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2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › War Now > War Better › 1NC – Modernization

China’s rapidly modernizing, making escalation inevitable – only striking now avoids extinction.

Tong Zhao 21, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy, 8-5-2021, "What’s Driving China’s Nuclear Buildup?," , cy

China’s nuclear arsenal appears to be expanding substantially for the first time in years. Over the past few decades, China had maintained only about twenty silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But recent evidence from independent U.S. experts shows that the country is likely constructing more than 200 new missile silos. China’s current program to modernize and update its nuclear weapons is moving at an unprecedented speed and scale.

This expansion is poised to change China’s traditionally small and mostly land-based arsenal across the board. Besides silo-based ICBMs, China also is building more road-mobile ICBMs and strategic nuclear submarines, even as it introduces air-based nuclear capabilities. The possibility that China could use fissile material produced in civil nuclear facilities to build up its nuclear warhead stockpile has raised further concerns because this would eliminate the biggest constraint on China’s warhead stockpiling capacity. The open-ended nature of this expansion, the abrupt departure from China’s long-standing minimalist nuclear policy, and the lack of any official Chinese confirmation or explanation have all contributed to confusion and suspicions about Beijing’s intentions.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › War Now > War Better › 1NC – Emerging Tech

Must act now – new tech developments will undermine second strike

Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala 21 – Professor of International Politics at the University of Leicester, Honorary Fellow at the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation, and Security at the University of Birmingham, member of the Cyber-Nuclear Threats Task Force run by the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative; Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University, tanton Junior Faculty Nuclear Security Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University; “Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age;” February 2021, European Journal of International Security, 6(3), 257-277. doi:10.1017/eis.2021.2

The combined effects of SNNW and the implications for the Third Nuclear Age The move towards a Third Nuclear Age has four significant technological developments, each facilitated by the latest information technology revolution and by enormous shifts in computing, processing, and sensing power. Taken together, these dynamics are continuing to push the policy focus away from nuclear punishment towards non-nuclear denial, blurring the distinction between offence and defence, and creating a more fluid, complex, and potentially dangerous nuclear order.

The first key component of the Third Nuclear Age is the growing perception that strategic forces and population centres could be protected against nuclear attacks with missile defences. While the pursuit of missile defences can be traced back to the 1940s, it has only really been in the last twenty years that the technology has matured to a point whereby interception by conventional hit-to-kill technologies might credibly be deployed against certain types of threats, and that the political debate that surrounds the use of anti-missile defences has become normalised.36 The US, Russia, China and India have all deployed or are in the process of deploying ballistic missile defences.37

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 1NC – ! – Bioweapons

Guarantees extinction – defense doesn’t assume cascading effects.

Nura A. Abboud 21, Founder of the Jordanian Society for Microbial Biodiversity, 9-21-2021, "Catastrophic Impacts of Biological Warfare on Biodiversity," , cy

Biological weapons are considered the most dangerous of all known weapons of mass destruction. They are used to deliberately cause epidemics among humans; destroy the environmental components, including water, air, and soil; and target crops and livestock. Examples of diseases used in biological warfare include anthrax, smallpox, plague, cholera, and avian flu. In addition to the catastrophic effects of biological warfare on the biodiversity and the environment, their danger lies in their low cost and rapid spread, as well as their easy preparation, transport, and use.

Unlike nuclear and chemical bombs, biological bombs are without odor or color and therefore cannot be detected. Additionally, bioweapons are dangerous because of their effects on untargeted organisms in a military attack, and the clinical symptoms they create may be difficult to distinguish from normal diseases. Bioweapon pathogens remain in nature for several years and are able to survive in harsh environmental conditions.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 2NC – ! – Biotech

Nanotech and cognitive warfare causes dangerous arms racing and machinic warfare.

Stephen Bryen 20, served as a deputy undersecretary of Defense and as the director of the Defense Technology Security Administration, senior fellow at the American Center for Democracy, “Line between warrior and machine blurs as China and U.S. military use artificial intelligence”, //lenox

The arrest of Harvard Professor Charles Lieber for failing to reveal his work for the Chinese is more than alarming. One of the world’s leading experts in nanotechnology, Mr. Lieber contributed to China’s Thousand Talents Program and assisted China in its military arms race with the United States, whether knowingly or not. Americans should be concerned that China is pursuing military nanotechnology solutions, including linking soldiers’ brains directly to computers. 

Since at least 2000, when President Clinton proclaimed his National Nanotechnology Initiative, U.S. government agencies have been heavily engaged in nanotechnology research. A significant part of the work has been funded by the Defense Department, and the long-term goal is to create a new kind of warrior linking the human brain to machines, to millions of sensors and to the computer cloud. If successful, the capability of the human brain would be expanded exponentially. For the warfighter, the complete integration of sensors to shooters and near-perfect situational awareness would create a formidable soldier, and if in the hands of an enemy, a highly dangerous adversary.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 2NC – ! – Biotech

Ensures a China war fought by bio-engineered soldiers which outweighs nuclear use

David Malet 15, Ph.D. is a Visiting Associate Professor of International Affairs; Director, Security Policy Studies Program at George Washington University, and served as a defense and foreign policy aide to US Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle 2000-2003. He previously worked or interned for organizations including the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, US Senator John Kerry, and the Attorney General of New South Wales, Australia. Prior to joining the Elliott School he served as director of the Center for the Study of Homeland Security at Colorado State University and as Associate Director of the School of Government at the University of Melbourne. “Captain America in International Relations: the Biotech Revolution in Military Affairs”, Defense Studies, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2015.1113665?journalCode=fdef20

The conventional wisdom on biotechnology has held that coming decades will see Western nations increasingly vulnerable to ever-more sophisticated biological weapons attacks by non-state actors and rogue states. As recombinant genetic technology proliferates, a greater number of actors will possess genetic engineering capabilities that will enhance the lethality and durability of their biological weapons. Proponents of this perspective note that the overwhelming technological advantage in conventional forces enjoyed by the United States creates the incentive for competitors to develop effective asymmetric responses, and that the affordability, accessibility, and relatively easy preparation of biological weapons make them a likely means of doing so. In this view, the superior conventional capabilities of the US military not only fail to deter the proliferation of biological weapons, but encourage their development. Western states will face an increasing number of biologically armed opponents, and will remain on the defensive. The priority for military biotech research is therefore the development of protective equipment and vaccines, antibiotics and antivirals (Department of Defense 1998). However, this scenario requires the presumption that military applications of biotechnology will simply be a secular progression from the bacteriological warfare that has existed throughout history. Even when analysts have factored in the vast possibilities of genetic engineering, it has usually only been to the extent that they can breed deadlier pathogens, and that the growing availability of technology means that it may be used by a broader spectrum of actors. Conventional wisdom therefore predicts an unstable future for the international system, a Hobbesian world in which the weakest have power to kill the strongest. Rather than rogue states and non-state terrorists, it is the most powerful and resource-laden actors in the international system that will enjoy the advantages of “biological warfare” in the twenty-first century as they continuously integrate emergent biotechnologies into their military and national defense infrastructures and extend their dominance. This process will closely resemble the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that occurred during the last 30 years of the twentieth century as the United States adapted its forces to exploit advances in new information technologies. The RMA, first described by the Soviet military intelligence in the 1970s and then witnessed by the world during the unexpectedly uneven 1991 Gulf War, occurred because the United States employed its competitive advantage in integrated computer systems. Rather than a single transformative device, like the atomic bomb, the steady accretion of advanced technologies augmenting existing equipment came to inform doctrine and strategies. The term asymmetric warfare is meant to describe efforts by weaker participants in military confrontations to frustrate the advantages of the stronger power by guerilla tactics or other unconventional methods not envisioned in force planning (Mack 1975). However, high technology also offers asymmetric advantages to the best-equipped actors, and American military planners sought to use the advances of the RMA to field forces that no state competitor could match. Their goals included “dominant maneuver” capability on the battlefield in bringing dispersed resources to bear against targets, “precision engagement” capability delivered by smart weapons, and “full dimension force protection” against all anticipated threats (Rizwan 2000). The ultimate expression of this vision would be a fighter comparable to a “Jedi knight” from the Star Wars films: a super-empowered solider, dressed in a protective stealth cloak and commanding an armed companion drone, able to perform solo missions and to transmit data back to headquarters (Hundley and Gritton 1994). Coincidentally or not, this is precisely how Darth Maul was depicted in 1999’s The Phantom Menace. Military planners likewise foresee similar advantages conferred by developments across the various biotech fields. In coming decades, biotechnology is forecast to bring advances such as “rugged computers” made from biological components that will provide situational awareness to individual soldiers on the battlefield, camouflaged materials and lightweight armor incorporating the properties of living organisms, and ingested biological markers to distinguish friendlies, which would be of particular use in counterinsurgency (Purdue University 2001). From the perspective of those involved in force planning, the anticipated future is not one of vulnerability but unassailability. Defense R&D While some military (or potentially military) applications of biotechnology are indeed products of the private sector, it is no state secret that militaries actively sponsor their own biotech research and development programs. The United States Department of Defense in particular is open about the large number of such projects that it oversees. And while most of these are described as intended for troop protection, many are clearly intended to enhance combat operations. As with pathogen stockpiles maintained ostensibly for defensive research, it is only the intent of the wielder that determines whether or not they are offensive. And as the 2001 anthrax case illustrates, even projects officially intended for defensive purposes may be misapplied. Much of the biotech research is conducted under the auspices of the Pentagon’s DARPA rather than legacy programs remaining from the era of bacteriological weapons stockpiles. Established in 1958 as a response to the launch of the first Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union the year before, DARPA was intended to promote “high-risk – high-payoff” R&D in areas beyond the immediate envisioned needs of military planners. The Agency’s singular most influential project has undoubtedly been a communications system that came to be known as DARPANET before penetrating – and transforming – the commercial sector as the internet (Van Atta 2008, pp. 20, 23, 27). While a reported 90% of its projects fail to come to fruition, high-profile DARPA research that has had a significant impact on United States military capability includes Saturn rockets, ground radar, stealth fighters, Predator missiles, and drones. The agency’s budget of $3 billion is small compared to intelligence agencies, but it supports an “open culture” promoting “radical innovation” praised by participant scientists, most of whom are university researchers (Moreno 2006, pp. 12–13, Basken 2013). In 2014, DARPA announced the creation of a new Biological Technologies Division, built from existing research units and new programs, intended to ensure that biotechnology is not merely an aspect of various research programs, but that “biology takes its place among the core sciences that represent the future of defense technology.” The new division’s primary goals include to “restore and maintain warfighter abilities,” and “to enhance global-scale stability” (DARPA 2014). Similarly, the Pentagon Office of Net Assessment (ONA), which envisions potential future strategic environments and challenges, has also promoted biotech R&D as a defense priority. In 2002, the ONA recommended revising Federal regulations to allow experimental biotechnologies to be brought to the battlefield more readily. It also called for facilitating a greater partnership with private sector researchers by restricting anti-trust laws to permit quicker product development (Armstrong and Warner 2003). In biotech in particular, the military has an advantage over the private sector because it does not have to go through the lengthy and rigorous clinical testing and approval process for medical devices and treatments (Wheelis, in Pearson et al. 2007, p. 4). The future is now: from lab to battlefield Whether in collaboration with the private sector or directly from their own research facilities, leading state military programs are implementing biotech innovations that have already had significant impacts beyond the realistic aspirations of non-state actors. The lives of thousands of Coalition troops have been saved by biotechnologies deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other projects being implemented will enable soldiers to fight more effectively under more adverse conditions than previously possible. In short, rather than being curtailed by asymmetric defenses, the power projection capabilities of the strongest actors in the international system will increase markedly during the twenty-first century. Troop health and survivability Despite the mechanization and increased destructive power of warfare in the midnineteenth century, it was not until World War II that wartime combat deaths exceeded those off the battlefield. This shift, due to advances in combat medicine, permitted American and British forces to conduct forward operations with reduced fatalities. Advances in biotechnology are responsible for the continuation of this trend into more current conflicts with similar results (Frank 2007). When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, many of its soldiers and Marines were treated with $90 HemCon bandages. The military ordered 26,000 of these dressings, made from a shrimp shell extract called chitosan, which stopped arterial bleeding within a minute of application to wounds. Another bandage, developed by the American Red Cross but with limited use because of its $1000 price tag, was made of clotting proteins extracted from human blood. By contrast, a powdered coagulant manufactured by Z-Medica called QuikClot that could be poured directly onto wounds was issued in first-aid kits, initially to Marines and then across service branches. QuikClot is a granular substance that can be poured directly onto a wound, almost instantly forming a clot that stops bleeding. A hemostatic agent in QuikClot draws water molecules out of blood and promotes accelerated clotting (Allen 2003). By 2010, both the United States Army and Marines had switched to providing QuikClot Combat Gauze in first aid kits instead (Cavallaro 2010). Other options are available as well: DARPA has tasked partner company Arsenal Medical with developing its hemostatic foam into a product that could be used to stop internal bleeding even without direct access to the combat wound (DARPA, “Wound Stasis System” 2013). The use of biotechnologically advanced coagulants to treat severe combat injuries had a substantial effect on the first wars of the twenty-first century: “The ratio of [American] combat-zone deaths to those wounded has dropped from 24% in Vietnam to 13% in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, the numbers of those killed as a percentage of overall casualties is lower” (Knickerbocker 2006). By the time of the War on Terror, 55% of battlefield deaths were due to excessive blood loss (Armstrong and Warner 2003). But the development of rapid coagulants sharply reduced the rate of combat deaths and may have sustained the American public’s tolerance for the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. The potential implication is that democracies may become more willing to engage in future wars if the human costs of doing so are minimized. Biotech is being employed along these lines across a variety of projects: “Technologies are under investigation to fully restore complex tissues (muscle, nerves, skin, etc.) after traumatic injury, and most dramatically, to develop neural-controlled upper extremity prostheses that fully recapitulate the motor and sensory functions of a natural limb” (DARPA, “Restorative Biomedical Technologies” 2010). In the area of combat medicine, DARPA is moving beyond coagulants. Its projects involve blood “pharming” that will produce engineered red blood cells (DARPA, “Blood Pharm” 2010) that can be preserved for delivery to the front lines to enable transfusions for wounded troops, despite the “austere conditions of forward deployment” (DARPA, “Long-Term Storage of Blood Products” 2010). A related program would use hormone therapy to extend the survivability of combatants losing critical amounts of blood before fluids and transfusions can reach them: “Achieving this goal will allow increased time – perhaps many hours or even days – for evacuation, triage, and initiation of supportive therapies” (DARPA, “Surviving Blood Loss” 2010). To better treat other battlefield wounds and reduce rehabilitation needs, “DARPA seeks to create a dynamic putty-like material which, when packed in/around a compound bone fracture, provides full load-bearing capabilities within days, creates an osteoconductive bone-like internal structure, and degrades over time to harmless resorbable by-products as normal bone regenerates” (DARPA, “Fracture Putty” 2010). In vivo biomaterials, or compounds directly incorporated by a living organism, would regenerate tissue and then be fully absorbed (Armstrong and Warner 2003). An additional development that could reduce infection and mortality among burn victims is a “self-medicating” bandage. “Laced with nanoparticles, it detects harmful bacteria in a wound and responds by secreting antibiotics” (De Lange 2010). A fully functional prosthetics program termed HAND: is developing the fundamental research that will enable the use of neural activity to … restore natural function through assistive devices. By directly harnessing the ability of neural pathways to operate natural systems, the HAND program seeks to provide means of restoring the lives of injured warfighters. (DARPA, “Human-Assisted Neural Devices” 2010, DARPA, “Reliable Neural Interface Technology” 2013). Clinical trials are underway on accompanying neural-controlled prosthetic devices “almost identical to a natural limb in terms of motor control and dexterity, sensory feedback … weight, and environmental resilience” (DARPA, “Revolutionizing Prosthetics” 2010). And in 2013, DARPA-funded research enabled amputees to experience partial sensations of touch through prosthetic limbs via neural interfaces (DARPA, “New Nerve and Muscle Interfaces and Wounded Warrior Amputees” 2013). That such research is being conducted by the Pentagon speaks to its perceived strategic value. This line of research connects with the 2003 DARPA Strategic Plan, coinciding with Director Goldblatt’s speech, which also called for creating “U.S. warfighters that only need use of the power of their thoughts to do things at great distances.” Enabling the human brain to directly control a peripheral device such as an artificial limb also means that it could control robots on the battlefield that could fight without risk to soldiers Moreno (2006, pp. 9, 39). Such avatars would be the infantry equivalent of drone aircraft and would profoundly change the nature of soldiering more than UAVs are now doing with piloting. Other developments in preventing or restoring injuries to troops are more overtly related to battlefield performance. DARPA, in noting that “the negative impact that stress has on the cognitive, emotional, and physical well-being of warfighters is irrefutable,” proposes that “Novel molecular biological techniques, coupled with in-vivo measurement technologies, can allow for management of the stress pathways and behavioral analysis in real time” (DARPA, “Enabling Stress Resistance” 2010). Already, studies conducted with trauma victims have demonstrated that Propranolol administered shortly after the incident can mitigate the occurrence of PTSD (Dando, in Pearson et al. 2007, pp. 133–134) 138–139). In the treatment of injuries, human stem cells that can regenerate and replace otherwise irreparably damaged cells could be used to potentially replace impaired organs (Committee on Opportunities in Biotechnology for Future Army Applications [hereafter Committee] 2001, p. 37). Another option is using engineered viruses for delivery of genes. In 2005, researchers were able to restore enough damaged cochlear hair cells in deafened guinea pigs to recover 50–80% of their hearing levels. The therapy was delivered by adenoviruses engineered both to render them harmless and to produce a hair growth stimulant (Coghlan 2005). Some analysts expect that advances in somatic genetics will render even therapeutic implants unnecessary because “gene therapy agents could be transfected into cells by bombarding a patch of skin with DNA-coated pellets from a gene gun” (Committee 2001, p. 70). Another possibility is neural or cortical implants such as prosthetic retinas, both to treat injuries and to offer enhanced abilities. “As the risks and costs associated with neural implants are reduced, they may be used to increase the visual and hearing acuity of unimpaired individuals to levels well above average. Soldiers possessing these extraordinary faculties would be well suited to gathering intelligence and performing long range reconnaissance missions” (Committee 2001, p. 38). Human enhancement Efforts to field augmented troops represent new approaches to the use of biotechnology in warfare, a qualitative shift away from traditional but uncertain bacteriological weapons to entirely new strategies for assuring battlefield dominance. As proponents of this biotech approach envision it, “futuristic, ‘superhuman’ capabilities of individual soldiers could enable small units to operate for extended periods of time, carry the fight to remote locales, and endure harsh extremes of climate” (Committee 2001, p. 7). Moreno (2006, p. 114) argues that “The first state (or nonstate) actor to build a better soldier will have taken an enormous leap in the arms race.” Although seemingly fantastic, billions of dollars have already been spent on several programs directed toward fielding various types of “Augments.” As with biotechnologies to increase survivability, introducing mechanically or biologically augmented living soldiers offers multiple benefits for states with the capacity to do so. It also raises a host of political and ethical questions without clear answers. Certainly, there would be tactical advantages for militaries whose personnel are able to operate more effectively than their adversaries under difficult conditions. And the boon of losing fewer servicemen to injury, and being able to return those who are injured to the front lines more quickly, is evident. But there are also broader potential national and international political impacts. Democratic governments, which endeavor to avoid costly or risky wars, (Gartner and Segura 1998, Reiter and Stamm 2002) might be tempted to exert their power as their conventional force advantages grow, and as the costs of providing for disabled veterans diminish. Duncan (2012) writes about the ethics of augmentation when everyone else is doing it. Parents might balk initially at the idea of using technology to increase their children’s cognitive performances, but not if it means that they fall behind their augmented classmates. Citizens might hesitate to vote for presidential candidates with neural implants to enhance their reflexes and decision-making capabilities during a crisis. But at some point, the question becomes “Would you vote for a commander in chief who wasn’t equipped with such a device?” This hypothetical involving heads of state is about as far as most of the ethicist approaches make toward questions of international security. But it raises the question, and particularly if rival hegemons are dispatching Augments with advanced bioweapons and biomedicines to the battlefield, what country with the capability to do so could justify sending its soldiers into harm’s way without the best advantages possible? The edited volume Human Enhancement presents opposing arguments over biopolitics between enthusiastic “transhumanists” and skeptical “bioconservatives” (Bostrom and Savulescu in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 1). Yet, for all of the discussion about practical issues and debates over social and ethical considerations ranging over hundreds of pages, there is no consideration that enhanced soldiers are at least as likely as enhanced athletes, and national security is not cited among the social obligations that transhumanists claim justify even heritable germline modifications. Fukuyama (2004, pp. 42–43) noted that because “The new procedures and technologies emerging from research laboratories and hospitals … can as easily be used to ‘enhance’ the species as to ease or ameliorate illness…. The first victim of transhumanism might be equality,” an implication even more troubling at the international level when considering what this might do to the already yawning resource gap between the richest and poorest countries. George Annas contended that: Ultimately it almost seems inevitable that genetic engineering would move homo sapiens into two separable species: the standard-issue human beings would be seen by the new, genetically enhanced neo-humans as heathens who can properly be slaughtered and subjugated. It is this genocidal potential that makes species-altering genetic engineering a potential weapon of mass destruction and the unaccountable genetic engineer a potential bioterrorist. (Juengst, in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 48) Major powers with both conventional and asymmetric biotechnological edges over rivals may similarly be open to the use of force to maintain their positions if they are secure in the knowledge that they are well beyond the capabilities of opponents to match them. The advent of nuclear weapons is credited with reducing the number of interstate wars, with the effect of entrenching the hegemony of the technologically advanced states that wield them. RMA advances gave the United States a lopsided advantage in its early post-Cold War interventions (zero combat deaths during nearly three months of NATO missions during the Kosovo War), and its initial easy success in toppling Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq led, temporarily, to rapprochement efforts by “rogue” regimes Iran and Libya to avoid the same fate. While advanced equipment is responsible for these successes, biotech now offers the opportunity to enhance the performance of the combatants themselves. [DARPA] is engaged in the development of designer drugs that will increase cognitive functioning, including attention span and alertness after periods of sleep deprivation. Another area for future research is “neural prostheses” that will enable commanders to monitor the vital signs of soldiers in the field or even to permit the control of UAVs directly by pilots in remote locations. (Huang and Kosal 2008) “In 2002, DARPA launched the Augmented Cognition (or AugCog) initiative, a project dedicated to developing a headband that monitors brain activity.” With sensory input controlled remotely, subjects doubled their recall and improved working memory by 500% (The Economist 2010). Research on reducing the amount of sleep that soldiers and pilots require to function effectively has become a global enterprise, with countries including France, Canada, Singapore, and Taiwan establishing military research units in this area. In the language of these projects, fatigue and even sleep are described as operational weaknesses preventing humans from taking full advantage of their equipment, weaknesses that intervention can ameliorate. Some major powers have already begun the attempt: during the Iraq War, the British Ministry of Defense had purchased 24,000 tablets of one of the most promising drugs, modafinil, and the United States and France both began to routinely supply it to pilots. The use of stimulants by militaries is so widely entrenched, with amphetamines in regular prescribed use for decades (Saletan 2013), that Bostrom and Savulescu (in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 2) question whether the use of modafinil is qualitatively different from “a good cup of tea.” But the premise of reducing or eliminating the need for sleep as a component of troop health is a recent development. Additionally, DARPA has provided congressional testimony about its Continuous Assistance Program that would “make the individual warfighter stronger, more alert, more endurant, and better able to heal … prevent fatigue and enable soldiers to stay awake, alert, and effective for up to seven days straight without suffering any deleterious mental or physical effects and without using any of the current generation of stimulants.” Potential approaches include the use of transcranial magnetic and electrical stimulation to activate brain pathways and to enhance learning (Moreno 2006, pp. 11, 118). Lab mice that have been altered as embryos with extra copies of a memory-related gene “learn more quickly and remember things longer than normal mice … and the improvement was passed on to offspring” (Sandel, in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 