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2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Inflation Answers › Uniqueness Answers › AT – Inflation Stable/Declining

Disinflationary trend coming to an end – inflation will rebound

Mott Capital Management Group, 7/9/23

[Mott Capital Management, 7-9-23, “The Stock Market’s Inflation Fantasy Ends This Week”, , accessed 7-15-23, MS]

The Stock Market's Inflation Fantasy Ends This Week

2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Inflation Answers › Uniqueness Answers › Inflation High Now

Fed is falling behind in the race against inflation and will have to over-correct making recession is inevitable

Tokic, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Finance Professor, 7-10-23

[Damir Tokic, 7-10-23, Seeking Alpha, “CPI: Preview: Disinflation Is Finished – Inflation To Start Rising Again,” , Accessed: 7-15-23, CV]

The Fed is essentially in a race against inflation. Drawing lessons from McMaster's race strategy, the Fed is supposed to get ahead of inflation - and if inflation accelerates, shift into a more aggressive tightening mode until the clear victory. In fact, that was exactly the Fed's strategy in the 1970s/early 1980s. Here's the graph that shows core PCE inflation (in blue) and effective Federal Funds rate (in red):

2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Inflation Answers › Uniqueness Answers › Inflation High Now

Inflation high now - multiple indicators prove.

Kramer, Mott Capital founder and Seeking Alpha analyst, 7/12/23

[Michael, 07/12/2023, Seeking Alpha, “The Inflation Battle Is Far From Over, Now The Hard Part Begins”, , accessed 07/15/2023, RT]

Core services for June were up 6.1% on a y/y basis, and goods were still up 1.3%. Both are still much higher than the historical average from 2000 until the beginning of 2020, when services averaged 2.8%, and goods averaged around 0%.

2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Economy Uniqueness › Employment Recession Incoming

An employment recession is incoming.

Tokic, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Finance Professor, 7-7-23

[Damir, 7-7-23, Seeking Alpha "A Full Employment Recession," , Accessed 7/15/23, S.A.M]

A Full Employment Recession

2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Economy Uniqueness › Recession Inevitable

Stimulus and delayed action on monetary policy have set us up for a recession

Lachman, Global macroeconomy Senior Fellow, 7-13-23

[Desmond, 7-13-23, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, “America Is Facing a Recession: Should We Blame Joe Biden?,” https://www.aei.org/america/is/facing/a/reccesion, accessed 7-15-23, DG]

John F. Kennedy was fond of repeating the wise old saying that success has a hundred fathers but failure is an orphan. If ever there was an area where this adage has applicability, it has to be in the field of economic policy.

2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Economy Uniqueness › Recession Inevitable

Labor market weakening now – Employers are shortening hours, which is a sign of future layoffs and potential for recession

Bhattarai, The Washington Post economics correspondent, 7-11-23

[Abha, 7-11-23, The Washington Post, “Businesses are cutting workers’ hours in a warning sign for the economy”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/07/11/part-time-jobs-economy/, Accessed 7-15-23, ED]

Businesses are starting to cut workers’ hours, forcing hundreds of thousands of people into part-time roles, in what could be an early warning sign for the economy.

2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Economy Uniqueness › Recession Inevitable

Recession inevitable – interest rates are only one factor

Redman, Bitcoin.com News Lead, 7-13-23

[Jamie, 7-13-23, Bitcoin.com, “Experts Warn of Impending Recession in the US as Survey Reveals 59% Chance by July 2024,” BITCOIN.COM, , accessed 7-15-23, MO]

According to economists surveyed by Bankrate, the probability of a recession occurring in the U.S. is significant. The survey, published on July 12, 2023, reveals that Bankrate’s experts estimate a 59% chance of a recession taking place by July 2024. Bankrate states that the expert forecasts “suggest a downturn is more probable than not.”

2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Economy Uniqueness › Recession Inevitable

Lachman, American Enterprise Institute Senior Fellow, 7-7-23

[Desmond, 7-7-23, American Enterprise Institute, “The Federal Reserve Keeps Fighting the Last War,” , accessed 7/15/23,CC]

Yet despite these deflationary forces, and despite the likelihood that the full effect of the past year’s tightening is still to be fully felt by the economy, the Fed shows every sign of maintaining its hawkish monetary policy stance. Indeed, in his most recent Congressional testimony, Mr. Powell was at pains to tell Congress that the Fed’s job of reducing inflation was far from done and that two more interest rate hikes were likely in the rest of the year.

The moral of the story is that the Fed keeps making the same policy mistakes. To wit, it follows a backward-looking data dependent policy and it pays too little regard to the long and variable lags with which monetary policy operates. Last year those policy mistakes gave us a bout of high inflation. Over the next year, those same mistakes are likely to give us an economic recession.

2023 GDI Evidence
AFF – Economy Uniqueness › Economic Decline Inevitable

Economic disorder inevitable – multiple indicators prove the risk is high

Lachmond, American Enterprise Institute senior fellow, 7-10-23

[Desmond, 7-10-23, American Enterprise Institute, “Brace for 1930s-Style Economic Disorder—Especially If Interest Rates Keep Climbing,” , Accessed 7-15-2023, ah]

The world is soon headed for a period of serious economic disorder, warns Ray Dalio, founder of the world’s largest hedge fund, Bridgewater.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › Permutations › 2ac – BIG perm

Perm – EITC stepping stone for UBI

CAVANAUGH, senior editor for the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 2022

[Tim, “Beware of expanding the earned income tax credit” The Hill December 31 2022 accessed 6.15.23 preJCP-TM]

Unfortunately, Michigan is not alone in looking to enlarge a program that’s rife with misspending. Twenty-seven states offer a refundable earned income tax credit based on the federal model, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. Only Michigan is presently aiming to more than triple the size of its EITC, but several states are considering enhancements to this or related tax credits. What explains the popularity of such a flawed program? The earned income tax credit is reserved for low- to moderate-income working individuals and households. Its chief requirement is that the recipient earn money from a job, and it reduces the amount of taxes the recipient owes. If the amount of the credit is more than the earner owes in taxes, that person gets money back. Even those who do not owe any income tax can get money from the program. The credit has some features that make it superior to other types of public assistance. It is set up to encourage work — the biggest factor in leaving poverty. It also has a phase-out, rather, an in-or-out line, to avoid spikes in tax liabilities as people earn more. Conservatives like its work requirement and its resemblance to a “negative income tax” originally proposed by the late economist Milton Friedman. Progressives see its fairly high earning threshold (the top salary for eligibility is $59,000 per year) as a way of providing public assistance all the way into the middle class. Fans of the universal basic income see it as a step (though, in their minds, an insufficient one) toward that goal.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › EITC doesn’t solve › Answers to studies prove effectiveness

Studies on EITC effectiveness on work incentives misattribute causality - no significant impact on work levels

Mead, professor of politics and public policy at New York University and an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2023

[Lawrence, “Overselling the Earned Income Tax Credit” National Review number 55 • spring 2023 reprint of Fall 2014 article accessed 6.15.23 prejcp-tm]

Another serious doubt about the studies concerns the causal direction of the effects they imply. The assumption behind the idea of an EITC effect is that, as the credit was expanded in 1986, 1990, and 1993, non-working poor mothers heard about it and went to work in higher numbers than before, producing the noted increases in employment levels. But a precondition of getting the EITC is that one is working. So at either the individual or aggregate level, one would expect work levels to precede and predict rising EITC claims rather than the other way around. Of course, one might hear of the EITC and then go to work and claim the credit, as the substitution effect supposes. But in terms of what is measurable, work levels should still determine EITC levels rather than vice versa. The statistical studies would also lead us to assume that claims for the EITC grew as more mothers went to work. But that did not occur. According to research by Joseph Hotz and John Karl Scholz, the number of EITC claimants reached 19 million in 1994 (from under 12 million just five years earlier) and then did not grow much further during the 1990s, even though labor-force participation by single mothers soared. The expansions of the credit in 1990 and 1993 apparently had little effect on EITC participation. How then could the credit explain rising work levels? If newly employed low-income women did not claim the credit in large numbers, how can the promise of the credit be what drew them into the work force? The effects attributed to the EITC by these studies are by far the largest ever claimed for a work incentive. But they are a poor fit not only with EITC claim levels in the '90s but also (as we shall see below) with the experience of those involved in welfare reform. One explanation might be that the studies are all statistical, and therefore less able to separate out the EITC from other influences on work levels than were the policy experiments noted above. Since the EITC's benefits and substitution effects, as described by these studies, strengthened in the mid-1990s just when welfare reform and a good economy were also promoting higher work levels, the EITC effect could easily be overestimated. Also, the effect of welfare reform on work levels is tougher to measure than that of the EITC or economic conditions. All the studies have to gauge reform pressures indirectly, for instance by looking at the "waivers" that states obtained from Washington to run various work experiments prior to welfare reform. Due to these measurement problems, the studies could easily overestimate the effect of the EITC on work levels while underestimating that of welfare reform. The question of whether the EITC drove welfare recipients to work in the '90s is ultimately a question about human motivation, and on this matter economic analysis alone cannot be trusted to provide a complete answer. Fortunately, these analyses are not our only source of insight regarding the psychology involved.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › EITC doesn’t solve › Answers to studies prove effectiveness

Studies on value of EITC overstate the role in incentivizing workers – multiple factors

Mead, professor of politics and public policy at New York University and an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2023

[Lawrence, “Overselling the Earned Income Tax Credit” National Review number 55 • spring 2023 reprint of Fall 2014 article accessed 6.15.23 prejcp-tm]

Thanks to this generosity, the EITC has become a large program. Twenty-seven million families received the credit in 2012. That year, the EITC cost $63 billion, or twice the cost of TANF and associated state programs. But in their enthusiasm for the credit, some policymakers have not been careful to distinguish the credit's role in increasing employment among the poor in the 1990s from the roles played by TANF and by the improved economy. Indeed, in recent years some on the left have downplayed the role of work requirements and have asserted that the EITC was the biggest driver of the work increase. This assertion implies that the main reason that relatively few poor mothers worked before the mid-1990s was not that welfare failed to require work, as welfare reform presumed, but that low-skilled wages were insufficient. The key constraint on entry into the work force for the poor, in this view, is the low-wage labor market. Give the poor a better deal and work levels will rise, without a need to enforce work. Much the same case is made for raising the minimum wage. These claims are based on several statistical studies that credit the EITC with much, even most, of the rise in work levels among welfare mothers in the 1990s. The most noted of these studies, published in 2001 by Bruce Meyer of Northwestern University and Dan Rosenbaum of the University of North Carolina, Greensboro, found that the EITC explains as much as 62% of the increase in the employment rates of single mothers when comparing 1984 to 1996 and as much as 35% of the increase between 1992 and 1996. Another study, published in 2003 by Jeffrey Grogger of the University of California, Los Angeles, found that the EITC explains 34% of the rise in employment among single mothers from 1993 to 1999. Similarly positive findings come from studies by Nadda Eissa and Jeffrey Liebman (in 1996); David Ellwood (in 2000); Joseph Hotz, Charles Mullin, and John Karl Scholz (in 2006); and Michael Keane and Robert Moffitt (in 1998). These studies assume that the EITC operates as a work incentive, moving people into work due to what economists call "the substitution effect" — raising the value of jobs compared to other activities, so that more people choose to work. Meyer and Rosenbaum think that the EITC was the "dominant" cause of work increases by single mothers between 1984 and 1996, and they question the need for "punitive measures, such as time limits and work requirements." Grogger remarks that "the EITC may be the single most important policy measure for explaining the decrease in welfare and the rise in work and earnings among female-headed families in recent years." In earlier decades, most experts believed that the EITC actually reduced incentives to work, for reasons explained below. But in light of these and similar recent studies, a new consensus has formed that the credit promotes work while also subsidizing the poor, a rare combination not previously achieved in social policy. Liberal experts now commonly assert that, as Peter Edelman and Harry Holzer put it last year, the EITC has "demonstrated the potential of 'make work pay'...to raise employment levels while improving earnings and income among the poor." A Brookings Institution review of the EITC a few years ago found its effects generally mixed, but claimed a "consistent" finding that the credit raises employment among single mothers, again citing the same set of statistical studies. According to a 2013 study by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, a liberal advocacy group, the EITC expansions were "the most important reason why employment rose among single mothers with children during the 1990s." Specifically, it was "more effective in encouraging work than either welfare reform or the strong economy." But this new consensus misses crucial parts of the story. The theory behind work incentives, the nation's actual experience with them, long-established patterns in the psychology of poverty, and on-the-ground testimony all suggest that the EITC in fact played a minor role in welfare reform and had only modest effects on decisions by welfare recipients to seek work. Economic studies fail to perceive this because they lack any such hands-on reference. Field researchers say that politics, not economics, largely drove the welfare revolution. Administrative work enforcement was the main reason work levels rose, and similar methods must be the main basis of policies aimed at raising work levels among the poor (especially poor men), as many would now like to do.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › EITC doesn’t solve › Extension – EITC reduces participation in labor force

Income effect outweighs substitution effect in wages – and can’t solve for jobs and employment

Mead, professor of politics and public policy at New York University and an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2023

[Lawrence, “Overselling the Earned Income Tax Credit” National Review number 55 • spring 2023 reprint of Fall 2014 article accessed 6.15.23 prejcp-tm]

Income and substitution It might seem obvious that subsidizing wages, as the EITC does, would tend to raise work levels, since the credit means that those not working will earn more by taking a job than they could before. But as economists have long known, the subsidy also raises the wages of those already working. They can now cover their needs with fewer working hours than before and may cut back work effort. This incentive, called the income effect, offsets the substitution effect of the higher wage. As a way of promoting employment, work incentives could thus turn out to be self-defeating. It is unclear a priori whether instituting a wage subsidy will raise or lower work levels overall. Some think that the EITC escapes this problem because the credit requires employment: It subsidizes only low earnings, not low income in general, so only the substitution effect should operate. But families receiving the EITC could nonetheless feel an income effect at the top end of the credit's income-eligibility range. That is, among the employed there could be a temptation to work less so as to remain eligible for the credit. Since over three-quarters of EITC earners have incomes in the upper ranges of the credit, this income effect could be important. EITC does reduce work effort by wives in two-parent families, apparently due to income effects, as Nada Eissa and Hillary Hoynes have shown. So as with work incentives in general, it is unclear a priori whether EITC raises work levels overall.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › EITC doesn’t solve › Extensions – work incentives

Substitution effect of EITC not supported by studies - no additional incentive to work

Mead, professor of politics and public policy at New York University and an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2023

[Lawrence, “Overselling the Earned Income Tax Credit” National Review number 55 • spring 2023 reprint of Fall 2014 article accessed 6.15.23 prejcp-tm]

Indeed, work incentives have been added to income-maintenance programs and experiments since the 1960s, and — until the relatively recent EITC studies — no one ever claimed that they much affected employment. In welfare, work incentives consist of reducing benefits by less than the full amount of earnings if a recipient takes a job. In AFDC, such incentives varied widely among states and over time, yet they had next to no effect on the work levels of mothers on welfare, which remained low throughout the life of the program. Under TANF, work incentives offered by states also have had no palpable effect on employment, even though on average these incentives are much stronger than those under AFDC, as Jordan Matsudaira and Rebecca Blank showed in a paper earlier this year. One particular set of studies demonstrates the danger of the income effect. Between 1968 and 1982, the federal government conducted four experiments to see how work levels would change if low-income families were guaranteed an income coupled with work incentives of varying strengths. The results showed clear income effects, in that work levels varied inversely with the grant level. But the work incentives showed less effect than statistical studies had anticipated. That is, varying the benefit-reduction rate in response to earnings and thus the effective wage had little impact on whether recipients worked. Some say, again, that the problem here was that neither AFDC nor the income-maintenance experiments strictly required work in order to qualify for a benefit. So work incentives should be more effective in the case of the EITC, since only workers are subsidized. But in recent decades, several experiments have tried to motivate welfare mothers to work by linking various benefits to employment, and the effects have been uneven at best. These projects included the New York State Child Assistance Program, the New Hope Project, the Minnesota Family Investment Program, Canada's Self-Sufficiency Project, JOBS-Plus, and the Opportunity NYC – Family Rewards Demonstration. All of these efforts conditioned the benefits they offered in some way on employment. And some had sizable effects — MFIP and the Self-Sufficiency Project raised the employment of welfare mothers by a third. But a pure substitution effect would operate by non-workers finding out about work subsidies, calculating that work now pays more, and entering jobs on their own. All the recent projects relied on a lot more than that to raise work levels. Except for CAP and JOBS-Plus, each of the programs required that eligible people work at least 30 hours a week to receive the benefits. Each program also used staff or other activities alongside the incentive to persuade eligible individuals to put in those hours and helped them to do so. MFIP even enforced participation for long-term recipients, on pain of cuts in their welfare payments. Some projects — CAP, New Hope, and Opportunity NYC — recorded no or small work increases even with a 30-hour rule and a staff structure. In no case did a work-incentive experiment achieve what the recent studies claim regarding the EITC: a large work increase based on the substitution effect alone. Doubts about the effects of the EITC are also raised by the fact that many of the eligible individuals in these experiments declined the benefits offered. In CAP, only a sixth of mothers eligible for the program took up its offer to earn higher incomes through working. In SSP, only 36% of eligible people participated at any time, and only 25% or less in any given month. Most notably, New Hope offered a generous package of jobs paying at least poverty-level wages, plus child and health care, in return for working 30 hours a week. And it did so in two Milwaukee neighborhoods where 12,000 to 30,000 adults were eligible. Yet it took the program 17 months to enroll only 1,362 applicants. This appears to contradict the premise underlying work incentives, which is that non-working adults actively seek to work but are barred from doing so by adverse incentives.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › EITC doesn’t solve › Extensions – work incentives

EITC doesn’t incentivize work – and doesn’t get lower income workers work

Mead, professor of politics and public policy at New York University and an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2023

[Lawrence, “Overselling the Earned Income Tax Credit” National Review number 55 • spring 2023 reprint of Fall 2014 article accessed 6.15.23 prejcp-tm]

Since the welfare reforms of the 1990s, the federal government and the states have conditioned much of the aid they provide to the poor on employment, or at least the active pursuit of employment. Linking welfare to work began as a conservative proposal that liberals opposed, but by the end of the Clinton era the idea had become reasonably bipartisan. And although it is now criticized more broadly and openly on the left than at any point in the last two decades, the idea remains essential to the way most Americans of all political stripes think about welfare. Even among advocates of work requirements, however, confusion reigns regarding how public policy can best encourage lower-income Americans to seek work. Increasingly, many on the left contend that we need not enforce work through the heavy-handed means that characterized the '90s welfare reform — requiring welfare mothers to enter the work force and empowering case managers to make sure they did. Many liberals believe that it is enough to subsidize wages for those of meager means, and that the resulting incentive will motivate them to seek work on their own. The chief evidence for this view is the supposed success of the Earned Income Tax Credit in lifting work levels among welfare mothers during welfare reform. The EITC subsidizes the earnings of low-income workers, thus effectively raising their wages. But its success in "making work pay" and combatting poverty among Americans who are employed has too easily been confused with success in causing more Americans to go to work. And this confusion is evident not only among opponents of strict work requirements. Even some on the right, like Senator Marco Rubio and Congressman Paul Ryan — who each have championed both work requirements in anti-poverty programs and an expansion of the EITC (or similar wage subsidy) in recent years — have at times confounded the potential benefits of the two. This confusion does not advance the cause of raising work levels in low-income America. The EITC is an effective weapon in America's anti-poverty arsenal, but it is crucial to understand what it does and does not achieve. The credit rewards those who work and helps keep them working, but it does little to get them to go to work in the first place. To raise work levels, we still need the sorts of administrative work requirements seen in the last major welfare reform.

2023 GDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › EITC doesn’t solve › EITC – work incentive answers

2ac - No increased work or labor force participation – studies of previous expansions prove and can’t generate jobs

Bruenig, president - People’s Policy Project and former policy analyst at Demos Think Tank - 2020

[Matt, “The Myths of the Earned Income Tax Credit” People’s Policy Project – socialist and social democratic economic ideas think tank , May 18 2020 accessed 6.15.23 prejcp-TM]

*figure omitted

2023 GDI Counterplan
Affirmative Answers › EITC doesn’t solve › EITC – doesn’t solve poverty

EITC anti-poverty impact overstates – wrong year calculations, nonparticipation problem and tax fees prove about half the impact as reported

Bruenig, president - People’s Policy Project and former policy analyst at Demos Think Tank - 2020

[Matt, “The Myths of the Earned Income Tax Credit” People’s Policy Project – socialist and social democratic economic ideas think tank , May 18 2020 accessed 6.15.23 prejcp-TM]

*figure omitted