Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › DA Links › Links – Politics

Massive resistance and fierce stakeholder opposition to passage of Medicare for all

, PhD 2019 November; 109(11): 1497–1500. Published online 2019 November. doi: PMCID: PMC6775897 PMID: Lessons From the Long and Winding Road to Medicare for All https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6775897/

Can Medicare for all move from aspiration and slogan to legislative reality? Single-payer reform would entail an extraordinary degree of change in US health policy and centralization of insurance coverage, financing, and provider payment under the federal government. Such disruption may be justified given the myriad pathologies of American health care. But that does not make any easier the political task in a nation whose political institutions and health care system both have powerful biases toward incrementalism. The political hurdles that tripped up national health insurance in the 20th century endure. Moreover, the ACA has become another obstacle to single-payer reform because it too is now part of the status quo. Both the politics, replete with formidable barriers and fierce opposition, and history of health reform, dominated by failure and incrementalism, are stacked heavily against Medicare for all. The ACA won enactment partly because it embraced incrementalism, built on the status quo to reduce stakeholder resistance, and minimized disruption for the already insured.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › DA Links › Links – Politics

Huge political obstacles to Medicare for All. The division is powerful and sustained.

, JD, PhD 2019 States as Policy Laboratories: The Politics of State-Based Single-Payer Proposals 2019 November; 109(11): 1511–1514. Published online 2019 November. doi: PMCID: PMC6775896 PMID: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6775896/

Despite the gains generated by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), more than 30 million Americans remain uninsured, and millions more delay or defer needed medical care because of high deductibles and other out-of-pocket costs. This ongoing policy challenge prompts an increasing cadre of progressive Democrats to call for a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s health care system, dramatically reducing (or perhaps completely eliminating) the multipayer private insurance health insurance industry and replacing it with comprehensive publicly funded coverage for all, referred to generally as a “single-payer” insurance model.1 Although the focus for most single-payer advocates is Washington, DC, where the rhetorical movement for Medicare for all animates the presidential campaigns of numerous Democratic candidates, there are also efforts in a handful of states to enact a state-based single-payer program that could become a model for federal policymakers.2 The political obstacles to the single-payer movement are obvious.3 First, the interest group opposition is fierce, wealthy, and influential. Opponents include private insurers worried about being forced into bankruptcy, providers worried about lower reimbursement, employers worried about higher taxes and lost control over employee benefits, unions worried about losing dollars generated by their health benefit programs, and of course a variety of conservative and Republican advocacy groups. Interest group support for single payer is far weaker, more fragmented, and less wealthy. Single-payer proposals also raise concerns about the appropriate role of government and the division of labor between the public and private sectors. These concerns are especially powerful here in the United States, where an antigovernment ethos resonates strongly with much of the population and where the view that government is less competent than the private sector is deeply engrained. This context makes any effort to dramatically raise taxes to fund a single-payer system even more difficult, even when economists point to administrative efficiencies, long-term system savings, and the elimination of insurance premiums. The odds of overcoming these obstacles are better at the state level than in Washington, DC.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › DA Links › Links – Politics

Medicare for All is too divisive – no bipartisan support.

JARED GANS - 02/21/23 1:42 PM ET Sanders: Medicare-for-all ‘ain’t going to happen’ in divided Congress https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/3868059-sanders-medicare-for-all-aint-going-to-happen-in-divided-congress/

Sen. (I-Vt.) said “Medicare for All,” a system that would establish government-run health care for all U.S. citizens, “ain’t going to happen” during the next two years amid a divided Congress. Sanders that members of Congress can still work together during this congressional session to improve health care throughout the country, even though he said no Republicans and only half of congressional Democrats support Medicare for All.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › DA Links › Links – Federalism

Medicare for All collapses state discretion and destroys federalism.

and July 19 2019 Federalism, the Affordable Care Act, and Health Reform in the 2020 Electionhttps://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2019/jul/federalism-affordable-care-act-health-reform-2020-election

Medicare for All. At the other end of the federalism spectrum, a Medicare for All approach, which would leave virtually no discretion to states, would be expected to increase coverage nationally and significantly reduce state variation in coverage and access. Given its near-automatic enrollment of all residents, it would go the farthest in moving states like Texas closer to the front of the pack. However, its uniform approach might not eliminate regional differences in access to coverage, which persist under Medicare. Additionally, it would stifle innovation in states like California, which have been performance leaders in marketplace and Medicaid expansion implementation.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › DA Links › Links – Inflation

Plan triggers inflation and interest rate hikes—increases in government spending when the economy is at full employment freaks out the Fed.

Olson and Sheiner 17

(Louise M. Sheiner Policy Director - The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Senior Fellow - Economic Studies at Brookings Peter Olson Research Analyst, , “The Hutchins Center Explains: Fiscal stimulus and the Fed,” pg online @

WHAT IS FISCAL STIMULUS? Fiscal stimulus is a term for tax cuts or new government spending that increase aggregate demand. Almost any deficit-increasing policy—reduced corporate taxes, more generous food stamps, added infrastructure spending—can stimulate demand, but the precise impacts depend on the structure of the package and the timing. For example, tax cuts aimed at the poor can boost the economy more in the near-term than tax cuts for the rich because the poor tend to spend a higher percentage of what they receive than the wealthy. In contrast, a decision today to build a new nuclear submarine five years in the future won’t have much effect on demand in the short-term at all. WHEN IS FISCAL STIMULUS WARRANTED? Fiscal stimulus can be helpful when unemployment is high and economic output is less than its potential. When the economy is at full employment, or close to it, fiscal stimulus is more likely to lead to higher prices than to higher output. In that case, the Federal Reserve is likely to raise interest rates to keep higher government spending or lower taxes from producing an unwelcome increase in inflation. DOES IT MAKE SENSE RIGHT NOW? The current unemployment rate in the U.S. (4.7%) is near what economists think of as “full employment”, and GDP growth in 2016 likely was close to what many economists think of as its potential rate (1.8 to 2.0%), roughly defined as the rate at which the labor force grows plus the rate at which productivity (output per hour of work) grows. As a result, the U.S. does not appear to require additional stimulus right now. At least, that was Chair Yellen’s take at the Federal Reserve’s December 2016 press conference. When asked about fiscal stimulus, she said that it was “not obviously needed,” given the “solid labor market.” Other Fed officials have made similar comments since Donald Trump’s election brought more talk of stimulus. For instance, Loretta Mester, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, said earlier this month that “I think we’re basically at full employment… and I think that inflation is going to be moving back up to 2 percent over the next couple of years. So I don’t see a need of the kind of fiscal policy just to stimulate aggregate demand….” HOW ABOUT SPENDING ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT? The Fed clearly would prefer that any fiscal expansion be aimed at increasing the long-run potential growth rate. John Williams, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, recently stated: “Today I don’t think we need short-term fiscal stimulus. What we need is really better policies and investments in the long-term health of the economy.” Increased government spending on investment—bridge projects, scientific research, education—raises the level of future GDP, whereas spending on consumption does not. So as Williams suggests, even when fiscal stimulus doesn’t make sense for near-term support for the economy, increased spending on public investment might. (For a Hutchins Center explainer on public investment, see here.) As Governor Lael Brainard said at the Hutchins Center recently: Changes in fiscal policy that raise the level or growth rate of productivity or that induce greater labor force participation and higher levels of skill and education in the workforce raise the nation’s productive capacity and result in more sustainable increases in output and living standards. The higher productivity and workforce levels engendered by these policies would likely increase investment opportunities and raise expectations of future income growth, sustainably boosting the levels of investment and consumption and, as a result, the longer-run neutral rate. Such policies are more likely to be sustainable because the boost to GDP that they provide continues to accumulate over time, limiting increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio and preserving fiscal space. [Fiscal space is how much more debt a government can take on before it runs into trouble.] Some economists, such as Douglas Elmendorf, dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and Louise Sheiner—one of the authors of this post—have argued that now is a particularly good time for the government to undertake more investment because interest rates are so low, which makes borrowing to finance that investment much cheaper. IS FEDERAL RESERVE INTEREST RATE POLICY LIKELY TO RESPOND DIFFERENTLY TO TAX CUTS AND SPENDING INCREASES IF THEY ARE LARGELY AIMED AT INCREASING INVESTMENT AS OPPOSED TO CONSUMPTION? It is entirely possible that the Fed could respond the same way to two packages that look quite different—one aimed at stimulating aggregate demand in the short term, and one aimed at improving the economy’s growth potential in the long run—because government spending intended to boost the economy’s productive capacity in the long run will generally also increase short-run aggregate demand. Government spending acts as fiscal stimulus whether the government is buying food or a supercomputer that may lead to scientific breakthroughs and greater growth potential. More generally, whether the Federal Reserve will increase interest rates in response to a fiscal stimulus package depends on both the timing of the effects and the magnitude of those effects. Inflationary pressures come from increases in aggregate demand not met by increases in aggregate supply. So if President Trump and Congress fashion a tax-and-spending package that increases both demand and supply by the same amount at the same time, that wouldn’t be inflationary. The Fed would not respond by raising interest rates. But such a policy would be unusual. Most investments take time to build and time to bear fruit. Consider the time it takes to develop a new air traffic control system and the time it takes for airlines to adapt to it, or the lag between improved education funding and a more skilled workforce. IF FISCAL STIMULUS MEANS TIGHTER MONETARY POLICY IN THE SHORT TERM, IS THERE ANY REASON TO DO IT? Spending increases and tax cuts would lead to greater deficits, and thus to an increase in the national debt. A larger debt, among other impacts, could make it harder for the federal government to borrow still more to provide fiscal stimulus during the next downturn. But a deficit-widening package of spending increases and tax cuts probably would lead the Federal Reserve to raise rates more than it otherwise would, and that would give it more room to cut rates in a downturn. In effect, fiscal space would be traded for monetary policy space.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › DA Links › Links - Business Confidence

Businesses oppose Medicare for All – recruiting, fear of demands for wage increases, and ideologically opposition

Harvard School of Public Health, 2021 Why a single-payer health care system lacks business support https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-the-news/why-a-single-payer-health-care-system-lacks-business-support/

Research indicates that a single-payer in the U.S. would save the country or individual states money in the long run, but many employers are opposed to such a system, even though it is costly, according to news reports. A June 10, 2021, Marketplace article noted that employers paid 67% of medical premiums for family coverage plans in March 2020 and contributed an annual average of almost $14,000 per family. The article examined several possible reasons companies prefer the current system, including that offering health insurance gives large established companies a competitive advantage over startups and fledgling companies when recruiting employees. , K.T. Li Professor of Economics, Emeritus, at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, noted that industries that are heavy with younger workers, such as the tech industry, are likely to oppose single-payer systems because health insurance premiums tend to be lower for younger people. Hsiao added that some companies may worry that their workers would demand higher pay if the company wasn’t covering their health insurance, while other companies may be ideologically opposed to having a government-run health system.

Medicare for All decreases commerce and raises taxes—reducing growth.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › DA Links › Links - Business Confidence

Plan reduces business confidence – fear it will hurt their talent base and increase their overall costs.

Janet Nguyen Jun 10, 2021 Why don’t U.S. businesses show more support for single-payer health care? https://www.marketplace.org/2021/06/10/why-dont-u-s-businesses-show-more-support-for-single-payer-health-care/

Despite the costs of health care, our current system is advantageous for some companies. Chad Stecher, an assistant professor of health economics at Arizona State University, said big tech companies like Amazon or Facebook can attract star talent by offering compelling benefits, including health care. “It’s in their interest to preserve that advantage over upstart companies that certainly won’t be able to compete with them on health insurance,” Stecher said. William Hsiao, an emeritus professor of economics at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of public health, said that industries employing younger workers, like the tech industry, are more likely to be opposed to single-payer health care because the health insurance premiums of those workers tend to be lower. With the uniform payroll tax of the single-payer system, Hsiao said, industries will probably end up paying more than they currently do. For a sense of that: A California Senate committee in 2017 found a single-payer plan in the state would cost $400 billion a year, which could be paid for with a 15% payroll tax. Another reason some companies are against a single-payer system simply has to do with ideology, Hsiao said — many believe the government should just “stay out of it.”

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Econ defense

Downturns don’t cause wars

Liao 19’ – Jianan, Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School, China. “Business Cycle and War: A Literature Review and Evaluation”, Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, Vol. 68, , 02-xx-2019

First, war can occur at any stage of expansion, crisis, recession, recovery, so it is unrealistic to assume that wars occur at any particular stage of the business cycle. On the one hand, although the domestic economic problems in the crisis/recession/depression period break out and become prominent in a short time, in fact, such challenge exists at all stages of the business cycle. When countries cannot manage to solve these problems through conventional approaches, including fiscal and monetary policies, they may resort to military expansion to achieve their goals, a theory known as Lateral Pressure. [13] Under such circumstances, even countries in the period of economic expansion are facing downward pressure on the economy and may try to solve the problem through expansion. On the other hand, although the resources required for foreign wars are huge for countries in economic depression, the decision to wage wars depends largely on the consideration of the gain and loss of wars. Even during depression, governments can raise funding for war by issuing bonds. Argentina, for example, was mired in economic stagflation before the war on the Malvinas islands (also known as the Falkland islands in the UK). In fact, many governments would dramatically increase their expenditure to stimulate the economy during the recession, and economically war is the same as these policies, so the claim that a depressed economy cannot support a war is unfounded. In addition, during the crisis period of the business cycle, which is the early stage of the economic downturn, despite the economic crisis and potential depression, the country still retains the ability to start wars based on its economic and military power. Based on the above understanding, war has the conditions and reasons for its outbreak in all stages of the business cycle.

Second, the economic origin for the outbreak of war is downward pressure on the economy rather than optimism or competition for monopoly capital, which may exist during economic recession or economic prosperity. This is due to a fact that during economic prosperity, people are also worried about a potential economic recession. Blainey pointed out that wars often occur in the economic upturn, which is caused by the optimism in people's mind [14], that is, the confidence to prevail. This interpretation linking optimism and war ignores the strength contrast between the warring parties. Not all wars are equally comprehensive, and there have always been wars of unequal strength. In such a war, one of the parties tends to have an absolute advantage, so the expectation of the outcome of the war is not directly related to the economic situation of the country. Optimism is not a major factor leading to war, but may somewhat serve as stimulation. In addition, Lenin attributed the war to competition between monopoly capital. This theory may seem plausible, but its scope of application is obviously too narrow. Lenin's theory of imperialism is only applicable to developed capitalist countries in the late stage of the development capitalism, but in reality, many wars take place among developing countries whose economies are still at their beginning stages. Therefore, the theory centered on competition among monopoly capital cannot explain most foreign wars. Moreover, even wars that occur during periods of economic expansion are likely to result from the potential expectation of economic recession, the "limits of growth" [15] faced during prosperity — a potential deficiency of market demand. So the downward pressure on the economy is the cause of war.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Econ defense

‘Slow growth’ is inevitable AND is proof of a strong economy

Vollrath 20 – Dietrich, Professor of economics at the University of Houston. “Slow economic growth is a sign of success”, USAPP, , 02-22-2020

We’re accustomed to looking at the growth rate of GDP to evaluate the health of our economy. Which is why the recent slowdown in growth appears so troubling. In the US, GDP growth for 2019 was 2.3%, meaning it has been nineteen years since growth hit 4%, and nearly as long since it touched 3%. For the UK the story is similar, as it has been fifteen years since growth hit 3%. In the Eurozone as a whole, growth last came close to 4% in 2000. These slowdowns across developed economies predates the financial crisis, and leads to natural questions: what went wrong with the economy, and how do we fix it?

But the slowdown we’re observing isn’t something we can fix – or that we would want to fix – because the slowdown was never a consequence of things that went wrong. Instead, as I show my new book, the slowdown is a consequence of things that went right.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Econ defense

No Econ Impact

Walt 20 – Stephen M, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, Foreign Policy, , 05-13-2020

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term. To be sure, I can’t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days. So there is no guarantee that we won’t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting. But given that it’s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history, I’m going to hope I’m right about this one.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Competitiveness defense

Decline does not cause disputes.

Macdonald and Parent 18 – Paul, Political Science Professor at Wellesley College. Joseph, Political Science Professor at the University of Notre Dame. “Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment”, University Press, pg. 61, 10.7591/cornell/9781501717093.001.0001, xx-xx-2018

Once declining powers get involved in a dispute, are they more likely to escalate? The evidence suggests not. Declining powers had an average hostility in their militarized disputes of 2.8, which compares to 2.9 for the baseline, a difference that is not statistically significant.46 Out of our sixteen cases of declining powers, seven had an average hostility that lay above the baseline in their militarized disputes, whereas seven had an average hostility that lay below the baseline. One partial exception to this null result may be small decliners, who had an average dispute hostility of 2.6. But in general, the typical behavior of declining powers appears to resemble that of their non-declining counterparts. They tend to display or threaten to display force, rather than actually use it.

Collectively, these three sets of findings provide sturdy evidence against preventive war theories. Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively, declining powers appear no more likely to initiate militarized disputes than the average power. Nor do declining powers appear more vulnerable to scavengers. Indeed, declining powers participate in fewer militarized disputes than their non-declining counterparts. The evidence also calls into question predictions that declining powers favor do-or-die schemes. Rather, declining powers do not get involved in disputes that escalate to higher levels of hostility than the average power.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Competitiveness defense

Primacy is locked in – GDP isn’t key

Brooks and Wohlforth 16 – Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. William, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government. “The once and future superpower: why China won't overtake the United States”, Foreign Affairs, , 06-xx-2016

After two and a half decades, is the United States' run as the world's sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes, seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, China's economy is on track to become the world's biggest, and even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon. But this is wishful, or fearful, thinking. Economic growth no longer translates as directly into military power as it did in the past, which means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and established ones to fall. And China--the only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United States--also faces a more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how far it lags behind technologically. Even though the United States' economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the country's military superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics, everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come. Lasting preeminence will help the United States ward off the greatest traditional international danger, war between the world's major powers. And it will give Washington options for dealing with nonstate threats such as terrorism and transnational challenges such as climate change. But it will also impose burdens of leadership and force choices among competing priorities, particularly as finances grow more straitened. With great power comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading role successfully will require Washington to display a maturity that U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked.

the wealth of nations

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Competitiveness defense

Declining competitiveness soothes war

Macdonald and Parent 18 – Paul, Political Science Professor at Wellesley College. Joseph, Political Science Professor at the University of Notre Dame. “Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment”, University Press, pg. 42-49, 10.7591/cornell/9781501717093.001.0001, xx-xx-2018

Our primary finding is that great powers deal with decline by retrenching promptly and proportionately. Regardless of regime type, retrenchment is the most common response to decline, and preventive wars almost never happen during decline. Retrenchment helps great powers regain their former positions with some regularity, but states that fail to retrench never recover their rank. Although decline promotes retrenchment, the rate of decline is only a rough predictor of the extent of retrenchment. Great powers have a tendency to retrench less than might be expected given underlying power trends, but most errors are modest. Without question, our theory has anomalies, but rival views are only theories of anomalies.

Secondarily, we find that states that fall at similar rates behave similarly—there is a stepwise relationship between non-decliners, small decline-ers, medium decliners, and large decliners. Declining powers spend less on defense and slow the growth of military personnel more than other states. They are no more likely to form new alliances, but they are less likely to participate in disputes. We also find evidence that states refine retrenchment policies to prevailing structural conditions. While our structural modifiers have modest explanatory power on their own, collectively they perform impressively. Declining powers that are most favorably positioned have almost all retrenched.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Increases deficit / debt

Deficit spending increases inflation and interest rates – decks economic growth and causes crises

Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget 7-14-2022, (The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget is a non-profit public policy organization based in Washington, D.C. that addresses federal budget and fiscal issues. “Risks and Threats from Deficits and Debt.” Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. Web. 7-14-2022. accessed 6-26-2023. < >) WHCCHS

Much of this borrowing was important for supporting households, securing balance sheets, limiting the depth of the recession, and supporting the economic recovery. However, the total magnitude of fiscal support – particularly support enacted in 2021 – greatly exceeded the needs or capacity of the economy.1 The resulting excess demand has contributed to inflation. The Federal Reserve normally aims for 2 percent inflation as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) index, the equivalent of roughly 2.3 percent in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Over the past year, the PCE index has risen by 6.3 percent; economists have attributed 2 to 4 percentage points of this rate to the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan alone.2 CPI inflation has totaled 8.6 percent, the highest in four decades. In response to rising inflation, the Federal Reserve has begun aggressively raising the federal funds interest rate, which reverberates throughout the economy. Similarly, investors generally respond to higher levels of debt issuance by demanding higher rates on Treasury bonds. A 2019 study by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) economists Edward Gamber and John Seliski found that every 10 percent increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio translates into a 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point increase in interest rates.9 Research from Ernie Tedeschi and Lukasz Rachel & Lawrence Summers reaches similar conclusions.10 These studies show that while many factors have reduced interest rates, high debt has increased them. Higher interest rates on federal debt and bank reserves increase interest rates throughout the economy on everything from mortgages to student loans to credit cards. They also contribute to a phenomenon called “crowd out,” where investors purchase government bonds instead of investing in the private sector, thus slowing economic growth. CBO estimates that for every $1 of new U.S. government borrowing, total investment falls by 33 cents and an additional 24 cents of the return to investments goes abroad, resulting in slowing income growth over time.11 In 2019, CBO compared national income if debt were allowed to rise rapidly, as in their alternative fiscal scenario, to a scenario where debt returned to historic levels as a share of the economy.12 After three decades, CBO found that growing debt would result in per-person income being $9,000 lower – or a 10 percent reduction – compared to declining debt. In a worst-case scenario, high and rising debt could even spur a fiscal crisis. In this case, loss of market confidence could quickly drive up interest rates or inflation expectations, devaluing existing bonds and causing severe global financial disruptions. The likelihood of such a crisis is low in a country like the United States, but it rises as the debt grows relative to the economy.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Increases deficit / debt

Deficit spending to fund health care can cause a long-term economic decline

Myers 2020 (Kristien Myers, award winning yahoo finance journalist, writes on January 30 2020, Bernie Sanders Medicare for all plan could shrink GDP by as much as accesed 06/29/23)

According to analysis by the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM), Medicare for all (M4A) could shrink U.S. GDP by as much as 24% by the year 2060, depending on how it is financed. Despite this hit to economic growth, the plan proposed by presidential candidate Bernie Sanders (I-VT) isn’t without benefits. According to the analysis, Medicare for all would improve population health overall, increasing life expectancy by roughly two years, grow the population of the United States by 3%, and boost worker productivity. The share of the population that is “seriously ill” would also decline, from 15% to 13%. But, the model warns, if the plan is deficit-financed — paid for by government borrowing — “the negative effects of larger deficits on labor supply, capital accumulation and GDP would significantly outweigh the positive effects on the economy that come from a larger and healthier workforce.”Study author Kent Smetters told Yahoo Finance that if financing of Medicare for all were changed, the plan could “be something that increases GDP.”Under current law, the analysis found, the uninsured population of the United States will increase from 10% to more than 27% by 2060. If Sanders’ Medicare for all plan were enacted, the uninsured rate of Americans would drop to zero.With a healthier population, the study notes, Medicare for all would “improve longevity, worker health, and population size.” Depending on the financing of the plan, worker productivity and wages could also get a boost.“M4A creates an immediate boost to wages and a broadening of the federal income tax base, resulting in higher federal tax revenues,” the report noted. “In the long run, however, this effect can be overtaken by economic effects of different financing options.”Financing Medicare for all According to studies, the cost of Medicare for all sits at roughly $32 trillion over the next decade. But, as the analysis notes, Sanders’ universal health care plan doesn’t have a built-in financing mechanism. The senator’s policy allows for different types of financing, including income-based premiums, savings on health care costs, and the wealth tax. But as a previous Penn Wharton Budget Model found, Sanders’ wealth tax would generate $1 trillion less in revenue than he stated. The analysis of Medicare for all considers three different types of financing: premiums, payroll taxes, and deficit financing.Under a premium model, everyone pays a flat rate regardless of age, income, or existing medical conditions. Payroll tax financing would be progressive, as a worker who has higher wages would pay a larger absolute amount. Lastly, deficit financing would rely on government borrowing, placing the costs of larger debt on current and future workers. Premium-based funding. The PWBM finds that with premium financing, the U.S. economy could grow by 0.2% by 2060. Income tax revenue under this model increases by 16%, according to the analysis. Payroll tax revenues would be boosted by 26%. Worker productivity would also increase by 3.6% by 2060 compared to the current law. Payroll-based funding. Medicare for all could also be paid for through payroll taxes. As a worker’s wages increase, the absolute amount paid for health care would also rise, making the tax progressive. Under this plan, GDP falls by 15%. While payroll tax revenues would grow by 160% under this model, income tax revenue would shrink by 6% Deficit-based funding. The real trouble comes when Medicare for all is financed by deficits. With government borrowing, universal health care could shrink the economy by as much as 24% by 2060, as investments in private capital are reduced. Worker productivity, however, would increase the most, at just under 8%. But overall income and payroll tax revenues would fall by 14% and 2%, respectively, after receiving a boost over the next two decades. The report says “it would be a net positive for the economy if financed in a way that avoids increasing the debt or raising taxes and instead charges beneficiaries a premium designed to cover the program’s costs. ”Understandably, deficit financing would have a huge impact on the country’s debt levels. Using this type of financing would mean an increase in the federal debt by 92% by 2060, according to the Penn Wharton model. Currently, federal debt sits at over $23 trillion. Payroll tax financing would increase the deficit modestly, at 4%. With premium financing however, the federal deficit would shrink by 13%.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Increases deficit / debt

Universal healthcare fails and spikes deficit

Michael D. Tanner April 5, 2017. Cato Institute senior fellow, Michael Tanner heads research into a variety of domestic policies with a particular emphasis on poverty and social welfare policy, health care reform, and Social Security. “Hard Truths about Health Care”

4. Medicare is not a success. Faced with the wreckage of Obamacare, Democrats are increasingly embracing the once controversial idea of “Medicare for all.” Most of them would start slowly, with a Trojan-horse “public option,” a taxpayer-subsidized plan that would undercut private insurance, but the result would still be a government-run national health-care plan based on Medicare. Medicare is undoubtedly popular, especially with its beneficiaries. It should be. The average two-earner couple pays about $150,000 over their lifetime in Medicare taxes and premiums, while collecting almost $450,000 in benefits. Jackpot! But that disparity is one of the reasons why Medicare is running some $58 trillion in the red, after totaling all projected future liabilities. A program facing more long-term debt than most countries probably isn’t begging to be expanded. Moreover, almost everything that people complain about with our health-care system is even more evident in Medicare. Medicare is inefficient, spending lots of money without evidence of better results. According to the landmark Dartmouth Atlas study, the counties with the highest per-patient Medicare costs showed no better outcomes than low-spending areas. Medicare over-covers routine care but stops covering you if you get really sick. It is based on an old-fashioned “fee for service” payment protocol that rewards inputs, not quality. And, its bureaucratic price controls under-reimburse doctors, shifting costs to private insurance plans, or discouraging doctors from seeing Medicare patients. About 15 percent of doctors don’t accept Medicare, and as many as a third limit the number of Medicare patients that they will treat.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Increases deficit / debt

Medicare for All will increase debt – costing at least $32.6 trillion in just the first 10 years.

Charles Blahous J. Fish and Lillian F. Smith 2018 The Costs of a National Single-Payer Healthcare System MERCATUS WORKING PAPER George Mason University. https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/costs-national-single-payer-healthcare-system

The leading current bill to establish single-payer health insurance, the Medicare for All Act (M4A), would, under conservative estimates, increase federal budget commitments by approximately $32.6 trillion during its first 10 years of full implementation (2022–2031), assuming enactment in 2018. This projected increase in federal healthcare commitments would equal approximately 10.7 percent of GDP in 2022, rising to nearly 12.7 percent of GDP in 2031 and further thereafter. Doubling all currently projected federal individual and corporate income tax collections would be insufficient to finance the added federal costs of the plan. It is likely that the actual cost of M4A would be substantially greater than these estimates, which assume significant administrative and drug cost savings under the plan, and also assume that healthcare providers operating under M4A will be reimbursed at rates more than 40 percent lower than those currently paid by private health insurance.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Causes job loss

Plan massively reduces industry jobs ---that creates devastating economic ripple effects

Dave Kamper 17, Dave Kamper is a labor organizer in the Twin Cities., 5-28-2017, "Taking Single-Payer Seriously," Jacobin, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/single-payer-medicare-for-all-health-jobs

Has the time for Medicare for All finally arrived? Many on the Left certainly think so. “Various half-measures are not worth it,” physician and activist Adam Gaffney wrote a few weeks ago. “Single-payer is the alternative to the health care status quo.” This is not just idle chitchat. A January Pew Research survey found that 60 percent of Americans think the government “has a responsibility to make sure all Americans have health care coverage.” And a recent Morning Consult poll showed 44 percent of Americans backed a single-payer plan, much more than those who opposed it. Those are real numbers, and the Left has every reason to be excited that our arguments are gaining traction. But if we want to make Medicare for All a reality, we have an obligation to think through the consequences of effectively euthanizing an industry that many have come to rely on for employment. A Spending Machine The private health insurance industry is, as many have observed, one of the primary drivers of health care costs. We spend far more on health care than any other advanced capitalist country and end up with inferior health outcomes. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) kept that basic system in place. For all the talk of mandates and cost curves and exchanges, Obamacare massively increased spending in the health care system. When more people get health insurance, more people use health care. The Medicaid expansion and the subsidies for coverage on the individual market funnel tens of billions of additional dollars into insurance companies and health care providers every year. In 2014, the first year that the ACA was more or less in full force, net expenditures on health care rose 4.6 percent. In 2015, they jumped 5.6 percent. The same year, the federal government estimated that outlays would expand “1.2 percentage points faster than Gross Domestic Product” over the next decade. By 2025, it projected, health care would no longer make up one-sixth of the American economy. It would make up one-fifth. Much of this spending results in new jobs. From 2011 to 2016, overall job growth in the US sat at 8.3 percent, but the number of health care practitioners rose 15.8 percent. Nurse practitioner jobs increased 76 percent. Speech-language pathologist positions expanded by 29.6 percent. “Medical records and health information technicians” went up 58.6 percent. In the health insurance industry, “insurance claims and policy processing clerks” went up 11 percent. As long as the ACA fire hose keeps spraying money at the health care industry, jobs will balloon accordingly. If the water pressure drops, the consequences will be real and drastic, even if the overall result is more equitable and more affordable health care. Medicare for All wouldn’t just scrap Obamacare — it would uproot the entire industry. It would be a huge efficiency savings. But it would also be devastating in the short term for hundreds of thousands of working people whose only crime was getting a job at an insurance company, and the hundreds of thousands more who work as billing specialists for clinics and hospitals (the number of medical assistants shot up 44 percent between 2011 and 2016). Yes, the CEO of United Health Group made $101 million in 2011. But few of the 230,000 other people working for the company saw money like that. Bernie Sanders’s recently announced Medicare for All plan asserts that we “need a health care system that significantly reduces overhead, administrative costs, and complexity,” and projects that his plan would save $6 trillion over ten years. Those trillions — currently being sucked up by a bloated, profit-hungry industry — could do amazing things. Infrastructure. Education. Housing. Insurance for all, in and of itself, would be remarkable. But you don’t save $6 trillion just by getting rid of the insurance industry. The US has 35.5 MRI machines per million people. The UK, with its National Health Service, has 6.1. Single-payer Canada has 8.5. We don’t need as many as we have. We can deliver complete patient care with many fewer machines. But fewer machines means fewer manufacturing jobs, fewer technician jobs, less need for new construction for new facilities, and so on. And MRIs are just one facet of a huge health care system that will see efficiencies across the board in a single-payer system. The benefits of those efficiencies will be felt by all, the harms by few, but they will feel them hard. The effects of these changes would be highly local. Some of the campuses of large health insurance companies employ thousands. Shuttering them would be like shuttering a steel mill or auto factory — the shockwaves would reverberate through the whole community. Like laid-off autoworkers, employees of insurance companies would be pushed onto the job market with a set of skills and experiences unsuited to most other occupations. The color of their collar wouldn’t change that. And that disruption would have serious political effects. The 2016 election hinged on the Rust Belt, states like Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania that used to be home to huge numbers of unionized, high-wage blue-collar jobs. As those industrial jobs disappeared, cities across the Midwest sustained hits from which they still haven’t recovered. The Democratic Party’s prescriptions — like trying to encourage fifty-year-old autoworkers to go back to community college to study IT — were both condescending and impractical. Many saw no reason to back a party that hadn’t done anything for them, and that left them exposed to the nativist economic nationalism of Trump. We can’t risk the same thing happening because of single-payer.

Massive job losses will result from the switch to Medicare for All

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Prescription drug costs

Lower prescription drug costs via Medicare for All unlikely – and prescription drugs only account for 10 percent of national health expenses.

Charles Blahous J. Fish and Lillian F. Smith 2018 The Costs of a National Single-Payer Healthcare System MERCATUS WORKING PAPER George Mason University. https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/costs-national-single-payer-healthcare-system

This analysis credits the M4A proposal with approximately $846 billion in additional savings over the 2022–2031 period from negotiating lower prices for prescription drugs. This is an aggressive assumption reflecting the intent of the bill to empower the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to negotiate lower drug prices on behalf of beneficiaries and specifically to “promote the use of generic medications to the greatest extent possible.”31 There are limits to the potential effectiveness of this approach to lowering healthcare costs. Generics have prices 75 to 90 percent lower than those of brand-name drugs, but they already make up roughly 85 percent of all prescription drugs sold.3 Additionally, prescription drugs account for only 10 percent of total national health expenditures.33 This analysis assumes virtually perfect success for M4A in replacing brand-name drugs with generics, both for those now on Medicare as well as for the population as a whole; therefore, actual savings are likely to be less than assumed under these projections.34 It is a matter of wide speculation whether granting negotiating power to the HHS secretary could produce savings beyond these aggressive assumptions with respect to generic drug penetration.35 Even if such a grant of power achieved greater savings, however, such additional savings are likely to be offset by imperfect success in eliminating brand-name drug purchases in favor of generics.36 These cost estimates do not reflect other potential effects of the proposed policy, such as lessened pharmaceutical innovation.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Medical Debt

Multiple initiatives are reducing the effect of medical debt on credit and consumer spending

Josh Boak, Associated Press, February 14 2023 White House reports nearly 18 percent drop in people with medical debt https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/white-house-reports-nearly-18-percent-drop-in-people-with-medical-debt

WASHINGTON (AP) — The number of people with medical debt on their credit reports fell by 8.2 million — or 17.9 percent — between 2020 and 2022, according to a report Tuesday from the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. White House officials said in a separate draft report that the two-year drop likely stems from their policies. Among the programs they say contributed to less debt was an expansion of the Obama-era healthcare law that added 4.2 million people with some form of . Also, local governments are leveraging $16 million in coronavirus relief funds to wipe out $1.5 billion worth of medical debt. There has also been a persistent effort by the CFPB to reduce medical debt. The major credit rating agencies said last year that they will no longer include in their reports medical debts under $500 or debts that were already repaid. The agencies will also extend the time it takes to add medical debt to reports from six months to one year, possibly giving families more time to repay before being penalized with lower credit scores. White House officials said the decline in debt could reduce fears about medical bills that can prevent people from making needed doctor appointments and filling pharmaceutical prescriptions. White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre told reporters at Tuesday’s briefing that Biden’s policies played “a critical role in reducing the burden of medical debt for millions of American families.”