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2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Medical Debt

Initiatives have been effective at reducing the economic effects of medical debt

Published on March 11, 2023 America’s Healthcare Debt Is Deepening U.S. citizenshave access to unparalleled medical care, but the cost means millions will never receive it. https://www.worth.com/americas-healthcare-debt-is-deepening/

Despite the insidious nature of medical debt, efforts in the past number of years to curb rates have shown both improvements in healthcare access and economic benefits. The 2013 expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act proved to be one of the most effective combatants of medical debt in the U.S. In fact, the Medicaid expansion was so effective that as of 2020, rates of medical debt in the eleven states that declined participation were over 30 percent higher than in the states that did participate. As population wellness is a concern closely aligned with the nation’s economic well-being, a KFF investigation of numerous studies found that Medicaid not only benefited patients but also had “overwhelmingly positive effects of expansion on [healthcare] providers.” The same detailed analysis discovered that the financial impact of Medicaid expansion on states additionally had “positive effects, including budget savings, revenue gains, and overall economic growth.”

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Administrative Costs

The aff is using faulty data

Galles 17 (Gary M, professor of economics at Pepperdine University and a research fellow at the non-profit Independent Institute, “Single-payer healthcare is far more expensive than advocates claim,” 6/15, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/337826-single-payer-healthcare-is-far-more-expensive-than-advocates)

In the roughly quarter-century since then-First Lady Hillary Clinton’s health care plan hit the headlines, advocates of expanded government control have asserted that single-payer systems such as Medicare have far lower administrative costs than private insurance. So moving toward “Medicare for all,” they said, would generate vast sums to increase access to health care. Paul Krugman, for example, argued that ObamaCare administrative cost savings would pay for its expanded coverage.

But the cost claim is alchemy, not actuality.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Administrative Costs

Single-payer won’t reduce admin costs – 3 reasons.

Pearl 17 (Robert, physician and CEO, Permanente Medical Groups, “3 myths about a single-payer system and why it’s doomed to fail,” March 27, http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2017/03/3-myths-single-payer-system-doomed-fail.html)

Myth 1: It would lower administrative costs Supporters claim a single-payer system would siphon out billions of dollars in administrative overhead. How they reach this conclusion varies by the source, but in each case, a deeper analysis reveals oversimplification and fallacious assumptions. One line of reasoning is based on the lower cost of health care in other countries with a government-run system. But the reduced costs in other nations reflect other factors — their cheaper drug prices, lower wages, and a higher number of primary care physicians compared to specialists — rather than lower administrative overhead. A second comparison drawn is between Medicare and commercial insurance in the United States. Here cost is confused with price, and vice versa. The federal government has a unilateral ability to set prices, and often does so at levels below the actual cost of care delivery. When it does this, hospitals and doctors offset the reduced payments they receive from the government by raising prices elsewhere. Published economic analyses indicate that only 90 percent of cost is reimbursed through Medicare today and that, as a consequence, commercial insurers pay, on average, approximately 120 percent of the Medicare rates to doctors and hospitals. Finally, some backers of a single-payer system look at the Medical Loss Ratio (percentage of health care premium spent on direct patient care) of some of the publicly traded insurance companies and note that, for some, nearly 20 percent of their revenues are used for administrative purposes. What is left unsaid is that there are already several not-for-profit insurance programs that spend more than 90 percent of their revenue on patient care — and as such, little savings would be achieved. The idea that a government-run plan could function without incurring major administrative costs is naive, especially if fee-for-service is the method of provider reimbursement. In such a system, doctors and hospitals would still need to complete claims forms. Government employees would, in turn, be required to sort through them, make certain they’re appropriate, question coding, and pay the providers accordingly. There is little evidence, whether we look at the U.S. Postal Service or the Department of Motor Vehicles, that the government is particularly efficient at these types of administrative tasks.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Administrative Costs

Won’t fix administrative costs – government is also regulatory and bureaucratic with its own costs.

Michael Chernew, PhD1; and Harrison Mintz, MPH1 October 20, 2021 Administrative Expenses in the US Health Care System Why So High? https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2785479

It is tempting to conclude that the US health system should move away from a market-based system to reduce administrative costs. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that government-run systems (and government intervention in market systems) may generate their own administrative costs associated with myriad regulations that govern health care organizations and markets. Moreover, while on balance government-run programs are generally administratively less costly, they have other drawbacks. Most important, government systems may prevent some individuals from obtaining the coverage or receiving the care they desire. The programs may limit choice and fail to incent efficiency or patient-centeredness. Government-managed cost containment (eg, price setting) runs the risk of adversely affecting access or quality of care. The extent to which those problems arise, and level of concern over whether some people are constrained in their behavior, depends on the perception of how well the government system (and the politics that will inevitably govern it) will function. Nonetheless, there may be some value in coordinated cost containment (eg, standardized plan designs or forms of payment).

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Administrative Costs

No big administrative cost savings – the regulations and bureaucracy will swamp it.

Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow, Center for Health and Welfare Policy Aug 9, 2019 3 min read https://www.heritage.org/medicare/commentary/medicare-no-model-administrative-simplicity-or-efficiency

The congressional champions of “Medicare for All” make another big mistake. They assume “big” administrative savings from legislation creating, from scratch, an entirely new federal infrastructure, heavily armed with an even greater arsenal of regulatory powers of unprecedented size and scope. Abolishing all private coverage as well as public programs, like Medicare, and starting over, as under both the House and Senate Medicare for All bills, would be a huge, complicated and costly undertaking. Champions of government-controlled health care fixate on private health plans’ administrative costs while studiously ignoring the stupendous amount of waste and inefficiency generated by existing government-controlled health programs. Harvard University Professor Regina Herzlinger it best. “The assertion that governmental control of the health sector would lower administrative expenses ignores all other aspects of the health care system, such as quality, convenience and innovation. It assumes that our sole interest is minimizing administrative expenses. But our interests are much more complex: we want excellent, high quality, convenient, consumer-responsive care, delivered at a reasonable price.” The fulfillment of these diverse personal needs is what “Medicare for All” will not, and cannot, deliver.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Administrative Costs

Won’t reduce administrative costs – likely to increase them because Medicare’s administrative costs have been more than private insurance.

Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow, Center for Health and Welfare Policy Aug 9, 2019 3 min read https://www.heritage.org/medicare/commentary/medicare-no-model-administrative-simplicity-or-efficiency

“Medicare for All” legislation pending in Congress would give Washington over American health care. It would abolish private and employer-based health coverage and replace it with a new, government-run health program. Its sponsors claim this would reduce administrative costs and produce huge savings. “Private insurance companies in this country spend between 12 and 18 percent on administration costs,” says Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt. “The cost of administering the Medicare program… is 2 percent. We can save approximately $500 billion a year just in administration costs.” Not so fast. Most independent analysts are reluctant to embrace such bold claims. Glenn Kessler, a fact-checker for The Washington Post backers of Medicare for All to be “cautious” in relying on “the administrative cost saving” as a talking point, and Politifact rated Senator Sanders’ statement as Comparisons between public and private sector administrative costs are tricky. Medicare and private insurance cover radically different populations: Medicare beneficiaries are generally older and sicker than those enrolled in private plans. Because Medicare beneficiaries’ utilize medical services at dramatically higher levels, the program’s administrative costs naturally account for a lower percentage of total program spending. However, as Dr. Robert Book, a senior fellow at George Mason University, measuring administrative cost per beneficiary, rather than as a percentage of total spending, shows that Medicare’s administrative cost has been historically higher than private insurance. Medicare is no model of administrative simplicity. The program is governed by tens of thousands of pages of rules, regulations, guidelines and related paperwork. Its structure, organization, payment and pricing and related rules—including coding, documentation and reporting requirements—are mind-numbingly detailed. This morass of bureaucratic complexity imposes high, albeit often hidden, costs, including administrative demands on harried doctors and other medical professionals who must daily comply with the program’s overbearing rules and paperwork under the penalty of law. These transactional costs—the mandatory reporting and the time, energy and effort required to satisfy these bureaucratic requirements—are very real. Writing for the Journal of the American Medical Association, researchers that, for American doctors, “…the time spent on administrative issues related to reporting clinical or quality data to government or other agencies is a major problem.”

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Administrative Costs

Several offsets to any perceived decrease in administrative costs – like fraud and corruption

Charles Blahous J. Fish and Lillian F. Smith 2018 The Costs of a National Single-Payer Healthcare System MERCATUS WORKING PAPER George Mason University. https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/costs-national-single-payer-healthcare-system

Moreover, even if administrative cost rates could be lowered by more than seven percentage points, there would be offsetting cost increases. A further reason private insurance administrative costs are relatively higher is the necessity of policing fraudulent or other improper payments to ensure an insurer’s continued solvency and to provide competitive value to its customers. Although government also polices fraud within its health insurance programs, financial survival and business competitiveness are concerns from which government-provided insurance is generally exempt. The Government Accountability Office found approximately $96 billion in improper Medicare and Medicaid payments in 2016, by itself more than twice the total government expenditures on health insurance administration.40 One apparent consequence of government’s lesser investment in insurance administration is a substantial additional cost associated with improper payments.41 Considering the various factors acting in combination, it is unlikely that total savings arising from less expensive administration could exceed the seven percentage point reduction assumed here. Beyond this, other policy and political dynamics of federally administered insurance should tend to increase total costs. This is evident in the text of the M4A bill, which, among its other provisions, includes a line item authorizing expenditures of up to 1 percent of the total national health budget during its first five years for “programs providing assistance to workers who perform functions in the administration of the health insurance system and who may experience economic dislocation as a result of the implementation of this Act.”42 The policy and political dynamics that gave rise to this proposed spending program would likely give rise to others in the course of enacting and implementing M4A, reducing net savings from lowered administrative costs.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › A2 Administrative Costs

Administrative savings are overestimated – current medicare rates could not be replicated with the entire population.

Charles Blahous J. Fish and Lillian F. Smith 2018 The Costs of a National Single-Payer Healthcare System MERCATUS WORKING PAPER George Mason University. https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/costs-national-single-payer-healthcare-system

Current administrative cost rates for Medicare as a whole are cited as being roughly 4 percent, though closer to 6 percent for Medicare Advantage.38 It is unlikely that the population now privately insured could be covered by M4A with administrative costs as low as 4 percent. Administrative cost rates are calculated as a percentage of total insurance costs, and these total costs per capita under private insurance are currently less than half of what they are in Medicare.39 In other words, one reason Medicare’s administrative cost rates appear to be so much lower than private insurance rates is that they are expressed as percentages of Medicare’s overall per capita costs, which are much higher. These higher Medicare costs exist primarily because Medicare serves an older population that consumes more healthcare services than the generally younger population now served by private insurance.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Plan increases costs

Laundry list of reasons suggest that Medicare for ALL would deck the economy

Haislmaier and Hall, 19 (Edmund Haislmaier and Jamie Hall, Edmund Haislmaier is expert in health care policy and markets at The Heritage Foundation and Jamie is a Research Fellow for quantitative analysis in the Center for Health and Welfare Policy at The Heritage Foundation, 11-19-19, How “Medicare for All” Harms Working Americans, , 6-28-22, SL)

Over half of the Democrats in the House and 14 Democrats in the Senate are calling for enactment of a new government-run health coverage program to replace all existing private health insurance, including employer-sponsored health benefits, as well as the current publicly funded coverage for Americans enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). The proposed new program would be operated and funded solely by the federal government, and private insurers and employers would be prohibited from offering coverage that duplicated any of the program’s benefits.

While the terminology (such as single-payer and Medicare for All) and the details may vary, any such proposal would significantly increase federal government spending and require major tax increases.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Plan increases costs

Medicare for All skyrockets the federal spending – major blow to the economy

Luhby, 19 (Tami Luhby, Tami Luhby covers the Affordable Care Act and health care policy, as well as economic mobility as a senior writer for CNN, 10-16-19, What ‘Medicare for All’ would really mean for US pocketbooks, , 6-28-22, SL)

The cost of was front and center at the yet again. Multiple estimates have pegged the cost of Medicare for All at more than $30 trillion over a decade – a big chunk of change for taxpayers to cover. But it’s important to know exactly what that figure means. It doesn’t reflect an increase in total US spending on health care. It’s how much federal spending would rise because the federal government would cover nearly all medical care. This would require a big hike in taxes. On the flip side, however, other spending would go down. The new federal health insurance system would replace what states spend on programs like Medicaid and employers would no longer be on the hook for covering their share of worker premiums. Individuals would no longer have to pay premiums, deductibles and other out-of-pocket costs. The debate over, however, isn’t only about taxes or costs – it’s about whether to remake the nation’s health insurance system, shifting the bulk of spending to the public sector, rather than leaving the choices up to individuals and employers. The sparring was evident in Tuesday’s Democratic debate hosted by CNN and The New York Times. Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren for Medicare for All without raising taxes on the middle class – something Minnesota Sen. Amy Klobuchar called “a pipe dream.” Warren responded that the rich and big companies would cover the tab, but she danced around the impact on the middle class, saying these families would not see an increase in “costs.” “Costs will go up for the wealthy, they will go up for big corporations and for middle class families they will go down,” said Warren, who has not released her own health care plan, instead voicing support for Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders’ Medicare for All. “I will not sign a bill into law that does not lower costs for middle class families.” Sanders, on the other hand, acknowledges that he would raise taxes on the middle class – he’s floated a 4% levy on employees, exempting the first $29,000 in income for a family of four, as an option. But he argues that many would still come out ahead because they would no longer have to pay for private insurance or for medical care. Since private insurance would essentially disappear, Americans would no longer have to pay annual premiums, which cost a family about $6,000, on average, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation. And they would no longer have to pay deductibles or copays. The shift would also affect employers and states. Companies would no longer be on the hook for annual premiums, which cost employers more than $14,000 for a family policy, on average. States would also see their outlays go down since they would no longer pay for medical care for those on Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) or for uncompensated care at hospitals. Sanders has suggested that Medicare for All would end up reducing the amount the country spends on health care, which experts say isn’t true – though individual households might end up coming out ahead. The Sanders campaign argues that under a single payer system, the federal government would have the leverage to lower spending. A spokesman pointed to several studies that say overall spending would go down under Medicare for All. But a new Urban Institute study shows that the nation’s overall health care spending is expected to rise roughly $7 trillion to $59 trillion over a decade if Medicare for All goes into effect, said Linda Blumberg, institute fellow at the institute’s Health Policy Center. The increase would be $720 billion for 2020 alone if the policy were enacted. That’s because more people would be insured, more benefits would be covered and more medical services would be used since there’d be no cost for care. “You will in total spend more as a nation on health care from adding all the bells and whistles that are associated with these kinds of proposals,” said Blumberg. The latest , released Wednesday, pegs a Medicare for All-type plan as raising federal spending by $34 trillion over a decade. Looking at the impact in 2020 alone, federal spending would skyrocket to $4.1 trillion, an increase of $2.8 trillion, according to Urban. But state spending would drop to $43 billion, a decline of $260 billion. Employers, meanwhile, would save the entire $955 billion they would have shelled out on health care. And households would see their spending plummet by nearly $887 billion, leaving them with a tab of roughly $45 billion to pay for institutional long-term care. But what matters is how much federal spending increases since that determines how much the government needs to raise in taxes, said Charles Blahous, senior research strategist at Mercatus, noting that his 2018 study found the federal tab could be as high as $39 trillion depending on drug costs and provider payment rates.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Plan increases costs

Single payer collapses the stock market---destroys trillions in asset values

Caird ’17 (Lawrence Caird – former Hospital Administration Assistant and worked in Health Care Management, former employee in Public Affairs at the Veterans Administration, “Medicare For All would likely be a huge failure,” 20 September 2017, http://registerguard.com/rg/opinion/35974386-78/medicare-for-all-would-likely-be-a-huge-failure.html.csp)

You say, “What about the profits?” Profits are paid to stockholders, many of whom are people investing for their retirement. The balance is invested in the economy. Insurance companies, unlike the government, have to have assets to cover unanticipated costs.

How do you think 9/11 claims were paid? Insurance companies did not have that amount of cash on hand. They liquidated investments to get the cash. The investments of health insurance companies, if they were put out of business by this law, would probably be sold and the proceeds would be paid to stockholders. But the industries and real estate they invest in would suffer the loss of capital.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Plan increases costs

Medicare for All would massively raise costs of health care and decimate the US economy

Partnership for America’s Health Care Future, 2.4.2020 / UPDATES Medicare For All Could ‘Decimate’ The Economy https://americashealthcarefuture.org/medicare-for-all-could-decimate-the-economy/

The unaffordable costs, tax increases and negative economic consequences of proposed one-size-fits-all new government health insurance systems – such as Medicare for All, Medicare buy-in and the public option – continue to make headlines. A new analysis from Penn Wharton reveals that Medicare for All could “could shrink U.S. GDP by as much as 24% by the year 2060,” Yahoo Finance . … [T]he model warns, if the plan is deficit-financed – paid for by government borrowing – “the negative effects of larger deficits on labor supply, capital accumulation and GDP would significantly outweigh the positive effects on the economy that come from a larger and healthier workforce.” … According to studies, the cost of Medicare for all sits at roughly $32 trillion over the next decade. But, as the analysis notes, [Senator Bernie] Sanders’ universal health care plan doesn’t have a built-in financing mechanism … Sanders’ wealth tax would generate $1 trillion less in revenue than he stated … The real trouble comes when Medicare for all is financed by deficits. With government borrowing, universal health care could shrink the economy by as much as 24% by 2060, as investments in private capital are reduced. The one-size-fits-all government health insurance system “could decimate the economy,” the Washington Examiner . This contributes to the mounting evidence that Medicare for All would burden American families with unaffordable new costs, as the Urban Institute finds “that federal spending on health care would increase by roughly $34 trillion under a single-payer plan similar to Medicare for All,” CNN . The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) that “fully offsetting the cost would require higher taxes on the middle class” and “require the equivalent of tripling payroll taxes or more than doubling all other taxes.” Senator Sanders previously that Americans making more than $29,000 per year would “pay more in taxes” for Medicare for All.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Costs sustainable

IRA will help stabilize affordability of health care

Nicole Rapfogel and Emily Gee, AUG 12, 2022 How the Inflation Reduction Act Reduces Health Care Costs https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-the-inflation-reduction-act-reduces-health-care-costs/

The Inflation Reduction Act will improve the affordability of health care for millions of Americans, both young and old. The extension of the enhanced subsidies for Affordable Care Act plans puts the nation on track to sustain high rates of health coverage, provides stability for current marketplace enrollees, and helps ensure that Americans will have affordable options when they need to turn to the marketplaces for coverage. The Medicare program’s ability to negotiate prescription drug costs for Part B and Part D will be transformational, and older adults will soon see relief from out-of-pocket costs for drugs as well. By passing the health components of the Inflation Reduction Act and improving access to coverage and medications, Congress will establish foundational reforms on which to make further improvements to health and well-being in years to come.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Costs sustainable

Health spending rates are declining post-COVID

American Medical Association, Trends in health care spending UPDATED MAR 20, 2023 https://www.ama-assn.org/about/research/trends-health-care-spending

Health spending in the U.S. increased by 2.7% in 2021 to $4.3 trillion or $12,914 per capita. This growth rate is substantially lower than 2020 (10.3% percent). This substantial deceleration in spending can be attributed to the decline in pandemic-related government expenditures offsetting increased utilization of medical goods and services that rebounded due to delayed care and pent-up demand from 2020. Overall, health spending was 18.3% of GDP in 2021 compared with 19.7% of GDP in 2020.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Growth Advantage › Costs sustainable

Health care costs and expenditures are stabilizing

Victoria Bailey, July 29 2022 National Healthcare Spending Declines for First Time in 60 Years https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/national-healthcare-spending-declines-for-first-time-in-60-years

National healthcare spending has declined for the first time in 60 years in the first quarter of 2022, with the country seeing a 1.7 percent year-over-year decrease, a from Altarum found. Between 1960 and 2020, has always been positive and greater than economywide inflation, according to the CMS National Health Expenditure Accounts. As a result, real or inflation-adjusted healthcare spending in the US has continually increased. However, real healthcare spending growth was flat in 2021 and declined in quarter one of 2022. The 1.7 percent year-over-year decrease represents a seven percentage point reduction from the long-term average of a 5.3 percent increase. The decline in healthcare price growth relative to inflation has significantly contributed to the decrease in real healthcare spending. The consumer price index (CPI) and producer price index (PPI) both increased rapidly starting in Q2 2021, whereas the Health Care Price Index (HCPI) maintained its long-term average growth. In Q1 2022, PPI had increased 10.7 percent and CPI increased 8.0 percent, while HCPI had only grown 2.3 percent year-over-year. According to the researchers, the slow growth in healthcare prices is likely a result of government policies and delays in contract negotiations. HCPI is projected to rise as 2022 prices reflect higher negotiated rates for care. Healthcare spending as a share of personal consumption has also declined, the brief found. Medical spending as a percent of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) peaked at 20.8 percent in 2019 and fell to 19.5 percent in Q1 2022. This figure likely shifted in 2020 before real healthcare spending dropped because , which are included in real healthcare spending. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) found that health spending as a percent of overall household income peaked in 2017 at 7.7 percent for all households. Consumer health spending declined for the next four years, reaching an average of 6.9 percent of household income in 2020. This represents a 0.8 percentage point decrease in healthcare costs as a proportion of household income.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Health Advantage › Bioterror defense

No bioterror impact – near-impossible

Jefferson 14 (Catherine, senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, where she led a project on Neuroscience, Conflict and Security. Prior to this she was a research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the University of Sussex, where she also obtained her DPhil, Filippa Lentzos, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, King’s College, Claire Marris, Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, King’s College, “Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the “myths”’, 8/21, http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115/full)

Myth 5 Terrorists want to pursue biological weapons for high consequence, mass casualty attacks Underlying the first four myths are certain assumptions about who the terrorists might actually be, what their intentions are, what capabilities they might pursue, and the level of skills and resources available to them. Despite a lack of analysis of the potential adversaries involved in the misuse of life science research, the bioterrorism threat has generally been portrayed in policy circles as an imminent concern, and emphasis is placed on high consequence, mass casualty attacks, performed with “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). For example, in one of the President George W. Bush’s earliest statements following 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks that drew the American people’s attention to the biological weapons threat, he said: Since September 11, America and others have been confronted by the evils these [biological] weapons can inflict. This threat is real and extremely dangerous. Rogue states and terrorists possess these weapons and are willing to use them (58). Later, he set up a WMD Commission and tasked it with examining the threat posed by the nexus of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In its report, this Commission asserted: Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack [(59), p. xv]. Bioterrorism became one of the Bush Administration’s key security concerns over its two terms in office. One estimate of civilian biodefense expenditure across the federal government since 2001 is that more than $70 billion have been spent (60). Despite this, on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks, the former US senators who chaired the WMD Commission, Bob Graham and Jim Talent, released a “report card” on America’s bio-response capabilities that concluded the US was still unprepared to respond to large-scale biological attacks. It also warned: Naturally occurring disease remains a serious biological threat; however, a thinking enemy armed with these same pathogens — or with multi-drug-resistant or synthetically engineered pathogens — could produce catastrophic consequences. A small team of individuals with graduate training in several key disciplines, using equipment readily available for purchase on the Internet could produce the type of bioweapons created by nation-states in the 1960s. Even more troubling, the rapid advances in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology, will allow non-state actors to produce increasingly powerful bioweapons in the future [(61), p. 11]. We see here how the myths we previously discussed, about de-skilling and increased access, and about the ease of designing new dangerous pathogens, underlie concerns about terrorists’ potential ability to launch a mass attack, and how these are connected, by actors, with the advent of synthetic biology. The senators were not alone in their assessments. For instance, the US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist made a similar warning in an earlier speech outlining the global threat of infectious disease and bioterrorism, and the need to better prepare the US and the world to respond to epidemics and outbreaks: No intelligence agency, no matter how astute, and no military, no matter how powerful and dedicated, can assure that a few technicians of middling skill using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment in a small and apparently innocuous setting cannot mount a first-order biological attack … Never have we had to fight such a battle, to protect so many people against so many threats that are so silent and so lethal (62). Similar messages were reinforced at the highest level. Addressing BWC members at their five-yearly meeting in 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: The advances in science and technology make it […] easier for states and non-state actors to develop biological weapons. A crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology (63). She also acknowledged, however, that not everyone in the international community shared the US assessment: I know there are some in the international community who have their doubts about the odds of a mass biological attack or major outbreak. They point out that we have not seen either so far, and conclude the risk must be low. But that is not the conclusion of the United States, because there are warning signs, and they are too serious to ignore (63). The belief that the focus should be on mass attacks was bluntly stated by an FBI agent at a symposium on synthetic biology this year (1st May), when she warned: “These technologies do not just pose a risk to individual buildings or cities, but if cleverly deployed, can reduce our population by significant percentages” (64). Challenges to Myth 5 There are two dimensions to Myth 5. The first is about the intention of would-be terrorists, and the assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of twentieth century state-level bioweapons programs. While most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and very present, they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be very small (65). This is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low casualty events aimed at causing panic, and disruption rather than excessive death tolls: (i) the Rajneesh cult’s use of Salmonella on salad bars in local restaurants to sicken potential voters and make them stay away from the polls during Oregon elections in 1984; (ii) the 1990–95 attempted use of botulinum toxin and anthrax by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; (iii) and the “anthrax letters” sent to media outlets and members of US Congress in 2001 resulting in at least 22 cases of anthrax, five of which were fatal (66, 67). The second dimension to Myth 5 is the implicit assumption that producing a pathogenic organism equates producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and developing a suitable dissemination method. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers. Drawing from her in-depth study of the Iraqi, Soviet, and US bioweapons programs (3, 4), Ben Ouagrham-Gormley explains: Scaling up fragile microorganisms that are sensitive to environmental conditions and susceptible to change — and viruses are more sensitive than bacteria — has been one of the stiffest challenges for past bioweapons programs to overcome, even with appropriate expertise at hand. Scaling-up requires a gradual approach, moving from laboratory sample, to a larger laboratory quantity, to pilot-scale production, and then to even larger-scale production. During each stage, the production parameters need to be tested and often modified to maintain the lethal qualities of the agent; the entire scaling-up process can take several years (68). The dissemination of biological agents also poses difficult technical challenges. Whereas persistent chemical agents such as sulfur mustard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed through the intact skin, no bacteria and viruses can enter the body via that route unless the skin has already been broken. Biological agents must either be ingested or inhaled to cause infection. To expose large numbers of people through the gastrointestinal tract, possible means of delivery are contamination of food and drinking water, yet neither of these scenarios would be easy to accomplish. Large urban reservoirs are usually unguarded, but unless terrorists added massive quantities of biological agent, the dilution effect would be so great that no healthy person drinking the water would receive an infectious dose (66). Moreover, modern sanitary techniques such as chlorination and filtration are designed to kill pathogens from natural sources and would probably be equally effective against a deliberately released agent. Bacterial contamination of the food supply is also unlikely to inflict mass casualties. Cooking, boiling, pasteurization, and other routine safety precautions are generally sufficient to kill pathogenic bacteria. The most likely way to inflict mass casualties with a biological agent is by disseminating it as a respirable aerosol: an invisible cloud of infectious droplets or particles so tiny that they remain suspended in the air for long periods and can be inhaled by large numbers of people. A high-concentration aerosol of B. anthracis or some other pathogen, released into the air in a densely populated urban area, could potentially infect thousands of victims simultaneously. After an incubation period of a few days, depending on the type of agent and the inhaled dose, the exposed population would experience an outbreak of an incapacitating or fatal illness. Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way of delivering a biological attack, it involves major technical hurdles that most terrorists would be unlikely to overcome. To infect through the lungs, infectious particles must be microscopic in size – between 1 and 5 μm in diameter. Terrorists would therefore have to develop or acquire a sophisticated delivery system capable of generating an aerosol cloud with the necessary particle size range and a high enough agent concentration to cover a broad area. Overall, an important trade-off exists between ease of production and effectiveness of dissemination. The easiest way to produce microbial agents is in a liquid form, yet when such a “slurry” is sprayed into the air, it forms heavy droplets that fall to the ground so that only a small percentage of the agent is aerosolized. In contrast, if the bacteria are first dried to a solid cake and then milled into a fine powder, they become far easier to aerosolize, yet the drying and milling process is technically difficult. The Aum Shinrikyo cult struggled with dissemination (67, 69, 70). In one of its anthrax dissemination attempts, it sprayed unknown, but probably very large, quantities of a liquid aerosol (most likely crude culture, unprocessed in any way) of B. anthracis from the roof of the Aum’s headquarters building in Tokyo. For the dissemination, the Aum set up two sprayers on the roof of the eight-story building, each within a large round cooling tower. Pipes were extended from the cooling towers to tanks below, which were filled with a liquid suspension of B. anthracis. The device worked poorly, producing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol needed for effective transmission of anthrax. It also appears the spore concentration was very low (at least five orders of magnitude below that necessary for a highly infectious wet aerosol). In another dissemination attempt, targeting the area around the Kanagawa prefectural office and the Imperial Palace, the Aum equipped vehicles with spraying devices, but according to prosecutors’ statements, the nozzle of the sprayer clogged and the operation failed. Despite its 200 m2 laboratory containing, amongst other equipment, a glove box, incubator, centrifuge, drier, DNA/RNA synthesizer, electron microscope, two fermenters each having about a 2,000 litre capacity, and an extensive scientific library, and despite its repeated attempts at dissemination, the Aum was unsuccessful in causing any disease, and in retrospect it is clear that the cult did not even make the first substantive step toward an effective bioweapon. If, despite the odds, aerosolization was achieved, the effective delivery of biological agents in the open air is highly dependent on atmospheric and wind conditions, creating additional uncertainties. Only under highly stable atmospheric conditions would the aerosol cloud remain close to the ground where it can be inhaled, rather than being rapidly dispersed. Moreover, most microorganisms are sensitive to ultraviolet radiation and cannot survive more than 30 min in bright sunlight, limiting their use to night-time attacks. One major exception is anthrax, which can be induced to form spores with tough outer coats that enable them to survive for several hours in sunlight. Terrorists could, of course, stage a biological attack inside an enclosed space such as a building, a subway station, a shopping mall, or a sports arena. Such an attack, if it involved a respiratory aerosol, might infect thousands of people, but even here the technical hurdles would by no means be trivial. Finally, even if a biological weapon had been disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed to the agent, and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detected and were able to respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack. Simple, proven ways to curtail epidemics, such as wearing face masks, hand washing, and avoiding hospitals where transmission rates might soar, can also prove effective in stemming the spread of a disease. Indeed, this aspect of a bioterrorism attack is often underplayed in scenarios like Tara O’Toole’s “Dark Winter” and “Atlantic Storm,” where the rates of contagion used are often significantly higher than those in historical cases of natural outbreaks (71).

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Health Advantage › Bioterror defense

No bioterror attacks and extinction

Davenport 14 (Mason Ryan Davenport is a MA candidate @ American Public University. “The Lingering Specter of Bioterrorism: Assessing Al-Qaeda ’s Intent and Capability to Use Biological Weapons against the U.S.” ) 5/19/15 RK

A slew of academic papers refute much of Washington’s furor over alQaeda’s bioweapons program. Seemingly, discussions in the Legislative and Executive branches mainly revolve around generalizations or outright misinformation. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer, provides a pointed case study in this regard. Titled “Al-Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype of Reality?,” the report investigates the veracity of a U.S. government-issued warning from 2003 in which an al-Qaeda WMD attack was predicted within two-year’s time (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a). Likewise, a predicted 2013 attack of a biological or chemical nature, as written in 2008 by Congress’s Graham/Talent WMD Commission, also failed to materialize (Sharoff 2011). Mowatt-Larssen, a former Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Specter of Bioterrorism 14 Department of Energy, could be considered one of the foremost authorities on the subject of WMD-terrorism as his work is frequently referenced in other papers. His report presents a chronology of al-Qaeda WMD items of interest from 1998 to 2003, allowing the reader to draw their own conclusions about the legitimacy of the 2003 warning. However, MowattLarssen does pose the question as to whether the threat was “hyped for political purposes” (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a, 9). Leonard Cole’s article in the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel, “Bioterrorism: Still a Threat to the United States,” takes D.C. to task over bloated and “misapplied” biodefense spending (Cole 2013, 10). Simply put, Cole’s argument is similar to those of other detractors: Washington excels at exaggerating the bioterrorism threat. For evidence of Washington’s propensity to overstate the bioterror threat, most scholars refer to standard U.S. bioterror exercise scenarios. Clark emphasizes that these scenarios are “extreme…often inflating the capabilities of the terrorists” (Clark 2008a, 19). Leonard Cole echoes this sentiment, writing that “descriptions of possible bioterrorism scenarios are often hyperbolic” (Cole 2012, 11). Ostensibly, most U.S. bioterrorism exercise scenarios were noted as having a tendency for oversimplification: “scenarios for national biological weapons (BW) exercises that posit various BW agents in advanced states of preparation in the hands of terrorist groups Specter of Bioterrorism 15 simply disregard the requirements in knowledge and practice that such groups would need in order to work with pathogens” (Leitenberg 2005, 88). One of the more unfortunate aspects of the U.S.’s effort to counter bioterrorism is the fact that it may be giving extremists a ‘playbook’ they didn’t previously have: “years of widely broadcast public discussion has provided such groups, at least on a general level, with suggestions as to what paths to follow” (Leitenberg 2005, 88). Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s current leader, is even on record admitting that the terror group didn’t put much thought into biological weapons until the U.S. Congress started sounding the alarm in the ‘90s. In “Revisiting Al-Qaeda’s Anthrax Program,” authors Rene Pita and Rohan Gunaratna break down the group’s early biological weapons program. They focus particular attention upon an electronic message sent by al-Zawahiri to Mohammed Atif (former military chief of al-Qaeda): “Despite [bioweapons’] extreme danger, we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials…” (Pita and Gunaratna 2009, 10). Tellingly, the terror outfit only began its push for a bioweapons research laboratory after Secretary of Defense Cohen’s dramatic press hearing with the bag of sugar meant to represent anthrax. Still, as previously covered, aspirations alone don’t really equate to successful enterprise. Many researchers note how Aum Shinrikyo failed to acquire or cultivate a lethal pathogen despite significant financial backing and state-of-the-art laboratories. Al-Qaeda has never come close to the capability of Aum Shinrikyo. For similar reasons, fears of lone-wolf bioterrorism appear just as implausible. Ellis surmises that lone wolf bioterror threats are most probable when it is an “insider” as it was in the case of Amerithrax (Ellis 2014, 214). Some of the literature uncovered during preliminary research showed a strong inclination, by researchers, to group biological weapons into the broader WMD / CBRN category: the Ellis, Mowatt-Larssen, and Salama/Hansell reports are all prime examples of this trend. This approach was considered as having a negative impact on this research paper’s main aim. Basically, viewing biological weapons on the same terms as nuclear and chemical issues marginalizes what could otherwise be a concise appreciation of al-Qaeda’s bioweapons agenda. Tucker’s report follows a similar, if slightly different model: it lumps biological weapons with chemical ones (not nuclear or radiological) (Tucker 2009). Chemical weapons are often grouped with bioweapons in their own distinct category (CB), but doing so glosses over the many distinct differences between chemical and biological weapons. For one, research indicates that chemical weapons, while presenting the same dispersal challenges, are far more readily available than biological ones. An interesting notion is that the last decade’s worth of preventative measures, on the part of the U.S. and other Western nations, may have forced al-Qaeda to rethink bioweapons entirely. A chief contention is that Specter of Bioterrorism 17 D.C.’s consistent trend towards hyperbole, when framing the bioterrorism threat, has inevitably led to a stronger national defense against biological weapons. Potentially, bioweapons may now be ill-suited to extremist aims of high-visibility, high-casualty attacks. For instance, “the U.S. has now developed vaccines or drugs to counter most known conventional pathogens” (Clark 2008a, 183). Project BioShield, established in 2004, provides U.S.-based drug companies with a monetary incentive to develop, produce, and stockpile various vaccines and drugs that would otherwise have no commercial appeal. Mark Sharoff and Leonard Cole each contend that Project BioShield has been largely ineffective in its main objective; yet, regardless of some high-profile failures in the program (VaxGen’s unstable anthrax vaccine), increased budgetary allotments are nevertheless considered a worthy enterprise since even one new vaccine further limits terrorists’ options. The BioWatch program involves air samplers in several U.S. cities in order to detect aerosolized pathogens. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) development of the Strategic National Stockpile and ‘push packages’, pre-packaged, rapidly deployable cargo containers full of vaccines and other medical supplies, further diminishes the impact and extent of any prospective bioterror incident (Clark 2008a, 114). Due to all the hype surrounding the issue of bioterrorism, some experts urge policymakers, and the general public, to put the threat in context. Clark and Leitenberg each contrast bioterrorism with other modern- Specter of Bioterrorism 18 day global issues that pose far greater danger to the U.S. way-of-life. Clark actually ends his book with a discussion of climate change, saying “challenges in the years ahead…make bioterrorism pale in comparison” (Clark 2008a, 190). Leitenberg also compares the threat of bioterrorism with that of climate change plus several additional planet-spanning problems: ocean pollution, population growth, war, poverty, nuclear terrorism, and naturally-occurring pandemics / epidemics (Leitenberg 2005, pp. 2-3). In light of the magnitude of these issues, such as HIV / AIDS already killing 5 million people “year in, year out”, these comparisons reveal a sense of imbalance in U.S. national security priorities (Leitenberg 2005, 3). Compellingly, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen proffers the hypothesis that al-Qaeda could be engaging in a “deception ruse”: continually drawing attention to their supposed desire for bioweapons if only to put the U.S. off the scent of their legitimate tactics (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a, 8). This concept certainly warrants further investigation. Assumptions about al-Qaeda’s plans to pursue biological weapons over easier-to-acquire and less problematic conventional attack means has not really been explored in depth. 21st century terror attacks thus far have involved predominantly small-arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Much of the literature demonstrates distinctly Western mindsets (when regarding terrorism) or, at least, views bioterrorism through the scope of U.S.-specific defense concerns. There is an evident desire among U.S. Specter of Bioterrorism 19 politicians and scientists to boost their cases for increased biodefense budgets or, as Leitenberg puts it, “a small coterie of individuals constantly calls for increasing [biodefense] expenditures still further” (Leitenberg 2011). This fact alone has unnecessarily complicated academic research into bioterrorism since 9/11. Furthermore, the literature overwhelmingly indicates that a biological attack on the homeland is far from the apocalyptic scenario that Congress and the White House typically portrays; a bioterror attack on U.S. soil is likely to cause “disruptions rather than mass casualties” (Ellis 2014, p. 220). Incidentally, the numerous statements and press releases from al-Qaeda primarily serve as propaganda, making it difficult to differentiate between genuine intent and fear-mongering.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Health Advantage › Bioterror defense

Complexity nullifies the threat

Revill 17 – Dr. James, Research Fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program at SPRU. “Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU”, Cambridge, pg. 626-642, , 09-29-2017

The second factor is “the perceived complexity of the innovation in terms of adoption and use”.40 This is important in the innovation literature, as Rogers remarked, “[t]he complexity of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is negatively related to its rate of adoption”.41 Several scholars of terrorist innovation have also highlighted the issue of complexity;42 or, as Cragin et al have stated, “[h]ow simple or complex a technology appears affects perceptions of how risky it will be to adopt.”43

In most cases terrorist groups appear to have largely opted for the simplest pathway towards the achievement of their goals and the weapons used tend to be vernacular, functional devices drawing on local and readily-available materials, rather than sophisticated, “baroque” technologies. This is certainly the case with IEDs, the history of which is characterised largely by incremental innovations – although nevertheless frequently effective ones – with many means of delivery recycled from the past.44 Complexity can therefore be seen as important in the adoption of technology by terrorists generally, but is perhaps particularly acute in the case of CBW technology.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Health Advantage › Bioterror defense

No synthetic pathogens

Wimmer 18 – Eckard, Professor at Stony Brook University. “Synthetic Biology, Dual Use Research, and Possibilities for Control”, Defence against Bioterrorism, pg. 7-11, , 03-23-2018

Listed below are some constraints that show how in the US the development of dangerous infectious agents, referred to as “select agents”, is controlled – perhaps misuse even prevented – through technical and administrative hurdles:

I. Re-creating an already existing dangerous virus for malicious intent is a complex scientific endeavor. (i) It requires considerable scientific knowledge and experience and, more importantly, considerable financial support. That support usually comes from government and private agencies (NIH, NAF, etc.), organizations that carefully screen at multiple levels all applications for funding of ALL biological research. (ii) It requires an environment suitable for experimenting with dangerous infectious agents (containment facilities). Any work in containment facilities is also carefully regulated.

2023 SDI Negative
MSDI Case Neg vs Medicare for All › A2 Health Advantage › Disease defense

No disease impact

intervening actors check, resilience, burnout, and adaptation – this ev smokes them

Amesh 16 — (AMESH ADALJA is an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh, 6-17-2016, "Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?," The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/, Accessed 7-30-2016, HWilson) ***we do not endorse the problematic language in this evidence

“You’ll tell us when you’re worried, right?” That was the question posed to me countless times at the height of the 2014 West African Ebola outbreak. As an infectious disease physician, I was interviewed on outlets such as CNN, NPR, and Fox News about the dangers of the virus, and the answer I gave was always the same: “Ebola is a deadly, scary disease, but it is not that contagious. It will not find the U.S. or other industrialized nations hospitable.” In other words, no, I wasn’t worried—and not because I have a rosy outlook on infectious diseases. I’m well-aware of the damage these diseases are causing around the world: HIV, malaria, tuberculosis; the influenza pandemic that took the world by surprise in 2009; the anti-vaccine movement bumping cases of measles to an all-time post-vaccine-era high; antibiotic-resistant bacteria threatening to collapse the entire structure of modern medicine—all these, like Ebola, are continuously placing an enormous number of lives at risk. But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained. I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience. For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived. Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like. So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now? In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely. Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians. The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies. HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk. Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care. Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions. While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary. None of this is meant to allay all fears of infectious diseases. To totally adopt a Panglossian viewpoint would be foolish—and dangerous. Humans do face countless threats from infectious diseases: witness Zika. And if not handled appropriately, severe calamity could, and will, ensue. The West African Ebola outbreak, for instance, festered for months before major efforts to bring it under control were initiated. When it comes to infectious diseases, I’m worried about the failure of institutions to understand the full impact of outbreaks. I’m worried about countries that don’t have the infrastructure or resources to combat these outbreaks when they come. But as long as we can keep adapting, I’m not worried about the future of the human race.