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Evidence
IR › Theory — Offensive Realism
Kaplan ’12 — Robert; a visiting professor at the United States Naval Academy, consultant to the U.S. Army's Special Forces, the United States Marines, and the United States Air Force. January 2012; “Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things)”; The Atlantic; ; //CYang
Mearsheimer reveres both men for their bravery in pointing out unpopular truths, and throughout his career he has tried to emulate them. Indeed, in a country that has always been hostile to what realism signifies, he wears his “realist” label as a badge of honor. “To realism!” he says as he raises his wineglass to me in a toast at a local restaurant. As Ashley J. Tellis, Mearsheimer’s former student and now, after a stint in the Bush administration, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, later tells me: “Realism is alien to the American tradition. It is consciously amoral, focused as it is on interests rather than on values in a debased world. But realism never dies, because it accurately reflects how states actually behave, behind the façade of their values-based rhetoric.”
Mearsheimer’s intellectually combative nature first disturbed the policy elite in 1988, with the publication of his critical biography, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. In it, he asserts that the revered British military theorist Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart was wrong on basic strategic questions of the period between the first and second world wars, especially in his opposition to the use of military force against the Third Reich, and was a de facto appeaser even after evidence had surfaced about the systematic murder of Jews. Mearsheimer expected that his perspective would draw fire from British reviewers who had been close to Liddell Hart, which it did. “Other political scientists work on capillaries. John goes for the jugular,” notes Richard Rosecrance, a retired UCLA professor who mentored Mearsheimer in the 1970s.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
IR › IR — AT: Science
Kavalski ’12 — Emilian; Associate Professor of Global Studies at the Institute for Social Justice, Australian Catholic University (Sydney). 2012; “Waking IR Up from its ‘Deep Newtonian Slumber’”; Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 41, Issue 1; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries
Is the discipline of International Relations (IR) a ‘science’? Its ‘scientific’ credentials have long concerned proponents and detractors. As Ronald Rogowski’s claim in the epigraph suggests, the hankering after an ‘elegant science of international politics’ has virtually become a ‘dream’ to which his and subsequent generations of IR scholars have succumbed. Belying this dreaming is a question whether IR’s social-scientific inquiry can ever approximate that of the natural sciences. Perceiving the natural sciences to be an ‘exact science’, cohorts of IR students have been developing ‘powerful’ and ‘parsimonious’ models for the explanation and understanding of international politics. Take the ‘balance of power’, for instance. Its aim is to ascertain the existence of a particular regularity in world affairs – parity between adversaries. Borrowing the notion of equilibrium from the natural sciences, the balance of power explains international order as a regulating mechanism motivated by the natural desire of states for survival.
In this way, IR has tended to propound explanations premised on assumptions of predictability rooted in the conviction that international life is a closed system, changing in a gradual manner and following linear trajectories, which can be elicited through discrete assessments of dependent and independent variables. What IR intends to produce in this way is a nearly mechanistic model of international politics that is perceived to be as rigorous and robust as the one of the natural sciences. In recent years, the simplification and reductionism underpinning this ‘dream’ of a scientific IR have come under severe criticism from different quarters. In fact, some – such as John G. Ruggie – have made the point that the discipline needs to wake up from this ‘deep Newtonian slumber’, if it is to have any bearing on the real world of international politics. The three books under review actively contribute to this decentring project by advancing the ‘complexification’ of IR. The notion of complexification entails different things for different authors, but what all of them share is some form of engagement with the complexity paradigm of the philosophy of science.3
2022
Michigan
Evidence
IR › IR — AT: Empirics
Abulof ’15 — Uriel; associate professor at Tel-Aviv University's School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs. He is a LISD research fellow at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School and at the Truman Institute. July 16, 2015; “The Malpractice of “Rationality” in International Relations”; Rationality and Society, Volume 25, Issue 3; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang
What is the purpose (or scholarly function) of ascribing rationality? Two aims are plain: describing/explaining or prescribing (wherein the actor or act either is, or ought to be, rational). Stein (1999) observes a curious shift: “What started as a normative enterprise has become a positive one. Tools once created to improve the quality of otherwise imperfect human decision making are now being used to explain choice” (p. 212). But this trend is more intricate. In principle, many contemporary RCT scholars agree that “rational-choice theory is first and foremost normative. It tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible” (Elster, 1989: 3). Still, in practice, RCT scholarship abounds in descriptive and explanatory analyses (Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010; Lovett, 2006).
