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2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 2: Green Jobs

Innovation influences national security – prevents war with China – extinction.

Suchodolski et al. 20 (Jeanne, Attorney with the United States Navy Office of General Counsel—Patent and Intellectual Property Counsel for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division Keyport; Suzanne Harrison, Founder of Percipience, LLC, Bowman Heiden, co-director of the Center for Intellectual Property, visiting professor at University of California, Berkeley. "Innovation Warfare," December 2020, from North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology, Volume 22, Issue 2, Article 4, https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1416&context=ncjolt)

Innovation, in particular, technology-based innovation, is the key driver for both economic competitiveness and national security. Other nations, with interests adverse to the United States, recognize this fact. In an increasingly interconnected world, nation states seek to accumulate innovation prowess, and hence economic strength, as a key element of their geopolitical power. Especially savvy nation states also pursue such ends as a mechanism to influence or diminish the national security and geopolitical power of the United States. There is no need to inflict upon the world the carnage of war if one’s geopolitical aims can be achieved via alternative competitive means. Several authors suggest China’s long-term ambitions include unseating the United States as the world’s economic and political leader.1 More compelling than opinions, several United States (“U.S.”) government and private studies document a systematic and coordinated effort by China to achieve technical and economic dominance through misappropriation of U.S. technology.2 These efforts are additionally supported by a companion effort to weaken international economic institutions and norms designed to protect U.S. intellectual property and free trade.3 The Chinese tactics include illegal means, and sophisticated use of legal means, to misappropriate U.S. technology and weaken the U.S. innovation infrastructure including: a) Leveraging the open university and laboratory ecosystem via direct sponsorship and engagement of Chinese nationals;4 b) Devaluing U.S. positions in patents and technology platforms;5 and c) Accessing private sector U.S. technology through acquisitions and ownership stakes in existing firms, funding of high-tech start-ups, and forced joint ventures and other contractual agreements as a prerequisite for entering the Chinese market.6 This particular form of competitive strategy targeting the innovation ecosystem in the United States is labeled by the Authors as “Innovation Warfare,”7 and it is defined as an executable competitive strategy: a) Reflecting an innovation, intellectual property, and technology strategy articulated and executed by the state (e.g. China); b) Using illegal means, political means, and legal economic activities—of the type previously residing solely in the province of commercial enterprise, to achieve the state’s objectives; c) Employing these economic and innovation activities to achieve both economic geopolitical power and to enhance military capabilities; and d) Functioning as a military, national security, and defense doctrine not solely as a reflection of the state’s economic policy goals nor commercial competition in the ordinary course. Innovation Warfare does not just threaten American jobs and economic prosperity. By simultaneously co-opting and weakening the innovation capabilities of the United States, China seeks to advance its rise to world power. China’s prosecution of Innovation Warfare not only encompasses a rejection of a rules-based international order, but also poses an existential threat. A world where China dominates the technology landscape is not just about who earns the profits or prevails in an abstract geopolitical fight. According to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (“National Security Strategy”), China pursues a world in which economies are less free, less fair, and less likely to respect human dignity and freedoms.8 China’s Innovation Warfare activities risk the type of economic and geopolitical aggressions that were a root cause of two World Wars.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 2: Green Jobs

GND inspires green growth and innovation to meet demand for tech

Allam et al. 2022 (Zaheer Allam; Research Candidate at the Institute of Sustainable Futures at the University of Technology Sydney, Ayyoob Sharifid, Damien Giurcoa, Samantha A. Sharpe, “Green new deals could be the answer to COP26’s deep decarbonisation Needs,” Sustainable Horizons Volume 1, January 2022, 100006, , GDI-MAM)

Green New Deals (GND) can be positioned as a potent model to pursue green growth. It simultaneously pursues economic growth, societal resilience, and community empowerment while addressing the core challenges of sustainability transitions. Regarding this, GNDs can be defined as a resolution agreed by either governments, institutions, or organizations to mobilize different aspects of economies and societies to ensure the transition to cleaner energy, production, and operation of varying human activities while increasing job opportunities for all people via a guarantee for social protection by authorities (Allam et al., 2021). As of 2021, a variety of GNDs existed, varying dynamics. An example of such is the European Union's GND Model illustrated in Figure 1 below, which showcases the breadth of scope that the model can be made to approach. Similarly, other geographies can implement such strategies regarding contextual needs, where policies can be made to respond to localized socio-economic needs while collectively building towards global emissions reduction targets.

The GND concept has gained traction in the last decade, with different regions formulating their versions. However, it is appreciated that the concept started to gain global popularity in 2008 after the United Nations announced a global Green Deal (Barbier, 2009). Following this, former United States President Barack Obama 2008 attempted, with no success, to introduce a GND for the U.S in 2008. However, in 2019, Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Markey championed the policy and successfully advocated for its passing, which could be credited to the efforts of the civil societies firmly demanding an economic paradigm shift (Conte, 2019). In other jurisdictions such as Europe, the GND concept has gained similar popularity, especially with the proposal for the EU region to embrace and adopt a circular economy model, incorporating the aspects of a GND (European Commission 2019).

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 2: Green Jobs

National GND policies inspire and direct global action that accounts for Least Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States.

Allam et al. 2022 (Zaheer Allam; Research Candidate at the Institute of Sustainable Futures at the University of Technology Sydney, Ayyoob Sharifid, Damien Giurcoa, Samantha A. Sharpe, “Green new deals could be the answer to COP26’s deep decarbonisation Needs,” Sustainable Horizons Volume 1, January 2022, 100006, , GDI-MAM)

Climate talks have been ongoing for three decades since the first Conference of Parties (COPs) in 1992, but negative climate impacts continue to increase both in terms of frequency and intensity. The United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) points out that if all countries commit to their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), temperatures could still increase by as much as 2.7 °C (UNFCCC 2021), exceeding the Paris Agreement target of 2 °C, preferably below 1.5 °C. This will demand deep decarbonization and adequate financing needs. Still, it is now understood that wealthy governments will not be fulfilling their pledge of USD 100 billion, aimed at helping developing economies in their pursuit of climate mitigation programs, until at least 2023 (OECD 2021), while it was initially proposed in 2009 and captured in the Paris Agreement (Article 9). The initial target was for the developed economies to raise at least $100 billion by 2020, but, as reported by the OECD (OECD 2020), only $78 billion was noted to have been raised by the end of 2019.

With the frequency and intensity of climate events such as storm surges, flash floods, desertification, and droughts, among others, is on the rise, Developing, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) continue to be exposed. These challenges continue to impact the livelihood of communities in those economies. The resilience gap between these and developed economies can be huge, while developed economies are the largest carbon emitters (Ari and Sari, 2017) that induced climate changes. The inequitable resilience levels contributed to increasing climate migrations. For instance, the number of climate migrants had risen by over 30.7 million by the end of 2020 (UNEP 2014). Additionally, in contrast with the Global North, which has financial means and capacities, SIDS experienced at least four times the costs of infrastructure investments due to high dependency on the importation, prompted by limited inland resources, and low resilience levels climate change (Mycoo and G.Donovan, 2017). This then points to a disproportionally high budgetary need to warrant investing in projects that match anticipated climate risks, as well as capacities to promote adaptability, resilience, and economic growth.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 2: Green Jobs

This makes fossil fuel reliant industries unviable.

Noor and Tcherneva, director of Economics program at Bard, 19 (Pavlina, 2-20-2019, "Why the Green New Deal Includes a Jobs Guarantee," Real News Network, , GDI-MAM)

DHARNA NOOR: So if there does need to be some reliance on the private sector, or some sort of public-private partnership, how do you regulate how much profit can be made, or ensure that private companies don’t just overcharge the public sector to make a profit like you sometimes see in the arms industry and other industries?

PAVLINA TCHERNEVA: I mean, again, I should say the Job Guarantee is a public service employment opportunity. We have worked on that program way before the Green New Deal captured the imagination of the public. And I have always spoken of the Job Guarantee as a Green Job Guarantee, as one that takes care of environment, of public spaces, of communities, of people, that basically serves the public good, the public needs, and really addresses neglected areas of the public sphere. So the Job Guarantee has always been a publicly designed, federally funded, but locally administered program to serve the public good. And so, I still envision it that way, even part and parcel of this bigger agenda that we are trading forward.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 2: Green Jobs

Job guarantees that replicate the Green New Deal (GND) decarbonize and shift the economy towards notions of justice and sustainability.

Novello, Century Foundation Policy Associate and Carlock, researcher, ‘19

[Amanda Novello, Senior Policy Associate, The Century Foundation and Greg Carlock, researcher in climate action policy and data, “Redefining Green Jobs for a Sustainable Economy,” Century Foundation and Data for Progress, 12—2—19, p. 1]

The movement toward a Green New Deal policy platform1 has become the predominant idea for addressing climate change. It would involve a massive government investment in equitable decarbonization, which would create millions of “green jobs.” The impact would be this large not only because greening the economy will be labor intensive across all sectors, but also because a green jobs guarantee would be required in order to ensure that all workers would be supported throughout this green transition.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 2: Green Jobs

Climate change magnifies environmental inequities which influence social and health outcomes – plan is a move towards equity

Novello, Century Foundation Policy Associate and Carlock, researcher, ‘19

[Amanda Novello, Senior Policy Associate, The Century Foundation and Greg Carlock, researcher in climate action policy and data, “Redefining Green Jobs for a Sustainable Economy,” Century Foundation and Data for Progress, 12—2—19, p. 5]

The concept of environmental equity—that everyone should have the right to a healthy environment, despite their race, class, or other social status—did not begin in the 1980s, but the idea grew more popular out of a greater awareness of the existing environmental inequity. A 1983 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), “Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities,”15 found that blacks made up the majority of the population in most communities where offsite hazardous waste landfills were located. The impact of this report fostered a flurry of research on the correlation between race, class, and access to basic environmental goods such as clean air and water, and the structural and institutional roots of environmental injustice. Today’s movement recognizes that, nationwide, race is the primary indicator of how likely someone is to live in proximity to toxic pollution, and that this correlation has serious consequences on health outcomes: black Americans are nearly 20 percent more likely to have asthma than whites,16 and nearly half of Latinos live in counties where air quality does not meet EPA clean air standards.17 And in fact, these correlations have grown stronger over the years: people of color were more concentrated around hazardous waste facilities in 2007 than they were twenty years prior.18 Van Jones, former Obama adviser and founder of environmental justice organization Green for All, calls the divide between ecological haves and have-nots—the difference between having clean air and water, and toxic air and water—“ecoaparthaid.” He has called instead for “eco-equity,” or a “green economy that is strong enough to lift people out of poverty, and give everybody a stake in the clean and green future.”19

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 2: Green Jobs

Status quo policy is insufficient– moves to tie climate change to economic security have lost momentum.

Battistoni, political theory professor at Barnard College, 2023 (Alyssa, Spring 2023, “Climate Still Changes Everything,” Dissent Magazine, , GDI-MAM)

When the Inflation Reduction Act was signed into law last August, it was celebrated as the biggest piece of federal climate legislation ever passed in the United States. This was an astonishingly low bar to clear: the IRA is also the country’s only real climate legislation. If its passage was a dubious landmark, it also stood at the end of an era for a U.S. climate movement galvanized nearly fifteen years earlier by the near-collapse of the UN climate conference in 2009 and the failure of previous federal legislation in 2010. Over the intervening years, the climate movement tacked sharply to the left as it grew more radical in its tactics and more visionary in its demands. The movement has undoubtedly changed the tenor of U.S. politics. But it has also run up against the limits of its power. What comes next?

As early as 2008, when Obama rode the financial crash into the White House, some floated a version of the Green New Deal as a stimulus response. Yet the administration opted instead for a slimmed-down stimulus that included some climate-related subsidies, namely in solar R&D. The administration’s signature climate bill, introduced in 2009 by Representative Henry Waxman and Senator Ed Markey, was its first legislative failure. That legislation, known as Waxman–Markey, proposed to implement a cap-and-trade system in which the state would set a cap on overall emissions and issue emissions permits to businesses that could be traded on a market. The radicalizing right wing of the Republican Party, then taking shape within the Tea Party, cut its teeth on opposing what it branded as “cap-and-tax.” While the bill passed the House in 2009, it needed a supermajority to pass the Senate—one it didn’t have. It never went up for a vote. With Waxman–Markey stalled, Obama went into the 2009 COP15 meeting in Copenhagen with little to show for his lofty climate rhetoric, which had seemed to offer a beacon of hope that a major international climate agreement would finally be possible after eight years of U.S. intransigence under George W. Bush. The negotiations concluded with a weak deal rather than the binding agreement many had hoped for.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 1: Labor

Liberal democracy is key to avert nationalism which causes extinction.

Harari 18 (Yuval, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. “We need a post-liberal order now” September 26, 2018. The Economist, https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now)

If the liberal order is collapsing, what new kind of global order might replace it? So far, those who challenge the liberal order do so mainly on a national level. They have many ideas about how to advance the interests of their particular country, but they don’t have a viable vision for how the world as a whole should function. For example, Russian nationalism can be a reasonable guide for running the affairs of Russia, but Russian nationalism has no plan for the rest of humanity. Unless, of course, nationalism morphs into imperialism, and calls for one nation to conquer and rule the entire world. A century ago, several nationalist movements indeed harboured such imperialist fantasies. Today’s nationalists, whether in Russia, Turkey, Italy or China, so far refrain from advocating global conquest. In place of violently establishing a global empire, some nationalists such as Steve Bannon, Viktor Orban, the Northern League in Italy and the British Brexiteers dream about a peaceful “Nationalist International”. They argue that all nations today face the same enemies. The bogeymen of globalism, multiculturalism and immigration are threatening to destroy the traditions and identities of all nations. Therefore nationalists across the world should make common cause in opposing these global forces. Hungarians, Italians, Turks and Israelis should build walls, erect fences and slow down the movement of people, goods, money and ideas. The world will then be divided into distinct nation-states, each with its own sacred identity and traditions. Based on mutual respect for these differing identities, all nation-states could cooperate and trade peacefully with one another. Hungary will be Hungarian, Turkey will be Turkish, Israel will be Israeli, and everyone will know who they are and what is their proper place in the world. It will be a world without immigration, without universal values, without multiculturalism, and without a global elite—but with peaceful international relations and some trade. In a word, the “Nationalist International” envisions the world as a network of walled-but-friendly fortresses. Many people would think this is quite a reasonable vision. Why isn’t it a viable alternative to the liberal order? Two things should be noted about it. First, it is still a comparatively liberal vision. It assumes that no human group is superior to all others, that no nation should dominate its peers, and that international cooperation is better than conflict. In fact, liberalism and nationalism were originally closely aligned with one another. The 19th century liberal nationalists, such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy, and Adam Mickiewicz in Poland, dreamt about precisely such an international liberal order of peacefully-coexisting nations. The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians. This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly. But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?” Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game. Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind. An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.” Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”. The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans. Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world. This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 1: Labor

JG democratizes the economy, which holds private employers accountable for both emissions and working conditions.

Battistoni, political theory professor at Barnard College, ’22 (Alyssa, 2022, “Sustaining Life on this Planet,” book chapter in The Case for Reorganizing the Economy, University of Chicago Press, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, p. 108, GDI-MAM)

While democratizing individual firms and production processes is essential, to remediate the environment it is also crucial to democratize the economy more broadly. Policies like sectoral bargaining and codetermination are key to improving the conditions of work across the board and setting standards for industry-wide problems like pollution and toxic waste exposure. Democratizing the economy also means bringing private investment decisions under greater public scrutiny and control. Firms often suggest they are working on environmental problems internally, touting their sustainability programs and decarbonization targets. In recent years, meanwhile, “ethical investment” strategies have become popular, often referred to under the banner of ESG—short for environmental, social, governance. But the standards for ESG investing are murky, making it susceptible to greenwashing. Meanwhile, companies’ actual commitments to decarbonization and shifts in capital allocation have lagged behind their lofty statements of ambition.10 We should not, in short, expect companies simply to adopt environmental remediation policies of their own accord: the pressures of profitability and competition all point in the opposite direction. Instead, investment writ large must become more democratic through mechanisms like public finance institutions, more rigorous regulation of “green finance” informed by public consultation, and restrictions on institutional investment in environmentally destructive assets.11 Nor do green investment standards typically say anything about labor. As capital pours into green investment opportunities, it is particularly important to attend to working conditions within sectors like renewable energy and green tech. Jobs in the renewable energy sector, for example, do not always pay as well as jobs in the fossil fuel industry, but that is not inherent to the work.12 Coal mining, for example, was always hard, dangerous, dirty work. But after coal miners unionized—after some of the bloodiest union struggles in US history—it was also work that came with a decent wage, health care, and a pension.13 Unionizing green jobs is an important step toward making them good jobs and toward ensuring that a greener economy is also a more democratic one.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 1: Labor

Federal job guarantee removes the threat of unemployment as a coercive tool – increases worker protections and bargaining power

Tcherneva, Bard Economics Associate professor, ‘22

[Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Associate Professor, Economics, Bard College, “Decommodifying Work: The Power of a Job Guarantee,” in Democratize Work : The Case for Reorganizing the Economy, University of Chicago Press, p. 85-88, GDI-MAM]

We work. We participate, care, and provide. We produce and reproduce. In the modern world, much of our work is commodified through private firms organizing production and employment for commercial return. Meanwhile, working people are often underpaid, brave dangerous conditions, and face the constant threat of unemployment. With or without COVID, the labor market is a cruel game of musical chairs in which hundreds of millions of people search fruitlessly for work while millions more endure precarious employment. Unemployment is a powerful, if silent, force of economic injustice. It has undermined the foundations of postwar labor relations, the social contract, and workplace solidarity. It looms in every negotiation between unions and firms and opens the door to job outsourcing, race-to-the-bottom pay practices, and the hiring of cheap migrant labor. The threat of unemployment has been and remains the most powerful coercive tool firms wield over their workers. The lives of the unemployed and the employed are thus shadowed by the same fate—the risk of economic insecurity.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 1: Labor

An adaptable job guarantee (JG) addresses unemployment and precarious employment by fundamentally reforming the economy

Tcherneva, Bard Economics Associate professor, ‘20

[Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Associate Professor, Economics, Bard College, THE CASE FOR A JOB GUARANTEE, Polity Press, Medford MA, 2020, epub]

The Job Guarantee deals with two very specific aspects of economic insecurity: unemployment (intermittent or long-term), and poorly paid employment (precarious and unequal). There are other labor market problems such as wage theft, discrimination, poverty, and stagnant income growth. And there are other forms of economic insecurity too, such as the lack of affordable and high quality food, care, housing, and education, or a lack of protection from the ravages of climate change. While, in a certain sense, the Job Guarantee has a narrow and clear mission – to provide a decent job at decent pay to all jobseekers who come a-knocking – by its very nature and design it addresses a wide range of social and economic problems and helps deliver a fairer economy.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 1: Labor

Unemployment is a form of economic inequality that perpetuates continued racial discrimination

Paul et al., Duke University post-doctoral associate, ‘18

[Mark Paul, Postdoctoral Associate, Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity, Duke University, William Darity Jr., Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and Director, Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity, Duke University, and Darrick Hamilton, Professor of Economics and Urban Policy, Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy, New School for Social Research, “The Federal Job Guarantee—A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment,” Center on Budget and policy Priorities, 3—9—18, p. 1-2]

Today, economists and policymakers, including the governors of the Federal Reserve System, tend to associate “full employment” with a four-to-six percent unemployment rate, using the standard measure of unemployment.4 This measure of unemployment counts workers who do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the previous four weeks, and are currently available for work; it does not count the millions who have stopped actively seeking employment, or those inadequately employed in temporary, seasonal, or other precarious employment situations. The four-to-six percent unemployment rate referred to above is based on a conception defined by economists as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). It is noteworthy that this “target” has changed throughout time. Moreover, an economy with these unemployment rates needlessly condemns millions of U.S. workers to unemployment and underemployment, often resulting in severe economic hardship for those left behind by decisionmakers’ policy choices.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 1: Labor

Economic inequality erodes institutional capacity---causes extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21. Associate Professor of Political Theory at the Faculty of Philosophy and the PPE Centre at the University of Groningen. Researcher/consultant within the Economics department at CE Delft, an independent research and consultancy organization. “Economic inequality and the long-term future.” May 2021. GPI Working Paper. https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Inequality-and-the-Long-Term-Future_Andreas-Schmidt-and-Daan-Juijn-reupload.pdf

It is often argued that a country’s long-term performance depends to a significant extent on the quality of its institutions, including its political and legal institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). Economic research mostly focuses on explaining long-term differences in growth rates. As seen above, some researchers argue that high inequality will reduce growth rates, among other things, because it can worsen institutional quality. However, besides facilitating economic growth, public institutions have other functions that matter from a long-term perspective. For example, disaster preparedness, education, public health, foreign policy, science policy, and many other areas could influence long-term trajectories. If such things go badly, they could increase existential risk. Conversely, good institutions will help reduce existential risk. For many existential risk reduction strategies likely require public goods and collective action, which in turn require good public institutions (among other reasons, because some such public goods are unlikely to be provided by markets). So, it seems reasonable to assume that, with most other societal goals, good institutions can help deliver existential risk reduction. Here is a cheesy analogy: targeted actions like washing your hands regularly or getting a flu shot can reduce your risk of dying from an infection. But you will also do well investing in a strong immune system, as that is an ‘all-purpose goods’ in lowering your risk of dying from any bacterium or virus. Investing in good institutions might similarly be an all-purpose-good: rather than tackling individual sources of existential risk directly, we improve conditions for tackling whatever existential risks may come our way. There are at least two reasons why higher inequality could decrease institutional capacities for longtermist public goods. First, there is some direct evidence that, whatever the causal pathway, inequality reduces institutional quality (which in turn typically leads to more inequality) (Chong and Gradstein 2007; Savoia, Easaw, and McKay 2010). Second, high inequality can lead to elite capture. Empirical work on studying political and de facto legal power is difficult, yet there is a growing consensus that high levels of inequality can lead to elite capture and thereby reduce the long-term quality of legal and political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; 2013; Bartels 2018; Bavel 2016; Chong and Gradstein 2007; Cummins and Rodriguez 2010; Savoia, Easaw, and McKay 2010). Further, if institutions are disproportionately geared towards elite interests, then they might be less likely to be geared towards positive longterm trajectories. We might see more rent-seeking and less investment in public goods. Moreover, if elite capture is strong enough, such capture, and the potential inequality that comes with it, can intensify going forward (Chong and Gradstein 2007). Now, one might object and wonder whether elite interests and longtermist interests will necessarily be misaligned. Could an enlightened elite not even be more longtermist than a more democratic system? Here are two potential arguments. First, wealthy donors fund a significant part of research and direct action on existential risk and longtermism (the Open Philanthropy Project, for example). Indirectly, inequality might thus reduce existential risk through such funding. Second, rich people might have a lower rate of pure time preference than less well-off people, which would make them more naturally aligned with investing in long-term causes. In response to the first argument, remember we here focus on income inequality reductions. Private funding only requires ‘enough’ wealth inequality going forward, it need not require elite capture. And reducing income inequality is unlikely to eradicate the required wealth inequality and the existence of big donors. In response to the second argument, we are somewhat sceptical that elite capture would translate a lower impatience rate into longtermist strategies in policy. A successful 14 transmission would require influence to be systematic and well-coordinated across time and, probably, across different elite actors. Yet lobbying and elite influence must often capitalise on shorter windows of opportunities, which makes well-coordinated intertemporal, and positive longtermist, policy capture less likely. Of course, such considerations are speculative. But, in any case, we think that, on balance, there are stronger reasons to believe elite capture would increase – rather than decrease – existential risk. First, elite capture often comes with rent seeking, which lowers institutional quality (Chong and Gradstein 2007). Second, industries like oil, gas, weapons and others are often concentrated and well organised in exerting influence in law and legislation. Their interests and influence overall are likely to be more short-term than longtermist. Third, recent decades have seen a shift towards a stronger shareholder value orientation in corporate governance. A common criticism of this shift is that it incentivises more short-term decisions. Accordingly, corporate influence into public institutions will likely display short-termist bias too. Finally, we can of course imagine that ‘prolongtermist elite capture’ could happen and gamble on that possibility. However, if strong democratic and legal oversight and the power to check elite influence is lost, we might struggle to reverse our gamble. Second, high inequality is likely to reduce social capital and trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Knack and Keefer 1997; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Social capital and trust in public institutions in turn are important for effective public goods provision (Knack and Keefer 1997; Beugelsdijk, Groot, and Schaik 2004). Effective public goods provision, in turn, is important for (some) effective measures to reduce existential risk (and, more generally, to coordinate towards more valuable long-term trajectories). Therefore, high inequality could reduce societies’ capacities to effectively respond to large-scale challenges like existential risk. Finally, some limited direct evidence suggests societies with higher social capital and lower inequality exhibit better preventive and adaptive outcomes for environmental risks and can show greater resilience to external shocks (Bavel and Curtis 2019; Kahn 2005). For example, Matthew Kahn provides some evidence that more equal countries, when controlled for GDP, have significantly lower death rates in natural catastrophes (Kahn 2005). While smaller natural catastrophes are different from global catastrophic risk scenarios, resilience in such events might be somewhat indicative of societies’ resilience to catastrophic risks. So, good social and institutional conditions could help reduce existential risk. Consider next how, conversely, bad conditions might increase existential risk. A key driver of existential risk is conflict, both between and within nation-states (or what (Ord 2020, 175–79) calls a ‘risk factor’). Conflicts and arms races raise human-induced existential risks such as nuclear war, the outbreak of a bioengineered virus or the launch of misaligned artificial intelligence. Note that an existential catastrophe could be set in motion either purposefully or accidentally. Both are more likely during conflict. Nuclear warheads, cyberweapons, and bioweapons could all be used purposefully to attack enemy states, leading to potential global escalation. But as past nuclear incidents and close calls during the Cold War show, arms races also increase the probability of accidental catastrophes (Schlosser 2013). Esteban and Schneider find that formal and empirical evidence suggests that political and social polarization increases the risk of violent conflict, both intra-nationally and internationally (Esteban and Schneider 2008). If income inequality increases polarization, inequality may indirectly drive existential risk. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that income inequality can increase the degree of polarization between groups of citizens. Bonica et al. find that the degree of polarization within the US House of Representatives, for example, is accurately tracked by domestic income inequality, with correlation coefficients rising up to 0.95 depending on the chosen time-period (Bonica et al. 2013, 105–8). Of course, correlation does not imply causation and the correlation is likely at least partially the result of reverse causation or a confounding variable. That said, we should assign a non-negligible credence to inequality partially causing polarization. Moreover, inequality and polarisation might also play some role in getting polarising and populist candidates elected (Piketty 2018). In a preliminary analysis of US election data, Darvas and Efstathiou find that more unequal states were more likely to vote for Donald Trump, after controlling for variables such as income, race and education (Darvas and Efstathiou 2016). Populist politicians – like Trump, Bolsonaro and others – are likely bad news for existential risk reduction. They are less cooperative in delivering regional and global public goods and typically prefer riskier, and more conflictual and nationalistic policy styles.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Advantage 1: Labor

Low pay, attacks on unionization, and insecure positions situate half of the workforce on the brink of poverty.

Institute for Policy Studies ‘20

[staff, “Green Jobs and a Just Transition for Workers and Communities,” Institute for Policy Studies, 6—20, , accessed 4-9-23]

While official estimates are known to be too low, the Bureau of Labor Statistics counted about six million people as unemployed and actively seeking work in 2019—a figure now rendered obsolete by the coronavirus crisis, but indicative of our economy under “good” circumstances.96 This figure does not include all working age people who are unemployed and more comprehensive methods of calculating unemployment often double the standard unemployment rate.

2023 GDI Evidence
Consequentialism/Util Good › Nuclear War Outweighs

Utilitarianism is the only moral option in a nuclear age.

Nye, Professor of political science @ Harvard, 86

(Joseph S., Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)

The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.

2023 GDI Evidence
Consequentialism/Util Good › Nuclear War Outweighs

Nuclear war outweighs- survival is a prerequisite to other values.

Nye, Professor of Political Science @ Harvard, 86

(Joseph S., Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 45-46)

Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.

2023 GDI Evidence
Consequentialism/Util Good › Policymakers Must Be Utilitarian

Deontology is irrelevant in policy making - intentions are impossible to know, only the outcome matters

Hinman, Professor of Ethics, 98

(Lawrence, Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, p. 186)

When, for example, we want to assess the moral correctness of proposed governmental legislation, we may well wish to set aside any question of the intentions of the legislators. After all good laws may be passed for the most venal of political motives, and bad legislation may be the outcome of quite good intentions. Instead, we can concentrate solely on the question of what

2023 GDI Evidence
Consequentialism/Util Good › Policymakers Must Be Utilitarian

There’s a distinction between public and private morality – Governments must make utilitarian calculations

Goodin, Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University, 95

(Robert E., Cambridge University Press, “Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy” pg 63)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (or, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding with that larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and their situations that makes it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, at relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy makers to use the utilitarian calculus – if they want to use it at all – to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.

2023 GDI Evidence
Consequentialism/Util Good › Policymakers Must Be Utilitarian

In the face of extinction risks, policymakers must be utilitarian.

George Kateb, Professor of Politics at Princeton University. 1992

(The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture., Pg.12. )

The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary pace in any democratic country's normal political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what the theory of rights leaves alone. When may rights be overridden by government? I have two sorts of cases in mind: overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call "civilization values." An advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state's overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. For the state to override is, sacrifice—a right of some so that others may keep it. The situation must be desperate. I have in mind, say, circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state (or some other agent) may kill some (or allow them to be killed), if the only alternative is letting every-one die. It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that "numbers count." Just as one may prefer saving one's own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third party—let us say, the state—can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed.