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Oscar Pocasangre, 5-23-2023, Oscar Pocasangre is a senior data analyst for the Political Reform program at New America. Pocasangre holds a PhD in political science from Columbia University, where he focused on comparative politics and quantitative methods. "Why Federalism Is No Good for Democracy," New America, -- MoState JG
In the American political tradition, federalism is a hallowed institution. It’s a bulwark against tyranny, it allows for policy experimentation, it creates competition for voters and businesses that incentivizes better performance, and it brings government closer to the people and holds it accountable. But take a look at some of the research on federalism in the field of comparative politics and for each virtue of federalism you’ll find a flaw. The many levels of government meant to guard against authoritarianism often lead to the shifting of blame and credit being claimed where it’s not earned, muddling accountability. The various institutional layers often make government impossible to understand, leading to increased corruption. States competing with each other for business by lowering taxes can lead to a race to the bottom that exacerbates inequalities across the country.
Jacob Grumbach’s impressive book Laboratories against Democracy: How National Parties Transformed State Politics forcefully shows that the United States is not immune to these flaws. Grumbach questions the conventional wisdom around federalism, providing an argument for why federalism in the United States is precipitating democratic backsliding and creating inequalities across states that have a measurable impact on the day-to-day life and wellbeing of citizens.
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Darrell M. West, 9-23-2022, "Why federalism has become risky for American democracy," Brookings, -- MoState JG
State and local governments long have been considered “laboratories of democracy” that spawn valuable innovation. But recently states have taken this a step farther entering a risky new phase that pits blue states against red ones and blue cities against red states, and threatens democracy as a whole. As opposed to tolerating policy experimentation by different jurisdictions, some leaders are seeking to impose their own policy views on other places. Taken to an extreme, this behavior likely would intensify conflict and escalate policy nullification on a broad scale. Take, for instance, the recent intensification of arguments over immigration. Governors Ron DeSantis of Florida and Greg Abbott of Texas have bussed unwanted arrivals from the southern border to New York City, Washington, DC, and Martha’s Vineyard as a way to express their discontent with national policy. These leaders are upset over so-called “sanctuary cities” that are pro-immigrant and seeking to attract media attention to their cause. While successful at generating press coverage, this confrontational stance puts innocent people in the middle of policy disputes and disrupts social service delivery in the targeted states. Another area is abortion policy where the Supreme Court reversal of Roe v. Wade turned that issue back to the states and transformed the politics of that subject. A number of states used that decision not only to outlaw abortion but to criminalize actions that provided help for those wanting abortions. The stark differences in how state legislatures have responded to the Roe aftermath suggests federalism is moving in a destructive direction and putting states on a collision path with one another. Similar issues have popped in regard to marijuana legalization. For a number of years, that area has pitted states wanting to relax prohibitions and spawn new businesses against existing laws preventing interstate commerce involving illegal drugs or using the national banking system to transfer money. The resulting jurisdictional conflicts have strained federalism and made it difficult for businesses to know whose laws they should obey. And in the gun area, California recently enacted a law allowing people to sue those who make or distribute assault weapons. Modeled after Texas legislation that enabled lawsuits against those who aid women seeking abortions, the legislation demonstrates how states are turning on one another and restricting personal activity on a much broader scale than before. It no longer is enough for states and localities to take decisive policy stances, but rather they are aiming their enforcement against people living elsewhere who have different points of view. Even within individual states, there are risks for governance and democracy. Increasingly, there is preemption between red states and blue cities whereby Republican-controlled legislatures are putting major restrictions on the ability of Democratically-controlled cities to spend money, set policy, and address social issues. These within-state conflicts are eroding the capacity of cities to innovate and undertake useful policy experiments. By restricting local prerogatives, state legislatures are upsetting the balance of power within their boundaries and relegating cities to purely administrative functions.
From these and other actions, it appears federalism is entering an intolerant terrain that threatens democracy itself. There is a power reshuffling that likely will have profound ramifications for questions of who decides and what they decide on many topics. Large-scale political and institutional shifts on abortion policy, immigration enforcement, gun safety, and marijuana legalization are rippling through many jurisdictions and eroding the traditional prerogatives of state and local government. In the past, trend-setting localities have piloted projects that experimented with new ideas and became models for the country as a whole. As part of our system of local rule, different jurisdictions had freedom to test policies such as welfare work requirements, school choice, and cannabis legalization, and that was considered a strength of American governance. Yet in recent years, federalism has entered a new phase. In my Brookings Institution Press book, Power Politics: Trump and the Assault on American Democracy, I argue the extreme polarization and radicalization that afflicts contemporary politics has recast federalism in an entirely different light. States are innovating in more polarized and extreme directions, and criminalizing behavior that is perfectly lawful in other places. These stakes are especially high given the fact that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear an elections case with the potential to alter how presidential elections operate. In a North Carolina lawsuit involving the primacy of state legislatures versus state courts in handling redistricting disputes, justices could make a decision that elevates the role of state legislatures in choosing Electoral College electors and scale back the ability of state courts to adjudicate future election disputes. The result could be legislatures certifying elector slates for a candidate who has not gained the popular vote majority in that state. Such a move would generate considerable chaos in federal elections and usher in undemocratic practices that would weaken the popular vote and limit the ability of voters to hold leaders accountable. If these and other policy moves spread, what traditionally have been considered strengths of American democracy, i.e., the ability of states and localities to experiment, chart their own policy paths, and represent the views of people within their own jurisdictions, could shift in destructive directions. Rather than protecting democracy through tolerant and variated approaches, the differential responses of states and localities could intensify regional conflict and weaken the glue that holds the country together. Our current political system may not survive the high level of conflict which results when states nullify laws from other jurisdictions and criminalize behavior that is legal elsewhere.
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AFF › Federalism fails
John Warren McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. The political regulation of national and ethnic conflict. Parliamentary Affairs v47.n1 (Jan 1994): pp94(22).
Unfortunately, federalism has a poor track record as a conflict-regulating device in multi-national and polyethnic states, even where it allows a degree of minority self-government. Democratic federations have broken…Federal failures have occurred because minorities continue to be outnumbered at the federal level of government. The resulting frustrations, combined with an already defined boundary and the significant institutional resources flowing from control of their own province or state, provide considerable incentives to attempt secession, which in turn can invite harsh responses from the rest of the federation…genuine democratic federalism is clearly an attractive way to regulate national conflict, with obvious moral advantages over pure control. The argument that it should be condemned because it leads to secession and civil war can be sustained only in three circumstances: first, if without federalism there would be no secessionist bid and, second, if it can be shown that national or ethnic conflict can be justly and consensually managed by alternative democratic means; and third, if the secessionist unit is likely to exercise hegemonic control (or worse) of its indigenous minorities.
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AFF › Federalism fails
Feldman 20 [Noah Feldman is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and host of the podcast “Deep Background.” He is a professor of law at Harvard University March 19, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-19/coronavirus-pandemic-shows-challenges-of-u-s-federalism]
One of the weirdest things in this weird historical moment is the hodgepodge nature of the coronavirus responses from different state, county, and local governments throughout the United States. In essentially every other country on earth, central government authorities are directing and running the response to Covid-19.
If Italy shuts down, it’s the Italian government that decides to do it. If Germany chooses to end hotel stays, it’s Chancellor Angela Merkel who makes the call. But in the U.S., separate Bay Area counties can go one way, the mayor of New York another, and the governor of Massachusetts yet a third. There’s little if any national coordination.
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AFF › Federalism fails
Polimédio and Souris 2018. Chayenne Polimédio, fellow with the Political Reform program at New America and Elena Souris Research Associate for the Political Reform program, New America. “Is America's Future Federalist?” New America March 8, 2019. <https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/americas-future-federalist/> Accessed 6/25/20. ARJH
This isn’t to make federalism sound like an easy, DIY recipe for politics: Add ballot initiatives and stir. As a system of government, federalism is much harder in practice. Over the last year, while gathering information for the database, we came across a slew of challenges that exemplify why even if federalism is the future, that future isn’t here—at least not yet. As we’ve discussed before, while federalism seems promising, it’s much more complicated on the ground. With 50 states come 50 possible ways to govern because of the freedom that federalism grants. That means little standardization and lots of hard-to-access information. That’s a problem, because voters need access in order to understand the laws in their state, and what different kinds of laws look like in other states, so that they can discern between reforms they do and don’t support at home. And yet, simply making information available isn’t enough. As Aaron Swartz, the founder of Demand Progress, wrote in 2006, “transparency… simply shifts the work from the government to the average citizen, who has neither the time nor the ability to investigate these questions in detail, let alone do anything about it.” More transparency, in other words, is useless if people don’t have the necessary tools to navigate and understand the laws governing them. Moreover, if the goal of political experiments is for good reforms to thrive and for bad ones to wither away, then citizens impacted by these reforms need to understand their laws in comparison to the other 49 states. On a more basic level, grassroots activism requires a precise understanding of current laws—which the present-day transparency process makes practically impossible for anyone without a politics or law degree. For organizers, lacking standardization makes it difficult, time-intensive, and expensive to try to mobilize groups across state lines, particularly when something as ostensibly straightforward as voter registration differs wildly from Texas to Washington. While some may argue that this is the reason why voters elect representatives, inaccessible information creates a bigger challenge and more inefficiency for everyone, including the local government and the citizens trying to work within that system.
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AFF › Federalism resilient
Rodriguez 2014 - Professor of Law @ Yale Law School [Christina M. Rodriguez, “Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124, (2014) p. 2094
Though pursuit of their interests by each player may often lead to conflict, particularly over which institutions should control any given policy domain, I argue that the value of the system common to all of its participants is the framework it creates for the ongoing negotiation of disagreements large and small—a value that requires regular attention by all participants to the integrity of federalism’s institutions. It is in this sense that I think federalism constitutes a framework for national integration, in the spirit of this Feature. It creates a multiplicity of institutions with lawmaking power through which to develop national consensus, while establishing a system of government that allows for meaningful expressions of disagreement when consensus fractures or proves¶ elusive—a value that transcends perspective.
In what follows, I attempt to establish these conclusions by considering how the negotiations required by federalism have structured our national debates over a number of pressing social welfare issues, including immigration, marriage equality, drug policy, education and health care reform, and law enforcement. I focus on how these debates play out in what I call the discretionary spaces of federalism, which consist of the policy conversations¶ and bureaucratic negotiations that actors within the system must have to figure¶ out how to interact with one another both vertically and horizontally. Indeed, within existing legal constraints, state and local actors will have considerable room to maneuver, and the federal government considerable discretion to¶ refrain from taking preemptive action. 2 I highlight questions of administration and enforcement, because it is in these domains that the system’s actors construct one another’s powers and interests on an ongoing basis, based on the value they seek to derive from the system. In these discretionary spaces, “winners” must sometimes emerge from discrete conflicts, whether through judicial resolution or political concession, and the parameters set by courts and Congress obviously define the terrain of negotiation. But the intergovernmental relationships and overlapping political communities the system creates are neither locked in zero-sum competition nor bound by fixed rules of engagement, precisely what makes federalism productive regardless of perspective.
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AFF › Federalism resilient
Bednar 2014. Jenna Bednar, political science professor at the University of Michigan. [The Resilience of the American Federal System, Handbook of Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, ]
Federal systems of governance have the capacity to be robust— meaning that despite internal and external changing circumstances, they can continue to produce the benefits of a decentralized but inter- nally coordinated polity. Whether or not a federal system is robust is a function of its institutional design and federal culture. The American federal system, distributing authority between levels of government, has been remarkably resilient, failing only once during the past two centuries. Its resilience surprises many who keep expecting it to wither away as the national government grows. In this chapter I make two contributions. In the first part, I review the claims of the Ameri- can federation's inherent centralization and suggest the evidence as well as institutional and cultural reasons why federalism may still be meaningful in the American context. Second, I present the science of federal robustness: its key is its adaptability, provided by a set of safeguards that jointly protect federalism's boundaries while permitting experimentation around the edges. Future progress in the study of federalism obliges us to move beyond the standard equlibrium-based analysis to take a more dynamic view of federal system design and operation.
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AFF › No Spillover
Ryan 2012 (Erin Ryan is currently a Fulbright Scholar in China. She is a professor of law at Lewis and Clark Law School, 7-3-2012, "Spending power bargaining after Obamacare, "OUPblog, )https://blog.oup.com/2012/07/spending-power-bargaining-after-obamacare/
It’s important to get these things right because an awful lot of American governance really is negotiated between state and federal actors this way. Federalism champions often mistakenly assume a “zero-sum” model of American federalism that emphasizes winner-takes-all competition between state and federal actors for power. But countless real-world examples show that the boundary between state and federal authority is really a project of ongoing negotiation, one that effectively harnesses the regulatory innovation and interjurisdictional synergy that is the hallmark of our federal system. Understanding state-federal relations as heavily mediated by negotiation betrays the growing gap between the rhetoric and reality of American federalism—and it offers hope for moving beyond the paralyzing features of the zero-sum discourse. Still, a core feature making the overall system work is that intergovernmental bargaining must be fairly secured by genuine consent.
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AFF › UQ – Federalism Down
Brynn Tannehill, 1-11-2023, Brynn Tannehill is a Naval Academy graduate, former naval aviator, author, and senior defense analyst. She currently lives in Northern Virginia with her wife and three children. "How the Supreme Court Is About to Destroy Federalism ," New Republic, --MoStateJG
Historically, when the Supreme Court strays too far from what the vast majority of the public wants and starts catering to a white Southern minority, nothing good comes of it. When the Supreme Court decided in 1857 not only that Dred Scott was not a free man but that no Black person could be a citizen of the United States or enjoy the rights afforded them by the Constitution, it doomed the country to civil war. In the process of protecting “states’ rights” for white Southerners, the Supreme Court led by Roger Taney trampled both human rights and the rights of free states to prohibit slavery on their own territory. The echoes of the past are even clearer when you compare the language and reasoning of the Taney and the current Roberts court. The written opinion of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford relied on the same sort of “originalist” logic used by Associate Justice Samuel Alito in Dobbs v. Jackson. Indeed, this passage by Taney on why Blacks were doomed to slavery, based on an originalist reading of the Constitution, could have been written by Alito last year: Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men—high in literary acquirements—high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting. They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others.… They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them. In addition to resembling the pre–Civil War Taney court, the current Supreme Court shares some of the odious traits of the court that followed the Civil War. That court, led by Chief Justice Morrison Waite, delivered decision after decision that ended Reconstruction. In United States v. Reese, the court ruled 7–2 that “racially neutral” voter suppression measures such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and the grandfather clause were constitutional. In United States v. Cruikshank, the Waite court ruled 9–0 that the federal government had no right to arrest the people responsible for the Colfax Massacre, the 1873 Louisiana riot where dozens of Black militiamen were murdered by a white mob. The Waite court also decided unanimously in Minor v. Happersett that women do not have a constitutional right to vote. In Elk v. Wilkins, the Waite court ruled 7–2 that being born on U.S. soil did not grant citizenship to Native Americans. The court also upheld miscegenation laws 9–0 in the 1883 case Pace v. Alabama. That same year, a majority struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in The Civil Rights Cases of 1883. Later, in 1896, under Chief Justice Melville Fuller, the Supreme Court enshrined segregation via Plessy v. Ferguson, under the rubric of states’ rights. The logic used by the court and the effects of its decisions were described eloquently by Adam Serwer in a 2018 Atlantic article: “They carefully framed their arguments in terms of limited government and individual liberty, writing opinion after opinion that allowed the white South to create an oppressive society in which black Americans had almost no rights at all. Their commitment to freedom in the abstract, and only in the abstract, allowed a brutal despotism to take root in Southern soil.” As if to drive this point home, the Roberts court ruled in Shinn v. Ramirez that it doesn’t matter if a person is innocent based on the preponderance of the evidence; so long as procedure was followed, the state can still execute people. Justice in the abstract, and only in the abstract, all over again. Almost 40 years passed between the Dred Scott decision and Plessy. Today, the Roberts Supreme Court is poised to do similar damage in perhaps as little as 20 years. We’ve already seen the court strike down most of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Shelby v. Holder (2013), and it looks ready to finish off the rest of it soon. It’s allowed states to strip Native Americans of their right to vote using the pretext of preventing voter fraud in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee. The court decided in Gill v. Whitford (2018) that while it’s unfortunate that partisan gerrymandering undeniably ends democracy, there’s nothing it can do about it constitutionally. At the same time, the Roberts court is elevating the dominant forces in our society while striking down the civil rights of minorities. It keeps finding that Christian organizations have a right to government money, while at the same time finding they also have a right to discriminate against LGBTQ people, Jews, etc. This is freedom in the abstract: Even if Jews and LGBTQ people were allowed to discriminate against Christians, it would have a negligible impact on Christians compared to Christians being permitted to discriminate against groups that make up much smaller percentages of the population. It is akin to saying Christians can only shop at Kroger, and Jews can only shop at Jewish-run businesses: The harm falls disproportionately on the minority groups. We’ve also seen the court strike down Roe v. Wade, and now women in states dominated by white conservatives are paying the price in blood, pain, and death. While it may have hurt the GOP in the 2022 elections, it wasn’t enough to prevent it from taking back the House of Representatives, in great part due to effective gerrymandering in red states, and even blue states like New York are putting in place judges who oppose gerrymandering. In Moore v. Harper, the court has before it the question of whether state legislatures can unilaterally decide everything about elections, including the option of deciding who gets the states’ Electoral College votes (regardless of how the people of the state actually voted) or creating alternate slates of electors (as Donald Trump and his team were trying to do).
At the district court level, extremist judges like Reed O’Connor and Matthew Kacsmaryk allow religious legal organizations to go judge shopping to reliably get injunctions against everything. O’Connor is notorious for having issued the nationwide injunction against birth control coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Kacsmaryk, formerly a lawyer for an organization opposed to abortion, has released a series of injunctions in the past year targeting women and the LGBTQ community. With judges such as these, there’s little the federal government can do to protect women and minorities. This serves to undermine faith in the legal system at all levels, and not just the Supreme Court. Perhaps the worst part is that the Roberts court can’t even bother with ideological consistency in pursuit of partisan goals. For instance, in Masterpiece Cake Shop and Little Sisters of the Poor, the court ruled that even the merest hint of bias or burden by the government was an intolerable evil. But when Trump instituted his “Muslim ban,” the court found in Trump v. Hawaii that it was just fine because Trump made his anti-Muslim statements while he was still only a candidate, thus it couldn’t be certain that the policy was motivated by religious animus. All the while, the right flank of the court engages in partisan activity. Associate Justice Samuel Alito openly sneers at and mocks justices who support gun control. Clarence Thomas is married to a woman who supported overthrowing the 2020 election and publicly uses right-wing talking points about “cancel culture.” Amy Coney-Barrett served as a “handmaid” in a right-wing Christian cult. Bret Kavanaugh’s hearings painted him as a beer-swilling alleged rapist with ultrarich parents to pay off his debts incurred by his country-club lifestyle. Faith in the Supreme Court has reached an all-time low as a result of this. When Chief Justice Roberts complains that the public no longer trusts the court, while stating that the court is impartial and that the public is wrong to be upset by its decisions, it comes across as completely out of touch with both history and reality. The Roberts court is taking us down the same pathway as the Taney and Waite courts—at an even faster pace. As a result, there’s the potential for a case to absolutely break the public’s willingness to accept court decisions, and the union in the process. And that day is coming fast.
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2NC › Impacts › A2: No spillover
Jonathan Wood Attorney at Pacific Legal Foundation, an adjunct fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center. “Symposium: In sports-betting case, the Supreme Court should bet on federalism” SCOTUSblog. August 16, 2017. <http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-sports-betting-case-supreme-court-bet-federalism/> Accessed October 7, 2017. ARJH
The Supreme Court has previously identified two principal justifications for the commandeering ban: (1) Commandeering would frustrate the Constitution’s system of federalism; and (2) commandeering would frustrate political accountability. Both also cut against PASPA and the 3rd Circuit’s rule. Limiting the commandeering doctrine to save PASPA would pose significant federalism problems. Most obviously, it would make cooperative federalism much more difficult, if not impossible. If Congress can compel states to continue enforcing policies forever as long as the initial adoption was voluntary, a state would have to think long and hard before participating in any cooperative federalism arrangement. If a state initially agreed to participate, the federal government could bind the state forever, no matter how expensive, unpopular or ineffective the policy proved. To do so, it would only need to enact a statute like PASPA forbidding the state from “authorizing” any activity prohibited by the policy. PASPA also undermines traditional federalism principles by denying states the ability to experiment with novel solutions to vexing public policy problems. Consider the recent federalism revolution on the issue of marijuana. Because of the failed federal war on drugs, many states have experimented with more relaxed regulations or wholesale legalization of the drug. If PASPA is constitutional, Congress could stop this federalism experiment (or any other) in its tracks by forbidding any more states from “authorizing” anything that was previously forbidden. This kind of commandeering would also frustrate political accountability. When the federal government dictates policy to states, accountability is diminished at both the state and federal level. The federal government is less accountable because it can adopt feel-good policies but shift the hard questions of how to implement and pay for them to states. And accountability at the state level will be undermined because voters will reasonably punish state politicians for these policies if they prove unpopular, even though the politicians are powerless to do anything about them. We have seen this play out in New Jersey, where the voters adopted a state referendum calling for state-law reform, apparently in the mistaken belief that the state had any say in what state law should be. It’s easy to underestimate this political accountability concern. Won’t voters realize what’s going on and vote accordingly, especially when the issue has received as much attention as PASPA has? Although intuitively appealing, this is a too-cheery view of politics. Because people’s time and attention are limited, and the likelihood that a single vote will affect an election is incomprehensibly small, voters are rationally ignorant on political issues. Only 42 percent of Americans can name the three branches of government. Hitting more closely to home for SCOTUSblog fans, only 34 percent can name a single Supreme Court justice. Expecting voters to understand the ins and outs of a relatively obscure statute like PASPA is out of the question. The Supreme Court’s decision to take up the question of PASPA’s constitutionality is a welcome sign. Letting the 3rd Circuit’s decision stand would risk Congress using a similar approach to undermine federalism and political accountability in other policy areas. By deciding the constitutional question now, the Supreme Court can set the necessary limits on commandeering while only PASPA is at stake. It would be harder for the court to take this step if PASPA’s approach, currently confined to a failed statutory regime, spread to other, more politically sensitive issues.
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Somin 2017. Ilya Somin Professor of Law at George Mason University. His research focuses on constitutional law, property law, and popular political participation. “Don’t gamble away federalism” The Washington Post. October 5, 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/05/dont-gamble-away-federalism/?utm_term=.30c354a34279> Accessed October 8, 2017. ARJH
This restriction on state power clashes with Tenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has long interpreted as banning “commandeering” of the states, in cases such as Printz v. United States (1997) and New York v. United States (1992). The federal government cannot require state officials to help enforce federal law, or force state legislatures to enact any legislation. It logically follows that federal law cannot compel New Jersey to continue to ban sports betting under its state law, even if that activity remains illegal under federal law. To get out of this conundrum, the Third Circuit court of appeals lower court decision in favor of the NCAA ruled that the New Jersey law goes beyond mere legalization of sports betting and qualifies as “affirmative authorization” of it, because it “selectively remove[s] a prohibition on sports wagering in a manner that permissively channels wagering activity to particular locations or operators.” Because New Jersey’s reform did not legalize all sports betting, but merely some of it, the federal government can forbid it without violating the prohibition on commandeering. The obvious problem with this reasoning is that nearly all laws that legalize a previously banned activity still continue to regulate or restrict it in various ways. When formerly “dry” jurisdictions legalize alcohol sales, they often restrict it to particular enterprises and locations, continue to ban sales to minors, and so on. The same goes for state laws legalizing marijuana, among other examples. Under the approach advocated by the NCAA and endorsed by the Third Circuit, the federal government can forbid states to legalize virtually any previously banned activity unless the do so categorically without any remaining restrictions. The Third Circuit tries to avoid this obvious implication of their reasoning by suggesting that “not all partial repeals are created equal. For instance, a state’s partial repeal of a sports wagering ban to allow de minimis wagers between friends and family would not have nearly the type of authorizing effect that we find in the 2014 Law.” But this distinction makes little sense. A “partial repeal” that “allow[s] de minimis wagers between friends and family” still has the effect of “permissively channel[ing] wagering activity to particular locations or operators”; in this case channeling it to small-scale betting pools run by groups of friends or family. That’s exactly what the court objects to in the case of the New Jersey legalization law. Perhaps the answer is that “channeling” is permissible so long as only a few small “operators” are allowed to engage in the formerly banned activity. But, in that event, state legalization is still largely forbidden whenever Congress chooses to block it. The Third Circuit and the NCAA also claim that forbidding the New Jersey legalization law does not qualify as commandeering because it does not force the state to take any action. This argument is also weak. Forcing the state to continue to ban sports betting (except, perhaps, if it legalizes it without any limitation) surely qualifies as forcing the state to act. In Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law that required state officials to perform background checks on gun buyers. Surely that federal law would still have been commandeering if it “merely” prevented states from ending any background check policies that they already had in place. The implications of this case go far beyond the issue of sports betting. If the NCAA and its allies win, the federal government will be able to enact laws preventing from legalizing almost any activity they previously banned, except perhaps in cases where they do so without leaving any regulatory restrictions in place at all. That will potentially constrain state experimentation on issues as varied drug legalization, licensing reform, gun control, land use restrictions, environmental policy, and many, many others. It will thereby endanger the interstate policy diversity that we need more than ever in a time of deep partisan and ideological polarization. Some may wonder why state law legalization matters if the activity in question is still banned by federal law – as most sports betting currently is, except in Nevada. But, often, the federal government cannot effectively enforce a federal ban if states refuse to cooperate. The feds generally have far fewer law enforcement resources than states and localities. Moreover, state experimentation can sometimes create political momentum that eventually forces the federal government to change its own policies. To take an obvious current example, state-level legalization of marijuana in many states has made it harder for the federal government to continue to enforce the federal ban, and has helped generate support for federal legalization. As the Third Circuit decision notes, PASPA already includes exemptions for some state-authorized sports betting operations that were already in place when the law was enacted. If more states legalize sports betting, Congress could be incentivized to increase the number of exceptions and perhaps eventually get the federal government out of this field altogether. The Supreme Court could end this attempt at commandeering by either striking down the relevant section of PASPA or interpreting it narrowly to avoid possible constitutional problems. In several recent cases, the Court has bent over backwards to avoid interpreting federal laws in ways that might render them unconstitutional. Here, it could do so by ruling that partial legalization of sports betting does not qualify as “licensing” or “authorization” forbidden by PASPA. I personally would prefer a straightforward ruling that this part of PASPA is unconstitutional. But either approach is far better than a ruling in favor of the NCAA. It is often claimed that the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering jurisprudence has no basis in the text and original meaning of the Constitution. But, as legal scholar Michael Rappaport showed in an important article, these decisions ha a basis in the Founding-era understanding of the word “state,” which implied a sovereign authority that the federal government could not undercut by seizing control over the state’s government apparatus. Freedom from commandeering is an important element of state sovereignty and a valuable constraint on federal power.
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2NC › Impacts › Environment
Food and Agricultural Organization, 2016, (The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is an agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat hunger, “Biodiversity”)
Biodiversity is essential for food security and nutrition. Thousands of interconnected species make up a vital web of biodiversity within the ecosystems upon which global food production depends. With the erosion of biodiversity, humankind loses the potential to adapt ecosystems to new challenges such as population growth and climate change. Achieving food security for all is intrinsically linked to the maintenance of biodiversity. Healthy ecosystems are essential to increase resilience and agricultural production in the face of change. Production needs to be sustainable: capitalizing on biological processes and harvesting resources without compromising natural capital such as biodiversity and ecosystem services. To cope with challenges and uncertainties, a large reservoir of biological diversity will be needed. Animals – The biodiversity of approximately 35 animal species domesticated for use in agriculture and food production is the primary biological capital for livestock development and is vital to food security and sustainable rural development. Plants – In human history, about 7 000 species of plants have been cultivated for consumption. Forests – Among the most important repositories of terrestrial biological diversity, tropical, temperate and boreal forests offer very diverse habitats for plants, animals and micro-organisms. Aquatic organisms – Marine, coastal and inland areas support a rich assortment of aquatic biological diversity, which contributes to the economic, cultural, nutritional, social, recreational and spiritual betterment of human populations. Soils – The variability among living organisms ranging from micro-organisms (e.g. bacteria, fungi, protozoa) to larger meso-fauna (e.g. acari and springtails) are essential to agriculture. Nutrition –The consumption of one variety over another can make the difference between nutritional adequacy and inadequacy. A large number of the world’s poor rely directly on biodiversity and ecosystem services, and their livelihoods would be affected first and foremost by biodiversity loss. A vastly broader share of the human population would be affected by a decrease in the provision of ecosystem services related to food production, nutrition, water and sanitation.
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2NC › Impacts › Environment
Torres ‘19 [Phil Torres, Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, Founder of the X-Risks Institute, Writer Appearing in Skeptic, Free Inquiry, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Truthout, Erkenntnis, Metaphilosophy, “Biodiversity Loss: An Existential Risk Comparable To Climate Change,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 11, 2016, https://thebulletin.org/2016/04/biodiversity-loss-an-existential-risk-comparable-to-climate-change]
Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.
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2NC › Impacts › Democracy
Dan Reiter 17, Professor at the Department of Political Science at Emory University, January, 2017, “Is Democracy a Cause of Peace?”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia, http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-287
Scholars have explored other means of assessing causation in the democratic peace, and have amassed three other types of evidence that support the conclusion that democracy causes peace: evidence demonstrating support for other empirical patterns suggested by democratic peace theory; evidence produced using experimental methods; and evidence produced using case studies. The first type of evidence explores for the existence of other empirical patterns predicted by democratic peace theory. If a theory predicts the existence of a variety of empirical patterns and these patterns are demonstrated through tests, we can be more confident in the validity of the theory, and in turn that observed correlations are causal and not just spurious. And, indeed, there is a wide array of quantitative empirical studies that provide support for various assumptions or implications of democratic peace theory, especially for institutionalist accounts of the democratic peace. Perhaps the central institutionalist explanation of the democratic peace proposes that elected leaders are motivated to avoid fighting wars, because the costs of wars will incite popular discontent in turn threatening their hold on power. Studies have demonstrated a number of empirical patterns consistent with this view. Democracies fight shorter wars (Reiter & Stam, 2002, ch. 7). Democracies suffer fewer casualties when they fight wars (Valentino et al., 2010), and when they fight, popular support for the leadership declines as casualties escalate (Mueller, 1973). The benefits of victorious wars may sometimes push democratic publics to accept the costs of war when they are confident of victory, and accordingly democracies almost never start wars they go on to lose (Reiter & Stam, 2002). During war, public support erodes as the perceived likelihood of victory declines (Gelpi et al., 2009). As the institutional explanation of the democratic peace would predict, variations of institutional and leadership form within democracies also affects conflict behavior, as in general more constrained states are less conflict prone (Reiter & Tillman, 2002). Consistent with the audience costs explanation, democracies can more effectively signal their resolve than at least some kinds of autocratic states (Schultz, 2001; Weeks, 2014). There are also some studies supporting elements of the normative explanation. For example, some studies have found that democracies are especially likely to use mediation or binding arbitration to resolve interstate disputes (Dixon, 1993; Raymond, 1994, 1996). In total, though there are certainly scholarly debates about some of these observed patterns,6 this collection of studies improves our confidence that democracy is causing peace in the manners described by democratic peace theory. The second type of evidence uses experimental methods. Some have proposed that experimental methods enjoy critical advantages over the analysis of observational data in assessing causation. Experimental methods are able largely to skirt some of the biggest causal inference problems associated with quasi-experimental methods, such as biased samples and nonrandom assignments of treatment. That said, the limitation of experimental methods is that, especially in international relations, they can only be used to test some arguments, or some components of arguments. For example, regarding the democratic peace an experimenter cannot take a set of states and then randomly assign some to be democratic and others to be non-democratic. That said, scholars have thus far been able to conduct survey and laboratory experiments that have tested some elements of the democratic peace. A number of surveys have found support for one of the core assertions of dyadic democratic peace theory: that citizens of democracies are significantly less likely to support the use of force against democracies as compared to using force against non-democracies (Geva et al., 1993; Johns & Davies 2012; Lacina & Lee, 2013; Mintz & Nehemia, 1993; Rousseau, 2005, pp. 219–232; Tomz & Weeks, 2013) Other experiments have tested elements of the audience costs variant of the democratic peace, showing that the public does inflict audience costs on leaders who back down in a crisis (Horowitz & Levendusky, 2012; Tomz, 2007; Trager & Vavreck, 2011). A third empirical means of demonstrating causation is to engage in process tracing through case studies. Scholars have presented several individual case studies of the democratic peace in events such as 19th-century American diplomatic crises, the 1898 Fashoda Crisis, the onset of World War II, the Spanish-American War, and many others (see Elman, 1997; Owen, 1997; Ray, 1995; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Rousseau, 2005; Schultz, 2001; for case studies presenting evidence against the democratic peace, see Layne, 1994). Some of these case studies demonstrate specific parts of the causal logic of the democratic peace, such as the ability of democracies to signal more effectively through invoking greater audience costs (Schultz, 2001), or the inability of elected leaders to manipulate public opinion or secretly drag their nations into wars the public would otherwise avoid (Reiter, 2012a). Perhaps the most striking case study of democratic peace dynamics is the pacification of Western Europe after World War II, democracy helping to dissolve immediately and completely one of the most violent interstate conflicts in modern history, the France-Germany rivalry (Russett & Oneal, 2001).
2023
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2NC › I/L › Environment Impact Mod
Sims, Charles et al, 2-16-2023, Department of Economics and Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy @University of Tennessee, "Leveraging federalism for flexible and robust management of social‐ecological systems," besjournals, -- MoState JG
2 | A SPEC TS OF SES THAT FAVOUR STATE OVER FEDERAL MANAGEMENT
1. Ecological heterogeneity: The quantity and quality of habitat as well as the resulting portfolio of organisms vary across states. State agencies that manage the environment, wildlife, and diseases have individuals stationed throughout the state to monitor habitat conditions and organism abundance. State governments tailor management to this localized information. While federal agencies collect and process data relevant to the management of SES, much of this information is readily available to local governments.
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Sims, Charles et al, 2-16-2023, Department of Economics and Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy @University of Tennessee, "Leveraging federalism for flexible and robust management of social‐ecological systems," besjournals, -- MoState JG
Ecological federalism highlights how the relative merits of state and federal management critically depend on features of the ecological and social systems. Disparate views over the relative merits of state versus federal management may reflect different perceptions of the spatiotemporal dynamics and critical biological and social heterogeneities that characterize the SES, instead of intractable political beliefs about the pros and cons of centralized government.
Figure 2 illustrates features of state-federal conflicts that ecological federalism is designed to address (see Supporting Information for details). In this pictorial model, the ecological system is defined by habitat patches, linkages between patches due to movement of organisms (animals, plants and viruses) and productivity or other gradients indicate that patches vary in their ability to support the organism. The ecological system spans two states whose residents value the ecosystem services produced from the SES and move between states. Each state can choose management that reflects the ecological system in their state and the values held by their residents. The greater the difference in the SES in the two states, the greater the difference in management chosen. However, absent interstate management conventions, state-level managers often ignore how their management affects neighbouring states. Federal management accounts for these spillovers between states but is forced to apply uniform, one-size-fits-all management in both states that ignores the differences in the SES in the two states. Federal level control with state-specific strategies developed in conjunction with the states allows for the coordination that federal management provides while incorporating local know-how into those coordinated management strategies. However, this type of regionally differentiated, perfectly informed, federal management is the exception rather than the rule. The federal government may have more resources and capacity than the states but typically not to the degree that customized management plans are created for each state. For a formalized model capturing many of these aspects of ecological federalism in a marine context, see Sanchirico et al. (2020).
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2NC › I/L › Democracy
Donald F. Kettl, 1-18-2022, columnist for Governing, is a professor emeritus and the former dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. "Can Federalism Save American Democracy? Maybe …," Governing, -- MoState JG
“Canada is like a nice family living over a biker bar,” Dustin Hoffman once quipped. “They keep telling the downstairs neighbors to keep down the noise, people are trying to sleep.” But our Canadian friends are increasingly worried that things downstairs are moving from disorder to danger. In the country’s leading newspaper, Toronto’s Globe and Mail, political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon , “By 2025, American democracy could collapse, causing extreme domestic political instability, including widespread civil violence. By 2030, if not sooner, the country could be governed by a right-wing dictatorship.” The United States “is becoming increasingly ungovernable,” he wrote, and wondered, “How should Canada prepare?” It’s not just the Canadians who are worried. An published in early January found that 64 percent of Americans agreed that “American democracy is in crisis and at risk of failing.” One in four believed that it was sometimes OK to use violence to protect American democracy, although of course it’s their own version of democracy they’d want to take up arms to protect. In a few short years, we’ve moved from the world’s very model of democracy to a government that, in the eyes of other nations, is anything but. A European think tank’s 2021 report classified the U.S. as with “the sustained and deliberate process of subversion of basic democratic tenets by political actors and governments.” Commentary around the anniversary of the Jan. 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol insurrection was united in the conclusion that “American democracy is tottering,” as . Even biker bars have rules that aim to keep at least a semblance of order. Critics are pointedly wondering if the same can be said for American democracy. The federal government is a mess. So it’s worth asking: Can state and local governments, closer to the people, provide a lifeline to the nation’s grand traditions of governance? Can federalism save American democracy? There’s a strong case that the answer is yes. After all, the biggest fear of some of the founders was that so much power would accumulate in Washington that liberty would erode. They believed that preserving the power of states, as the new nation’s building blocks, would prevent tyranny.
Worrisome Battles So if the United States is backsliding, can its state and local building blocks stop the skid? There’s certainly hope. Congress is the Hells Angels of biker bars, with Gallup finding public trust in the federal government to handle domestic problems at , near the historic low. (And that may be an optimistic number: The Pew Research Center found that trust Washington “to do what is right just about always or most of the time.”) But while Americans’ confidence in state and local governments has been slipping in recent years, those levels of government still enjoy much higher levels of public trust: 57 percent and 66 percent, respectively, according to Gallup. A Deloitte study : “the more local, the more trusted.” Yet despite the headlines about Washington’s dysfunction, some of the more worrisome battles are raging at the state and local levels. In 2021, at least 34 laws were passed in 19 states that restricted voting, the , with more such legislation teed up for 2022. Brennan called this an “alarming and unprecedented attack on our democracy.” Meanwhile, are cascading into once-sleepy races for state secretaries of state, from groups trying to set up the next round of vote challenges. Just as alarming are the full-blooded battles that have erupted at school board meetings around the country. In many communities, these meetings used to be downright boring affairs, mostly poring over the details of school budgets. But COVID-19 and the culture wars have changed all that. In Rapid City, S.D., and Kalispell, Mont., for example, conservatives who were furious about mask mandates ran to . In a suburban school district near Columbia, S.C., a battle over pandemic restrictions led to who was the state’s reigning Superintendent of the Year. In Texas, a new state law from being forced to discuss “a controversial issue of public policy or social affairs” in the classroom. That spun off into a battle to ban the teaching of critical race theory (CRT) in local schools, even though there’s no evidence that local schools were teaching it. CRT was, until recently, a relatively obscure college-level issue focusing on whether race is woven into legal systems and political practice. But now any issue involving race attracts the CRT label — and an argument to ban it. The battle led a Black principal accused of promoting CRT . And in Virginia, in November Republican Glenn Youngkin surprisingly won the race for governor on the back of attacks on CRT, although the evidence that the issue won the race for him is . Noncontroversial was the problem itself: Virginia teachers don’t teach CRT. It’s not just issues around race. Texas Gov. Greg Abbott called on the Texas Education Agency to into “the availability of pornography” in the state’s public schools. It wasn’t clear where rivers of obscenity were flowing through the schools. In any event, the TEA has no investigators or prosecutors. In Williamson County, near Austin, county commissioners to two local school districts in a battle over what they claimed were offensive books on library shelves. A New Civil War? Americans might trust state and local governments more than the feds because the more local a government is the more trusted it is. But, on the other hand, the more local a government is, the easier it is to create flashpoints on issues, mobilize crowds to overwhelm debates and terrify elected officials into relenting. That’s led some analysts to warn starkly that the U.S. stands on the verge of a new civil war. In The Atlantic’s Jan. 6 issue, Barton Gellman that “January 6 was practice” and that the “next coup has already begun.” Barbara F. Walter, the author of the new book , tells us, “We are closer to civil war than any of us would like to believe.” That’s a tough message to hear but, , “if you were an analyst in a foreign country looking at events in America — the same way you’d look at events in Ukraine or the Ivory Coast or Venezuela — you would go down a checklist, assessing each of the conditions that make civil war likely. And what you would find is that the United States, a democracy founded more than two centuries ago, has entered very dangerous territory.” And, back to the Canadians, journalist Stephen Marche, in , warns of the escalating “tolerance for violence.” He writes, “Eventually somebody acts on it.” In The Globe and Mail, Homer-Dixon worries that “we live in a world where the absurd regularly becomes real and the horrible commonplace.” Our neighbors are worried about what’s going on downstairs in the biker bar of American democracy. A Democracy-Building Strategy There’s a way out, but it won’t be easy. In the Deloitte study, John O’Leary, Angela Welle and Sushumna Agarwal suggest a simple strategy: Go local, since people tend to trust the government that they interact most with; go focused on individual governmental functions, since people tend to trust the programs and agencies that deliver value to them; go digital, since satisfaction with digital services is connected with higher levels of trust; and go transparent, since it’s easier to trust the things we see than the mysteries we don’t. The best bet for saving American democracy lies, as always, with state and local governments. Working to uproot the incivility and polarization that has infected local governments — especially local school boards — would be an important first step. The second step lies in the collection of trust-building strategies that local governments have close at hand. In the raucous politics spreading through local governments, that’s possible, with strong leadership. But it’s a very tall order. Or the disruptive battles wracking local politics could continue, or perhaps even escalate. That would be both sad and dangerous. Sad, because it would eat away at the foundation of American government. Dangerous, because without that foundation, the worries of our Canadian neighbors could come to pass. America is in genuine trouble. Federalism can save it, or sink it. For clues about which way it’s going to go, check in with your local school board. And tell those bikers to cool it.
2023
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2NC › Links › Federal Jobs Guarantee
Ladner, Andreas, et al. 2017, University of Lausanne Professor, Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration, “Autonomy and Austerity: Re-Investing in Local Government.” The Future of Local Government in Europe: Lessons from Research and Practice in 31 Countries, edited by Christian Schwab et al., 1st ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 2017, pp. 23–52. JSTOR, – mostate JG
There are basically three directions municipalities can take when looking for alternative ways to provide their tasks and services. A first direction can be termed cooperation with the private sector. This entails different forms of outsourcing or purchasing of services and public-private partnerships. The spectrum is wide and the terminology varies, but the basic idea is that the municipality still has the last word but takes advantage of the competence of and the opportunities offered by private actors. The second possibility is the joint provision of tasks and services with other municipalities. Inter-municipal cooperation is a way to optimize the catchment area of a task, which results in lower costs or more professional provision. This is often seen as an alternative to amalgamations and offers the advantage that the catchment areas can be adapted according to the requirements of each specific task. The last possibility is intensified cooperation with higher levels of state. This must not be confounded with transferring the task to the higher level, which is nothing but centralization. The municipalities still contribute to the funding and by doing so – following the principle of fiscal equivalence – they should also keep some decisional power.
To what extent do these reforms have an impact on the autonomy of local government? Outsourcing, or more intensive cooperation with the private sector, does not necessarily lead to less autonomy, since the municipalities remain in charge of these tasks and services. One of the problems arising here is what political scientists call the ‘principal-agent’ problem. The municipalities have the role of the principal. They take the final decisions, define the goals to be achieved and set the rules and conditions to respect. The private providers of the services are the agent. They know how to execute these tasks and retain all the important information. This gives them the chance to influence the terms of the contract in their interest. The municipalities depend on the know-how of their agents (private service providers). Although the municipalities’ autonomy is not reduced, they might lose some influence on the tasks and services provided. In an ideal form, however, they receive precisely what they want and might get it at a cheaper price.
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2NC › Links › Federal Jobs Guarantee
Greg Ip, 5-2-2018, Chief Economics Commentator, "The Problem With a Federal Jobs Guarantee (Hint: It’s Not the Price Tag) ," WSJ, -- mostate JG
In 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a second bill of rights enshrining the right to a job and a decent income. More than 70 years later, many on the left say it is time to deliver. Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, a Democratic presidential candidate in 2016 and likely again in 2020, is drafting legislation that would guarantee a job to anyone who wants one, at $15 an hour plus benefits. New Jersey Democratic Sen. Cory Booker has proposed a somewhat less ambitious version. Why now? Unemployment was 20% or more when Roosevelt put millions to work through the Civilian Conservation Corps and Works Progress Administration. Nowadays, full employment is part of the Federal Reserve’s mandate, and while its record has blemishes, today it can claim mission accomplished. With the unemployment rate now at 4.1%, mainstream economists consider the U.S. effectively at or beyond full employment; Letting unemployment go lower risks shortages and inflation.
But the big thinkers behind the federal jobs guarantee have their eyes on a bigger prize. That 4.1% only represents the 6.6 million who are unemployed under the Labor Department’s official definition. Another 5.1 million don’t meet it but want a job, and 5 million work part time because they can’t find full-time work. Eradicating these last vestiges of un- or underemployment “would fundamentally transform the current labor market,” write Mark Paul, William Darity and Darrick Hamilton in a paper for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a left-of-center think tank. Their proposal, which forms the basis of Mr. Sanders’s bill, would “significantly alter the current power dynamics between labor and capital” by forcing all employers to match the federal standards for pay and benefits. Yes, a job guarantee would cost a fortune, but ignoring the obvious political impediments, the price tag isn’t the catastrophe some critics claim. To hire all the official and unofficial unemployed and half the involuntary part timers at $15 an hour plus $3 an hour for benefits would cost around $450 billion, or 2.3% of gross domestic product. The actual cost could be much lower: Many of the unemployed won’t take up the federal offer because they expect to get something better, don’t like what’s being offered, or face some sort of obstacle (family, disability, etc.). Also, some of what gets spent on salaries will be saved in reduced Medicaid, tax credits, unemployment insurance and other safety net outlays. Five scholars at the Levy Institute, a think tank, have advanced a plan they say will cost just 1% to 1.5% of gross domestic product. The federal government spends three times that on Social Security and twice that on defense. The price tag would jump in recessions as laid-off people flock to the program. That is a feature, not a bug: By automatically injecting public money into the economy, it would prop up spending, private employment and tax revenue, lessening the recession’s severity. And unlike universal basic income, another fashionable idea for reducing inequality in which everyone gets a check regardless of whether they work, a jobs guarantee gets the taxpayer something in return: workers. That, however, is also the problem.
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2NC › Links › UBI
Paul Boyce, 5-5-2019, "Universal Basic Income Is a Pandora’s Box," Foundation for Economic Education, -- mostate JG
The case for a Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a strong one, in some ways. A UBI would stimulate aggregate demand, help those affected by technological change, and create a basic income for the poor. Its effectiveness and impact, however, depend on how much is given out. The benefits and consequences of a $100 UBI will be very different than one of $1,000. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, I will look at the case for a $1,000 per month UBI—as suggested by presidential candidate Andrew Yang. Previous Experiments Are Not Comparable First, it must be said that there are a number of cases that suggest UBI does, in fact, work. In Alaska, each resident gets up to $2,000 per year from the “Alaska Permanent Fund.” The state doesn't call it a UBI, but it works in a similar way. The difference, however, is that it is funded by its oil revenues. If oil prices go down, so do their dividends, which fell to $1,100 in 2017. Research by Damon Jones of the University of Chicago and Ioana Marinescu of the University of Pennsylvania found it had no impact on employment. However, this example and many others are not comparable to the $12,000 Yang proposes. Even European trials of UBI in Barcelona, Utrecht, and Helsinki only grant $590 per month. While there have been many "successful" UBI trials, few have been tested at over $12,000 per year. There have been "successful" pilots in Namibia and India, but neither offered a comparable income. In Namibia for example, citizens received 100 Namibian dollars per month, or just over $7. In India, the trial gave each adult 300 Indian rupees per month, or just over $4. Although these sums may help the lives of those in the respective countries, they are not comparable to Yang's proposal. Previous experiments with UBI may suggest it would work, but they in no way represent the scale of $12,000. There is no conclusive evidence to suggest this would work in practice. While the late Milton Friedman is a source of inspiration, he only suggested a modest $300 negative income tax in 1962. In today’s money, this is equivalent to $2,500—far short of the proposed sum.
Higher Prices and Inflation A UBI would essentially transfer wealth away from higher earners toward low earners. This spurs higher consumption because those with lower incomes have a higher propensity to consume. On a macro basis, this may not necessarily create any inflation, as there is no new money entering the economy. However, it will create inflation on a micro basis. Rather than money going toward investment, it is going toward consumer goods. Instead of inflation occurring through a wide variety of areas, it is being concentrated. Importance of Velocity Yang says this is just using the existing money in the economy. In part, he is right. However, he fails to consider the velocity of money. One of the reasons the US did not experience significant inflation after quantitative easing was due to a slowing of consumption growth. If we put $12,000 into everyone's hands, consumer demand will rise, and so, too, will velocity. When velocity increases, the same $1 exchanges hands at a quicker rate. For example, A may buy a television from B for $100. B will then buy a used iPhone from C for $100. C will then buy a used sofa from D for $100. The initial $100 has circulated around the economy at a value of $300. This sends demand signals to the relevant parties, who then respond with higher prices. Prices React to Demand Yang also suggests that prices will be kept down by competition. His point is that if the cost of a hamburger goes up from $5 to $10, the customer will go elsewhere. What he doesn’t consider is the impact of supply and demand. Let's say a barber is only able to cut 10 people’s hair per day. The barber has 20 customers who want an appointment, but he is unable to serve them all. Is he not going to raise prices because there is a barber down the road? The simple demand mechanism tells him there is demand for his service. He is unable to meet that demand. To achieve the most favorable outcome for the barber, it is in his interest to increase prices until there is no excess demand.