The descriptive-prescriptive schism should not obfuscate rationality’s third purpose: rationality “as if” it were real. I refer to this as subjunctive rationality. It is pervasive in RCT, especially in formal modeling (Morton, 1999). Accordingly, actors “behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns,” much like “the density of leaves around a tree” is determined “as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives, given the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the physical laws …” — this subjunctive “formula is accepted because it works,” not because it is a truthful account of reality (Friedman, 1953: 21,19,18; cf. Nagel, 1963). On a larger scale, decisions may then be aggregated in order to understand collective actions as if they were decided by rational individuals, even when it is not so (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994: 75).
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Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk
Building on the previous discussion of AI as a GPT, it appears that the challenge for NATO is subtle, multifaceted and significant. First, in an age of accelerating technological change and growing domain applicability, catching up with industry leaders and innovators becomes more and more difficult for those that lag behind.73 This means that waiting is not a solution – even though acting prematurely, in a realm of great uncertainty, is inherently difficult and risky.74 Second, governments cannot expect that individuals, firms and organizations will be able to embrace and successfully exploit the new wave of technological transformation alone, without advice, support, direction, vision or investments in infrastructure. Third, while some countries will have an advantage, others will find the transition more difficult. Regardless of this, technological transitions do not occur in a vacuum, as they require the alignment of incentives among a multiplicity of actors, organizations and institutions, as well as the provision of complementary services and goods for the new technologies to flourish and be adopted.75 Fourth, and more important for NATO, without coordinating and cooperating on their investments in the necessary complementary assets, goods and services, Allies could find themselves having to face additional hurdles.
What types of problem could emerge? Technology-generated efficiency gains in production lead to lower prices. However, lower prices lead to increases in demand – because the relative price of substitute goods (rivals) increases.76 Over the past decade, AI – and, in particular, ML – has made a particular activity, prediction, cheaper: it is reasonable to forecast that this trend will continue in the future.77 As AI becomes cheaper, however, the demand for AI-related services will increase, thus leading to more demand for related necessities like AI specialists, AI infrastructure (and 5G networks) and AI components (processors). This in turn might well lead to scarcity and higher prices, thus pitching actors against one another – not unlike the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis, when individual self-interested actions led to collectively bad outcomes.78 In the context of a military alliance, the problem goes much deeper, as it can generate a beggar-thy-neighbour effect with allies competing for the same scarce resources.79 Moreover, without consultation and cooperation, Allies could end up developing different technological solutions, with the risk of undermining compatibility and interoperability. Similarly, they could end up prioritizing some problems over others, with the risk of developing multiple, different and redundant solutions while neglecting other points in need of attention.80 However, through intra-alliance coordination and cooperation, as well as dialogue and consultation, secondary market mechanisms and other approaches, NATO could provide an important contribution to identify and address this type of problems.81
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Andrew Imbrie et al 20, Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service is a research organization focused on studying the security impacts of emerging technologies, supporting academic work in security and technology studies, and delivering nonpartisan analysis to the policy community. February. "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" //pipk
The global competition for AI talent is nominally zero-sum, but talent development efforts such as education and training could expand it. The United States should cultivate international networks of researchers through exchange programs. One potential model is the U.S. Telecommunication Training Institute, which brings officials from developing countries to the United States for tuition-free training in information and communications technologies. Such programs would enable U.S. and allied policymakers to identify comparative advantages in AI, share best practices, and promote linkages and the free flow of ideas between government, industry, and academia.
The right approach would facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practices among allied and partner countries. The NSF, for example, has awarded grants to researchers who seek to promote international collaboration and benefit from the expertise and specialized skill sets of international partners.84 Additional programs, joint scholarships, and conference support could synchronize efforts to grow the pool of AI talent. Survey results suggest that partners already engage in various efforts to leverage international ties to encourage STEM education, provide AI-relevant fellowships, and offer AI-specific advanced and technical degrees.