74). In the meantime, the military relies on more conventional stimulants, and the results might give pause to planners considering more radical medical interventions. B-1 bomber pilots who operate 19-h flights between the Persian Gulf and United States take Dexedrine, an amphetamine known as speed or “go pills.” One such pilot, who subsequently went drinking with buddies before attacking them in a fit of paranoid delusions in which he seemed to believe he was in the television series 24, was acquitted by a court-martial after military psychiatrists concluded that he suffered from a “substanceinduced delirium” (Murphy 2012). American pilots who killed Canadian soldiers in a 2003 friendly fire incident in Afghanistan had also been on Dexedrine during 30-h missions (Moreno 2006, p. 115). Another DARPA neural program with battlefield applications is Silent Talk, which would develop the capability to communicate without speaking by recognizing the neural signals for specific words. Linked devices would permit troops in the field to recognize the signals for the “intended speech” of at least 100 words commonly used by troops in combat operations (Warwick 2009). Beyond the advantages of silent communication and preventing hostile forces from intercepting messages, such technology would effectively produce electronic telepathy and have a tremendous commercial sector potential for hands-free communication. While Augments would be able to receive more situational information on the battlefield through neural devices, processing it effectively is another matter. Technologies developed through the AugCog and Enabling Stress Resistance projects might alert commanders that individuals are suffering mental or physical exhaustion. Another approach would be to “develop quantitative and integrative neuroscience-based approaches for measuring, tracking, and accelerating skill acquisition and learning while producing a twofold increase in progression in an individual’s progress through stages of task learning.” Reminiscent of the neural training uploads for particular weapons systems and martial arts in the science fiction Matrix films, results would be achieved through the “development of neurally based techniques for maintenance of acquired skills [and on] preferential brain network activation” (DARPA, “Accelerated Learning” 2010). Another program with the goal of “enhancing combat performance” studies the influences of biological clocks on soldier health (DARPA, “Biochronicity” 2013). Other biotechnologies would provide physical enhancements to Augments. The field of biomimetics seeks to mimic useful naturally occurring characteristics in living organisms. For example, ants and spiders can lift loads dozens of times their own weight, and horses can withstand freezing temperatures without thick hair. “Understanding how horses and other animals overcome drastic changes in their environment would be extremely useful. As a measure of the importance of biomimesis, the Army has declared biomimetics one of its Strategic Research Objectives (primary focus areas for basic research)” (Committee 2001, pp.14–15). Already, researchers have developed synthetic genes that repair damaged muscles and improve healthy ones in mice (Sandel, in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 73). Another project at least at the prototype stage for humans utilizes an electrically charged under suit “focusing on the soft tissues that connect and interface with the skeletal system.” The goal of Warrior Web is “augmenting the work of Soldiers’ own muscles to significantly boost endurance, carrying capacity, and warfighter effectiveness” (DARPA, “Warrior Web” 2013, DARPA, “Warrior Web Prototype Takes Its First Steps” 2013). Power projection Unless the R&D invested in these projects proves futile, the United States Department of Defense is indeed on its way to developing not just super-soldiers, but essentially comic book super-heroes. Mentally and physically enhanced soldiers with access to regenerative medical treatments not available to their enemies will be far from the full extent of the impact of the biotech RMA. One $3 billion program, begun in 2002, is intended to create a “metabolically dominant soldier” who will be enabled by gene therapy to lift up to 800lbs, block pain receptors for days, and “run at Olympic sprint speeds for 15 minutes on one breath of air” (Sokolove 2007). And if neural or cybernetic prostheses and gene therapy do not eventually produce a Captain America, the contributions of other research programs may still permit the fielding of a biomimetic Spiderman: The Z-Man program will develop biologically inspired climbing aids that will enable an individual soldier to scale vertical walls constructed of typical building materials without the need for ropes or ladders. The inspiration for these climbing aids is the way geckos, spiders, and small animals scale vertical surfaces…. The overall goal of the program is to enable an individual soldier using Z-Man technologies to scale a vertical surface while carrying a full combat load. (DARPA, “Z-Man” 2010) DARPA has offered “a proof-of-concept demonstration of a 16-square-inch sheet of Geckskin adhering to a vertical glass wall while supporting a static load of up to 660 pounds” (DARPA, “Z-Man” 2013). This is perhaps the most outlandish example of how biotechnologies are being developed to aid in military power projection capabilities, but it is by no means the only one. Another, completed biomimetic project increased the efficiency of human swimmers by 80% and more than doubled their speed by giving them oscillating foils based on the propulsion mechanisms used by some fish and sea birds (DARPA, “PowerSwim” 2010). And a project to achieve Rapid Altitude and Hypoxia Acclimatization would permit the fielding of troops (perhaps in potential battle zones such as the Hindu Kush or the Himalayas) with “novel pharmacological, biological, and technological approaches to adapt to high altitudes (4000–6000 meters)” (DARPA, “RAHA” 2010). The adoption of biotechnology to enable force projection began during the colonial era, when Europeans discovered that quinine could prevent malaria, thus opening the door for the Scramble for Africa. Shortages of anti-malarial drugs during World War II caused such high morbidity rates among American personnel serving in the Pacific that General Douglas MacArthur remarked that the campaign would be a slow one unless additional measures were taken (Marble 2010). In the twenty-first century, anti-malarial drugs remain a challenge to force projection. Mefloquine, a comparatively affordable anti-malarial also marketed as Lariam, has severe psychiatric side effects, first noted in the Vietnam War. Problems include psychotic behavior, paranoia, and hallucinations. A 2003 report indicated that “Mefloquine use was a factor in half of the suicides among troops in Iraq in 2003 – and how suicides dropped by 50% after the Army stopped handing out the drug.” Its use was also linked to murders and suicides by Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan 2002–2004 (Benjamin 2012). In 2012, Roche Pharmaceuticals, the maker of Lariam, notified the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that it had been alerted by a physician that a patient with traumatic brain injury taking the drug, presumed to be a serviceman charged in a high-profile massacre of civilians, had committed a homicide involving 17 victims (Ritchie 2013). When difficulties with malaria mounted during the Vietnam War, including transmission back to America, the United States Navy utilized recombinant technology to develop a DNA vaccine to prevent malaria infections. When the program began in the 1990s, the majority of troop deployments, aside from Bosnia, were to malarial regions, and the Plasmodium parasites were the top cause of casualties in Somalia. In tests announced in 1998, research teams were immunized with Plasmodium DNA, with the majority of participants developing T-cells that function as antibodies when confronted with malarial parasites. This development involved the creation of malaria vectors that functioned like common vaccines, potentially opening the way to safer deployments for American Marines (Gillert 1998). The advent of DNA vaccines of this type theoretically allows scientists to develop vaccinations against all known diseases. The Naval Medical Research Institute therefore created a “phage library” for the purposes of developing antibodies to all possible strains of infectious agents (Wang 1998). As the technology is further developed, the militaries of advanced states will increasingly turn to active biotech solutions to biological threats, rather than pharmaceutical prophylactics. However, with defense planners concerned by the possibility of the use of genetically modified bioweapons by rogue and non-state actors, they will also conduct further research into countering genetically engineered vectors that might be created to replace the naturally occurring agents against which American forces are already protected (Department of Defense 1998). DARPA’s (2013) “7 Day Biodefense” program seeks to develop persistent and transient immunities to unspecified pathogens out of the recognition that unfamiliar agents would likely be employed in a major biowarfare attack. Benign uses of Frankenfoods The apparent arrival of the end of germ warfare for military biotech purposes does not portend the resolution of the dual-use dilemma. As the planners of the AMP project note, it is still necessary to work with deadly pathogens if one is to find treatments for them. Another commercial sector field that is experiencing securitization, and is already highly controversial in its own right, is genetically modified food. Called “Frankenfoods” by their vocal detractors and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) by agribusiness, they represent a growing number of plant and animal products that have been the recipients of recombinant engineering to, among other results, increase their yield, improve their flavor, or lengthen their shelf lives. GMOs potentially hold a number of possibilities for military purposes. As far back as 1960, the United States Air Force and Navy funded studies to determine whether ions accelerated plant growth and could thereby feed troops on forward deployments (Krueger et al. 1962). More recently, the Army has initiated programs to develop crops with enhanced levels of nutritional components, built-in vaccines, or edible factors that impart resistance to spoilage (Committee 2001, p. 53). In particular, “functional foods” are expected to reduce logistical demands, which would enable more efficient power projection. Such foods have been modified to provide more than their normal nutritional value. Instead, they can contain nutraceuticals “such as naturally occurring antimicrobials that inhibit certain pathogens known to exist in a given operational area. Or foods could be designed with vaccines in them, and an army could be vaccinated quickly and efficiently by distributing genetically engineered food” (Armstrong and Warner 2003). Genetically modified food is also being developed to be highly digestible to reduce the quantity of rations that require transportation, and with biomarkers to distinguish the ingestor as friendly under battlefield or peacekeeping scans (Egudo 2004, p. 14). Future plans call for each soldier to be outfitted with [such] a wearable computer system to provide situational awareness displays, analysis of sensor and targeting data, and communications. [The prototype] is capable of withstanding virtually any environmental abuse, including extended submersion in water … Such devices take an input data block and scan it against stored images. One practical military application is for the rapid battlefield identification of friend or foe. (Armstrong and Warner 2003) The Army Land Warrior Program is scheduled to provide each combat soldier with a wearable computer to assist with the processing of sensor and targeting data, situational awareness displays, and communications. As the use of graphical formats to facilitate the assimilation of information in real time increases, the Army will have a growing need for computer memory capacity on the battlefield. In principle, an optical 3-D memory based on bacteria polymers can store roughly three orders of magnitude more information in the same size enclosure than a two-dimensional optical disk. (Committee 2001, pp. 27–28) These advancements were followed by the use of a single gram of synthetic DNA to store 700 terabytes of data – or the equivalent of 70,000 movies – indefinitely in a transportable freeze-dried form (Ingham 2013). While new biomaterials (incorporating biological organisms or their outputs) must be reviewed and approved by the Federal FDA for safety and efficacy, substances that are merely biomimetic (or “bioinspired”) do not face this hurdle. One such example, developed by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration, is the fastener Velcro. In addition to augmenting soldiers by giving them the proportional strength of insects, military planners also hope to endow them with lightweight body armor that absorbs impacts as efficiently as the exoskeletons of mollusks (Armstrong and Warner 2003). “On a strength-to-weight basis, the abalone shell has armor protection capabilities equal to or greater than those of existing materials … When laminated hierarchical structures of biological systems (e.g. the nacre of abalone shell) are mimicked … significant improvements in the composite mechanical properties have been observed” (Committee 2001, p. 43). Imaging and surveillance Enzyme research also entails the development of “bioreceptors” comprised of thin films with photoelectronic properties. Processes recently developed include integrating lightsensitive proteins into optical devices, particularly for laser eye protection, polymerbased batteries, and electromagnetic shielding. Bioreceptors can also detect the presence of selected DNA, which makes them useful in identifying infectious agents (United States Army: New Materials Development Using Biotechnology Process 1998). “A network of biosensors could considerably improve a commander’s view of the battlefield. Some researchers envision soldiers wearing wristwatch-style biosensors that are sensitive to a variety of target molecules. In effect, each solider would become a detection device and warn of a possible biological or chemical attack. Also, such sensors could be used to monitor the health and well-being of entire units” (Armstrong and Warner 2003). But still other efforts have made tremendous progress in reducing the role of humans in collecting data and replacing them with other agents: insects. Although the United States Army may have experimented with mosquitoes as bioweapon delivery systems in the 1960s (Maurer, in Maurer 2009, p. 96); in 2009, DARPA-funded engineers at the University of California, Berkeley, announced that they had developed cyborg beetles that they could direct by remote control. The researchers implanted electrodes into the brains and muscles of two species of beetle, which could then be made to fly and maneuver on command, for use in recover and spying missions (Callaway 2009). DARPA describes its Hybrid Insect MEMS Program as follows: The animal world has provided mankind with locomotion over millennia…. The HI-MEMS program is aimed to develop technology that provides more control over insect locomotion, just as saddles and horseshoes are needed for horse locomotion control … The realization of cyborgs with most of the machine component inside the insect body will provide stealthy robots that use muscle actuators which have been developed over millions of years of evolution. (DARPA, “HI-MEMS” 2010) Prior to the insect agents, DARPA had already created a “roborat,” a rodent controlled by a neural prosthesis via a laptop keyboard so that it could climb stairs and navigate mazes, which Director Goldblatt compared to a child’s remote-controlled car. Further developments included mounted cameras for visual data collection, and prostheses implanted along the rat’s belly so that it would not be observed. The neural prostheses stimulated the rats’ pleasure centers, motivating them on in their tasks, and Moreno (2006, pp. 43–44) notes that there are obvious implications for how such prostheses could be adapted to human subjects as well. Exotic weaponry Whether commanding a fleet of drone bees along with drone aircraft, or a company of