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2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Inequality*** › Populism impacts

Populism goes nuclear

de Waal 16 (Alex de Waal – Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. “Garrison America and the Threat of Global War,” Boston Review. December 5, 2016. )

What does a world in global, generalized war look like? We have an unwinnable “war on terror” that is metastasizing with every escalation, and which has blurred the boundaries between war and everything else. We have deep states—built on a new oligarchy of generals, spies, and private-sector suppliers—that are strangling liberalism. We have emboldened middle powers (such as Saudi Arabia) and revanchist powers (such as Russia) rearming and taking unilateral military action across borders (Ukraine and Syria). We have massive profiteering from conflicts by the arms industry, as well as through the corruption and organized crime that follow in their wake (Afghanistan). We have impoverishment and starvation through economic warfare, the worst case being Yemen. We have “peacekeeping” forces fighting wars (Somalia). We have regional rivals threatening one another, some with nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan) and others with possibilities of acquiring them (Saudi Arabia and Iran). Above all, today’s generalized war is a conflict of destabilization, with big powers intervening in the domestic politics of others, buying influence in their security establishments, bribing their way to big commercial contracts and thereby corroding respect for government, and manipulating public opinion through the media. Washington, D.C., and Moscow each does this in its own way. Put the pieces together and a global political market of rival plutocracies comes into view. Add virulent reactionary populism to the mix and it resembles a war on democracy. What more might we see? Economic liberalism is a creed of optimism and abundance; reactionary protectionism feeds on pessimistic scarcity. If we see punitive trade wars and national leaders taking preemptive action to secure strategic resources within the walls of their garrison states, then old-fashioned territorial disputes along with accelerated state-commercial grabbing of land and minerals are in prospect. We could see mobilization against immigrants and minorities as a way of enflaming and rewarding a constituency that can police borders, enforce the new political rightness, and even become electoral vigilantes. Liberal multilateralism is a system of seeking common wins through peaceful negotiation; case-by-case power dealing is a zero-sum calculus. We may see regional arms races, nuclear proliferation, and opportunistic power coalitions to exploit the weak. In such a global political marketplace, we would see middle-ranking and junior states rewarded for the toughness of their bargaining, and foreign policy and security strategy delegated to the CEOs of oil companies, defense contractors, bankers, and real estate magnates. The United Nations system appeals to leaders to live up to the highest standards. The fact that they so often conceal their transgressions is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. A cabal of plutocratic populists would revel in the opposite: applauding one another’s readiness to tear up cosmopolitan liberalism and pursue a latter-day mercantilist naked self-interest. Garrison America could opportunistically collude with similarly constituted political-military business regimes in Russia, China, Turkey, and elsewhere for a new realpolitik global concert, redolent of the early nineteenth-century era of the Congress of Vienna, bringing a façade of stability for as long as they collude—and war when they fall out.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Inequality*** › Populism impacts

Populism leads to war

Claude Forthomme - Senior Editor. Why Populism is Dangerous: The Propensity for War. . October 28, 2018. Accessed 3.29.23. AR

Populism is dangerous and has shown overtime an irresistible propensity for war. Public safety, health and the economy are at risk. But populist propaganda is hard to resist. Populist politicians thrive on fake news: it is so much easier to fuel people’s emotions if you feed them fabricated news of imaginary crises. And if you divert their attention from real economic problems with the irresistible lure of national identity politics and blaming foreigners. Previous articles have addressed the issue of austerity (here), the public health crisis (here) and the false “migrant crisis” (here). Here we take a look at populism’s propensity for war. Historically, populist leaders have been warmongers, Hitler first among them, for waging war across national borders and Pol Pot within borders. Nowadays, exhibit A is Putin’s invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, diverting Russians’ attention from a deepening recession. Exhibit B is Trump’s rising militarism that has just jumped to the next level with John Bolton’s visit to Moscow this week to tell Putin the U.S. will withdraw from the I.N.F. Treaty.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Inequality*** › Automation – UBI solves

UBI solves inequality, poverty, and the ills of welfare

Dorn ’23. [Chase, May 2023, , University of South Carolina Honors College International Business and Finance Student, “Free Money: The Feasibility of Implementing a Universal Basic Income in the United States”, https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/587/, accessed 6/27/2023, S.P.]

While wealth inequality and employment insecurity via automation are population-level issues that could be solved – or at the very least partially alleviated – by a universal basic income, there are a variety of demographic-specific benefits as well: a UBI could act as a means to reduce health inequality, alleviate poverty, and eliminate the welfare trap. There has long been an established link between high levels of inequality in a society and poor health of its lower earners, though determining the cause of the link has not been quite as easy (Painter, 2016). If we can assume a causal relationship between the two, then implementing a program like basic income which reduces inequality will thus reduce health inequality as well, regardless of why the link exists. We can assume that with more money comes less stress on how bills will be paid or needs covered, which can lead to fewer cases of poor mental and physical health for individuals, as shown in the Dauphin and North Carolina studies referenced by Painter (2016). Financial security can often translate to a healthier life overall. As for alleviating poverty, implementing a basic income is a straightforward equation: giving people money means they have more in their pockets, thus raising their income level and allowing them to cover their needs easier. Some critics question whether those living in poverty would even use it for such, arguing that the current welfare system keeps individuals from spending government funds on vices instead of needs. But basic income experiments in developing countries providing unconditional cash transfers to citizens saw many strong benefits. Maytree Director of Policy and Research Noah Zon phrases it simply: “When you give people who don’t have enough money more of it, no strings attached, it gets used well” (2016). The welfare trap problem would also become a relic of a welfare system past. When people don’t lose their state-provided benefits upon gaining employment, they will always be better off working than not. This means there is no longer a necessity to choose the higher value option of either working for low income or simply receiving welfare, as the second is already guaranteed.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Inequality*** › Automation – UBI solves

UBI solves squo welfare inefficiencies that lock-in inequality

Lee, University of La Verne, Public Administration, Professor 21

[Soomi Lee, 2021, Basic Income Studies Vol.16 (2), “Politics of Universal and Unconditional Cash Transfer: Examining Attitudes Toward Universal Basic Income,” , Accessed: 06-24-23, CV]

Supporters of UBI argue that means-tested programs fail to accomplish their goal of helping the poor because eligibility rules make recipients worse off if and when they gain employment. Means testing creates a welfare cliff, keeps recipients in a poverty trap, and discourages them from working. For instance, with the current means-tested policies, the poor lose more than 60% of their earnings from a full-time job in almost all European countries (Matsaganis & Figari, 2016). People who advocate for means-tested programs criticize the flat-rate universalism of UBI for shifting scarce resources from the poor to the well-off. They believe in selectivism, in which benefits specifically target those most in need. This position is known as “targeting within universalism (Skocpol, 1991)” or positive discrimination—a practice in social policy that uses a means test to privilege low-income individuals (Anttonen, Häikiö, Stefáansson, & Sipilä, 2012). Counter to the targeting argument, UBI supporters maintain that universal programs reach the poor more effectively than means-tested programs because flat-rate universalism helps create a broad political coalition that ultimately protects the poor (Van Parijis, 2018). The social choice literature also suggests that the majority prefers broadly distributed benefits to thode that are narrowly targeted (De Donder & Hindriks, 1997; Moene & Wallerstein, 2003). In their study on the history of welfare states, Korpi and Palme 1998 show that a universal provision of benefits helped build well-developed welfare states in Europe. In a similar vein, when governments have historically cut spending, European counties implemented larger cuts on means-tested programs than on universal programs (Nelson, 2007). UBI supporters also point out that current welfare programs divide citizens into benefit-receiving free riders and resentful taxpayers, which leads to social exclusion and stigma (Butler & Watt, 2007; Hancock, 2004; Steinert and Pilgram, Table : Comparison of current cash transfer programs and UBI: Universalism and unconditionality. Universal Basic Income (UBI) Current cash transfer programs Universal benefit Selected/targeted benefit Benefits are distributed regardless of income. Benefits are transferred to those who prove eligibility through a means test. – Disincentive to work – Social stigma and low take-up rates Unconditional benefit Conditional benefit Unconditional benefit: no strings attached. Benefits are contingent on behaviors—E.g. Job-seeking activities. Politics of Universal Basic Income 193 2007). As a consequence, means-tested programs have lower take-up rates (Friedrichsen, König, & Schmacker, 2017; Moffitt, 1983). The average take-up rate is less than 40% in most European countries (Eurofound, 2015). Lastly, UBI supporters point out that means-tested programs incur high administrative costs since welfare programs are fragmented with sometimes contradictory eligibility rules and compliance requirements (Cato Institute, 2017). The convoluted system is also prone to errors such as including ineligible individuals and excluding those who are qualified. Researchers have suggested that a better program design would alleviate these problems (Besley & Coate, 1995; Skoufias & Coady, 2007), but UBI supporters doubt that even a well-designed, means-tested program would escape from bureaucratic disarray. Thus, they advocate consolidating disjointed social programs into a unifying and universal program such as UBI (Murray, 2006; Zwolinski, 2014).

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Inequality*** › Automation – UBI solves

UBI is better in the long run and tackles human unemployment relating to the rise of AI Automation

Ghezzi, European Law from Maastricht University and European Competition Law and Regulations at the University of Amsterdam, 22 [Sofia Ghezzi, April 22, 2022, Institute for Internet & the Just Society, “Artificial Intelligence Transforming our Societal Structure – The Rise Useless Class,” Accessed: 06-26-23, CV]

 argues that when artificial intelligence will push many out of work, in order to deal with that part of the community, which could risk being marginalised, we must forge new economic, social, and educational systems. With the rise of Artificial Intelligence (hereinafter “AI”) and the use of algorithms, it is inevitable that computerised devices will be invented to perform working functions in the form of hardware or software-based routines that will consequently force a huge portion of the population out of work. Automation will inevitably substitute many jobs causing the rise of a new “,” as it is called by Harari, transforming the current societal structure. In the aftermath of the AI revolution, “.” The useless class, or “Homo Inutilis”, will be composed by those people working jobs that can easily be automated. In society, we will see a polarisation between two classes: i) a class that will remain as the only workforce in the society, who will take care of the functioning of the machines, and continue driving innovation, and ii) a useless class, that deprived of work, will not have any source of revenue. In this scenario, the military, tailors, factory workers will be substituted by machines; doctors will not be required anymore to perform surgeries or provide diagnosis as a machine will take their place, as well as robots will be able to find the best arguments to win a case instead of lawyers. By contrast, innovation, research, and creativity will arguably remain entrusted to humans. However, realistically we will have to deal with the portion of the society which will become unemployed, and possibly, unemployable. Clearly, the useless class is a threat to the peace of the community for two main reasons: i) they will need a stream of revenue to survive, and ii) they will need a new purpose in life. The creation of the two classes will drive inequality even further and this would possibly give rise to malcontent and disorder within a community. Moreover, even with assured revenue streams provided by governments to the unemployed, the human psychology of this class needs to be considered. Can humans live happily without purpose in their life? How can we deal with the boredom of the useless class? According to Harari, “… nobody has any idea what kind of jobs or skills people will need in 30 years. Which means that we have absolutely no idea what to teach our children at school today (, 2020). He continues claiming that even if the AI revolution would create new job opportunities, those opportunities would be for high-skilled jobs and most of the unemployed mass departing from less-skilled jobs will not be able to make the transition. So, what to do with the newly established useless class, “which has no military or economic usefulness, and therefore no political power?” and what to do with the new socio-economic bias created by the AI revolution?

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Inequality*** › Automation – Internal link to populism

Now is key for the plan – the Impact of Automation leads to societal divide and decline in well being of individuals due to a loss of purpose

Susskind, Oxford University, Institute for Ethics in AI, Senior Research Associate 23 [Daniel Susskind, January 2, 2023, Center on Regulation and Markets at Brookings, “Working Paper: Work and meaning in the age of AI,” Accessed: 06-25-23, CV]

Every day, we hear stories of systems and machines taking on tasks that until recently we thought only human beings could ever do: making medical diagnoses and driving cars, drafting legal contracts and designing buildings, composing music and writing news reports. These technological developments have challenged the traditionally rigid distinctions that economists use to distinguish between tasks that can and cannot be readily automated: in particular, the distinction between ‘routine’ tasks that can be automated and ‘non-routine’ that cannot (see, for instance Susskind 2019, 2020a). And in turn, this has led to the development of alternative measures to mark out the limits of machine capabilities: for instance, the AI Occupational Impact Measure, the Suitability for Machine Learning Index, and the AI Exposure Score (Acemoglu et al., 2021). As of a consequence of this technological progress, the economic literature is now characterised by far greater agnosticism with respect to the limits of machine capabilities. There are fewer attempts to demarcate a fixed boundary marking which tasks that machines can and cannot do. And instead, there is a growing recognition that these technologies are becoming increasingly capable over time, albeit in directions that are difficult to predict with certainty. Many newer models, for instance, use an endogenously determined cut-off in task space to mark the boundary between activities that can and cannot be automated (for instance, in Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018b; Aghion, B. Jones, and C. Jones 2019; Moll, Rachel, and Restrepo 2021). And as technological progress takes place, that cut-off in task space shifts – there is a process of ‘task encroachment’ at work, where machines gradually, but relentlessly, take on more tasks (see Susskind 2020a, 2020b, 2022). Unsurprisingly, the traditional economic literature has almost exclusively focused on the economic impact of AI (and other Emerging Technologies or ETs) on the labour market: in particular, the implication of this process of task encroachment for employment and earnings. Significantly, the latest research, with its revised conception of machine capabilities, has challenged the relatively benign view of automation that has dominated the profession of economics until now (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018a, b, c; Susskind 2022). A change of heart has taken place in the field over the past 80 years or so, accelerated by recent developments in AI – from a blinkered optimism about the impact of technological change on work, to a creeping pessimism (Susskind 2022). This pessimism concerns not only the quantity of work to be done but the quality of that work: recognising the different margins on which technological change can affect the labour market is important and I will return to these later in the paper. Importantly, though, the impact of AI on the labour market is not limited to this economic dimension. In both popular commentary and more expert analysis, it is often said that paid work is not only a source of an income but of meaning as well – an inconsistently defined and used term, designed to capture the way in which work provides some with, for example, a sense of purpose, an opportunity for self-fulfilment, and a sense of direction in life (from now, I refer to ‘paid work’ as simply ‘work’). If that broad claim is right, then the challenge of technological change is not just that the labour market might be hollowed out, leaving some workers without work or with a different type of work, but that it might hollow out that sense of meaning in life as well. This paper is focused on this latter claim about work and its relationship to meaning – whether this claim is correct and what its consequences might be. Section 1 explores the theoretical and empirical literature on the nature of the relationship between work and meaning. Section 2 explains why economists ought to take this relationship more seriously than at present. And finally, Section 3 explains the implications for the politics and the political philosophy of work. The line of investigation in this paper is likely to be unfamiliar to most traditional economists who explore the impact of technological change on the labour market. The non-economic dimensions of work, and in particular its role as a source of meaning, has not attracted much formal attention. That omission was understandable in a world where the impact of technology on the labour market was expected to be relatively muted. However, given the encroachment of new technologies on an ever-widening range of tasks, and a recognition that their impact may be far more disruptive than previously imagined, it is important – for a variety of reasons that I will explore – to take this non-economic dimension seriously as well.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Inequality*** › Automation – Internal link to populism

Compounding cultural and personal anxieties surrounding automation make escalation uniquely likely

Kelly 22

Kelly, Lauren. Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism. Journal of Sociology, 0(0). . October 9, 2022. Accessed: 06/15/23. AR.

The cyclicality of automation anxiety suggests these debates are not purely technological, but reflect latent, historically embedded cultural anxieties. The latest wave of automation anxiety coincides with a period of significant uncertainty for many of the world's workers. While trends of increasing precarity, de-unionisation, and hostile neoliberal state and managerial practices have been in motion for years, the Covid-19 pandemic further exposed fault lines of inequality in the landscape of work. There is little doubt that declining working conditions are widely and unevenly experienced by workers across lines of gender, race, migration status and class. The understandable anxiety felt by workers during this time is often attributed to deterministic narratives of technological change and the destruction of jobs. Automation, in particular, captures the public imaginary with sweeping headlines declaring human labour's impending obsolescence. Trade press celebrates Elon Musk's deferential humanoid factory robots that ‘won’t fight back’ (Siddiqui, 2021); McDonald's executives threaten to replace workers with machines if they demand $15 per hour (Rensi, 2016); and supermarket delivery drones appear ready to replace precarious gig workers (Terzon, 2022). The fact that many of these technologies remain speculative fantasies of the billionaire class is beside the point – they could become reality. Automation theorists from both ends of the political spectrum tend to reproduce these claims by treating automation as an inexorable and accelerating force. This has generated renewed discussion of impending technological unemployment and the necessity of a universal basic income (UBI) as human labour becomes increasingly redundant.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Inequality*** › UQ – Automation inevitable

Mass automation slashes jobs and worker salaries

Cabrales et al. 20

Cabrales, Antonio- Professor Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Hernández, Penelope- professor Departament d’Economía, Universitat de València. & Sánchez, Angel- professor Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Robots, labor markets, and universal basic income. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 7, 185 (2020). . 16 December 2020. Accessed 6/07/23.

The rapidly growing wave of automation is submitting our society to large changes of profound consequences. Undoubtedly, the availability of a cheaper, more efficient workforce of robots will affect every aspect of our socioeconomic life, from welfare to job opportunities and conditions through markets and businesses. In this context, there is a growing concern about optimal policy responses to the challenges associated with those social and economic effects. Indeed, there is an emerging research field on this topic showing the impacts of automation on society. For instance, Frey and Osborne (2013) estimate that 47% of current US jobs are at risk from automation. The World Bank (2016) also estimates that about 57% of current jobs in the whole OECD could be automated in the coming decades. On the other hand, Arntz et al. (2016) argue that these figures could be overestimated in so far as they do not take into account the fact that workers will specialize in hard-to-automate jobs; in that case, we would experience a lower, but still very relevant, loss of 9% of jobs within OECD countries. This and related research points to the sizable effects that automation may have on the job market. A specially relevant question has been posed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) who analyzed the impact of robots and automation on jobs and salaries. They estimate that for each extra robot per 1000 workers, jobs will decrease between 0.18% and 0.34% and salaries will also decrease between 0.25% and 0.5%. Further, the study (Autor and Salomons, 2018) considered the impact of automation on employment and salaries with data from 19 developed countries over four decades. They find a net positive effect on employment, even if the direct effect on the affected sector is negative. On the other hand, the net effect on salaries is negative. For this reason, they argue that policies should concern themselves with the distributional aspects of technological change rather than with job losses.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Workforce turn

Finland disproves labor flight

Dent, freelance policy and research consultant, 19

[Anna, Feb 12 2019, the guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/12/universal-basic-income-work-finland-experiment-payments, Accessed 6/24/2023, S.P.]

Preliminary results from Finland’s basic income experiment found little to no impact on recipients’ likelihood of undertaking paid employment. This has led some to suggest that the experiment is a failure – indeed, the Finnish government had hoped the plan would increase participation in paid work. However, although it was not a trial of a full UBI (universal, unconditional, non-withdrawable and non means-tested) it is being celebrated by many who advocate the idea, as it provides important evidence about the interaction of UBI and work. One of the major objections is that getting “free money” would undermine recipients’ motivation to undertake paid work: the Finnish case shows this is not so.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Workforce turn

UBI increases overall labor force and any decline is made up for by spending

Gaskell, reporter for forbes, 18

[Adi, March 5 2018, forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/adigaskell/2018/03/05/does-a-universal-basic-income-discourage-work/#46f9000a541b, accessed 6/24/2023, S.P.]

The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend program has been in place for the past 25 years, with money distributed from the oil reserve royalties earned in the state. The unconditional cash payments amounts to $2,000 per Alaskan resident.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Workforce turn

UBI Won’t incite people to quit their jobs.

Reich, former secretary of labor, 18 [Robert B. Reich, Jul 15 2018, The New York Times, “GIVE PEOPLE MONEY: How a Universal Basic Income Would End Poverty, Revolutionize Work, and Remake the World/THE WAR ON NORMAL PEOPLE: The Truth About America's Disappearing Jobs and Why Universal Basic Income Is Our Future,” , 6/23/2023, EJ]

U.B.I.'s critics understandably worry that it would spur millions to drop out of the labor force, induce laziness or at least rob people of the structure and meaning work provides. Both Yang and Lowrey muster substantial research to rebut these claims. I'm not sure they need it. After all, $12,000 a year doesn't deliver a comfortable life even in the lowest-cost precincts of America, so there would still be plenty of incentive to work. Most of today's jobs provide very little by way of fulfillment or creativity anyway.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Workforce turn

Decreased labor participation is small and inconsequential

MICHAEL HILTZIK, BUSINESS COLUMNIST, ’17. JUNE 23, 2017, “Column: Conservatives, liberals, techies, and social activists all love universal basic income: Has its time come?” LOS ANGELES TIMES, https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-ubi-20170625-story.html

“The effects of unconditional cash transfers” included “a significant increase in … quality of life benefits,” Ioana Marinescu of the University of Chicago noted in a recent report. Those included improvements in “mental and physical health, education outcomes, parenting [and] reduced criminal activity.” Studies found either no impact or a slight decrease in labor participation, but some of that may have been due to recipients leaving workplace jobs to care for family members, including children, at home.

Those results show that “poor people and the middle class know best how to spend their money,” says Foster. “They just don’t have it.”

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Workforce turn

Basic income is the best incentive to work

Painter, RSA Policy and Strategy Director, Thoung, Economist, 15

[Anthony, Chris, December 2015, RSA, "Creative citizen, creative state: the principled and pragmatic case for a Universal Basic Income.", , accessed 6/26/2023, S.P.]

If you want to incentivise work at every level of income then Basic Income is simply the best system. Tax credits have marginal withdrawal rates near 80 percent at some (low) income levels. In the case of the Basic Income scheme laid out here, no basic rate tax payer faces a marginal withdrawal rate above 32 percent (though housing costs do need separate consideration). Individuals are guaranteed to earn significantly more in employment than out of it. This is a moral and political position that answers some current concerns about welfare

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Welfare turn

UBI streamlines social welfare and undermines paternalism

Thomas Straubhaar, University of Hamburg, ’17. “On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income,” INTERECONOMICS, Volume 52, 2017 · Number 2 · pp. 74–80, https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2017/number/2/article/on-the-economics-of-a-universal-basic-income.html

The UBI replaces the activating, controlling and thus paternalistic social policy of indirect aid with unconditional direct cash payments. However, this also explains why social bureaucracy and trade unions might oppose a UBI. They would lose influence and power in this new construction of the welfare state. The minimum wage would be replaced by a state-guaranteed minimum income, and the state would no longer have to worry about job creation or unemployment. Active public labour policies would become superfluous, which would save administrative costs.

Direct aid is more economically sensible and socially just than indirect actions, which are always associated with leakage in the form of bureaucracy and false incentives. Indirect interventions in the labour, education, health, insurance or housing markets are comparatively more expensive, imprecise and unjust.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Welfare turn

Normal means ensures a smooth transition

Drew Riedl, Lecturer at Cornell Jeb E. Brooks School of Public Policy. Basic Income Studies. Financing Universal Basic Income: Eliminating Poverty and Bolstering the Middle Class While Addressing Inequality, Economic Rents, and Climate Change. DOI: 10.1515/bis-2020-0013. November 2020.

Why has UBI not been implemented? While the main opposition to a UBI program is the supposed ‘infeasibility’ due to cost, there are several other oppositions points that have been raised (Milanovic, 2019; Stiglitz, 2019):

Limited experience with UBI. Trials have been too small, too short, or not truly universal or unconditional. As examples, Finland’s trial only included unemployed, and the State of Alaska’s dividend is a “windfall grant” and therefore varies too much to be considered guaranteed income. While limited data exists for a full scale implementation, experience and comfort can be gained by incrementally increasing UBI payments as funding sources are put into place (a “piecemeal” approach). Social welfare programs would stay in place until UBI payments are sufficient to elevate individuals above the poverty level.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Welfare turn

Public Assistance Programs Stink, Basic Income is Baller

Drexel University, 21

[February 21, Drexel University Center for Hunger-Free Communities, “Universal Basic Income: Key to Reducing Food Insecurity and Improving Health, , 6/25/2023, EJ]

The government focus on documentation and surveillance as part of these benefit programs is highly inefficient. Outdated systems and technology also lead to increased labor costs and reduced efficiency in administering programs. For participants, these programs demand a significant amount of time, effort, and documentation, which interferes with seeking work and caring for children.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 Welfare turn

UBI trade-offs are beneficial – their link concedes funding exists

Worstall 2016’

[Tim, June 4 2016, Forbes, “Of Course We Can Afford A Universal Basic Income: Do We Want One Though?,” , date accessed 6/24, DG]

June 4 2016 One of the arguments against a universal basic income is that we can't actually afford one. Whatever amount that we were able to pay to everyone simply wouldn't be large enough to actually cover the basics of life. Well, not without pushing up taxation levels to unsupportable levels. This isn't in fact true: we can indeed afford a UBI at an entirely reasonable level within the confines of the amount that we already tax. So thus the question moves on to the next point: do we actually want one? At which point I say yes, obviously we do, as I have been saying for some years now. Simply on the basis that a UBI would be vastly better than the cruel, almost wicked, welfare states that we currently have. Which brings us to the calculation of how we can indeed afford a UBI. Charles Murray is in the WSJ today: In my version, every American citizen age 21 and older would get a $13,000 annual grant deposited electronically into a bank account in monthly installments. Three thousand dollars must be used for health insurance (a complicated provision I won’t try to explain here), leaving every adult with $10,000 in disposable annual income for the rest of their lives. There is no increment for children. From Murray's earlier book (which I think is being released in updated form soon) I recall that the argument here was interesting. A UBI requires that no one insist upon how you live your life. Here's your income, use it as you wish. If that includes having children then fine, if it includes not doing so then fine also. The point being that we really are trying to maximise human freedom here, even while making sure that all can at least eat. And if we're maximising freedom to do whatever you want then we can't go around changing how much you get because of what you do. It's possible that you think $13,000 a year isn't enough. It's certainly not going to be a plush lifestyle by American standards, not when someone decides to do no work at all to top it up. But it's also true that $13,000 a year puts you in the top 12% of all global income earners. It would be nicer if there was some more significant digit there, like $13k puts you into the global 10% or something, but that does seem a fair enough guarantee to get purely through the privilege of having been born an American. There's two issues which also get entirely solved by such a plan, over and above our destruction of the current welfare state....and as Murray points out, we would indeed destroy that: The UBI is to be financed by getting rid of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, housing subsidies, welfare for single women and every other kind of welfare and social-services program, as well as agricultural subsidies and corporate welfare. As of 2014, the annual cost of a UBI would have been about $200 billion cheaper than the current system. By 2020, it would be nearly a trillion dollars cheaper. A UBI at this level is actually cheaper than the current system.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 UBI is utopian

Universal Income has empirically been successfully implemented and supported

Battistoni, Magazine Editor, 17

(Alyssa Battistoni, PhD candidate in political science at Yale University and an editor at Jacobin magazine, “The False Promise of Universal Basic Income” https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/false-promise-universal-basic-income-andy-stern-ruger-bregman-grh)

UBI was recently endorsed by the Movement for Black Lives as part of a reparations program, while Canada’s Leap Manifesto calls for consideration of UBI on the grounds of environmental sustainability. Jeremy Corbyn said last September that the Labour Party would investigate the prospects for basic income in the UK, and experiments are on the agenda in Scotland, backed by the left-wing SNP. In France, Benoît Hamon recently won the Socialist Party presidential nomination on a platform that included a basic income.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***Solvency debate*** › A2 UBI is utopian

Implementation is possible

Painter, RSA Policy and Strategy Director, Thoung, Economist, 15

[Anthony, Chris, December 2015, RSA, "Creative citizen, creative state: the principled and pragmatic case for a Universal Basic Income.", , accessed 6/26/2023, S.P.]

The negative distributional consequences of Basic Income can be heavily mitigated and even eliminated. There are practical systems that have been proposed – the RSA Basic Income model is one – and some in real world operation, most particularly in Alaska. The strong moral underpinning of providing basic support to all and ensuring work pays is also intrinsic to Basic Income. In the context of our four tests – moral alignment, fiscal viability, distributional fairness, and support for creativity – Basic Income is a system that has strong merits in principle and sufficient evidence to suggest merits in practice. This is why a Basic Income pilot in the UK at a city or cityregion level should be explored. At least then, we would have a better idea of how it would work in practice.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF › ***1AC Core*** › 1AC – Solvency

Automation makes UBI more cost-effective – transfers from existing social spending are sufficient

Reich, former secretary of labor, 18 [Robert B. Reich, Jul 15 2018, The New York Times, “GIVE PEOPLE MONEY: How a Universal Basic Income Would End Poverty, Revolutionize Work, and Remake the World/THE WAR ON NORMAL PEOPLE: The Truth About America's Disappearing Jobs and Why Universal Basic Income Is Our Future,” accessed June 29, 2023, https://www.proquest.com/magazines/give-people-money-how-universal-basic-income/docview/2069424117/se-2?accountid=1557, 6/23/2023, EJ]

Whatever the source of funds, it seems a safe bet that increased automation will allow the economy to continue to grow, making a U.B.I. more affordable. A U.B.I. would itself generate more consumer spending, stimulating additional economic activity. And less poverty would mean less crime, incarceration and other social costs associated with deprivation. "You know what's really expensive?" Yang asks. "Dysfunction. Revolution."

If these measures still aren't enough to foot the bill, Lowrey suggests making a U.B.I. less universal by taxing away U.B.I. payments to high-income earners and reducing other forms of social insurance (for example, eliminating food stamps and welfare programs). As a last resort, she writes, a U.B.I. could be implemented as a kind of negative income tax, by which government simply ensures that every person or household has a certain minimum yearly income. This is what Richard Nixon and Milton Friedman had in mind. Lowrey figures that the cost of such a guarantee would approximate the current total costs of the earned-income tax credit, supplemental security income, housing assistance, food stamps and school lunches. She notes that the simplest way to achieve this would be to transform existing antipoverty programs into unconditional cash transfers.