposals for a job guarantee have been put forward as national policies due to the flexibility the federal government has in paying for the program. This flexibility stems from the ability of the Treasury and the Central Bank to work in cooperation to implement fiscal and monetary policies. There are many obstacles, however, to government policies at the federal level, including political, administrative, legislative, and ideological. An alternative route to job creation at the local level would be to use a complementary currency to pay for community service employment. In this way, cities, counties, or states that are currency users in terms of dollars can become currency issuers in terms of the comple- mentary currency. In addition, this form of local financing dovetails nicely with the focus of most job guarantee proposals on local administration and management of JG activities by local governments, non-profits, and NGOs. There are numerous other potential benefits of the local solution for individuals, families, neighborhoods, communities, and regions (Forstater 2013). It is possible that the benefits of a well-managed local currency may mean its implementation is desirable even in communities within a nation operating a neo-chartalist monetary system and managing its budgets according to the principles of functional finance (including a job guarantee), and during prosperous times and not only in the event of a crisis.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Cosmo K › 1NC – Links

Monetary sovereignty assumes atomized, competitive nation-states

Kotilainen 21 — Konsta Kotilainen, a SYLFF fellow at the University of Helsinki in politics, economics, and philosophy, doctoral researcher, holds a M.A. and B.A in world politics with specializations in Global Political Economy and Global Governance and a further degree in Theoretical Philosophy from the University of Helsinki, 2021 (“A Cosmopolitan Reading of Modern Monetary Theory,” Taylor and Francis Online, March 19th, available online at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600826.2021.1898343, accessed 07-14-2023) //CD

My third MMT-inspired argument against leaving the exercise of monetary sovereignty solely to the nation-states relates to the wider political economy in which these states operate. As the neochartalists often stress, numerous institutional, judicial, and ideological factors, as distinct from “purely economic” ones, undermine the ability of monetarily sovereign states to take the full advantage of their currency privileges (Armstrong ; Sardoni and Wray ). Many such barriers are supranational by nature. Contemporary nation-states are rarely politically strong enough to coordinate sufficiently effective economic, social, and regulatory policies despite their in principle considerable capacities as monetary sovereigns. Few individual states acting alone are fit to fight the global institutional and ideological forces that constrain their exercise of monetary sovereignty. While even the smallest and poorest of nation-states are not always incapable of benefitting from their sovereign privileges to some limited extent, it is especially hard for them to bact alone against the prevailing global near-consensus on appropriate macroeconomic policy defined by the powerful states, governance organisations, and influential private actors on the scene. As Gill and Law (, 491) argue, transnational capital greatly benefits from the political division of the world into separate, competing, and mostly relatively weak, nation-states. In playing states against each other, economic elites routinely employ the age-old divide et impera strategy. As a result, long-term trends in global political economy are not easily reversed by any single state even within its own territorial borders. For instance, “new constitutional” neoliberalism (Gill , 116–142; Hirschl ), manifested in the evermore-stringent legal constraints on national policies from the 1990s onwards, probably cannot be effectively combatted without cross-border action for new, truly transformative forms of global constitutionalism (Kochi ).

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Cosmo K › 1NC – Links

Implementation of a UBI relies on exploitative labor to improve the Global North

Sticker '23 [Martin; 03/15/23; Department of Philosophy, Cotham House, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK, " A merely national ‘universal’ basic income and global justice," Political Philosophy, Vol. 31, Issue/No. 2, p. 159-163//JJB]

The problem I raise in this section is a more pressing version of the already well-known exploitation or free-rider objection to UBI. My problem is concerned with the exploitation specifically of non-nationals or non-residents, who contribute to but do not benefit from a merely national UBI. The literature pays surprisingly little attention to injustices between different nations that a merely national UBI might amplify. In fact, discussions of exploitation and unfairness within the UBI literature take place almost exclusively on an intranational level.13 The original exploitation objection is inspired by Rawls's claim that Malibu surfers are not entitled to public funds.14 The (in)famous surfer is someone who could contribute to society either via paid work or in other socially beneficial ways, but, instead, spends all his time surfing. While the surfer potentially poses a problem for all government schemes founded on cooperation between citizens, the objection is particularly pressing for a UBI, as here benefits are explicitly not conditional upon willingness to cooperate, for example by seeking paid employment. UBI advocates see this unconditionality as a feature, not a bug.15 Nonetheless, in the case of the surfer, a UBI seems to clash with ‘a widely accepted notion of justice: it is unfair for able bodied people to live off the labour of others’.16 This objection is sometimes phrased in terms of unfairness, sometimes in terms of exploitation or parasitism, since the surfer lives off the labour of others who (supposedly) do not receive adequate compensation for the services they perform. I take it that the underlying intuition is that it is unjust if one person's lifestyle is subsidized by the labour of other persons and there is no reciprocity in this subsidy, even though the first person could reciprocate. There is a straightforward response to the surfer problem. Take Lazy (the surfer) and Crazy, who works hard and whose income and other taxes help fund a UBI that allows Lazy to spend all of his time surfing. Crazy cannot reasonably complain about this, since, if he finds the lifestyle of Lazy more appealing than his own, he could give up his job and become a surfer himself. After all, an effective UBI affords him the real freedom to live this way. If Crazy does not give up his job, then this is because he chooses the life of work and higher income—in which case both Lazy and Crazy live the life they chose, and the UBI is working out well for both. Thus, Lazy is not exploiting Crazy, since Crazy can withdraw his labour and is afforded the same economic security and freedom to live the life of his choosing as Lazy.

I find this response to the original surfer problem persuasive.17 Things would be different, however, if someone in Crazy's position could not choose to give up their job and become a (financially adequately supported) surfer, because they (I'll call them ‘Exploited’) are neither citizen nor resident18 of a country that pays a UBI. Given the globalized world that we live in, Exploited might well perform work that benefits Lazy as well as Crazy. Such work can be a subsidy of their lifestyles if Exploited's labour is cheaper than the labour of those in the same strong bargaining position as Lazy and Crazy to demand higher pay or better working conditions. After all, Lazy and Crazy have the freedom and security to opt out of work altogether. If it is unjust that someone's lifestyle is subsidized by the labour of another person and there is no adequate reciprocity in this subsidy, then a merely national UBI suffers from a justice problem with regard to the subsidies Lazy and Crazy receive from Exploited and the lack of reciprocity. In the debate about the fairness of a UBI there is much concern about noncontributors, such as the Malibu surfer, receiving benefits. There is much less concern about people who do contribute, but do not receive benefits because they are of a different nationality or live in a different country.19 The latter, it seems to me, constitutes the most pressing justice problem. Let me spell this out in more detail. A merely national UBI excludes certain people as recipients, even if they contribute to the effectiveness of the UBI in that country. They can make such a contribution by subsidizing UBI recipients with their cheap labour, which increases the relative value of the UBI for recipients, as it makes products and services more affordable than they would be if everyone received a UBI. This impacts what and how much those living off a UBI can afford, the opportunities open to them, and how attractive it is for them to exit jobs (or to reduce hours), and thus whether the UBI realizes the goods that it promises, and to what extent it does so. These subsidies for UBI recipients would be, in one sense, not dissimilar from currently existing conditions. After all, the citizens of developed countries already benefit from global inequalities, poor working conditions, and low pay in developing countries where people are forced to work to meet their basic needs. However, there currently exists a work requirement even in wealthy countries, whereas there would be no such requirement for those enjoying an effective UBI. It is reasonable to assume that if non-recipient contributors were not forced to work for their subsistence, because they also enjoyed a UBI that frees them of the need to work for their subsistence, then some services and goods that are currently offered or produced cheaply would become more expensive. The subsidies would likely (at least in part) disappear, and the UBI thus become less effective for recipients.

2023 DDI Negative
NEG---KM vs KM Bataille › Work CP › 1NC

Work is good.

Deranty 21 [Jean-Philippe Deranty works at Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Post-work society as an oxymoron: Why we cannot, and should not, wish work away, April 27, 2021, European Journal of Social Theory, 25(3), 422–439. ] EAY

--the constraints of work allow it to be an activity of personal growth

--creates social approval

2023 DDI Disadvantage
Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 › Impacts › Welfare Impact---General---1NC

Cuts in the welfare state leave millions vulnerable to a laundry list of impacts

RICHARD KOGAN et al. 19 (Richard Kogan rejoined the Center in May 2011 as a senior fellow after having served as a Senior Adviser at the Office of Management and Budget since January 2009; “Cuts to Low-Income Assistance Programs in President Trump’s 2020 Budget Are Wide-Ranging”; Center on Budget and Policy priorities; https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/cuts-to-low-income-assistance-programs-in-president-trumps-2020-budget-are//TMS-Isir)

Budget Plan Would Leave Millions More Without Health Coverage While the President is promising to enact health care legislation that would lower costs while protecting people with pre-existing conditions, his budget reaffirms his support for an ACA repeal plan that would cause millions of people to lose coverage, increase health care costs for millions more, end nationwide protections for people with pre-existing conditions, and cut Medicaid deeply.[2] The budget also includes proposals designed to make it harder for low- and moderate-income people to enroll in or maintain Medicaid coverage — including taking Medicaid coverage away from people nationwide who don’t meet a work requirement — and proposals to shrink premium tax credits and make it more difficult for people to maintain coverage in the ACA marketplaces. In total, the budget would cut Medicaid and ACA financial assistance by $777 billion over ten years, with the cuts mounting over time. The budget calls on Congress to enact legislation “modeled closely after” the ACA “repeal and replace” bill from Senators Bill Cassidy and Lindsey Graham, and on top of that, to then cut coverage programs by hundreds of billions of dollars over ten years below the levels specified in that legislation.