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Michael J. Mazarr et al 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. "Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition" Research Report. //pipk
There is not necessarily a competition in security cooperation per se, and security cooperation activities among major rivals are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Our analysis in this study suggests that U.S. security cooperation activities seldom directly compete with those of U.S. rivals, other than through those activities’ contribution to overall influence. Many of the case studies reveal that the United States engages in significant levels and types of security cooperation with countries that are pursuing similar activities with Russia, China, or both. There are few cases in which Russian or Chinese security cooperation prevented or obstructed parallel U.S. activities (although arms sales could be seen as an exception). Security cooperation is best viewed as one piece of a much larger competition for influence; security cooperation activities themselves are usually not zero-sum.
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Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Disads › 2AC---AT: EU Tradeoff DA
EU Institute for Security Studies 19, The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the Union’s agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues. Its core mission is to assist the EU and its member states in the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as other external action of the Union. "The EU Nato and Artificial Intelligence" November 14. //pipk
On this basis, a number of specific areas for increased EU-NATO cooperation were discussed during the discussion. It was proposed that further steps were taken to implement the Joint Declarations, including possibly by establishing an ‘AI Centre of Excellence’. Another proposal concerned adding an AI research dimension to the Declarations, although a different view contended that AI would nonetheless automatically and incrementally feature in EU-NATO cooperation given its crosscutting nature. The need for a common EU-NATO data-management and data-sharing framework was also proposed, in light of the importance of data pools for the performance of AI algorithms. Although much remained to be done in that area, data labelling was identified as a good starting point.
Another point raised on several occasions was the importance of interoperability. Here, it was argued, AI had the potential to either increase or decrease existing gaps. Militaries could mitigate AI interoperability gaps through exercises and common training, such as through the Cyber Education Platform, or by developing niche capabilities, especially by utilising EU initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Some participants argued that divergences were nevertheless inevitable and that, consequently, countries with low or no AI capabilities should be able to trust the technologies of those with more advanced technologies. This, in turn, required a common framework for certification and evaluation procedures, as well as standardised interfaces and modular system architectures that would combine closed/‘national’ and open/‘shared’ components.
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Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Disads › 2AC---AT: EU Tradeoff DA
EU Institute for Security Studies 19, The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the Union’s agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues. Its core mission is to assist the EU and its member states in the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as other external action of the Union. "The EU Nato and Artificial Intelligence" November 14. //pipk
However, the conference also addressed specific challenges to cooperation. It was pointed out that the two organisations occasionally held diverging perspectives on particular issues, such as Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) or the appropriate balance between laissez-faire and dirigiste approaches to defence industrial and technological matters. The fact that not every EU member state had published their positions on AI yet, while the US AI military strategy does not even mention NATO, did little to bridge these divergent viewpoints. It was also highlighted that despite any possible need for cooperation on AI, the respective mandates and autonomy of each organisation should be respected.
NEXT STEPS FOR EU-NATO COOPERATION A shared view at the event was that moving EU-NATO cooperation forward was essential. As in the cyber domain, the two organisations could play complementary roles, drawing on their respective strengths and instruments, with the EU leading in dual-use and NATO in military standards. The importance of shared values and outlooks was also highlighted on several occasions. The two organisations held similar perspectives on fundamental issues, including the unknown qualities of AI in defence, the need for technological partnership between democracies, an AI arms control regime and strong links between government and industry. In addition, cooperation required a shared understanding of AI. Creating a common vocabulary was key in this respect, an area that the European Defence Agency (EDA) was already working. It was also noted that inter-institutional cooperation would not be fully effective until each organisation developed an internally coherent outlook, with clearly defined goals, threat perceptions and a goal-driven approach to AI.
