2023
TDI
Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Uniqueness › UQ---West Asia
Montgomery 21 [Evan; 2021; director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; “CREDIBILITY CONTROVERSIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHANISTAN FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC”; ] brett TDI
In the end, Washington’s involvement in Afghanistan might not influence the credibility of its other security commitments nearly as much, or as adversely, as many pessimists maintain. But any influence the Afghanistan experience does have might not be as negligible, or as beneficial, as more optimistic assessments suggest. Rather, it could turn out to be a case of mixed signals and missed opportunities. Policymakers have incentives, therefore, to take steps that mitigate potential credibility damage, leverage the withdrawal to realize credibility gains, and avoid a situation where Washington fails to meet the expectations it has set for itself.
What would that look like?
2023
TDI
Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Assurances---West Asia › 1nc---DA
Cirincione & Brown 20 [Joe & Zack; 5-20-20; national security analyst and author with 40 years of experience working these issues in Washington, D.C., former vice president for national security at the Center for American Progress, AND Policy Associate and Special Assistant to the President at Ploughshares Fund; “Why letting our allies get nuclear weapons is a bad idea”; ] brett TDI
It is tempting to think that it would be cheaper and more effective to have distant allies like Germany or South Korea or Saudi Arabia get the bomb rather than link their security to U.S. forces, bases, and assurances. Nuclear theorists like Kenneth Waltz point to the so-called “pacifying” effects of nuclear weapons, saying their existence makes states “exceedingly cautious” and therefore less likely to fight similarly-armed opponents. If more countries had the bomb, the logic goes, fewer wars would occur.
But countries do not obtain the bomb in a vacuum. The nuclear posture and strategic decisions of nuclear-armed nations have a significant, often immediate, impact on the nuclear acquisition decisions of other nations. More simply: If your adversary or your neighbor goes nuclear, you will, too.
2023
TDI
Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Assurances---West Asia › 1nc---DA
Alterman 20 [Jon; 10-19-20; Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program; “Pivoting to Asia Doesn’t Get You Out of the Middle East”; ] brett TDI
Of all of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy ideas, the one that may enjoy the broadest public consensus is that the United States has been overcommitted to the Middle East. Seemingly endless U.S. military engagements, intractable problems, and rising energy self-sufficiency all push a growing number of Americans to argue for a far lighter footprint there, in favor of a shift in focus to the Pacific. There, the United States can partner with dynamic economies, engage with fast-growing populations, and confront Chinese aggression. Much of the same argument was behind the Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia,” announced almost a decade ago.
The problem with that argument comes when you talk with U.S. partners in Asia about that plan. Almost completely reliant on the Middle East for energy, they fear a U.S. rebalance away from the region will leave them both vulnerable to upheavals and even more susceptible to Chinese pressure. Put simply, they worry that a greater U.S. focus on China at the expense of the Middle East will prove self-defeating, because a U.S. abandonment of the Middle East actually will make China more dominant in Asia.
2023
TDI
Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Assurances---West Asia › 1nc---DA
McGee 21 [Luke; Aug 25, 2021; UK and European Policy and Politics Editor for CNN Digital; “Afghan withdrawal leaves allies to face harsh reality of US's departure from world stage”; ] brett TDI
London(CNN)The sudden fall of Kabul and the Taliban's near-total takeover of Afghanistan has left many of America's long-standing partners wondering what will become of the values-based, US-led international order.
While President Joe Biden's withdrawal of troops by August 31 is inevitable, the speed at which the situation descended into chaos, and the White House's lack of contrition and flexibility has left allies spinning.
2023
TDI
Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Assurances---West Asia › 1nc---DA
Wechsler 21 [William F.; 5-24-21; director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council; “No, the US shouldn’t withdraw from the Middle East”; ] brett TDI
Rather than argue for a return to pre-2003 policies, which often involved restraint but also typically required consistent US presence and leadership, the authors advocate instead for a radical military withdrawal that would inevitably have much wider implications. They state that their proposals “might strike some as dramatic.” In this case, it can be argued, “some” would include all long-standing US regional partners and the vast majority of US national security professionals, both Democratic and Republican, who have worked on the region for decades.