[chart omitted]

2023 DDI Disadvantage
Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 › Impacts › ---XT---Poverty I/L

Cuts to social security make a sharp increase in poverty inevitable- millions of Americans rely on social security as their primary source of income

KATHLEEN ROMIG 23 (Kathleen Romig is Director of Social Security and Disability Policy at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. She works on Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, paid leave, and other budget issues; “Social Security Lifts More People Above the Poverty Line Than Any Other Program”; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-lifts-more-people-above-the-poverty-line-than-any-other//TMS-Isir)

Most people aged 65 and older receive the majority of their income from Social Security.[1] Without Social Security benefits, 37.7 percent of older adults would have incomes below the official poverty line, all else being equal; with Social Security benefits, only 10.3 percent do. (See Figure 1.) The benefits lift 15.4 million older adults above the poverty line, these estimates show. Comprehensive studies that match Census survey data to administrative records suggest that the official estimates overstate older adults’ reliance on Social Security but confirm that Social Security lifts millions of older adults above the poverty line and dramatically reduces the poverty rate among people aged 65 and older. (See Appendix for more information.) Social Security Lifts 1 Million Children Above the Poverty Line Social Security is important for children and their families as well as for older adults. About 6.2 million children under age 18 (9 percent of all children in the U.S.) lived in families that received income from Social Security in 2021, according to Census data. This figure includes children who received their own benefits as dependents of retired, disabled, or deceased workers, as well as those who lived with parents or relatives who received Social Security. In all, Social Security lifts 1 million children above the poverty line.[2] Social Security records show that 2.7 million children under age 18 qualified for Social Security payments in December 2021. (See Appendix Table 2.) Of these, 1.2 million were the survivor of a deceased worker. Another 1.1 million received payments because their parent had a severe disability. And 327,000 children under 18 received payments because their parent was retired.[3] Social Security Protects Groups That Are Particularly Vulnerable to Poverty Social Security is especially important for women and people of color. Women tend to earn less than men, take more time out of the paid workforce, live longer, accumulate less savings, and receive smaller pensions. Social Security brings 8.8 million older women above the poverty line, as Table 2 shows. Black and Latino workers benefit substantially from Social Security because they have higher disability rates and lower lifetime earnings than white workers, on average. In addition, Black workers have higher rates of premature death than white workers, and so their spouses and children are more likely to be eligible for Social Security survivor benefits. Latino workers have longer average life expectancies than white workers, which means they have more years to collect retirement benefits. Without Social Security, the poverty rate among older Latino adults would be 44.5 percent, and the poverty rate among older Black adults would be 50.2 percent.[4]

[chart omitted]

2023 DDI Disadvantage
Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 › Impacts › Social Security Impact---Poverty---1NC

Strong Social Security program is key to poverty reduction

LAURA HALTZEL 23 (Laura Haltzel is a senior fellow with The Century Foundation, where she focuses on ensuring retirement income security for all Americans; “Social Security Is Essential. So Why Do Some Want to Cut It?”; TCF; https://tcf.org/content/report/social-security-is-essential-so-why-do-some-want-to-cut-it///TMS-Isir)

Why Is Social Security So Essential? Social Security is a nearly universal program that protects covered workers from the “vicissitudes of life”14 and the damage these events—disability or death of a worker, or the worker’s retirement—can have on a household’s income. The social insurance structure—by which all covered workers contribute to the program to pool their risks against these income losses, and earn a level of financial protection from them—was a foundational program element and remains so today. As an insurance program, the triggering event for benefit payments is the retirement, disability, or death of the worker. Unlike the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI), which flowed from the original federal grants to the states that were established at the same time the Social Security program was enacted, payment of benefits is not means-tested and benefit payments are not connected to the poverty threshold. Nonetheless, partly due to meager SSI benefit levels and low income and asset tests to receive SSI benefits, Social Security has become the predominant source of income for low-income households and a critical anti-poverty program. The program’s social insurance role moves far beyond the area of retirement, and provides critical disability insurance and life insurance to covered workers and their survivors. Almost all older Americans benefit from Social Security. Nearly nine out of ten people age 65 and older were receiving a Social Security benefit in June 2022.15 According to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis, more than half of Americans age 65 and older had no pension income in their household in 2017.16 It is therefore not surprising that Social Security is the largest single source of income for most older adults. As seen in Figure 2, Social Security is the largest portion of income for 60 percent of households age 65 and older. However, Social Security is particularly critical for individuals in the bottom-fifth of the income distribution, for whom Social Security provides about 83 percent of their income, and for whom pensions comprise only 4 percent of annual income. Figure 2 also shows that higher-income households have earnings that comprise as much as 33 percent of their household income, meaning these households still have active workers contributing to their financial security in old age.17

[table omitted]

2023 DDI Disadvantage
Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 › Impacts › Social Security Impact---Economy---1NC

A new, prolonged recession risks global nuclear conflict.

