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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – Terror - !D
Fettweis ’19 [Christopher; associate professor of political science at Tulane University in New Orleans. He holds a doctorate degree from the University of Maryland–College Park specializing in political psychology and US foreign policy. Spring 2019; “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age”; Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 13, Issue 1; https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-1/Fettweis.pdf] TDI
Finally, despite the string of bleak and terrifying projections from a variety of experts, nuclear weapons have remained well beyond the capabilities of the modern apocalyptic terrorist. The great fear of the SNA literature, that scientific knowledge and technology would gradually become more accessible to nonstate actors, has remained only a dream. Nor does there appear to be a great reservoir of fissile material in the world’s various black markets waiting to be weaponized.58
Just because something has not yet occurred does not mean that it cannot or will not occur eventually. However, it is worth noting that the world has not experienced any close calls regarding nuclear terrorism. Forecasting future unique events is a necessarily dicey enterprise, but one way to improve accuracy is to examine events that have already or almost happened. Given the many complexities involved with nuclear weapons, especially for amateurs as any terrorists would almost certainly be, it is not unreasonable to expect a few failures, or near misses, to precede success. While it is possible that we might not know about all the plots disrupted by international law enforcement, keeping the lid on nuclear near misses would presumably be no small task. As of this writing, the public is aware of no serious attempts to construct, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, much less smuggle and detonate one. “Leakage” does not seem to be a problem, yet.59
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – Terror – K
Patel ’17 [Tina; Patel completed her degree in Criminal Justice at Liverpool John Moores University, the qualification of PhD. She was appointed as a research fellow at Nottingham Trent University. She is currently Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Salford Manchester. May 2, 2017; “It’s not about security, it’s about racism: counter-terror strategies, civilizing processes and the post-race fiction”; Palgrave Communications] TDI
Counter-terror measures have been criticized for their over-focus on all Muslims, and for their simplistic, generic and one-dimensional notions of Islam (Kundnani, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Bonino, 2013; Patel, 2017). This has presented the commonsensical view that extremism and radicalization is inherent within Muslim culture. It is a logic that presents all Muslims as extremists, rather than problematising the extremist mind-set of individuals themselves. Anti-Muslim racism has seen the state and its allied services construct Muslims through a language of disobedience, deviance and criminality, which is itself considered to be built on anti-Western hostility and a history of Orientalism (Said, 1979). Within the “war on terror” context, this means that there is an easy acceptance in lay society of “the dangerous brown man” — an adaptation of earlier racist mythologies around the “dangerous black man” (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 96), which is used to both represent and sustain racialized anxieties. Rooted in these anxieties is the idea that Muslims are uncivil, inferior and inhumane. This logic not only helps to justify their unequal treatment in society, but also helps to ensure that accusations of abuse and torture by the state are viewed with relatively little sympathy. As Kundnani (2007: 126) notes, “to be a “Muslim” in the “war on terror” is to belong to a group with common origins, a shared culture and a monolithic identity that can be held collectively responsible for terrorism, segregation and the failure of multicultural Britain”. Muslims are not just seen to be deviant or even criminal, but they are considered to be the worse type of criminal — the fundamentalist terrorist, different to comparatively humanistic terrorists of yester-year. The “Islamic terrorist” indiscriminately targets all Western-civilians, including it most vulnerable and precious: women and children.