My colleagues’ specific recommendations include the following (I have bolded some parts for emphasis):
2023
TDI
Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Assurances---West Asia › 1nc---DA
Montgomery 21 [Evan; 2021; director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; “CREDIBILITY CONTROVERSIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHANISTAN FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC”; ] brett TDI
In the end, Washington’s involvement in Afghanistan might not influence the credibility of its other security commitments nearly as much, or as adversely, as many pessimists maintain. But any influence the Afghanistan experience does have might not be as negligible, or as beneficial, as more optimistic assessments suggest. Rather, it could turn out to be a case of mixed signals and missed opportunities. Policymakers have incentives, therefore, to take steps that mitigate potential credibility damage, leverage the withdrawal to realize credibility gains, and avoid a situation where Washington fails to meet the expectations it has set for itself.
What would that look like?
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Rightsizing › 1NC — Offshore Balancing
Brands 15 – [Hal, faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. During 2015-16, he is also serving as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Yale University. “THE LIMITS OF OFFSHORE BALANCING,” September 2015, ] TDI
Offshore balancing, then, would probably not pay great dividends on essential security issues like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and, in key respects, it would likely cause more harm than good. But how does offshore balancing fare when one considers the broader and even more crucial issue at hand—the question of how successful that strategy will be in preserving U.S. global influence and maintaining a comparatively stable and advantageous international environment? A core assumption of offshore balancing is that retrenchment will not imperil that environment. Offshore balancers believe that a more circumspect grand strategy will lessen great power frictions, compel free-riding American allies to bear more of the load, and thus sustain basic global stability at a reduced price. As noted earlier, some proponents of the strategy also believe that offshore balancing will, counterintuitively, enhance American influence overseas. Here as elsewhere, the central claim of offshore balancing is that less activism and engagement will produce equal or even better results. Here as elsewhere, however, that argument is deeply suspect. Grasping this point requires understanding that offshore balancers’ critique of the inherited U.S. strategy is considerably overdrawn. From reading arguments in favor of offshore balancing, one often gets the impression that American strategy actively undercuts the nation’s influence and interests, by eliciting widespread systemic resistance and making Washington more enemies than friends. Yet the reality is not nearly so bleak. Yes, American power and interventions undoubtedly appear threatening to U.S. rivals, and certain post-Cold War endeavors—particularly the invasion of Iraq—were highly unpopular overseas.91 But even so, it is misleading to suggest that American policy causes such widespread, systematic alienation and pushback as offshore balancers believe. As several leading scholars have noted, for example, the importance of anti-U.S. “soft balancing” is frequently exaggerated, because empirical support for that phenomenon is actually quite weak, and because it is really Washington that most frequently utilizes the tools of “soft balancing”—international institutions, diplomatic coalition-building, and others—to achieve its foreign-policy preferences.92 Moreover, and contrary to what one might expect from reading the offshore balancing literature, the dominant tendency of the post-Cold War era has been for countries to align with, rather than against, America. This has been true in Europe, where the United States has not simply maintained NATO but taken on 12 additional allies since the outset of the unipolar period. It has also been true in Asia, where American defense, security, and political relationships have frequently been upgraded, intensified, and expanded since the mid1990s. Even during the George W. Bush administration—the years when anti-American sentiment was probably at its peak—Washington actually increased and improved its security ties with a wide range of second- and third-tier states that saw American influence not as a threat but as a source of reassurance and protection vis-à-vis rising regional powers like Russia and China. Certain American policies may elicit widespread global disapproval, but the recent trend has been one of “balancing with” the United States rather than “balancing against it.”93 Far from being a geopolitical liability, in fact, America’s forward presence