Sundaram and Popov 19 – former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007; former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin

Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Vladimir Popov, "Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War," Inter Press Service, 2-12-2019, http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/

KUALA LUMPUR and BERLIN, Feb 12 2019 (IPS) - Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict.

2023 DDI Disadvantage
Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 › Impacts › Social Security Impact---Economy---1NC

Social Security is a key economic stabilizer---cuts make instability inevitable

Laura D. Quinby et al 21 (Laura D. Quinby is a senior research economist at the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. She conducts research on state and locally administered retirement programs – including pensions, disability and retiree health insurance, Medicaid, and state initiatives to expand private-sector coverage – as well as Social Security.; “DOES SOCIAL SECURITY SERVE AS AN ECONOMIC STABILIZER?”; Center for Retirement Research at Boston College; https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/wp_2021-9_.pdf//TMS-Isir)

Results This section first tests for our measure of stabilization across both outcomes, employment and earnings, and discusses those results. Next, it estimates the equations for the two measures by industry groups. It then tests for a difference in stabilization between the Great Recession and the surrounding expansions. Finally, it decomposes the impact of Social Security income into benefit generosity and number of beneficiaries. The Stabilizing Effects of Social Security Income Table 2 reports the OLS results of regression (1), estimating the relationship between statewide unemployment and county-level macroeconomic variables, and how it varies with Social Security benefits as a share of county income. Columns 1 and 3 look at county employment while columns 2 and 4 use county earned income. Columns 3 and 4 include the Social Security income share interacted with a linear time trend as well. A one-percentage point increase in the share of a county’s income from Social Security decreases the impact of a one percentage point increase in the rest of the state’s unemployment rate by 0.18 percent on county employment and 0.3 percent on county earned income (based on Columns 1 and 2, respectively). In both cases, a higher share of Social Security income is associated with more stability.16 Social Security income may be important in offsetting the instability of poor counties. In each specification in Table 2, higher county income is associated with higher county stability, whether on employment or earnings. Across all specifications, a one-percentage-point increase in real income decreases the impact of a one-percentage-point state unemployment shock by around 0.01 percentage points. These results suggest that the presence of retirees helps low income counties maintain stable economies, in addition to providing them income. 17 Estimates of the stabilization from Social Security are lower when including a time trend for the income share. From Maestas, Mullen, and Powell (2016), we hypothesized that old counties, defined here as those with higher shares of Social Security income, would grow more slowly. At the same time, given the years in our sample, unemployment rates broadly decrease from the peak of the Great Recession in 2010 to the end of the sample. The main specification may pick up this relationship in the stabilization estimates (columns 1 and 2). When the time trend is introduced, the impact on earnings remains significant, but the impact on employment loses significance. The Stabilization Effects of Social Security Income by Industry Table 3 presents the results of OLS regression (2) for employment and Table 4 presents the results of regression (2) for earnings, each broken down by industry groups. The financial services category includes real estate, banking and, insurance. The other services category contains local services such as salons, car repair, and dry cleaning. Manufacturing is excluded because demand for manufactured goods is not necessarily local. Industries that sell locally all appear similarly stabilized by the presence of Social Security income. Such industries include construction (1), retail and entertainment (2), healthcare (3), education (4), financial services (5), and other services (6). The results show that a one-percentage-point increase in the income share of Social Security reduces the impact on employment and earnings of a one-percentage-point increase in state unemployment by approximately 0.3 percentage points across industries. The stabilization persists even across industries which are inherently more or less stable. For example, education is very stable in response to unemployment shocks while construction is the most unstable sector. However, both are similarly stabilized by Social Security income. Overall, these results are consistent with a story where the stability of Social Security income leads to more stable demand from retirees. Stabilization Effects in Booms versus Busts This section reports the difference in stabilization across recessions and expansions, which determines the character of the marginal workers. In recessions, the marginal employment decision is whether or not to fire a worker. In expansions, the marginal employment decision is whether or not to hire an additional worker. Table 5 shows the results of OLS regression (3) which interacts the stabilization variables with a dummy for the Great Recession (years 2007-2010). The stabilizing effect of Social Security looks quite similar during the recession and the expansion. However, bisecting the sample into two periods leads to a loss of statistical significance. 18 On the other hand, when removing manufacturing from the employment and earnings variables in columns 3 and 4 respectively, the stabilization results return to statistical significance. 19 Again, the impact during recession and expansion is virtually identical. Decomposing the Stabilization Effect: Age versus Benefit Generosity This section examines two components of a county’s Social Security income: the number of beneficiaries and the amount each beneficiary receives in OASI benefits. For this decomposition, we first replace the county’s share of Social Security income with the log of total Social Security income. Note that the control for log average real income makes the total similar to the share, because it holds constant the denominator of the share. Table 6 shows the results of this functional form change. Both Social Security income and total income are associated with more stabilization. Controlling for time trends based on Social Security income share reduces the estimates of the stabilizing effect from Social Security; however, the effect is still significant for both earnings and employment. Table 7 shows the results of the decomposition into the population share of those at least 62 years old, and the share of benefits per person for this group. 20 In all four columns, the impact of a county’s population ages 62 and older is stabilizing and statistically significant. A one-percentage-point increase in the age 62+ population share reduces the impact of a one percentage-point increase in state unemployment on employment by 0.01 percentage points and on earnings by 0.03 percentage points. The amount of benefits per eligible person, however, has no statistically significant stabilization effect. Were it only the total amount of money from Social Security that stabilized an economy, the stabilization coefficients 𝛽5 and 𝛽6 would be equal, and both benefit generosity and eligible population would have equal stabilization effects. But, they are clearly different.21 Conclusion Conceptually, the stable nature of Social Security benefits insulates recipients from macroeconomic conditions on a personal level. Workers whose income and employment depends on the local job market may reduce their spending in response to negative shocks, lowering demand for goods and services in a given county. However, retirees have no such fluctuations in their OASI benefits and may maintain local spending regardless of economic conditions. At a macro-finance level, the Social Security OASI program smooths national income by providing stable spending with cyclical borrowing. The payroll tax financing implicitly borrows from expansions to spend more in recessions at a national level, and borrows from counties in a relative boom to spend in counties in a relative bust. This study shows evidence that a county’s share of Social Security income is associated with a relatively smaller relationship between the macroeconomic fluctuations in a given county and the remainder of its state. Furthermore, in industries where demand is local – such as retail, healthcare, and entertainment – employment and earnings were similarly stabilized by a higher share of Social Security benefits in total county income. This stabilization was statistically indistinguishable between the Great Recession, when the employment margin was fewer firings, and the surrounding expansions, when the employment margin was hiring.