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Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Disads › 2AC---AT: Russia AI Bad DA
Matej Tonin 19, current Slovenian Minister of Defense, was an active member of the NATO PA from 2012 to 2020. He served as rapporteur and Chairperson of the Assembly's Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security and as Deputy Head of the Slovenian delegation to the NATO PA. "ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S ARMED FORCES" Report from the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security. October 13. //pipk
D. RUSSIA 56. President Vladimir Putin has declared that “AI is the future […]. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world”. Although Russia still lags behind the United States and China, it has demonstrated its commitment to catching up with its competitors – at least in certain areas. Nevertheless, while Chinese and US companies spend billions of US dollars in AI, the Russian private sector only invested an estimated RUB 700 million annually (less than USD 11 million at the time of writing) (Horowitz et al., 2018). New reports indicate, however, that the Russian Direct Investment Fund has recently raised USD 2 billion from foreign investors to support the domestic AI sector (bne IntelliNews, 2019).
57. The Ministry of Defence, along with elements of the defence industry, has assumed a leading role on AI. For one, the Russian Military Industrial Committee seeks to make 30% of its military equipment remotely controllable by 2025 (Allen and Chan, 2017). As part of this push, the Russian government created the Advanced Research Foundation, Russia’s response to DARPA, whose annual budget stands at approximately RUB 4 billion (about USD 62 million at the time of writing). The agency has so far focused on technologies imitating human thinking, data analysis, and assimilation of new knowledge. It has also singled out four main lines of effort that AI developments should follow: image recognition; speech recognition; control of autonomous military systems; and life-cycle support for weapon systems (Bendett, 2018). Russia’s AI national strategy is expected to be published in June 2019. In May 2019, President Putin outlined some of the strategy’s priorities: training programmes, public-private partnerships, new legislation, and building on the country’s strengths in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (Bendett, 2019). He and several ministers also hinted that up to USD 1.4 billion could be invested into domestic AI efforts to develop “technological sovereignty” in AI (Bendett, 2019).
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Matej Tonin 19, current Slovenian Minister of Defense, was an active member of the NATO PA from 2012 to 2020. He served as rapporteur and Chairperson of the Assembly's Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security and as Deputy Head of the Slovenian delegation to the NATO PA. "ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S ARMED FORCES" Report from the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security. October 13.
C. CHINA 53. AI has become a top priority for Chinese leaders, both for commercial and military applications. As articulated in the 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan, China is aiming to become the global AI leader and develop a domestic AI market worth USD 150 billion by 2030. Already today, the government and industry have begun to believe that China has “largely closed the gap with the United States in both AI R&D and commercial AI products” (Allen, 2019). However, significant gaps remain in a number of areas, for example AI talent, technical standards, software frameworks and platforms, and semiconductors (Allen, 2019). China-based companies already play a significant role in the global development of AI technologies. Not only is China investing at home, but the country has also been investing abroad, which draws increased scrutiny by Allies.
54. As two Committee speakers outlined at the 2019 Spring Session, the entanglement of the private sector with public institutions, such as the party-state and the armed forces, significantly facilitates the incorporation of AI technologies into the defence sector, since top-down coordination clearly guides companies’ development priorities. The emphasis put by President Xi Jinping on “military-civil fusion” is likely to sustain this trend (Sheppard et al., 2018). Moreover, China has been an early adopter of AI technologies for domestic surveillance applications. This lowers the barriers to adoption of AI-enabled systems by the military (Allen, 2019). Lower privacy standards compared to North America and Europe, combined with the sheer numerical advantage of the private data collected, provide a key advantage for developing new AI algorithms, too.
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Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Disads › 2AC---AT: Europe Military AI Bad DA
Matej Tonin 19, current Slovenian Minister of Defense, was an active member of the NATO PA from 2012 to 2020. He served as rapporteur and Chairperson of the Assembly's Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security and as Deputy Head of the Slovenian delegation to the NATO PA. "ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S ARMED FORCES" Report from the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security. October 13. //pipk
B. EUROPE 48. European states and the EU have increasingly recognised the growing importance of AI technologies and applications. Indeed, all EU member states and the European Commission have now adopted AI strategies. Many countries and the EU itself have substantially increased AI funding and set up organisational structures and entities to deal with the opportunities and challenges of AI. However, Europe is confronting a number of structural challenges. In terms of hardware, European actors still rely heavily on US chipmakers. Moreover, it faces intense competition from the United States where salaries are more attractive to European researchers. Europe is also comparatively less successful at translating research into commercial products. Finally, Europe’s comparatively stricter data security rules, which most Europeans value very highly, restrains its access to data pools (Franke, 2019). To deal with privacy and other ethical concerns, an EU HighLevel Expert Group on AI presented Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in April 2019.
49. As the EU builds up its defence initiatives, notably the European Defence Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation, defence-related AI R&D could certainly play an important role. For now, however, most efforts are designed and implemented at the national or bilateral levels, with the United Kingdom and France taking the leading role within Europe.
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Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Disads › 2AC---AT: US Military AI Bad DA
Matej Tonin 19, current Slovenian Minister of Defense, was an active member of the NATO PA from 2012 to 2020. He served as rapporteur and Chairperson of the Assembly's Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security and as Deputy Head of the Slovenian delegation to the NATO PA. "ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S ARMED FORCES" Report from the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security. October 13. //pipk
A. THE UNITED STATES 45. As the global leader in AI, the United States has actively sought to integrate AI into its military capabilities. Defence-related AI continues to be a big part of the efforts started under the Obama administration’s Third Offset Strategy, aimed at the preservation of the US military advantage. In 2018, the US Department of Defense (DoD) published its own AI strategy, which will certainly be reinforced by the national American AI Initiative launched by the Trump administration in February 2019.
46. The DoD continues to invest significant resources in AI-related programmes and initiatives. A 2017 report estimated that, between 2013 and 2017, approximately USD 1.76 billion were devoted to three categories of relevant DoD spending (learning and intelligence; advanced computing; and AI systems) (Govini, 2017). In 2018, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced an additional USD 2 billion between 2018 and 2023. In 2016, the DoD created the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to facilitate the integration of commercial technology into the military. As the STC learned when meeting with DIU officials in October 2018, AI is a key area of the DIU’s activities. In 2018, the DoD also established a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), whose Chief Architect laid out JAIC’s aims during the October 2018 STC visit. JAIC has been allocated a budget of USD 1.75 billion for six years to oversee and coordinate DoD AI efforts.
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Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" //pipk
The U.S. military has already started to develop this type of capability. As part of a series of exercises, the Defense Department demonstrated a command-and-control network that uses AI to automatically detect enemy activity and pass targeting information between multiple intelligence and military assets. During one of these exercises, a space asset detected a simulated enemy ship, but was unable to identify it. The network automatically cued an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform to collect additional information on the adversary vessel, which it then sent to a command-and-control asset. The command-and-control platform used AI to select the best platform available to strike the enemy ship and passed targeting data to the nearby U.S. naval destroyer that would engage the adversary vessel. AI significantly shortened the targeting process relative to efforts without AI technology. When describing the AI-enabled network in November 2019, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein announced, “This is no longer PowerPoint. It’s real.”90
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Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Disads › 2AC---AT: AI Cooperation Bad DA
Andrew Imbrie et al 20, Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service is a research organization focused on studying the security impacts of emerging technologies, supporting academic work in security and technology studies, and delivering nonpartisan analysis to the policy community. February. "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" //pipk
All surveyed officials indicated that they engage with international partners on AI-related issues. Bilateral efforts were the most cited avenue of international collaboration on AI, in four cases (EU, Australia, Czech Republic, and Italy) involving the United States. Multilateral fora were another common and increasingly relevant avenue for collaboration. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was the most cited multilateral forum, while multiple officials indicated engagement through the EU, Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty, or the newly created Global Partnership on AI (GPAI). Current international efforts focus on developing shared ethical standards, in part following the lead of the OECD and EU on defining AI standards. Other officials noted collaboration around workforce challenges, data policies, climate change, and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS).
Partners’ active engagement and interest in international collaboration around AI is matched with positive perceptions of the United States’ role as an AI partner. Eighty percent of officials said their country considers the United States to be a reliable partner on AI issues. The remaining three officials, representing the EU, Germany, and France, suggested that while they consider the United States a like-minded ally and continue to value U.S. partnership, recent exchanges have been less fruitful and current approaches raise general concerns regarding U.S. reliability as an AI partner. Officials also rated the United States highly in terms of commitment to responsible use of AI with an average rating similar to the average rating of their own countries, or institutions, in the case of the EU, and a significantly higher rating than they assigned to China’s commitment to responsible AI (7.3, 7.9, and 3.8 out of 10, respectively).
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Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" //pipk
Broadly defined, AI is the ability of computers and machines to perform tasks that traditionally require human intelligence.22 AI has been applied to control self-driving cars and swarms of unmanned aircraft, to assist physicians in making medical diagnoses, and at the more quotidian level, to screen spam emails and act as virtual personal assistants.23 Underlying AI technologies are a variety of approaches including mathematical optimization, statistical methods, and artificial neural networks — computer systems that attempt to perform specific tasks in a similar way to the human brain.24 Regardless of approach, AI typically uses large amounts of data to train and feed algorithms to accomplish tasks and processes that are normally associated with human cognition. Most current AI is considered to be “narrow,” designed to achieve a specific task — like identifying objects in images. Researchers, however, are working to develop artificial general intelligence that can accomplish any task the human brain can.25
Narrow AI technology has increasingly been applied in the national security domain. Although much policy and scholarly writing focuses on lethal autonomous weapon systems — “killer robots” that can identify and engage targets without human intervention — AI is far more commonly employed in a range of more mundane military and national security tasks.26 In some cases, AI is part of analytical processes, like the use of machine learning to classify targets in satellite imagery.27 In other instances, it is part of the software used to operate physical systems, like autonomous planes or ships.28 In both cases, AI is not a military capability in itself, but an enabler that can enhance the efficiency of military tasks and systems.29
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R. Clarke Cooper 21, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. Former U.S. Alternate Representative to the United Nations Security Council. Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. September 3. "American security cooperation needs an ‘integrity check’" //pipk
Since World War II, US presidents have understood the tremendous value of security cooperation, prompting them to invest in alliances and partnerships. These are, after all, significant components of US national security, and as President Joe Biden recently noted, “America’s alliances are our greatest asset.”
Yet successful security cooperation—which includes arms transfers, training, security assistance, treaties, or agreements—is built around two key principles: trust and integrity of commitment, both of which are at risk today thanks to the haphazard US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
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R. Clarke Cooper 21, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, former assistant secretary at the US Department of State, a former senior intelligence officer for the US Joint Special Operations Command. December 23. "A multipolar world requires more adaptive US security thinking" //pipk
While the scale and volume of military interventions by China, Russia, and Iran are reportedly lower now than at the height of Cold War, the increasing risks of disruptive actions by these state actors and their proxies in a multipolar world require deterrence featuring robust technological solutions, which can only emerge from smart, adaptive policy.
The United States and its security partners are awaiting the Biden administration’s Global Posture Review, along with the potential expansion of security cooperation procedures, expanded congressional reviews, and a revision of the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy—which would further protract an already lengthy arms-sale process. Meanwhile, dictatorial adversaries of democracy and freedom in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are aggressively seeking opportunities for disruption wherever Washington might expand or reduce security cooperation, or simply withdraw its presence. Ready access to low-cost, but effective, commercial technologies render that threat even more potent.
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Simona R. Soare 21, was a Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations. Prior to joining EUISS, Simona served as advisor to the Vice-President of the European Parliament (2015-2019) and as an analyst with the Romanian Ministry of Defence, working on transatlantic and European security. She has also been a research associate with the Institut d’Études Européennes (IEE) at Université Saint Louis-Bruxelles. Simona holds a PhD in Political Science from the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest where she lectured on international security (2008-2015). She is the recipient of a U.S. Department of State fellowship on U.S. Grand Strategy and has published extensively on American and transatlantic security. "Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies" June 11. //pipk
There is great convergence and commonality among the recommendations of the Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies and the NATO 2030 Reflection Group. Both call for the establishment of transatlantic digital consultations and dedicated structures, including a NATO Advanced Technology Projects Agency and funding instruments such as a NATO Investment Bank. Building on these recommendations, as well as on NATO-private sector dialogues, in February Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg proposed the establishment of a NATO Defense Innovation Initiative “to promote interoperability and serve as a catalyst for transatlantic cooperation on defense innovation.”18 After consultations and meeting political roadblocks, the allies decided to establish the Defense Innovation Accelerator instead as a more flexible, opt-in, and off-budget instrument.
The NATO 2030 agenda thus incorporates innovation and EDTs under the broader mantra of an “ambitious program for the continued adaptation of the alliance.”19 However, NATO’s history of adaptation also underlines important limitations and challenges.20 These include challenges in speed of adoption, spending levels, technological compartmentalization, fragmented and incomplete information and skills, stovepiped innovation practices, fragmented national innovation initiatives, lagging NATO-EU cooperation, allied technology and digitalization gaps, and a general underuse of NATO instruments to pursue collaborative defense innovation in EDTs.21 Faced with the prospect of long-term competition with technically capable China and Russia, NATO’s history of incremental adaptation may be too slow, prescriptive, or inflexible for successful innovation.
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Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: NATO PIC
Andrea Gilli et al 20, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College where he works on issues related to technological change and military innovation. He has been visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University as well as Stanford University (where he remains an Affiliate) and Harvard University. Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETHZurich. Before joining CSS, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Dickey Center, Dartmouth College. Ann-Sophie Leonard is a former Mercator Fellow on International Affairs, focusing on the intersection of international security and technology. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2019. Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. NDC Research Paper No.15 – December 2020 //pipk
Over the past 150 years, the complexity of technology – whether military or commercial – has grown exponentially.311 The fact that increasingly capable technologies developed in different countries, in different years and by companies operating in different industries can work together and interact efficiently is, to a significant extent, a product of standards.312 Standards are, literally, documents defining technical specifications, requirements, guidelines or characteristics.313 For instance, all USB sticks enter any USB port and our laptops or smartphones can connect to any WiFi network: this is the product of standards. By the same token, standards are intensively used in the military domain to address similar compatibility issues, from the measurements of cartridges to communications. Standards deserve attention because they are also going to play a key role when it comes to AI, ML and BD.
There are, fundamentally, two types of standards. Technical standards refer to specificities, parameters and characteristics. Non-technical standards define procedures, processes and practices. To examine this issue in greater detail, it is useful to look more broadly at what standards do and what their merits are. First, standards not only connect technologies vertically (in the same field) and horizontally (across different fields), but also span different times of development. In this way, standards enable innovation. A related point is that common standards also expand the size of a market, as they eliminate nontariff barriers and thus contribute to guaranteeing economic efficiency and technological effectiveness.314 Second, standards define and protect intellectual property and thus make it possible to gather royalties: in this way, they also incentivize innovation.315 In the language of social science, standards are thus an institution that makes it possible to solve a collective action problem related to adjudication of rents in complex systems.316 Third, standards also make it possible to comply with specific requirements. For instance, technical standards may require certain levels of safety and security through the imposition of specific parameters. By the same token, non-technical standards may call for procedures and processes that comply with these or other demands – for instance, emphasizing transparency or calling for specific verification steps.317
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff---AI Logistics---Starter Pack › AT: Counterplans › 2AC---AT: NATO PIC
Joanna van der Merwe 21, Fellow, Defense Tech Initiative. Center for European Policy Analysis. MA in International Relations and Global Conflict in the Modern Era, from Leiden University. She conducted her research in collaboration with the Land Warfare Centre of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, focusing on Artificial Intelligence and the future of combat. This research built on her previous experience at the Netherlands Army looking at big data on the future battlefield. Joanna is currently the Privacy and Protection Lead at the Centre for Innovation at Leiden University. She has also worked on early warning systems for mass atrocities at the Signal Program on Human Security and Technology at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. She also continues to advise and speak on data and AI in contexts such as policy-making and the future of warfare and defence. February 17. "NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability" //pipk
Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment.
In October 2020, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană highlighted the benefits of establishing a “transatlantic community cooperating on Artificial Intelligence (AI).” The Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit followed with a commitment to its responsible use. The US Department of Defense (DoD) adopted Ethical Principles for AI in 2020 and has committed to bringing together NATO member and partners to operationalize these principles. Despite these statements and developments, more work is required to tackle the very real challenge that ethical AI will pose to future interoperability within NATO.