Underpinned by older (immigration) concerns of “civilizing” Muslim populations, newer counter-terror measures have allowed for a wider-reaching remit of control of Muslims. It has done so though, in a way that exudes a sense of urgency for extreme deprivation measures and the enhanced surveillance of Muslims. A number of legal measures have been introduced, which by capitalizing on popular anti-Muslim sentiment, have over-focused on Islamic terrorism. For instance, in the United Kingdom, there was the extending of the 2000 Terrorism Act (Home Office, 2000), which actively designated Muslims as dangerous, suspect and in need of control (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009: 652). The 2000 Act criminalised a range of activities associated with a number of proscribed organizations, which included supporting or attending meetings of said organizations. Subsequent amendments to the 2000 Act increased the number of proscribed organizations, with most newly added organizations being associated with countries where Islam is the main faith. There was also an extension of stop and search powers under sections 44 and 45, allowing for practice to be undertaken without the need for reasonable suspicion. Unlike the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (Home Office, 1984), the police officer did not need to have “reasonable suspicion” for the stop and search2. The Act was later followed by the anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Home Office, 2001); the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Home Office, 2005); the Terrorism Act 2006 (Home Office, 2006); the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Home Office, 2008); and, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Home Office, 2015a). In combination, these Acts have over-criminalized Muslim populations, and have made “legal” their enhanced status as sources of risk and consequently their vulnerability to victimization by the state, especially in relation to police stop and search practices (Medina Ariza, 2013).
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – A2 Non-Alignment Turn
1NC Shoki ’23 [(William Shoki, deputy editor of Africa Is a Country. He is based in Johannesburg.) “Anti-imperialism for the ruling class”, Africa is a Country, 05/12/2023. ] pfox TDI
And so, creating a viable society at home is a necessary step towards creating a viable international solidarity. This demands a confrontation with capital, which requires building the economic and political power of the working class.
The contemporary realities of scarcity, economic decline, and effective “de-development” make the task daunting. But meaningful internationalism must be grounded in real efforts to build a mass, international movement in opposition to capital. To do that, we have to organize ourselves first.
2023
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – Russia – Wagner Thumps
Pilling et al. ’23 [David; Africa editor of the Financial Times. Andres Schipani, Aanu Adeoye, Samer Al-Atrush. June 27, 2023; “Wagner’s future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny”; Financial Times; https://www.ft.com/content/93381925-9b2e-4c57-b669-7c592536cffc] TDI
For years Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group has been the main vehicle of Russia’s power projection in Africa, engaging in military, mining and propaganda activities across the continent from Libya and Sudan to Mali and Mozambique.
If Moscow is able to follow through on its threat to disband Wagner after Prigozhin’s aborted mutiny in Russia, the question now is what will happen to the mercenary group’s extensive African operations.
2023
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – Russia – K
Roberts ’16 [(Kari Roberts, PhD, Political Science at Mount Royal University, Senior Fellow at the Canadian International Council.) “Why a Normal Relationship With Russia Is So Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American Foreign Policy Discourse and The Decision to Expand NATO”, May 2016. ] pfox TDI
Andrei Tsygankov accurately identifies anti-Russianism, or Russophobia, in American decision making, defined as “a fear of Russia’s political system on the grounds that it is incompatible with the interests and values of the West in general and the United States in particular. This fear finds expression in various forms of criticism of Russia that are unbalanced and distorted. No matter which independent actions Moscow may pursue, they are sure to be perceived… as reflecting Russia’s expansionist interests, not as a legitimate pursuit of national interests.” 19 Russophobia transcends ideological and partisan lines, as both neo-conservative and liberal minded groups demonize Russia in fairly equal measure. These attitudes are more than simply a cultural animosity toward Russians; rather, they reflect “a very real fear of Russia’s political influence” that finds expression in a distorted critique of Russia and its politics. This animosity results in a persistent need to contain Russia’s influence, even in times of relative peace and cooperation between the two nations. This is evidenced by the impulse to expand NATO just a few short years after the end of the Cold War and before the reversal of early expectations for Russia’s democratic consolidation. This will be discussed later in the paper.
For Tsygankov, Russia is viewed as an expansionist state that refuses to abide by “acceptable rules of international behavior,” owing either to its political culture or its questionable leadership; either way, it must be “contained or fundamentally transformed.” Russophobia is informed by a misinterpretation of Russia’s history, one in which Russia has been forced to respond to the actions of the West, rather than represent some sort of ingrained need to conquer and dominate. Russia is viewed as an autocratic empire that perpetually oppresses nationalities, denies its citizens basic rights, “concentrates economic and military resources in the hands of the state,” and doggedly pursues its inherent and illegitimate expansionist national interests. This last point bears re-stating: Russia is not accorded the courtesy of being seen to possess legitimate national interests, owing to the above assumptions about its nature and motivations. Tsygankov notes that, “even during the 1990s, when Russia looked more like a failing state than one capable of projecting power, some members of the American political class were worried about the future revival of the Eurasian giant as a revisionist power.” He attributes the rampant triumphalism in the US at the end of the Cold War to this fear of Russia, noting it reached its zenith in the mid-1990s. In fact, it was actually the Clinton administration that “entrenched the rhetoric of victorious thinking by drawing the analogy between Russia and the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II.” This triumphalism implied something inherently superior, and therefore inferior, about the US and Russia, respectively.
2023
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – China – Status
Murray ’19 [Michelle; Associate Professor of Political Studies; Director of Global Initiatives at Bard College. PhD in International Relations at University of Chicago. 2019; “Identity, Insecurity, and China’s Place in the World”; The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries] TDI
China’s view of, and future place in, the international order are importantly connected to its experiences during the Century of Humiliation and the dual concepts of national humiliation and national rejuvenation that constitute its self-understanding. The Century of Humiliation began with the first Opium War in 1839, when Britain forced China to open its ports to the opium trade, and did not end until the success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the civil war of 1949. During this time, China was the target of repeated international interventions, lost large pieces of its territory to Western powers and Japan, saw the collapse of its millennia old imperial system, and was torn apart by internal uprisings.44 According to the national humiliation narrative, the first Opium War represents a distinct turning point in Chinese history, when a powerful and successful ancient civilization was forced into a semi-colonial position at the hands of foreign interventions. National humiliation is an active part of contemporary Chinese collective identity. It serves as an important resource for those cultivating Chinese nationalism, unifying the Chinese people against foreign others who perpetrated these past humiliations and legitimating the CCP, the party seen as leading China’s reemergence as a major power.
The Century of Humiliation, however, is not just about recounting a particular interpretation of the past. Rather, it actively informs beliefs about how the world works and is used to interpret the dynamics of international relations today.45 Specifically, the national humiliation narrative constructs China’s self-understanding and its place in the international system, shaping its interests and aspirations as a rising power. First, the narrative of national humiliation represents China as a victim of Western subjugation. When articulated in the context of current international relations, this representation works to breed suspicion of outside actors, including the United States, and gives an emotional valence to seemingly inconsequential interactions. For example, in 2001 a US spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea, sparking an international incident and inflaming tensions between China and the United States. As the incident played itself out, it became apparent that “resolving this problem did not involve military retaliation or economic reparations so much as symbolic recognition: China demanded a public apology from the United States.”46 Thus, understood through the prism of national humiliation, interactions with the West are always contextualized in a history where China suffered humiliating losses at the hands of Western expansion, and where Western power is, in and of itself, the instrument of that subjugation.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – China – No Threat
Pei ’21 [Minxin; professor of government at Claremont McKenna College. May 27, 2021; “The China Threat Is Being Overhyped”; Bloomberg; [edited for ableist language]; https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-27/u-s-shouldn-t-treat-china-as-an-existential-threat] TDI
Republicans across the political spectrum, from moderate Senator Mitt Romney to fire-breathing former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have decreed that China poses an existential threat to the United States. While President Joe Biden hasn’t gone that far yet, his national-security team has maintained the previous administration’s hardline policies toward Beijing. Any other stance would risk a political backlash: The latest Gallup poll shows nearly 80% of Americans hold unfavorable views of China — a number that will only rise if U.S. intelligence agencies conclude that the new coronavirus leaked from a Chinese lab.
Biden should think carefully before he commits himself further. Countries facing an existential threat must mobilize and deploy all their resources to confront, if not remove, that threat and ensure their survival. How the Biden administration assesses the threat China poses will effectively determine war and peace in the 21st century.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – China – No Africa !
Eland ’23 [Ivan; senior fellow with the Independent Institute and author of War and the Rogue Presidency. January 11, 2023; “Does the U.S. Need to Contain China in Africa?”; National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/does-us-need-contain-china-africa-206097] TDI
Last month’s U.S.-African Leaders Summit aimed to compete with China, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other nations for “influence” in Africa, a continent that is growing in prominence. According to the New York Times, China, which recently gave a whopping $60 billion in aid and loans to African nations, is leading the race for influence on the rising continent, with the United States falling behind in the giveaways. Really, that’s just fine.
After World War II, during the Cold War, and 150 years after the Constitutional Convention, the United States deviated from its traditional foreign policy of being a reluctant and late participant in overseas wars. President Harry Truman, in choosing to help the autocratic governments of Turkey and Greece fend off Communist influence in 1947, pledged the United States to compete for influence in a global Cold War with the Soviet Union. In that forty-two-year Cold War, the United States spent huge amounts of blood and treasure reflexively competing all over the world to contain, and in a few cases roll back, Communism. This established a muscle memory for gaining ever more ethereal “influence” in far reaches of the planet. When the East Bloc and Soviet Union suddenly collapsed and the United States was perceived to have “won” the Cold War, such uncharacteristic American interventionism appeared to have validation. (In reality, the Soviet Empire collapsed because its creaking economy could no longer support its overextended empire. If the United States had not contested the then-basket cases of South Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and instead let the Soviets bear the cost of conquering and administering them, perhaps the Soviet Union would have collapsed faster than it did.)
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – China – K
Barder ’21 [Alexander, International Relations @ Florida International University. 2021. “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and the Asia-Pacific War”, Chapter 6 in Global Race War: International Politics and Racial Hierarchy.] pfox TDI
The salience of anti-Japanese racism in the United States did not emerge willy-nilly out of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor or the need to induce pro-war sentiment in an American public largely content with its aloofness from global geopolitics. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, anti-Asian racism proliferated in American society and politics. Recall from Alfred Mahan’s concern about the nascent conflicts with Asiatic civilizations and the potential for racial conflict in the twentieth century that would come to constitute global politics. As America became a global power, the notion of the “yellow peril” dominated American ideas about the Pacific as much as those of economic expansion. From the Chinese-Exclusion Act of 1882 to the denial by the United States of Japan’s request for enshrining a covenant on racial equality at Versailles for the League of Nations in 1919, this period in the United States marked a certain fear of and contempt for the Japanese and Chinese in particular. The famous American writer Jack London, in his 1910 short story “The Unparalleled Invasion,” imagines a resurgent China bursting beyond the Pacific as a result of population growth to challenge Western civilization. Only, London writes, as a result of biological warfare leading to outright genocide of the Chinese is Western civilization saved. Indeed, London’s message in the story is not only that racial genocide avant la lettre is warranted but that such techniques should be used only against non-Western populations as a way of maintaining racial hierarchy. In much of the “yellow peril” literature, fictional and otherwise, a persistent theme is the need for a broad alliance of European/Western powers to counteract the threat posed by a rising Asia.
This particular theme of presenting Asian races as inherently threatening in terms of an almost unstoppable mass of people was ubiquitous in late nineteenth-century Western literature and political discourse. Its anxiety reimagines the Mongolian invasions of the thirteenth century as a specter haunting Europe and the West as a whole. Indeed, it was not just in the United States that such racist views proliferated; European intellectuals and politicians voiced outright hostility toward what they saw as an inferior, yet potentially dangerous, set of East Asian “hordes.” The term itself, “yellow peril,” came into widespread circulation with Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany pronouncing it in the 1890s; it evoked this specter of a global threat that challenged the very notion of a European state system. “The East” thus came to signify this almost limitless territorial expanse populated by racially inferior people, which would cultivate particularly German fantasies of empire and colonization, a theme that the Nazis would base their geopolitical imaginary on (). Moreover, this racial notion of the East or Asiatic would continue to structure Western imaginations after the Second World War; it would come to play an important role during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union being seen as an “Asiatic” power and the Chinese as a monolithic communist threat to American interests in the Pacific. George Kennan, in his famous essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” argued that the Soviet Union emerged out of the “Russian-Asiatic world,” which implied that its “particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power.” The fear of “Asia” in American discourse never entirely goes away. Throughout the Cold War, China becomes the Asiatic (communist) enemy whose machinations aim to subvert American influence and power in the region. In the 1980s, the nominally pliant Japanese ally takes on more ominous characterizations with the intensity of economic competition. By the turn of the twentieth-first century, China returns as the main culprit in future threats to American global hegemony.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – North Africa – No War
Burbach ’16 [David; an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Dr. Burbach received a Ph.D in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and has expertise in African security, defense planning, and U.S. foreign policy. September 23, 2016; “THE COMING PEACE: AFRICA’S DECLINING CONFLICTS”; Somaliland Sun; https://www.somalilandsun.com/the-coming-peace-africas-declining-conflicts/] TDI
Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent, but this depiction is becoming outdated. In the 21st century, the amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever.
Displaced by war
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – Core – Topshelf
Gbadamosi ’22 [Nosmot; multimedia journalist and the writer of Foreign Policy’s weekly Africa Brief. May 25, 2022; “How the West Lost Africa”; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/25/west-africa-russia-ukraine-war-us-congress/] TDI
Both stories focused on the U.S. Congress’s debate in April of a bill that would seek to “counter the malign influence and activities” of Russia and its proxies in Africa. The headlines offered great insight into how some African journalists and citizens view U.S. foreign policy in Africa as being primarily driven by geopolitical concerns about rivals Russia and China rather than the prosperity of Africans.
The proposed act, sponsored by Democratic Rep. Gregory Meeks, would allow Congress to assess the scope of Russian engagement on the continent, as well as monitor disinformation operations and the activities of Russian private military contractors. It passed the House of Representatives on April 27, with 415 members voting in favor and just nine against.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – DA – Deterrence › 1AR – Core – IR K
Reus-Smit ’19 [Christian; Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, in Brisbane Australia. March 21, 2019; "International Relations Theory Doesn’t Understand Culture"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/international-relations-theory-doesnt-understand-culture/] TDI
Realists are materialists at heart, yet they frequently make arguments that rest on cultural assumptions. They describe themselves as studying conflict groups, and when we probe the nature of these groups, they commonly appear as cultural units: nation-states with national characters, identities, and interests. The anarchic international system gives states certain primary interests — principally survival — but national culture is commonly seen as a key source of other interests.
Many realists admit that today’s international order rests on legitimacy as much as material might. And when explaining such legitimacy, they join others in emphasizing Western civilization, which is said to provide the norms and values that inform and sustain modern institutions. For former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others, the erosion of this cultural foundation poses a fundamental threat. How can “regions with such divergent cultures, histories, and traditional theories of order vindicate the legitimacy of any common system?” Kissinger asked in his book World Order.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – Case › 1AR – A2 Shift
Queally ‘12 [(Jon, senior editor and staff writer – Common Dreams.) “A Retort to US Military Expansion in Africa: 'Dismantle AFRICOM', As US makes plans to blanket continent with soldiers and drones, an alternative: Don't”,m Common Dreams, 12/24/2012. ] pfox TDI
The sharper focus on Africa by the U.S. comes against a backdrop of widespread insurgent violence across North Africa, and as the African Union and other nations discuss military intervention in northern Mali.
In his speech at Brown, Ham explained that the expansion is designed to protect the 'national security interests of the United States'. However, in his remarks—in which he acknowledged the audience included "ambassadors and scholars, former ambassadors and practitioners, members of various governments and civil society"—he admitted that he lacked the "depth of knowledge and background and experience in Africa" that was widely represented by others.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AR – Case › 1AR – A2 AFRICOM Good
Turse ’19 [(Nick Turse, contributing writer for The Intercept, reporting on national security and foreign policy. He is the author, most recently, of "Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and Survival in South Sudan," as well as "Tomorrow's Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa," and "Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam." He has written for the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, The Nation, and Village Voice, among other publications. He has received a Ridenhour Prize for Investigative Reporting, a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, and a Guggenheim Fellowship. Turse is a fellow at The Nation Institute and the managing editor of TomDispatch.com) “Violence Has Spiked in Africa Since the Military Founded AFRICOM, Pentagon Study Finds”, The Intercept, 07/29/2019. ] pfox TDI
AFRICOM “disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats” in order to “promote regional security, stability and prosperity,” according to its mission statement. But since AFRICOM began, key indicators of security and stability in Africa have plummeted according to the Defense Department’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution. “Overall, militant Islamist group activity in Africa has doubled since 2012,” according to a recent analysis by the Africa Center.
There are now roughly 24 “active militant Islamist groups” operating on the continent, up from just five in 2010, the analysis found. Today, 13 African countries face attacks from these groups — a 160 percent increase over that same time span. In fact, the number of “violent events” across the continent has jumped 960 percent, from 288 in 2009 to 3,050 in 2018, according to the Africa Center’s analysis.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AC › 1AC – Imperialism
Mitchell and Chaudhury ’20 [Audra Mitchell, Balsillie School of International Affairs @ Wilfrid Laurier University, and Aadita Chaudhury, York University. “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms”, September 2020. ] pfox TDI
It is often said that the ‘end of the world’ is approaching – but whose world, exactly, is expected to end? Over the last several decades, a popular and increasingly influential literature on ‘human extinction’, ‘global catastrophic risks’, and eco-apocalypse has emerged in the social sciences and popular culture. This rapidly growing body of knowledge is produced by scientists, science journalists, policy-analysts, and scholars of global affairs, all seeking to reach broad audiences and influence international policy-making. Their central aim is to diagnose the gravest global threats and to offer strategies to protect the future of what they regard as ‘humanity’. Yet, despite their claims to universality, we argue that these ‘end of the world’ discourses are more specifically concerned about protecting the future of whiteness. Although our primary aim in this article is to diagnose these potentially destructive narratives, we also engage with the rich and varied sphere of BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color) futurisms. These contributions challenge the perception that there is no alternative to the apocalyptic futures imagined by white scholars. They work to create plural worlds that vastly exceed white visions of ‘the’ end of ‘the world’, embodying much wider, diverse, and transformative concepts of, and beyond, ‘humanity’, ‘nature’, and ‘the planet’. We view this article as a call for IR scholars to recognize and engage these plural imaginaries, which contest and perforate the boundaries of mainstream IR concepts such as ‘humanity’, ‘agency’, ‘governance’, ‘threat’, and ‘harm’. As Amy Niang’s contribution to this special issue shows, those concepts are too often constructed through forms of power that negate, oppress, and super-exploit particular human bodies, societies, and ways of being.
Our analysis takes seriously this special issue’s efforts toward ‘thinking IR into the future’, but with several important caveats. First, we reject the Euro-centric notion that there is ‘a’ or ‘the’ single future – just as we reject the notion of a single world, now or ever. Such assumptions are at the core of the mainstream apocalyptic visions (and their linear temporalities) that are increasing integral to IR imaginaries at the ‘turn’ of the discipline’s ‘first century’. We contend that the foundational and generative role of such imaginaries in global power structures does not receive adequate attention in the field of IR or in the broader social and natural sciences. As a result, their tendency to narrow and homogenize the futures of worlds, plural, goes largely unchecked within the discipline and its discourses. Yet the white futurist discourses we discuss are influential: they aim to bring about major shifts in global public consciousness and policy-making and strategy. They are often accorded validation by the scientific credentials of their authors and their embeddedness in large-scale data and modeling processes. Through these means of public persuasion, such discourses have the potential to shape concepts that are, and will likely continue to be, foundational to IR: how threats are understood; the boundaries of ‘humanity’ and ‘nonhumanity’, and the distributions of harm across and beyond these structures; and the forms of agency and governance demanded by, and deemed acceptable within, a context of global crises. An interdisciplinary IR concerned with interconnected global challenges – the aspiration of this special issue – needs to attend to how dominant narratives and futural imaginaries cut off and sideline the concrete presents and possible futures of plural Others. Second, where this special issue asks ‘how we should hold things together, conceptually, empirically and disciplinarily’ (see introduction, italics ours), we ask what possibilities arise when current structures fall apart – or, indeed, are actively dismantled by the resurgence of worlds they seek to oppress or erase. Far from seeing this scenario solely in terms of catastrophe, as many of the narratives discussed in this article do, we want to open up more conversation in IR about its emancipatory, creative potential for the global connection between and amongst plural worlds.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AC › 1AC – Imperialism
Brewer et al ’23 [(Rose Brewer, PhD, is an activist-scholar specializing in political economy, social movements, and studies in Africa and the African diaspora. She is a professor of African-American and African Studies at the University of Minnesota, where she is the Morse Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor and previous chairperson of the Department of African American and African Studies. Interviewed by T.A. Tran and Leanne Loo.) “Resisting AFRICOM and Beyond: An Interview with Rose Brewer of Black Alliance for Peace”, Science for the People, Winter 2022/2023. ] pfox TDI
SftP: Can you tell us about the work you do around resistance against militarism and United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) through the Black Alliance for Peace?
Brewer: Black Alliance for Peace is just a little bit over five years old, and the AFRICOM initiative is one of the most sturdy and significant pieces of work done by BAP. The idea of having military bases on the continent has really gathered steam since the Bush administration, and from the idea that was presented by the Defense Department in 2007.3 It didn’t really get catalyzed until 2008. There’s always been, or for quite a while, pushback against having those bases by the countries on the continent. More recently under the mantra of “fighting the war on poverty,” more and more of the African countries have allowed military bases to come in. Our work in BAP has really been a tremendous pushback against this for a number of reasons. BAP is an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial formation, concerned with the persistence of the neocolonial realities of not only Africa, but other parts of the world, and indeed on the tremendous negative impact by the US empire and its alliance with what we call “comprador class”—the governing structures of those societies. Basically that means the [African] elites who are in relationship with the Defense Department for those bases. Their public message is to provide “military training” to those various nations on the continent for protection to “secure democracy.” But of course none of that has really happened.
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AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AC › 1AC – Imperialism
Carliner ’22 [(Sam Carliner, socialist with a background in journalism. He mainly writes for Left Voice about US imperialism.) “U.S. Military in Africa Fuels Political Violence Across the Continent”, Left Voice, 02/12/2022. ] pfox TDI
Much like South and Central America, imperialist nations have long viewed the African continent as a place for stealing valuable assets. The continent has 30 percent of the world’s remaining mineral wealth and is home to five of the top 30 oil producing countries in the world. That is why the European powers carved up the continent during the “Scramble for Africa,” and it is why the United States now seeks to control the military operations of African countries in key regions like the Sahel (along with French imperialism) and The Horn, as well as maintain a broader military presence throughout the continent.
The best-known example of AFRICOM’s impact is the regime change mission in Libya in 2011. This operation was enacted by a multi-state “coalition,” led by the United States, to impose United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 — which established the basis for a foreign military intervention in Libya’s civil war. It is an example of just how much damage U.S.-led intervention can do to a country without the United States ever having to put boots on the ground or act unilaterally — both recurring aspects of AFRICOM’s operations.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AC › 1AC – Imperialism
Shupak ’20 [(Greg Shupak writes fiction, non-fiction and book reviews. His most recent book is The Wrong Story: Palestine, Israel, and The Media. He teaches Media Studies at the University of Guelph.) “The Last Thing Libya Needs Is an Intensification of a U.S. Proxy War”, In These Times, 08/18/2020. ] pfox TDI
Antagonism between the United States and Russia is deepening over Libya’s natural resources. Libya has long had two competing seats of government: the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), which is led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and recognized by the UN Security Council, and the eastern-based House of Representatives, an ally of the Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA is led by commander Khalifa Haftar, a U.S. citizen and one-time C.I.A asset who owns properties in Virginia. Russian contractors have taken control of two of Libya’s largest oil facilities, giving the contractors sway over crucial export flows to Europe, as well as over assets partly owned by major Western oil companies. Haftar, who Russia supports, is blocking much of Libya’s oil production. In July, the U.S. Treasury Department levied new sanctions against Russia, citing in part Russian involvement in Libya, while the State Department says the United States is incensed by Russia’s support for Haftar’s obstruction of the oil industry.
The last thing that Libya needs is intensification of the proxy war in the country. Americans should agitate to prevent their government from using Libya as a battleground against Russia. After all, the United States and its allies are answerable for the litany of horrors through which Libyans have lived for most of the last decade because these unfolded under the conditions left by NATO’s overthrow of Gaddafi’s government.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AC › 1AC – Imperialism
Wai ’14 [(Zubaru Wai, Department of Political Science, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Canada.) “The empire's new clothes: Africa, liberal interventionism and contemporary world order”, Review of African Political Economy, 2014. ] pfox TDI
Although he appeared to have repaired relations with the West in the post-9/11 environment, Western suspicion of Gaddafi lingered: he was still too ‘dangerous’ and unpredictable to be trusted. For example, his vocal stance against the United States’ Africa Command (AFRICOM), the latest military front for projecting the power of the United States on the continent, made especially that state very uncomfortable, and confirmed to US officials that Gaddafi had not given up his old ways. Gaddafi's influence on the continent appeared to have, in part, put the future of the project in jeopardy, at least temporarily. As journalist Dan Glazebrook rightly notes in The Guardian:
Gaddafi ended his political life as a dedicated pan-Africanist and, whatever one thought of the man, it is clear that his vision for Africa was very different from that of the subordinate supplier of cheap labour and raw materials that Africom was created to maintain. He was not only the driving force behind the creation of the African Union in 2002, but had also served as its elected head, and made Libya its biggest financial donor. To the dismay of some of his African colleagues, he used his time as leader to push for a ‘United States of Africa,’ with a single currency, single army and single passport. More concretely, Gaddafi's Libya had an estimated $150bn worth of investment in Africa – often in social infrastructure and development projects, and this largesse bought him many friends, particularly in the smaller nations. As long as Gaddafi retained this level of influence in Africa, Africom was going to founder. (Glazebrook Citation2012)
2023
TDI
Affirmative
AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23 › 1AC › 1AC – Imperialism
A-APRP ’21 [(All-African People’s Revolutionary Party, a permanent, independent, revolutionary, socialist, Pan-African Political Party based in Africa. Africa is the just homeland of African People all over the world. Our Party is an integral part of the Pan-African and World Socialist revolutionary movement. The A-APRP understands that “all people of African descent, whether they live in North or South America, the Caribbean, or in any other part of the world, are Africans and belong to the African Nation”.) “Say No To Africom!”, A-APRP, 12/01/2021. ] pfox TDI
In an arrogant assertion of their intention to own and militarily dominate the world, the United States of America has established eleven unified combatant commands across the globe, each with an “area of responsibility”. This “responsibility” represents the positioning of the U.S. to militarily protect its allies, to keep pressure on nations to maintain a relationship of subservience to the U.S., and to militarily ‘keep in check’ or attack nations that refuse to bow down to its demands. These demands force the incorporation of all nations into an economic and political system dominated by U.S. corporate imperialism, thus preventing any genuine self-determination.
Eritrea is the only country in Africa that is not a part of AFRICOM and continues steadfast resistance to U.S. military presence on our continent. Egypt is not in AFRICOM because it falls under the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM. The separating of Egypt from the rest of Africa in US military strategy is important because it connects Egypt to Israel under the umbrella of CENTCOM. This arrangement is designed to ensure U.S. Control of the Suez Canal and the strategic waterways of the Red and Mediterranean Seas. Egypt and Israel are two of the largest recipients of U.S. military and financial aid in the world.