2023 DDI Disadvantage
Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 › Impacts › Social Security Impact---China---1NC

Causes global war---economic checks are insufficient

Brandon Tozzo 18, Ph.D in political studies, Commentator, Political Science Prof @ Trent University, “The Demographic and Economic Problems of China,” American Hegemony after the Great Recession, 2018, Palgrave Macmillan UK. CrossRef, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-57539-5

As part of its efforts to tackle these problems, Beijing has begun to undertake reforms to lower education costs and increase the amount of low-income housing, but these policies are proving expensive, particularly in light of its rapidly greying population.9 It is estimated that by 2020, one in five people in China will be over the age of 65, placing further pressure on its old-age pension program already viewed as inadequate in many rural regions of the country.10 By 2050, the median age in China will be 45, and over a third of the Chinese population will over 60 years of age. Even if China can maintain its impressive growth rates, which is by no means assured, the Chinese government will still face enormous challenges providing services to a population that is growing older and more unequal.

In addition to the problems posed by inequality and an ageing population, in the next few decades, China will face a devastating demographic crisis due to the retention of the “family planning policy”, put in place in 1978 to curb massive population growth by restricting the number of children born to urban families. While the one child policy has been successful in limiting population growth, it has had the unintended effect of creating an increasingly large disparity between males and females, as Chinese parents have demonstrated a marked willingness to abort or abandon unwanted girls. Most countries possess a gender ratio of 103–107 males for every 100 females, in China the gender gap was already 119 men for every 100 women in 2005. If these trends continue, this will lead to 40 million more men than women by 2020,11 and anywhere from 17 to 42 million more adult men than women by 2050.12 There can be little doubt that the high gender imbalance will create a massive strain on the social order, since less wealthy men will be unable to marry and have children, creating a large underclass of poor, low-status males who are unable to fnd wives. Research conducted in this area has shown that unmarried, economically disadvantaged men tend to commit more violent crime and are more likely to join radical militant movements,13 and China’s skewed demographic ratio is likely to result in a large pool of frustrated and disenfranchised males. Thus, in coming decades, China will be forced to cope with a population of millions of adult men with little wealth and no stake in the existing order, which will undoubtedly place a signifcant strain on the resources of the Chinese government as it attempts to maintain order and facilitate economic growth.

2023 DDI Disadvantage
Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 › Impacts › Social Security Impact---China---1NC

Social Security cuts rob China of critical models necessary to manage its aging crisis.

