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2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Populism › 2AC --- Populism – 3rd Party CP

A third-party president would be detrimental.

Klein 14

Ezra Klein, Ezra Klein is the founder of Vox and was formerly an editor-at-large. Before that, he was columnist and editor at the Washington Post, a policy analyst at MSNBC, and a contributor to Bloomberg. He’s written for the New Yorker and the New York Review of Books, and appeared on Face the Nation, Real Time with Bill Maher, The McLaughlin Report, the Daily Show, and many more (A third party won't fix what's broken in American politics, December 8th, Vox, https://www.vox.com/2014/12/8/7352425/third-party-america)

Could a third party break that deadlock? Probably not. In fact, it might well make it worse.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Populism › 2AC --- Populism – 3rd Party CP

A third-party would cause more congressional gridlock.

Klein 14

Ezra Klein, Ezra Klein is the founder of Vox and was formerly an editor-at-large. Before that, he was columnist and editor at the Washington Post, a policy analyst at MSNBC, and a contributor to Bloomberg. He’s written for the New Yorker and the New York Review of Books, and appeared on Face the Nation, Real Time with Bill Maher, The McLaughlin Report, the Daily Show, and many more (A third party won't fix what's broken in American politics, December 8th, Vox, https://www.vox.com/2014/12/8/7352425/third-party-america)

Arguably, a third party could attack congressional gridlock at its source: by winning seats in Congress and then doing … something … to fix the chamber. But that something is hard to imagine.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Populism › 2AC --- Populism – 3rd Party CP

A third-party candidate would be the same as a democratic candidate.

Galston 22

William, Ezra K. Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow – Governance Studies (“Are Americans finally ready for a Third Party?,” Brookings, August 12th, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/are-americans-finally-ready-for-a-third-party/)

The thought of a third party is, as shown, attractive to many in theory at least. But before signing up it is important to take note of a structural asymmetry in the current party system: Democrats are far less satisfied with their party than are Republicans and are more willing to consider alternatives to it. Here’s why: three-quarters of Republicans identify as conservative or very conservative, compared to only one-half of Democrats who consider themselves liberal or very liberal. A centrist independent or third-party presidential candidate probably would draw more heavily from the Democratic nominee than from the Republican. And because presidential elections have been so close in recent decades, the asymmetrical effects of an independent or third-party candidacy could well prove decisive in returning Donald Trump to the Oval Office—unless such a candidacy made history by triumphing over both the existing parties. But despite today’s high level of discontent with these parties, the odds against this outcome remain dauntingly high—and the consequences of failure could be catastrophic.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Polarization › 2AC --- Polarization --- Daily Wire CP

Squo – nobody takes ben shapiro seriously.

Dani Di Placido, 8-11-2020, "The Mass Humiliation Of Ben Shapiro," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/danidiplacido/2020/08/11/the-importance-of-humiliating-ben-shapiro/?sh=620236ce4270

Whenever Ben Shapiro is trending on Twitter, it means that another cringe-inducing moment has gone viral. Recently, Shapiro took great offense to Cardi B’s song, “WAP,” to the point where he awkwardly recited a (censored) version of the song's lyrics, live on his show. It’s an ; Shapiro repeats the sexually explicit phrases with stilted, painful apprehension, as though the words themselves could summon a succubus with a swollen rear. The memeable moment proved incredibly popular, not with Shapiro’s fans, of course, but his detractors. Shapiro’s audio was soon remixed, autotuned, spliced with Cardi B’s official music video, and, inevitably, made its way to . Noticing that he was, again, the subject of mass mockery, Shapiro took the time to tweet a response, which contained an amusing implication. Now, I’m not going to deny that it’s fun to mock Ben Shapiro - the man rose to fame by shrieking statistics at college students, and when a BBC reporter finally confronted him on his hypocrisy, : "I'm popular and no one has ever heard of you," before ending the interview. Memorably, Shapiro once proposed that those unfortunate enough to be displaced by the rising tides of climate change should simply “sell their homes and move.” YouTuber Hbomberguy  with: “Sell their houses to who, Ben? F**king Aquaman?” For many of Shapiro’s detractors, he’s almost too embarrassing to ignore. But the world has been making fun of Shapiro for years, and it's starting to get stale. Yes, the man talks like a VHS tape on fast-forward, has an abundance of poorly thought-out opinions, and a puritanical attitude to fun music videos. But being the punchline of a joke has never negatively affected Shapiro’s ability to reach millions on social media (o, Shapiro is followed by 7 million people, and almost 3 million ). Shapiro has, seemingly, only benefited from the mass mockery sparked by his deliriously bad takes. Retweets, comments, jokes, and memes (and articles like this) only serve in Shapiro’s favor. The recommendation algorithms on social media might be complex and somewhat mysterious, but they generally favor engagement; thus, controversy, followed by mass-mockery, is an ideal way to attract an incredible amount of attention. I’d be surprised if Shapiro himself didn’t understand this contradictory dynamic, and actively seek public humiliation, on a regular basis, for the sake of his career. And in that regard, Shapiro is certainly succeeding.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Polarization › 2AC --- Polarization --- Abolish FPTP CP

Ranked choice is a flop – makes all parties feel equally DISPLEASED and UNHEARD

FGA, 2022, "Ranked-Choice Voting: A Disaster in Disguise," Foundation for Government Accountability, |dd

Almost universally, American elections are decided on the “one-person, one vote” principle, in which each voter chooses one candidate, and the winner secures the plurality of votes. By contrast, voters in RCV elections must rank candidates on the ballot.4 If no candidate wins a 50-percent majority, the race goes through multiple rounds of tabulation in an instant runoff.5 One of the biggest hurdles for voters in RCV elections is the difficulty of being informed about the candidates. Having a strong knowledge of all candidates on the ballot is a necessary component of active citizenship, but RCV creates the opportunity for several candidates without party affiliations to run in one race.6 This may seem manageable when there are four prominent candidates in a race for a high-profile position, but when there are upwards of 20 candidates running for an obscure local office, knowing all relevant details about the candidates’ positions and backgrounds becomes much more difficult.7 Casting a vote in an RCV election is difficult. Instructions for RCV ballots are generally cumbersome, often confusing voters.8 Because the process of filling out the ballot is difficult to understand, error rates for RCV elections remain higher than those of traditional elections.9 This results in more citizens having their votes thrown away because of an overly complex system. In traditional elections, every submitted ballot that follows the instructions is counted towards the result, but this isn’t the case with RCV. “Exhausted ballots” in RCV elections do not count towards the final tally. While many RCV ballots are thrown out due to voter error in following convoluted instructions, ballots that follow the instructions to the letter can also be thrown away because the voter ranked candidates who are no longer in contention.10 As candidates are eliminated through multiple rounds of tabulation, voters have their ballots exhausted if they only ranked candidates that have been removed during successive rounds.11 In other words, for a voter’s voice to fully count in every round of an RCV election, he must vote for all candidates on the ballot, even those he may not support. Because of ballot exhaustion, winners of RCV races do not necessarily represent the choice of all voters who participated. RCV claims to protect majority rule, but in reality, RCV creates an artificial majority by eliminating the votes of the lowest-scoring candidates during successive tabulations. One study of Maine elections found that, of 98 recent RCV elections, 60 percent of RCV victors did not win by a majority of the total votes cast.12

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Polarization › 2AC --- Polarization --- Denounce Trump CP

Lobbying is inevitable – no solution.

Kamarck 15

Elaine Kamarck, 4-13-2015, "America's lobbying addiction," Brookings,

Lobbying, in Drutman’s telling, is a habit-forming addiction for America’s corporations. Once a corporation takes up the Washington game, it rarely quits; indeed, the more it plays the more its lobbyists are likely to convince it of further opportunities worth pursuing. Especially for the largest firms which spend more than $1 million each year on lobbying, large institutionalized policy staffs working out of D.C. offices are good at figuring out tasks for themselves and for additional hired guns, and good at selling their firms’ management on the idea that they must run faster and faster even just to stay in place. As a result, corporations’ lobbying presence in Washington has become “pervasive” and “ubiquitous.” “This Town” is saturated in advocates working a huge variety of different channels in hopes of influencing policy. And yet it is hard to say that corporations, writ large, are really winners from this arrangement. Certainly, their interests are respectfully considered in every corner of the policymaking process in a way that regular people’s are not. But Drutman paints a portrait of an arms race that has primarily benefited the arms manufacturers. There is so much lobbying that it is difficult to understand which efforts are really efficacious or worthwhile, and that creates a vicious principal-agent problem in which the lobbyists’ ability to exploit their clients’ uncertainty is nearly limitless. To the extent firms try to solve this by insisting on pursuing measurable impacts, they end up seeking highly particularistic, outcomes—which in turn exponentially expands the field for lobbying, as sector-wide interest group advocacy takes a back seat to firm-specific, intra-sector competition. It seems clear that we need the lobbyist version of the old lawyer joke: that town is too small for one lawyer to make a living, but it could probably support two and offer a fine living to three. As Drutman puts it, lobbying begets lobbying. This is because it is harder to cut through the noise created by all the other lobbyists; because the fixed costs of launching a policy shop are already sunk; and because figuring out ways in which the government should reorient its policies is inexhaustible. And Drutman provides convincing data to show that the ratchet only goes one way: there has never been a significant draw-down in aggregate troops, and even at the firm level attrition is unusual. As a result of all this lobbying, the system becomes more byzantine, making it harder for anyone to navigate without more lobbyists. The lobbyists—probably contrary to the interests of business as a whole—are the patrons of , which is the environment in which they thrive. According to his interviews, this isn’t just an emergent property of the system, but something that lobbyists are canny enough to consciously promote as they play a long game. As the policy environment gets more nooks and crannies—often put there by lobbyists able to stick them into giant bills that overload mere mortal lawmakers with more information than they can process—the need for native Washington knowledge increases. It becomes a full time job, or many full time jobs, just to keep track of all the noteworthy developments in many different forums. As one relative newcomer to the scene told Drutman, “Everybody around here knows everybody, and everybody here is all things to all people. It’s just amazing. You never find anyone who says they don’t know everyone or can’t do everything” (159). That means established incumbents of the lobbying trade, who can make these claims most credibly, seem more and more necessary. How did we get to this point? Drutman lays out the history, with the 1970s as the watershed. Previously in the habit of taking policymakers’ sympathies for granted, corporations found themselves under attack by Naderites pushing new social regulation and slowly but surely figured out how to mobilize their resources to fight back. Over the last four decades, they have just kept going and going. Drutman thinks this occurs almost entirely on the strength of its own momentum, for the reasons described above, and not because corporations are reacting to the rise of any countervailing forces, especially since lobbying expenditures for unions and public interest groups are so pitiful compared to those for corporations (something like $1 spent for every $34 spent by corporations). Though the momentum story is convincing, it seems to me that Drutman doesn’t really look in the right places to understand the growing power of the anti-corporate forces that corporations must reckon with. The power of the trial bar, the muckraking electronic media, and the ambitions of the regulatory state have all grown enormously alongside the corporate lobbying , and that hardly seems like a coincidence. To give just one example, Drutman notes that tobacco companies had the biggest growth in their lobbying expenditures from 1981 to 2004. Whatever you think of the merits of the arguments made on their behalf, this mobilization seems quite unsurprising; they were truly fighting an existential threat. Once we start thinking along these lines, a big question looms into view: just what level of involvement in politics is appropriate for corporate America? Almost nobody (and certainly not Drutman) thinks that firms should passively await the pronouncements of policymakers without trying to communicate the specific nature of their needs and interests, and so some degree of lobbying seems benign. The more kludgey and detailed the government’s involvement in a business’s affairs, the more important these communications will become. Corporations will be self-serving in their presentations of information, but there is also good reason to think that they are the ones who know the most about what exactly makes the economy function. We want to prevent undue influence by corporate lobbyists, but “undue” is hardly self-evident. Probably smartly, Drutman studiously avoids trying to offer any kind of philosophical answer to this question; whatever is appropriate, he is confident that we are well beyond that level right now, and he ends his book with some high-level thoughts on how we might improve the situation. His first bin of suggestions he calls “Madisonian” for their aspiration of balancing faction against faction. If corporate influence is disproportionately large but hard to diminish, maybe the thing to do is simply increase other groups’ ability to exert their own influence, Drutman reasons. This could take the form of subsidizing lobbying for underrepresented groups, or even providing them with public assistance from an Office of Public Lobbying akin to public defenders. I have to admit, this reminds me of nothing so much as the restaurant customer who thinks the food is terrible but wishes there were bigger portions. If the corporate lobbyists can create the conditions for their own proliferation in a way that chokes the system, it’s not clear to me why we should expect things to be so different if we add a bunch more who are nominally working on behalf of “the public.” The principal-agent problems here seem even worse. The second group of suggestions, which Drutman labels “Genuine Public Conversation” reforms, hearkens back to the author’s years at the Sunlight Foundation.Basically, the idea is that airing out the lobbying process would loosen the corporate chokehold on the policymaking system. In a way analogous to the Administrative Procedure Act, a Congressional Lobbying Procedure Act could routinize and rationalize the lobbying process, the hope being that greater scrutiny would diminish information asymmetries and thus render our discourse something more like the ideal of calm deliberation. But I wonder if creating reams of new data for analysis would really change much, given that the relevant constraints seem to be on processing information just as much as getting it. That leads to Drutman’s third group of suggestions, which is the most promising: building the government’s own capacity to collect and process information so that it is less dependent on the lobbyists for this function. This could entail fairly modest programs such as creating a “Congressional Clerkship” program for law students, or a more ambitious full-scale overhaul of congressional staff designed to attract more experienced and talented people to policymaking jobs and then retain them (as Drutman and Steve Teles elaborate on in ). One important question to ask about reforms such as these is how they relate to the actual men and women who now work as lobbyists—on whom Drutman never casts any aspersions, it must be said. Many policymakers have complained that K Street has leeched all the talent away from Capitol Hill, and that ought to make reformers wonder whether trying to ban these people from directly participating in the policymaking process (as the Obama administration tried to do) misses the point. Drutman’s book should alert people to just what a huge enterprise lobbying has become over the past decades, and his logic asks us to think if we can put this collection of human talent to better use, rather than simply denouncing it as a moral outrage.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Pandemics › 2AC --- Pandemics --- R&D CP

Research and innovation can create unanticipated harmful effects which may outweigh any benefits.

Coad, et al 21

[Alex Coad has a PhD from Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and the Sant'Anna School. He is a Professor at Waseda Business School. Paul Nightingale received his Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex and is the Director of the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex. Jack Stilgoe is a Professor of Science and Technology Policy at University College London. Antonio Vezzani has a PhD in Economics from University of Rome Tor Vergata. He is a Professor in Economics at Roma Tre University. “Editorial: the dark side of innovation,” .] cgarland

2.1. Issues of scale: explorations by lead users vs the dependence of mass consumers Small problems due to one-off explorations are generally accepted to be benign and acceptable. For example, small scale pollution from a pioneering scientific experiment is probably acceptable to most people. But if this scales up through the everyday habits of millions of consumers worldwide, harmful effects can accumulate and interact, and new problems can appear. The example of congestion and pollution is a classical case used by economists to illustrate that (public) goods have a capacity beyond which interference (or cumulative) effects become noticeable to then increase disproportionally (Rothenberg 1970). Similar effects apply in many other circumstances and political decisions about the impact of a technology may mistakenly be made by focusing on the initial circumstances, rather than the problems that emerge when the technology diffuses and is used at scale. In this vein, the adoption of new products and technologies can cause problems due to rising demand for key inputs, like the rapid growth in the demand for cobalt (a key input for lithium-ion batteries) causing social problems such as corruption, environmental pollution, extreme poverty and child labour (Conca 2020). 2.2. End-of-product-life considerations Another dark side of innovation relates to end-of-product-life considerations, that are predictable from the start, but often ignored until the end. Examples include the disposal of nuclear waste, mining clean-up operations, and heavy metal leakage from the recycling of electronic waste. With new technologies, and especially technologies with long work- ing lives, these end of life costs may be uncertain. In some instances, a new technology can reduce these costs, but in many others rising social expectations and more stringent environmental and health regulations can substantially increase costs over time. Recycling can reduce the environmental impact of waste. However, if new materials such as plastics are relatively cheap, recycling can be prohibitively expensive compared to landfill or burning. In one example, from the UK, Westminster council sent 82% of all household waste – including that put in recycling bins – for incineration in 2017/18 (Franklin-Wallis 2019). Disposal problems are exacerbated in the case of planned obsolescence, where products have deliberately shortened lifetimes, or are designed such that they are impossible or difficult to repair.1 For example, Apple has been repeatedly accused of deliberately slowing its iPhones in order to increase the sales of new products, and restricts the repair of Apple products even in the case of fairly simple repairs (Svensson et al. 2018). Despite the usual focus on the benefits of renewable energy, Hansen and Nygaard (this issue) provide evidence on the dangers. New technologies for solar panels cause problems of heavy metal disposal, in particular for lead, which is a potent neurotoxin. Many Sub- Saharan African nations lack capabilities to dispose of waste, and there are uncertainties about the longer-term environmental performance of solar panels. The recycling of hazardous materials is often done by the poor who lack equipment, protection, and political representation. Innovations that address one kind of pollution can create new problems, that fall on different people, and these costs should not be ignored, even if the overall improvement is substantial. 2.3. Features vs bugs: ‘unintended’ versus ‘unanticipated’ consequences Innovations can be intentionally harmful, such as for example the atomic bomb, auto- matic rifles, electric chairs, or the ‘Spanish donkey.’ These innovations clearly cause great harm by creating new opportunities for individuals to more effectively carry out harmful intentions. More in general, the introduction of new technology can lead to ‘revenge effects.’ Pesticide and antibiotic use can create conditions where new super-weeds and super- bugs evolve, air-conditioning increases external temperatures, and expanding roads can increase traffic and lead to more congestion. Tenner (1997) sub-divides these revenge effects into rearranging, repeating, recomplicating, regenerating and recongesting effects. In some cases, the harm from innovation comes not from regular use but from unanticipated accidents, such as Chernobyl. In other cases, the harm is an unintended yet anticipated outcome that comes from proper use. This harm can be well-known or hidden. A known side-effect of the proper use of cigarettes is lung cancer. A relatively little-known fact about shale gas production is that it produces considerable amounts of radioactive waste (Warner et al. 2013). Even the truck drivers disposing of this radio- active waste are not aware that their truckload is radioactive (Nobel 2020). We have seen with digital technologies such as social media and machine learning, that things seen as dark sides – discrimination in applications and data sources or cognitive distraction – are part of the constitutions of technologies. It is convenient for innovators to label negative consequences as ‘unintended’, but they may be designed into the system – features, not bugs – or they may be deliberately unanticipated to avoid accountability (Stilgoe 2020).