super-soldier Augments with the abilities of insects, the United States and its technologically advanced allies and competitors are assuming the capacity to wage conventional warfare and espionage in a manner that will not soon be available to internal or regional adversaries or to non-state antagonists. But it is in the area of novel bioweapons where hegemonic actors stand poised to offer attacks against which their adversaries could mount no possible defense. Currently, many potential lines of research are banned under the terms of the BWC, but even if state actors abide by its terms, private sector breakthroughs will continue to have dual-use capabilities that can be studied. Indeed, some of them have already caused outbursts of political violence internationally. Genetic weapons Until the end of the twentieth century, bioweapons meant pathogens (and possibly animal delivery systems). The biotech revolution, and particularly the ability to sequence and translate entire genomes, has altered that equation. Some state militaries, notably China’s, are already publicly expressing an interest in attacking targets by reordering their bodily functions through what is known in more benign applications as gene therapy. Planners in the United States also note that: The long term implications of genomics will present the Army with opportunities and challenges even in the next decade … The Army can, however, promote development of new products and processes that will be consistent with or specific to its missions and needs. This will require that the Army be fully aware of the synergistic effects of biological tools. (Committee 2001, p. 15) “The goal of gene therapy is to effect a change in the genetic makeup of an individual by introducing new information designed to replace or repair a faulty gene.” This is accomplished by using the same principle employed since the first smallpox vaccination: the use of a harnessed, crippled virus to serve as a “Trojan horse” vector, in this case bearing replacement or supplemental genes to alter cell functioning. Somatic cell therapy affects only the cells of the individual receiving it, and for reasons of ethics and technical feasibility, most therapeutic research has been of this type. But there is also the technique of germline cell therapy, which might “lead to a heritable change that could repair problems for all future generations” (Block, in Drell et al. 1999, pp. 60–62). Although American military planners are bullish on the potential for gene therapy to improve the lots of wounded servicemen in the near future, the technologies are not yet universally acclaimed nor even accepted. The United States Department of Energy (2009) noted that the FDA “has not yet [as of 2014] approved any human gene therapy product for sale. Current gene therapy is experimental and has not proven very successful in clinical trials. Little progress has been made since the first gene therapy clinical trial began in 1990.” This reaction stems in part from the death and illness of several children who had received gene therapies to treat life-threatening chronic conditions. At the same time, however, researchers elsewhere announced that gene therapy safely and successfully restored partial sight to congenitally blind test subjects. The results were accomplished by inserting healthy copies of a missing gene into patient retina cells via a vector manufactured by a private American company called Targeted Genetics (University College of London 2008). Vector-delivered gene therapies remain an emerging biotechnology, but cases such as these demonstrate both that vectors can be used to create significant physical alterations in targets, and that these changes can be deadly. The discovery that viruses can be carried airborne for considerable distances even after the droplets of fluid constituting their transmission media have fallen to the ground provides further evidence that vectors might soon be used to deliver genetic therapies – or maladies – to wide target populations (The Medical News 2007). With the genetic maps of entire organisms now available – the full genome for the plague bacterium was decoded in 2001 – it is inevitable that researchers will develop the means to rewrite specified segments of targeted genes (Preston 2009, p. 296). Direct effect weapons The United States military is currently developing “a set of design and synthesis processes that will enable the specification of a desired function, and be able to rapidly synthesize a protein that performs the function.” Rather than modifying existing proteins, this biotechnology would allow the creation of new proteins based on specific performance objectives (DARPA, “Protein Design Processes” 1998). The field of genetic protein decoding and engineering of this kind is known as proteomics (Committee 2001, p. 15). Understanding the functions of proteins is key to opening entirely new frontiers in medicine – and warfare. Already, researchers have destroyed targeted cancer cells by using engineered nanoparticles to deliver genes only to the tumor and not to healthy neighboring tissue. Once the genes were inserted, they stimulated the production of a protein that selectively destroys the cancer (BBC News 2009). However, proteomics also opens a different avenue of potential development in biotechnological attacks in shifting away from infectious agents to targeting human bioregulators, natural substances in the body that control automatic processes such as blood pressure and immune responses. Alibek (1999) claimed that the Soviet Union pursued this research into “direct effect weapons” in the 1980s to circumvent the BWC. The result would not actually be an illness, but the turning of the body against itself through disruption, and projects along these lines have at least been considered (Huang and Kosal 2008, p. 9, Preston 2009, pp. 313–314). Interfering with some of the body’s neurotransmitters, for example, could cause memory loss, panic disorder, or depression (Dando, in Pearson et al. 2007, pp. 133–134). NATO has listed “chemical technologies that could act on the central nervous system” as “technologies of interest” (Pearson, in Pearson et al. 2007, p. 89). Chinese researchers Guo and Yang (2005) directly addressed the security applications of such efforts in proteomics, arguing: Direct-effect weapons … can cause destruction that is both more powerful and more civilized than that caused by conventional killing methods like gunpowder or nuclear weapons … A military attack, therefore, might wound an enemy’s genes, proteins, cells, tissues, and organs, causing more damage than conventional weapons could. However, such devastating, nonlethal effects will require us to pacify the enemy through postwar reconstruction efforts and hatred control … [W]e could create a microbullet out of a 1 micron tungsten or gold ion, on whose surface plasmid DNA or naked DNA could be precipitated, and deliver the bullet via a gunpowder explosion, electron transmission, or high-pressured gas to penetrate the body surface. We could then release DNA molecules to integrate with the host’s cells through blood circulation and cause disease or injury by controlling genes. Around the same time, an American biodefense expert added that: If one can disrupt unit loyalty through fear or another emotion, the army would cease to exist as a fighting force. Claustrophobia would make soldiers tear off their protective face mask. Fear, thirst, accelerated heart rate, hypermotility of the gut – these would be the desired peptide effects. Delivery would be accomplished using engineered pathogens, and their primary role in biowarfare would be as delivery systems for direct effect weapons rather than the transmission of infectious disease (Moreno 2006, pp. 178–179). The international balance of power With the emergence of advanced biotechnologies, many of which already exist or are being developed for expressly military purposes, the United States holds the potential for achieving a decisive advantage in power projection capabilities beyond the reach of its current adversaries and most of its likely potential competitors. Besides the United States, other actors are expanding their biotech R&D sectors, notably the emerging great powers China and India, where force planners