Wei Hui 16, St. Cloud State University, Population Aging and Long-Term Care Policy in China and the United States. Culminating Projects in Gerontology, Paper 3, 2016, http://repository.stcloudstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=gero_etds

For the past several decades, China has experienced falling fertility rates and increasing longevity, and those two demographic indicators reveal that China is becoming an aging society (Zhang & Goza, 2006). China’s one child per couple policy (OCP), which is established in 1979, has affected the aging of China’s population with falling fertility rates (Zhang & Goza, 2006). According to the census data provided by the China National Committee on Ageing (CNCA) and China Research Center on Aging (CRCA), China's population over the age of 60 will exceed at least 400 million by 2033, with an average annual increase of 10 million. By 2050, this population is expected to reach 1/3 of China’s national population (Accelerated Aging of Population in China, 2015). Combined with the market-driven reform of social services and rapid erosion of family support, the provision of affordable and accessible social care services to older people has already become an urgent issue for the Chinese government to address (Wong & Leung, 2012).

In the meantime, as the baby-boom generation starts to reach age 65, the United States (U.S.) is also experiencing the challenge of an increasing aging population. According to the Administration on Aging (AoA), the population age 65 and over reached 44.7 million in 2013, with an increase of 8.8 million or 24.7% since 2003. This represents 14.1% of the U.S. population, which is about one in every seven American. By 2040, it is predicted that this number will grow by 21.7% and reach 82.3 million, over twice their number in 2000. The 85+ population is projected to more than double from 6 million in 2013 to 14.6 million in 2040 (Profile of older American’s, 2014). 4

2023 DDI Disadvantage
Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 › Impacts › ---Competitiveness Impact---XT---!

Global great power war---innovation key.

Daniel Drezner 16, Professor of International Politics, Tufts; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy.” Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, May 2016,

