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2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › UBI can’t solve poverty

UBI fails to fix poverty- costs 3 trillion that comes from lower class

Doar 2018 [ Robert Doar, Morgridge Fellow in Poverty Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, “Universal Basic Income Would Undermine the Success of Our Safety Net”, George W. Bush Institute Spring 2018 ]

Universal Basic Income (UBI) would be an unaffordable way to undermine our social safety net’s successes. UBI would transfer money away from those who need it most, change the distinctly American relationship between citizen and government, and sharply raise taxes or the national debt (or both). And critically, it would fail to improve upon our current safety net’s biggest weakness: UBI would destroy – not improve – incentives to work.

The first problem is the money. A truly universal payment of $10,000 to every citizen every year adds up to a new expense of about $3 trillion, well more than we spend on our social safety net now, and close to the entirety of the tax revenue currently collected by the federal government.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › UBI can’t solve poverty

Effects of UBI are difficult to predict, it could reduce incomes.

Büchs 21 (Milena, Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, LS2 9JT Leeds, United Kingdom, “Sustainable welfare: How do universal basic income and universal basic services compare?” Science Direct, 7/22/2021, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092100210X#ab0010)

Estimating overall distributive outcomes would need to take into account the effect of abolishing other cash benefits and the impact of UBI on real wages. Most proposals assume that a UBI would replace existing minimum income schemes. In relative terms, the removal of these schemes would reduce incomes at the bottom and middle of the distribution more than top incomes. For overall distributive effects of UBI to remain progressive, financing of the UBI would need to correct for this by putting higher burdens on rich households. Modelling by the OECD (2017) has shown that while the richest income groups would tend to be the greatest net losers from a UBI, there are some scenarios in which low to middle income groups would be the greatest net losers due to the removal of existing cash benefits. Furthermore, distributional outcomes of a UBI would depend on effects on real wages. In response to a UBI, employers might decrease wages (Zamora, 2017) because they know that people's living costs are now partly covered by the basic income. In addition, producers might increase prices in response to higher taxes on capital or profits, thus passing costs on to consumers and reducing real incomes. Impacts on wages might differ by sector. For instance, wages of unpopular, low-pay jobs may increase if workers can reduce their labour supply for such jobs due to the greater financial security they would have with the UBI (Calnitsky, 2018). Conversely, wages in higher paid sectors might fall, for instance if a UBI would lead to higher labour supply here due to the impacts of progressive income taxation. Such shifts in wages may have additional redistributive effects.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › UBI can’t solve poverty

UBI doesn’t solve everything for the poor – money cannot cure all ills.

Sawhill 16 (Isabel V., Senior Fellow - Economic Studies, Center for Economic Security and Opportunity, “Money for nothing: Why a universal basic income is a step too far,” Brookings, 6/15/2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/money-for-nothing-why-a-universal-basic-income-is-a-step-too-far/)

Robert Greenstein argues, however, that a UBI would actually hurt the poor by reallocating support up the income scale. His logic is inescapable: either we have to spend additional trillions providing income grants to all Americans or we have to limit assistance to those who need it most. One option is to provide unconditional payments along the lines of a UBI, but to phase it out as income rises. Libertarians like this approach since it gets rid of bureaucracies and leaves the poor free to spend the money on whatever they choose, rather than providing specific funds for particular needs. Liberals fear that such unconditional assistance would be unpopular and would be an easy target for elimination in the face of budget pressures. Right now most of our social programs are conditional. With the exception of the aged and the disabled, assistance is tied to work or to the consumption of necessities such as food, housing, or medical care, and our two largest means-tested programs are Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit. Liberals have been less willing to openly acknowledge that a little paternalism in social policy may not be such a bad thing. In fact, progressives and libertarians alike are loath to admit that many of the poor and jobless are lacking more than just cash. They may be addicted to drugs or alcohol, suffer from mental health issues, have criminal records, or have difficulty functioning in a complex society. Money may be needed but money by itself does not cure such ills. A humane and wealthy society should provide the disadvantaged with adequate services and support. But there is nothing wrong with making assistance conditional on individuals fulfilling some obligation whether it is work, training, getting treatment, or living in a supportive but supervised environment.

In the end, the biggest problem with a universal basic income may not be its costs or its distributive implications, but the flawed assumption that money cures all ills.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › UBI – No S Inequality

A UBI alone is not sufficient to address the moral shortcomings of liberal markets and would result in disaster, perpetuating inequality.

Rogers’ 17 [Brishen Rogers; May 3, 2017; Associate Professor at Temple University's Beasley School of Law, and a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. worked as a community organizer promoting living wage policies and affordable housing, “Basic Income in a Just Society” https://www.bostonreview.net/forum/brishen-rogers-basic-income-just-society/]

And of course many have argued that a basic income would make minimum wage and collective bargaining laws less necessary, since workers’ material needs would be met by the state. But cash benefits and reasonable wages are not morally equivalent. In Robert Solow’s memorable phrase, the labor market is a “social institution” governed in part by norms of reciprocity and mutual respect. Workers often demand higher wages from larger and more profitable employers. And they work less diligently when they feel disrespected. So there is a major difference between a generous wage on the one hand and a meager wage supplemented with cash from the state on the other. Generous wages help make firms’ economic responsibility roughly commensurate with their economic power. Meager wages signal disrespect, and state transfers are impersonal. In fact, without labor market regulations in place, the impact of a basic income on very low-wage work could be disastrous. If a basic income were not extended to green card holders, guest workers, or “irregular” immigrants (those who enter or stay without authorization), such workers would be far cheaper to employ in menial jobs, at which point they would be permanently enshrined as a laboring underclass. (Currently minimum wage laws apply regardless of work authorization, on the grounds that differential treatment would undermine standards for all.) A basic income could even be designed to serve white nationalist ends. In fact, far-right European parties have often embraced the welfare state as a means of defending citizens against a purported tide of immigrants. A standalone basic income also will not ensure equal access to quality education, health care, mental health care, housing, and transportation. Liberal markets systematically fail to provide such goods to the poor and working class, for the simple reason that they often are not profitable when provided on equitable terms. Giving cash to individuals to purchase them will not suddenly change matters. Popular debates have largely ignored these limits of a standalone basic income, an oversight that is not entirely accidental. As a tax-and-transfer program, basic income would be consistent with a wide variety of political-economic systems, including neoliberal capitalism, social democracy, and various forms of socialism, but much of the basic income literature has a libertarian streak. On the right, Milton Friedman proposed a negative income tax in large part because he hoped it would reduce government bureaucracy. On the left, Philippe van Parijs’s now-classic argument for the policy held it would maximize what he called “real freedom” better than standard welfare-state policies. And Silicon Valley’s take exemplifies an “everyday libertarianism,” which views market results, including pre-tax incomes, as presumptively fair. Unlike many libertarians, basic income proponents accept the necessity and fairness of income and wealth taxation. But a basic income is still no cure for the moral ills of liberal markets. Since labor cannot be separated from workers, it will never be a classic commodity, and labor markets will never be stock exchanges for faceless buyers and sellers. Low wages carry a stigma that low bids for soybeans never will. In the long run, companies cannot treat workers or even consumers as line items on a balance sheet without risking a revolt. Uber is now paying a high price for ignoring this lesson. The company’s flagrant disregard for our moral economy and its open embrace of a cutthroat, winner-take-all libertarianism made it a pariah in many quarters well before it faced allegations of a workplace culture of sexual harassment. In my view, the more compelling arguments for basic income are rooted in commitments to equality as well as freedom. Take Thomas Paine’s Agrarian Justice (1797), which prefigured the later case for social insurance. The earth, he argued, had been “the common property of the human race” in its natural state. Private property enabled the few to profit from the earth’s resources, but all are entitled to compensation through a “citizens dividend.” G. D. H. Cole updated Paine in the twentieth century, arguing for a “social dividend” on the grounds that all production is “a joint result of current effort and of the social heritage of inventiveness.” Auto manufacturers did not discover electricity, after all, and Silicon Valley did not invent the Internet. Rather than a means of maximizing freedom, a basic income would help meet our duties toward one another. Workers cannot appeal to a computer’s emotions in asking for more or less time, a raise, or a slower pace of work. A still more compelling case for basic income builds on Elizabeth Anderson’s and Philip Pettit’s (quite distinct) arguments that a just society must ensure that no group of citizens is subordinate to another. Extreme poverty causes subordination since it forces us to beg or to work at terrible jobs. Means tests are equally degrading since food stamps and similar programs tend to restrict what we can buy, again stigmatizing the poor. This argument is quite different from the libertarian case for a basic income since it does not view basic income as a replacement for the welfare state. Rather it asks basic income to serve a discrete and limited purpose: making sure nobody falls through the cracks. And if one agrees that we need to root out subordination, we will need to do much more than pass a basic income. A just society would not just eliminate penury and then leave people to their fates. It would also strive for a fair distribution of power. This point strikes me as obvious, but we can miss it by focusing on unemployment and poverty. A society in which a few make decisions and the many take orders is an oligarchy, not a democracy. This is what I mean by the “social democratic” case for a basic income: it would help build a post-industrial welfare state by alleviating dire poverty. But it is unlikely to pass and would do little good unless coupled with other efforts to ensure broadly dispersed power, including a substantially revamped public sector and new and stronger regulations around work. The public sector agenda should begin with a massive investment in human services. This would include primary, secondary, and higher education; childcare and elder care; health care; and mental health services. All of these are critical to human flourishing and economic growth, especially in a technologically advanced economy. There is also the added benefit that these sectors are among the least vulnerable to automation since they require interpersonal communication and human judgment: turning them into basic rights of citizenship would create millions of jobs. Extensive job training and placement programs for unemployed workers would reduce the devastations associated with job losses. This should be coupled with a guarantee that the government will stand as employer of last resort, as William Darity and Darrick Hamilton have advocated. Classic WPA-style public works would be one option, but we might do more good by thinking locally: retrofitting houses and other smaller buildings for energy efficiency, as john a. powell and others have suggested, or building and repairing local parks and schools, or training unemployed workers for jobs in childcare, education, elder care, or health care. Some subset of the projects could be identified through participatory budgeting or other deliberative processes and carried out in partnership with local governments or organizations. Then we should consider unconditional cash benefits in some form, ideally a generous basic income, especially if technological unemployment becomes significant. But we need to design it correctly. If certain immigrants are denied a basic income, then we must establish a transparent pathway to citizenship and ensure that they enjoy generous wages. Currently many states restrict convicted felons from voting or collecting many public benefits. If that pattern holds with a basic income, that group could also become a pool of menial labor.Paying for all of this would not be easy, of course, which is why it may make sense to take baby steps. Unconditional cash grants to parents, for instance, would go a long way toward alleviating poverty and would be less politically controversial than unconditional benefits for the able-bodied and childless. Or perhaps a participation income, in which citizens would be entitled to cash benefits on the basis of some qualified civic service each year, though this would be less desirable than a public jobs guarantee combined with other generous benefits. As we wait for the politics to catch up with the policy, however, the “baby steps” approach can inch us closer to meeting social needs, developing a highly trained workforce and rebuilding faith in the public sector. Then there are the near-intractable problems of improving private sector work and limiting corporate power. Of course what makes work “good” is hard to define, in part because it is so dependent on social context and individuals’ preferences. We look back fondly on the industrial era in part because manufacturing jobs delivered high wages and benefits, but those jobs only became “good” after workers organized and forced firms to raise wages and reduce hours. Manufacturing jobs were also physically and emotionally punishing, and factory workers’ pride was often based on a perverse ethic of masculine suffering. It is easier to say what bad work is. There is certainly no shortage of it these days: many workers earn low pay, have long or unpredictable hours, and are vulnerable to arbitrary treatment. Raising the minimum wage and reducing the standard workweek to thirty-five or even thirty hours would help. So would the public investments in human services discussed above, since those new jobs would require significant judgment (ensuring a degree of worker autonomy) and current law extends many democratic norms to the public sector already. A public jobs guarantee would give workers the security of knowing that an alternative always exists if a private-sector job proves unendurable. The centerpiece of reform efforts should be the encouragement of collective bargaining between workers, their employers, and whatever other firms enjoy economic power over them. That will require reforms to bring our labor laws into sync with the reality of what work now looks like. Rather than requiring workers to organize shop by shop, we could encourage bargaining at the corporate level, such that all McDonald’s workers, for example, would be in one bargaining unit, regardless of whether their restaurants are franchises or owned by the parent corporation. Better still, we could put all fast food workers nationwide in one bargaining unit empowered to negotiate with an association of fast food companies. Similarly workers could be granted bargaining rights with the firms at the top of their respective supply chains: Uber drivers would have bargaining rights vis-à-vis Uber, and Walmart and Target would have duties toward the workers who produce, process, and move goods to their shelves, including production workers, warehouse workers, farm workers, janitors, and many others. Without labor market regulations, the impact of a basic income on low-wage work could be disastrous.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › AT Global Coop !

Governance issues

Feffer 21 [John Feffer is the director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, is a senior associate at the Asia Institute in Seoul, “Multilateralism and the Biden Administration,” Rosalux, 3-11-21, https://rosalux.nyc/multilateralism-and-the-biden-administration/]

Finally, there is the problem of governance. There is no global government and thus no democratic way to regulate global affairs. Multilateralism is one response to this problem of governance. It asserts that governments, as the representatives of their people, cooperate on a state-to-state basis to solve collective problems. Governments pool their resources to address a crisis; they contribute soldiers to peacekeeping forces; they provide judges and lawyers to participate in international court cases. The United Nations is a global institution but it’s more like a forum than a government, for it has no taxation authority or independent army or autonomous capacity to enforce its decisions.

Largely absent from this inter-state arrangement are civil society organizations, municipal authorities, corporations, and other intermediate institutions, though they sometimes hold consultative status in international fora. One alternative to emerge in recent years is multistakeholderism, which seeks to “bring together global actors that have a potential ‘stake’ in an issue and ask them to collaboratively sort out a solution.” These arrangements, which bring together government, civil society, and business in “public-private” configurations, have their own flaws. They often leave out critical voices, fail to address significant power differentials among the stakeholders, and gloss over questions of accountability. Of course, these governance problems can be found at virtually every level of authority from the smallest community group to the UN Security Council.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › AT Global Coop !

Noncompliance issues

Feffer 21 [John Feffer is the director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, is a senior associate at the Asia Institute in Seoul, “Multilateralism and the Biden Administration,” Rosalux, 3-11-21, https://rosalux.nyc/multilateralism-and-the-biden-administration/]

A second challenge for multilateralism is non-compliance. If powerful countries don’t want to abide by international rules, they simply don’t. The United States has demonstrated this problem of non-compliance repeatedly over the years, most recently on drone warfare and refugee policy. Russia in Crimea and China in the South China Sea have also flouted international law. Even relatively weak countries have managed to defy international agreements and authorities, as North Korea has done in developing its nuclear weapons program. Non-compliance triggers penalties such as economic sanctions, but countries are often willing to absorb those penalties.

This problem of non-compliance will become ever more salient on environmental questions. Many governments have pledged to become carbon neutral by 2050. But there are no enforcement mechanisms to keep countries to their word. Nor are there international authorities to pressure countries into making those pledges in the first place. As an aspect of the collective action problem, non-compliance is a feature of multilateralism across the board, whether non-proliferation, pandemic suppression, or the treatment of public commons like the oceans, cyberspace, or outer space. But with the Doomsday Clock of The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists still a mere 100 second from midnight, non-compliance carries with it unprecedented existential risks for the human race.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › AT Global Coop !

Multilat is resilient – support for the liberal order is overwhelming.

Krogh, 20 -- Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Justice in World Affairs at Georgetown University

[Alexander Kentikelenis and Erik Voeten, “Biden promises to embrace multilateralism again. World leaders agree,” Washington Post, 12-16-20, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/16/biden-promises-embrace-multilateralism-again-world-leaders-agree/, accessed 5-9-2022]

During the Trump administration, many countries continued to support global institutions, however. China, the E.U. and other countries agreed to a temporary workaround to the impasse at the WTO Appellate Body, while the remaining TPP participants forged ahead without the U.S. Other countries pledged additional contributions to the World Health Organization, and continued to support linchpins of global economic governance like the WTO, World Bank or the IMF.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › AT Global Coop !

No multilat impact

Maull 20 [Dr. Hanns W. Maull is a Senior Distinguished Fellow and a Visiting Fellow with the Executive Board of SWP, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs, “Multilateralism: Variants, Potential, Constraints and Conditions for Success,” https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C09_multilateralism.pdf]

The potential for shaping multilateralism. It is often assumed that if international cooperation were sufficiently broad, it would be possible to develop options on a global scale that would be analogous to those available to the nation state within its own territory, as the term “global governance” suggests. Science and technology and the organisational resources of governments and non-state actors can and should indeed provide the necessary problem-solving potential. This could be mobilized effectively if the (theoretically extensive) problem-solving capacities of the nation state were effectively coordinated through international cooperation. In practice, however, the state’s monopoly on the use of force and its (ideal or typical) extensive possibilities to shape politics within its own borders are often far less comprehensive and far less powerful than is assumed. These empirical deficiencies in statehood can – to a degree – be compensated by new forms of interaction between state and non-state actors and international organizations. Overall, however, the problem-solving capacity of multilateralism seems quite uncertain. Its potential for realising effective world governance will depend considerably on favourable conditions.

Multilateral diplomacy: advantages and problems

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › AT Populism !

No populist wars.

Saleem 21 [Raja M. Ali Saleem, Associate Professor (Public Policy) at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance at Forman Christian College in Lahore, Pakistan. “Military and Populism: An Introduction.” 4/26/21. https://www.populismstudies.org/military-and-populism-an-introduction/]

The points of contention between populists and the military are primarily populism’s anti-capitalism, anti-science, and anti-war program. Populists are generally anti-capitalistic, which is problematic to the military as capitalists are enthusiastic about military expenditures and generally support wars. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, himself a former five-star general, warned the Americans about the rise of the military-industrial complex. Populists are also against foreign interventions and wars and are generally ready to decrease defense expenditures to increase the budget for social programs, which is not acceptable to the military. Populists are also anti-science, making their alliance with the army difficult as nowadays the armed forces use the most sophisticated technologies available.

There are several possible ways in which the military deals with populism and populist leaders. In advanced consolidated democracies, the military, as an institution, keeps its opinions to itself and serves whoever is elected. Populist leaders—because of their fiery rhetoric and meager respect for conventional legal rules—are more difficult to deal with. Depending on their institutional interests, the military elite silently helps or thwarts populist leaders while remaining within the laws and rules in advanced democracies. The interests of the military generally find more acceptance in right-wing populism than left-wing populism. The idea of the nation being in danger from foreigners or traitors who are constantly conspiring against it supports authoritarianism and an increased role of law-enforcement agencies, including the military.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › AT Populism !

No impact to populism – institutional checks.

Nicola Mai & Peder Beck-Friis 19, 2-13-2019, Nicola Mai is an executive vice president in the London office and a sovereign credit analyst in the portfolio management group; Dr. Peder Beck-Friis is a vice president and portfolio manager in the London office, "EU Elections: Populism’s Threat May Be Overstated," Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, https://www.pimco.com/en-us/insights/viewpoints/eu-elections-populisms-threat-may-be-overstated/

It is unlikely that the eurosceptic parties will form a united anti-establishment front. The eurosceptic parties are heterogeneous, ranging from extreme left to extreme right, and they have diverging views on how Europe should be reformed. We think the probability that these parties coalesce into one political group is low.

Support for eurosceptic parties should remain well below 50%. This is important because even if these parties manage to form a united front, they will face the opposition of moderate parties, which will likely coalesce against them in parliamentary votes and obstruct radical proposals that could involve the dismantling or weakening of the European infrastructure.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Inequality › AT Populism !

Populism doesn’t cause war.

Ferguson 16 [Niall Ferguson, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, Senior Fellow of the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, and Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, “Populism as a Backlash against Globalization - Historical Perspectives,” Autumn 2016, https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-autumn-2016--issue-no-8/populism-as-a-backlash-against-globalization]

Such comparisons between the United States today and Germany in the 1930s are becoming commonplace. As a professional historian, I would like to offer what seems to me a better analogy. Our Tranquil Times Journalists are fond of saying that we are living in a time of “unprecedented” instability. In reality, as numerous studies have shown, our time is a period of remarkable stability in terms of conflict. In fact, viewed globally, there has been a small uptick in organized lethal violence since the misnamed Arab Spring. But even allowing for the horrors of the Syrian civil war, the world is an order of magnitude less dangerous than it was in the 1970s and 1980s, and a haven of peace and tranquility compared with the period between 1914 and 1945. This point matters because the defining feature of interwar fascism was its militarism. Fascists wore uniforms. They marched in enormous and well-drilled parades and they planned wars. That is not what we see today. So why do so many commentators feel that we are living through “unprecedented instability?” The answer, aside from plain ignorance of history, is that political populism has become a global phenomenon, and established politicians and political parties are struggling even to understand it, much less resist it. Yet populism is not such a mysterious thing, if one only has some historical knowledge. The important point is not to make the mistake of confusing it with fascism, which it resembles in only a few respects. Rather like a television chef, I shall describe a recipe for populism, based on historical experience. It is a simple recipe, with just five ingredients. Five Ingredients for A Populist Backlash The first of these ingredients is a rise in immigration. In the past 45 years, the percentage of the population of the United States that is foreign-born has risen from below 5 percent in 1970 to over 13 percent in 2014—almost as high as the rates achieved between 1860 and 1910, which ranged between 13 percent and an all-time high of 14.7 percent in 1890. So when people say, as they often do, that “the United States is a land based on immigration,” they are indulging in selective recollection. There was a period, between 1910 and 1970, when immigration drastically declined. It is only in relatively recent times that we have seen immigration reach levels comparable with those of a century ago, in what has justly been called the first age of globalization. Ingredient number two is an increase in inequality. Drawing on the work done on income distribution by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, we can see that we have recently regained the heights of inequality that were last seen in the pre-World War I period. The share of income going to the top one percent of earners is back up from below 8 percent of total income in 1970 to above 20 percent of total income. The peak before the financial crisis, in 2007, was almost exactly the same as the peak on the eve of the Great Depression in 1928. Ingredient number three is the perception of corruption. For populism to thrive, people have to start believing that the political establishment is no longer clean. Recent Gallup data on public approval of institutions in the United States show, among other things, notable drops in the standing of all institutions save the military and small businesses. Just 9 percent of Americans have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Congress—a remarkable figure. It is striking to see which other institutions are down near the bottom of the league. Big business is second-lowest, with just 21 percent of the public expressing confidence in it. Newspapers, television news, and the criminal justice system fare only slightly better. What is even more remarkable is the list of institutions that have fallen furthest in recent times: the U.S. Supreme Court now has just a 36 percent approval rating, down from a historical average of 44 percent, while the Presidency has dropped from 43 percent to 36 percent approval. The financial crisis appears to have convinced many Americans—and not without good reason—that there is an unhealthy and likely corrupt relationship between political institutions, big business, and the media. The fourth ingredient necessary for a populist backlash is a major financial crisis. The three biggest financial crises in modern history—if one uses the U.S. equity market index as the measure—were the crises of 1873, 1929, and 2008. Each was followed by a prolonged period of depressed economic performance, though these varied in their depth and duration. In the most recent of these crises, the peak of the U.S. stock market was October 2007. With the onset of the financial crisis, we essentially replayed for about a year the events of 1929 and 1930. However, beginning in mid to late 2009, we bounced out of the crisis, thanks to a combination of monetary, fiscal, and Chinese stimulus, whereas the Great Depression was characterized by a deep and prolonged decline in stock prices, as well as much higher unemployment rates and lower growth. The first of these historical crises is the least known: the post-1873 “great depression,” as contemporaries called it. What happened after 1873 was nothing as dramatic as 1929; it was more of a slow burn. The United States and, indeed, the world economy went from a financial crisis—which was driven by excessively loose monetary policy and real estate speculation, amongst other things—into a protracted period of deflation. Economic activity was much less impaired than in the 1930s. Yet the sustained decline in prices inflicted considerable pain, especially on indebted farmers, who complained (in reference to the then prevailing gold standard) that they were being “crucified on a cross of gold.” We have come a long way since those days; gold is no longer a key component of the monetary base, and farmers are no longer a major part of the workforce. Nevertheless, in my view, the period after 1873 is much more like our own time, both economically and politically, than the period after 1929. There is still one missing ingredient to be added. If one were cooking, this would be the moment when flames would leap from the pan. The flammable ingredient is, of course, the demagogue, for populist demagogues react vituperatively and explosively against all of the aforementioned four ingredients. Kearney’s Cause Now, my argument is not intended to dismiss or downplay those elements of Donald Trump’s campaign for President of the United States that have been implicitly, if not explicitly, racist. Nor do I treat lightly the various signals he has given of indifference to, or at least ignorance of, the U.S. Constitution. My point is that these demerits do not by themselves qualify Trump for comparison with Mussolini, much less with Hitler. Rather, I want to argue that Trump has much more in common with the demagogues of the earlier, lesser depression of the late nineteenth century, and that it is to that period that we should look for historical analogies and insights. The best illustration of my case is the now forgotten figure of Denis Kearney, leader of the Workingmen’s Party of California and the author of the slogan “The Chinese Must Go!” Himself an Irish immigrant to the United States—as opposed to the son of a Scottish immigrant and grandson of a German, which is what Donald Trump is—Kearney was part of a movement of nativist parties and “Anti-Coolie” clubs that sought to end Chinese immigration into the United States. The report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration in 1877 gives a flavor of the times. “The Pacific coast must in time become either Mongolian or American,” was the committee’s view. The report argued that the Chinese brought with them the habits of despotic government, a tendency to lie in court, a weakness for tax evasion and “insufficient brainspace […] to furnish [the] motive power for self-government.” Moreover, Chinese women were “bought and sold for prostitution and treated worse than dogs,” while the Chinese were “cruel and indifferent to their sick.” Giving such inferior beings citizenship, the committee’s report declared, “would practically destroy republican institutions on the Pacific coast.” The realities were, it scarcely needs to be said, very different. According to the “Six Companies” of Chinese in San Francisco—corporate bodies that represented the Chinese population of the city—there was compelling evidence that Chinese immigration was a boon to California. Not only did the Chinese provide labor for the state’s rapidly developing railroads and farms; they also tended to improve the neighborhoods in which they settled. Moreover, there was no evidence of a disproportionate Chinese role in gambling and prostitution. In fact, statistics showed that the Irish were more of a charge on the city’s hospital and almshouse than the Chinese. Nevertheless, a powerful coalition of “laboring men and artisans,” small businessmen and “grangers” (the term used to describe those who aimed to shift the burden of taxation onto big business and the rich) rallied to Kearney’s cause. As one shrewd contemporary observer noted, part of his appeal was that he was attacking not just the Chinese, but also the big steamship and railroad companies that profited from employing Chinese labor, not to mention the corrupt two-party establishment that ran San Francisco politics: Neither Democrats nor Republicans had done, nor seemed likely to do, anything to remove these evils or to improve the lot of the people. They were only seeking (so men thought) places or the chance of jobs for themselves, and could always be bought by a powerful corporation. Working men must help themselves; there must be new methods and a new departure […] The old parties, though both denouncing Chinese immigration in every convention they held, and professing to legislate against it, had failed to check it […] Everything, in short, was ripe for a demagogue. Fate was kind to the Californians in sending them a demagogue of a mean type, noisy and confident, but with neither political foresight nor constructive talent. Kearney may have lacked foresight and “constructive talent,” but there is no gainsaying what he and his ilk were able to achieve. Beginning with the Page Law (1875) prohibiting the immigration of Asian women for “lewd or immoral purposes,” American legislators scarcely rested until Chinese immigration to the United States had been stopped altogether. The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) suspended immigration of Chinese for 10 years, introduced “certificates of registration” for departing laborers (effectively re-entry permits), required Chinese officials to vet travelers from Asia, and, for the first time in American history, created an offense of illegal immigration, with the possibility of deportation as a part of the penalty. The Foran Act (1885) banned all contract laborers from immigrating to America. Legislation passed in the Scott Act (1888) banned all Chinese from travel to the United States except “teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for pleasure.” In all, between 1875 and 1924, more than a dozen pieces of legislation served to restrict and finally end altogether Chinese immigration. No one should therefore underestimate the power of populism. For all his coarseness and bombast, Denis Kearney and his allies effectively sealed the American border along the Pacific coast of the United States; indeed, one cartoon of the time depicted them constructing a wall across the San Francisco harbor. In the 1850s and 1860s, as many as 40 percent of all Chinese emigrants had travelled beyond Asia, though the numbers arriving in the United States had in fact been relatively small (between 1870 and 1880, a total of 138,941 Chinese immigrants came, just 4.3 percent of the total, a share dwarfed by the vast European exodus across the Atlantic in the same period). What exclusion did ensure in the late nineteenth was that Chinese immigration would not grow, as it surely would have, but instead dwindled and then ceased. Ironies Populism, then, is not just a form of political entertainment. One sometimes hears it said of Donald Trump: “Ah, he says wild things on the campaign trail, but when he is president it will be fine.” History suggests otherwise. It suggests that men who threaten to restrict immigration—as well as to impose tariffs and to discourage capital export, as populists generally do—mean what they say. Indeed, populists are under a special compulsion to enact what they pledge in the campaign trail, for their followers are fickle to begin with. In the case of Trump, most have already defected from the Republican Party establishment. If he fails to deliver, they can defect from him, too. Of course, populists are bound eventually to disappoint their supporters. For populism is a toxic brew as well as an intoxicating one. Populists nearly always make life miserable for whichever minorities they chose to scapegoat, but they seldom make life much better for the people whose ire they whip up. Whatever the demagogues may promise—and they always promise “jam today”—populism tends to have significantly more economic costs than benefits. Restricting immigration, imposing tariffs on imported goods, penalizing firms for investing abroad: such measures, if adopted by an American government in 2017, would be almost certain to reduce growth and employment, rather than the reverse. That has certainly been the Latin American experience—and few regions of the world have run the populist experiment more often. The foreign dimension brings us to a final irony. Despite their habitual insistence on narrow national self-interest, populists are nearly always part of a global phenomenon. Globalization had been making enormous strides prior to 1873, with world trade, migration, and international capital flows growing at unprecedented rates. But the crisis of that year generated a populist backlash against globalization that was itself global in its scope. Then, just as now, the principal targets of the demagogues were immigration, free trade, and high finance. Just as the United States excluded immigrants and raised tariffs, so did European countries by adopting similar discriminatory measures. In Bismarck’s Germany, populism was often antisemitic—as it was in the France of the Dreyfus Affair—while in late Victorian Britain it was anti-Irish. Tariffs went up almost everywhere except in Britain. Populism today has a similarly global quality. In June, the British vote to leave the European Union was hailed by populists right across the European continent as well as by Donald Trump in the United States and, implicitly, by Vladimir Putin in Russia. Yielding to the Complicators Let me conclude with a note of qualified optimism. Because populism is not fascism, populist victories should not be construed as harbingers of war—if anything, the opposite is true. In the 1870s and 1880s, populists did achieve significant reductions in globalization: not only immigration restrictions, but also higher tariffs. But they did not form many national governments, and they did not subvert any constitutions. Nor were populists much interested in starting wars; if anything, they lent towards isolationism and viewed imperialism as just another big business racket. In most countries, the populist high tide was in the 1880s. What came next—in many ways as a reaction to populism, but also as an alternative set of policy solutions to the same public grievances—was Progressivism in the United States and socialism in Europe. Perhaps something similar will also happen in our time. Perhaps that is something to look forward to. Nevertheless, we would do well to remember that World War I broke out during the progressive not the populist era. The world today is, as I observed at the outset, in much less turmoil than one might infer from television news. Nevertheless, the economic and social consequences of globalization and the most recent financial crisis sowed the seeds for the populist backlash that we now see. Populists are not fascists. They prefer trade wars to actual wars; administrative border walls to more defensible fortifications. The maladies they seek to cure are not imaginary: uncontrolled rising immigration, widening inequality, free trade with “unfree” countries, and political cronyism are all things that a substantial section of the electorate have some reason to dislike. The problem with populism is that its remedies are wrong and, in fact, counterproductive. What we most have to fear—as was true of Brexit—is not therefore Armageddon, but something more prosaic: an attempt to reverse certain aspects of globalization, followed by disappointment when the snake oil does not really cure the patient’s ills, followed by the emergence of a new and ostensibly more progressive set of remedies for our current malaise. The “terrible simplifiers” may have their day then. But they will end up yielding power to well-intentioned complicators, those more congenial to educated elites, but probably every a bit as dangerous, if not more so.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › AT China !

MAD still checks US-China war – it survived Trump for a reason

Sheng ’20 [Yang Sheng holds a master's degree in international relations from Durham University and is a chief reporter at the Global Times covering Chinese politics, diplomacy and military, “China-US war unlikely despite rising hostility,” 5-10-20, ]

The failed handling of the COVID-19 outbreak in the US has fueled Washington's hostility toward China and escalated concern that worsening bilateral ties might lead to a China-US war, prompting Chinese experts to assert that Beijing has sufficient nuclear capacity to assure mutually assured destruction (MAD) and create deterrence to reduce the risks of any direct conflict. Intention and capability are two elements for judging whether or not the US wants a war with China, Chinese observers noted on Sunday. A series of "anti-China" expressions by some senior US politicians that assign blame for the pandemic have provoked discussion about the potential for a nuclear war with China. Chinese experts say it remains unclear what is the real intention behind the hostile narratives of US policymakers about China. To strengthen China's nuclear arsenal was an essential way to deter hawkish and warlike US policymakers from making dangerous moves, the experts believed. But in order to effectively prevent a war between China and the US, they urged Washington to abandon its war of words that poisons bilateral ties and risks a miscalculation of US intent by China. US hawks should understand China is capable of bringing destructive consequences to them after China detects a nuclear attack from the US, warned Chinese military experts. No one wants to see that kind of doomsday tragedy, they added. CNN commentator Fareed Zakaria expressed a similar kind of concern. "Mike Pompeo, Donald Trump are trying to pressure the intelligence community to say we have some kind of smoking gun with regard to China. And this is the kind of politicized intelligence that led to the mistakes of the Iraq war," he said on Tuesday at CNN Tonight. "Again, Pompeo or Trump is trying to plat washing powder," responded one tweet about the show. The tweet was referring to the former US secretary of state Collin Powell showing "evidence" of Iraqi weapons of massive destruction (WMD) at the UN in an attempt to legitimize a war against Sadam Hussein's regime. Some joked the "evidence" could be a small pot of washing powder as the WMD accusation later proved a catastrophic intelligence failure. Nuclear deterrence In response, Hua Chunying, a spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, posted on Twitter on Saturday that "China won't be Iraq." Some Chinese Net users noted that the most important reason China wouldn't be another Iraq was China has real WMDs. Hu Xijin, editor in chief of the Global Times, reinforced his call for China to strengthen its nuclear arsenal to deter the US on China's Twitter-like Sina Weibo platform on Saturday after his post Friday called on China to build more nuclear warheads and DF-41 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Hu said in the past, China might have had enough nuclear power to deter the US, but now, as the US is treating China as its major or even top strategic competitor and strengthening the US arsenal, so China's nuclear strength should not stay indifferent. Hu said he was a "peace lover" but peace has never come from "nice words and begging." His two posts on Friday and Saturday received about 300,000 likes on Sina Weibo. Lü Xiang, a research fellow on US studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, told the Global Times on Sunday nuclear concerns were entirely reasonable as the US intention to treat China as an enemy was increasing in its statements and in the behavior of senior politicians like Pompeo and White House adviser Pete Navaro, even President Donald Trump. "The key for us to judge the decision-making from the US is to analyze the real intention behind extreme and hostile words from the White House," he said. "The performance of the Trump administration forced Chinese elites and the public to think more about the worst scenario." The two countries were still far from a direct military conflict, said Diao Daming, a US studies expert at the Renmin University of China in Beijing. On the one hand, China should prepare for all possibilities but on the other, there was no need to overemphasize preparation for war, Diao said. That might speed up the arms race with the US, he warned. "The US is unilaterally executing major power competition, and due to US-launched stigmatization against China on the COVID-19 pandemic, China-US relationship is experiencing a profound change," Diao said. "Although the cooperation part of the bilateral ties still exists, the competition part is increasing sharply." Jin Canrong, the associate dean of Renmin University of China's School of International Studies in Beijing, expressed his concern over China-US decoupling. "The decoupling unilaterally pushed by the US side risks increasing strategic conflicts between the two major powers, and Taiwan, the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula could become potential conflict zones." Mutually assured destruction or development Chinese experts on nuclear weapons and arms control said there was no need to doubt China's nuclear strength and strategic deterrence. They called on the Chinese public to remain calm as the US noticed clearly that China has enough to ensure mutually assured destruction. Yang Chengjun, a Chinese expert on missile technology and nuclear strategy and chief scientist of quantum defense, told the Global Times that a core principle of China's nuclear policy was not to seek a warheads arms race. China's nuclear warheads were fewer than 1,000, Yang said but Beijing was totally capable of building more warheads if necessary. "Although we have fewer warheads than the US, but once we detect any nuclear attack from the US, our warheads are enough to destroy the US in the counterattack. This is the effective nuclear deterrence," Yang said. An anonymous military expert at a Beijing-based military academy said "increasing the number of warheads is a measure to increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, as the US has missile defense system." China needed to make the US believe it could effectively destroy its cities despite the US missile defense system, the anonymous expert said. "To improve the technology of defense penetration ability of our ICBMs is also a way." Xu Guangyu, a senior adviser to the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told the Global Times on Sunday that there was a common sense understanding among the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council, also the five major nuclear powers, that a nuclear war between any would "bring a doomsday tragedy to humanity."

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › AT China !

No US-China war – global interdependence and public opinion check

Delova ’20 [Marija Delova is a Researcher at Livingston Research, holds a law degree from the Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, where she was a junior researcher, is a former translator at the International Center fot the Study of Violent Extremism, “Thucydides Trap – Why China and the US Are Not Destined for War,” 9-2-20, https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/thucydides-trap-why-china-and-the-us-are-not-destined-for-war]

Recently, the rise of China has led to arguments that its growing economic and military strength puts it on a potential collision course with the US. However, while the economy of China is growing, that does not mean that war between the two powers is certain or even likely. The economic success stories of Japan and Germany in the last few decades show that countries do not necessarily translate their economic power into military power. Although China is now the second largest economy, there is still a large gap between China and the US in terms of comprehensive power. For now, China's ambitions seem moderate and can easily be accommodated by the US. China shows a desire for economic interdependence abroad to protect its own internal security and to control a small sphere of influence. It shows almost no appetite for military investments that would allow it to project its power globally. Chinese President Xi Jinping attempted to remodel his country’s export-focused economy to one driven by domestic consumption. He has pursued an active Chinese foreign policy that is safeguarding the country’s interests, something he called the “China Dream”. After a century of weakness, exploitation and national humiliation by Western colonialists, China is now being rebuilt as an emerging power. If China does not challenge the US's predominant position in the world, this is very unlikely to provoke a war. The rivalry between China and the US has now extended to trade, technology, geopolitics and political ideology, but shows no sign of an impending war. However, there are some parallels to other Thucydides trap case studies, such as the Cold War. Like before, two great powers face off with competing political and social systems. Once again, the conflict is fought through subversive activities around the world, and key technologies, such as the 5G network and Artificial Intelligence, play a crucial role in this. Some are saying that the situation between the US and China is a new Cold War. So far there is no clear bloc formation between the West led by America or a sphere of influence dominated by China. The main reason suggested is that the world is currently too intertwined economically to be split easily by a new Iron Curtain. Even if there is no military confrontation, a Cold War between the US and China would be an enormous burden on the global economy. [4] Highly interdependent relationships have increased the cost of serious conflicts between countries. So, it is in the interests of American allies, China, and the US to maintain mutually restrained competition rather than end up in a war. These countries (ex. Germany) tend to play a moderating role between both powers. Therefore, further economic cooperation and inclusion of China in expanding the 5G network, rather than exclusion, would be the necessary steps to avoid conflicts. The COVID-19 pandemic could be treated as a common enemy too. Viruses, after all, do not respect borders. No country acting on its own can win the war against this invisible enemy. For now, the common interest in defeating the COVID-19 crisis might have offered a way out of the Thucydides Trap. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized China over its handling of the pandemic. Although his attitude toward China may largely be about election politics, it's no lie that the spread of COVID-19 brought new challenges to the relationship between the world’s two largest economies. It may seem, for now, like good short-term politics for President Trump to criticize China. However, in the long term the two countries may have more to gain from cooperation than confrontation, though this is highly debated among national security experts. Despite the narrowing power gap between China and the US in political, economic, cultural and social aspects, the disparity between them remains striking in terms of per capita income, military strength, education level, scientific achievement, and technological advancement . [5] Furthermore, the US exercises nearly full dominance over the global commons and international strategic channels, extensive influence and decision-making power in international organizations, and an outsized presence in international cultural arenas. [6] For the time being, since China cannot seriously challenge the American predominance in the world, the US is very unlikely to provoke war with China but will rather seek comparatively more peaceful means of dealing with its new rival. [7] A direct conflict seems no longer to be a viable option for both countries. That a war is not inevitable is evident from the fact that it has been prevented in the past. When states have avoided war, it required some adjustments in attitudes and actions not just of the challenger but also of the challenged. China and the US need to continue strengthening their communication and cooperation. These past situations also demonstrate how the public’s opinion plays a role in avoiding conflicts. Having in memory the huge losses and casualties caused by the two world wars, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The global public’s common hope is for a stable international environment that would allow them to enjoy the benefits of economic development and improved living standards. As political scientist Graham Allison once said: ‘The rise of a 5,000 year old civilization with 1.3 billion people is not a problem that can be solved. It is a state, a chronic state, that has to be managed throughout generations!’ [8]

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › AT China !

No risk of US-China war or escalation

Lieven ‘20 [Anatol Lieven holds a doctorate in political science from Jesus College, Cambridge, is a professor at Georgetown University and a visiting professor at King's College London, “Stay Calm About China,” 8-26-20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/china-existential-threat-united-states-xi-jinping/]

Rivalry with China should thus be conceptualized by the U.S. foreign and security establishment as a limited competition in particular areas, not a universal and existential struggle between good and evil. Apart from anything else, to center the whole of U.S. policy on struggle with China will be a terrible distraction from what are in fact much greater threats to the well-being of U.S. citizens: at home, economic inequality and racial tensions; in the world as a whole, climate change and its consequences. The coronavirus pandemic should also help the United States better to understand the real interests of ordinary Americans. Whatever the administration of President Donald Trump may now be trying to suggest, it has been a virus (albeit made worse by Chinese and U.S. governmental incompetence), and not a rival great power, that at the time of writing has killed more Americans than died in the Vietnam War and Korean War put together. U.S. competition with China is real, serious, and bound to increase. That is inevitable, both for economic reasons and because of the incompatibility between Chinese ambitions and the U.S. establishment’s determination to maintain U.S. global leadership. However, it is not an existential struggle between two fundamentally opposed systems, nor is it a universal struggle that must be fought in every corner of the world. A comparison with basic features of the Cold War should make the difference clear. China is not promoting communist revolution around the world. In fact there is no evidence at all that it is aiming at the overthrow of existing states. As a great capitalist trading power, it has a strong stake in the stability of markets and the safety of Chinese investments. If the Chinese government in principle prefers authoritarian states, it has as yet done nothing to foster such systems. Chinese influence operations in the West are real and should be resisted, but they are intended to influence Western policies toward China, not cause state collapse and revolution. And the United States has an old and tried arsenal of international influence operations of its own that it can deploy in response. As to the U.S. political system, the impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems. It was not China that killed George Floyd. As a capitalist trading state, China is dependent on the health and stability of the international capitalist system. Unlike the Soviet Union, it needs a degree of rules-based international order—though not if (as seen from China) this means a system in which the United States sets all the rules and then breaks them whenever it wishes. On the other hand, China has certainly sought with great determination to increase its international influence through international capitalism. Some of these efforts (like Huawei’s role in fifth-generation telecommunications technology) must be strongly resisted. They do not however as yet greatly exceed past U.S. patterns of international economic influence. The impact of Chinese (and Russian) covert propaganda on U.S. politics has been minimal compared to the impact of the United States’ own domestic problems. It was not China that killed George Floyd. The defense and strengthening of U.S. capitalism in competition with China is indeed essential, but needs to be seen not just in terms of tariffs on Chinese imports (as the Trump administration has seen it), but as requiring a massive program of U.S. domestic economic reform and investment in infrastructure and technology—in other words, the way the Chinese government conducts this competition. When it comes to hard geopolitical influence and the expansion of Chinese military power, with one important exception China has proceeded with great caution. In the Indian Ocean, until now the Chinese program of port construction has been entirely commercial (except for a small refueling and repair station in Djibouti, next to a much bigger U.S. one). The Chinese naval presence in the region is insignificant compared to that of the United States, let alone the United States plus India. Above all, China has not sought to exploit U.S. difficulties in the Middle East, despite multiple opportunities to do so. The contrast between the strategies of Beijing and Moscow in this regard is extremely marked. Readers may wish to imagine, for example, the impact on the United States’ position in the region if China were to devote even a fraction of its resources to a full-scale program of strengthening Iran economically and militarily. The reasons for this Chinese abstinence are not of course altruistic. In the first place, China as the world’s greatest energy importer depends on the stability of the Persian Gulf—far more than does the United States, since thanks to fracking the United States is now virtually self-sufficient in oil and gas. Secondly, as a Chinese official told me a decade ago, China has studied the repeated and disastrous messes that the United States has gotten into (and sometimes caused) in the Middle East, and has no desire to follow suit. There is no evidence that this very sensible approach has changed in the years since.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › AT China !

China is restrained – PLA commanders know they’re unprepared for new wars

Blasko ’19 [Dennis J. Blasko is a retired lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army with 23 years of service as a military intelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China, former Army attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong, “The Chinese Military Speaks to Itself, Revealing Doubts,” 2-18-19, ]

After becoming Central Military Commission chairman in 2012, Xi has sought to raise the overall level of the PLA’s combat readiness, embodied in the slogan “be able to fight and win” (néng dǎzhàng, dǎ shèngzhàng, 能打仗、打胜仗). By raising its warfighting capabilities and demonstrating them to the world, the PLA seeks to enhance its deterrence posture directed at a variety of threats to China’s national interests and to achieve China’s political objectives without fighting. In 2013, Xi revived the Deng-era slogan the “Two Inabilities” (liǎnggè nénglì bùgòu, 两个能力不够), which says the PLA’s ability to fight a modern war and the ability of its cadres (officers) at all levels to command modern war are not sufficient. The first half of this formula is similar to the first part of the “Two Incompatibles,” but the second portion is a general criticism of PLA combat leadership capabilities. That same year, the “Two Big Gaps” (liǎnggè chājù hěn dà, 两个差距很大) often began to accompany the “Two Inabilities” in usage. The “Two Big Gaps” speaks of “big gaps” between the PLA’s military modernization level and the requirements for national security compared to the level of the world’s advanced militaries. It reiterates leadership concern over PLA fighting abilities in general, but compares them to other advanced militaries, highlighting the relative gap between Chinese and advanced military capabilities. One of the few instances of a Chinese-origin, English-language reference to the “Two Big Gaps” and “Two Inabilities” was published in 2016. However, it does not include the two slogans themselves and casual readers could miss the larger context and history behind this passage: Improving the army’s combat strength has become a major focus. But the modernization level of the Chinese army is inadequate to safeguard national security, and it lags far behind advanced global peers. The Chinese army is not capable enough of waging modern warfare, and officers lack command skills for modern warfare. The following year, the “Three Whethers” (sāngè néngbùnéng, 三个能不能) asked (a) whether the PLA can maintain the party’s absolute leadership, (b) whether it can fight victoriously when needed, and (c) whether commanders at all levels are competent to lead troops and command in war. This slogan adds a political dimension to concerns about the military’s operational and leadership abilities. (Other slogans, such as the “Five Excesses” (五多) and “Four Winds [or Four Bad Styles]” (四风), that focus on political and ideological issues, are not be addressed here.) However, the “Five Incapables [Cannots]” (wǔgè bùhuì, 五个不会) from 2015 is probably the most important criticism of all. It emphasizes that “some” officers cannot judge situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions, make operational decisions, deploy troops, nor deal with unexpected situations. These are the basics of combat leadership, applicable at all levels of war, for all militaries. This appraisal and the “Two Inabilities,” which also mentions leadership problems, are now the most frequently repeated slogans in the Chinese military media. Since 2006 when the “Two Incompatibles” was first promulgated, these five assessments have appeared in over 500 articles in the PLA Daily alone. Harvard Professor Alastair Iain Johnston has graphed the number of articles in which one or more of these terms each has been observed annually through 2018 in the PLA Daily: The total number of PLA Daily articles in which the following assessments have appeared is: “Two Incompatibles”: 120 articles “Two Inabilities”: 169 “Two Big Gaps”: 78 “Three Whethers”: 27 “Five Incapables”: 163 Total: 557 These self-criticisms are used specifically to justify many training events and leadership activities. For example, the 17 Stride and Firepower-series trans-regional exercises in 2016 were expressly designed to resolve commanders’ “Five Incapables” problem; during the summer of 2018, all four services held senior leadership training focused on the same set of leadership issues. The “Two Inabilities” was cited specifically as a reason to improve realistic training when the updated Military Training Outline was disseminated in 2018. The “Peace Disease” In addition to the general assessments identified above, the PLA leadership acknowledges that the force has developed lax attitudes and practices resulting from four decades without fighting a major campaign against a foreign enemy. Current vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Zhang Youxia identified this weakness in 2009 when he was Shenyang Military Region commander: Today, the PLA hasn’t been in actual combat for many years now, yet the fires of war are burning throughout the world. In this area, the gap between the PLA and foreign militaries is growing day by day. This is an actual problem. The Chinese media frequently urges the troops to overcome the “peace disease” (hépíng bìng, 和平病), “peacetime habits” (hépíng jīxí, 和平积习), and “peacetime practices [or problems]” (hépíng jībì, 和平积弊). In an exchange email, Johnston indicated the term “peace disease” was first observed in the late 1980s and that these three terms have appeared roughly 565 times in the PLA Daily from 2012 to mid-2018. They continue to be used regularly in 2019 as shorthand for challenges to be overcome. The recently announced regulation to improve centralized training inspections specifically cited the need to eliminate “peacetime practices.” If soldiers have a peacetime attitude and do not expect to go to war during their period of service, they may take shortcuts, develop bad habits, or just “go through the motions” during training, compromising unit readiness. Rectifying this problem is an important motive behind Xi’s current emphasis on raising combat readiness. Xi’s call to be able to “fight and win” and “cure the peace disease,” however, does not imply that the PLA should undertake a military campaign to test its warfighting capabilities. Rather it is the equivalent of the U.S. military’s priority to be ready to “Fight Tonight.”

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › AT China !

China won’t escalate conflicts – economic struggles and geography check

Hass 3-3-21 [Ryan Hass is the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, was the China Director at the National Security Council and served in the U.S. embassy in Beijing, “How Alarmism Undermines American Strategy,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-03/china-not-ten-feet-tall]

In recent years, Beijing has made plain its revisionist ambitions. It seeks adjustments to the distribution of power in the international system, the security order in Asia, the role and remit of international institutions, the free flow of uncensored information across borders, and the liberal nature of the existing international order. It wants its Leninist political model and state-led economic model to be accepted and respected. It has signaled that it will brook no challenges to its conception of its territorial boundaries or its management of domestic affairs. And it has declared a national goal of becoming the world leader in a growing number of advanced technologies, from artificial intelligence to electric vehicles. But it is hardly a foregone conclusion that China will travel a linear path toward realizing its goals. For an accurate measure of the challenges China poses to U.S. interests, Beijing’s strengths must be evaluated alongside its vulnerabilities. Xi and his advisers face as stiff a set of challenges as almost anyone else in the world. The United States remains the stronger power in the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Consider China’s seemingly unstoppable economic ascent. In reality, the challenges over the medium term are significant. China is at risk of growing old before it grows rich, becoming a graying society with degrading economic fundamentals that impede growth. The working-age population is already shrinking; by 2050, China will go from having eight workers per retiree now to two workers per retiree. Moreover, it has already squeezed out most of the large productivity gains that come with a population becoming more educated and urban and adopting technologies to make manufacturing more efficient. China is running out of productive places to invest in infrastructure, and rising debt levels will further complicate its growth path. In the past decade alone, China’s debt has more than doubled, from 141 percent of GDP in 2008 to over 300 percent in 2019. Ballooning debt will make it harder for China to buy its way up the ladder from low-end manufacturing to high value-added production, as South Korea and Taiwan did at similar levels of development. Meanwhile, the political system is growing increasingly sclerotic as power becomes more concentrated around Xi. Once renowned for technocratic competence, the Chinese Communist Party is becoming better known for Leninist rigidity. Space for local policy experimentation appears to be shrinking, as more decisions become concentrated in Beijing. The top-down nature of the system has also made it more difficult for officials to revisit past decisions or report bad news to the top. This dynamic likely contributed to the slow early response to the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan. Although the leadership has made notable gains in alleviating extreme poverty, it also has become increasingly anxious and uncompromising in clamping down on perceived challenges to its authority. Beijing’s rigid ethos for imposing its will along the country’s peripheral regions, including but not limited to Xinjiang, may bring future problems. Externally, China faces formidable obstacles to its ambitions. Beijing’s repression at home, assertiveness abroad, and efforts to conceal critical initial details surrounding the coronavirus pandemic have contributed to rising negative views toward China. According to Pew polling from October 2020, unfavorable views of China have reached historic highs across a diverse set of countries. Beijing is also likely to encounter rising budgetary constraints on its massive overseas initiatives in the coming years, as it contends with both a cooling economy and rising demands from an aging society. From a strategic perspective, China’s military likely will remain relatively constrained for the foreseeable future in its ability to project force beyond its immediate periphery, let alone to marry power projection with political and economic influence on a global scale—definitional features of a superpower. China confronts a uniquely challenging geography. It is bordered by 14 countries, four of which are nuclear armed and five of which harbor unresolved territorial disputes with Beijing. These include an aging but wealthy Japan, a rising and nationalistic India, a revanchist Russia, a technologically powerful South Korea, and a dynamic and determined Vietnam. All these countries have national identities that resist subordination to China or its interests. And the United States maintains a constant forward-deployed military presence in the region, supported by basing and access agreements in countries along China’s periphery.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › AT UBI Helps Small Businesses

UBI fails for small business – cant solve rising costs

Krämer 20 - a German trade unionist and politician

Ralf, 2020, Abstract of "Universal Basic Income - not really an alternative." International Union Rights, vol. 27 no. 3, 2020, Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/iur.2020.a838153.

24 | International Union Rights | 27/3 FOCUS | IMPACTS OF COVID-19 ON WORK AND THE CHALLENGE FOR UNION RIGHTS Universal Basic Income – not really an alternative The idea of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) sounds intriguing at first: everyone should be guaranteed an income which covers their basic needs. Who would argue with that? Taking a closer look, however, there is much uncertainty as to what exactly is meant and how a UBI should work and be financed. This was also evident during the Covid 19 pandemic, when proposals were made to use a temporary basic income to cushion the economic consequences for the population and especially its particularly vulnerable sections. For example a study for the United Nations Development Programme proposed this for the world’s three billion poorest people. But this would be neither universal nor sufficient – in average US$ 2.50 per person per day. In the paper there is also a positive reference to Spain, where a ‘basic income’ was introduced. There it concerns however an even worse Spanish variant of the German model of basic security for needy unemployed (‘Hartz IV’), which is criticised by the trade unions as too low and too repressive. UBI as a rescue against the crisis? For Germany this discussion makes little sense. This is a country with a highly developed social welfare system, which showed its performance in the ongoing crisis – despite of all problems and legitimate criticisms. This system is characterised by social insurance schemes, which involve the vast majority of the population – in particular, dependent employees and their families – which provide benefits on the basis of contributions paid. Especially, the short-time work allowance saved millions from falling into unemployment. But nevertheless many mini-jobbers, self-employed and small entrepreneurs are particularly hard hit. They often have low incomes anyway and need every euro, but do not receive short-time work benefits or unemployment benefits because they are not covered by unemployment insurance. If they are needy, they can apply for basic security, but this is below the German poverty line. For the German UBI community this is rather a deterrent example, they see a ‘real UBI’ as the fundamental alternative to this means-tested basic provision. A UBI as they mean it is intended to be an income that the government pays unconditionally to each person, regardless of what income that person receives or what assets they possess. There is no means testing and each person receives the same amount (only children less). The UBI should be high enough to cover basic needs and guarantee social participation. The search for gainful employment would not be required. As a response to the Covid 19 crisis more than 400,000 people supported a petition that demands the introduction of an unconditional basic income of 800-1200 euro per person and month in Germany for 6 months. This would cost about 500 billion euro, which would be 3 or 4 times the complete public expenditure on education. But why should everyone receive such an unconditional basic income (BGE) as a measure against the crisis, although for many, fortunately the majority of employees, the income is not at all lost, but continues as before? For the majority of the employees hit by the crisis the short-time work allowance or even the unemployment benefit is better than such a UBI would be. On the other hand, such an UBI would not be a rescue for the many self-employed and small businesses that are on the verge of bankruptcy because their income is lost but they still have to pay various running costs, rents, etc. Targeted aid for those who need it would also make more economic sense so that they can get started again after the crisis. And this would be far less expensive because far fewer people than the entire population would receive it. Arguments against demands for a UBI In principle, the various arguments that speak against a UBI also apply to a corona crisis UBI. Why should the vast majority of the population receive this money, although they do not need it at all? Why should everyone get the same amount, no matter how high their...

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › AT UBI Helps Small Businesses

California proves UBI would result in a tax on small business and force them to go out of business

Wilford 22 --- Andrew Wilford, DIRECTOR OF NTUF'S INTERSTATE COMMERCE INITIATIVE. 8/22/2022 (“San Francisco Would Fund UBI With Tax Hit on Small Businesses”. https://www.ntu.org/foundation/detail/san-francisco-would-fund-ubi-with-tax-hit-on-small-businesses. Date Accessed: 7-21-2023.)

First and foremost, Prop K would represent an undue burden on interstate commerce, one that is likely to face challenges under the dormant commerce clause. The structure of the tax ensures that San Francisco-based businesses face significantly lower tax rates than businesses that sell into the city, as Tables A and B show, with no justification.

A main reason the United States has a Constitution rather than Articles of Confederation is to prevent sub-national bodies from attempting to fill their coffers with revenue from non-residents in order to offer their residents lower tax rates. Not only is this manifestly unfair, it is also bad for the country as a whole, as it unmoors the taxpayer from representation in the legislative body taxing them. Absent a federal government protecting taxpayers from states and localities trying to “import” revenue from each others’ citizens, interstate commerce suffers.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › AT UBI Helps innovation

UBI reduces entrepreneurship and innovation – it would just replace current social safety nets, doesn’t draw in financers, and causes bankruptcy of companies

Seamans 17 --- Robert Seamans is an Associate Professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business and Director of the Center for the Future of Management. In 2015-2016 they served as a Senior Economist on President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers where they worked on a wide range of policies relating to technology, innovation and entrepreneurship. 6/6/2017 (“Universal Basic Income Is Not An Innovation Policy.” Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/06/06/universal-basic-income-is-not-an-innovation-policy/?sh=6018e38f2e8f. Date Accessed: 7-21-2023.)

UBI Is Unlikely To Stimulate Entrepreneurship And Innovation

In my view, while there may be other benefits to UBI, the argument that UBI might stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation suffers from two key problems. First, the U.S. economy already has multiple safety nets in place for would-be entrepreneurs and innovators, including bankruptcy laws, unemployment insurance, the Affordable Care Act (which allows employees to leave their firms without fear of losing health care), and other programs described below. It is not clear that replacing one set of safety nets with another will stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › UBI Hurts Economy

UBI costs too much and hurts economic activity and growth.

Ezrati 19 (Milton, MSS in mathematical economics from Birmingham University in England and a BA in economics from the State University of New York at Buffalo, “Universal Basic Income: A Thoroughly Wrongheaded Idea,” Forbes, 1/15/2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2019/01/15/universal-basic-income-a-thoroughly-wrongheaded-idea/?sh=66ecf71545e1)

Cost is an obvious consideration. The most quoted schemes today would, according calculations from Commerce Department data, cost the federal government between $2 and 4 trillion a year, amounting to a 50% increase in current federal outlays or more than 10% of last year’s gross domestic product (GDP). Such a draw on the economy would markedly burden taxpayers and increase government debt with all the associated economic ills. At the same time, such a huge draw on federal financial resources would also preclude other government priorities, such as infrastructure refurbishment, including the building of hospitals and the construction of affordable housing. Both effects would undermine productive incentives and otherwise constrain both public and private investment in the economy. Economic activity and growth potentials would suffer accordingly, not the least because UBI payouts would do little to invest in the future except if recipients really do use the funds for education and training. Not surprisingly, several UBI proponents suggest ways the country might finance the entitlement. These, though sometimes imaginative, would hardly lift the associated economic burdens. Some would sell off government land. That could certainly raise a lot of money initially, perhaps even enough to finance the giveaway for a while. As the government disposed of the land, however, this source of revenue would dwindle and fail to support what the proposers describe as a huge, ongoing entitlement. In any case, such an answer would surely provoke intense resistance from the green lobby. Other UBI proponents suggest a tax on the market capitalization of public companies. One proposal calls for an initial 3% levy on all corporations followed by a lower ongoing tax. Some would add a 5% levy on initial public offerings and a 3% tax on mergers. A carbon tax occasionally makes it into the mix. Even if these financing options could balance the accountant’s books, and that is doubtful, they, like other taxes, would still have ill effects on economic incentives as well as investing and hence on growth prospects generally.