and engagement have long been deeply interlinked with both U.S. influence and international stability. On the subject of influence, the security that America has provided its friends and allies has, in turn, provided America with substantial leverage in shaping those partners’ policies. “The more U.S. troops are stationed in a country,” one statistical analysis of this question finds, “the more closely that country’s foreign policy orientation aligns with that of the United States.”94 Historical evidence supports this assertion. From the early Cold War to the present, U.S. officials have often invoked the sway afforded by America’s forward presence to prevent allies from pursuing nuclear weapons, to gain more beneficial terms in trade and financial pacts, and even to impact the makeup of its allies’ governments.95 In the trade and financial realm, for instance, U.S. troop presence provided a bargaining chip that Washington employed to get NATO allies to bolster the dollar during the 1960s. Over 40 years later, the U.S.-South Korea security relationship provided leverage that American negotiators used to obtain better terms in the U.S. South Korea Free Trade Agreement.96 More broadly, American alliances have served as mechanisms for influencing economic, political, and security agendas in key regions, and for projecting Washington’s voice on a wide array of matters. Admittedly, that voice might not be as strong as U.S. officials desire or some international observers believe, but it has nonetheless been quite powerful and pervasive by any meaningful comparison.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Rightsizing › 1NC — Rightsizing
Wechsler 21 – [William, senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Wechsler is a graduate of Cornell University and received a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He has been an adjunct lecturer at SIPA and is currently an executive committee member of the SIPA alumni association, “No, the US Shouldn’t Withdraw from the Middle East.” Atlantic Council, , June 24, 2021] TDI
Dealing first with the contention that American military forces in the Middle East are wastefully ineffective, it is true that military-led nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been . Unfortunately, these massive (and ) failures of military-led nation-building efforts in the Middle East (and beyond) conflate and mask the highly successful counterterrorism (CT) operations that have consistently , smashed , and limited the ability of terrorist groups to conduct on U.S. soil. Bluntly, the failures of the American military’s nation-building efforts in the Middle East are exceeded only by the successes of its CT efforts. Recognizing the stark and monumental outcome differences between military-led nation-building operations and CT operations allows for a more balanced and accurate assessment of the American footprint (and its true costs) in the Middle East. While American military forces may be susceptible to enemy attacks from their forward positions in the Middle East, they also prosecute operations that disrupt terrorism in tangible ways that continue to keep Americans safe. In short, in the conduct of its CT mission, forward-deployed troops are more often the predator (on America’s behalf) than the prey. Arguments advocating for the wholesale withdrawal of American forces from the Middle East jeopardize American lives to exactly the extent that they fail to distinguish the difference between successful (and still required) CT operations and failed nation-building efforts.
If a failure to recognize the security imperatives of a persistent American military presence in the Middle East represents the strongest myth perpetuating calls for American disengagement, a dogmatic belief in the “zero-sum” resource ledger for GPC efforts represents the loudest. According to this position, military commitments in the Middle East automatically decrease military readiness for GPC threats in a “zero-sum” relationship and thus threats from great power competitors require the American military to . Given the stakes of GPC, certainly a reprioritization of resources is prudent and necessary. But how much and from what elements of national power?
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Rightsizing › 1NC — Retrenchment
Coffey 21 – [Luke, Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation. “US Military Presence in the Gulf Is a Strategic Priority.” Arab News Japan, , November 27, 2021] TDI
There is no shortage of challenges and threats facing the US and its allies and partners in the Middle East. Obviously, the biggest threat comes from Iran. Since 1979, Tehran has pursued a policy of destabilization that has had a ripple effect across much of the region. The support and funding of proxy groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen has made Iran one of the world’s largest state sponsors of terrorism.
Iran’s cavalier behavior in the Gulf is reminiscent of 19th-century piracy. Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is not only a threat to the region, but also to world peace.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Rightsizing › 1NC — Retrenchment
Wright 20 – [Thomas, Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-first Century and the Future of American Power. , February 10, 2020] TDI
The realists and the progressives arguing for retrenchment differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments. This is a false promise, for a number of reasons. First, retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at too high a price—and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although pulling back would invite regional security competition, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because regional rivals would check one another. This is a perilous gambit, however, because regional conflicts often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might thus end up drawing the United States back in after it has left—resulting in a much more dangerous venture than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war. The progressives’ view of regional security is similarly flawed. These retrenchers reject the idea that regional security competition will intensify if the United States leaves. In fact, they argue, U.S. alliances often promote competition, as in the Middle East, where U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has emboldened those countries in their cold war with Iran. But this logic does not apply to Europe or Asia, where U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. A U.S. pullback from those places is more likely to embolden the regional powers. Since 2008, Russia has invaded two of its neighbors that are not members of NATO, and if the Baltic states were no longer protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it is conceivable that Russia would test the boundaries with gray-zone warfare. In East Asia, a U.S. withdrawal would force Japan to increase its defense capabilities and change its constitution to enable it to compete with China on its own, straining relations with South Korea. The second problem with retrenchment involves nuclear proliferation. If the United States pulled out of NATO or ended its alliance with Japan, as many realist advocates of retrenchment recommend, some of its allies, no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Unlike the progressives for retrenchment, the realists are comfortable with that result, since they see deterrence as a stabilizing force. Most Americans are not so sanguine, and rightly so. There are good reasons to worry about nuclear proliferation: nuclear materials could end up in the hands of terrorists, states with less experience might be more prone to nuclear accidents, and nuclear powers in close proximity have shorter response times and thus conflicts among them have a greater chance of spiraling into escalation. Third, retrenchment would heighten nationalism and xenophobia. In Europe, a U.S. withdrawal would send the message that every country must fend for itself. It would therefore empower the far-right groups already making this claim—such as the Alternative for Germany, the League in Italy, and the National Front in France—while undermining the centrist democratic leaders there who told their populations that they could rely on the United States and NATO. As a result, Washington would lose leverage over the domestic politics of individual allies, particularly younger and more fragile democracies such as Poland. And since these nationalist populist groups are almost always protectionist, retrenchment would damage U.S. economic interests, as well. Even more alarming, many of the right-wing nationalists that retrenchment would empower have called for greater accommodation of China and Russia. A fourth problem concerns regional stability after global retrenchment. The most likely end state is a spheres-of-influence system, whereby China and Russia dominate their neighbors, but such an order is inherently unstable. The lines of demarcation for such spheres tend to be unclear, and there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not seek to move them outward over time. Moreover, the United States cannot simply grant other major powers a sphere of influence—the countries that would fall into those realms have agency, too. If the United States ceded Taiwan to China, for example, the Taiwanese people could say no. The current U.S. policy toward the country is working and may be sustainable. Withdrawing support from Taiwan against its will would plunge cross-strait relations into chaos. The entire idea of letting regional powers have their own spheres of influence has an imperial air that is at odds with modern principles of sovereignty and international law. A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people may favor greater burden sharing, but there is no evidence that they are onboard with a withdrawal from Europe and Asia. As a survey conducted in 2019 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found, seven out of ten Americans believe that maintaining military superiority makes the United States safer, and almost three-quarters think that alliances contribute to U.S. security. A 2019 Eurasia Group Foundation poll found that over 60 percent of Americans want to maintain or increase defense spending. As it became apparent that China and Russia would benefit from this shift toward retrenchment, and as the United States’ democratic allies objected to its withdrawal, the domestic political backlash would grow. One result could be a prolonged foreign policy debate that would cause the United States to oscillate between retrenchment and reengagement, creating uncertainty about its commitments and thus raising the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals. Realist and progressive retrenchers like to argue that the architects of the United States’ postwar foreign policy naively sought to remake the world in its image. But the real revisionists are those who argue for retrenchment, a geopolitical experiment of unprecedented scale in modern history. If this camp were to have its way, Europe and Asia—two stable, peaceful, and prosperous regions that form the two main pillars of the U.S.-led order—would be plunged into an era of uncertainty.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Rightsizing › 1NC — Retrenchment
Dubowitz et al. 20 – [Mark, Chief Executive, Behnam Ben Taleblu, Senior Fellow, and Varsha Koduvayur Koduvayur, Valens Global, “Countering the Iranian Threat in the Persian Gulf.” FDD, , December 15, 2020] TDI
The U.S. military cannot ignore partner military readiness and capability, either. Given the threats from Tehran and others, enhancing partner capability not only enables burden-sharing, but also represents the only path to a safe and durable withdrawal of some U.S. forces from the region. Ignoring this important strategy would only increase the chances Washington would have to return in haste in the future – likely at a greater cost.
The United States must also consider the impact of a withdrawal on our efforts to halt Iran’s efforts to destabilize the region through material and political support for violent non-state groups. An excessive reduction of U.S. forces in the Gulf would reduce Washington’s ability to detect, interdict, and expose weapons proliferation. That would make it easier for Tehran to conduct its operations directly or by proxy and to advance its arms proliferation strategy.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Rightsizing › 1NC — Retrenchment
Wechsler 21 – [William, senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Wechsler is a graduate of Cornell University and received a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He has been an adjunct lecturer at SIPA and is currently an executive committee member of the SIPA alumni association, “No, the US Shouldn’t Withdraw from the Middle East.” Atlantic Council, , June 24, 2021] TDI
Make no mistake: this is a call to repeal the Carter Doctrine, shut down the US Fifth Fleet (headquartered in Bahrain), and eliminate much of the infrastructure, built over more than half a century, that allows the United States the placement and access required to protect US national security interests. This would be no mere redeployment or retrenchment. It’s an argument for ending the routine projection of US power into the region through the air and over the seas and removing all US military personnel stationed within key partner nations, regardless of the preferences of their leaders. No matter how artfully described, such a policy would be immediately and correctly recognized by all regional leaders as a general US withdrawal.
At that point, the biggest flaw in this plan would become immediately evident. The authors assert that, in order to protect US interests, the United States should then make “greater investments in intelligence and early warning,” seek “close coordination with regional states,” and engage in “robust diplomacy.” While these are worthy goals, in the context of a general withdrawal they are entirely unrealistic.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Regional Stability › 1NC — Populism
Bartels 17 – [Larry, May Werthan Shayne Chair of Public Policy and Social Science at Vanderbilt University. He has written extensively on American electoral politics, public opinion, representation, and public policy. “The ‘wave’ of right-wing populist sentiment is a myth.” , June 21, 2017] TDI
Last year’s Brexit vote, the election of Donald Trump and electoral gains by right-wing populist parties in countries as diverse as Hungary, Switzerland and Denmark seem to demonstrate that right-wing populist sentiment is on the rise in affluent democracies. But in Europe, at least, that’s simply not the case.
In fact, the attitudes fueling right-wing populism have been remarkably stable since at least 2002. Political entrepreneurs may be getting better at exploiting those attitudes. But the “wave” of populist sentiment is really more like a reservoir — and its political potential is still largely submerged.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Regional Stability › 1NC — Economic Decline
Posen 20 – [Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program; Foreign Affairs, “Do Pandemics Promote Peace?” , April 23, 2020] TDI
As the novel coronavirus infects the globe, states compete for scientific and medical supplies and blame one another for the pandemic’s spread. Policy analysts have started asking whether such tensions could eventually erupt into military conflict. Has the pandemic increased or decreased the motive and opportunity of states to wage war?