The erosion of the trade and demographic drivers puts even more pressure on technological innovation to be the engine of economic growth in the developed world. As one McKinsey analysis concluded, “For economic growth to match its historical rates, virtually all of it must come from increases in labor productivity.”78 Growth in labor productivity is partially a function of capital investment, but mostly a function of technological innovation. The key question is whether the pace of technological innovation will sustain itself. This remains a known unknown. The pace of innovation relative to global population has slowed dramatically over the past fifty years.79 Consider that the developed world still relies on the same general purpose technologies of modern society that were originally invented 50-100 years ago: the automobile, airplane, telephone, refrigerator, and computer. To be sure, all of these technologies have improved in recent decades, in some cases dramatically. But nothing new has replaced them. And even these improvements have not necessarily had dramatic systemic effects. For example, the average speed on a passenger aircraft has actually fallen since the introduction of the Boeing 707 in 1958, because of the need to conserve fuel. For all of the talk of “disruptive innovations,” the effect of these disruptions on both the business world and aggregate economic growth have been exaggerated.80 At present, many of the fields that seem promising for innovation—nanotechnology, green energy, and so forth—require massive fixed investments. Only large institutions, like research universities, multinational corporations and government entities, can play in that kind of game. Joseph Schumpeter warned that once large organizations became the primary engine of innovation, the pace of change would naturally slow down. Because large organizations are inherently bureaucratic and conservative, they will be less able to imagine radical innovations.81 What if the “secular stagnation” debate is really just a harbinger of a deeper debate about a return to pre-19th century growth levels? An obvious counter to this argument is that the pace of technological innovation in laptops, smart phones, tablets, and the Internet of things has accelerated. This is undeniably true—but the problem is that the gains in utility have not been, strictly speaking, economic. Most of the important innovations that we think about with respect to the Internet—Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube and so forth —are free technologies for consumers. As Tyler Cowen argues, “The big technological gains are coming in revenue-deficient sectors.”82 They generate lots of enjoyment but little employment. The largest and most dynamic information technology firms, like Google and Apple, hire only a fraction of the people who worked for General Motors in its heyday. At the same time, Internet-based content has eroded the financial viability of other parts of the economy. Content-providing sectors—such as music, entertainment, and journalism—have suffered directly. The growth of “sharing economy” firms like Uber and Airbnb that develop peer-to-peer markets are causing similar levels of creative disruption to the travel and tourism sectors.83 The rapid acceleration of automation is also leading to debates about whether the “lump of labor” fallacy remains a fallacy—in other words, whether displaced workers will be able to find new employment.84 A slow-growth economic trajectory also creates policy problems that increase the likelihood of even slower growth. Higher growth is a political palliative that makes structural reforms easier. For example, Germany prides itself on the “Hartz reforms” to its labor markets last decade, and has advocated similar policies for the rest of the Eurozone since the start of the 2008 financial crisis. But the Hartz reforms were accomplished during a global economic upswing, boosting German exports and cushioning the shortterm cost of the reforms themselves. In a low-growth world, other economies will be understandably reluctant to engage in such reforms. It is possible that concerns about a radical growth slowdown are exaggerated. In 1987, Robert Solow famously said, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”85 A decade later, the late 1990s productivity surge was in full bloom. Economists are furiously debating whether the visible innovations in the information sector are leading to productivity advances that are simply going undetected in the current productivity statistics.86 Google’s chief economist Hal Varian, echoing Solow from a generation ago, asserts that “there is a lack of appreciation for what’s happening in Silicon Valley, because we don’t have a good way to measure it.”87 It is also possible that current innovations will only lead to gains in labor productivity a decade from now. The OECD argues that the productivity problem resides in firms far from the leading edge failing to adopt new technologies and systems.88 There are plenty of sectors, such as health or education, in which technological innovations can yield significant productivity gains. It would foolhardy to predict the end of radical innovations. But the possibility of a technological slowdown is a significant “known unknown.” And if such a slowdown occurs, it would have catastrophic effects on the public finances of the OECD economies. Most of the developed world will have to support disproportionately large numbers of pensioners by 2036; slower-growing economies will worsen the debt-to-GDP ratios of most of these economies, causing further macroeconomic stresses—and, potentially, political unrest from increasingly stringent budget constraints.89 2. Are there hard constraints on the ability of the developing world to converge to developed-country living standards? One of the common predictions made for the next generation economy is that China will displace the United States as the world’s biggest economy. This is a synecdoche of the deeper forecast that per capita incomes in developing countries will slowly converge towards the living standards of the advance industrialized democracies. The OECD’s Looking to 2060 report is based on “a tendency of GDP per capita to converge across countries” even if that convergence is slow-moving. The EIU’s long-term macroeconomic forecast predicts that China’s per capita income will approximate Japan’s by 2050.90 The Carnegie Endowment’s World Order in 2050 report presumes that total factor productivity gains in the developing world will be significantly higher than countries on the technological frontier. Looking at the previous twenty years of economic growth, Kemal Dervis posited that by 2030, “The rather stark division of the world into ‘advanced’ and ‘poor’ economies that began with the industrial revolution will end, ceding to a much more differentiated and multipolar world economy.”91 Intuitively, this seems rational. The theory is that developing countries have lower incomes primarily because they are capital-deficient and because their economies operate further away from technological frontier. The gains from physical and human capital investment in the developing world should be greater than in the developed world. From Alexander Gerschenkron forward, development economists have presumed that there are some growth advantages to “economic backwardness”92 This intuitive logic, however, is somewhat contradicted by the “middle income trap.” Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park, and Kwanho Shin have argued in a series of papers that as an economy’s GDP per capita hits close to $10,000, and then again at $16,000, growth slowdowns commence.93 This makes it very difficult for these economies to converge towards the per capita income levels of the advanced industrialized states. History bears this out. There is a powerful correlation between a country’s GDP per capita in 1960 and that country’s per capita income in 2008. In fact, more countries that were middle income in 1960 had become relatively poorer than had joined the ranks of the rich economies. To be sure, there have been success stories, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Israel. But other success stories, such as Greece, look increasingly fragile. Lant Prichett and Lawrence Summers conclude that “past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Regression to the mean is the single most robust and empirical relevant fact about cross-national growth rates.”94 Post-2008 growth performance of the established and emerging markets matches this assessment. While most of the developing world experienced rapid growth in the previous decade, the BRICS have run into roadblocks. Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, these economies are looking less likely to converge with the developed world. During the Great Recession, the non-Chinese BRICS—India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa—have not seen their relative share of the global economy increase at all.95 China’s growth has also slowed down dramatically over the past few years. Recent and massive outflows of capital suggests that the Chinese economy is headed for a significant market correction. The collapse of commodity prices removed another source of economic growth in the developing world. By 2015, the gap between developing country growth and developed country growth had narrowed to its lowest level in the 21st century.96 What explains the middle income trap? Eichengreen, Park and Shin suggest that “slowdowns coincide with the point in the growth process where it is no longer possible to boost productivity by shifting additional workers from agriculture to industry and where the gains from importing foreign technology diminish.”97 But that is insufficient to explain why the slowdowns in growth have been so dramatic and widespread. There are multiple candidate explanations. One argument, consistent with Paul Krugman’s deconstruction of the previous East Asia “miracle,”98 is that much of this growth was based on unsustainable levels of ill-conceived capital investment. Economies that allocate large shares of GDP to investment can generate high growth rates, particularly in capital-deficient countries. The sustainability of those growth rates depends on whether the investments are productive or unproductive. For example, high levels of Soviet economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s masked the degree to which this capital was misallocated. As Krugman noted, a lesser though similar phenomenon took place in the Asian tigers in the 1990s. It is plausible that China has been experiencing the same illusory growth-from-bad-investment problem. Reports of overinvestment in infrastructure and “ghost cities” are rampant; according to two Chinese government researchers, the country wasted an estimated $6.8 trillion in “ineffective investment” between 2009 and 2013 alone.99 A political explanation would be rooted in the fact that many emerging markets lack the political and institutional capabilities to sustain continued growth. Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson argue that modern economies are based on either “extractive institutions” or “inclusive institutions.”100 Governments based on extractive institutions can generate higher rates of growth than governments without any effective structures. It is not surprising, for example, that post-Maoist Chinese economic growth has far outstripped Maoist-era rates of growth. Inclusive institutions are open to a wider array of citizens, and therefore more democratic. Acemoğlu and Robinson argue that economies based on inclusive institutions will outperform those based on extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions are less likely to be prone to corruption, more able to credibly commit to the rule of law, and more likely to invest in the necessary public goods for broad-based economic growth. Similarly, Pritchett and Summers conclude that institutional quality has a powerful and long-lasting effect on economic growth—and that “salient characteristics of China—high levels of state control and corruption along with high measures of authoritarian rule—make a discontinuous decline in growth even more likely than general experience would suggest.”101 A more forward-looking explanation is that the changing nature of manufacturing has badly disrupted the 20th century pathway for economic development. For decades, the principal blueprint for developing economies to become developed was to specialize in industrial sectors where low-cost labor offered a comparative advantage. The resulting growth from export promotion would then spill over into upstream and downstream sectors, creating new job-creating sectors. Globalization, however, has already generated tremendous productivity gains in manufacturing—to the point where industrial sectors do not create the same amount of employment opportunities that they used to.102 Like agriculture in the developed world, manufacturing has become so productive that it does not need that many workers. As a result, many developing economies suffer from what Dani Rodrik labels “premature deindustrialization.” If Rodrik is correct, then going forward, manufacturing will fail to jump-start developing economies into higher growth trajectories—and the political effects that have traditionally come with industrialization will also be stunted.103 Both the middle-income trap and the regression to the mean observation are empirical observations about the past. There is no guaranteeing that these empirical regularities will hold for the future. Indeed, China’s astonishing growth rate over the past 30 years is a direct contradiction of the regression to the mean phenomenon. It is possible that over time the convergence hypothesis swamps the myriad explanations listed above for continued divergence. But in sketching out the next generation global economy, the implications of whether regression to the mean will dominate the convergence hypothesis are massive. Looking at China and India alone, the gap in projections between a continuation of past growth trends and regression to the mean is equivalent to $42 trillion—more than half of global economic output in 2015.104 This gap is significant enough to matter not just to China and India, but to the world economy. As with the developed world, a growth slowdown in the developing world can have a feedback effect that makes more growth-friendly reforms more difficult to accomplish. As Chinese economic growth has slowed, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economic reform plans have stalled out in favor of more political repression. Follows the recent playbook of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has added diversionary war as another distracting tactic from negative economic growth. Short-term steps towards political repression will make politically risky steps towards economic reform that less palatable in the future. Instead, the advanced developing economies seem set to double down on strategies that yield less economic growth over time. 3. Will geopolitical rivalries or technological innovation alter the patterns of economic interdependence? Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades.105 The Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that commercial interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously thought.106 The liberal logic is straightforward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. This creates incentives for governments to preserve an open economy even during times of crisis. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in minimizing political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics.108 Even militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital. Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely to break out during a great power transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything approaching war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war—from taking place. Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—democratization and multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.110 Economic openness survived the negative shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going forward. But some international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that interdependence is not a powerful constraint.111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization exacerbates financial volatility—which in turn can lead to political instability and violence.112 A different counterargument is that the continued growth of interdependence will stall out. Since 2008, for example, the growth in global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still considerably smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend. Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic output. In the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output.113 In 2012 and 2013, trade grew less than economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2014.114 While the stock of interdependence remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle. The Financial Times has suggested that the global economy has hit “peak trade.”115 If economic growth continues to outstrip trade, then the level of interdependence will slowly decline, thereby weakening the liberal constraint on great power conflicts. And there are several reasons to posit why interdependence might stall out. One possibility is due to innovations reducing the need for traded goods. For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States triggered investments into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these steps reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are developed would further reduce the need for imported energy even more.116 A more radical possibility is the development of technologies that reduce the need for physical trade across borders. Digital manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-user markets, shortening the global supply chain.117 An even more radical discontinuity would come from the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce multiple component parts of a larger manufactured good eliminates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin notes, “Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from specialization and the costs of dispersal. This would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated machines…To put it sharply, transmission of data would substitute for transportation of goods.”118 As 3-D printing technology improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly declines.119 Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward.