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2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › statehood cp

Granting Puerto Ricans American Citizenship is ideal

HLR 86, Harvard Law Review 1986 – “PUERTO RICO: COLONIALISM AS CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE”, (https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341109) accessed 7-19-23// dl>

Colonialism hurts. It hurts even those "colonials" who are most successful under a colonial arrangement and who most admire the colonial power and its institutions. They may be especially hurt be- cause their education and experience enhance their awareness of their subordinate status. Consequently, the history of decolonization in our time is in large measure the history of political action by colonial elites who lost tolerance for their "separate and unequal" place in the scheme of things.3 It is therefore not entirely surprising that Juan R. Torruella, a federal judge in the midst of a distinguished career in the service of the United States, is wounded and angered by a political and constitutional system that keeps the people of Puerto Rico, "a class of several million . . . citizens[,] in a subservient condition ad infinitum, with less rights than even aliens who reside in the United States" - an arrangement that "makes no sense and cannot today be sustained on legal, moral or logical grounds" (p. 268).

Torruella defies the popular image of the crusader against inequality and colonialism. A yachtsman in private life and a Republican in national politics, he was appointed by President Ford in I974 to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico - a tribunal that for more than eighty years has enforced and embodied American law in Puerto Rico and to which no Puerto Rican was appointed until I952 Judge of that court before President Reagan appointed him a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Torruella is the first Puerto Rican member of what for many decades has effectively been the court of last resort for Puerto Rico;7 he is, in fact, the first Puerto Rican to serve on any federal appellate bench. Torruella's brand of anticolonialism, however, is neither eccentric nor elitist. Torruella's views reflect those of the island's statehood movement, a movement that took root at the beginning of the century among Puerto Rico's blacks and poor whites, that for most of this century was led by members of the island's elite, and that today is broadly representative of all sectors of Puerto Rican society

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Ks › Set Col / Cap K Alt

Only a socialist revolution of the working class in Puerto Rico can ensure an end to their exploitation by U.S. imperialism

[Hector Reyes, 97, JD at Stanford Law School and a PhD in economics at Stanford School of Humanities and Sciences. He completed a bachelor of science in economics and mathematics at the University of Southern California (USC), "Puerto Rico: The Last Colony,", https://isreview.org/issues/03/Puerto_Rico/, Accessed 7-19-2023, LASA-LR]

The notion of socialism common on the Puerto Rican left is an eclectic–and elastic–concept in which nationalism is combined with elements of a Marxist analysis. The idea of socialist revolution is cloudy, and is frequently conceived of in terms of some sort of guerrilla struggle. This conception can give rise to illusions regarding individual terrorism. For most of the Puerto Rican left, the working class is not the central actor. Rather, workers are viewed as one progressive component of a broad nationalist front. The PCPR’s "popular front" politics, which betrayed the struggle against imperialism in the 1940s, were widely despised in nationalist circles. But the same type of cross-class politics found expression in the popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Neither Marx nor Lenin thought about the struggle for self-determination or for socialism in those terms. In the classical Marxist view, international working-class revolution is the basis for the liberation of the people of one country from the oppression by the ruling class of another more powerful country. The old Marxist battlecry "workers of all countries unite" is not a catchy phrase but an historical necessity–and a condition for the emancipation of all workers.

Applying classical Marxism to Puerto Rico today, one must start with the assumption that American workers do not benefit from the oppression of Puerto Rican workers. Runaway industries that result in job losses, limited wages, lousy working conditions, environmental and health hazards do not benefit either working class. The role of revolutionary socialists is to build working-class solidarity across national borders. However, if international socialism is the final goal, the starting point is different depending on where revolutionaries find themselves. Socialists in the oppressor country must defend the right to self-determination of the colonial countries, including the right to secession. Class unity across borders can only take place voluntarily. Real equality between the peoples of the oppressed nation and the oppressor nation can only be guaranteed by the freedom of the oppressed nation to secede if it so wishes. In turn, socialists in the oppressed country must argue for a firm and consistent opposition to imperialism and for international working-class unity, in particular unity with the workers of the oppressor country. After all, workers in both countries share a common enemy–the ruling class of the oppressor country. This includes sharply combating nationalist politics promoted by the middle class of the oppressed country. In Lenin’s words:

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Ks › Set Col Links

The aff uses welfare capitalism as a means of making imperialism more palatable to residents of Puerto Rico

[Cristopher Abel, Colin Lewis, 10-9-2019, "Welfare, Poverty and Development in Latin America", https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-11325-5_12, Accessed 7-19-2023, LASA-LR]

Welfare policy evolved in a context of political and economic ambiguity. Political ambiguity was observed in the status that Puerto Rico Puerto Rico: A Model of Welfare Capitalism? 259 acquired under US supervision and the second-class citizenship that accompanied it. Economic ambiguity was visible in the uncertainty surrounding the extent to which Puerto Rican decision-makers (business and political) influenced the pace and direction of industrialization and economic change. These discrepancies shaped an environment in which social policy was shot though with imprecision. Ambiguities of political status made for a lack of synchronization between insular and federal initiative and a shuttling of responsibility between insular and federal agencies when policies faltered. Insular resources could finance only modest programmes; hence these tended to be merely complementary to those undertaken by federal agencies. But funding by federal agencies was discontinuous. Federal aid arrived unexpected -like a windfall gain; it was employed energetically; and was withdrawn for reasons seldom directly connected to Puerto Rico. There was no guarantee that a federal programme would be completed. Since the insular authorities had negligible control over the size and disbursement of federal funds, stagnation of welfare initiative usually occurred where federal funding was abruptly terminated.

Economic ambiguities were equally important. Welfare initiative was undertaken on the assumption that the process of industrialization would be self-sustaining, that its positive consequences for the Puerto Rican economy would be general throughout the island, and that they would be sufficient to ensure self-sustaining welfare gains. The reality was otherwise. The process of industrialization, never self-sustaining, was always dependent on the performance of the US economy; the benefits of growth were heavily concentrated in the urban zones, especially San Juan and contiguous areas; and an absence of self-sustaining growth precluded the evolution of selfsustaining welfare expansion.

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Ks › Set Col Links

The assumption of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens and deserving of their benefits further entrenches them as U.S. colonial subjects, disregarding their own self-determination in favor of assimilation.

Font-Guzmán 17 (Jacqueline N. Font-Guzmán is professor of law and conflict studies and director of the Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Program in the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies at Creighton University Graduate School, “Puerto Ricans are hardly U.S. citizens. They are colonial subjects.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/puerto-ricans-are-hardly-us-citizens-they-are-colonial-subjects/2017/12/13/c0f1c700-de9f-11e7-89e8-edec16379010_story.html)//英生

Hurricanes do more than destroy homes, daily routines, power lines, agriculture, communication systems and levees. Hurricanes unveil unequal power dynamics, crush souls and create narratives, such as: "Puerto Ricans are American citizens." This is dangerous and arrogant. It is dangerous because it is incomplete. It is arrogant because it presupposes that the solution to Puerto Ricans' colonial predicament is U.S. citizenship.

As a Puerto Rican, I find this story disturbing. It deprives us of our self-determination, and it assumes that the master knows what is best for the slave. The question is not why Puerto Ricans are not treated as U.S. citizens. The question should be whether Puerto Ricans want to be U.S. citizens.

