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2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › United States federal government › USfg = We the People

The United States federal government is structured around the people of America.

United States Senate ND (The official page of the senate, ran by government officials) “Constitution of the United States” United States Senate -- VS

Written in 1787, ratified in 1788, and in operation since 1789, the United States Constitution is the world’s longest surviving written charter of government. Its first three words – “We The People” – affirm that the government of the United States exists to serve its citizens. The supremacy of the people through their elected representatives is recognized in Article I, which creates a Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The positioning of Congress at the beginning of the Constitution affirms its status as the “First Branch” of the federal government.

2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › United States federal government › USfg = Branches and Regulations

The United States federal government is made up of branches and regulations.

Wex Definitions Team Jan 23 (Connected to Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute) “federal” LII -- VS

The term federal is typically used to refer to the United States Government, its legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the statutes, rules, and regulations enacted by those branches of government.

2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › United States federal government › USfg = Federal

The United States federal government is a federal representative republic composed of 50 states.

James E. Clyburn ND (Clyburn is a congressman of South Carolina. He went to South Carolina State University.) “Our American Government” US Congressman James E. Clyburn -- VS

The Constitution establishes a federal democratic republic form of government. That is, we have an indivisible union of 50 sovereign States. It is a democracy because people govern themselves. It is representative because people choose elected officials by free and secret ballot. It is a republic because the Government derives its power from the people.

2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › United States federal government › USfg = 3 Branches

The United States federal government is all three branches.

The White House ND (The official webpage) “Our Government” The White House whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/our-government/ -- VS

The Federal Government is composed of three distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial, whose powers are vested by the U.S. Constitution in the Congress, the President, and the Federal courts, respectively.

2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › Resolved › Resolved = Correction

“Resolved” means correcting the cause of a disruption/error

Tatiana Ferreira ’21 (Chief Customer Officer Launchmetrics, Senior Manager, Public Relations of Digital & Brand Communications, Director of Special Events Vogue, Marketing and Information Systems Loyola University “Master Serivces Agreement Terms and Conditions” Launchmetrics. Accessed 7-2-23. https://www.launchmetrics.com/master-services-agreement-terms-and-conditions-italian)//ahigh

“​Resolve​” and the correlative terms, “Resolved”, “Resolving” and “Resolution” each means that the Services are restored to a point where the Customer can perform their job. In some cases, this may only be a work around solution until the root cause of the Error or Unplanned Disruption is identified and corrected (the need for restoration of normal service supersedes the need to find the root cause of the incident).

2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › Resolved › Resolved =/= Certain

“Resolved” means formal temporary action

Nichole McCarthy ’22 (Masters in Library and Information Science, Bachelors in Women’s Studies, Masters in Criminal Justice Administration. Original Content Collections Manager for Cornell Law Legal Information Institute. “resolution” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Accessed 7-2-23. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/resolution)//ahigh

A resolution is a formal statement of opinion or a decision to take an action. In judicial proceedings, “resolution” means a judgment or decision of the court. In the context of a legislative practice, “resolution” is just a form in which a legislative body expresses an opinion or a purpose with respect to a given matter or topic that is temporary in nature. It denotes the adoption of a motion, the subject-matter of which does not constitute a statute. In corporations, a corporate resolution is a written document containing authorization, usually by a corporation's board of directors, documenting a binding decision made on behalf of the corporation.

2023 UTNIF Topicality
UTNIF GRIPE File – T – 2023 › Resolved › Resolved = Certain

“Resolve” means formal, definitive action

Merriam-Webster No date (Oldest dictionary publisher in the United States “Merriam-Webster Dictionary” Merriam-Webster. Accessed 7-2-23. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve)//ahigh

Legal Definition · 1. : to deal with successfully : clear up. resolve a dispute · 2. to reach a firm decision about. 3. a. : to declare or decide by formal resolution and vote.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
AFF Cards › Link › Turn – Federalism Bad

Federalism is outdated and unnecessary – Texas, vaccine distribution, climate change, and education all prove

Feldman 21 (Noah Feldman is a Bloomberg View columnist. He is a professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard University and was a clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter.) "Federalism shows its age." Seattle Times. https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/federalism-shows-its-age/. 2-24-2021. accessed 6-25-2021. ALS

There wasn’t much President Joe Biden could have done about this month’s Texas energy disaster. Ditto the slow-moving vaccine rollout. The reason is the same: federalism, a system dating back to the 1780s and only seriously overhauled once. Although federalism still has some benefits, its obsolescence is increasingly obvious when the U.S. faces crises that, like climate change and COVID-19, don’t respect state boundaries. Energy and health care are only two of the crucial infrastructure systems that remain state-regulated or state-run. And many of those systems are in need of updating everywhere — not piecemeal, as federalism tends to support. Federalism was, in important ways, an American invention — the brainchild of James Madison. It was a product of political necessity for 13 states that had been separately administered as British colonies and that had already tried and failed to function as a loose confederation between 1776 and 1787. Unifying into a single nation would have been practical for the early United States. At the Philadelphia constitutional convention, big-state representatives, including Madison, favored a heavily national model of government to replace the failing decentralized system created by the Articles of Confederation. But local elites in the small states did not want to give up power. They staged a walkout, returning only once they were assured of permanent protections for their states, including equal representation in the Senate. The core idea of federalism was that states would retain sovereignty over their citizens, while the federal government would in parallel exercise its own sovereignty over the same people. The founders thus “split the atom of sovereignty,” as Justice Anthony Kennedy once grandly put it: Instead of a single sovereign government, the U.S. would have a federal semi-sovereign government operating alongside the semi-sovereign states. The devil was in the details. Which government controlled which powers became a challenge. The Civil War was fought in part over the question of whether states or the federal government would have control over the existence of slavery. Recognizably modern national regulatory legislation began to emerge gradually in the Progressive Era. In 1887, a century after the Philadelphia convention, the Interstate Commerce Commission was created by Congress to regulate railroads, the most important interstate infrastructure of the day. But it took the Great Depression and the resultant New Deal for Congress to pass vast national legislation and to create a raft of federal agencies to perform coordinating tasks that had previously been unthinkable. New Deal federalism was itself continuing the compromise between the federal government and the states. Core issues of national competency were moved to the federal level. Yet states retained a tremendous amount of regulatory capacity, including in areas that overlapped with federal regulatory control. Thus, to take the example of energy, both the federal government and the states regulate different aspects of the power grid. In this respect, today’s federalism isn’t radically different from the federalism of the New Deal. Texas actually made a conscious choice not to connect its power grid to that of other states, partly in order to retain state regulatory control. Under the Constitution as it has been interpreted since the New Deal, Congress would have the power to pass laws that impose regulatory controls even on in-state power grids. If Congress wanted to, it could enact laws empowering federal regulators to require state-based power plants to be capable of functioning even in very cold temperatures, thereby reducing the risk of the kind of temperature-based breakdowns that caused the recent Texas power disaster. Similarly, Congress has the authority to do much more than it does to control or regulate health care at the state level. Even a nationalized health-care system would be within the constitutional reach of Congress. Education is yet another area where states exercise near total authority, even though the issue is of obvious national importance. The problem, therefore, doesn’t lie in the Constitution, at least not primarily. It lies in the deeply established political norms and customs that still confer enormous power on states, even regarding national infrastructure problems that span state boundaries. Those customs and norms continue to shape the distribution of power and responsibility as between the states and the federal government. True, the constitutional design of the Senate, as well as the continued sovereign existence of the states, help shape the ongoing political reality. But as the New Deal federalism overhaul shows, those structural features of our federal system can be overcome when crisis demands it. Will the crises regarding climate change and COVID-19 generate support for overhauling federalism again? If failures continue to pile up over time, the public will demand change, and to meet that need, Congress and the president may see fit to regulate more extensively. As infrastructure in the United States continues to degrade, the need for such federal initiatives is likely to continue to grow. Until it does, the U.S. will remain stuck with the legacy of an 18th-century Constitution that, despite its many virtues, doesn’t always meet the needs of the moment.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
AFF Cards › Link › No Link – UBI/Welfare

No link and Turn – [taxes/UBI/welfare] doesn’t promote government overreach; but more federalism does not solve the problem.

Miller 22 – Lisa L. Miller is Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. Her books include Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control and The Myth of Mob Rule: Violent Crime and Democratic Politics, [“Up From Federalism”, Boston Review, 7/18/2022, https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/up-from-federalism/]RA

This arrangement helps to explain why the United States lags behind the rest of the rich democratized world in health outcomes, income inequality, and a host of other social and economic outcomes. Nearly every president since Eisenhower has tried to produce a more equitable health system that would cover all Americans—an idea that Americans have supported for seventy-five years. These efforts have been thwarted for many reasons, but at least some of them are a function of our federal system. Claims to state constitutional authority are inseparable from claims about hard constraints on congressional power and these arguments have been used to challenge, stymie, and sometimes reject national social policies on everything from social security, minimum wage, and labor relations to universal health care, gun control, and voting rights. Of course, limiting national governmental authority is also lauded as one of federalism’s key virtues. Allen seems to want at least some assurance of a constitutionally protected sphere of authority at the state and local level to protect political minorities from the potential of exclusion and oppression in the national arena. Other advocates of federalism from the left are less attached to the concept of state sovereignty but nonetheless champion the ability of racial and ethnic minorities to hold power at the local level as facilitating a “politics of recognition.” Allen thinks the national government should focus on the “big picture.” But federalism creates opportunities for preventing just that. But here again we run into problems with the distinction between federalism and decentralization. Under American federalism, local governments have no constitutional status; they are creatures of state constitutions. Even in home rule states—states that allow municipalities to draft local charters that transfer some powers from the state to the locality—the scope of local authority can be changed by the state legislature. In fact, as cities have become the province of liberals, states dominated by conservative lawmakers have increasingly enacted pre-emption laws, limiting the scope of municipal authority on issues like minimum wage, paid leave, anti-discrimination, gun control, and even the creation of municipal broadband. And even where local governments operate in liberal states, they face extraordinary fiscal imbalance compared to the host of problems confronting them. Perhaps most puzzling, there is nothing in the structure of American federalism that ensures that vulnerable (as opposed to powerful) minority groups will be the ones whose voices, representation, and influence are supposedly amplified in subnational governments. Some, arguably all, of the most powerful interests in American society are political minorities: the “one percent,” corporate CEOs and shareholders, and other individuals and groups with a high degree of economic resources. So, too, are white nativists, who have long sought to confine American power and citizenship to white people (or at least, the right kind of white people). As Grant McConnell trenchantly noted in his 1996 book, Private Power and American Democracy, constraining the power of the national government does not eliminate the problem of power; it simply moves it elsewhere, primarily to the private sector and regional elites. Grumbach sheds light on this phenomenon by asking what happens when limited national government leads to more policy activity at the state level. His focus is on the past few decades of increasing political polarization and the nationalization of the political parties. There is little doubt that polarization has increased, particularly on the right, and that polarization has largely incapacitated Congress. At the same time, political parties at all levels of government have also become more national in focus, with increasing national coordination among groups, activists, incumbents, platforms, and candidates. Grumbach argues that the intersection of these two developments—deep polarization and nationalization of parties—has transformed American federalism into a system that exacerbates, more than mitigates, the nation’s challenges. Whereas the conventional narratives about federalism highlight its capacity for participation, accountability, experimentation, and protection against oppressive power, Grumbach finds that today’s federalism is more likely to do the opposite. It reinforces and even worsens unequal political influence, reduces political accountability, and enables antidemocratic interests, especially the wealthy, to win out, despite their unpopular policies. Grumbach begins by showing that, whereas divided government in Congress is now fairly common, partisan control at the state level has become more unified. For both Democrats and Republicans, there are almost always a few states where they have control. To study the impact of this trend, Grumbach examines interest groups, donors to state political campaigns, and state policies between 1970 and 2018, drawing on an original dataset of 135 policies across 15 issue areas: abortion, campaign finance, civil rights, criminal justice, education, environment, guns, health/welfare, housing/transportation, immigration, labor, LGBT rights, marijuana, public sector labor, taxation, and voting. In practice, Grumbach finds, federalism today is more likely to stymie democracy than to enhance it. Grumbach finds that states have been very busy over the last twenty years, with policy changes occurring across all issues. But it turns out that state elections are just as elite-driven as national ones, and donors are actually more likely to be white and wealthy at the state level than the national. Contrary to the hopes of progressive federalists, it is not grassroots groups of ordinary voters (let alone the most vulnerable political minorities) that dominate state politics but rather highly organized, highly resourced activists, donors, and organizations. Policy is being changed by the parties in power, but public opinion has been relatively static on most issues. And the adoption of “innovative” policies from other states seems to occur not on the basis of their effectiveness and consistency with public preferences in the state but, rather, on whether they were implemented by states controlled by the same political party. States, in short, don’t appear to be very robust “laboratories” of democracy (as in the metaphor made famous by Justice Louis Brandeis). Most challenging to federalism’s aspirationalists is Grumbach’s evidence of democratic backsliding. Over the past two decades, if your state was controlled by the Republican party, it likely became less democratic than the average Democratic-controlled state: more voter restrictions, more restricted access to the ballot, more gerrymandering, more disenfranchisement, more registrations rejected, fewer resources for identifying polling places, less same-day registration and absentee voting. This assault on democracy would not have been so successful, Grumbach argues, if it were not for American federalism, which structures power in ways that facilitate elite influence at every level of government. It is worth quoting him at length here: The major crises in modern American politics are not just the result of institutional racism, plutocratic influence, or partisan polarization. They are a product of these forces flowing in a federal institutional system of government. . . . The structure and multiplicity of these venues make it more difficult for ordinary Americans to hold politicians accountable in elections. This structure is advantageous to well-resourced interests, who can move their political money and influence across venues in highly strategic ways. Federalism makes it easier for political actors to tilt the rules of American democracy, itself, to their advantage. Antidemocratic interests need only to take control of a state government for a short period of time to implement changes that make it harder for their opponents to participate in politics at all levels—local, state, and national. Rather than enhance political accountability, then, the multiplicity of overlapping political authorities in American federalism seems to weaken the incentives of lawmakers to perform well. One reason, Grumbach argues, is that it is harder for voters to trace which level of government is responsible for what. This information asymmetry undermines the power of ordinary people but strengthens it for economic elites, whose concentrated and narrower interests allow them to sustain mobilization, propose model legislation, and get in early on blocking policies adverse to their interests. In any political system, elites have greater access to power than the masses. But the fractured landscape of American federalism provides them with many more venues than they might otherwise have. What do we have to show for the massive social engineering states have undertaken over the last twenty years? For Grumbach, we can hardly say that the United States as a whole is better off than it was a generation ago. “Rather than ushering in democratic responsiveness, social harmony, and economic prosperity,” he notes, “the shift in policymaking from the national to the state level since the 1970s has coincided with the weakening of democratic institutions, the precipitous rise of economic inequality, and growing mass polarization and discontent.” Aspirational federalists might counter with the observation that Grumbach’s own findings show that states under Democratic control have become more progressive and, on some issues, like environmental regulation, health, and welfare, the overall effect across the country has been more liberalizing. But on other issues, of course—abortion, civil rights, guns, immigration, labor, and voting rights—the overall trend has tacked right. This is the devil’s deal for the left that comes with American federalism. Victories in California and Massachusetts may be gratifying, but they do not solve national problems or nationwide inequality, and losses in states controlled by conservatives or reactionaries only exacerbate unequal opportunities and outcomes. Pandemics, guns, pollution, and racist groups all travel across state borders; rules about participation and representation vary widely, too. Until there were national rules with aggressive federal enforcement, fair policies on voting rights, equal protection, clean air, the minimum wage, and labor organizing—among other areas—were not safe or fully effective. (As Jamila Michener has recently shown in relation to Medicaid, for example, variation across states has a profound impact on the lives and political disempowerment of individuals, families, and communities.) Ironically, many of the policies adopted in liberal states—like legal abortion, gun safety measures, and expansion of Medicaid—are popular nationally. Championing federalism for producing innovative liberal policies at the state level overlooks the fact that American federalism may be one of the reasons why at least some of these policies do not exist on the national scale in the first place. In a final challenge to the hopes of federalism’s progressive aspirationalists, Grumbach argues that, by creating new opportunities for the states to gerrymander, suppress votes, and diminish the power of labor unions, American federalism may have indirectly contributed to the rise of Trump, rather than served as its antidote. Maybe a different vision of American federalism, like the one Allen and other progressive federalists imagine, is the answer. But Grumbach is not alone in finding that the structure and complexity of American-style federalism seems to benefit powerful elites more than ordinary people, no matter how much we may wish it were otherwise. In the United States, federalism has always been a battleground over the nature of American democracy itself—who gets to participate, to decide what we, as a nation, will be and do. As promising as it sounds in theory to diffuse political authority through multiple locations where different groups can engage in political combat and find common ground, the messy landscape of American federalism has often functioned to limit democracy rather than expand it, and to empower already powerful elites rather than restrain them. Progressive strategy cannot ignore state and local politics. But it must also not lose sight of the imperative of national power.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
AFF Cards › Link › No Link – Taxes

Enforcing tax laws doesn’t collapse federalism – no overreach.

Porter 23 – Joe Porter is a contributor and reporter at Syracuse.com, [“Enforcing Tax Laws Isn’t ‘Government Overreach’ by the IRS”, Syracuse.com, 1/26/2023, ]RA

Williams called last year’s funding for the IRS “government overreach,” but since when is law enforcement government overreach? Defunding the IRS is as stupid as defunding the police forces across America. It’s as extreme as it is unwise. It deprives our government of much-needed revenue and deprives taxpayers of much-needed services to help them file their tax forms. Williams says, “The IRS has a long history of abusing their power to intimidate Americans.” Really? Law-abiding Americans? More so than other federal law-enforcement agencies like the FBI, the DEA or ICE? The IRS is not a charitable organization; it should strictly enforce the tax laws passed by Congress. If the Republicans want a smaller IRS budget, then their Ways and Means Committee should write a more simplified tax code; it’s the complexity of the tax code that makes it expensive to comply with and enforce. Both political parties have failed us when it comes to collecting taxes. This is largely why our federal government swims in the red ink of deficit spending every year and why our national debt is over $31 trillion. However, the Democrats seem to be waking up. They want to enlarge the understaffed IRS and replace its outdated technology, all in an effort to stop large corporations and wealthy individuals from evading taxes. Janet Yellen, our Treasury Secretary, told Reuters that the tax gap — the difference between what is owed the government and what is paid — amounts annually to “$600 billion in unpaid tax bills.” That’s revenue we could be investing in America. Amy Hanauer, executive director of the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, told Newsweek, “Defunding the IRS is an attack on tax enforcement and the fairness of our entire tax system.” Like the lemmings of Jan. 6th, the lemmings of the 118th Congress will eventually learn that what the American people want is not protectionism for wealthy tax cheats, nor a weakened federal government, but law and order.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
AFF Cards › Link › No Link - Generic

The JG program is federalism – federal involvement is just funding, implementation and organization is local

Fogarty 15 Will Fogarty, Research Fellow for the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity. “Federally Funded, Locally Organized: An Affordable Job Guarantee Program”, Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity (July 2015),

Local administration and supervision is also critical to the JG program. Bureaucracy, at large, is responsible for the lack of faith in government programs. As John Kenneth Galbraith notes in his book The Good Society, bureaucracy has taken on a decidedly negative connotation, and for good reason (Galbraith 1996, 105). The prevailing view of government organizations is that they are inefficient and slow to respond, perhaps staffed by unmotivated or disengaged employees. Although this line of thought is typically aimed at public entities, most private corporations also wallow in bureaucratic excess. Galbraith explains: In all great organizations a strong and even irresistible tendency is to add managerial, technical, professional and other employees. Only as one gets to the shop floor in the industrial corporation—to, as significantly they are called, the working levels of the enterprise…is there a close, continuing assessment of needed workers to product (Galbraith 1996, 106). 10 The strength of corporate bureaucracy also contributes to the marginalization of the ‘working class.’ There is no doubt that many existing federal organizations, such as the Department of Veteran Affairs, are failing. This failure is due to a top-down approach that emphasizes discipline rather than critical thinking on how a common goal can be achieved (Galbraith 1996, 105). In brief, it is well known that federal programs often fall short. Consequently, this proposal advocates that the federal government be limited primarily to footing the bill. Congress will only announce the federal government’s willingness to provide each individual that is ready, willing, and able to work with a job. It will rely on local governments and non-profit organizations to hire workers; volunteer organizations could now offer to pay people. These organizations will remain “non-profit”, but the volunteers they currently depend upon would be supplemented with federally-funded employees. As a result, these organizations will be able to carry out their objects far more effectively, and could even add new community-oriented projects to their plate. In order to avoid the possibility of organizations embezzling federal money, the JG program will pay its employees directly (Wray 2012, 1). In communities where there are many idle workers but few non-profit organizations, the local and federal government may act to assist in the creation of new ones. The program will not be permitted to provide employment for private, for-profit companies; as Wray notes, this would add the incentive for employers to replace existing employees with lower wage JG program participants (Wray 2012, 1). Just like many private sector ventures, the JG program will hit some snags, but utilizing local organizations will significantly reduce these obstacles. Local policymakers and non-profit managers will be responsible for the administration and supervision of projects best suited to the various needs of that community.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
AFF Cards › Uniqueness › Non-Unique

Federalism is adaptive and dynamic, can incorporate new laws and balance authority

Erin Ryan, 2015, Elizabeth C. & Clyde W. Atkinson Professor of Law, Florida State University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, M.A., Wesleyan University, B.A., Harvard University. This chapter draws on material previously published in ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (Oxford, 2012), and several related articles: Erin Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, in Alberto López Basaguren and Leire Escajedo San-Epifanio, eds., THE WAYS OF FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN, VOL. 1 (Springer, 2013); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011); Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 COLORADO L. REV. 1 (2010); and Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007), Chapter entitled “Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within” in the book by Kalyani Robins, ed., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Edward Elgar, 2015), Accessible at: http://www.environmentandsociety.org/sites/default/files/key_docs/environmental_federalisms_tug_of_war_within_ssrn_2.pdf, /MB

In response to shortcomings in these paradigmatic models, a host of new scholarship is developing newer theoretical conceptions of federalism, 76 including the Balanced Federalism model that I proposed in FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN. 77 Balanced Federalism emphasizes dynamic interaction among the various levels of government and shared interpretive responsibility among the three branches of government, with the overall goal of achieving a balance among the competing federalism values that is both dynamic and adaptive over time. 78 As I describe it there, the Balanced Federalism model involves:

“a series of innovations to bring judicial, legislative, and executive efforts to manage the tug of war into more fully theorized focus. [Balanced Federalism] mediates the tensions within federalism on three separate planes: (1) fostering balance among the competing federalism values, (2) leveraging the functional capacities of the three branches of government in interpreting federalism, and (3) maximizing the wisdom of both state and federal actors in so doing. [This initial foray] imagines three successive means of coping with federalism’s values tug of war, each experimenting with different degrees of judicial and political leadership at different levels of government. Along the way, the analysis provides clearer theoretical justification for the ways in which the tug of war is already legitimately mediated through various forms of balancing, compromise, and negotiation.”79

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
AFF Cards › Uniqueness › Non-Unique

Non-Unique – Encroachment high now.

Katz 21 - Diane Katz is Senior Research Fellow in Regulatory Policy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation, [“Federalism in Crisis: Urgent Action Required to Preserve Self-Government”, The Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis, SPECIAL REPORT No. 248, November 30, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/SR248.pdf]RA

There is abundant evidence of excessive encroachment: The number and cost of federal mandates have increased markedly—an additional 457 enacted between 2006 and 2019 —as have pre-emptions6 of state and local authority. States are also more dependent on federal grants-in-aid, which comprised 32.4 percent of total state spending in fiscal year (FY) 2020.7 Outlays for the federal regulatory bureaucracy have grown by 18 percent in the past decade, to $66.2 billion in FY 2020 —excluding budgets and staffing for tax functions, entitlement programs, and government procurement. Federal dictates have likewise engulfed private enterprise, including 856 new mandates between 2006 and 2019.9 Not only has federal power expanded in scope, it has also become increasingly coercive, including the effective takeover of public education, reams of health care dictates, and prohibitions on states’ appeals of federal property takings.10 The recently enacted COVID-19 “relief” act, titled the American Rescue Plan,11 prohibits states from enacting tax cuts as a condition of aid. A number of other drastic measures are also in the pipeline. The Democrats’ H.R. 1 legislation, the so-called For the People Act, would override states’ election laws,12 while the House-passed Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act would prohibit state right-to-work laws. States periodically assert their sovereignty on select policy issues, as has occurred with immigration enforcement, physician-assisted suicide, same-sex marriage, and recreational use of marijuana.13 Most recently, 23 states announced their intention to opt out of federally funded enhanced unemployment benefits related to COVID-19,14 which appear to be a disincentive to work.15 In some cases, states’ pushback is a matter of partisan politics rather than principle. In President Donald Trump’s first year, for example, Democratic states filed 35 lawsuits against the Administration (compared to 46 lawsuits filed by Republicans during the eight years of the Obama Administration).16 Regardless of motivation, states’ legal victories these days are overwhelmed by the extent of the federal power grab, which stokes conflict and divisiveness by heightening the political stakes of even mundane matters.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Impact › TURNS CASE – climate

Climate change spills up and triggers biodiversity loss and extinction

Rice 20 (Doyle Rice, Reporter for USA TODAY, "One-third of all plant and animal species could be extinct in 50 years, study warns," USA TODAY, Feburary 14th, 2020, , //calb)

Researchers studied recent extinctions from climate change to estimate how many species would be lost over the next 50 years. Specifically, scientists from the University of Arizona studied data from 538 species at 581 sites around the world and focused on plant and animal species that were surveyed at the same sites over time, at least 10 years apart. "By analyzing the change in 19 climatic variables at each site, we could determine which variables drive local extinctions and how much change a population can tolerate without going extinct," said Cristian Román-Palacios, of the department of ecology and evolutionary biology at the University of Arizona, in a statement. "We also estimated how quickly populations can move to try and escape rising temperatures. "When we put all of these pieces of information together for each species, we can come up with detailed estimates of global extinction rates for hundreds of plant and animal species." Globally, up to 1 million species are at risk of extinction because of human activities, according to a United Nations report released in May. Many experts say a “mass extinction event” – only the sixth in the past half-billion years – is already underway. Climate change: Bumblebees are disappearing at rates 'consistent with mass extinction' This study found that maximum annual temperatures – the highest daily highs in summer – are the key variable that best explains whether a species will go extinct. Previous studies have focused on migration to cooler habitats as a way for species to "escape" from warming climates. However, this study found that most species won't be able to do this quickly enough to avoid extinction, based on their past rates of movement. Instead, researchers found that many species were able to tolerate some increases in maximum temperatures, but only up to a point. They found that about 50% of the species had local extinctions if maximum temperatures increased by more than 0.9 degrees Fahrenheit, and up to 95% if temperatures increased by more than 5.2 degrees Fahrenheit.

2023 UTNIF Disadvantage
2NC Cards › Impact › TURNS CASE – climate

A federalist balance of power is key to long-term climate efforts

Fox 21 [Sarah J.; Professor in the Northern Illinois University College of Law; 3-4-2021; “Why Localizing Climate Federalism Matters (Even) During a Biden Administration”; Texas Law Review Online, Vol. 99, No. 122; ; Accessed 6-24-2021; BM]

The shifts in federal administration in 2016 and in 2020 have been accompanied by markedly different positions on how (and whether) to handle the climate crisis. Those swings show the importance of national elections as well as the potential fragility of depending on only a federal response to climate change.79 Thus, while comprehensive federal action on climate change is enormously welcome and needed, both Congress and the Biden Administration should also ensure that any action they take preserves the flexibility of and possibility for climate action at the state and local level as well. Federal climate action should work to include states as partners and responsible parties in any regulatory response. And where the federal government can empower climate action by local governments that would otherwise likely be subject to preemption by the state, it can have a lasting impact in shoring up the role of local governments as environmental actors within the United States.80 In short, federal tackling the climate crisis during the Biden Administration should include a clear-eyed view of the federal, state, and local possibilities for action, and work to empower a climate response from all points along the federalism spectrum.

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Uncooperative federalism BEST for addressing climate – CONFLICT spurs positive action

Osofsky 11 sociate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; Associate Director of Law, Geo- graphy & Environment, Consortium on Law and Values in Health, Environment & the Life Sciences and Affiliated Faculty, Geography and Conservation Biology, University of Minnesota

Cooperativeness, like the other dimensions, serves as just one factor in a regulatory scheme, and may vary at different stages. As I have described in depth in the preceding companion article, California's waiver request and the EPA's denial have formed a part of conflicts over the appropriate role of states in motor vehicle emissions regulation. n219 However, the Obama Administration EPA's reconsideration of both the granting of the waiver and the results thereof, in tandem with harmonization efforts with respect to fuel economy standards, have created a cooperative diagonal scheme. n220 Recent federalism scholarship explores the complex mix of cooperation and conflict that arises in a variety of contexts, including with respect to climate change. n221 Cooperative federalism's greatest advantage as a basis for climate change regulation is its ability to create coordinated multiscalar action in which each actor provides its unique contribution. A number of scholars and policymakers have taken significant steps to sketch a framework for cooperative action. They are exploring the nuances of how collaboration might work among specific entities in particular policy areas. This analysis makes clear that cooperative approaches, if crafted well, incentivize action while making room for innovation. For instance, a Center for Progressive Reform study by William Andreen and others presents how localities, [*286] states, and the federal government can work together on this problem. n222 Alice Kaswan has also published an interesting cooperative federalism proposal bringing together these three levels of government, and Holly Doremus and W. Michael Hanemann have argued that the Clean Air Act provides a cooperative federalism model that could be used in crafting effective climate change legislation. n223 Some dynamic environmental approaches combine cooperative federalism with other theories. For example, Brad Karkkainen's analysis of information-forcing environmental regulation brings together cooperative federalism and new governance approaches to consider how "properly structured, penalty default rules might be used to induce meaningful participation in locally devolved, place-based, collaborative, public-private hybrid, new governance institutions, aimed at integrated, adaptive, experimentalist management of watersheds and other institutions." n224 This particular combination of cooperative federalism and new governance approaches allows for innovative structures that encompass the multidimensionality of these problems. However, other dynamic federalism scholars have questioned the extent to which cooperative models can capture the disagreement over climate change policy choices, and as a result, a stream of scholarship focusing on uncooperative federalism has emerged. This scholarship includes those directly terming their model "uncooperative," such as Karen Bridges, Kirk Junker, and Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken. n225 But the literature also contains work like that of Ann Carlson and Robert Schapiro, which incorporates conflict in the dynamics they highlight. n226 In addition, some scholars, such as William Buzbee, Ann Carlson, Robert Glicksman and Richard Levy, Alexandra Klass, and Bejamin Sovacool have looked at these questions of cooperation and conflict in a preemption context, arguing for the important complementary role that state and local efforts and state court common law litigation play in the broader environmental regulatory picture. n227 Overall, this scholarship dealing with the [*287] limits of cooperative models explores the way in which disagreement over time should be brought into a federalist regulatory scheme. This scholarship on conflict within federalism highlights two potential difficulties facing cooperative schemes. First, conflict exists. As Robert Schapiro has noted, cooperative schemes may struggle at times to address differences adequately and to include all relevant actors. n228 Certainly, in the U.S. climate change context, states have and continue to vary greatly in how they want to approach the problem, as represented by the states on both sides of Massachusetts v. EPA. n229 Second, and at least as importantly, conflict has value. Regulatory schemes that include opportunities for dissent, such as through citizen suit provisions, can potentially incorporate divergent views more effectively, as well as make sure that pressure remains on policymakers to think through tough issues. n230 In two recent high-profile examples of conflict over motor vehicle emissions regulation--Massachusetts v. EPA and the California CAA waiver dispute--the change in presidential administration during their ultimate resolution helped to shape more rigorous national approaches. These approaches will continue to evolve as the Obama Administration develops its regulatory approach more fully over time in collaboration with California and automobile companies and attempts to navigate the intense partisan politics of climate change. n231 However, as these examples illustrate, the Obama Administration will often need a mix of cooperation and conflict in this evolution over time to achieve effective multiscalar climate regulation; the conflict helps to air differences and to create pressure for action, while the cooperation allows for coordination and collaboration. In sum, an effective diagonal strategy could be developed further through a combination of approaches skewed in any of the four dimen [*288] sions. The key to creating the needed crosscutting interactions is to ensure that incentives for a variety of skews exist in a situationally appropriate fashion. Part IV examines what those incentives might be in the context of the Obama Administration's approach to motor vehicles regulation. It builds upon this Part's assessment of where skews lie in each of these dimensions to examine future possibilities for diagonal strategies in this area.

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Federal pre-emption of environmental laws fail and affects state priorities.

Adler 5 Jonathan H. Adler is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and inaugural Director of the Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. “Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism” , Case Western University School of Law, https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=faculty_publications, [Accessed: 6-24-2021]//cblasi

The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy distorts state environmental policymaking and can have significant environmental consequences. As a result of extensive federal involvement in areas best left in state or local hands, state policy development is heavily distorted. 178 The lack of a match between the scope of environmental problems and the political jurisdictions asserting authority over such concerns leads to poor prioritization. The over-centralization of environmental policy further compounds the problem of excessive rigidity created by excessive uniformity. 179 The extension of federal authority into areas more properly left under state and local control does not extinguish the demand for greater environmental protection at the state and local level. It does, however, rechannel it. One consequence of the mismatch is that state and local policy makers increasingly tum to environmental issues and concerns where the case for federal dominance is stronger. The most obvious way federal action influences state environmental protection efforts is when federal rules preempt conflicting or varying state rules. For example, section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting "any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles." 180 Similarly, the Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any state regulation of automotive fuel economy . 181 Preemption can be express, as in the above examples, or implied. 182 Where implied preemption is found, federal regulation will typically preclude any state or local regulation whatsoever. 183 Because preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity, the net effect of federal preemption is for there to be less regulation than there would have been otherwise. 184 Where federal measures are insufficiently protective, or where federally imposed uniformity is inefficient, there will be suboptimal results. As a recent environmental group report concluded, " [ f] ederal preemption of states' ability to go above and beyond the federal floor suppresses states' creativity in developing new approaches to solving public policy problems, such as air pollution."185 Sometimes federal preemption may be justified by economies of scale. In other cases, however, preemption precludes the adoption of state-level standards that are more tailored to local or regional conditions and needs. As a practical matter, a federal regulatory "floor" can become a ceiling. The existence of a federal standard may discourage state policyrnakers from adopting and maintaining more stringent measures of their own, even where such measures could be justified. Many states have adopted legislation to prevent state environmental agencies from adopting regulatory standards that are more protective than federal rules. 186 New Mexico and Colorado, for example, have statutes prohibiting the promulgation of air pollution controls more stringent than what would be required by federal law. 187 Virginia law bars state regulatory authorities from requiring greater amounts of water treatment than mandated under the federal Clean Water Act. 188 Others states have general prohibitions against agency promulgation of environmental rules more stringent than federal law. 189 Insofar as federal standards are not based upon accurate, up-to-date scientific assessments of environmental problems, and such information about the nature and extent of environmental problems is not available to state and local policymakers, the federal regulation may have an even greater distorting effect on state priorities. The mere existence of a federally mandated,_ floor also preempts contrary state policies and environmental priorities. If a local community has different health and environment-related regulatory priorities, it still must meet the requirements of federal law. 190 In 2000, for example, the outgoing Clinton Administration proposed lowering the federal standard for arsenic in drinking water from 50 to 10 parts per billion (ppb ), largely to reduce the risk of bladder cancer from arsenic consumption. 191 While the leaders of national environmental groups cheered the proposed reduction in the federal arsenic standard, many communities faced with high compliance costs were less enthusiastic. 192 In Los Lunas, New Mexico groundwater naturally contains 12-19 ppb of arsenic. Local officials estimated that reducing arsenic levels to the new 10 ppb standard would cost $14 million. 193 Local experts also noted that while New Mexico has among the highest natural concentrations of arsenic in groundwater in the country, it also has among the lowest rates of bladder cancer, leading many to question whether spending millions to reduce local arsenic levels was the most cost-effective way to safeguard public health. 194 There is even evidence that the federal arsenic rule will increase risks to public health in some communities insofar as the higher water rates necessary to pay for the change induces some families to opt for water from their own wells. 195 Yet insofar as residents of Los Lunas, or any other community, wish to adopt different drinking water standards that are more in line with their environmental and public health needs, and lack the resources to pursue every laudable public health or environmental goal, the federal standard precludes them from acting on their preferences. While the federal government may preempt state regulatory action, and may require state compliance with a general regulatory scheme that does not target states-as-states, it cannot force states to adopt federally desired regulations. It can, however, offer various inducements to encourage state "cooperation." The federal government may, for instance, condition funding on state cooperation or threaten to preempt state and local regulations if such measures do not meet federal requirements. This approach is ~typically referred to as "cooperative federalism," 196 though many analysts question whether the relationship can be properly described as "cooperative."197 Particularly where the consequence of state refusal to cooperate is the imposition of a federal regulatory scheme, the "cooperative federalism" model does not leave much flexibility in the scope and design of regulatory programs. Even where federal involvement is supposed to be "cooperative," states are often precluded or at least discouraged from adopting environmental policies that would be more efficient or effective at addressing their particular environmental concerns and demands. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, the federal government uses the . threat of sanctions to impose federal air pollution control priorities on state governments. Bpecifically, the threatened loss of highway flli1ds induces states to adopt that mix of air pollution control measures preferred by federal policymakers, even when an alternative mix of pollution control measures may produce greater environmental results. The adoption of one air pollution control measure may increase other forms of pollution or otherwise contribute to other environmental problems. 198 Although ostensibly designed to reduce automotive emissions, there is substantial scientific evidence that oxygenated fuels provide little environmental benefit, 199 and can even cause environmental harm.200 This is not the only instance in which the Clean Air Act mandates may impede the achievement of optimal levels of environmental protection. Because the formation of tropospheric ozone ("smog") is in part dependent upon ratios of ozone precursors in the ambient air, measures that reduce ozone levels in some cities increase ozone levels elsewhere?01 Some earlier measures had similar effects. For instance, air pollution control provisions adopted as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 were tailored to advantage regional coal producers at the expense of their competitors, and air quality suffered as a result. 202 Federal inaction can alter state environmental policy priorities just as much as federal action. In some cases, federal failure to conduct scientific research leaves states without the scientific and technical information necessary to set environmental priorities in accordance with local preferences. The failure of federal policymakers to address new or emerging environmental concerns has encouraged states to become more aggressive in their approach to such problems. 203 New York State, for example, sought to restrict the sale of sulfur-dioxide emission credits under the Clean Air Act due to concerns that such sales could increase pollution within the state. 204 Yet because the federal government is disproportionately active in those areas where there is no strong case for federal involvement, states may be disproportionately active in those areas where federal action, and perhaps even federal preemption, would be preferable. Global climate change policy is a prime example of increasing state activity where federal action would provide for a greater jurisdictional match. In recent years, state governments have become quite active on climate change, both for and against greater action to control greenhouse gas emissions.205 As of 2004, 28 states had begun developing greenhouse gas emission policies.206 Some, such as New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, adopted emission reduction targets. In July 2002, California adopted legislation requi1ing the California Air Resources Board to "develop and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles."207 The state has also embarked on an ambitious plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent over the next fifteen years.208 Others states have adopted voluntary plans. New York and seven other states, mostly in the Northeast, also filed suit directly against various Midwestern utilities alleging that their failure to control greenhouse gas emissions constitutes common law nuisance.209 This activity is the result, in pari, of relative federal inaction on climate change.210 Setting aside the question of whether regulatory action to control greenhouse gases is worthwhile, it should be clear that any such action is best undertaken at the national (if not international) level, rather than by state and local governments. policies indicate that a "bottom-up approach to addressing global climate change" is inevitable for "a nation as physically large and economically diverse as the United States”. CONCLUSION Environmental protections would be more successful if responsibility were divided between the federal and state governments in a more justifiable manner.211 Ideally, the federal government should reorient its efforts toward those areas in which the federal government possesses an institutional advantage, due to economies of scale, or where state and local governments are incapable of addressing environmental problems, such as where there are substantial interstate spillovers. A greater "match" between the scope of environmental problems and the institutions entrusted with addressing such concerns would enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of existing environmental protection efforts. The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy was not created overnight, nor can it be cured easily.212 Numerous reports and studies have identified the deficiency in federal research and scientific knowledge relevant to environmental concerns, and there is some evidence of progress on this front. Addressing the jurisdictional mismatch will be more difficult; at present there is little interest in revisiting the basic structure of federal environmental law in the legislative or executive branch. Nor are courts likely to force wholesale revisions in existing federal environmental regulations.213 One possible means of addressing the jurisdictional mismatch would be to create greater opportunities for states to free themselves of inappropriate federal requirements. Elsewhere this author has proposed a policy of "ecological forbearance," under which states could petition federal agencies for waivers from federal requirements where no compelling reasons exist to enforce the federal rule. 214 Such a policy would enable states to experiment with alternative means of environmental protection, which could reopen the laboratories of democracy in enviromnental policy. It also would have the potential to free up federal resources to focus on those areas m which interstate spillovers or economies of scale reqmre greater federal involvement. However it is accomplished, fixing the current jurisdictional mismatch should be a high priority for environmental reform. Despite the environmental successes of the past three decades, the overlapping and contradictory state and federal rules do not lead to efficient or effective environmental protection. It is in some senses an historical accident that state leadership in environmental policy was supplanted by federal regulation, and environmental policy could be improved if states regained more of their historic role. The federal government did not come to dominate environmental policy because a more decentralized system was leading to environmental ruin.215 Yet environmental protection could be improved if federal dominance was confined to those areas in which the federal government has something unique to contribute.

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Federalism is critical to successful environmental policy

Stan Meiburg, 4-26-2021, Ph.D. is the Director of the Graduate Studies in Sustainability at Wake Forest University and a Fellow at the National Academy of Public Administration, American Federalism and the Environment – FEDERALISM.US," Federalism.US a place for policy makers, researchers and citizens interested in analyzing and better understanding issues related to federalism, intergovernmental relations and multilevel democracy.

, https://federalism.us/2021/04/american-federalism-and-the-environment/, Accessed: 6-24-2021, /Kent Denver-MB

To a degree unprecedented in recent American history, the environment, especially but not limited to climate change, has moved to the front rank of our public policy concerns. Even more remarkable is the degree to which this concern is interwoven with other threads: economic recovery, racial and social justice, energy supply and demand, trade policy, financial investments, agricultural policy, and national security.

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Strong state role is key – creates a wave of clean energy innovation and continues Paris momentum

Hart, senior fellow at the Brookings Metro Program, 17

(David, “How states and localities can limit the fallout of Trump’s withdrawal from Paris”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/06/02/how-states-and-localities-can-limit-the-fallout-of-trumps-withdrawal-from-paris/)

President Trump shocked the world yesterday by yanking the United States out of the landmark Paris Climate Agreement. The other are outraged, while the of Americans, who support our nation staying in, are left feeling voiceless. And yet, for all that, a measure of consolation can be had in the fact that state and local governments across the United States are already moving to limit the global fallout by renewing their own commitments to clean energy, which is the most important component of America’s contribution to the global climate solution. And so here is an idea: states and localities should take it to the next level. They should magnify their impact by formally registering their clean energy commitments with the international community, as former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg has , and aggregating them together in a single unified announcement, which would be made at a national convention of leaders from all sectors of American society. While such distributed but collective action by state and local governments would not be a complete substitute for the federal government’s pullback, it would be more than a mere holding action. It might even trigger a new wave of “bottom up” progress toward a clean energy economy. The Paris Agreement itself gives states and localities this valuable leverage. The agreement does not work by punishing non-compliance, but instead by cultivating mutual awareness and building mutual confidence (a key point that the administration seems to have missed in preparing to make this ill-advised decision). Global stakeholders announce independently determined commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and endorse arrangements to measure and verify progress toward them. The transparency of the commitment creates awareness, while the verification measures build confidence. Over time, this structure has the potential to lead to a virtuous cycle of action that will limit the damage to human health, the economy, and the environment caused by climate change, which is already occurring and getting worse each year. In this regard, while nations are the legal parties to the Paris Agreement, state and local governments are vital stakeholders, too, and can contribute directly to the achievement of its goals. As it happens, advocates of global climate action shrewdly devised a structure for these contributions that parallels that for nations. States and localities may, like nations, decide for themselves to set emissions reductions targets and declare these to the world. The (NAZCA) portal provides a platform that makes all other stakeholders aware of such pledges by registering them with the international community. Over 6,000 commitments by subnational governments around the world have been registered on the NAZCA portal to date. Verification that these jurisdictions are making progress toward fulfilling their commitments is provided by NAZCA’s eight internationally recognized partners, which have established standardized measuring and reporting methods. Along these lines, the and the are cooperative initiatives that, while not formally linked to the agreement among nations, provide benchmarks for subnational governments that want to participate in the Paris process. Governors, mayors, and other leaders who join them agree to reduce emissions and report their results via NAZCA. States and localities that aspire to emission reductions of 80 percent or greater by 2050 may join other cooperative initiatives like the and the that further the Paris call for increasingly ambitious action to fend off the worst impacts of climate change. Already, governors and legislatures, county executives and councils, and mayors and city councils across the United States have begun to step into the breach created by President Trump’s decision. Two hundred and three registrants on NAZCA hail from this country. , for instance, belongs to the Compact of States and Regions and the Under 2 MOU and has made a half-dozen specific commitments on clean energy. Houston, Nashville, and Memphis, similarly, are among the 182 American cities that have declared their membership in the global mayors’ group. However, many more U.S. state and local governments that are taking action to address climate change have not yet registered their commitments internationally. According to the , more than 1,000 American cities have adopted greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. The at North Carolina State University shows that 29 states and the District of Columbia have adopted requirements for the use of renewable resources for electricity generation. For many regions, in fact, clean energy is becoming a key component of economic development, as the Metro Program has . Specialized of new, fast-growing clean energy industries that create good jobs have emerged in large and small cities around the country. And so by taking the simple step of registering on NAZCA actions to which they are already committed, U.S. states and localities can send this message to the world: we support the Paris Agreement, regardless of what the President says. Which prompts our second idea—the creation of a major new forum for publicizing and adding up commitments. Bottom-up engagement would become even more powerful if subnational governments made it in unison at a new American Clean Energy Convention. At such a convention, each state could share its own state-determined plan to reduce emissions to the degree and in the manner that best suits it. Where states are unwilling to do so, delegations made up of localities and private leaders might fill in. Such an American Clean Energy Convention would help to reassure the world that it is the federal government, not America, that is withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. At the same time, the convention, by drawing on the creativity of our dynamic federal system, might also inspire its participants to take more ambitious steps at the state and local levels. Friendly competition, synergies between regional energy systems, and mobilization of citizens and companies could turn the process of making declarations into powerful race to the top. In any event, a new, more concerted, and more effective surge of “bottom-up” climate and energy problem-solving is now surely needed. States and localities should respond to President Trump’s rash and short-sighted decision with a new phase of commitment to transform our old, outmoded 1900s energy system into a dynamic, clean system suited to this new century. In this way a four-year hiatus in federal policy need not become the end of the world. Indeed, ambitious steps by states and localities would ensure that a future president who wants to rejoin the Paris Agreement—to which every other nation in the world but two belongs—gets a running start.

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Federalism balance key to solve climate change

Vicki Arroyo 10-31-2019, Vicki Arroyo is the Executive Director of the Georgetown Climate Center based at Georgetown University Law Center, where she is also a Professor from Practice. Professor Arroyo serves as Special Advisor to the President of Georgetown University, and was previously Law Center’s Assistant Dean of Centers and Institutes.Someone Left the Cake Out in the Rain: The Dissolution of Cooperative Federalism in the Trump Era," JD Supra, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/someone-left-the-cake-out-in-the-rain-39747/, Accessed: 6-24-2021, /MB

In fact, frustrated by the lack of progress, I left D.C. to help draft and enact legislation in my home state of Louisiana that cut air toxics emissions by half in just four years. My former colleagues back at EPA continued their work on the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments signed into law by President George H.W. Bush, and were able to implement regulations requiring the use of advanced technologies to reduce air toxics and apply a “residual risk” assessment. Together, state and federal action delivered major cuts in pollution that causes cancer, miscarriages, and other serious health problems.

Now we face an even greater planetary threat—climate change—and state action has been one of the few bright spots in an overall grim U.S. policy picture. Thirty years ago, when I represented Louisiana Governor Buddy Roemer on a bipartisan National Governors’ Association (NGA) task force on climate change, we recognized the importance of national and global action. We also saw major roles for states in areas like electric power and transportation, where they hold significant authority over planning, investment, and regulation.