War is a risky business, with potentially very high costs. The historian Geoffrey Blainey argued in The Causes of War that most wars share a common characteristic at their outset: optimism. The belligerents usually start out sanguine about their odds of military success. When elites on both or all sides are confident, they are more willing to take the plunge—and less likely to negotiate, because they think they will come out better by fighting. Peace, by contrast, is served by pessimism. Even one party’s pessimism can be helpful: that party will be more inclined to negotiate and even accept an unfavorable bargain in order to avoid war.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Regional Stability › 1NC — Middle East War
Karlin & Wittes 19 – [Mara, International Studies Professor at John Hopkins University, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development 2015-2016, & Tamara Cofman Wittes, a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2009-2012. “America’s Middle East Purgatory: The Case for Doing Less”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019] TDI
LESS RELEVANT REGION In response to the Iraq war, the United States has aimed to reduce its role in the Middle East. Three factors have made that course both more alluring and more possible. First, interstate conflicts that directly threatened U.S. interests in the past have largely been replaced by substate security threats. Second, other rising regions, especially Asia, have taken on more importance to U.S. global strategy. And third, the diversification of global energy markets has weakened oil as a driver of U.S. policy. During the Cold War, traditional state-based threats pushed the United States to play a major role in the Middle East. That role involved not only ensuring the stable supply of energy to Western markets but also working to prevent the spread of communist influence and tamping down the Arab-Israeli conflict so as to help stabilize friendly states. These efforts were largely successful. Beginning in the 1970s, the United States nudged Egypt out of the pro-Soviet camp, oversaw the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty, and solidified its hegemony in the region. Despite challenges from Iran after its 1979 revolution and from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq throughout the 1990s, U.S. dominance was never seriously in question. The United States contained the Arab-Israeli conflict, countered Saddam’s bid to gain territory through force in the 1990–91 Gulf War, and built a seemingly permanent military presence in the Gulf that deterred Iran and muffled disputes among the Gulf Arab states. Thanks to all these efforts, the chances of deliberate interstate war in the Middle East are perhaps lower now than at any time in the past 50 years.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Regional Stability › 1NC — Hormuz
Al-Khair 23 – [Waleed Abu, journalist, “Increased US, International Presence in Strait of Hormuz Reassures Region.” Al, , May 22, 2023] TDI
The after a spate of unlawful Iranian seizures of oil tankers has brought a sense of reassurance to the region, military analysts said.
A fleet of high-speed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) craft on May 3 surrounded and seized the Panama-flagged, Greek-owned Niovi as it travelled from Dubai to Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Regional Stability › 1NC — Lasers Weapons
Bailey 22 – [Michelle, Lieutenant, United States Navy, BS, San Diego State University, “The Iranian Maritime Challenge.” Naval Postgraduate School, , September 2022] TDI
The United States has developed various strategies for effectively dealing with Iran’s kinetic swarm tactics. Attempting to use Harpoon or Tomahawk missiles has proved infeasible due to cost implications from the millions of dollars’ worth of missiles that far exceed the cost of Iranian swarm vessels.131 Accordingly, the U.S. Navy has opted to use kinetic-energy or laser weapons with the forerunner, laser weapons-armed ship the USS Ponce already in operation in the Middle East. Unlike conventional missiles, Lasers are cheap, spending just several cents to fire. Furthermore, while a ship is limited to carrying a finite number of missiles, lasers allow U.S. naval ships almost an infinite ammunition stockpile that comes in handy in responding to the threat posed by the Iranian speedboats swarm.132
Besides lasers, other U.S. Navy ventures to solve the Iranian speedboat threats involve integrating the Longbow Hellfire surface-to-surface missile module (SSMM) system onto U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy has successfully tested the Longbow Hellfire missile system mounted on a Littoral Combat Ship. In the mid-June simulations off the Virginia coast, the Longbow Hellfire modified missiles effectively destroyed a swarm of small boat targets, including 7 out of the overall 8 targets engaged by the system, with the sole miss blamed on target issue unrelated to the capability of the missile.133 The test simulated the engagement of numerous fast-attack crafts such as those employed by Iran’s navy. The Guided Test Vehicle-1 simulation demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed Longbow Hellfire launched missile coupled with a seeker in dealing with the threat posed by Iran’s high-speed maneuvering surface targets (HSMSTs) in the form of FACs and FIACs.134 Furthermore, the “fire and forget” Raytheon’s Griffin IIB missiles held by littoral combat ships enable the firing of numerous missiles simultaneously.135
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Regional Stability › 1NC — Re-Interventions
Brands 19 – [Hal, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He served as special assistant to the secretary of defense for strategic planning in 2015–16. “Why America Can’t Quit the Middle East” Hoover Institution, , March 21, 2019] TDI
One of the most persistent myths about U.S. foreign policy is the idea that America desires—due to greed, messianic ideological impulses, or simple imperial presumptions—to dominate the Middle East. In reality, American policy has long been torn by two conflicting imperatives: The need to protect enduring U.S. interests, on the one hand, and the desire to stay clear of the region’s unending headaches, on the other. Paul Wolfowitz once that his shift from focusing on the Middle East to working on East Asia was like “walking out of some oppressive, stuffy room into sunlight and fresh air.” To borrow the metaphor, American officials have long desired to walk toward the sunlight—while understanding that they cannot fully escape the darkness.
Today, calls for the United States to disengage militarily from the Middle East are commonplace. Those calls reflect deep frustration with the travails of American interventions over the past two decades, as well as the belief—entirely correct—that the United States faces greater challenges elsewhere. Yet U.S. interests in the region have not disappeared, and the prospect that Middle Eastern troubles will impact America if left unattended is as high as ever. If the United States rushes for the exits, it may find that it is pulled back under worse circumstances, and at higher costs, in the future. President Trump is giving voice to a powerful and understandable urge to cut cleanly and get out of the Middle East. The best approach, however, may be one that reflects America’s longstanding ambivalence about the region.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › ADV — Regional Stability › 1NC — CENTCOM
Cooper 22 – [Clarke, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, former assistant secretary at the US Department of State, a former senior intelligence officer for the US Joint Special Operations Command, and a combat veteran. “US Interests and Capacity for Middle East Stability Exist, but President Biden Must Convey Will .” Atlantic Council, , July 13, 2022] TDI
If US President Joe Biden wants to foster regional stability, bolster US relationships in the Middle East, and advance normalization with Israel—in addition to the Jerusalem Declaration to re-affirm US-Israeli security cooperation and commit to denying nuclear capability to Iran—the president has two significant tools provided to him when he took office in 2021.
The Donald Trump administration led the in 2020 and the January 2021 decision to include Israel in the US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). This compelled all Arab capitals to reassess their relationship with Israel. The Abraham Accords were the first official reciprocal agreement any Arab country had signed with Israel in twenty-six years. Furthermore, of the CENTCOM AOR brought regional militaries into the US-led security cooperation space, where Arab military personnel are now able to conduct exercises and training with Israeli counterparts.
2023
TDI
Affirmative
NEG---Persian Gulf › CP — Integrated Posture › 1NC — CP — Integrated Posture
Saab & Pavel ’21 – [Bilal, senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, and Barry, senior vice president and director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. “Diplomacy Is the Key to Reducing US Forces in the Mideast.” Defense One, , December 6, 2021] TDI
U.S. military posture is a perfect example of the interdependence between defense strategy and foreign policy. Defense professionals in the Pentagon can come up with the best ideas for where and how the United States should station its troops and military assets overseas, but without the necessary U.S. diplomacy to secure security agreements or understandings with global allies and partners, those concepts will not be implementable.
The more enduring, robust, and predictable those bilateral (and multilateral) relationships are, generally, the more flexibility is afforded for U.S. posture. Thus, U.S. forces stationed on the territory of close treaty allies such as the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, and Australia enjoy greater flexibility for training, exercises, and even re-stationing than those deployed in other countries.