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Case › Dependency

The Plan increases Puerto Rican dependency on the U.S., further destroying their autonomy

Colón-Morera and Cordero-Nieves 22 [José Javier Colón-Morera, Department of Political Sciences, University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus, San Juan, Puerto Rico; Yolanda Cordero-Nieves, Graduate School of Public Administration, CEMGAP, University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus, San Juan, Puerto Rico; “Puerto Rico: Intergovernmental Relations, Territoriality, and the Political Question”; Public Organization Review; November 30, 2022; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11115-022-00690-1#auth-Jos__Javier-Col_n_Morera-LASA LR]

Fiscal policies precede government action. In that sense, fiscal powers are considered "keystones of autonomy" (Agranof, 2004). Moreover, decisions regarding what gets funded or not are at the core of political control and autonomy (Krane & Wright, 2000). For that reason, most intergovernmental conflicts arise from the need to control public funds through fiscal policy decisions. Puerto Rico, however, is more dependent on federal funds than ever. Federal funds increased consistently from $2,680 billion (27% of the General Fund) in 2000 to $5,617 billion (35%) in 2017. Then, after Hurricane María federal funds increased considerably more reaching $13,437 billion (56%) in 2020 (Economic Report to the Governor, 2006, 2014, 2020). We argue that instead of improving the financial model to create a healthier economy and more employment, the U.S. Government has focused on increasing federal funds, leading to more dependency and less capacity to promote local policies.

The U.S. Government granted Puerto Rico the fiscal autonomy to generate revenues and determine its allocation.6 Excluding the Island from Federal taxation was a decision taken in the aftermath of the 1898 Treaty of Paris. At the time, and still today, the Puerto Rican economy was too weak to absorb the impact of the Federal taxation system. This exclusion allowed subsidiaries of American companies an exemption from taxation for all income derived from their operations in the U.S. territories to stimulate job creation through, for example, Sect. 936 of the Federal tax code.7 This exemption made Puerto Rico more attractive to manufacturing and pharmaceutical companies. However, by 1995 the U.S. Congress had doubts about its benefits, and the Puerto Rican pro-statehood government supported its elimination since it was a policy not available to the states (González García, 2017; Maldonado, 2021). It was argued that the number of jobs created by the 936 Section companies was not enough to justify the loss in tax revenue (Hexner & Jenkins, 2016). Therefore, in 2006 it was eliminated. Section 936 was the last significant effort made by the U.S. Government to favor its territories’ economic development (Caraballo-Cueto, 2021).

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Case › Overwhelming Taxation

Extending social security would burden the Puerto Rican economy with new significant forms of taxation

[Kelsey Reichmann, 7-19-2023, Courthouse News Service, "Puerto Ricans seeking federal disability benefits strike out at Supreme Court,", https://www.courthousenews.com/puerto-ricans-seeking-federal-disability-benefits-strike-out-at-supreme-court/, Accessed 7-19-2023, LASA-LR]

The court traced Vaello Madero’s position to far-reaching consequences, like forcing Congress to extend many federal benefits programs to residents of territories like it does for states.

“If this Court were to require identical treatment on the benefits side, residents of the States could presumably insist that federal taxes be imposed on residents of Puerto Rico and other Territories in the same way that those taxes are imposed on residents of the States,” Kavanaugh wrote (emphasis in original(. “Doing that, however, would inflict significant new financial burdens on residents of Puerto Rico, with serious implications for the Puerto Rican people and the Puerto Rican economy. The Constitution does not require that extreme outcome.”

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Case › Puerto Rico SSI Fraud ‍️

Puerto Rico has historically been a hotspot for social security fraud, significantly hurting the U.S. welfare budget

[Tad Dehaven, 8-15-2013, Cato Institute, "Social Security Disability Fraud in Puerto Rico,", https://www.cato.org/blog/social-security-disability-fraud-puerto-rico, Accessed 7-19-2023, LASA-LR]

In 2011, the Wall Street Journal’s Daniel Paletta reported on the rapid growth in individuals applying for and receiving Social Security disability benefits. Paletta found that Puerto Rico had become a particularly easy place to obtain benefits. Officials with the Social Security Administration (SSA) absurdly claimed that nothing was amiss.

It looks like the SSA is about to get some egg on its face.

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Case › Random Congress Key Card I Found

It is up to congress to act on the expansion of welfare to Puerto Rico

[Mark Sherman, 11-9-2021, PBS NewsHour, "Court seems reluctant to rule for Puerto Rican resident excluded from U.S. welfare program,", https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/court-seems-reluctant-to-rule-for-puerto-rican-resident-excluded-from-u-s-welfare-program, Accessed 7-19-2023, LASA-LR]

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court appeared reluctant Tuesday to rule for a resident of Puerto Rico who claims it’s unconstitutional to be excluded from a welfare program that’s available in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

The justices acknowledged that the differential treatment of Puerto Ricans might be problematic, but several suggested that it is up to Congress, not the courts, to act.

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Case › 2nc---expansion fails

The combination neoliberal socialist policies forwards consumption culture that leads to indebtedness

Rotenberg 12 (Raquel Romberg currently teaches at Tel Aviv University in Israel. She taught previously at Swarthmore College and Temple University and was a Mellon Scholar in the Institute for Global Stdies in Culture, Power and History at Johns Hopkins University. “The Moral Economy of Brujería under the Modern Colony: A Pirated Modernity,” Duke University Press, 4/2012, https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/1611/chapter-abstract/176767/The-Moral-Economy-of-Brujeri-a-under-the-Modern?redirectedFrom=fulltext) //sz

In addition to transforming Puerto Rico into a modern colony, the Americanization of the island reconstituted not just the previous roles and power basis of brujos but also the material desires of their clients. New sites for economic mobility that have been opened up by U.S. federal welfare agencies and U.S.-based businesses, together with the alluring powers of the modern colony—consumerism and fame, not persecution and isolation—now inform the practices of brujería.≤≠ According to the economist Jaime E. Benson-Arias, Puerto Rico’s norm of consumption after the Second World War has been shaped by its participation in mainland accumulation and regulation activities, which has been maintained even during periods of economic crisis. With the recent post-Fordist neoliberal social policies that lowered considerably the buying power of many Puerto Ricans, the norm of consumption on the island has been maintained through an increase in consumer indebtedness (just as it has on the mainland).≤∞ Indeed, the social scientist Laura Ortiz-Negrón’s investigation of consumer practices in Puerto Rico shows that shopping has become a primary social activity, confirming the adage that ‘‘going shopping is a national pastime in Puerto Rico.’’ This is so, Ortiz-Negrón argues, not just because of the sheer amount of shopping malls and mega-stores plastered on the small island, but also because these shopping malls are always full despite relatively low salaries, an unofficial unemployment rate of 30 percent, and the fact that 60 percent of the population receives federal nutritional assistance through the program known as pan (Programa de Asistencia Nutricional).≤≤ Looking at the constitutive nature of consumption on Puerto Rican subjectivities, OrtizNegrón’s study reveals that consumer culture offers an escape from the utilitarian spaces of everyday life, that it signifies the participation in, not just the illusion of, equal access to goods and services, and that it allows for a nontraditional perception of commodities and social relations that stresses elements of desire and cultural capital.≤≥ Consumerism under the modern colony, she concludes in a way that pertains to my chapter here, needs not be assessed solely in terms of ‘‘the problem of consumption’’ or as a prevalent mode of criticism of American hegemony, cultural imperialism, and national identity.≤∂ Therefore, consumerism as a contemporary (some would add, postmodern) means of imagining and constructing self-images through the acquisition of commodities may be examined in relation to magic in general or the transformative potential of commodities (as in the spirit of matter, or ‘‘commodity Welfare SSI fetishism’’), and to brujería practices more specifically as one of the social arenas in which one’s ‘‘blessings’’ could be attested or tested. In framing the moral economy of brujería also within consumer capitalism, I also want to draw attention to the impact of consumerism on vernacular religious practices in Puerto Rico. Indeed, capitalist modes of consumption, not just production, could be considered as critical sites for the exploration of both the constitutive aspects of capitalist forms of domination and the potential agency of consumers as producers of meaning.≤∑ The distinction made by Daniel Miller between a priori and a posteriori differences in the kinds of rupture that the consumption of commodities might entail is useful here. By focusing on the a posteriori effects of consumer capitalism on brujería practices, I illuminate ‘‘the unprecedented diversity created by the differential consumption of what had once been thought to be global and homogenizing institutions.’’ Rather than solve theoretical conundrums, it provides a lens to observe how brujos and their clients ‘‘commonly live out these contradictions in local practice.’’≤∏ Since the late 1980s, the increasing transnational pool of ritual experts and commodities in Puerto Rico, together with a local multicultural identity politics, have also reshaped the moral economy of brujería with a more inclusive and positive attitude toward people and things African.≤π Taken together, these economic, political, and cultural changes have not only shaped Puerto Rico’s modernity in comparison to other Caribbean nations, but also, as I will show below, distinguishes the moral economy of brujería from other vernacular religions in the Caribbean. In the concluding discussion of this chapter, these ethnographic realities will be situated within and against a growing, compelling cross-cultural literature on the modernity of magic as a first step in tracing the unique genealogy of modernity that the moral economy of brujería (under a modern colony) exposes. olonization

2023 Michigan Negative
NEG › Case › 1nc---expansion fails

Social Security in Puerto Rico Increases Unemployment

Romberg 12 (Raquel Romberg currently teaches at Tel Aviv University in Israel. She taught previously at Swarthmore College and Temple University and was a Mellon Scholar in the Institute for Global Stdies in Culture, Power and History at Johns Hopkins University. “The Moral Economy of Brujería under the Modern Colony: A Pirated Modernity,” Duke University Press, 4/2012, https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/1611/chapter-abstract/176767/The-Moral-Economy-of-Brujeri-a-under-the-Modern?redirectedFrom=fulltext) //sz

The economic boom of the island between World War II and the 1970s was ‘‘showcased’’ internationally (especially in contrast to the involvement of the Soviet Union in Cuba) as an American success story of development. For example, Operation Bootstrap (‘‘industrialization by invitation’’) in the 1950s boosted labor-intensive industries and the infrastructure. In addition, the exemption from federal taxes granted to American companies on the island under the 936 Law in 1976 propelled massive foreign and federal investments for capital-intensive industries. According to the political scientist Ramón Grosfoguel and the sociologist Marietta Morrissey, the United States welfare system was extended to Puerto Rico as a social and political buffer for its various massive, postwar capitalist development programs. In addition to extending federal social insurance and public assistance, the minimum wages guaranteed in the United States were imposed on Puerto Rico. Although this improved the personal income of Puerto Ricans, it drove many companies away from the island, raising its levels of unemployment.∞π To prevent social unrest, the United States government extended its food stamp program to the island (used by approximately 60 percent of Puerto Rican families by the 1980s).∞∫ Most analysts conclude that these economic changes had repercussions that were not only economic and social but also political and cultural. Along with stimulating the growth of the manufacturing, financial, and service sectors and raising personal income and living standards, these measures contributed to the assimilation of and dependence on American consumerist and welfare values and practices, which eventually hindered the decolonization impetus on the island and constituted a unique boricua everyday practice marked by political and cultural ambiguity.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Solve Growth

NIT does not improve the economy’s growth rate

Angyridis and Thompson 2016

(Constantine Angyridis, Ph.D., University of Toronto, and Brennan Scott Thompson, brennan@ryerson.ca “Negative income taxes, inequality and poverty.” https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/24915800.pdfrefreqid=excelsior:b8f3249dd5e2755190f8bd30be6bdf9c&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1)

From the government's flow budget constraint (8), it is clear that by keeping the debt- and government spending-to-output ratios constant, a rise in the demogrant-to-output ratio will cause an increase in the tax rate, r. Indeed, by increasing the demogrant-to-output ratio from zero to 20%, we find that the tax rate rises monotonically from 27.9% to 51.3% (see table 2 for a summary of our results). It is interesting to note that at a demogrant-to-output ratio of 20%, 48.8% of the population is faced with a non-positive tax liability (the demogrant is greater than or equal to the tax paid on the wage and interest income of these agents). The increase in the tax rate distorts the labour-leisure choice and results in a fall in aggregate labour supply from 0.380 to 0.280 as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased from zero to 20%. This reduction in labour supply causes an increase in the pre-tax wage rate from 1.843 to 2.497. On the other hand, the increase in the tax rate is sharp enough that the post-tax wage rate falls from 1.329 to 1.217. Similarly, the rising tax rate caused by the increase in the demogrant-to-output ratio distorts investment, resulting in lower asset accumulation. Specifically, the assets-to-output ratio falls from 3.522 to 3.045 as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased from zero to 20%. Due to the decrease in investment, the pre-tax interest rate increases sharply from 3.0% to 5.1%. However, despite the large increase in the tax rate, the post-tax interest rate rises only slightly, from 2.2% to 2.5%. As a result of the large decreases in both the labour supply and investment, output at a demogrant-to-output ratio of 20% is only 68.2% of its level with a demogrant-to-output ratio of zero. Moreo demogrant-to-output ratio of 20% is reduced compared to a demogrant-to-output ratio of z mean lifetime utility does not decrease m to-output ratio (as output does). Indeed, mean demogrant-to-output ratio of 5.0%. We now turn to the redistributive effects of ratio. In figure 2a, we plot the Lorenz curv to demogrant-to-output ratios of zero (sol that the Lorenz curves for pre- and post-tax worked, are all identical since they are constan the distribution of wage income at a demogra dominates that of wage income at a demogr implies an unambiguously higher level of inequ We also confirm this numerically for all inte output ratio. Indeed, the Gini coefficient curve, is the same pre- and post-tax) monotonically increases from 0.580 to 0.680 as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased from zero to 20%. This unambiguous and substantial increase in wage income inequality can be explained by the fact that, although all individuals reduce the number of hours they work, higher productivity individuals reduce their labour supply by a lesser amount compared to lower productivity individuals. Similarly, although investment in assets falls for all individuals, it falls by slightly less for the higher productivity individuals who work more relative to the lower productivity individuals and, thus, have relatively higher disposable income to invest. Figure 2b displays the Lorenz curves for interest income corresponding to demogrant-to-output ratios of zero (solid line) and 20% (dashed line). Note that the Lorenz curves for pre- and post-tax interest income, as well as for wealth, are all identical since they are constant multiples of one another. Although it is difficult to detect visually, the distribution in interest income at a demogrant-to output ratio of zero Lorenz-dominates that of the interest income at a demogrant to-output ratio of 20% (again, we confirmed this numerically for all intermediate cases). This is also reflected in the behaviour of the Gini coefficient for interest income, which, as seen in table 3, increases slightly from 0.425 to 0.441 as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased from zero to 20%. Of course, since interest income is just a multiple of asset holdings, the Lorenz curve for asset holdings is identical to that shown for interest income in figure 2b. In contrast to what we saw for wage and interest income, the Lorenz curves for pre- and post-tax total income are different from one another. The reason for this is the inclusion of the demogrant in total income, which makes post- total income an affine function of pre-tax total income. However, the Lo curves, and thus the Gini coefficients, for pre- and post-tax total income equal when the demogrant-to-output ratio is zero. In figures 2c and 2d, we pl the Lorenz curves for pre- and post-tax total income, respectively, correspon to demogrant-to-output ratios of zero (solid line) and 20% (dashed line). As demogrant-to-output ratio is increased, the resulting pre-tax total income distribution is always Lorenz-dominated by the existing one. However, the resulting post-tax total income distribution always Lorenz-dominates the existing one. The increase in pre-tax total income inequality follows directly from the com bined increase in both wage and capital income inequality. On the other hand, the effect of the increasing demogrant is strong enough to cause the level of inequal ity in post-tax total income to fall. This result is consistent with the theoretical result of Davies and Hoy (2002), where the number of hours worked is fixed. Furthermore, it implies that the Gini coefficient for pre-tax total income is rising, from 0.504 to 0.564, while for post-tax total income it is falling from 0.504 to 0.383. Generalized Lorenz curves for post-tax total income corresponding to demo grant-to-output ratios of zero (solid line) and 20% (dashed line) are shown in figure 3 (the distributions of wage income, interest income, and pre-tax total in come at a demogrant-to-output ratio of zero clearly dominate the corresponding distributions at any higher demogrant-to-output ratio in the generalized Lorenz order). Note that, in computing these generalized Lorenz curves, the mean level of post-tax income has been scaled by the relative output level (i.e., the mean level of post-tax income is multiplied by 0.682 when the demogrant-to-output ratio is 20%). It is interesting to note that, at a demogrant-to-output ratio of 20%, the generalized Lorenz curve for post-tax total income lies above that correspond ing to a demogrant-to-output ratio of zero for all p up to 0.600. Accordingly, we can conclude that the (post-tax) income of the poorest individuals actually increases as the demogrant-to-output ratio rises, thereby producing an improvement under the Rawlsian maxi-min cr has important implications for the lev we now turn. Figure 4 displays the Foster et al. (1984) poverty measures, Po (solid li P\ (dashed line) and Pj (dash-dotted line), for post-tax total income (see a table 2). We consider both relative (figure 4a) and absolute (figure 4b) pov lines. As noted in section 1, the relative poverty line is set equal to one half of median level of post-tax income (a level widely used in studies of relative pover see Smeeding 2006). The absolute poverty line is fixed at the level of the relat poverty line when the demogrant-to-output ratio is equal to zero. Changes in level of absolute poverty thus reflect both the redistributive effects and the ou effects of the change in tax policy. From figure 4, it is clear that all of these poverty measures are falling stantially as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased. This is consistent wi the static partial equilibrium results of Thompson (2012). It is interesting to that, while the headcount ratio is equal to 29.1% when the demogrant-to-outp ratio is zero, relative poverty is entirely eliminated (i.e., P( — 0 for any e) when demogrant-to-output ratio is 19.7%, which corresponds to a tax rate of 50 Moreover, despite the large decreases in output, absolute poverty is substanti reduced as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased: the headcount ratio (i.e the proportion of the population that is poor) is 19.8% at this threshold of the demogrant-to-output ratio, while it is 29.1% with a demogrant-to-outp ratio of zero Note also that the effect of relatively small increases in output ratio on both relative and absolute poverty is even mor the higher order poverty measures, P\ and Pj. This is becaause place a greater weight on "extreme" poverty. The demogrant e a minimum income guarantee, significantly increasing the inc est individuals. Nevertheless, one needs to take into account th demogrant-to-output ratio reduces the incomes of many no as is clear from the generalized Lorenz curves shown in figure 4.1. Sensitivity analysis We now consider the sensitivity of our results with respec of relative risk aversion, //. The inverse of ß is the intertemp substitution. As a consequence, it is a key parameter that affe consumption/saving and labour supply decisions. Specificall higher values of ß, namely 2.0 and 2.5, and compare them wit value of ß — 1.5. Qualitatively, the results of increasing the demogrant-to-ou variables of interest are the same as in the benchmark model. to preserve space, we limit our attention to only the minim output ratio that eliminates relative poverty. We denote this th demogrant-to-output ratio by x* As is seen in table 3, higher values of ß require a larger dem ratio (and therefore a higher tax rate) in order to eliminate rela ever, these increases are not large. Specifically, in increasing ß only increases from 19.7% to 22.0%. Thus, this particular qu quite robust to the value of ß. Table 3 also shows that the redu X* are slightly larger at higher values of ß, while the reduction utility are substantially larger at higher values of at. We have shown that increases in the demogrant-to-output ratio (between zero and 20%) reduce the level of inequality, and both relative and absolute poverty (all measured in terms of post-tax total income). However, these reductions in inequality and poverty are accompanied by a significant contraction in output and, beyond a demogrant-to-output ratio of 5.0%, a fall in mean lifetime utility. The model that we considered assumes an exogenously determined growth rate for labour-augmenting technological progress. As a consequence, the redistribu tive policies that we studied had no impact on the economy's long-run growth rate. The effect of these policy changes on the growth rate could be examined using an endogenous growth model as in Cassou and Lansing (2004, 2006) for example. Another possible extension is to incorporate differential taxation be tween capital and labour, as in Ventura (1999) and Conesa et al. (2009), or a progressive income tax schedule, as in Hsu and Yang (2013) and H eathcote et al. (2014). We intend to pursue such extensions in future research.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

NIT increases cost of labor, which in turn increases unemployment

Lages Dos Santos, 04 (Perdo, French economist from Universite du Havre, 9/9,04, CERENE, “Negative Income Tax, Employment and Welfare”, , Rosado)

The increase of the probability of separation between employer/employees has for direct effect to raise the number of unemployed people but also to decrease the number of vacant jobs making lower the tightness in labour market. Moreover, as it involves a diminution of the expected jobs’ life duration, the increase of s has for effect to raise wage that workers claims leading to an increase in λ to keep implicitly jobs profitability. As a consequence, average productivity as average wage decrease. We have to note that the probability to fill a vacant job rises since λ increases but also because there are less vacant jobs for more applicants. However, even if it is not possible to determine the effect on the hiring probability, the evident increase of the term s/p involves, because of flow equilibrium condition, an increase of unemployment. 4.2.2.3. Vacant job cost. The increase of the costs of creation and maintenance of vacant job has for consequence to decrease the number of these because they are less profitable. So it appears that it has a negative effect on the tightness in labour market. Concerning the effect on matching limit, λ, combining equation (28) and (33), we deduce that the diminution of θ induces a diminution of equilibrium value of less efficient job productivity y(λ) and, as a consequence, means an increase in λ (remind that y(λ) is decreasing in λ). This increase in limit λ has for direct effect to decrease the equilibrium average values of productivity and wage. Moreover, the probability of filling a vacant job raises seeing that the tightness on market is lower ant the investigation area is more important. However, taking into account equations (28) and (33), we show that the increase of the cost of a vacant job leads to a diminution of the probability p to be hired and consequently, an increase of the level of unemployment and a diminution of global production. 5. SIMULATIONS 5.1. Presentation In this 5th part, we initiate simulations in order to specify the results we obtained with theoretical analysis but also and mainly in order to determine the effect of the measure on θ. Consequently, for these simulations, in addition to the hypothesises already held, we consider as an explicit function of workers productivity a simple linear function of the form: y l = y − dl 0 )( As we have already precised, the budget constraint imposes us: ∫ = )0( ( ) ( ) 0 W w t w dw λ If we consider a tax function of the form t(w) = -α + γw and given that w(λ)<w(0), the financing of this measure imposes : γ λ α = + 2 w( ) w )0( These simulations, made with the software “Matlab”, permit us to study particularly the effects of the reform on unemployment rate, on production and on surplus. 5.2. The results The simulations gave the results presented in tables 2, 3 and 4. Case 1 corresponds to the reference situation that is the reform’s setting up. Consequently, cases 2, 3, 4 and 5 present the results of the implementation of a Negative Income Tax. In all the cases, we held the following parameters: β=0,5 ; d=0,5 ; s=0,05 ; x=0,9 ; c=0,5 ; N=1 and y0 = 0,5. Besides, in addition to the other variables already defined, Y represents global production, SC, the collective surplus and ,0( 544) WE, the utility of the worker initially the poorest.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

NIT decreases productivity

Amine and Santos 2013

(Samir Amine, Egyptian-French Marxian economist, political scientist and world-systems analyst, and Pedro Lages Dos Santos, Université du Havre · Département AES/Economie PHD. “TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES AND LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION: NEGATIVE INCOME TAX”. DOI: 10.14208/eer.2013.03.02.001) AH

The rise in the tax credit for low income workers (i.e. low-skilled workers) encourages all active workers of all qualification levels to reduce their reservation wage and negotiate lower wages (equation (14)).¶ Given that taxation only concerns workers, firms benefit from this reform, taking a larger share of the collective surplus by reducing the qualification threshold for hiring (reduction of zˆ ). This negative impact on¶ firms' selectivity is explained analytically by the equilibrium equation (20)¶ stating that the increase in the tax credit results in a direct decrease in minimum productivity (zy ˆ .)¶ The second effect concerns the characteristics of the jobs firms will¶ create. Firms have become less selective, and since they are sure they will hire more low-skilled workers, they adapt their job offers to that category of worker by making them less complex (reduction in a).¶ However, although introducing a NIT policy can encourage recovery¶ in the labor market by increasing the proportion of workers considered¶ active and consequently raising labor market participation, the decline in the qualification threshold and job complexity is reflected in a deterioration of matching quality. The tax credit reduces the average productivity, and consequently the average wage.¶ As for the effect on job creation, NIT has a negative effect on labor¶ market tightness. Analytically, this is explained by the equilibrium equation¶ (27). Although firms take a larger share of the total surplus, the deterioration in average job quality makes market entry, and consequently job creation, less profitable. The probability p )( of finding a job falls, while vacant jobs¶ are rapidly filled (rise in q  )( ). Then, although labor market participation¶ rises, lower market tightness accentuates the unemployment rate in this economy.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

NIT will disrupt future economy – people won’t want to work

Mintz, 20 (Jack Mintz, istinguished fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and President’s Fellow of the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary, MLI, “A guaranteed basic income will be too expensive and bad for economic recovery: Jack Mintz for Inside Policy”, May 7, 2020, , Rosado)

As appealing as it seems, Friedman’s negative income tax is not so simple to implement. Obviously, minimum payments would need to recognize different households’ characteristics. Single individuals would get less than those families with multiple adults and children. Households with a disabled parent or child should be given more to cover additional costs. Those temporarily out of work, after earning a higher income, might need replacement income that would be significantly above the minimum payment. So, once we start differentiating people by their needs, we get back too many current programs – and the bureaucracy – to determine eligibility for various benefit payments. Nor is it clear voters would support the elimination of, tuition tax credits, property tax and rent credits, pension and RRSP deductions, age credits, refundable GST tax credits and other targeted relief measures, which all play a role in social policy. And if voters dislike a flat rate, a much higher marginal tax rate would be needed than 49 percent to make up for special preferences. But such high marginal tax rates would discourage work, saving and risk-taking, ultimately eroding the ability for an economy to sustain a guaranteed income. The idea of just giving out cash to relieve poverty also raises eyebrows for many voters who have to pay tax on their earnings from work. And there’s the unknown labour-supply effect: how many recipients might choose to stay at home, receiving $30,000 cheques, rather than work? That’s why many economists concerned about the working poor prefer wage subsidies instead of just handing cash to otherwise able workers. And cash alone isn’t a panacea for helping all low-income families: we would still need professionals to support those with mental or other health issues, social problems or who lack the basic skills to contend with daily life. As we begin to recover from this pandemic, the last form of intervention we need is to discourage people from pursuing new opportunities and jobs that will eventually become available. That is a lesson so far from the grand experiment we had to adopt in a hurry to help many people survive a severe recession. While necessary in the short term, if the federal government were to heed calls to continue this policy on a permanent basis it could disrupt recovery for years to come.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

NIT has failed before and will decrease hours of work

Menon 2018

(University of Virginia with a bachelor’s degree in economics and government and a master’s degree in public policy, Universal Basic Income Has Been Tried Before. It Didn’t Work, https://www.heritage.org/poverty-and-inequality/commentary/universal-basic-income-has-been-tried-it-didnt-work)

The best available evidence about the potential effects of these programs comes from the federal government’s “negative income tax” experiment. The experiment, which ran from 1968 to 1980, consisted of four random, controlled trials across six states designed to test the negative income tax. Similar to the universal basic income, a negative income tax guarantees a minimum income, which phases out as earnings increase. In his 1984 book “Losing Ground,” Murray himself described the negative income tax experiment as “the most ambitious social-science experiment in history.” “No other even comes close to its combination of size, expense, length, and detail of analysis,” he wrote. As Murray recounted, the experiment’s planners hoped that providing a minimum income would encourage work. But their worst fears were realized when the results showed the opposite. Evaluations of the experiment found that the negative income tax reduced “desired hours of work by 9 percent for husbands, by 20 percent for wives, and by 25 percent for single female heads of families.” For single males who were not heads of households throughout the experiment, the reduction in hours worked per week was a staggering43 percent. If recipients lost their jobs during the experiment, they experienced significantly longer spells of unemployment compared with non-recipients—more than two months longer for husbands, almost a year longer for wives, and longer still for single mothers. For every $1,000 in additional benefits, there was an average reductionof $660 in earned income, meaning that $3,000 in government benefits were required to increase net income by $1,000. These studies also made clear that it was the receipt of unconditional aid, not the phase-out of benefits, which led to the reduced work effort. In “Losing Ground,” Murray concluded that the effect of the negative income tax on reducing work was “unambiguous and strong.” To his credit, Murray has acknowledged that such disastrous results should be expected if guaranteed income is an add-on to, rather than a wholesale replacement of, the existing system of welfare and social insurance. In fact, he asserts in “Losing Ground” that the true negative effects in the negative income tax experiment are understated, because these effects were “over and above the effect of the work disincentives in the existing system.” Instead, Murray argues that the universal basic income will realize its full potential “only if it replaces all other transfer payments and the bureaucracies that oversee them.” But while his proposal is respectable in its intent, it presents several new problems. First, Murray proposes eliminating Social Security and Medicare payments to pay for a universal basic income. This would shift resources from the elderly to the non-elderly, including childless adults who are capable of self-support. Second, universal basic income payments would be given to all citizens, including middle- and high-income earners. By not targeting payments to those with low incomes, the proposal would transfer funds away from the vulnerable to the relatively affluent. But the most apparent flaw with the concept is that it fails to require work or work preparation for its recipients. Although the current welfare system does little to encourage self-support, a comprehensive universal basic income policy would remove the idea of personal responsibility entirely. It’s a misguided approach. Public opinion and social psychology indicate that adopting policies with a demonstrated track record of discouraging work would be a bad development. In the 2016 General Social Survey, for example, 70 percent of Americans agreed that they would enjoy working in a paying job, even if they didn’t need the money. Moreover, prominent social psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues that work is a central pillar of human well-being and happiness. Policy should be designed to reward work, rather than replace it. Therefore, a better alternative to a universal basic income would be to expand the earned income tax credit.

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Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

An NIT would decrease work rate and damage the existing welfare state.

Manzi 11

(Jim Manzi, 2011, CEO (APT), B.S., Against the Negative Income Tax, February 15, 2011, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/against-negative-income-tax-jim-manzi/)

The NIT, in plain English, is a government-guaranteed minimum level of income. Sorman makes the classic argument that the biggest advantage of the NIT is that it would eliminate almost the entire welfare bureaucracy, and the tangle of often counter-productive programs that go with it. He dismisses the obvious commonsense objection — that the prospect of a lifetime income for doing nothing might discourage people from slapping the top of the alarm clock every weekday morning at 6 a.m. and going to work — with the argument that the NIT could be made progressive in a way that would theoretically encourage work as compared to the current welfare system: Say the government drew the income line at $10,000 for a family of four and the NIT was 50 percent, as most economists recommend. If the family had no income at all, it would receive $5,000—that is, 50 percent of the amount by which its income fell short of $10,000. If the family earned $2,000, it would get $4,000 from the government — again, 50 percent of its income shortfall—for a total post-tax income of $6,000. Bring in $4,000, and it would receive $3,000, for a total of $7,000. So as the family’s earnings rise, its post-tax income rises, too, preserving the work incentive. This is very different from many social welfare programs, in which a household either receives all of a benefit or, if it ceases to qualify, nothing at all. The all-or-nothing model encourages what social scientists call “poverty traps,” tempting the poor not to improve their situations. Sorman goes on to reference the famous (among nerds) series of randomized experiments in the 1960s and ’70s that tested the effects of the NIT on labor-force participation. He says that the results of these experiments were “fuzzy,” but that the first of the experiments showed that the unemployed people who received the NIT grant were “likelier to try to get back to work.” Sorman is wise to look to these tests of the theory. The power of randomized experiments is that they provide the scientific gold-standabrd method for cutting through the tangle of correlations inherent to these kinds of social questions to create a definitive answer to the question of the causal effects of a tested program on a measured outcome. But I believe his interpretation of the NIT experiments is incomplete, in ways that are fundamental to his argument. There were four large NIT experiments conducted in the U.S. between 1968 and 1980. These tested a wide variety of program variants among the urban and rural poor, in better and worse macroeconomic periods, and in geographies from New Jersey to Seattle. There was, and is, a lot of scholarly debate about many of the experimental results, and their potential application to policymaking. But there are two consistent findings across this body of experiments. First, the tested NIT programs reduce number of hours worked versus the existing welfare system. Directly contrary to how I understand Sorman’s claim that the New Jersey–Pennsylvania experiment showed that the NIT made recipients “likelier to try to get back to work,” this reduction in labor hours was primarily caused by workers remaining non-employed longer if and when they became non-employed. Second, the tested levels of progressivity of implicit tax rates did not get around this problem by encouraging work, as Sorman’s theoretical argument asserts they should. See, for example, Robert A. Moffitt (the subject-matter expert cited by Sorman), who has written extensively about why the NIT experiments showed that “lowered tax rates had essentially no effect on labor supply.” Moffitt has, in fact, written a series of papers trying to show why even the theoretical argument that implicit tax progressivity would encourage work was incorrect. While generalizing from experiments to broad policy is always complicated in social science, true randomized experiments confirm common sense: When it has been put to the test, the NIT reduced work effort. There was a further series of about 30 welfare experiments done around the time of the welfare debates of the early 1990s. These tested many ideas for improving welfare. What emerged from them was a clear picture: work requirements, and only work requirements, could be shown experimentally to get people off welfare and into jobs in a humane fashion. (I’ll have a lot more about this in the upcoming book.) These experiments were an important input into the central tenet of welfare reform — work requirements — which was one of the greatest conservative domestic policy successes of the past 20 years. It moved us in exactly the opposite direction of the permanent, lifetime dole of the NIT. But what about the argument that there is an important benefit — namely, the elimination of the welfare bureaucracy and the dog’s breakfast of “food stamps, public housing, Medicaid, cash welfare, and a myriad of community development programs” that according to Sorman’s article accounts for $522 billion of annual federal spending? This is extremely unlikely. By analogy, the debate in global-warming circles sometimes pits a “simple, efficient carbon tax” against the politicized mess of the cap-and-trade bill that emerged from Congress. But in that case, the real difference is not that between a theoretical carbon tax and a theoretical cap-and-trade system; it is the difference between an academic idea that has not yet been subjected to lobbying and legislation, on one hand, and real laws that are the product of a democratic process, on the other. In the same way, there is nothing inherent about an NIT that will prevent Congress from creating thousands of pages of special rules, exemptions, tax expenditures and so on, that are collectively just as convoluted as the current welfare system. After all, “tax each person a given fraction of income” is a pretty simple idea too, but look at the 2011 federal income tax code. And the likely maintenance or reemergence of the functional equivalents of many of these programs isn’t just the result of cynicism, but of healthy intuitions of natural justice that are essential to maintaining a well-functioning political order. As one example, do we really think it’s a good idea to further disconnect work and income? As another, if part of the motivation for giving adults income is that they spend it supporting their children, would we really allow parents receiving taxpayer money to spend it any way they want with no requirements for child welfare beyond child abuse laws? And as another, a huge portion of the costs of the list of programs Sorman provides is health care. Suppose we gave every adult in America an annual grant of $10,000, and some person who did not buy health insurance with it got sick with an acute, easily treatable condition. Would we really bar them from any urgent medical care and just say “Tough luck, but it’s time to die”? Even if you think this would be a desirable public policy, it’s not plausible that the existence of an NIT would somehow change the political calculus enough to make it substantially more of a reality than it is today. Inevitably, and justifiably, the taxpayers who will have to work more overtime, take shorter vacations, and eat out less in order to come up with the taxes to pay for an NIT or any other welfare system, will demand some degree of accountability from the recipients; which will, in turn, require monitoring, enforcement, adjudication, and the other manifestations of a welfare bureaucracy. As I put this in a recent article in National Review: This basic idea arose again and again during the 1960s and 70s. Examples of such proposals advanced by the political right and left included Milton Friedman’s negative income tax (1962), Robert Theobald’s guaranteed income (1965), James Tobin’s guaranteed income plan (1965), R.J. Lampman’s subsidy plan (1967), Edward Schwartz’s guaranteed income, the negative income tax plan of President Johnson’s Income Maintenance Commission (1969), President Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (1969), George McGovern’s $1,00-a-year plan (1972), and HEW’s Income Supplementation Plan (1974). This idea constantly arises even today in academic discussions, and is being pursued seriously by the current coalition government in the U.K. The key reason we haven’t implemented such a scheme in the U.S. is that we are afraid that many of the recipients will not work, and then blow the money on Cheetos, beer and big-screen TVs. In more academic language, the moral legitimization of the welfare system requires that the recipients earn and then use this money in support of a way of living that comports in some rough sense with the idea of the good life held by taxpayers who provide the funds. The NIT is a fascinating and useful thought experiment, but it’s not a practical public policy.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT solves poverty

Negative Income Tax does not solve average poverty and welfare in the long-run.

Chang et al, 23, Chang, Y., Han, J., & Kim, S. (2023). Chang is on the Monetary Policy Board in the Bank of Korea, Han is affiliated with the Economics Department in Ajou University in South Korea, Kim is affiliated with the Department of Economics in Yonsei University in South Korea “Negative income tax and universal basic income in the eyes of Aiyagari”. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1-13. doi:10.1017/S1365100523000263 https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/journals/macroeconomic-dynamics/article/negative-income-tax-and-universal-basic-income-in-the-eyes-of-aiyagari/00FEC4C9D02026504E18270ABF9ED82D

We compare two welfare programs that are popular in public and political debates: the universal basic income (UBI) and a means-tested negative income tax (NIT). Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021) illustrated that within the class of linear income tax-and-transfer system, the NIT can replicate the same allocation as the UBI by providing an identical marginal effective tax schedule. According to Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021), “The two policies are equivalent because the net payment—that is, taxes less transfers—is identical under the two policies The difference is only a matter of framing.” However, Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021) was not explicit about the total amount of the budget of the policy. The size of the budget differs vastly between the two programs. Although the two programs can generate an identical allocation, we analytically show that the total budget of the NIT is always smaller than that of the UBI.

Based on a standard heterogeneous agents general equilibrium model [a la Aiyagari (Reference Aiyagari1994)], calibrated to approximate the income and wealth distributions in the United States, we perform quantitative analyses on various versions of the UBI and NIT (within the class of linear income tax). While the UBI that pays everyone 20% of the average income costs about 15.4% of the GDP, the NIT (that replicates the identical outcome) costs only 3.8% of the GDP. Neither program improves the average welfare significantly in the long run (in fact, it decreases slightly by 0.27% in consumption-equivalence units), as the reduction in capital and labor (owing to a tax distortion and a weakened motive for precautionary savings and work) roughly offsets the insurance benefit. Furthermore, the aggregate output, capital, and hours worked decrease by 12%, 22%, and 10%, respectively, in the long run.

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Aff Answers › AT: NIT solves poverty

NIT is counterproductive and insufficient to solve poverty.

Gibson, 15 (Preceding the existence of MSNBC, Gibson hosted a news program for America’s Talking. Gibson began his broadcasting career as a West Coast correspondent for NBC News Channel, where he supplied NBC affiliates with live reports on various breaking stories and events such as the O.J. Simpson trial, Wiley Online Library, “Expand Social Protection May Do More Harm than Good: A Pessimistic Review, Sept. 9, 2015, , Roasdo)

What is a sensible effective marginal tax rate to use in this illustration? The International Monetary Fund (IMF) () shows that the income tax rate that maximises tax paid by top income earners ranges from 45 to 70 per cent and averages around 60 per cent. It would be counterproductive for the t in Figure  to be higher than any of these rates, since that would likely reduce the revenue available to fund the social protection transfers. If perhaps t = 0.5 was used, then the breakeven point would be twice the poverty line. In the PNG context, that requires taxing 27 per cent of the population to fund transfers to 73 per cent (given the shape of the density). Putting aside risk of exit by the highly skilled amongst the taxpaying 27 per cent, even a t = 0.5 rate may be too high and could result in dulled incentives to work. For example, the current author faces a marginal tax rate of 33 per cent and it seems unfair for poor people in poor countries to face higher tax rates than professors in rich countries.

How would Figure  look if t = 0.33? The answer is shown by the line labelled (b). Any person consuming less than three times the poverty line gets a transfer, and anyone living above this level pays tax to fund the transfer. This may violate condition (iii) that transfers be targeted just to the (relatively) needy since living above three times the poverty line might be considered ‘middle class’ in a country with mass poverty like PNG. A bigger problem is that just 12 per cent of the PNG population is sufficiently affluent to have a consumption level above three poverty line units, so there are likely to be too few of these affluent people to tax heavily enough to raise the revenue to fund transfers. The dashed line in the top part of Figure  shows the cumulative tax shares of households, starting from the right-hand side axis; the 12 per cent of the population living above three times the poverty line already pay about 43 per cent of the income tax and it is not clear how much more tax could be obtained from them before they sought greener fields in less-taxing countries.

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Aff Answers › CP Links to IRS DA

NIT is hard for IRS to implement.

Allen NO DATE GIVEN

(Jodie Allen, American businesswoman, entrepreneur, and philanthropist. She is the sister of Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, and served as the chief executive officer of his investment and project management company, Vulcan Inc., from its founding in 1986 until 2015. She is also the co-founder and president of the Paul G. Allen Family Foundation, Econlib, “Negative Income Tax, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NegativeIncomeTax.html, Correct AF)

The idea of a negative income tax (NIT) is commonly thought to have originated with economist Milton Friedman, who advocated it in his 1962 book, Capitalism and Freedom. Others, notably the late Joseph Pechman, long-time tax dean of the Brookings Institution, credited the University of Wisconsin's Robert Lampman with at least simultaneous discovery and with bringing the concept to the attention of government policy planners in 1965. In its purest form a NIT promised a revolution in American social policy. Gone would be the intrusive and costly welfare bureaucracy, the pernicious distinctions between "worthy" and "unworthy" recipients, the perverse disincentives for work effort and family formation. The needy would, like everyone else, simply file annual—or perhaps quarterly—income returns with the Internal Revenue Service. But unlike other filers who would make payments to the IRS, based on the amount by which their incomes exceeded the threshold for tax liability, NIT beneficiaries would receive payments ("negative taxes") from the IRS, based on how far their incomes fell below the tax threshold. The NIT would thus be a mirror image of the regular tax system. Instead of tax liabilities varying positively with income according to a tax rate schedule, benefits would vary inversely with income according to a negative tax rate (or benefit-reduction) schedule. If, for example, the threshold for positive tax liability for a family of four was, say, $10,000, a family with only $8,000 of annual income would, given a negative tax rate of 25 percent, receive a check from the Treasury worth $500 (25 percent of the $2,000 difference between its $8,000 income and the $10,000 threshold). A family with zero income would receive $2,500. Very neat. So attractive that researchers in the Office of Economic Opportunity, the brain trust for Lyndon Johnson's Great Society in the mid-sixties, began planning a large-scale field experiment of the idea. Several sites in New Jersey were ultimately selected for the test, which was launched in 1968 with the University of Wisconsin's Institute for Research on Poverty in charge of the research and a Princeton-based firm, Mathematica Inc., in charge of field operations and data collection. The primary purpose of the experiment was to address the concerns of labor-supply theorists. These labor economists worried that providing the working poor with a basic income guarantee if they quit work, and then reducing that guarantee at a fairly steep rate as income from work increased would damage work incentives and ultimately swell NIT costs. They feared that NIT would reduce work effort in two ways. First, by giving a family with no outside income a guaranteed minimum income, NIT might, at the extreme, discourage family members from working at all. And even if workers didn't quit entirely, they might work less since they could satisfy their basic needs with less work effort. Economists call this an income effect. Second, by reducing benefits some fraction of a dollar for every dollar earned, NIT would, along with payroll and state and local income taxes, reduce the net value of wages and induce recipients to "substitute" leisure for work. Economists call this a substitution effect. Using a complicated model intended to minimize program costs for a given sample design, the New Jersey experimenters set out to measure the strength of these two effects. Potential participants were assigned to a variety of "treatment" cells, with the treatment being a particular combination of basic guarantee and negative tax rate. The sample included a "control" group of families not eligible for any experimental payments. Thus, a treatment might offer a guarantee equal to half the poverty line, which was then about $8,000 for a family of four, with benefits being reduced by 50 percent of the family's income. When income was zero, the family would receive the full $4,000 (50 percent of $8,000). When income reached $8,000, the benefit would be reduced to zero and the family would "break even" (i.e., neither receive negative taxes nor pay positive taxes). The experimenters—and the planners in what was then called the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (myself included) who drew upon their work in designing President Richard Nixon's Family Assistance Plan of 1969 (FAP)—quickly encountered a host of problems, both conceptual and administrative. These continue to haunt negative tax advocates to this day. The first and most basic problem is that it is currently fiscally—and perhaps administratively—impossible to construct an NIT that simultaneously 1. provides an income guarantee as generous as the cash and in-kind benefits already available to many welfare recipients in the United States 2. provides an ostensible incentive to work (a far greater concern when benefits are to be extended beyond the traditional welfare population dominated by female-headed families), and 3. restricts coverage to any manageable proportion of the population—the so-called "break-even" problem. These constraints are, in fact, irreconcilable as long as the median income remains within striking distance of the poverty line—a situation that has barely improved over the last two decades of slow average economic growth. The McGovern plan proposed by the Democrats' 1972 presidential candidate starkly illustrated this problem. With a guarantee determined by the candidate's promise of $1,000 per person, and a benefit reduction rate limited to 33 1/3 percent at the behest of economic advisers worried about imposing work disincentives on a sizable proportion of the labor force, the plan had a break-even of $12,000 for a family of four—roughly the median income at the time. Thus, it would have converted roughly half the population into federal tax beneficiaries while the other half of the population would have paid for these transfers along with the cost of all other federal activities. The second problem with a NIT is that the welfare system already provides a package of cash and in-kind benefits that, in many states, is worth considerably more than any likely NIT (though at the cost of excluding large groups of the poor—such as two-parent families—from eligibility). Political and humanitarian considerations prevent reducing these benefits, thus vitiating one of the NIT's attractions—the possibility of abolishing the welfare system. Competition from welfare was a severe problem for the New Jersey experimenters. Many of the families in the study were actually receiving welfare benefits worth more than the experimental payments. Therefore, some experts questioned the experimenters' findings that the NIT had only a minimal effect on work incentives, and indeed questioned whether the experiment had really measured anything at all. HEW attempted to solve these problems by launching subsequent income-maintenance experiments in Seattle and Denver (SIME/DIME). These experiments more carefully integrated existing welfare programs and offered more generous NIT plans. But the generosity of most of the tested plans made them unlikely to be replicated on a national scale, and more complicated to analyze. The Stanford Research Institute (SRI), which analyzed the SIME/DIME findings, found stronger work disincentive effects, ranging from an average 9 percent work reduction for husbands to an average 18 percent reduction for wives. This was not as scary as some NIT opponents had predicted. But it was large enough to suggest that as much as 50 to 60 percent of the transfers paid to two-parent families under a NIT might go to replace lost earnings. They also found an unexpected result: instead of promoting family stability (the presumed result of extending benefits to two-parent working families on an equal basis), the NITs seemed to increase family breakup. The SRI researchers—Michael T. Hannah, Nancy B. Tuma, and Lyle P. Groeneveld—hypothesized that the availability of the income guarantee to some families reduced the pressure on the breadwinner to remain with the family, while the benefit-reduction rate also reduced the value to the family of keeping a wage earner in the unit. Other researchers, notably the University of Wisconsin's Glen G. Cain, disputed the analytical strength of these findings. But at the very least the results were discouraging to those who promoted an NIT as a boon to family stability. A third set of problems is administrative. One is the matter of the appropriate income-accounting period, which spawned a whole literature (to which I contributed my share). If income for NIT purposes is measured over a year, as in the positive tax system, families in great, but temporary, need may be denied benefits. If the accounting period is shorter, say a month, as in the welfare system, and income reporting procedures are lax, potential costs and caseloads might be as much as 70 percent higher than those predicted by the annual income-based models used to estimate the costs of FAP and its early successors. The income accounting and reporting analysis—backed up by an HEW administrative experiment in cooperation with the Denver welfare department—also drew attention to the fact that many negative tax participants cheat on income reports. To be sure, many taxpayers cheat too. But the irregularity of income sources and shifting family arrangements at the lower end of the distribution make it unlikely that the IRS could prevent widespread fraud unless it converted itself into a facsimile of the much-detested local welfare offices. Some indication of the difficulty that the IRS might experience in administering a large-scale NIT is provided by the Earned Income Credit (EIC), a hybrid version of an NIT that was slipped into the tax code in 1975 by Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long. Long saw it as a way to offset the regressive effect of payroll taxes on low-income earners. The EIC works like this (using 1993 rules for a family with one qualifying child): For every dollar of earned income, the family receives a refundable tax credit of 18.5 percent, up to a maximum credit of $1,434 (not including additional credits for young children and health insurance costs) for a family with earnings of $7,750. The credit is phased out at a rate of 13.21 cents for every dollar of adjusted gross income (AGI) above $12,200, until it reaches a zero value for a family with AGI of $23,050. One attraction of the EIC is that because its benefits rise positively with earnings up to the phase-out point, it has a positive rather than negative effect on work incentives for workers earning a very low income. In the phase-out range, however, its substitution effects are identical to those of a comparable NIT. More important, a 1990 IRS study revealed that owing in part to the complexity of the EIC rules, almost 40 percent of EIC benefits were paid to families who were not eligible for them. Yet the finding of such a high error rate did not deter Congress from both enlarging and further complicating the EIC in the fall of 1990. To these problems must be added the messy reality of the day-to-day stresses and strains of many of America's poor. Data from another HEW experiment revealed that many of the low-income population's problems are not readily addressed by the provision of an extra few hundred dollars in annual income. Indeed, recent revisionist social welfare thinking has questioned the central premise of the NIT planners—that a nonintrusive income-maintenance system is preferable. More recent policy has stressed direct interventions to improve family functioning and self-reliance, including eligibility rules that require work effort. Nonetheless, the NIT is still popular among many researchers and politicians. Nixon's FAP, which compromised with both the conceptual and administrative problems by essentially retaining the current welfare system and grafting on to it a low-level income-maintenance benefit for the working poor, pleased neither academics nor welfare advocates. Nor did it please the big-city mayors and governors, who looked at welfare reform as primarily a way to reduce their share of the system's cost. (Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan's Politics of a Guaranteed Income, is the definitive text on this point.) The Ford administration floated a reworked version of FAP, but it foundered on the same concerns as FAP. President Jimmy Carter set out to develop a welfare reform that would have zero additional cost. Although Carter's plan emphasized work alternatives to welfare, HEW's analysts quickly shifted the emphasis to a more generous reworking of the FAP concept. Forced to compromise with analysts at the Department of Labor—myself, by then, included—who were promoting a low-wage guaranteed job approach, the reformers ended up with the unwieldy Better Jobs and Income Plan (BJIP), which would have cost many billions more and pleased neither liberals nor conservatives in Congress. The Reagan administration put its efforts into cutting back, rather than extending, income benefits, though the eighties witnessed both an expansion of earned-income tax credits and the 1988 welfare act, which tried, at so-far modest cost and effect, to direct more welfare recipients into jobs. More recently, some "middle-income tax relief" proposals floated in Congress in 1991 would convert the current positive tax personal exemption into a "refundable" credit, paid out in cash to families with incomes below the tax-liability threshold. These proposals, thus, would incorporate a full-bodied NIT into the Internal Revenue Code. The appeal of a negative income tax lives on. And so do its many problems.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › CP Links to IRS DA

The NIT would cost the IRS lots of time, money, and focus. Links to the net benefit.

Johnson 03, Steve Johnson is the Dunbar Family Professor of Law. Johnson has received numerous teaching awards. His courses include Taxation, Business Planning, Bankruptcy, Legislation, and Administrative Law. He also works with Florida State’s highly successful moot court program and has coached a national championship team and many other award-winning Florida State teams in moot court competitions around the country.

Sometimes the best action is inaction. When the tax law frequently changes and the changes are unclear or fail to anticipate major implementation issues, the IRS (and taxpayers) are severely burdened. The need to learn, re-learn, "unlearn," and just make it up as one goes along, is an invisible yet large cost, claiming time, attention, and energy that could have been profitably applied to other responsibilities. There is little doubt that the above describes the current unsatisfactory pace and quality of federal tax legislative outputs. Each year brings multiple tax acts, many of them major acts (as in 1997, 1998, and 2001). Unfortunately, the provisions enacted are of declining quality in terms of clarity, specificity, and foresight' One aspect of this has been Congress' tendency in recent years to "legislate concepts" rather than firm provisions, leaving it up to the IRS to sort out the details. "[A] process that deals with concepts and not in details, is one that leads to complexity, because legislators don't always focus on the impact of their provisions and what kind of burden they may be imposing. Both the volume of tax legislative outputs and the declining quality of them have put substantial pressures on the IRS. Indeed, its job has been "made worse by each successive Congress. Thus, putting tax legislation on holiday for some years would give the IRS welcome breathing space, allowing it to fulfill its present duties better. But, of course, this will not happen. The economic and political factors that have driven frenetic tax legislation in recent decades show no signs of losing steam. Thus, this relief mechanism will remain purely a theoretical option. 2. Relief from Non-Revenue Obligations. There was a time when people could seriously argue that the Internal Revenue Code should be used only to raise revenue. Those days are long gone. In the past decade, the President and Congress have used the income tax the way my mother employed chicken soup: as a magic elixir to solve all the nation's economic and social difficulties. If the nation has a problem in access to education, child care affordability, health insurance coverage, or the financing of long-term care, an income tax deduction or credit is [viewed as] the answer. The examples could easily be multiplied. A major one is the earned income credit, which is "truly a welfare system grafted onto" the answer which means the IRS is "running a negative income tax program Code, for 25 million" Americans. The fundamental problem is that the IRS is being asked to do too much. Having to administer [non-revenue responsibilities] ... has diverted IRS audit resources .... The IRS cannot do all these things well .... Many it cannot do at all. We should not expect it to. A major simplification of the nation's tax 24 law is necessary.