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US Legal [United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition. https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/]
The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.
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Brian Galle, 21. Professor of Law at Georgetown University. A.B., Harvard; J.D., Columbia; LL.M., Georgetown. "The American Rescue Plan and the Future of the Safety Net," Yale Law Journal Forum 131 (2021): 561-586.
This is the familiar paradox of cooperative-federalism doctrine. When the Court steps in to "protect" states from federal commandeering or coercion, it pushes Congress towards two extreme options: abandon its plans or make them wholly federal with little meaningful policy role for states. 9 Sometimes this gambit will foil legislative efforts, but sometimes it will instead move us towards nationalization. Depending on which prevails more often, efforts to protect state autonomy may instead result in less.
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Brian Galle, 21. Professor of Law at Georgetown University. A.B., Harvard; J.D., Columbia; LL.M., Georgetown. "The American Rescue Plan and the Future of the Safety Net," Yale Law Journal Forum 131 (2021): 561-586.
By dollars and popular awareness, two key pillars of the American Rescue Plan (ARPA) are continuations of the Economic Impact Payments (better known as "the Checks") and the unemployment insurance (UI) expansions begun in 2020.1 Both began in the CARES Act, as part of the national response to the massive workplace disruptions caused by the COVID-1 9 pandemic.2 But they are a mismatched pair. Where UI relief is elaborately targeted, capped, and constrained by an array of eligibility and filing requirements, the Checks were indiscriminately distributed to households earning less than $15o,ooo.3 Behind the scenes as the ARPA was being drafted, though, it seemed that these two facts were tightly related. Americans needed the Checks precisely because UI -long intended to be the nation's bulwark against this exact kind of widespread work interruption - had failed to reach many needy families.4 UI's failure wasn't an accident or an oversight. As Florida Governor Ron DeSantis observed of his state's UI system, unemployment insurance in the United States is designed with "pointless roadblocks" to frustrate people so that they will abandon their claims.' Known as the "ordeal" mechanism, this strategy is recommended by some economists as a way of supposedly targeting safety-net programs to those who need them most.6 The government's choice to deliver safety-net programs jointly by states and the federal government, through our system of cooperative federalism, produces similar frustrations.7 Indeed, ordeals and federalism are interrelated: ordeals are not unique to cooperative programs, but the incentives and structures of cooperative federalism allow them to thrive.
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Robert Ressetar, 03. Senior Staff member of APA, “The Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository from a Federalism Perspective,” 23 Journal of Land, Resources, & Environmental Law 219, 2003, Lexis.
To enforce the national environmental standards, most federal legislation employs what has been referred to as "cooperative federalism," in which the federal and state governments share regulatory responsibility.n21 Cooperative federalism works through a combination of financial and regulatory incentives by which the federal government encourages the states to assume regulatory responsibility for federal standards, thereby allowing a degree of local control and consideration of local situations, made more palatable to the states by means of cash subsidies. An additional incentive for state participation is the threat that the federal government will assume regulatory and enforcement authority if the state fails to fulfill its regulatory burdens. However, this implies that the states have the option of withdrawing their participation and abandoning the field to the federal government. n22 Critics claim that "cooperative federalism has proved better in theory than in practice" as either the regulated or benefited parties gain control of the federal program, or, in attempting to avoid capture, the programs become unduly expensive.n23 However, the federal government has an alternative to cooperative federalism in establishing national environmental standards. Although rarely used in the environmental arena, the federal government may use its [*222] preemptive powers under the Commerce Clause to directly regulate the use of environmentally sensitive articles of interstate commerce,n24 as it has done in the Toxic Substances Control Act. n25 Preemption as a means of environmental protection has generally been restricted to regulation of products that are nationally distributed, and the courts have preferred not to infer preemption in cases on federal pollution control laws absent a clear congressional intent to preempt. N26
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Jonathan H. Adler, 06, "When Is Two a Crowd: The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation" (2006). Faculty Publications. Paper 178. http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/178
Federal policies that directly influence state regulatory decisions are only half of the picture. Just as federal action may encourage or discourage state regulatory action directly, federal action may indirectly, or even incidentally, encourage or discourage state regulatory action. Federal policies will facilitate greater state regulation where such actions reduce the costs of state implementation, such as by subsidizing necessary research, or where federal policies increase the demand for given regulatory policies at the state level so as to alter or “set” state policy agendas. Federal policies will discourage state regulatory action where they “signal” that state regulatory action is excessive or unnecessary, or where they reduce the marginal benefits of adopting state regulatory programs—benefits either to the general welfare, those interest groups demanding state regulatory activity, or to the policy-makers responsible for adopting the relevant policies. Such crowding out is most likely to occur where federal regulations serve as a substitute for state regulations, though there may be other factors that have a similar effect. Adding in these indirect inºuences— facilitation, agenda setting, signaling, and crowding out—produces a more complete matrix of the ways in which federal policies inºuence state regulatory choices (see Figure 1b below).
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Alan Greenblatt, 10. News writer for npr.org and a former staff writer for Governing magazine, July/August 2010, “Is the president exploiting the states’ fiscal woes to push his policies?” http://www.ncsl.org/magazine/federalism-in-the-age-of-obama.aspx
Obama understands that he has states over a barrel financially. He has shown a great deal of interest in collaborating with states when he can, and he certainly is willing to federalize ideas that bubble up from them. But he also understands that their budget situations have diminished the ability of states to set their own courses.¶ The federal spigot may be about to shut off, as this spring’s struggles to find extra money for Medicaid and teachers demonstrated. And the White House and a Congress riven by partisanship may leave plenty for states to do on their own. Still, this is not an administration that will support a federalism that provides more money to states to focus on their own plans and initiatives.¶ “This is an administration that doesn’t take the states and locals as it finds them. It has an agenda,” says Paul Posner, a federalism expert at George Mason University in Virginia. “The focus will be on national goals. I can see this administration pursuing additional ways to put money down in the state and local sectors but tying it to strong national goals. It’s going to have to be a twofer.”¶ The result might be a kind of symbiotic federalism. Washington needs states to carry out its grand visions on the ground, but the administration also fully intends to give them numerous pushes in its preferred direction.¶ Most federal money goes out to states through set formulas. But the Obama administration is clearly interested in pursuing variations on its Race to the Top model, using competitive grants to get states to dance to its tune.¶ If the effort at the federal level is successful, it will put a new twist on the old observation from Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis that states are the laboratories of democracy. ¶ “Rather than states being the laboratories of democracy in and of themselves,” says Howard, of Federal Funds Information for States, “some of them will become the federal government’s laboratories of democracy.”
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Kangoh Lee, 22. Kangoh Lee is a Professor of Economics at San Diego State University. “Federalism and primary-income inequality.” Applied Economics, 54:54 (2022): 6303-6321, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2022.2083568
Governments, federal or provincial or local, of a country certainly affect income inequality through redistributive policies, taxes and transfers, among individuals and among jurisdictions as well. This paper, however, concerns federalism and inequality in primary incomes (or before-tax-and-transfer incomes) rather than secondary or net incomes (or after-tax-and-transfer incomes), and the next section discusses the importance of primary-income inequality.1
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G. Jason Jolley, 22. Jolley is a Professor of Rural Economic Development and director of the Master of Public Administration program at Ohio University's Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio University. “Basic income: a 50-state economic impact analysis.”Journal of Financial Economic Policy 14.6, 2022. pp. 768-777.
This paper focuses on the SEED as an example program for modeling the economic impact
of a basic income across all 50 states. The SEED program provided $500 monthly ($6,000 per year) to 125 residents of Stockton over a 24-month period (West et al., 2021). While there were no income limitations, recipients were required to live in a neighborhood with a mean income at or below $46,033 (West et al., 2021). The SEED program tracked purchases made on a debit card and found that aggregate data demonstrated the $500 in income was spent on food at grocery stores, sales/merchandise at retailers like Wal-Mart (which were also likely to be food purchases), and utilities and transportation (West et al., 2021). Participants in the SEED program experienced multiple positive outcomes, including less income volatility, improved mental health and greater full-time employment (West et al., 2021). These consumption patterns are also consistent with hypothetical studies conducted by other scholars. Garcia-Murillo and MacInnes (2021) conducted a survey of individuals regarding expected consumption patterns should they receive a UBI of $6,000 annually (e.g. the same amount of the SEED study and the same estimate used in this paper). While the Garcia-Murillo and MacInnes (2021) study did not limit participants’ incomes in their hypothetical study, they found the low amount of $6,000 annually would not change the spending or consumption patterns for most participants, but it would alleviate challenges such as paying off debt.
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Jeffrey A. Miron, 11. Senior lecturer and director of undergraduate studies in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. “Rethinking Redistribution.” National Affairs, Winter 2011. https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/rethinking-redistribution
The ideal system of redistribution to benefit the poor in America, then, would involve mainly cash transfers. Possible exceptions might include vouchers for education and health insurance. Where possible, these exceptions should be managed at the state level; to the extent that the federal government is involved, it should supply funding to the states through block grants — which provide a set amount of money to the states, generally based on each state's population, and allow the states to make their own decisions about how to allocate the funds. This, in turn, allows more decisions about benefit allocation to be made by people closer to the ground — people who have a better understanding of the lives and needs of benefit recipients. It also gives the states more flexibility to experiment with different approaches. Indeed, the negative income-tax system as a whole might well work best at the state level — that is, if it replaced both federal and state redistribution efforts with 50 state-level negative income-tax systems. Advocates of redistribution fear that state-level negative income taxes would start a "race to the bottom," in which states slash benefits to avoid attracting poor populations. But in fact, numerous examples — including minimum-wage laws, TANF and Medicaid provision, and pre-1935 state-level Social Security programs — show that states can exhibit substantial altruism, so that state-level anti-poverty efforts would not be miserly. Concern over in-migration might nevertheless counter political pressures in favor of excessive expansion, yielding a better balance than a federal system could attain. And state experimentation would no doubt produce some innovations and improvements that a federal system would fail to discover. Of course, a transition from our current system to a negative income tax might be easier if it first involved a transition to one federal negative income tax. In an ideal world, however, such a system would eventually be turned over to the states.
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William Magnuson, 20. Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A., Universita di Padova; A.B., Princeton University, “The Race to the Middle,” Notre Dame Law Review 95.3 (2020): 1183-1231. Available online: https://ndlawreview.org/publications/archives/volume-95-issue-3/
How does federalism affect the quality of state law? It is a difficult question that scholars have struggled with, and disagreed about, for decades. At its core, though, the question is a simple one. States are free to establish their own laws in a wide variety of areas and thus inevitably face choices about which laws to adopt. In making these choices, states are informed by the laws in place in other states. Their eventual choices will, in turn, inform the choices that other states make about their own laws. Given this dynamic, how should we expect states to act? Scholars that have addressed the question generally fall into one of two camps: those who see federalism as leading to a "race to the bottom"' and those who see it as leading to a "race to the top." 2 The race-to-the-bottom camp views federalism as creating a powerful incentive for states to engage in harmful and inefficient deregulation. According to this line of thought, state legislatures desire to attract corporations to their jurisdictions in order to increase tax revenues, create jobs, and generally improve their economies. But in order to appeal to the corporations and corporate executives that make decisions about where to locate business, states must adopt regulations that are more permissive than the regulations in force in other states. As each state adopts progressively looser regulations in order to outdo their neighbors, the resulting degradation of standards leads to suboptimal levels of regulation, whether it be in shareholder protections, 3 labor laws, 4 tax levels, 5 or environmental standards. 6 The race-to-the-top camp sees things differently. According to this model of federalism, competition between states on regulatory structures in fact leads to better, more efficient levels of regulation. 7 While the precise dynamics of this process differ depending on the issue area, the basic argument is that if the market is functioning correctly, corporations should benefit from better regulation, not from the absence of it. After all, corporations have constituencies as well, and if their shareholders are regularly fleeced by corporate management or their employees live in polluted cities, they will eventually lobby for change (or go elsewhere). As a result, states have incentives to provide regulations that promote overall prosperity, rather than favoring the narrow interests of the few. Over time, then, states should progressively improve the quality and efficiency of their regulatory structures in order to outcompete their neighboring states. Despite their disagreements, however, both the race-to-the-bottom and race-to-the-top theories share one fundamental assumption-that states race to distinguish their laws from the laws of other states. 8 In other words, for there to be a race upward or downward, states must seek to outdo one another, either by steadily loosening their regulations or steadily tightening them. Both theories take for granted that this dynamic will lead to ever more extreme regulatory structures. But the assumption that interstate competition leads inevitably to differentiation overlooks another powerful aspect of interstate competition that in many ways counteracts the races to the top and bottom. This dynamic, which may usefully be called the "race to the middle," pushes states toward regulatory schemes that are similar or identical to the schemes adopted by sufficiently large numbers of other states. The race to the middle encourages states to focus on harmonizing, not differentiating, their regulatory structures. The race to the middle is driven by four interrelated factors, all of which provide benefits to states from adopting well-established regulatory structures already prevailing in other states. First, states that adopt regulatory structures already existing in other states benefit from informational effects about the benefits and risks of the structure. Second, the prevalence of an already established regulatory structure provides greater familiarity and, thus, certainty to corporations and other regulated actors about the effects of the regulation on their activities, thereby increasing the attractiveness of jurisdictions that adopt that structure. Third, states benefit from network effects when they adopt regulatory structures that are interoperable with the regulatory structures in place in other states. And finally, states that adopt well-established regulatory structures that are common across the nation are less likely to face regulatory intervention from federal lawmakers. In many ways, the race to the middle is a reassuring phenomenon. It suggests that regulatory competition does not inevitably lead to ever more extreme forms of regulation. It counteracts countervailing pressures for states to race to the bottom by deregulating at the expense of consumers and citizens or overregulating to the detriment of beneficial corporate activity. And it works to reduce the magnitude and prevalence of conflicting laws that can raise the cost of doing business across borders.
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Economic Security Project, 22. The Economic Security Project (ESP) works to advance economic prosperity by providing research, supporting campaigns to get from pilot to policy, and working to change narratives about economic inequality and poverty. “States Lead the Way.” “Reimagining the Social Safety Net Through Implementation of a Guaranteed Income.” April 13, 2022.
Economic Security Project, Shriver Center on Poverty Law. Report.
Dividend from an Invested Public Fund
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Michael Tanner, 17. Tanner was a Cato Institute senior fellow and headed research into a variety of domestic policies, with an emphasis on poverty and social welfare policy, health care, and Social Security and entitlement reform. “Is an Allowance for All Americans as Crazy as It Sounds?” CATO Institute June 2, 2017. https://www.cato.org/commentary/allowance-all-americans-crazy-it-sounds
State and local governments spend another $300 billion per year on anti‐poverty programs. Yet, despite thisroughly $1 trillion investment, poverty rates (even using more accurate alternative measures) have not significantly improved since the 1970s, and economic mobility among the poor remains stagnant.
A universal basic income would have several advantages over the current welfare system. It would obviously be simpler and far more transparent than the hodgepodge of existing anti‐poverty programs. With different, often contradictory, eligibility levels, work requirements and other restrictions, our current welfare system is a nightmare of unaccountability that fails to effectively help people transition out of these programs and escape poverty.
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Economic Security Project, 22. The Economic Security Project (ESP) works to advance economic prosperity by providing research, supporting campaigns to get from pilot to policy, and working to change narratives about economic inequality and poverty. “States Lead the Way.” Reimagining the Social Safety Net Through Implementation of a Guaranteed Income.” April 13, 2022.
Economic Security Project, Shriver Center on Poverty Law. Report.
As states consider the creation of a large-scale, publicly funded guaranteed income program, they need to choose how to implement the program. Implementation strategies do not merely affect overall program cost and administration, but they are also highly relevant in determining how publicly funded guaranteed income payments interact with other means-tested public benefits.
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Katherine Landergan, 21. New Jersey bureau chief for POLITICO, and before that was a statehouse reporter for nearly five years. “States faced financial ruin. Now they’re swimming in cash.” July 1, 2021. https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/07/states-financial-status-pandemic-498403
As the coronavirus tore across America last spring, elected leaders and economists feared the worst: the pandemic and resulting financial turmoil would devastate the budgets of states across the nation. Governors pleaded with Washington for a massive bailout. States borrowed billions to close the gap. And Mitch McConnell told them all to go bankrupt. Now, cash is raining down on state capitals as the economy rebounds faster than virtually anyone expected. The rich got richer as the stock market boomed. Businesses are begging workers to come back, juicing pay and raising prices to cover the costs. And Congress, in the end, did come through with a mountain of aid meant to plug deficits from Honolulu to Augusta. Governors and lawmakers, who months ago thought they would be making deep cuts to their budgets, are instead facing the very unusual problem of how to spend bundles of money. These state leaders, emboldened by the brighter tax revenues and the hundreds of billions of dollars provided by the federal government, are launching transportation projects, cutting stimulus checks and even paying down debt. “No one would have ever dreamed that we would have this kind of funding,” said New Jersey Senate President Steve Sweeney, a Democrat whose state just enacted a budget with a multibillion-dollar surplus. That’s not to say the needs weren’t significant, or that every state has since seen the same surge in revenue. All incurred massive costs from the pandemic, and the need for social programs only increased as the poorest Americans were hit the hardest. But from coast to coast, governors and lawmakers who were preparing to make difficult, politically-challenging moves are now faced with a surprise windfall. This is leading to partisan and intraparty feuds in statehouses over what to spend the cash on, and when, and setting up kitchen-table debates over what’s more important: Spending money now to boost the economy or saving for future problems.
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Howard Chernick, 07. Howard Chernick is a Professor of Economics at Hunter College in New York. “A Reconsideration of the Optimal Assignment of Redistribution Under Fiscal Federalism.” Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association, Vol. 100, 100th Annual Conference on Taxation (November 15-17, 2007), pp. 216-224.
Taking into account the political and economic costs of redistribution at both the federal and subnational levels, I argue that, while the central government should play the primary role, optimal redistribution in a federal system requires sharing of fiscal responsibility between central and subnational governments. While too much decentralization leads to suboptimal redistribution in low capacity or weak preference states, too much centralization can lead to welfare losses in high capacity or strong preference states. The appropriate degree of sharing depends on the variation in fiscal capacity and need across jurisdictions, and on the social marginal cost of subnational redistribution, relative to the social marginal cost of national redistribution. My assessment of the evidence is that at the state level the social cost is relatively small, with little evidence that higher redistribution hurts a state’s economy. The wide and even increasing variation in fiscal capacity across U.S. states over the past 25 years has increased the importance of the central government in raising redistributional levels in states with low fiscal capacities, but at the same time it has increased the importance of supplemental subnational redistribution in the high fiscal capacity states. Both matching grants and block grants may be deficient as national fiscal strategies for eliminating the societal deadweight losses from both decentralized underprovision and centralized underprovision of redistribution.
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Johannes Fleck et al, 21. *Fleck is an economist at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. *Jonathan Heathcote is a monetary advisor in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. *Kjetil Storesletten is the Richard and Beverly Fink Professor of Economics at University of Minnesota and a Fellow of Econometric Society. *Giovanni L. Violante is a Professor of Economics at Princeton University. “Tax and Transfer Progressivity at the US State Level,” September 2021. . This is a working paper. The date we accessed it was 5/22/23.
Income inequality has risen sharply in the United States and other countries during recent decades. This trend has rekindled interest in using government redistribution through taxes and transfers as a policy tool to potentially address adverse aspects of inequality. A natural first step is to measure the redistribution already taking place through the current government tax- and transfer system. Most of the US debate has focused on redistribution at the federal level. But tax revenue at the state and local level is also large, amounting to around 7% of GDP compared to 8% for federal income taxes and 6% for payroll taxes during the last decades. Moreover, there is large variation across US states in terms of the level of per capita tax revenue, in terms of the choice of tax base, and in terms of the level and composition of spending.1 Thus, one might expect substantial differences across states in terms of how much redistribution the tax and transfer system delivers.
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Noah Smith, 21. Smith is an American blogger, journalist, and commentator on economics and current events. Smith obtained his doctorate in Economics from the University of Michigan in 2012 and was an assistant professor of Behavioral Finance at Stony Brook University “Will New Mexico prove a universal basic income can work?” August 14, 2021. https://www.tbsnews.net/analysis/will-new-mexico-prove-universal-basic-income-can-work-288169
Basic income experiments like the one in Stockton, California (on which Santa Fe's experiment is modeled) have achieved promising results with modest monthly sums. Most encouragingly, recipients worked more rather than less, consistent with the idea that a modest stipend represents a hand up instead of just a handout; extra monthly cash gave them the time and mental space to focus on long-term self-betterment. A few hundred extra dollars a month is also unlikely to hurt labor supply; something that's borne out by economic evidence. And while still somewhat expensive, it's at least within the realm of fiscal possibility. States are the perfect place to try out this new, scaled-down basic income. Unlike cities, they have the money to carry out these experiments at a truly universal level; Stockton or Santa Fe can hand out money to a few people, with the help of private foundations, but states have far deeper pockets.
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Bruce J. Casino, 88. Vice President, National Council for the Church and Social Action, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., University of Maryland, 1984; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1987. “Federal Grants-in-Aid: Evolution, Crisis, and Future.” The Urban Lawyer, 20.1 (1988): 25-71. JSTOR.
The late sixties and early seventies saw a resurfacing of interest in this block grant approach. The Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments78 block grant in 1966 and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act79 block grant in 1968 were among the first enacted. During the 1970s, use of the block grant device expanded. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) in 1974, and the social services block grant under title XX of the Social Security Act, also in 1974.80 As was true of the earlier block grants, Congress required that the funds be used to implement certain broad national policies while bowing to federalism by allowing state and local government recipients flexibility in determining the specific programs that would use the federal funds.81 In 1972, revenue sharing was initiated with the enactment of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act.82 This program was a major departure from the consistent prior practice of restricting the use of federal funds to activities promoting congressionally determined priorities. Revenue sharing allowed state and local governments to determine their own priorities for the expenditure of federal funds.83 It was seen as a means of relieving the perceived fiscal crisis facing state and local governments. It was also "envisioned as a means for equalizing the level of public services between the richer and poorer states, by redressing the inability of the poorer state to raise sufficient revenues or to do so only with an oppressive and therefore a counterproductive tax burden."84
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Michael Tanner, 15. Tanner is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and the author of numerous books, including The Poverty of Welfare: Helping Others in Civil Society (2003). “The Pros and Cons of a Guaranteed National Income.” CATO Institute Policy Analysis, May 12, 2015. Number 773. https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa773.pdf
Rep. Paul Ryan has proposed something similar in this country, at least in terms of consolidation. Under Ryan’s plan, states would receive a block grant in lieu of funding for 11 current welfare programs (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or food stamps; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCV); Section 521 Rural Rental Assistance Payments; Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance; Public Housing Capital and Operating Funds; Child Care and Development Fund; the Weatherization Assistance Program; the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP); Community Development Block Grant; and the WIA Dislocated Workers program).123 Unfortunately, however, Ryan’s proposal would send the money to the states rather than to the recipients themselves. As noted, state provision of welfare is better than federal provision, but Ryan also includes a host of strings, severely limiting the ways in which states may use this money. While that may be politically realistic given the resistance to any reform, it therefore represents a federalist version of the current system. Still, it would simplify the current system, and states could theoretically use the money to provide direct payments to individuals. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) proposes going even further, replacing most current federal welfare programs with a state-run “Flex Fund,” under which states could provide benefits the way they want.124 Rubio specifically urges states to replace in-kind programs with cash benefits, although he would leave the final decision up to the states. In fact, Rubio would impose few mandates for how the states should use their money. For example, while Rubio notes the importance of work requirements as a condition for receiving assistance, he would allow states to decide whether or not to impose such restrictions. In theory, states would be free to adopt programs that are very close to the sort of guaranteed-income programs discussed herein. While cost and implementation issues make a full-fledged move in this direction unlikely, we should nonetheless expect far more state experimentation.
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Veronique de Rugy & Andrea Castillo, 16. *Veronique de Rugy is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and a nationally syndicated columnist. Has an MA in economics from the Paris Dauphine University and PhD in economics from the Pantheon Sorbonne University. *Andrea Castillo is the program manager of the Technology Policy Program at the Mercatus Center and is pursuing a PhD in economics at George Mason University. “US Antipoverty Policy and Reform.” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, VA, July 2016.
Despite decades of a war on poverty that came with proliferating programs and ballooning budgets, the official poverty rate in the United States has stubbornly refused to break from its narrow historical range. This failure stems largely from the methods used to pursue the alleviation of poverty, including a complex and chaotic welfare system that strips the poor of their dignity and their incentive to work. Welfare reform proposals are generally dominated by income support programs such as universal basic income. Although those proposals would indeed simplify the United States’ overwhelming welfare system, experiments with such guaranteed income schemes reveal complex problems with incentives and with a potential for politicization that could be damaging. Policymakers should instead turn to block grants to states, a policy that has real-world empirical support and that would alleviate the knowledge problem suffered by the federal government. States, in turn, should administer income support programs tailored to the individual causes of poverty, implementing work requirements for people who are temporarily disadvantaged and providing direct income to people who are truly unable to work.