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Marine Ecosystem

MPA’s are weak---can’t spill over to solve much larger alt causes like climate and oil spills

Gies 18 [Erica Gies covers water, energy, critters and more on the science and environment beat, holds a master’s degree in literature, with a focus in eco-criticism, her work has appeared in The New York Times, Scientific American, Nature, The Economist and others, this story originally appeared in bioGraphic, an online magazine about nature and sustainability powered by the California Academy of Sciences, “Does Size Matter? Debating the Role of Marine Protected Areas,” ]

Whether we manage to set aside 2 percent of our oceans, or 10 percent or even 16 percent, scientists and policymakers are fiddling around the edges of decline. And because the science is complex and there aren’t simple answers, and because the need is vast and the money and political will are slim, conservationists are fighting over scraps. They are recommending compromises that embed loss into the calculation. If we really want to maintain biodiversity and ensure a healthy future for our oceans that sustain human life – with food, CO2 absorption, climate regulation and much more – according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature, we need to protect 30 percent of our oceans with no extractive activities by 2030. Some scientists have suggested that an even higher percentage is necessary for long-term sustainability.

And even the strongest MPAs cannot protect against climate change, oil spills, plastic pollution, agricultural runoff, illegal fishing – all factors aggravated by the twin fundamental drivers of biodiversity loss: the exponentially increasing number of humans on the planet and their consumption of resources, according to a recent paper in Nature Ecology & Evolution. But protected areas can provide space for resilience.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Marine Ecosystem

MPAs only are insufficient—they must be done in conjunction with other broad ecosystem approaches.

Dan Laffoley, et al, 2019 (International Union for Conservation of Nature), 2019. Retrieved Apr. 19, 2021 from

MPAs are most effective when implemented through a rigorous science-based approach, but they must not be considered as the sole management approach for conserving all marine biodiversity. MPAs when they are properly established are the best tool for protecting ocean biodiversity, but they remain vulnerable to external stressors, such as pollution, landbased runoff, and climate change. MPAs should therefore be considered in conjunction with other broad ecosystem-based management approaches across the wider seascape.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Marine Ecosystem

MPAs don’t solve and give a false sense of security of environmental protection:

Brian Payton, 2020 (award-winning author), “Marine Protected Areas: May or May Not Include Actual Protection,” Jan. 7, 2020. Retrieved Apr. 19, 2021 from

Dudas and her colleagues must wrap up soon and return to the Vector, a nearly 40-meter Canadian Coast Guard vessel waiting just offshore. Their work here, part of an expedition to study both intertidal and deep-water ecosystems along the central coast, may help establish new marine protected areas (MPAs). Canada has committed to protecting 10 percent of its territorial waters by this year as part of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity Aichi targets. One hundred ninety-six countries have ratified the convention, making it a truly global push for marine conservation. Sarah Dudas Sarah Dudas, significant areas program head for Fisheries and Oceans Canada, analyzes samples she and her team collected from intertidal zones on Goose Island, British Columbia. Photo by Ocean Networks Canada This sounds like a win for politicians, coastal communities, and ecosystems alike. But just as governments around the world announce new MPAs, troubling new research is raising questions about their effectiveness. Do MPAs deliver what’s advertised—protection of the marine environment—or are they little more than “paper parks,” amounting to protection in name only? Time will tell. For now, the tide is rising. An opportunity is closing. Dudas focuses in. Clearly, a marine protected area is a region of the ocean—and the marine life therein—set aside to be preserved in its natural state, kept safe from human exploitation, right? If only it were that simple. MPAs can involve a spectrum of objectives from allowing sustainable fishing and gathering to protecting biodiversity to conserving sites of scientific or cultural interest. In the end, unless it is created and managed in accordance with globally recognized standards, an MPA is whatever a particular jurisdiction decides it will be. Modern governments have been late to the cause of marine conservation. Back in the 19th century, scientists were questioning whether the marine environment—and fisheries in particular—could or should be managed. Reports about the scarcity of fish from all around the United Kingdom’s coasts were sparking concern. Conventional wisdom (and a Royal Commission) held that there were plenty of fish in the sea, but there was no scientific consensus. In 1883, at the International Fisheries Exhibition in London, naturalist Thomas Henry Huxley declared: “I believe, then, that the cod fishery, the herring fishery, the pilchard fishery, the mackerel fishery, and probably all the great sea fisheries, are inexhaustible; that is to say that nothing we do seriously affects the number of fish. And any attempt to regulate these fisheries seem consequently, from the nature of the case, to be useless.” Despite this sentiment, concern about falling fish stocks continued to grow. This led to a 10-year experiment, launched in 1886, involving trawling restrictions in the Firth of Forth estuary and Saint Andrews Bay in Scotland. Results were mixed and scientists disagreed on the outcome. Even as late as 1919, some influential British scientists were still denying that human activity could exhaust the sea’s bounty. researches on Goose Island, British Columbia Researchers collect marine organisms from Goose Island as part of a larger project studying the biodiversity along British Columbia’s central coast. Photo by Ocean Networks Canada But fish conservation and management techniques had been in use long before the Victorians. European royalties have been controlling access to fish in rivers and streams since the Middle Ages. King Philip IV of France was so worried about falling fish stocks that he decreed his realm’s first fisheries ordinance in 1289. In the South Pacific, Polynesians observed their waitui tabu (prohibited zone) fisheries management system for untold generations. The tabu dictated who can catch what kind of seafood where and when. British explorer Captain James Cook brought back news of the tabu system in the 18th century and the word taboo has been a part of the English language ever since. Here on British Columbia’s central coast, Indigenous peoples have been using a diversity of conservation strategies and techniques for millennia, such as building clam gardens (rock-walled intertidal beach terraces), to both enhance and manage their marine environments. In the 21st century, our understanding of fisheries management has come a long way and yet global fish stocks are on the verge of collapse. Two-thirds of predatory fish have vanished from the world’s oceans over the past century, according to one recent study, and the loss is accelerating. Clearly, knowledge ≠ practice. Is there a way forward? Many believe MPAs could be a big part of the answer. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is the world’s oldest and largest global environmental organization. It has more than 1,200 government and NGO members and almost 11,000 volunteer experts in some 160 countries. According to the IUCN, a protected area is defined, recognized, and managed to achieve the long-term conservation of nature, natural resources, and cultural values. This definition makes it difficult to square with industrial resource extraction. Some MPAs allow commercial fishing, for example, in an area supposedly set aside for protection. Marine protected areas range in size from Marae Moana, a two-million-square-kilometer zone in the South Pacific, to a tiny 0.4-hectare section of British Columbia’s Echo Bay Marine Provincial Park. Today, nearly 17,000 MPAs cover 7.5 percent of the world’s marine environment. Research reveals that MPAs can produce abundance—both ecological and economic—as well as social benefits when designed and managed properly. The revived tabu system in Fiji, for example, re-established local stewardship over the ecosystem, a change that increased local biodiversity, fish and shellfish stocks, as well as income. In the Irish Sea, a small, protected area off the Isle of Man was declared a no-trawl zone in 1989 and closely monitored for 14 years. Over that time, researchers found that the overall density of scallops was nearly five times higher in the protected zone. An adjacent, unprotected area also saw an increase in scallop stocks, likely through what is known as the spillover effect. Engaging community, industry, governments, and scientists has consistently proven to be the most important factor in the design of successful MPAs, according to research. One of the leading causes of failure is the lack of surveillance, which results in poor enforcement and compliance. The evidence is clear: designating MPAs is not enough—they must be managed, patrolled, and controlled. Researchers on Goose Island, British Columbia Sarah Dudas and Karen Hunter, an aquatic science biologist with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, identify and count marine flora and fauna at a survey site on Goose Island. Photo by Ocean Networks Canada Another study surveyed MPAs with an eye toward determining the best type for reversing the global degradation of marine life. The authors found that no-take marine reserves—the MPAs at the most protective end of the spectrum, where extractive activities are prohibited—are best for restoring and preserving biodiversity in the long term. Studies have shown that fish biomass in no-take reserves is on average 670 percent greater than in neighboring unprotected areas. And, compared with partially protected MPAs, no-take zones have 343 percent more biomass. Partial protection has some value by restricting specific activities—like trawling, which results in habitat destruction—but is generally less effective overall, the authors found. They concluded that while MPAs will not solve all the ocean’s problems, they do provide “outstanding ecological and economic benefits within and beyond their boundaries.” Marine protected area. Three seemingly simple, straightforward words that—in the minds of the general public—mean mission accomplished when applied to a map of the ocean. Much of the scientific and conservation communities share this view. But as governments around the world rush to announce the establishment of new MPAs to meet their 2020 Aichi targets, a chance discovery by a shark researcher is upending that perception. Manuel Dureuil is a postdoctoral fellow at the Worm Lab for Marine Conservation Biology at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and president of Sharks of the Atlantic Research and Conservation Centre (ShARCC), a nonprofit based in Halifax. For the past 10 years, the 34-year-old has been researching elasmobranchs (sharks, rays, and skates), focusing on conservation ecology and fisheries science. He wants the world to know that these remarkable species are in urgent need of protection. Sharks are both formidable survivors and sensitive biodiversity indicators, he says. They appeared more that 400 million years ago—well before the first dinosaurs—and have long played a key role in maintaining the health and balance of marine ecosystems. But many species of sharks have been driven to near extinction through overfishing and finning, the cruel and wasteful practice of cutting off a shark’s fins and discarding its body for the sake of shark fin soup. We are killing them faster than they can reproduce. Some populations have declined by more than 90 percent and their loss is likely resulting in drastic—and possibly irreversible—damage to marine ecosystems. It was Dureuil’s shark research that led to a jaw-dropping conclusion about Europe’s MPAs and landed him his first publication in the esteemed journal Science. CCGS Vector CCGS Vector transports researchers to intertidal and deep-water study areas along the coast of British Columbia. Photo by Ocean Networks Canada What started as an investigation into North Atlantic shark populations unearthed a troubling fact about Europe’s MPAs. European Union territorial waters, the largest maritime territory on Earth, is a global hotspot of industrial fishing and has an extensive network of MPAs (29 percent of the total area). The trend Dureuil was seeing exploded his expectation that those MPAs were effective in preserving and protecting species sensitive to destructive fishing, such as sharks, skates, and rays. To help make sense of his findings, he teamed up with colleagues at the Worm lab and the Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel in Germany to gather and crunch the data and draw conclusions from the results. Using newly available satellite sensors that allow fine-scale, real-time quantification of industrial fishing activity from space, the team studied 727 European MPAs. What they discovered was shocking. “We found that 59 percent of MPAs are commercially trawled, and average trawling intensity across MPAs is at least 1.4-fold higher compared with non-protected areas,” the authors reported in Science. And in those heavily trawled areas, the abundance of sensitive species decreased by nearly 70 percent compared to areas with low trawling intensity. Dureuil and his coauthors were not necessarily surprised that fishing was taking place in MPAs—it was the intensity of fishing that caused alarm. They concluded that widespread industrial exploitation of MPAs in Europe undermines global conservation targets and casts a shadow over protected areas worldwide. A variety of MPA types exist in European Union waters and, due to the supremacy of the EU Common Fishing Policy, which sets quotas for member states, many do not address commercial fisheries. Yet all 727 of the MPAs studied were registered in the IUCN’s World Database on Protected Areas and counted toward international biodiversity conservation targets. Over 50 percent did not report a management plan, over 90 percent were not classified according to IUCN criteria, and over 99 percent had no information on no-take areas. The result? Scientists, conservationists, and the general public were astonished to learn that endangered and critically endangered species were all more than five times more abundant outside MPAs. blue shark Researchers found that 59 percent of Europe’s marine protected areas (MPAs) are commercially trawled and in those heavily trawled areas, the abundance of sensitive species decreased by nearly 70 percent compared to areas with low trawling intensity. Photo by Luis Quinta/Minden Pictures Europe’s MPAs give a false sense of security about government action to protect the oceans. Dureuil and his colleagues revealed that simply declaring a stretch of water an MPA has little benefit for the species in most need of protection. To truly protect and preserve marine environments, they recommend MPAs require better reporting, management planning, independent vetting of standards, and a commitment to enforce those standards. “You really can’t blame the fishermen,” Dureuil says, adding that what they are doing is completely legal. But it goes to show how something can look very “green,” appear to protect vast areas, but give a false sense of security. “I think we should not call something a marine protected area [if it doesn’t] exclude harmful fishing practices.” Not all MPAs necessarily need to ban activities like local, small-scale, sustainable fishing, Dureuil explains, they just need to prohibit destructive and unsustainable industrial fishing. Canada, for its part, recently announced a ban on industrial activities inside federally designated MPAs, including bottom trawling, oil and gas development, mining, and dumping. MPAs can work very well for both marine environments and the local human populations that depend on them, he says. “We just have to have guidelines and follow them.” The guidelines, he says, should be those of the IUCN. No country has a longer coastline than Canada. At 243,042 kilometers, it is 12 times longer than the United States’. In 2016, Canada announced a plan to protect 10 percent of its vast marine and coastal areas as part of its 2020 Aichi targets. At the time, less than one percent was protected. The National Advisory Panel on Marine Protected Areas Standards was convened. The panel consulted experts and groups with a stake in the process, researched best practices, and delivered a final report in September 2018. Among its recommendations were ensuring respect for Indigenous knowledge and practice and the establishment of Indigenous protected areas in addition to MPAs. When it came to adopting standards, the panel was clear: Canada should adopt IUCN standards and guidelines for all marine protected areas. In his response to the report, Jonathan Wilkinson, Canada’s minister of fisheries, oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, committed the federal government to implementing protection standards in its new MPAs but did not specifically cite the IUCN’s standards. A spokesperson for the minister later clarified Canada’s position. “The government has adopted protection standards that are consistent with IUCN recommendations.” International agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity only exist at the whim of the governments of the day. Look no further than the announced withdrawal of the United States from the 2016 Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation. And yet these agreements, and the standards they set, are vital because they offer a way to hold governments accountable. While it is significant that Canada has adopted standards that are “consistent with” IUCN recommendations for MPAs, it falls short of a commitment to adhere to the IUCN’s Global Conservation Standards. Researchers on Goose Island, British Columbia Researchers collect fish on Goose Island as part of a biodiversity survey that may inform the creation of new MPAs. Photo by Ocean Networks Canada Canada has resolved to meet the most important condition for MPA success: engaging those most affected—Indigenous groups, local communities, and fishers. Mindful that a leading cause of failure is lack of enforcement, Canada has pledged to invest more than CAN $50-million in the national fisheries enforcement program and hire 100 new fishery officers nationwide. Stephen Woodley, a member of the IUCN’s World Commission on Protected Areas and an intervener on Canada’s national advisory panel, worked to ensure that the government would adhere to IUCN standards. “I always want the language to be stronger and our commitment to nature conservation to be greater,” he says of Canada’s guidelines. “This is not perfect with me, but I can live with it. Proof is in actions.” Around the world, those concerned with marine conservation are already looking beyond 2020 and the 10 percent Aichi targets. In 2016, the IUCN joined scientists in calling for a new and more ambitious goal—the full protection of at least 30 percent of the world’s oceans by 2030. This is what scientists now deem necessary to reverse the damage already done, to increase the planet’s resilience to climate change, and to leave us with any hope of passing on a healthy, sustainable marine environment to future generations. It is this duty—this hope—that calls researchers like Sarah Dudas to remote intertidal zones far from home. Back on Goose Island, the tide is high. It’s time to go. Dudas and her colleagues have packed their gear and specimens for the short ride to the bright red-and-white Canadian Coast Guard vessel standing by to take them to the next research site. During their voyage of discovery, they will bring back hard, scientific data from British Columbia’s remote central coast—evidence that could make the case for future MPAs. One of the boats on hand to ferry the researchers and their gear back to the waiting ship is operated by Robert Johnson, a Heiltsuk watchman. The Coastal Guardian Watchmen are a network of Indigenous peoples who monitor, steward, and protect their traditional territories. Coastal Guardian Watchmen boat The Coastal Guardian Watchmen are a group of Indigenous peoples who patrol and protect their traditional territories. At the end of an intertidal survey on Goose Island, a watchman takes researchers and their gear back to CCGS Vector, seen here in the distance. Photo by Ocean Networks Canada Once all the gear and passengers are aboard, Johnson offers coffee, adjusts his baseball cap, and settles in behind the wheel. Like other members of the Heiltsuk Nation, he grew up on the water. He has watched outsiders come and go, and use and abuse his people’s traditional territory for much of his life. He has watched well-meaning scientists and government people pass through too. “These areas are all shellfish gardens and part of our trapline systems,” Johnson says of the intertidal zone. He was brought up on the cockles, geoducks, herring roe, and seaweed found here. For the Heiltsuk, traplines are territories that have been passed down through hereditary lines and come with rights and responsibilities related to stewardship of the land and water. “These family rights are still honored today.” When it comes to designating new protected areas, Johnson wants to ensure they respect Indigenous peoples’ territories and cultures. People have been a part of this marine ecosystem for a very long time, he says. On nearby Triquet Island, researchers recently found artifacts at a village site that have been radiocarbon dated to around 14,000 years—making it one of the oldest human settlements in North America. If local involvement is one of the keys to the success of MPAs, then the Hakai Lúxvbálís Conservancy, which covers Goose Island, is off to a good start. Created through an agreement between British Columbia and the Heiltsuk Nation, it acknowledges that Indigenous peoples have been a part of this ecosystem since at least the last ice age. Industrial fishing—by and for those who live far away—is a relatively new problem. Whatever promises are made elsewhere, Johnson doesn’t wonder who will ultimately be left to keep an eye on things around here. Even if the government doesn’t get around to publishing a management plan or step up monitoring and enforcement he and his fellow watchmen will be on the job, working to preserve and protect the natural world. Because these beaches, these islands, and the water in between provide more than his subsistence. This is his ancestors’ home.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: LIO › 2AC --- LIO --- Security Order CP

An increase in defense spending trades of with domestic economic concerns.

Rooney, Bryan, 21, "How Does Defense Spending Affect Economic Growth?," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-2.html//pl

Like all new administrations, U.S. President Joseph Biden's administration will reassess and possibly change the size of the U.S. defense budget. Such a decision involves balancing trade-offs; a larger budget gives the country more funds to promote and defend its global interests, it but also reduces funds available for domestic programs, including those that might do more to boost economic growth. The economic trade-offs associated with defense spending have been underexamined compared with other aspects of the debate about U.S. grand strategy. Yet these trade-offs might be of greater public interest in coming years. In early 2021, as the United States remains in a recession amid the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, questions about how different budget choices affect economic performance might become more salient. Once the immediate crisis has passed, the country will have an even larger public debt than before and might also have to grapple with the question of what level of defense spending is sustainable in the long term. In this report — the first in a series on the security and economic trade-offs associated with competing visions for U.S. grand strategy — the authors examine the relationship between U.S. defense spending and economic growth. To do so, they consider what the effect on growth would be if the United States were to adopt any one of three policy changes: reallocate funds between defense spending and infrastructure investments, change its overall level of defense spending and apply the difference to public debt, or increase taxes to finance defense spending.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: LIO › 2AC --- LIO --- Econ Version CP

The TTP is awful for the US economy.

Robert Lighthizer, 6-29-2023, "Just Say No to Rejoining TPP," American Compass, https://americancompass.org/just-say-no-to-rejoining-tpp//PL

Economic theorists treat globalization as the free market’s natural end state. But trade practitioners know that the opposite is true—that efforts at stitching together the world’s economies are among the messiest sausage-making exercises in policymaking. The protracted process of establishing rules to “liberalize” trade suffers from all the same maladies that free traders warn would accompany protection of the domestic market. Their latest project, reviving the “Trans Pacific Partnership” (TPP), provides the latest and greatest case in point. As the relationship between the United States and China rapidly deteriorates, many are awaiting to the Biden Administration’s soon-to-be-released economic strategy for the Asia-Pacific. Some in Congress, the business community, and assorted editorial boards are again pushing for the U.S. to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—what was supposed to be a regional free trade agreement between the United States and 11 other countries bordering the Pacific. It was originally an Obama Administration idea, as part of its so-called “pivot to Asia.” Though it had completed negotiations, the Obama Administration never submitted the agreement to Congress, because it was never close to having enough votes for passage. In 2017 President Trump officially pulled the United States out of the TPP, and the other 11 countries eventually agreed to a watered-down deal known as the “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership” (CPTPP). Rejoining the TPP would be a serious mistake. The agreement was oversold from the beginning as a way to increase American exports and create a counterweight to China’s rise. But it would do neither of these things. Instead, it would encourage multinational companies to create supply chains outside the United States and thus generate even more imports, further erode American manufacturing, and increase our already staggering trade deficit. From the perspective of American workers, the terms of the TPP are the weakest of any of our trade agreements. Let’s look at the facts. First, the TPP would do almost nothing to help create jobs here. We already have free trade agreements (FTAs) with six of the 11 potential member states—Canada, Mexico, Singapore, Peru, Chile, and Australia. These six include almost every major economy in the TPP. The agreement would give the U.S. no new significant market access in any of them. Of the remaining five countries, 95% of the total GDP covered is in one market: Japan. But principal new market access gained in Japan from the TPP would be in the agriculture sector, which the Trump Administration already gained substantially through a bilateral agreement in 2019. So, there is no real benefit to the TPP with respect to Japan either. The final four countries covered by the TPP are: New Zealand, with a tiny economy and an agriculture sector that could damage ours; Brunei, with a GDP a tenth the size of Cleveland, Ohio; Malaysia; and Vietnam. These last two have small, but not insignificant, economies—each is less than half the size of Ohio—but we already have large trade deficits with both. In Vietnam, for instance, exports to the U.S. represent about 25% of its total economy, and their surplus with us is $81 billion and growing rapidly. Does anyone really think that we will benefit from further integration of our economy with communist Vietnam? Further, considering our enormous leverage in trade talks, why don’t we just insist that they give us market access if we think it could help us? On a smaller scale, the same is true of Malaysia. It is no surprise then that when the International Trade Commission modeled the effects of the TPP, it found no significant new exports for Americans. The geopolitical argument for joining the TPP is equally fallacious. Although its supporters are a bit vague here, they seem to believe that, if we import more from these countries and increase our trade deficits with them, they will be our friends and oppose China. This is nonsense. It is inconceivable that more trade with any of these countries will change how they relate to China. Six are already FTA partners, and of the others New Zealand and Japan are among our most steadfast allies in resisting the Chinese threat. Does anyone really believe that Vietnam, Malaysia, or Brunei will befriend us and oppose China’s because of trade? Vietnam, for example, has both an 800-mile border and a very difficult history with China. The Vietnamese will certainly take our money and our jobs, but that certainly would not incent them to risk their future by confronting the enormous threat on their border. The potential gains from TPP are illusory. We will not gain significant new U.S. exports or geopolitical influence. But the potential harms to American workers are all too real. The TPP includes very troubling concessions that would levy substantial costs on American manufacturing and immediately endanger thousands of American jobs in the automobile, auto parts, and steel industries. Every trade agreement has what are called “rules of origin” that dictate how much of the content of products benefiting from the agreement must be made in the region. NAFTA’s weak rules of origin were a principal reason why so many American jobs moved to Mexico. The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) negotiated under President Trump reversed them and required that 75% of cars be made in our region and that 40% be made with wages too high for Mexico. The TPP, by contrast, encourages producers to ship jobs overseas by requiring that only 45% of a car be made in the TPP region to obtain duty-free treatment. So, a product could be 45% made in Vietnam and 55% in China, despite China not belonging to the TPP, and it would qualify for special treatment in the United States. This would help China and probably Vietnam but cost us dearly. Further, weaker rules of origin would supersede the tougher pro-U.S. rules for Canada and Mexico as well. In joining the TPP, we would essentially surrender our gains from USMCA for no additional access to two of our biggest trading partners. The automobile plants that are coming back to the U.S. would head right back to Mexico. The TPP is bad for American manufacturing workers beyond its weak rules of origin. Unlike the USMCA, it has no enforceable labor or environmental requirements. It has no currency provisions and no sunset provisions to encourage our trading partners to give us better treatment in the future. It includes waivers from “Buy America” requirements and establishes investor tribunals that will encourage outsourcing of American jobs and drive investment away from America. And it largely excludes financial services—a rare area where the United States has a competitive advantage—from the benefits of digital trade access. The TPP is a bad agreement, and joining it now would be a serious mistake. Doubling down on globalization would not only jeopardize American interests, but ignore lessons of the last three decades. If we are worried about China and its growing influence in the Pacific, as we should be, the most important thing we can do is to trade less with them. China’s $320 billion annual trade surplus with us is a major reason for their economic growth and military build-up. The best counter to China and the best service we can provide our allies is to have a strong U.S. economy, a strong industrial base, and a lower trade deficit.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Inequality › 2AC --- Inequality --- UBS CP

UBS will fail because its specifics are extremely unclear—vote aff for a UBI that will support current social services.

Duffy 22 [Simon Duffy received his MA in Philosophy & Politics from the University of Edinburgh. He is a welfare rights researcher, philosopher, activist, and co-founder of Citizen Network. “Problems With Universal Basic Services (UBS),” .] cgarland

The Case for BS However I think this is also one of the clear points of disagreement between me and Anna Coote. I think that we both value the welfare state; but she believes the best way to protect it is to convert as much of it as possible into blocks of services that will be harder to harm than income streams. This argument applies the logic of Odysseus and the Sirens: If we give people income they will be tempted by the siren calls of individualism and consumerism If we invest in services then this protects us by securely fastening money to the mast of institutional power Therefore the safest solution is to always prefer services over income This is an elegant argument; the problem is that both of its premises are false. Child Benefit, State Pensions and all the other forms of income security, that ordinary people have fought for over the last hundred and fifty years, do not drive individualism or consumerism. The people who waste resources, damage the planet, pay for advertising, own newspapers and generally undermine the human spirit are the rich. Income security is good for us and our well being, insecurity is dangerous and at its worst it drives people, out of desperation, towards Fascism (Standing, 2011). Nor are services inevitably better protected than incomes. Again, the UK provides a perfect counter-example. In 2010 the Coalition government unleashed the most severe attack on the welfare state, since its creation. The three things that have been (relatively) well protected are the state pension, schools and the NHS. The things that have been most severely attacked are the services managed by local government (community, youth and social services) and benefits for working age adults, including disability benefits (Duffy, 2013). It is clear from the UK that services do not trump incomes; rather it is clear that the the universal trumps the means-tested. It is those services that are recognised as universal rights that politicians fear to attack, not services in general. So, if we were wise, we would look to create the right balance of universal services and universal systems of income security. There are many important needs in life that are best met by giving people enough money and allowing people to purchase the mixture of goods and services that works best for them. But we also need excellent services - organised in the right way and democratically accountable to us - to provide things that need to be organised collectively. Intellectual confusion on BS It does not seem hard to reconcile Universal Basic Income and Universal (Basic) Services. So why all the fuss? At this point my argument is based on a guess. But I do ask myself why the strong case for universal services (many of which we already have in the UK) has now become an argument for ‘Universal Basic Services’. I certainly do not want ‘basic’ healthcare or ‘basic’ education. I want excellent education and excellent healthcare. So why dream up UBS as some kind of UBI doppelgänger? My suspicion is that this move does not come from any serious belief that the NHS is better conceptualised as a Basic Service (BS); rather the advocates of UBS simply want to create a phoney sense of tension between services and income in order to undermine support for UBI. This is reflected in Anna Coote’s strange argument that we cannot afford both UBS and UBI. This is such a peculiar argument for any progressive to make. UBI is not public spending. UBI (combined with the necessary taxes) is an income transfer from the rich to the poor. It is redistribution; it doesn’t involve any public spending at all. You can just as easily afford the NHS after redistribution as before redistribution, because you have not yet spent any money at all. You have simply shifted money from the rich to the poor. The same amount of money is still available. It is an inherently progressive policy, not only creating economic security for all, but also reducing income inequality significantly. If there is any difficulty it is not economic it is political. In a society, like the UK, which has a high level of inequality then this means there is a small number of people who control most of the money. If those people want to hang on to what they tell themselves is ‘their money’ rather than to see money distributed fairly then they will do all the things that we see in the UK today: Control the newspaper and television Undermine the neutrality of publicly owned media Fund politicians who will protect their interests Create think tanks to lobby for policies that suit them Use privatisation policies to control public services Attack trade unions and public services Restrict the independence of charities and advocacy bodies Misrepresent progressive policies as a threat to ordinary people Promote policies that scapegoat disadvantaged groups And so on… It is certainly reasonable for Anna Coote to argue that achieving progressive policies in the UK is difficult, given the regressive forces currently in play. But that is not an economic argument; it is just an admission of weakness. The strangeness of this affordability argument is even more apparent if we follow through its essential logic. If we can only afford Basic Services by using means-testing to ration benefits then why stop with Universal Credit, Employment & Support Allowance and other means-tested benefits? Does Anna Coote also want to means-test Personal Independent Payments, the State Pension or Child Benefit? I don’t think she does; but why not? If means-testing people on low incomes is good because it enable us to fund more services then why restrict that means-testing to people of working age? This again reinforces the problem of deploying such a wide ranging concept as ‘services’ without defining what we really mean and what the proper cost and organisation of these services should be. For example, if the NHS simply pays top doctors and managers more money then we are not investing more in healthcare, we are simply increasing income inequality and inefficiency. Whereas if we create a UBI we will be improving health and reducing pressure on some parts of the NHS. We need to be much clearer about what good public spending looks like and much more aware of the inter-relationship between incomes, inequalities and services. Details matter. I think it is clear that we can afford UBI, although certainly introducing UBI will mean making changes to our tax and benefit system that the richest 15% may dislike if they are only operating from selfish motives. But politically one of the great benefits of UBI is that it actually benefits most people and that it hugely benefits the worst off, who are very poor indeed. This is no threat to public services and in fact would simply make it easier for public services to do their job well. For examples, schools could focus on teaching, rather than fighting poverty and malnutrition.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony › 2AC --- Heg🦅--- Philippines CP

US presence is the South China Sea increases aggression

Michael D. Swaine, 7-23-2015,(Swaine was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies) "America’s Security Role in the South China Sea," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/23/america-s-security-role-in-south-china-sea-pub-60826//PL

For the United States, the South China Sea is an important area of the Asia-Pacific region for three reasons: 1) it is part of a major transit route for maritime commercial traffic to and from East Asia and for the United States Navy; 2) disputes over the ownership of its many small islands, reefs, atolls, and rocks among China and several nearby Southeast Asian states (including one United States ally, the Philippines) are generating tensions that could result in conflict and instability; and 3) Beijing could eventually use its growing influence in the area to create a sphere of influence detrimental to United States interests. Michael D. Swaine Swaine was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. @DALZELL60 These factors justify United States attention to events occurring in the South China Sea, and a set of policies designed to ensure access and transit, prevent or minimize tensions, and support the peaceful and legally based management of local disputes. Unfortunately, United States statements and actions at present are not effectively achieving such objectives, and growing tensions over the issue are threatening to severely destabilize the critical United States-China relationship in unnecessary ways. Reacting to continued Chinese land reclamation efforts on several reefs in the Spratly Islands, senior United States officials and military officers vow to “fight tonight” if needed to defend United States interests across the Indo-Pacific, while referring to Chinese claims across the South China Sea as “preposterous” and Chinese land activities there as designed to “militarize” the region and to build a “great wall of sand.” In response, Chinese officials and spokespersons warn the United States against provocative actions, insist that China will not back down, and reiterate their determination to “safeguard our own sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Meanwhile, this heated rhetoric is being fueled by all manner of often misleading claims, charges, and demands for more aggressive action by outside commentators on both sides. Many in the United States see China as engaged in a concerted strategic effort to seize control over the entire South China Sea, land and water alike, as part of a larger attempt to push the United States out of Asia and replace it as the dominant force in the region. Only a more aggressive and sustained military-centered United States pushback designed to deter and humble China will avert this outcome, they insist. In contrast, many in China see the United States as using the disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea and elsewhere as a means of justifying more concerted efforts to contain and undermine all Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific, and to encourage other states to provoke China and militarize the issue. Beijing must double its efforts to strengthen its position and show the United States and others that China cannot be intimidated, they demand. This situation is not just another temporary downward blip in an up and down Sino-United States relationship. It threatens to drive United States-China relations in a far more adversarial, zero-sum direction and destabilize the region. To allow a dispute over a few rocks and islands in a corner of the Asia-Pacific region to derail a vital relationship critical to both regional and global peace and prosperity is the height of folly. Hyperbolic statements, veiled threats and calls for more military action serve no useful purpose and will only lead to hardened positions and redoubled efforts on both sides to counter the other. What is needed is a far sharper level of clarity by both Beijing and Washington regarding their claims, grievances and concerns, and, on that basis, a clear indication of the consequences of unacceptable behavior, along with a commitment to provide mutual assurances over the near term to avoid specific tripwires, while working to stabilize the long term situation. Washington’s message on the South China Sea issue has been badly garbled, making it seem as if it is opposed to any Chinese activities that involve an increase in presence or capability in the area, with little serious reference to the provocative actions of any other claimants, in particular Vietnam and the Philippines. To clarify its position, the United States needs to focus like a laser on its two only real interests in the South China Sea, and connect its statements and actions to them as much as possible. The first interest is freedom of navigation (FON), meaning access by the United States Navy to areas outside any legally established territorial waters surrounding islands or other features, including the so-called Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends for 200 nautical miles beyond such waters. China has no interest in obstructing commercial shipping or flights across the South China Sea and warning them against something they have never undertaken and would never do in the future, except perhaps in time of war, is unnecessarily provocative and misleading. The second United States interest regarding this issue is the possible unprovoked use of force by China against other claimants. Such actions would inevitably generate a much greater level of tension across the region and push it toward an emphasis on military rivalry over peaceful economic growth. Both Washington and Beijing have a vital interest in preventing an escalating spiral of violence over disputed rocks and islands. Washington needs to end its vague opposition to undefined “coercion” by Beijing or others in the South China Sea and focus on preventing the sustained use of force. Both of these United States interests involve potential violations of or disputes regarding international law and process in respect to three issues: 1) whether man-made islands can be used to justify 12nm territorial seas and EEZs that can then be used to limit naval access; 2) whether a coastal state with EEZs can demand that foreign militaries notify them before transiting or engaging in ISR or similar military activities; and 3) the threat or resort to force over disputed territories. Regarding the first point, the United States must make it abundantly clear to the Chinese government that any attempt to claim sovereign waters or EEZs for man-made islands built on features that do not possess territorial waters or EEZs would be in violation of international law and completely unacceptable. Washington has in fact said this at times, but too often it also makes statements that give the impression that it is opposed to Chinese land reclamation per se. Land reclamation in itself is meaningless. Virtually every claimant has engaged in it, and to say that China is doing more of it means little. The issue is about what China does with its reclaimed land. In addition, the lack of Chinese clarity regarding the specific claim to waters around man-made islands is magnified by its larger unwillingness to clearly define its claims to those waters existing outside of any conceivable 12 nm limit or EEZ associated with land features and yet inside the much larger “nine-dashed line” (9DL) that is intended to signify its claims across the South China Sea. Beijing has at times acted as if it has exclusive rights over such waters, but has never clearly stated its position, thus greatly increasing the overall level of uncertainty. Washington and others have repeatedly called for Beijing to clarify its stance on the 9DL and should continue to do so. On the second point (regarding naval activities within EEZs) Beijing and Washington clearly differ over how freely United States military assets can operate in areas just outside territorial waters, especially the EEZ. China, along with several other coastal nations such as India and Brazil, insists that it has the legal right, under the regulations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to deny foreign navies the ability to conduct a variety of supposedly “hostile” activities in its EEZ, including surveillance. The United States and many other countries reject this interpretation. Moreover, China has itself conducted such supposedly “hostile” naval actions (i.e., surveillance) in the United States EEZs around Guam and Hawaii. Washington must point out the hypocrisy of the Chinese position and insist that it has a right to operate in a non-hostile manner (including normal surveillance activities) outside of legal 12 nm territorial waters. At the same time, Washington should reduce the frequency of its monitoring activities within China’s EEZs. It is my understanding, based on discussions with former United States officials, that the United States military does not need to conduct such ISR activities at high levels. The third point (an unprovoked threat or use of force) would constitute a clear violation of the UN Charter prohibiting such behavior. Any sustained attempt by China to forcibly threaten or remove other claimants from disputed territories without any clear appeal to self-defense would seriously disrupt peace and generate a strong regional and international response. Beijing must recognize that such an outcome would undermine its entire “peaceful development” policy and put at risk its relations with the West and many regional states. Although China has stated many times that it is committed to a peaceful process of negotiation over the disputed areas and signed the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ­­– in which all parties agreed “to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force,”---it has never clearly disavowed an unprovoked use of force. Moreover, China has employed force in the past to eject other claimants from disputed South China Sea territories, and at present it (along with many ASEAN states) seems to offer little strong support for adopting a binding Code of Conduct to avoid future incidents. The United States and others should thus press China and other claimants to make a clear, definitive statement that they will not resort to force to remove other claimants without a direct, prior provocation. Some might counter that China and others could not make such a pledge without damaging its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea or undermining its future negotiating leverage. However, such consequences are avoidable if Beijing makes its non-use-of force- pledge contingent on similar pledges by other claimants and defines its pledge clearly as a confidence building measure that in no way imperils its sovereignty claims. In addition to the above near-term actions in support of its two interests in the South China Sea, Washington should also undertake several specific actions to prevent the further deterioration of the situation over the long term. First, Washington should stop emphasizing military deterrence methods to prevent changes in the status quo (thus freezing the situation into one of constant potential conflict) and start focusing instead on the resolution of territorial disputes through negotiations between the claimants designed to clarify the nature of claims. This should be followed by the application of UNCLOS principles to sort out the territorial and EEZ implications of the claims, perhaps using South China Sea Council modeled on the Arctic Council. Second, Washington needs to make it clear privately to Beijing that its continued failure to enter into binding Code of Conduct talks, to clarify the nature of its claims to waters within the 9DL, and to disavow the unprovoked use of force, combined with its growing presence and capabilities in the area, will increasingly cause the United States and other states to hedge against worst case outcomes and act accordingly. Specifically, the United States will need to maintain its own capacity, and the capacity of others, to counter possible future attempts by Beijing to declare a de facto exclusionary zone or zones in the area and to employ force, possibly against an ally (the Philippines). Third, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that such hedging would require a significant improvement in United States defense relations and presence with, and the provision of armaments to Manila, as well as Hanoi and Malaysia. However, this augmented level of United States activity should be made contingent on China clarifying its claims and entering into negotiated codes of conduct with other claimants. Beijing must also clearly affirm, through its words and actions, that there is no military solution to these disputes and that it will never seek to dislodge rivals forcefully from occupied areas in an unprovoked manner. It should also refrain from deploying significant power projection capabilities on its occupied islands in the Spratly Islands, such as advanced fighters. Washington should make it clear that, if China undertakes such actions and pledges, the United States would suspend the above hedging activities, but would restart them if China violates its commitment. Fourth, regarding negotiations over the disputed claims, Washington should stop opposing bilateral talks between claimants, including China-Vietnam, China-Philippines and China-Malaysia, and try to broker bilateral settlements between Vietnam and the Philippines and Vietnam and Malaysia so as to reduce differences between claimants to the bilateral level with China. The current United States stance of pushing “collaborative” efforts is a non-starter in the absence of any unity among the non-China claimants. Fifth, in order to reduce tensions and improve the environment for negotiations, Washington should work behind the scenes (perhaps with Indonesia) to organize an effort to promote the joint exploration of seabed resources without prejudice to sovereignty, as has already been done by Malaysia and Thailand (1979), Malaysia and Vietnam (1992), and Malaysia and Brunei (2009), and as China has long urged. Washington should call Beijing’s apparent bluff on this issue. Sixth, while Japan’s effort to improve the capacity of coast guard units of our allies and friends in Southeast Asia is welcome, Washington should not encourage the Japan Self-Defense Force to join the United States in patrolling the South China Sea. Having the JSDF in the South China Sea where Japan has no territorial claims (unlike China) and its security and freedom of navigation are not threatened would intensify the emerging security dilemma between the US-Japan alliance and China and promote instability. Moreover, it is highly likely that Japan is legally prohibited from engaging in such joint patrols. Finally, this issue, and the need for greater clarity regarding concerns and consequences, is sufficiently urgent and important to justify discussion at the highest levels of government. It should be on the agenda of President Xi Jinping’s meeting with President Obama during the former’s upcoming state visit to Washington in September. Rather than yet again exchanging each side’s formal position, the two presidents and their aides should seek to achieve a clearer and more finely grained understanding of concerns, intentions, and consequences and commit themselves to undertaking mutual assurances designed to avoid an escalating spiral. Military and civilian authorities at lower levels could then develop such assurances. The United States and China must get beyond the heated rhetoric and signals of resolve and build the basis for demilitarizing and defusing the escalating tensions in the South China Sea. If this is not done, the current course of action threatens to produce a far more dangerous situation that will prove extremely difficult to reverse.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Genocide › 2AC --- Genocide --- Arms Sales CP

Arms sales give the US leverage.

Grady 18

John Grady, former managing editor of Navy Times, Former director of communications for the Association of the United States Army, 2018 (“Panel: Expansion of U.S. Arms Sales Tool to Expand American Influence,” USNI News, August 8th, Available Online at , Accessed on 09-26-2019)

The administration’s goal in streamlining the process for American defense contractors to grow their sales internationally and bringing in unmanned aerial systems is a race for global influence that goes well beyond the marketplace, government and industry association panelists agreed on Wednesday.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Genocide › 2AC --- Genocide --- Arms Sales CP

Arms key to diplomacy — signals long-term relationships.

Shapiro 12

Andrew J. Shapiro, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, BA in Diplomatic History from the University of Pennsylvania, J.D./M.A. in International Affairs from Columbia University, 2012 (“A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance,” The Washington Quarterly, October 1st, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/twq-new-era-us-security-assistance-fall-2012 , Accessed on 08-29-2019, pp. 29-30)

In addition to empowering allies and partners, U.S. security assistance has an added strategic benefit: it helps solidify diplomatic ties between these countries and the United States. It helps solidify partnerships and ensure their durability. The reason the State Department — as the lead diplomatic agency — also directs security assistance and regulates exports of military hardware is because these programs have broad foreign policy implications. Security assistance and the export of military systems, either as a government-to-government transfer or commercial transfer, is fundamentally a foreign policy act.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Genocide › 2AC --- Genocide --- Arms Sales CP

Arms sales are specifically key — signal U.S. resolve and ensure military advantage.

Cooper 19

René Clarke Cooper, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, former Counselor for United Nations Management & Reform, former Alternative Representative to the United Nations Security Council, B.A in history from Florida State University, 2019 (“Testimony of R. Clarke Cooper: Assistant Secretary of State, Political-Military Affairs before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,” June 12th, Available Online at , Accessed 08-16-2019)

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, Members: “In recent days, neutral shipping has been attacked… By providing a deterrent against hostile actions, this transfer lowers the risk of a broader conflict. The… determination reflects United States grave concern with the growing escalation in the Gulf and its implication for the security of our friends in the region.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Food Security

15-minute cities further marginalize impoverished communities.

Feargus O'Sullivan 21, Feargus O'Sullivan is a writer for CityLab in London, focused on European infrastructure, design and urban governance, “Where the ‘15-Minute City’ Falls Short”, 3-2-2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-02/the-downsides-of-a-15-minute-city//KOO

The idea of a “15-minute city,” in which residents live within a short walk or bike ride of all their daily needs has been embraced by many mayors around the world during the global pandemic as a central planning tenet.

But there are dangers of applying a model conceived in Europe to many North American cities, some urban experts warn. Transplanting the 15-minute city template across the Atlantic could be “presumptive and colonial” said Toronto-based urban designer and thinker Jay Pitter at the CityLab 2021 conference, hosted by Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Aspen Institute.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Fertility › 2AC --- Fertility --- PFAS CP

EPA sucks booty and won’t solve.

AdvaMed 23 (AdvaMed, or the Advanced Medical Technology Association, is an American medical device trade association, based in Washington, D.C, 6/27/2023, accessed 7/19/2023, Advanced Medical Technology Association, “Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OPP–2013–0244; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Proposed Interim Registration Review Decision Applicable to Ethylene Oxide.” https://www.advamed.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/AdvaMed-Federal-Insecticide-Fungicide-Rodenticide-Act-FIFRA-Comments-062723.pdf)SAADK

EPA failed to undertake the required assessment of the “economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of” EtO.

Despite the requirement to consider economic, social, and environmental cost and benefits, the PID states: “As is typical of the Registration Review process under FIFRA, OPP did not conduct a cost analysis for the proposed mitigation in this PID.”15 Thus, EPA has not yet performed an appropriate analysis of economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits. As discussed below in Sections IV and V, the PID’s proposals would have drastic consequences for the supply chain of critical medical devices—resulting in economic, social, and public health costs—and would be extremely expensive or infeasible to implement. As explained in the Supply Chain and Capacity Considerations report by economists at the National Economics Research Associates (or NERA), the inelasticity of demand for medical devices “means that even modest sized shifts or disruptions in supply will cause medical device shortages that will affect patients.”16

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Education › 2AC --- Education --- Stem Funding CP

Expansive federal aid undermines democratic control, misallocates spending and can’t solve k-12 education.

Edwards 19 CATO institute “Restoring Responsible Government by Cutting Federal Aid to the States” Chris Edwards [senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation] MAY 20, 2019 https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/restoring-responsible-government-cutting-federal-aid-states

The federal government has a large presence in state and local policy activities such as education, housing, and transportation. That presence is facilitated by “grants‐​in‐​aid” programs, which are subsidies to state and local governments accompanied by top‐​down regulations. Federal aid spending was $697 billion in 2018, which was distributed through an estimated 1,386 separate programs. The number of programs has tripled since the 1980s, indicating that the scope of federal activities has expanded as spending has grown. Rather than being a positive feature of American federalism, the aid system produces irresponsible policymaking. It encourages excessive and misallocated spending. It reduces accountability for failures while generating costly bureaucracy and regulations. And it stifles policy diversity and undermines democratic control. Cutting federal aid would reduce federal budget deficits, but more importantly it would improve the performance of federal, state, and local governments. The idea that federal experts can efficiently solve local problems with rule‐​laden subsidy programs is misguided. Decades of experience in many policy areas show that federal aid often produces harmful results and displaces state, local, and private policy solutions. This study describes the advantages of cutting federal aid. It discusses 18 reasons why it is better to fund state activities with state revenues rather than with aid from Washington. Shrinking the aid system would improve American governance along many dimensions. Growth in Federal Aid Under the Constitution, the federal government was assigned specific limited powers and most government functions were left to the states. To ensure that people understood the limits on federal power, the Framers added the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The amendment embodies federalism, the idea that federal and state governments have separate policy areas and that proper federal activities are “few and defined,” as James Madison noted in Federalist 45. The federal government generally kept out of state and local affairs for the first century and a half of the nation. But in recent decades, Congress has increasingly intervened in state and local activities with federal aid or grant programs. The expansion of the aid system has created advantages for elected officials, but it has created costs and few benefits for the public. Figure 1 shows the number of federal aid programs for state and local governments over the past century. In the 19th century, aid to the states was rare other than grants of federal land. In the early 20th century, the number of cash aid programs began growing steadily. The biggest change came in the 1960s, when the aid system greatly expanded under President Lyndon Johnson. His administration added hundreds of programs for housing, urban renewal, education, and other local activities. Johnson and other policymakers at the time were optimistic that federal experts could solve virtually any local problem. At the same time, moves to decentralize decisionmaking within Congress empowered members to seek benefits for local activities in their states. The optimism of the 1960s was short‐​lived. President Richard Nixon in 1971 lambasted “the idea that a bureaucratic elite in Washington knows best what is best for people everywhere.” Nixon and subsequently President Gerald Ford pursued modest reforms to the aid system by turning narrow grants into broader block grants. After Ford, President Jimmy Carter promised a “concentrated attack on red tape and confusion in the federal grant‐​in‐​aid system.” In academia, “the mainstream of economic research into fiscal federalism became increasingly critical of federal grants‐​in‐​aid in the late 1970s and early 1980s.” Also at that time, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) was regularly publishing studies about the aid system’s complexity and ineffectiveness. The ACIR was a bipartisan body consisting of federal, state, and local officials that produced expert studies on federalism issues. It was abolished in 1996. President Ronald Reagan came into office criticizing the “confused mess” of federal grants, and he pushed to cut the system under the theme of “New Federalism.” He had more success with reforms than his White House predecessors and was able to cut the number of grant programs in his first term by about one‐​quarter. Unfortunately, Reagan’s efforts to trim the federal aid system were later reversed. The number of aid programs rose from 463 in 1990 to 653 in 2000. That increase happened despite promises by Republicans in 1995 to “return power to our states and our people,” as Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole promised, and to “return money, power and responsibility to the states,” as House Budget Committee chair John Kasich remarked. The number of federal aid programs jumped to 967 by 2010 and then to 1,386 by 2018. The 2018 figure is based on a new count of aid programs for state and local governments in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA). The CFDA lists all federal benefit or subsidy programs, but the program count here includes only programs for state, local, and tribal government recipients that were funded in 2018. Table 1 shows the number of aid programs and spending by federal department. Federal aid spending was $697 billion in 2018 and is expected to jump to $750 billion in 2019. Aid programs allocate funds to the states either by mathematical formulas or by a competitive process as project grants. Some aid is distributed as a lump sum, while other aid requires recipient states to partly match the federal funding amount. The largest federal aid program is Medicaid, which accounts for 56 percent of overall aid. Other large aid programs are for highway funding, school breakfasts and lunches, rental housing, and K–12 education. Aside from these, there are many smaller aid programs for a vast range of activities, including rural housing, local police and fire services, nursing workforce diversity, boating safety, indoor radon, arts in education, sport fishing, brownfields redevelopment, healthy marriage promotion, and farmers markets.All of this federal spending on state and local activities is misguided. Experience has shown that federal aid and related regulations are not effective at solving state and local problems. State and local funding and control of government programs is preferable, as this study discusses. Cutting aid to the states should be a bipartisan goal. Cuts should appeal to con­servative lawmakers because aid programs tend to be bureaucratic, inefficient, and beset by waste. Cuts should also appeal to liberal lawmakers because the aid system undermines democracy, diversity, choice, and local control in government. The Trump administration has proposed trimming some aid programs, including programs for health, housing, and community development. But the administration has also proposed new aid programs for infrastructure, even though infrastructure aid has the same shortcomings as other aid, as discussed below. Table 2 contrasts two ways of funding state programs: federal aid and state funding. The table essentially summarizes 18 disadvantages of federal aid compared to state funding, and these are discussed in order in the balance of the report. Federal aid distorts government spending levels and spending allocations, and it undermines program efficiency, program quality, and good governance. In Table 2 and the balance of the report, the term “states” generally refers to both state and local governments.