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2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › NU › Enlistment – Interest

Interest outweighs economics—no one wants to join the military

Barno and Bensahel 23

Lt. Gen. David W. Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel, visiting professors of strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellows at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies. “ADDRESSING THE U.S. MILITARY RECRUITING CRISIS.” War on the Rocks. 3/10/2023. LJS

Though improving eligibility is extremely important, as we discuss below, it alone cannot solve the recruiting crisis. The second, and much more challenging, factor involves military propensity — the number of young people who are interested in serving in the military. Only 13 percent of young Americans said they would consider military service before the pandemic, and that already paltry figure shrank to just 9 percent last year. That number is simply not high enough to ensure the stable flow of recruits upon which the all-volunteer force relies. Two sets of survey data help explain why propensity may be declining. First, the number of Americans expressing confidence in the U.S. military has plummeted in the past few years. To be clear, American confidence in almost all major U.S. institutions has declined, with data from Gallup showing that it reached an all-time average low of just 27 percent in 2022. Compared to that dismal statistic, the fact that 64 percent of survey respondents expressed confidence in the military last year is a strong endorsement indeed. Yet that figure was 72 percent in 2020 and 69 percent in 2021 — marking an 8 percentage point drop in only two years. More disturbingly, the Reagan National Defense Survey found even steeper declines, with confidence in the U.S. military dropping from 70 percent in 2018 to just 45 percent in 2021 (before rebounding slightly to 48 percent in 2022). Second, there are some early indications that fewer people in and around the military are willing to recommend military service to young people. In 2019, almost 75 percent of military families said they would recommend military service to someone they care about. Yet that figure dropped to just under 63 percent in 2021, another sharp decline in just two years. Since 80 percent of the young people who join the military today have a family member in the military — and 25–30 percent have a parent in the military — it may well be that more military families are steering their children away from uniformed service toward civilian careers. It’s difficult to assess the exact causes of these rapidly declining numbers, since as with eligibility, many different trends are converging at once. The chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is almost certainly one of the reasons, as most Americans disapproved of the way in which the Biden administration executed the withdrawal (including many who generally supported the decision to withdraw). Another is the increasing perception that U.S. military leaders are becoming too involved in politics, partly due to several controversies surrounding Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley. And the ever-increasing rates of sexual assault in the military became far more widely known after the tragic disappearance and death of Specialist Vanessa Guillen in 2020, and the subsequent disciplining of 14 Army officials at Fort Hood. Indeed, in a fall 2021 survey, 30 percent of Americans aged 16 to 24 said that the possibility of sexual harassment or assault was one of the main reasons why they would not consider joining the U.S. military. (The Guillen case also led Congress to pass sweeping reforms of the military justice system last year, which may eventually help alleviate such concerns.) Furthermore, partisans on both sides of the political divide are publicly highlighting different problems facing the military, which may deter their followers (and their followers’ children) from considering military service. Democrats, for example, have publicly expressed worries about the small but significant problem of extremists in the military. Many Democrats, especially Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, have also long criticized the military’s seeming inability to make significant progress addressing its problems with sexual harassment and assault, and they may continue to do so if the judicial reforms mentioned above prove insufficient. Republicans, by contrast, play down the extremist issue and instead focus on what they call the increasing “wokeness” of the military. Even though Chairman Milley, leaders from all services, and outside experts have strongly rejected such claims, some Republican members of Congress continue to push this narrative, even accusing the military of using “cherry-picked data” in ways that obscure these problems. In November, for example, the offices of Senator Marco Rubio and Representative Chip Roy published a report called Woke Warfighters, which accuses the Biden administration of weakening military strength by promoting critical race theory, supporting sex-reassignment procedures, and promoting LGBTQ+ individuality. In a recent survey, almost half of Republicans agreed with the statement that “‘woke practices undermining military effectiveness” was one of the reasons for their decreased confidence in the U.S. military. And now that Republicans have regained control of the House of Representatives, they are planning to push back hard on these issues by focusing on what Representative Jim Jordan called “getting rid of all of the ‘woke’ in our military.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › NU › Enlistment – Eligibility

Eligibility problems and declining patriotism are crushing readiness - 75% of young people are not eligible and only 9% of those qualified will consider enlistment.

Hannah Pinski, 3-28-2023, "Ernst working to improve military recruitment numbers," Daily Iowan, https://dailyiowan.com/2023/03/28/ernst-working-to-improve-military-recruitment-numbers gac

WASHINGTON — Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, wants to improve military recruitment as the number of people enlisting in the armed forces has dropped dramatically in the past 10 years. The U.S. army fell short of about 15,000 soldiers to meet its 60,000 goal for recruiting target in 2022, and Ernst said factors such as a smaller pool of qualified applicants and lack of patriotism among the younger generation are factors contributing to the dramatic shortfall. According to the U.S. Army’s website, requirement categories include age, medical, moral, and physical status, and the test score on the Army’s Placement Exam. Most able-bodied men were able to join the military during the 1960s and 70s. But in recent years, 75 percent of 18 – 22-year-old men aren’t qualified to join the armed forces and are stopped by factors like obesity and having a criminal record. Ernst said only about 23 percent of 18 – 24-year-olds will pass all the requirements, which is not easy. “Some of them also will have criminal histories that disqualify them from service,” Ernst said. “So, understanding that that pool is getting much smaller, how do we motivate people and of the 23% that do qualify for military service.” The scramble isn’t just to find qualified people who can enlist — it’s also finding people who actually want to join. NBC News previously reported that only 9 percent of young Americans who meet the qualifications have an interest in enlisting in 2022, which was the lowest number in 2017. According to the survey, 57 percent of young Americans also reported concerns about having emotional or psychological problems after they serve. Ernst served as a logistic officer and earned the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Iowa National Guard. She said wants to increase patriotism and help young Americans understand that the U.S. has opportunities that other countries don’t have. In 1998, 70 percent of Americans said they cared about patriotism, but under 40 percent of Americans felt like patriotism was important in 2022, according to a poll done by the Wall Street Journal and NORC at the University of Chicago.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › NU › Enlistment – Abortion

Readiness way down now and abortion policy will make it even worse.

Michael Bennet, 3-28-2023, "Opinion: The cruel twist that harms women in the military," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/28/opinions/military-service-women-abortion-access-bennet/index.html Editor’s Note: Michael Bennet, a Democrat, is the senior US senator from Colorado. The views expressed in this commentary are his own. View more opinion on CNN. Gac

Since the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, 18 states have rushed to ban or limit abortion access. Ten have no exceptions, even for rape or incest. Meanwhile, radical state legislators have introduced bills restricting the freedom of women to travel from one state to another for reproductive care. And several states – from Iowa to Nebraska – have only begun to chip away at a woman’s right to choose. Texas, home to Fort Hood – one of the largest military bases in the US, has posted $10,000 bounties for residents who successfully sue anyone who has helped in accessing or performing an abortion after it is no longer legal. Alabama, home to six military bases, has threatened doctors and nurses with up to 99 years in jail for performing an abortion. The state’s attorney general even suggested using a chemical endangerment law – which is designed to protect kids from meth – to prosecute women for ending their pregnancies with a medication abortion pill. Anti-abortion demonstrators and abortion rights supporters protest outside the U.S. Supreme Court the day after the United States Supreme Court ruled in the Dobbs v Women's Health Organization abortion case, overturning the landmark Roe v Wade abortion decision, in Washington, U.S., June 25, 2022. America's chaotic new reality over abortion takes shape In Florida, which is home to 21 military bases, Gov. Ron DeSantis just endorsed a six-week abortion ban. He may be unaware – or may not even care – that a third of women don’t even know they’re pregnant until around six weeks. These cruel policies are part of an escalating war on access to reproductive care, and we cannot allow our military readiness to become collateral damage. After Dobbs, it’s not hard to see why a woman might think twice before enlisting if the Pentagon could station her in a state that bans abortion – even if she is a victim of rape or incest. The former Air Force officer who called me understood immediately how it harms military readiness to force service women to travel far from their base to access care, to say nothing of the cost to their privacy when every single person in their units finds out about it. A recent study from RAND Corporation found that Dobbs could increase attrition, decrease readiness and harm military recruiting. And that’s after the Pentagon just had its worst recruiting year since the Vietnam War ended.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › NU › Enlistment – General

Readiness has already reached an irreversible breaking point because of eligibility problems and lack of interest.

David Barno, 3-10-2023, "Addressing the U.S. Military Recruiting Crisis," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/addressing-the-u-s-military-recruiting-crisis/ gac

The all-volunteer force may finally have reached its breaking point. During the first years of the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many military experts worried that the constant deployments would “break” the force since they expected that fewer young Americans would volunteer to serve in a wartime military. Thankfully, that didn’t happen. Yet a perilous recruiting crisis began just after the United States fully withdrew from Afghanistan last summer, and it shows no sign of abating anytime soon. As a result, the U.S. military is shrinking, not because of any strategic choices, but simply because there aren’t enough qualified volunteers — and that may have enormous implications for the U.S. strategic position in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world. How bad is the recruiting crisis? During the last fiscal year, the Army missed its recruiting goal by 15,000 active-duty soldiers, or 25 percent of its target. This shortfall forced the Army to cut its planned active-duty end strength from 476,000 to 466,000. And the current fiscal year is likely to be even worse. Army officials project that active end strength could shrink by as much as 20,000 soldiers by September, down to 445,000. That means that the nation’s primary land force could plummet by as much as 7 percent in only two years — at a time when its missions are increasing in Europe and even in the Pacific, where the Army provides many of the critical wartime theater enablers without which the other services cannot function. The other services barely met their active-duty recruiting goals last year, but it will be harder for them to do so in 2023. They all accelerated their delayed entry applicants at the end of the last fiscal year, leaving them with a far shallower pool to draw from this year. The Marine Corps may be able to compensate for this problem because its outstanding retention rates last year enabled it to lower its recruiting goal. It may be able to do so again this year. But the Navy and the Air Force face greater recruiting headwinds. Both started with deeper holes in their pool of delayed entry applicants, offered extensive financial bonuses, and took a wide range of other one-time measures — such as the Navy increasing the maximum enlistment age from 39 to 41. Furthermore, Navy and Air Force recruiters took advantage of the release of Top Gun: Maverick, which, like its 1986 predecessor, was the highest-grossing film of the year. A recent analysis showed that the original Top Gun boosted recruiting by 8 percent. To the extent that the sequel helped boost Navy and Air Force enlistments in 2022, their recruiting holes could be even deeper in 2023. Indeed, the Air Force just announced that will likely fail to meet its recruiting goals across all three of its components. Why is this happening now? Part of it, no doubt, is that the end of the war in Afghanistan makes military service seem less compelling. For the first time in almost 20 years, American troops are no longer fighting abroad to keep insurgents and terrorists at bay. Unemployment is low, which always makes it harder to recruit — and the tight labor market has also forced many companies to increase wages and offer compelling incentives to attract the best talent. But two other sets of factors are interacting in complex ways that make it almost impossible to determine which are having the greatest effect. First, the number of young people who are eligible to serve in the military dropped precipitously last year — from an already low figure of 29 percent to a shocking 23 percent — largely due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Levels of depression, anxiety, and other mental health conditions exploded among young Americans (and many not-so-young Americans), who faced sometimes extreme levels of social isolation. School closures and remote instruction have caused test scores to decline dramatically throughout the country (and the world), and scores on the ASVAB, the military’s standardized test for potential recruits, declined by as much as 9 percent. Shuttered schools also made it extremely difficult for recruiters to meet with young people and develop the personal relationships that are so essential for their jobs. And youth obesity rates — which have long been one of the biggest reasons for military ineligibility — increased from 19 percent to 22 percent during the pandemic. Few of these statistics will rebound quickly — and some may never recover to their pre-pandemic levels. Though improving eligibility is extremely important, as we discuss below, it alone cannot solve the recruiting crisis. The second, and much more challenging, factor involves military propensity — the number of young people who are interested in serving in the military. Only 13 percent of young Americans said they would consider military service before the pandemic, and that already paltry figure shrank to just 9 percent last year. That number is simply not high enough to ensure the stable flow of recruits upon which the all-volunteer force relies. Two sets of survey data help explain why propensity may be declining. First, the number of Americans expressing confidence in the U.S. military has plummeted in the past few years. To be clear, American confidence in almost all major U.S. institutions has declined, with data from Gallup showing that it reached an all-time average low of just 27 percent in 2022. Compared to that dismal statistic, the fact that 64 percent of survey respondents expressed confidence in the military last year is a strong endorsement indeed. Yet that figure was 72 percent in 2020 and 69 percent in 2021 — marking an 8 percentage point drop in only two years. More disturbingly, the Reagan National Defense Survey found even steeper declines, with confidence in the U.S. military dropping from 70 percent in 2018 to just 45 percent in 2021 (before rebounding slightly to 48 percent in 2022). Second, there are some early indications that fewer people in and around the military are willing to recommend military service to young people. In 2019, almost 75 percent of military families said they would recommend military service to someone they care about. Yet that figure dropped to just under 63 percent in 2021, another sharp decline in just two years. Since 80 percent of the young people who join the military today have a family member in the military — and 25–30 percent have a parent in the military — it may well be that more military families are steering their children away from uniformed service toward civilian careers.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › ! – Yes Russia/ China Threat

Yes Russia and China are a threat—nuclear provocations and invasions

Mordowanec 22

Nick, staff writer. “Putin Is 'Acute' Nuclear Threat to U.S. Homeland: Pentagon.” Newsweek. 10/27/2022. LJS

Vladimir Putin and Russia are viewed by the Pentagon as an "acute" threat based on the Ukrainian invasion and escalated threats of nuclear warfare. The Department of Defense (DoD) used the term "acute" 10 times in total, with most of those related to discussions of Russia, in Thursday's publication of the 80-page, congressionally mandated 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) report regarding the United States' national security policies. While the People's Republic of China (PRC) is acknowledged as posing a "pacing challenge" to the U.S., Russia's actions are viewed as more urgent. "Contemptuous of its neighbors' independence, Russia's government seeks to use force to impose border changes and to reimpose an imperial sphere of influence," the report said. "Its extensive track record of territorial aggression includes the escalation of its brutal, unprovoked war against Ukraine." "Russia presents the most acute example of [potentially escalating to nuclear employment] given its significantly larger stockpile of regional nuclear systems and the possibility it would use these forces to try to win a war on its periphery or avoid defeat if it was in danger of losing a conventional war," the report added. President Joe Biden recently warned Russia that provocations regarding the use of nuclear weapons are a "serious mistake." Aside from nuclear threats, the U.S. is wary of Russia's long-range cruise missiles, cyber and information operations, chemical and biological weapons, underwater warfare and "gray zone" campaigns targeted against democracies. A multitude of challenges exist now and will for the next two decades, the Pentagon said, including "strategic challenges stemming from complex interactions between a rapidly changing global balance of military capabilities" in addition to emerging technologies and new threats to the U.S. due to "competitor doctrines." "These rapidly evolving features of the security environment threaten to erode the United States' ability to deter aggression and to help maintain favorable balances of power in critical regions," the Pentagon said in a statement. "The PRC presents the most consequential and systemic challenge, while Russia poses acute threats—both to vital U.S. national interests abroad and to the homeland."

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › ! – Brink

Heg is on the brink—Sino-Russo alliance

Deng, Simmons, Gershkovich, and Maudlin 22

Chao, China correspondent for The Wall Street Journal in Taipei; Ann M., Wall Street Journal's Moscow Bureau Chief; Evan, Moscow correspondent for The Wall Street Journal; William, reporter. “Putin, Xi Aim Russia-China Partnership Against U.S.” Wall Street Journal. 2/4/2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-vladimir-putin-meets-with-chinese-leader-xi-jinping-in-beijing-11643966743?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_nn_20220209&instance_id=52576&nl=the-morning&regi_id=90552453&segment_id=82087&te=1&user_id=70a93a524e51e56bd1dfa547ec0b4034 //LJS

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping vaulted their growing partnership into a forward-leaning pact avowedly aimed at the U.S., opposing America’s global network of alliances and seeking to nudge it aside as the sole superpower. With Friday’s opening of the Beijing Winter Olympics and Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine as a backdrop, the two leaders conferred at a summit, struck deals on oil and gas and then pledged in a broad-ranging joint statement to provide new leadership at a time, it said, that power is shifting in the world. Pointedly, in a break with the indirect pronouncements of past summits, their statement criticized the U.S. by name six times, taking issue with its alliances with Australia and others in Asia, and its arms-control and other policies. It also opposed any expansion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—a central demand from Russia in its standoff with the West over Ukraine. The opposition to NATO marked China’s most explicit support to date of Russia in the confrontation and, international-affairs specialists said, showed Beijing’s ambition to have a say in European security and its closest alignment with Russia since the early years of the Communist bloc’s Cold War with the West. “The world should get ready for a further significant deepening of the China-Russia security and economic relationship,” said Kevin Rudd, president of the Asia Society, a New York-based think tank, and former prime Minister of Australia. Mr. Rudd said not since the bitter Communist bloc split between the Soviet Union and China in the late 1950s has Beijing taken such a definitive position backing Russia on European security. The Beijing-Moscow entente falls short of the full-fledged treaty alliances that the U.S. enjoys with Europe, Japan, Australia and others and that the Biden administration says undergirds U.S. strength and influence around the world. Closer ties with Moscow present particular pitfalls for Beijing, with China being a top trading nation still dependent on the West for critical technologies. The timing of Friday’s meeting between Messrs. Xi and Putin at a time of high tension with the West and their statement’s pointed criticisms of the U.S. mark a shift in their challenge to Washington as it tries to maintain its global pre-eminence and shore up a Western-led economic and political world order. “The growing breadth and depth of Sino-Russian cooperation is rooted in sheer pragmatism, not in ideology,” said Daniel Russel, a former Obama administration official handling Asia issues. “Russia and China are making common cause to better defend their respective interests and their authoritarian systems from Western pressure.” China-Russia collaboration could frustrate U.S. efforts to isolate Moscow over its military intimidation of Ukraine, which Moscow wants to pry into its sphere of influence and away from its increasingly Western orientation. The U.S. has threatened to impose sanctions on Russian banks, state companies and imports such as microelectronics in the event Russia attacks Ukraine, and China could fill many of the gaps by bulking up trade, investment and finance. Daniel Kritenbrink, the assistant U.S. secretary of state for the Asia-Pacific region, said Beijing should have used the summit to “encourage Russia to pursue diplomacy and de-escalation in Ukraine. That is what the world expects from responsible powers.” Instead, Mr. Kritenbrink told reporters, “If Russia further invades Ukraine and China looks the other way, it suggests that China is willing to tolerate or tacitly support Russia’s efforts to coerce Ukraine, even when they embarrass Beijing, harm European security and risk global peace and economic stability.” The China-Russia joint statement looks more broadly, talking of knitting together signature economic initiatives—Mr. Xi’s Belt and Road infrastructure drive and Mr. Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union—to forge stronger links across much of the Eurasian continent and with developing nations. The two sides said they would cooperate on Arctic sea passages for shipping and on international technological standards—areas where the U.S. has been wary of China’s ambitions. Other areas of economic cooperation include nuclear energy, with Russia’s state energy corporation Rosatom launching construction of power plants in China last year. The two countries’ leading aviation companies, China’s Comac and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation, are also collaborating on an airliner to challenge the Airbus and Boeing. Russia and China have staged joint military exercises, including one last summer that featured coordinated command centers. Moscow has been increasingly willing to transfer military technology it once guarded from Beijing, defense analysts said. Added to that is Friday’s opposition to the U.S. alliances, with Beijing backing Russia on NATO and Moscow taking China’s side against the Biden administration’s strategy to rally partners in the Indo-Pacific and its new Australia-U.K.-U.S., or AUKUS, defense pact. That raises the possibility of eventual cooperation by Russia and China across two hemispheres. “Russia and China stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions,” the statement said. It later added: Both “sides believe that certain states, military and political alliances and coalitions seek to obtain, directly or indirectly, unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of others.” During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union contested for influence across much of the developing world, with Moscow being joined by Beijing for much of the 1950s. Differences over ideology, geopolitics and leadership of the Communist world sundered those ties; Soviet and Chinese forces engaged in bloody border skirmishes. Relations warmed as both Moscow and Beijing sought to improve ties with the West and draw in investment. China’s need for energy to fuel its fast-growing economy, Russia’s search for markets outside the West and a shared sense by Messrs. Putin and Xi that the U.S. aimed to hem in their global ambitions have increasingly underpinned ties. On a 2019 trip to Moscow, Mr. Xi hailed the countries’ deepening their economic cooperation as a “key pillar of our relations.” That year the two countries opened the $55 billion Power of Siberia pipeline delivering Russian natural gas to China. Moscow is pushing a second pipeline that would ship gas through Mongolia. On the back of that energy alliance, said Yana Leksyutina, a professor at St. Petersburg State University, trade between the two countries has surged. China is Russia’s largest trading partner, and last year trade between the two countries hit a record $147 billion. On Friday, as Messrs. Putin and Xi met, the two countries unveiled new oil and gas deals valued at an estimated $117.5 billion. Russia’s largest oil producer, Rosneft, also said it had a new oil agreement to supply 100 million tons of crude via Kazakhstan to Chinese state energy major CNPC over the next 10 years, while Russian gas giant Gazprom agreed to supply CNPC 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year. Those Gazprom shipments are due to start through a new pipeline in two to three years. The tightening of ties with Moscow, as evidenced in Friday’s statement, represents a fundamental shift in China’s foreign policy, which for four decades has centered on building its relationship with the U.S. Then-President Donald Trump’s trade war against Beijing helped wear away at the foundation of relations. With tensions now escalating in areas from human rights to Beijing’s sovereignty claims, the narrative that Washington is bent on keeping China down has taken hold both in official circles and among the general Chinese public. Nowadays, the guideline set by Mr. Xi early in his reign—that “we have a thousand reasons to get the China-U.S. relationship right, and not one reason to spoil it”—has been replaced with a more self-assertive and confrontational approach. Mr. Xi’s government has hit back on every measure Washington has taken against China, whether related to China’s crackdown on civil liberties in Hong Kong or Beijing’s treatment of Uyghur minorities in the western Xinjiang region. In private meetings with American scholars and business executives, Chinese diplomats and other officials no longer describe the Sino-U.S. ties as the most important bilateral relationship for Beijing, as they used to, but as one of its key relationships. Friday’s joint statement said friendship between Russia and China “has no limits. There are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › ! – Heg S War

Heg solves great power war.

Twinning 17 (Daniel, Director at the German Marshall Fund of the United States,” Abandoning the Liberal International Order for a Spheres-of-Influence World is a Trap for America and its Allies”, Published March 21, 2017, Accessed July 18, 2018, Online, Medium)//SMSUSVA

The liberal world order is under assault. Polls suggest an American ambivalence about upholding the rules-based global system. Populists are besieging governing elites in the West while Russia works strategically to destabilize European and American governments through propaganda and proxies. A rising China wants to create a global system that is not U.S.-centric, one in which smaller powers defer to bigger ones and norms of democracy and rule of law do not prevail. Meanwhile, the U.S. alliance system looks adrift while competitors in China and Russia appear to be on the march. If it holds, this trend could produce a spheres-of-influence world — which many, including the current presidents of the United States, China, and Russia, find intuitively attractive. But were such an order to replace one based on global integration and American leadership in the geopolitical cockpits of Europe and Asia, it would only engender insecurity and conflict. In a spheres-of-influence world, great powers order their regions. The United States would go back to a “Monroe Doctrine” version of grand strategy; Russia would dominate the former Soviet space; China would govern East Asia, and India South Asia. The problem with this kind of order, however, is several-fold. Too many spheres overlap in ways that would generate conflict rather than clean lines of responsibility. Japan would oppose Chinese suzerainty in East Asia, including by developing nuclear weapons; India and China would compete vigorously in Southeast Asia; Russia and China would contest the resources and loyalties of Central Asia; Europe and Russia would clash over primacy of Central and Eastern Europe. The Middle East would be an even more likely arena for hot war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey would contest regions also claimed by Russia, Europe, and possibly China. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. A spheres of influence world would also sharpen great power competition outside of each region. Regional hegemony is a springboard for global contestation. China would be more likely to challenge the United States out-of-area if it had subdued strategic competition in its own region. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. (The fact that Russian troops marched through Paris during the Napoleonic Wars demonstrates that the limits of Russian power need not be confined to the former Warsaw Pact). American leaders have long understood that a “Fortress America” approach is a source of national insecurity. Franklin Roosevelt made this case in a series of “fireside chats” in the run-up to America’s participation in World War II — even before the advent of the far more sophisticated power-projection technologies that exist today. Roosevelt and his generals well understood that the United States could not be safe if hostile powers controlled Europe and Asia, despite the wide oceans separating North America from both theaters. A spheres-of-influence world would also crack up the integrated global economy that underlies the miracle in human welfare that has lifted billions out of poverty in past decades. It would replicate the exclusive economic blocs of the 1930s, including an East Asia “co-prosperity sphere,” seeding conflict and undercutting prosperity. A real-world and real-time example of what happens when American power retreats in an effort to encourage regional powers to solve their own problems is the mess in Syria. It has produced the greatest refugee crisis since 1945 — a stain on the consciousness of human civilization — and has led many to conclude that the Middle Eastern order of states dating to the end of World War 1 is collapsing. President Obama pursued an express policy of retracting American military power from the Middle East, including withdrawing all troops from Iraq and refusing to intervene militarily when President Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, despite a red-line injunction from the United States not to do so. Obama and his White House political advisors believed that American withdrawal from the Arab Middle East (if not from the ironclad U.S. commitment to Israel) would lead a new balance of power to form, one policed by regional powers rather than by America. This flawed, amoral, and un-strategic approach has led to a series of hot wars — in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — the collapse of Arab allies’ confidence in the United States as an ally, as well as an intensified cold war with Iran. Despite the international agreement freezing Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism and hostile insurgencies targeting American allies across its region actually intensified during this period. A spheres-of-influence world leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence This experience underlines a core problem with a spheres-of-influence world. It leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence. It emboldens American adversaries and leads American allies to take self-help measures that themselves may undercut American security interests. A spheres-of-influence world would also produce contestation of the open global commons that are the basis for the unprecedented prosperity produced by the liberal international economic order. Should the Indian and Pacific Oceans, or the Arctic and Mediterranean Seas, become arenas of great-power conflict (like the South China Sea already has thanks to China’s militarization and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over it) as leading states seek to incorporate them into their privileged zones of control, economic globalization would collapse, harming the economies of every major power. The United States, because of its sheer power and resource base as well as its relative geographical isolation, might do OK in a spheres-of-influence world. Most of America’s friends and allies would not. Their weakening and insecurity would in turn render the United States weaker and more insecure — since U.S. allies are force-multipliers for American hard and soft power, and since norms like freedom of the global commons are in fact underwritten by that power. More broadly, such a transition would also likely lead to the kind of hot wars that reorder the international balance of power, including by incentivizing aggressive states to push out and assert regional dominion, knowing that America does not have the will or interest to oppose them. The fact that U.S. competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran — all of whom want to weaken the American-led world order — would welcome a spheres-of-influence world is another reason for Americans to oppose it. It would also be ironic if the United States were to back away from its historic commitment to shaping a world that is an idealized vision of America itself — one ruled by laws, norms, institutions, markets, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › ! – Heg S Terror

US withdrawal wrecks counterterrorism efforts and boosts the anti-American sentiment that drives attacks to begin with.

Brands 15 – (Hal Brands is on the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. During 2015-16, he is also serving as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Yale University. “THE LIMITS OF OFFSHORE BALANCING,” September 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA621792, p.28-34)//sy

Exaggerated Security Benefits: Terrorism. The prospect of financial savings, of course, is but one aspect of offshore balancing’s appeal. Its proponents also claim that the strategy will yield important security benefits by reducing the severity of critical threats like international terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and better positioning the United States to deal with those issues. If these claims were true, they would provide powerful vindication for offshore balancing and its “less can be more” ethos. In reality, however, the advantages of retrenchment are frequently inflated when it comes to these matters, while substantial dangers and drawbacks are often obscured or ignored. This is certainly true with respect to terrorism. In fairness, offshore balancers certainly have a point in arguing that America’s onshore presence in the Gulf and the larger Middle East has long served as a key source of incitement to jihadist attacks. It was U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1982-84 that first brought America into the crosshairs of suicide terrorism by provoking Hezbollah’s deadly bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. In the Gulf specifically, the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during and after the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 was indeed a primary motivator of al-Qaeda’s escalating campaign of terrorism against American targets, and the later invasion and occupation of Iraq breathed new life into a jihadist movement that had been badly damaged in the wake of 9/11. The Iraq War, National Intelligence Council Chairman Robert Hutchings commented in 2005, acted as “a magnet for international terrorist activity” and a key recruiting device for alQaeda.62 Finally, and at a broader level of analysis, scholarly research indicates that resentment of foreign troop deployments and military occupations have traditionally been leading causes of suicide terrorism.63 There is thus little doubt that certain U.S. policies have fanned the flames of terror, as offshore balancers allege. More problematic, however, is the assertion that their preferred strategy would significantly reduce the threat. One key reason for skepticism is that the military withdrawal that most offshore balancers envision is not the withdrawal that jihadist groups have demanded as the price of peace. When al-Qaeda and other groups call for a U.S. military withdrawal from the Muslim world, they are calling for the removal not simply of large-scale ground forces and other sizable units (the assets that most offshore balancers focus on in advocating retrenchment). Rather, they are calling for the removal of all forms of American military power and influence, including trainers and advisers, drones, security assistance and weapons sales, and other tools that would presumably continue to be crucial to counterterrorism, even in an offshore balancing context. “Even U.S. intelligence liaison, which involves sharing information, training, and other forms of exchange, is . . . a sensitive issue” for al-Qaeda and other jihadists, one expert writes.64 This leaves advocates of retrenchment stuck with an awkward dilemma. Undertaking the truly comprehensive military withdrawal that al-Qaeda and other extremist groups demand would utterly [devastate] cripple America’s approach to counterterrorism as well as its broader ability to support friendly regimes in the region. Undertaking a lesser withdrawal, by contrast, might still assuage some anti-U.S. resentment, but it would presumably not mollify jihadist grievances to the extent that offshore balancers believe. This first reason for skepticism is reinforced by a second, which is that even though the deployment of American troops on Muslim lands has historically been a cause of anti-U.S. extremism, it has never been the sole cause. That extremism also originated from grievances fueled by U.S. policy toward Iraq in the 1990s, long-standing American support for dictatorial Arab regimes, the extensive and intimate U.S. relationship with Israel, and the perceived invasion of Muslim societies by Western cultural and economic influences. Many of these grievances were featured in early al-Qaeda pronouncements, including bin Laden’s famous 1998 fatwa declaring that “the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies . . . is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it.”65 Many of the same issues continue to figure prominently today. As al-Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn declared in 2010, removal of U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf and beyond was only one of a series of requirements that Washington must meet in order to earn a respite from jihadist attacks: First, you must pull every last one of your soldiers, spies, security advisors, trainers, attaches, contractors, robots, drones, and all other American personnel, ships, and aircraft out of every Muslim land from Afghanistan to Zanzibar. Second, you must end all support—both moral and material—to Israel and bar your citizens from traveling to Occupied Palestine or settling there, and you must impose a blanket ban on American trade with the Zionist regime and investment in it. Third, you must stop all support and aid—be it military, political, or economic, or otherwise—to the hated regimes of the Muslim world. This includes the socalled “development aid” . . . Fourth, you must cease all interference in the religion, society, politics, economy, and government of the Islamic world. Fifth, you must also put an end to all forms of American and American-sponsored interference in the educational curricula and information media of the Muslim world. And sixth, you must free all Muslim captives from your prisons, detention facilities, and concentration camps, regardless of whether they have been recipients of what you call a ‘fair’ trial or not. “Your refusal to release our prisoners or your failure to meet any of our other legitimate demands,” the pronouncement concluded, “will mean the continuation of our just struggle against your tyranny.” As this statement indicates, anti-American terrorism has complex and multi-faceted causes, and foreswearing forward military presence in the Middle East would satisfy just one of a wide range of grievances.66 By truly adopting offshore balancing, in fact, Washington would merely inflame some of those grievances all the more. A strategy that ruled out stationing American forces in the region would unavoidably make the United States more dependent on its authoritarian Arab allies—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf sheikdoms—as providers of security and stability. During the 1970s, for instance, America poured arms into the Persian Gulf autocracies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran, at a time when it had only a skeletal military presence of its own in the area.67 Retrenchment today would similarly imply increased American military sales, intelligence cooperation, and other forms of support for local allies, and a general accentuation of the “friendly dictators” approach that has so incensed Muslim radicals. By the same token, even though many advocates of offshore balancing argue that Washington should sharply curtail its security ties to Israel, commentators like Marc Lynch and Colin Kahl have correctly observed that retrenchment would undoubtedly heighten American reliance on that country as the strongest, most pro-U.S. partner in an endemically unstable region. “While some advocates of offshore balancing are highly critical of America’s special relationship with Israel,” they write, “it is worth noting that, in practice, the approach would have to rely on and work indirectly through allies such as Israel to help uphold a regional balance of power favorable to U.S. interests.”68 In these respects, offshore balancing would actually mean redoubling certain U.S. policies that have long provoked terrorist attacks. Offshore balancing has troubling implications for counterterrorism in other respects, too. Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda prosper amid instability and security vacuums; such instability and vacuums, in turn, unwittingly can be encouraged by the premature withdrawal of U.S. military power from troubled areas. One illustration of this phenomenon would be the U.S. drawdown in Iraq in 2011, which demonstrated that the removal of American forces from a still unstable context could undercut previous counterterrorism gains and facilitate the insecurity in which jihadist organizations thrive. Although that move was generally consistent with offshore balancers’ desire for reduced American military exposure in the Gulf, it ended up facilitating the renewed destabilization of large swaths of Iraq and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) as a potent force in that area. “Had a residual U.S. force stayed in Iraq after 2011,” one senior adviser to the U.S. military in Iraq has written: the United States would have had far greater insight into the growing threat posed by ISIS [the Islamic States in Iraq and Syria] and could have helped the Iraqis stop the group from taking so much territory. Instead, ISIS’ march across northern Iraq took Washington almost completely by surprise.69 Withdrawal, in other words, does not always lead to a reduced terrorist threat—its effects can sometimes cut in the opposite direction. Finally, offshore balancing would simultaneously make it more difficult to respond effectively to largescale terrorism by corroding the infrastructure and partnerships that America has long employed to do so. As Robert Art observes, the conduct of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan after 9/11 depended extensively on just those overseas bases and units that would likely be reduced or eliminated as Washington slashed its forward presence. (Since 2014, U.S. military operations against the IS have utilized many of these same assets.) In an offshore balancing scenario, by contrast, America “would have to start from scratch to build alliances and gain access to bases, a difficult and problematic process” that would likely lengthen the timeline and reduce the impact of U.S. response. In the same vein, U.S. forward deployments and security commitments have long fostered the relationships and leverage that American officials can use to obtain greater cooperation in the “quieter phase of fighting terrorism”—the diplomatic collaboration, intelligence liaison, and other largely out-ofsight measures that are crucial to defeating jihadist organizations.70 Were America significantly to retract its security posture, one could reasonably surmise that the relationships and leverage would erode as well. Writing in 2010, Daniel Byman observed that largescale military retrenchment “would likely have mixed results on the threat of terrorism, some of which are difficult to predict with certainty and a few of which could prove exceptionally dangerous.”71 This appraisal still seems appropriate today. Offshore balancing offers no panaceas when it comes to counterterrorism. Its advantages are not nearly as clear-cut as one might think, and significant perils and liabilities lurk just beneath the surface. As will be seen, that pattern is even more pronounced when it comes to another security issue that offshore balancers emphasize: nuclear proliferation.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › ! – Heg S Deterrence – China/ Russia

Heg checks Russian and Chinese revisionism through military deterrence

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-20-20; " Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

What a difference two decades make. In the early years of this century, the world appeared to be moving toward a single, seamless order under U.S. leadership. Today the world is fragmenting, and authoritarian challengers, led by China and Russia, are chipping away at American influence in East Asia, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush administration envisioned the end of great-power rivalries. In 2020, the question is how great powers can navigate their rivalries without stumbling into war. Writing in Foreign Affairs (“The New Spheres of Influence,” March/April 2020), Graham Allison offers a road map for this new environment: the United States should accept the return of “spheres of influence” and effectively let China and Russia dominate swaths of their respective geopolitical neighborhoods. Doing so, Allison contends, is actually in keeping with the United States’ best diplomatic traditions, considering that Washington tolerated a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe during the Cold War. Reviving that tradition is necessary, simply because the United States no longer has the military and economic dominance to deny China and Russia their geopolitical due. And it is desirable, because mutually accepted spheres of influence can promote stability and peace in a more rivalrous world. Allison’s argument is alluring but wrong. In truth, the United States has resisted the creation of rival spheres of influence for most of its history, even as it has worked assiduously to build its own. Ceding ground to China and Russia today would be not a recipe for stability but a blueprint for coercion and conflict, and it would weaken the United States’ geopolitical hand vis-à-vis its rivals. Nor is a return to spheres of influence foreordained—Washington still has the power to prevent Beijing and Moscow from dominating their regions, so long as it rejects Allison’s advice to cut loose its vulnerable frontline allies. A tougher, more competitive world is unavoidable. A far more dangerous world, divided into competing superpower fiefdoms, is not. AN AMERICAN TRADITION Spheres of influence have been common throughout history, but Americans have never been quite comfortable with them. In fact, much of U.S. foreign policy dating back to independence has consisted of efforts to prevent rival powers from establishing such domains. In the nineteenth century, U.S. leaders rejected the idea that any European power should have a sphere of influence in North America or the Western Hemisphere at large. They maneuvered—often quite ruthlessly—to evict European powers from these areas. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States took this regional policy global. The so-called Open Door policy aimed to dissuade foreign powers from carving up China, and later all of East Asia, into exclusive spheres. Washington joined World War I in part to prevent Germany from becoming the dominant European power. A generation later, the United States fought to deny Japan a sphere of influence in the Pacific and prevent Hitler from establishing primacy over the entire Old World. During and after World War II, Washington also engaged in quieter diplomatic and economic efforts to accelerate the dissolution of the British Empire. Even during the Cold War, Americans never fully accepted Soviet control over eastern Europe. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to roll back the Iron Curtain through ideological warfare and covert action; later administrations expanded trade and diplomatic ties with Warsaw Pact states as a subtler way of undermining Kremlin control. The Reagan administration overtly and covertly supported political movements that were challenging the Kremlin’s authority from within. And when Washington had a chance to peacefully destroy the Soviet sphere of influence after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it did, supporting German unification and the expansion of NATO. Opposition to spheres of influence, in other words, is a part of U.S. diplomatic DNA. The reason for this, Charles Edel and I argued in 2018, is that spheres of influence clash with fundamental tenets of U.S. foreign policy. Among them is the United States’ approach to security, which holds that safeguarding the country’s vital interests and physical well-being requires preventing rival powers from establishing a foothold in the Western Hemisphere or dominating strategically important regions overseas. Likewise, the United States’ emphasis on promoting liberty and free trade translates to a concern that spheres of influence—particularly those dominated by authoritarian powers—would impede the spread of U.S. values and allow hostile powers to block American trade and investment. Finally, spheres of influence do not mesh well with American exceptionalism—the notion that the United States should transcend the old, corrupt ways of balance-of-power diplomacy and establish a more humane, democratic system of international relations. Of course, that intellectual tradition did not stop the United States from building its own sphere of influence in Latin America from the early nineteenth century onward, nor did it prevent it from drawing large chunks of Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East into a global sphere of influence after World War II. Yet the same tradition has led the United States to run its sphere of influence far more progressively than past great powers, which is why far more countries have sought to join that sphere than to leave it. And since hypocrisy is another venerable tradition in global affairs, it is not surprising that Americans would establish their own, relatively enlightened sphere of influence while denying the legitimacy of everyone else’s. That endeavor reached its zenith in the post–Cold War era, when the collapse of the Soviet bloc made it possible to envision a world in which Washington’s sphere of influence—also known as the liberal international order—was the only game in town. The United States maintained a world-beating military that could intervene around the globe; preserved and expanded a global alliance structure as a check on aggression; and sought to integrate potential challengers, namely Beijing and Moscow, into a U.S.-led system. It was a remarkably ambitious project, as Allison rightly notes, but it was the culmination of, rather than a departure from, a diplomatic tradition reaching back two centuries.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › ! – Heg S Deterrence – China/ Russia

Expansion of US hegemonic influence in Eastern Europe is vital to deter China and Russia – perception is key.

Rothman 22 – has a M.A. in International Relations from the University of Seton Hall, 1/24/22 (Noah, “What the Right Gets Wrong about Ukraine, Russia, and American Hegemony”, Commentary, https://www.commentary.org/noah-rothman/what-the-right-gets-wrong-about-ukraine-russia-and-american-hegemony/, accessed 6/26/22)//jd

With Russia bearing down on Ukraine and Western nations demonstrating more willingness to deter Moscow from starting another shooting war on the European continent, some on the American right are wondering why the West is invested in Ukrainian security at all. Indeed, they don’t see America’s commitment to deterring Russian aggression as deterrence. It is, to them, America sleepwalking into a disastrous conflict that is none of our business. They have gotten the stakes of this standoff and America’s interests precisely wrong. One of the primary sources of confusion among those on the right who favor a more introverted American foreign policy is that they have adopted Moscow’s confused rationale for its own aggression. Of this impulse, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat’s analysis is instructive. In his latest column, Douthat lays most of the blame for the current crisis at the Kremlin’s feet, but not all of it. He writes that, in the supposedly bygone era in which the United States was a “hyperpower,” America backed the eastward expansion of NATO that was both provocative and risky. This, he writes, was an aspirational foreign policy, not one that accounted for “the realities of power.” Douthat adds, “the attempt to draw Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit, the partway-open door to Ukrainians who preferred westward-focused alliances, was a foolish overcommitment even when American power was at its height.” This outlook is flawed in two ways. First, it assigns all agency to Washington and robs America’s non-allied partners of sovereignty. Washington didn’t grab Ukraine by the hand and guide it toward integration with the West. Ukrainians themselves have made that desire plain, and they have demonstrated a repeated willingness to fight for it. Ukraine’s present conflict with Moscow arguably began with the “Orange Revolution” of January 2005, xwhich culminated in the ascension of Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency. Almost immediately after that regime change, Ukraine and NATO inaugurated an “intensified dialogue” around a Membership Action Plan (MAP) that would one day result in Ukrainian ascension into NATO. But the conditions NATO attached to ascension were never met and, by 2008, a NATO summit in Bucharest that agreed to Ukraine and Georgia’s ascension only in the distant and indefinite future signaled the end of Ukraine’s progress toward becoming a NATO member. At the same time, the rise of “non-aligned” Viktor Yanukovych to serve as prime minister and, eventually, the president seemed like a concession to the “realities of power” in the region. But that proved a concession that Ukrainians were unwilling to make. A second revolution in 2014 ousted the Yanukovych regime, but the Ukrainians who fought and died fighting their own government in Maidan weren’t carrying NATO flags to the front. They carried the flags of both Ukraine and the European Union because the event that catalyzed that rebellion was the Yanukovych government’s unilateral suspension of a free trade agreement with the EU, not NATO’s enlargement. Westward alignment isn’t something that Ukrainians are ambivalent about. As recently as December, polling indicated that only about one-fifth of Ukrainians support joining a customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. They back integration with the EU and NATO by 58 and 54 percent respectively—a national ambition so central to Ukraine’s identity it is codified in its constitution. Consigning Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence wouldn’t be the natural course of affairs if we only extricated ourselves from Europe’s complexities, and that sentiment won’t go away just because we want it to. That brings us to the second flaw in Douthat’s analysis: Ukraine’s ascension into NATO was and remains a distant prospect. It is Kyiv’s desire to integrate economically and politically with the West that Moscow views as an imminent threat. Russia retails the notion that the present crisis is a response to the West’s heedless expansionism, but there’s no reason to lend credence to that dubious narrative. It’s Ukraine’s independence that so irritates the Kremlin. Douthat proposes an “ideal retreat” from Ukraine which would leave “NATO expansion permanently tabled, with Ukraine subject to inevitable Russian pressure but neither invaded nor annexed, and with our NATO allies shouldering more of the burden of maintaining a security perimeter in Eastern Europe.” He concedes that it would be a struggle to execute an immaculate retrenchment, as our bitter experience in Afghanistan suggests. But it might be the “least-bad” of our available options. This is exactly the concession Russia is demanding from the West. How else could you interpret Moscow’s demands in exchange for ratcheting down tensions? The Kremlin has insisted, in writing, that the United States and the West must commit not just to halting NATO expansion but must remove all troops and weapons from nations that entered the NATO alliance after 1997; namely, the entire former Warsaw Pact. Thus, Russia has effectively asked the West to gift them a sphere of influence they cannot secure militarily, diplomatically, or economically. To do so would abrogate the sovereignty of our partners and allies in Europe, shatter confidence in America across the globe, and represent a profound misreading of the imbalance of forces arrayed against Russian interests in its own backyard. Those who are attracted to Douthat’s argument appear to believe that the West’s only course of action short of war with Russia is retreat. There is, in the estimation of the American Conservative editor Rod Dreher, an “eagerness” among “American elites” to get involved in a real shooting war with Russia. “We have no realistic choice but to cede to at least some of Russia’s demands,” he writes, lest we abandon the geostrategic imperative of containing a revisionist China. Such a theory confuses deterrence with war-making. The dispatching of lethal arms into Ukraine, as well as the deployment of troops, naval assets, and area denial technology, is designed to raise the stakes of conflict to the point that Moscow blinks. That would be the best of all imaginable resolutions to the present conflict, because the refugee crisis, economic disruptions, and war of attrition in Europe that would follow a Russian invasion would be catastrophic. After all, the likelihood that U.S. could avoid becoming entangled in a conflict on NATO’s borders that involves America’s ratified allies is negligible. Nor is deterrence a zero-sum game. Both the Chinese and Taiwanese are watching events in Eastern Europe closely, the latter with a sense of existential dread. In recent weeks, Taiwan has committed to deepening its bilateral ties with post-Soviet states (in particular, Lithuania) including the establishment of a billion-dollar fund designed to offset Beijing’s economic pressure on these and other nations to abandon Taipei. In a 2019 report to Taiwan’s parliament, the country’s National Security Bureau warned that “the Chinese Communist Party is copying the methods used by Russia to annex Crimea against Taiwan.” The Taiwanese would rightly view a Western capitulation to Russian demands that acknowledges the legitimacy of a security architecture that robs Kyiv of its right to freely join foreign military alliances as a precursor to its own abandonment. Douthat is wrong insofar as the “least-bad” resolution to the crisis in Europe would be to defuse it without sacrificing either the post-Cold War order or Westphalian sovereignty. And the only way to secure that outcome amid the crisis Moscow has inaugurated would be to force it to back down—through troop deployments, diplomatic offensives, preventative sanctions, or even the provision of face-saving offramps like the restoration of defunct security agreements. But back down it must. What we cannot do is consign Ukraine to Russian domination. Even if we could, the Ukrainians themselves have proven they would never accept it. That is a challenge, indeed, but it’s a manageable challenge. By contrast, the wages of appeasement would be too costly to bear.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › IL – Readiness K2 Heg

Readiness solves hegemony – key to power projection and operability

Ryan 17 (Maj. Gen. Kurt J. Ryan is the commanding general of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. An Ordnance Corps officer, he holds a bachelor's degree from York College of Pennsylvania, a master's degree in logistics management from the Florida Institute of Technology, and a master's degree in strategic studies from the Army War College. “Power projection readiness: A historical perspective,” US army website, 3/1/17, https://www.army.mil/article/185970/power_projection_readiness_a_historical_perspective)

For close to a decade and a half, U.S. forces deployed on a rotational basis and were not required to exercise critical short-notice unit-level rapid deployment skills. As a result, the Army's ability to project units rapidly with their full complements of authorized equipment has atrophied. The time and location of the nation's next major conflict is unknown, but we do know that we must be ready. To be ready, it is imperative that the total force build the collective skills of power projection and large-scale deployment readiness so that, if called upon, we can provide a viable land force that is prepared to operate across the conflict continuum. As a continental United States-based expeditionary Army, we must train deployment readiness relentlessly, and we must practice these skills at the "speed of war." The Army must leverage every training opportunity, such as deployments to and from combat training centers, rotations of forces in support of combatant commanders' theater security and cooperation plans, and emergency deployment readiness exercises. Bottom line: the Army must build its capabilities and instill a mindset to be ready to rapidly alert, marshal, deploy, and upon arrival at the theater, be ready to fight. Installations are the power projection platforms, and deployment readiness begins in the motor pools. Leaders must build unit capacity to marshal and upload equipment at home station, to move equipment by rail, line haul, or inland barge, or to convoy equipment to any of the nation's 23 strategic seaports. Strategic enabling commands, including the Forces Command, the Army Materiel Command, and the U.S. Transportation Command, must practice fort-to-port and port-to-port tasks to rapidly load seagoing vessels to sail combat power to foreign ports of debarkation. When units arrive, theater enablers, including the Army service component commands, theater sustainment commands, and assistance from allied support agreements, will facilitate deploying units' reception, staging, onward movement, and integration tasks, which are key to building and providing ready-to-fight forces to the joint force commander. Historical vignettes from the Army's own power projection experiences over the past 50 years show many applicable examples of how the Army can effectively campaign as long as it can deploy rapidly. THE VIETNAM WAR The United States managed the considerable feat of transporting 200,000 troops to South Vietnam in the early months of 1965 following the presidential order to deploy a large-scale combat force to Southeast Asia. However, the moves of the first two divisions--the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Infantry Division--were neither synchronized nor efficient. The Army had last deployed a large-scale joint force for the Korean War in the early 1950s; it was out of practice. The initial force move to South Vietnam required 17 special trains, 126 aircraft, 27 cargo vessels, 933 buses, 12 troop ships, and five aircraft carriers to move the two divisions. After this initial, albeit inefficient, success, the nation made changes to significantly improve its power projection readiness. The Army faced long delays in offloading ships in South Vietnam, and the delays were made worse by single ships making multiple port calls. The Army adjusted its deployment processes by sending fully loaded ships of combat configured loads to a single port whenever possible. While only 7 percent of ships en route to South Vietnam were destined for a single port in October 1965, by April 1966 that number had improved to 95 percent. This vastly increased the nation's capability to efficiently project military forces and to amass combat effects upon arrival. The Army was relearning quickly and began institutionalizing deployment processes by investing in training and focusing on critical deployment and redeployment mission-essential tasks. These tasks are now resident in nearly every unit's mission-essential task list. DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM In March 1988, Brig. Gen. John R. Piatak, the U.S. Transportation Command's first director of plans, presciently stated, "In the future, we will have to pay closer attention to our deployment readiness and to industry's ability to handle transportation surges." Just 29 months later, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the president called for the massive deployment of U.S. forces to the Middle East to commence Operation Desert Shield. Deployment lessons learned from combat training center rotations throughout the 1980s helped to shape the Army's response to the massive force deployment requirements of the operation, which included more than 500,000 service members at its height. In August 1990, commercial ports at Jacksonville, Florida; Savannah, Georgia; and Charleston, South Carolina, were selected as the best ports from which to deploy the large volume of equipment needed for the first three Army divisions to defend Saudi Arabia. These divisions were the 101st Airborne Division, the 24th Infantry Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division. Soldiers and equipment simultaneously deployed by strategic air from designated airfields close to each division's home station. The divisions and brigades had rehearsed their deployment tasks prior to their deployment notifications. Senior mission commanders had refined readiness standard operating procedures, practiced installation deployment assistance teams, and conducted emergency deployment readiness exercises. These exercises were often held in conjunction with a movement to a combat training center. Units had been evaluated on deployment mission-essential tasks, and the port authorities were familiar with the units' special outload needs. Deploying units had formed and exercised necessary port support activities, routinely conducted reconnaissance of their designated ports, and occasionally performed tabletop exercises or tactical exercises without troops to the port. The port at Jacksonville enjoyed the requisite size to handle the special requirements of the 101st Airborne Division's unique cargo, which included more than 300 helicopters. Savannah's close proximity to the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, Georgia, provided an adequate rail network connecting bases to the port and promised faster loading and departures. Deployments were executed at the speed of war. ENDURING AND IRAQI FREEDOM Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated the importance of being ready. Deployments began within days after the terrorist attacks. President George W. Bush initially announced the operation as a bombing campaign and deployed special operations forces to support the Afghan Northern Alliance in its successful drive to topple the Taliban government. Operation Iraqi Freedom began with large-scale deployments to Kuwait in 2002 in preparation for operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army in March 2003. The U.S. Army benefited from months of prior planning, several warfighting exercises, and deployment rehearsals that enabled commanders and staffs to learn from prior deployments. The U.S. Central Command's continual rotation of brigade teams to Kuwait throughout the 1990s had helped to keep the Army ready for large-scale deployments. Using brigade combat teams provided a foundation of familiarity and deployment readiness for future operations in the Middle East. THE ARMY'S FUTURE While history provides us with experience and a frame of reference, the benefits end there if we do not build upon the lessons learned. Readiness can only be attained through focused effort, continued action, and a relentless desire to master deployment tasks. The Army may enjoy only a narrow window of opportunity to prepare for the nation's next conflict. The period we are in now will be described as the current generation's interwar years. We do not know when or where the next fight will take place, but as history shows, it will most certainly come, and we must be ready. Repetition is key, and Army leaders should leverage every unit movement as a deployment training opportunity. In 2017, the Army will deploy or redeploy numerous brigade combat teams. Each movement should be viewed as an opportunity to build deployment readiness in the Army's warfighting formations. By repetitively practicing and mastering the skills associated with deployment and global power projection, the Army will ensure it is ready to deploy, fight, and win when it is called.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › IL – Ground Troops K2 Deterrence

US ground troop deployment key to preventing crisis from escalating to war.

Bryan Frederick et all 2020, Bryan, Stephen Watts, Matthew Lane, Abby Doll, Ashley L. Rhoades, and Meagan L. Smith, Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2533.html. Also available in print form. Gac

Crisis Deployments May Prevent Escalation but Do Not Improve Partners’ Leverage If the United States does not forward-deploy its forces in steady-state conditions, or if it does so in numbers insufficient to achieve deterrence, it can attempt to compensate by surging forces forward in the event of an international crisis. The number of such crisis deployments is small enough that we should be careful about generalization, but analysis of the roughly two dozen crises in which the United States did rush forces forward shows a large decline in the incidence of major clashes or war. Deployments of ground and air forces, in particular, were associated with an extremely low incidence of further escalation. As with steady-state deterrence, however, this finding comes with important caveats for military planners. First, geography and infrastructure matter a lot. Because ground forces take a substantial amount of time to transport, the United States was generally able to deploy them where it already had considerable forward posture and infrastructure to handle the logistical requirements. Even with such factors working in the United States’ favor, the ability of crisis deployments to prevent no-notice or short-notice faits accomplis launched by highly capable adversaries is limited. This limitation, in turn, highlights the importance of a second caveat. Crisis deployments appear better at reducing the risk of escalation than they are at improving the defended state’s long-term bargaining leverage. In other words, while crisis deployments can help maintain the status quo between states, they are not necessarily well-suited to altering the long-term strategic dynamics between states. Consequently, crisis deployments seem best suited to maintaining the status quo rather than reversing facts on the ground.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › IL – Ground Troops K2 Deterrence

US forward troop deployment key to deterrence – planes, ships, and mobile forces can’t replace them - and they solve crisis escalation.

Bryan Frederick et all 2020, Bryan, Stephen Watts, Matthew Lane, Abby Doll, Ashley L. Rhoades, and Meagan L. Smith, Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2533.html. Also available in print form. Gac

The statistical research reported here suggests several conclusions about U.S. forward posture and deterrence. First, consistent with prior RAND research, our analysis suggests that at least some types of U.S. forward posture do indeed generally have deterrent effects when deployed near the ally or partner state to be defended. Second, we generally found that the more mobile forces are, the less evidence we have that they deter. This is possibly because mobile forces represent a lesser degree of high-level or long-term U.S. commitment or possibly because measuring their effects is more difficult. Thus, we found the clearest evidence for the deterrent impact of heavy ground forces and little, if any, evidence for the deterrent impact of air and naval forces. Our findings also suggest that forward-deployed forces may involve important trade-offs. Again consistent with prior RAND work, we found that when U.S. forces, particularly light ground forces, are stationed inside the borders of the ally or partner to be defended rather than in nearby states in the broader theater, they are associated with an increased likelihood of militarized disputes, including those of both lower and higher intensity, though not including war. This pattern may be the result of probing, signal-sending, and friction between U.S. forces and those of its adversaries operating in close proximity. It should be noted that this finding relies heavily on the experience of a single host of U.S. forces—Japan—and may therefore be less generalizable. It is also possible, however, that more in-depth analyses might reveal that light ground forces do indeed tend to provoke escalating tensions. Perhaps light forces represent a more rapidly deployable capability that provokes U.S. adversaries without representing sufficient capabilities to deter. If the United States opts not to deploy forces overseas in steadystate conditions, or if the forces it does forward-deploy are not sufficient to establish and maintain deterrence, the United States can attempt to re-establish deterrence during international crises by surging forces toward the contested area. Such crisis deployments are not without risks: They occur in periods of heightened tension, when foreign decisionmakers operating under enormous stress must make decisions about whether to preemptively attack. Despite these risks, the historical record suggests that very few crises escalate when the United States deploys forces to the crisis region. Although approximately two-thirds of all crises escalate to major clashes or outright wars, little more than one-quarter of crises escalate when the United States deploys forces into a crisis. These effects are particularly strong for ground forces, where no crises have escalated to major confrontation or war, and for air forces, where only one crisis has escalated. The small number of crisis deployments reduces our confidence in the generalizability of these findings, but, in the cases that do exist, the reduction in the risk associated with ground and air forces is extremely large (and still sizable in the case of naval forces). Although crisis deployments appear successful in reducing the risk of escalation, they are not similarly successful in improving bargaining outcomes for partner states. Indeed, countries supported by U.S. crisis deployments appear no more likely to achieve their strategic goals in a crisis than countries that do not enjoy such support. These results suggest that U.S. crisis deployments can help maintain the status quo at reduced risk of war, but they do not readily translate into bargaining leverage or improved long-term positions for partner states. Our case studies are generally consistent with the results of our statistical analyses and provide additional nuance, caveats, and clarity about the reasons why U.S. forces achieved the effects they did. Distinguishing the independent effects of forward-deployed U.S. forces from the other factors in play is difficult: Decisionmakers typically reach decisions on the basis of a complex calculus of costs and benefits, and the relative weight of different factors in the final decisions is often not clear to the decisionmakers. But in both the Berlin crisis of 1961 and Operation Vigilant Warrior in the Persian Gulf in 1994, U.S. forces in theater appear to have played an important role in deterring U.S. adversaries. The reinforcement of U.S. forces in West Berlin during the crisis and robust plans to enhance U.S. posture in Europe over the long term helped shift Soviet perceptions of U.S. commitment and contributed to the de-escalation of the crisis. It is even more difficult to distinguish the effects of different types of forces; however, in the case of Iraq, where we have access to a much more complete archival record, it appears that Saddam Hussein’s regime particularly feared ground forces because they (as opposed to air strikes) were perceived as posing a threat of forcible regime change. Consequently, the Iraqis appear to have taken the deployment of U.S. ground forces to the theater particularly seriously. Policy Implications The findings of this study have two important implications for policy, but both come with caveats. Heavy Ground Forces Are the Most Likely to Enhance Deterrence Our results provide consistent evidence for the deterrent effects of heavy ground forces and air defense capabilities, especially when deployed in the general theater of interest but not necessarily on the front lines of a potential conflict. Although we cannot establish a causal relationship, the statistical findings are robust. The effects of these two types of forces were almost consistently positive, strongly statistically significant, and robust to multiple model specifications. There is evidence that light ground forces, particularly when deployed directly inside the borders of the partner or ally being threatened, may be associated with a higher risk of low-intensity militarized disputes, but we do not find similar evidence of this risk for heavy ground forces in our statistical models. It is worth noting, however, that the Berlin 1961 case study highlights the potential risks associated with ground forces, including heavy forces, operating in close proximity to U.S. adversaries. Of course, the United States’ decisions about forward posture are made on the basis of more than just deterrence considerations, and not all adversaries may react the same way to the introduction of U.S. forces. Although, in the average case, heavy forces appear to successfully contribute to deterrence, such forward posture can also come at a cost. The presence of U.S. forces in a particular country carries both a financial and an opportunity cost. Forces deployed in one location may be less available for contingencies elsewhere. Furthermore, this study has not examined the broader effects of U.S. forward posture on geopolitics, including the potential for forward basing to lead to higher levels of nonmilitarized hostility between the United States and potential adversaries. If steady-state forward posture leads to a breakdown in diplomatic cooperation, potential deterrence gains may not be worth the costs to other U.S. interests. These broader strategic considerations were outside the scope of this study but are certainly questions that policymakers should ask.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › U – Heg Sustainable

Unipolarity is sustainable

Michael Beckley 18. Professor of political science at Tufts. Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower. Cornell University Press. 1-2.

Yet in terms of wealth and military capabilities—the pillars of global power—the United States is in a league of its own. With only 5 percent of the world’s population, the United States accounts for 25 percent of global wealth, 35 percent of world innovation, and 40 percent of global military spending. 4 It is home to nearly 600 of the world’s 2,000 most profi table companies and 50 of the top 100 universities. 5 And it is the only country that can fight major wars beyond its home region and strike targets anywhere on earth within an hour, with 587 bases scattered across 42 countries and a navy and air force stronger than that of the next ten nations combined. 6 According to Yale historian Paul Kennedy, “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing.” The United States is, quite simply, “the greatest superpower ever.” 7 Why is the United States so dominant? And how long will this imbalance of power last? In the following pages, I argue that the United States will remain the world’s sole superpower for many decades, and probably throughout this century. We are not living in a transitional post–Cold War era. Instead, we are in the midst of what could be called the unipolar era—a period as profound as any epoch in modern history. This conclusion challenges the conventional wisdom among pundits, policymakers, and the public. 8 Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have dismissed unipolarity as a fleeting “moment” that would soon be swept away by the rise of new powers. 9 Bookstores feature bestsellers such as The Post-American World and Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline ; 10 the U.S. National Intelligence Council has issued multiple reports advising the president to prepare the country for multipolarity by 2030; 11 and the “rise of China” has been the most read-about news story of the twenty-fi rst century. 12 These writings, in turn, have shaped public opinion: polls show that most people in most countries think that China is overtaking the United States as the world’s leading power. 13 How can all of these people be wrong? I argue that the current literature suffers from two shortcomings that distort peoples’ perceptions of the balance of power. First, the literature mismeasures power. Most studies size up countries using gross indicators of economic and military resources, such as gross domestic product (GDP) and military spending. 14 These indicators tally countries’ resources without deducting the costs countries pay to police, protect, and provide services for their people. As a result, standard indicators exaggerate the wealth and military power of poor, populous countries like China and India—these countries produce vast output and field large armies, but they also bear massive welfare and security burdens that drain their resources. To account for these costs, I measure power in net rather than gross terms. In essence, I create a balance sheet for each country: assets go on one side of the ledger, liabilities go on the other, and net resources are calculated by subtracting the latter from the former. When this is done, it becomes clear that America’s economic and military lead over other countries is much larger than typically assumed—and the trends are mostly in its favor. Second, many projections of U.S. power are based on flawed notions about why great powers rise and fall. Much of the literature assumes that great powers have predictable life spans and that the more powerful a country becomes the more it suffers from crippling ailments that doom it to decline. 15 The Habsburg, French, and British empires all collapsed. It is therefore natural to assume that the American empire is also destined for the dustbin of history. I argue, however, that the laws of history do not apply today. The United States is not like other great powers. Rather, it enjoys a unique set of geographic, demographic, and institutional advantages that translate into a commanding geopolitical position. The United States does not rank first in all sources of national strength, but it scores highly across the board, whereas all of its potential rivals suffer from critical weaknesses. The United States thus has the best prospects of any nation to amass wealth and military power in the decades ahead. For the foreseeable future, therefore, no country is likely to acquire the means to challenge the United States for global primacy. This is an extraordinary development, because the world has been plagued by great power rivalry for millennia. In the past five hundred years alone, there have been sixteen hegemonic rivalries between a ruling power and a rising power, and twelve of them ended in catastrophic wars. 16 In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, when the world was multipolar, Germany twice challenged Britain for European primacy. The result was two world wars. In the second half of the twentieth century, under bipolarity, the Soviet Union challenged the United States for global primacy. The result was the Cold War, a conflict in which the superpowers spent between 6 and 25 percent of their GDPs on defense every year, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and brought the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. Today, by contrast, unipolarity makes a comparable level of great power competition impossible and thus makes a comparable level of conflict highly unlikely. 17

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › U – Readiness High

US military readiness high – forward deployed troops create an environment favorable to US interests, and the US can power project anywhere.

Heritage Foundation, 10-18-2022, "Executive Summary of the 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/executive-summary

The United States is a global power with global security interests, and its military must be able to protect those interests anywhere they are threatened. While this may occur in any region, three regions—Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—stand apart because of the scale and scope of U.S. interests associated with them and the significance of competitors that are able to pose commensurately large threats. Aggregating the three regional scores provides a global operating environment score of FAVORABLE in the 2023 Index. Europe. Overall, the European region remains stable, mature, and friendly to U.S. military operational requirements. Russia remains the preeminent military threat to the region, both conventionally and unconventionally, and its invasion of Ukraine marks a serious escalation in its efforts to exert influence on its periphery. China continues to have a significant presence in Europe and, by mitigating sanctions, has been a key enabler of the Russian government’s ability to conduct the war in Ukraine. The past year saw continued U.S. reengagement with the continent along with increases in European allies’ defense budgets and capability investment spurred by alarm over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and related threats to countries that are supporting Ukraine’s defense. It is difficult to predict whether NATO’s renewed emphasis on collective defense and its reinvigorated defense spending will continue in the long term or whether this is a short-term response to Russia’s invasion. We hope for the former but must plan against the latter. For Europe, scores this year remained steady, as they did in 2021 (assessed in the 2022 Index), with no substantial changes in any individual categories or average scores. The 2023 Index again assesses the European operating environment as “favorable.” The Middle East. The Middle East region is now highly unstable, both because its authoritarian regimes have eroded and because it continues to serve as a breeding ground for terrorism. Overall, regional security has continued to deteriorate. Although Iraq has restored its territorial integrity since the defeat of ISIS, the political situation and future relations between Baghdad and the United States will remain difficult as long as a government that is sympathetic to Iran is in power. U.S. relations in the region will remain complex, but this has not stopped the U.S. military from operating as needed. The region’s primary challenges—continued meddling by Iran and surging transnational terrorism—are made more difficult by Sunni–Shia sectarian divides, the more aggressive nature of Iran’s Islamist revolutionary nationalism and its open pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities, and the proliferation of Sunni Islamist revolutionary groups. In the Middle East, the U.S. benefits from operationally proven procedures that leverage bases, infrastructure, and the logistical processes needed to maintain a large force forward deployed thousands of miles away from the homeland. The personal links between allied armed forces are also present, and joint training exercises improve interoperability and give the U.S. an opportunity to influence some of the region’s future leaders. America’s relationships in the region are pragmatic, based on shared security and economic concerns. As long as these issues remain relevant to both sides, the U.S. is likely to have an open door to operate in the Middle East when its national interests require that it do so. Although circumstances in all measured areas vary throughout the year, in general terms, the 2023 Index assesses the Middle East operating environment as “moderate,” but the region’s political stability continues to be “unfavorable” and will remain a dark cloud over everything else. Asia. The Asian strategic environment includes half of the globe and is characterized by a variety of political relationships among states with wildly varying capabilities. This makes Asia far different from Europe, which in turn makes America’s relations with the region different from its relations with Europe. American conceptions of Asia must recognize the physical limitations imposed by the tyranny of distance and the need to move forces as necessary to respond to challenges from China and North Korea. The complicated nature of intra-Asian relations and the lack of an integrated, regional security architecture along the lines of NATO make defense of U.S. security interests more challenging than many Americans appreciate. However, the U.S. has strong relations with allies in the region, and their willingness to host bases helps to offset the vast distances that must be covered. The militaries of Japan and the Republic of Korea are larger and more capable than European militaries, and both countries are becoming more interested in developing missile defense capabilities that will be essential in combatting the regional threat posed by North Korea. In Japan, the growing public awareness of the need to adopt a more “normal” posture militarily in response to China’s increasingly aggressive actions indicates a break with the pacifist tradition among the Japanese since the end of World War II. This could lead to improved military capabilities and the prospect of joining the U.S. in defense measures beyond the immediate vicinity of Japan. We continue to assess the Asia region as “favorable” to U.S. interests in terms of alliances, overall political stability, militarily relevant infrastructure, and the presence of U.S. military forces. Summarizing the condition of each region enables us to get a sense of how they compare in terms of the difficulty that would be involved in projecting U.S. military power and sustaining combat operations in each one. As a whole, the global operating environment maintains a score of “favorable,” which means that the United States should be able to project military power anywhere in the world to defend its interests without substantial opposition or high levels of risk other than those imposed by a capable enemy.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › F – Turns Income Inequality

Readiness turns income inequality—enlistment helps increase social mobility

Stickles 18

Brendan R., Federal Executive Fellow - Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution; Commander - U.S. Navy. “How the U.S. military became the exception to America’s wage stagnation problem.” Brookings Institute. 11/29/2-18.

Earlier this week, Brookings scholar Richard Reeves published an enlightening analysis of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) data on income inequality. His piece, “Restoring middle class incomes; redistribution won’t do,” described what frustrated Americans have felt for years: Since 1979, the wealthiest Americans experienced the most significant income gains. Counterintuitively, Reeves also highlighted that the lowest earners—the bottom quintile of household income—kept roughly on pace with the growth rates of the highest earners. His analysis focuses on income stagnation and policy solutions for the Americans in the middle. While the top and bottom quintiles grew at 79 and 78 percent respectively, middle-class household income rose at a tepid 46 percent. Unlike the decades after World War II, when every income level increased at comparative rates, in recent years the middle class lagged woefully behind. With one important exception. Over the last 18 years, active duty military pay increases significantly outpaced their civilian counterparts. A combination of economic forces and political obligations inverted the earning potential for uniformed personnel. With very little fanfare, military service became one of the last bastions of middle class social mobility. An April 2018 demographic analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations indicated that the modern military draws heavily from middle-class families. Over 60 percent of 2016 enlistments came from neighborhoods with a median household income between $38,345 and $80,912. The quintiles below and above that band were underrepresented, with the poorest quintile providing 19 percent of the force and the richest Americans enlisting at a rate of 17 percent. The modern force comes predominantly from the middle-class households highlighted in Reeves’ article. Historically, those middle-class enlistees expected a comparatively low salary paired with exceptional benefits. This traditionally included a tax-free housing allowance and fully compensated medical care, but more recently incorporated full tuition coverage from the GI Bill. Over the last 20 years as civilian wages plateaued, military compensation for the post-9/11 force steadily increased. A mid-grade enlisted sailor, soldier, or airman (at an E5 paygrade) made 10 percent less than the median American in 2000 and at the time (as John McCain pointed out) was eligible for food stamps. By 2011, service members of the same rank were making 10 percent more than the median American, even without including benefits. The most recent jobs report indicated a national wage increase of 3.1 percent, slightly higher than the 2019 military pay raise of 2.6 percent. But for now, even excluding housing cost and medical insurance an “E5” is making an above-average American salary. It’s not that the Pentagon was “keeping up with the Joneses.” It’s just that in the last 20 years, the Joneses weren’t keeping up with the military. While the military is traditionally immune to the fluctuations and volatility of their private sector counterparts, the remarkable swing over the last decade was the result of two once-in-a-century events occurring in concert. The economic recession began in 2008, around the same time as the so called “surge” in Iraq and the continuation of the war in Afghanistan. Those unrelated events created an unprecedented shift in military compensation relative to the rest of the public sector. In other words, the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression corresponded with the longest war in U.S. history.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › ! – Readiness › F – Turns Econ

Hegemony is necessary to prevent economic decline

Norrlof 17

[17 July 2017, Norrlof, Carla, Carla Norrlöf is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, a Senior Fellow of Massey College and a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council. Her research is on theories of international cooperation with a special focus on great powers particularly US hegemony in the areas of money, trade and security., “Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Unipolarity: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Hegemonic Order Studies”, Oxford University Press]//AA

Rationale for the Hegemonic Order Several international relations theories of dominance have emerged: the public goods version of hegemonic stability theory, the security version of hegemonic stability theory, the dyadic-hierarchy model, and unipolarity. All of these perspectives agree that it is worthwhile to study a concentration of power across different dimensions. Public Goods Version of Hegemonic Stability Theory (Kindleberger) Kindleberger proposed that a dominant power was necessary for stable, harmonious economic relations (Kindleberger, 1973, 1981). He explained international economic cooperation as a public goods problem, from which everyone could benefit but no one could be excluded (Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1970). Since beneficiaries can enjoy public goods irrespective of their contributions, by free-riding, large groups encounter difficulties providing public goods (Olson, 1965). If everyone fails to contribute, the public good will not be fully provided. However, a single actor with sufficient interest in bearing the full costs of public good provision can solve the problem (Olson, 1965; Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966). In Olson’s (1965) famous assertion, “The small exploit the large.” From the theory outlining the difficulty of collective action, Kindleberger derived his proposition that, for “the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer—one stabilizer” (1973, p. 304). For Kindleberger, global economic stabilization meant “some country . . . would undertake to provide a market for distress goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic” (Kindleberger, 1981, p. 247). He also added exchange-rate stabilization and coordination of monetary policies. In the late 1980s, Webb and Krasner (1989, p. 196) invited scholars to validate Kindleberger’s argument, which they said “might not have been truly tested . . . The real test of hegemonic leadership arises in times of crises.” Two decades passed before scholars met this call. The 2008 financial crisis brought renewed interest in the question of whether the United States, as the world’s dominant power, performed crucial stabilization functions during the crisis. Scholars were invited to reorient around real problems to explain the emergence and maintenance of global financial orders (Drezner & McNamara, 2013). Drezner (2014, p. 153, p. 156) drew on some of Kindleberger’s criteria to examine whether the United States and multilateral institutions helped stabilize the world economy and found that both played a role. Cohen (2015a) used Kindleberger’s five functions to explore whether China’s rise as a monetary power could be successfully accommodated, and concluded that accommodation is possible. However, his investigation did not settle whether and how stabilization occurred during the crisis. Norrlof and Reich (2015) examined Kindleberger’s five functions and asked whether the world economy requires one stabilizer or if these functions were shared between the United States and China. They found limited support for the first proposition, with stronger support for shared stabilization, during the global financial crisis. As more Chinese data become available, alternative methods should be used to determine the robustness of these findings and the validity of Kindleberger’s version of hegemonic stability theory. McDowell (2012) provided a detailed case study of the capabilities and incentives that resulted in the United States acting as an international lender of last resort during the global financial crisis, arguing that the Federal Reserve’s swap program is an example of U.S. structural power as conceived by Strange (1988b). Norrlof (2014) provided empirical snapshots of the dollar’s sustained preeminence despite deficits, wars, and the global financial crisis, and theorized how U.S. monetary capabilities translate into currency influence using power analysis. Cohen also explained the dollar’s supremacy after the financial crisis through a power lens, seeing autonomy as especially important for understanding the dollar’s global role (Cohen, 2015b). Helleiner (2014) described the continuity in the global financial order since the 2008 crisis, concurring with McDowell (2012) that Federal Reserve swap lines reflect U.S. structural power, and that the dollar’s reserve role has remained largely unchanged but Helleiner’s metrics are flawed. Security Version of Hegemonic Stability Theory (Gilpin & Krasner) More than any other scholar, Gilpin (1975, 1977, 1981) was the progenitor of hegemonic stability theory: “Just as the Pax Britannica provided the security and political organization for the expansion of transnational economic activity in the nineteenth century, so the Pax Americana has fulfilled a similar function in the mid-twentieth century” (Gilpin, 1975, p. 111). Krasner’s (1976) work was seminal in providing theoretical justification for why, and under what conditions, a hegemonic power supported free trade. Gilpin went beyond claims relating dominance to economic openness, arguing that the “Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security” (Gilpin, 1981, pp. 144–145). Reflecting on his contribution, Gilpin observed, “Stephen Krasner and I each appropriated Kindleberger’s basic idea that a political leader was needed to create and manage an international liberal economy. However, each of us made several modifications that placed Kindleberger’s insight within a state-centric intellectual framework of political analysis and thus fashioned a state-centric version of the theory of hegemonic stability” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 99). In this version of hegemonic stability theory, the hegemon provides an open economy as long as the distribution of gains does not compromise its security. As Webb and Krasner (1989, p. 184) explained, “. . . the dominant state can promote liberalization without jeopardizing essential security objectives. This is because an open system increases the income, the growth, and the political power of the hegemonic state without seriously affecting its social stability, and because the hegemonic state has symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that can be used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure . . . If the pattern of relative gains threatens the security of powerful states, international economic liberalization will be restricted even though those states could have increased their absolute welfare by participating in a more open system.” Thus, the hegemonic power will only support openness as long as other states do not gain more than the hegemon from international economic exchange. If the distribution of gains were to shift toward other states, economic gains could be transferred to the security arena, undermining the hegemon’s dominance. These contributions have had tremendous impact and still resonate four decades later. The central claim embodied in Gilpin and Krasner’s version of hegemonic stability is that an economically open and peaceful international system is more likely to emerge when a hegemon is rising and has the capability and interest to foster open, peaceful interstate relations (Krasner, 1976, p. 323; Gilpin, 1981). Dominance breeds stability because only a dominant power has the incentive to single-handedly provide public goods from which everyone benefits.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Links › FJG – Cyclical Unemployment

Plan prevents the next dip in private employment, and unemployment is key to military recruiting.

Edward Colimore 10 Military enlistment a popular option during recession The Philadelphia Inquirer July 5, 2010 Monday JERSEY-C Edition Copyright 2010 Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC All Rights Reserved Section: NATIONAL; P-com News for PC Home Page; Pg. A01 Length: 1026 words Byline: By Edward Colimore, Inquirer Staff Writer. gac

Michael Lyons thought he had a career plan: Continue working as an equity trader on Wall Street and finish 20 years of service with the Army National Guard. Then came layoffs. His well-paying civilian job was gone. So Lyons, 45, of Princeton, turned to full-time employment in the New Jersey National Guard, where he found job security and benefits. He is among tens of thousands of men and women who looked at the vagaries of the civilian job market and chose the military. With the nation's economy suffering and unemployment hovering near 10 percent, many are remaining in uniform longer than they planned. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines exceeded their retention goals last year and this year despite the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army met 124 percent of its goal last year, compared with 102 percent in 2001. "At this stage, I like the safety and security of a military position," said Lt. Col. Lyons, the New Jersey National Guard's director of construction and facility management. "There are a lot of unemployed traders out there." "I love what I do," the 25-year veteran said. "It's rewarding." Recruitment also has risen, officials said. The Army met 104 percent of its goal for active-duty service in March, April, and May. And it achieved 132 percent of its goal for the Army National Guard in March and April, prompting recruiters to scale back efforts in May to avoid exceeding their required numbers for this year. Employment opportunities, job security, patriotism, and free college tuition are among the chief reasons many have chosen the Army, officials said. But groups such as the American Friends Service Committee in Chicago see the higher recruitment and retention numbers as an unfortunate by-product of the recession. When prospective recruits seek advice about joining, said Darlene Gramigna, the committee's Truth in Recruitment program director, "I tell them, 'Here are some things you should know. . . . There are still wars going on. Nothing has changed. If you think you're going to college, you may go to war first.' " "It's like signing a contract," she said. "I don't recommend students join . . . and young people are highly recruited." Army recruiters, of course, emphasize employment opportunities. "You can do more in the military than you can do any place else," said Lt. Col. John Sheard, 45, commander of recruiting and retention for the New Jersey Army National Guard. "People are getting in or staying in because of opportunities. "We have 250 different jobs. There's not a profession we don't have," he said. "We have lawyers, doctors, aviators, electricians, engineers, and journalists. Or you could be a helicopter pilot, like me." Whether the interest in the all-volunteer military is the result of the bad economy or free tuition, it comes at an unusual time, officials said. The nation is simultaneously battling a recession and two long-term wars. The military draft, which hit a low in popularity during the Vietnam War, ended in July 1973. "A 1 percent change in civilian unemployment yields a 0.6 percent increase in Army recruiting, historically," said Douglas Smith, a spokesman for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command at Fort Knox, Ky. "We take no delight in civilian unemployment. It's not good for the country." At the same time, "we know the economy is one element" of the military's success in filling the ranks, he said. "People know it's harder to get a civilian job. A number of them have a break in their civilian career." Patriotism also is high among reasons for military service cited by recruits, especially after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, said Lt. Col. Harry Woodmansee, commander of the Mid-Atlantic Recruiting Battalion at Lakehurst, N.J. "Nine-11 brought us all together," he said. "The jobs, benefits, and education always help to bring people in, but patriotism has a lot to do with it." The military's success comes despite a smaller pool of eligible men and woman. About 75 percent of people ages 17 to 24 are ineligible because they can't pass the "three M's," as the Army describes them - mental, medical, and moral requirements. Ten percent of the rest go to college, leaving 15 percent for recruiting, Defense Department spokeswoman Eileen Lainez said. "In a tighter job market, young men and woman may be more receptive to learning about the opportunities the military has to offer," Lainez said.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Links › Economic Incentives

The aff crowds out enlistment—benefits, job stability, job training

Clark 21

James, staff writer for Task & Purpose and former Marine combat correspondent. “Why Do People Join the U.S. Military? Here Are the Top 5 Reasons.” National Interest. 3/19/2021. LJS

In other words, the overwhelming majority of respondents had economic reasons for joining up; for most enlistees, it seems military service is a job first and a calling second. According to the RAND study, the primary motivations for enlisting include: Adventure and travel: Perhaps Matthew Modine was onto something in Full Metal Jacket when he commented that he "wanted to meet interesting and stimulating people of an ancient culture... and kill them." 42% of soldiers joined up to get out of Dodge. “I’ve been in Kansas the majority of my life, so I figured if I joined [the Army], I’d have a greater chance to go out and visit new states and new countries," one soldier told the RAND researchers. Benefits: A significant number of soldiers (32%) called military benefits a major motivation for enlisting: health care, active-duty tuition assistance, and post-service support structures like the GI Bill. Military service is a "lifeline" for some Americans, the researchers note, citing one single mother who joined "just because I had my son and I needed the benefits, I guess you could say." Job stability and pay: Nearly a quarter of soldiers had a simple explanation for their decision to enlist: They “needed to make money," especially given the economic turmoil the country's faced in recent years. "The Army can provide me with great education benefits, great career benefits later on," one soldier told the researchers. "So... why not start that and do that, instead of just working at some dead-end job that’s only paying minimum wage, maybe $10 an hour when I can go and get fantastic benefits?"After weighing the factors, another added, "I was like, well, why not, and if I stay in for 20-plus years [I can] retire at 40. So it seemed like a good deal to me, especially in the economy we’re in." Escaping a negative environment: For many, the military isn't just an economic lifeline — it's a sociopolitical one. "I guess I just joined to get out of the situation I was in, didn’t really see myself going anywhere," one soldier told the RAND researchers. "Yeah, [I feel like the Army has provided that for me]. The kids that I grew up with, out of the group that I hung out with, two of them are in jail and then the three either passed away or disappeared." Job training: Many of the enlisted soldiers chose the Army over other service branches "because it allows enlistees to choose their MOS before enlisting," providing an extra incentive for those who see the military primarily as an economic vehicle, according to RAND: "Participants stated that this provided them a bit of autonomy and allowed them some idea of the role they would be expected to play once their terms of service began."

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › UQ › AT Enlistment Low

Military recruitment is suffering a temporary dip due to strong employment, but only sustained recruitment failures compromise operational capacity and national security.

Jon Jackson, 3-20-2023, "Will U.S. military recruitment struggles cripple response to wars?," Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/will-us-military-recruitment-struggles-cripple-response-wars-1789001 gac

"We know that when the civilian economy is strong, military recruiting becomes a lot more difficult to enlist the type of people the military prefers," she said. "It's not just that the unemployment rate is very low. It's that we know that fewer young men are participating in the labor force. They're not working, and they're not even looking for work. They've left the labor force." Asch said that explanations for this lack of enthusiasm toward work includes the emerging gig economy, the opioid crisis and the decline of manufacturing, as well as the changing attitudes about work-life balance that arose during the pandemic. Surveys also show the public's trust in the military—along with trust in most major institutions—is low. Reasons cited for this are scrutiny over how the U.S. handled the withdrawal from Afghanistan, reports of military sexual assaults, incidents of white supremacists joining military ranks and claims of the military becoming too "woke." Asch said "there's not rigorous analysis if any or all of those factors explain the decline in confidence." As for what can be done to help persuade more people to join the military, Riley said the Air Force has a team "examining existing policies and procedures to ensure they reflect the service members needed for the future." In one policy move to reflect changes in American culture, Riley said the Air Force recently updated its policy to allow for some hand and neck tattoos, since having body ink was found to be "irrelevant to war-fighting." Another area in which military branches are easing up on the rules is cannabis use. As medical and recreational marijuana becomes legal in more states across the country, a growing number of people who are of enlistment age have likely experimented with cannabis. As a result, Asch said the Army, for one, now allows new recruits to retest after a short period if they test positive during their initial physical exam. Other steps have also been taken to ramp up recruitment. Signing bonuses have been offered to new recruits, while new marketing initiatives have been implemented. For the Army, the latter includes returning to a tried-and-true formula. After two decades of experimenting with new slogans, the Army returned to the popular "Be All You Can Be" motto early this month. As the U.S. military becomes more technologically advanced with unmanned weapons such as drones, the various branches likely require less people. In addition, such work as IT services and jobs like painting ships can be farmed out to civilians. Despite this, Asch said military recruiting requirements "reflect the technology." But does this mean national security is at risk? Does the military lack the forces needed to defend the nation if it were attacked? Hewitt said the Army does not expect its recruitment "shortfall to negatively impact our ability to fulfill our requirements as outlined in the current National Defense Strategy." Asch also said that for the time being, national security being endangered is not a major concern. She said if a military branch is lacking in manpower, "what will happen is they'll just be delayed on lower priority things ... It becomes more of a problem of operational capability if this is an ongoing problem for a few years ... If the recruiting problem is sustained for a while, maybe even the higher priority units will start having issues potentially."