must consider the usage of bioweapons in Asian theaters of combat in both classical and modern times (Clunan et al. 2008). China is developing its military capabilities to become a regional power at the least, and advanced biotechnologies could play a role in this effort. “As the Chinese military expands its power projection capabilities, it will concentrate on creating asymmetrical advantages in the face of superior US conventional technology” (NTI 2003). Chinese military medical researchers have written a number of articles proposing the use of proteomic weapons to engage in non-lethal “precision injury” attacks that could be healed upon enemy surrender as evidence of hegemonic “mercifulness.” Despite the evident offensive strategic potential of such research – one such article is titled “The Command of Biotechnology and Merciful Conquest” – there is still evidence of the constraints of international norms against biowarfare. Indeed, the author claims that biotech warfare approaches “abide by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention more effectively, and strike a blow on the traditional bioweapons, therefore welcoming new military progresses and reforms, and changing the notions and civilization level of war” (Guo 2006, pp. 1152–1154). India, with its reliance on the Green revolution to attempt to achieve food sufficiency, has spent the last two decades encouraging the development of agricultural biotechnologies. Many of these advances were facilitated using extensive knowledge of genetic engineering, which in turn provided information on the de novo synthesis of biological agents. Whether such synthesis has actually been done is uncertain. India has made substantial efforts to prepare its military force for a biological attack. In December of 1998, India began to train its medical personnel to deal with the eventualities of such an attack. (NTI 2009) India’s equivalent of DARPA, the Defense Research & Development Organization operates a network of 52 laboratories whose research includes life sciences for military purposes. These include the Defense Institute of High-Altitude Research and the Defense Food Research Laboratory (Department of Biotechnology, Government of India 2013, p. 20). Its reported products parallel those investigated by its American counterparts, including treatments to combat altitude sickness, transgenic crops, and protective polymers for uniforms, although products are frequently described in terms of their commercial rather than strategic potentials (Defense Research & Development Organization 2015). One widely cited potential threat to international security from biotechnology is that, as more actors become involved in research into militarized biotechnology, the threat of dissemination to non-state actors increases through the increased availability of production equipment and available data. Maurer (in Maurer 2009, p. 86) notes that commercially available micronizers are sold that can produce 1–10 μm particles, and in their advertising material, the “companies boast that they can be operated by ‘anyone … in their garage.’” And non-state actors with interests in such technologies have been quite busy utilizing such machinery in the past decade, with individuals referred to as “garage hackers” operating autonomously with small pieces of equipment and biological material that can be purchased from suppliers over the internet (United States House of Representatives 2005, p. 30). Still, because such proliferation occurs over time, and because research by defense establishments will continue during this period, including in biodefense, the most sophisticated uses of biotech will remain in the arsenals of advanced state actors just as they do with conventional armaments today, despite the proliferation of surplus conventional arms. Rather than being the “poor man’s nuclear weapon,” twenty-first-century biotechnology will actually provide a decided asymmetrical advantage to major powers that will complement their superiority in conventional forces. Technologically advanced states will be far more likely to be able to counter classical “germ warfare” like anthrax attacks by rogue states and non-state groups than will be actors bereft of a biotech industry to mount defenses against vectors that introduce engineered viruses, or proteomic weapons that disrupt human bioregulators. Re-evaluating Human Security after the Biotech RMA It might be asked whether, for all the novelty of the particular technologies described, there is anything genuinely qualitatively different from any other technological developments that improved the effectiveness and reach of fighters, going back to clubs and spears. In describing efforts to enhance cognitive functioning, Bostrom and Savulescu (cited in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 2) ask “How is taking modafinil fundamentally different from imbibing a good cup of tea? How is either morally different from getting a good night’s sleep?” They note that even simple shoes can arguably be called a technological human enhancement over bare feet. Sandel (in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, pp. 73–74) adds that it is otherness rather than fairness that is the objection to human enhancement in sports because different athletes have different physical capabilities to begin with. Certainly this distinction would apply to states as well. Wheelis (in Pearson et al. 2007, p. 4) argues that there is no real incentive for states to spend billions of dollars in a bid to develop lethal neurotransmitter disruptors when they have effective conventional armaments. He does, however, note the potential power of such technology for purposes of incapacitation. A natural extension would be the use of coercion against the incapacitated (e.g. Tell us where the rebels are hiding and your blood pressure will return to normal). Perhaps the greatest threat to international stability in the genomic age is the international emergence of two classes of humankind, separated by disparities in living conditions far wider than those between the developed and developing worlds today. Described by biologist Lee Silver, this would be “a two-class system with rich, genetically enhanced ‘GenRich’ types lording it over poorer, inferior ‘Naturals,’” on a global scale (Armstrong and Warner 2003). Ultimately, the perception of injustice by the multitude of the have-nots would render such a system unstable (Carr 1964, Bull 2002). What these biotechnologies do not disrupt is order within the international system. In the past, advances in weapons technology have been condemned as immoral in part because the most powerful actors, whether states or rulers, viewed them as challenges to their hegemony. Today, terrorists and rogue states are imputed to have a desire to use bioweapons, meaning to release pathogens against civilian targets, but few outcries have been heard over the legitimacy of the advantages conferred by other biotechnologies upon what are already the strongest actors. In this sense, the biotech RMA is more akin to the development of status quo-reinforcing asymmetric weapons technologies like machine guns, which were not condemned by hegemonic powers, than by potentially status quo-disruptive asymmetric technologies such as chemical warfare (Price 1997, pp. 2–6). While matching advanced technology is a challenge to would-be competitors, it is not an insurmountable one (Quille, in Lewer 2002, p. 45). And it might actually inspire new forms of lower cost asymmetric counter-attacks, as attempts to use model airplanes as drones to attack American targets by would-be terrorists demonstrates. But for now, as with the nuclear club, with their overwhelming edge in both offensive and defensive capabilities, the United States and other advanced industrial nations can rest assured that their military and economic dominance of the international system is in no jeopardy. Biotechnology, often cited as an asymmetric threat to conventional power projection capabilities, is being harnessed by those very militaries as a force multiplier, and their R&D and production capabilities far outstrip those of any possible combination of rogue states and terrorist groups. The biotech RMA is well underway, and states are free to shift their attention from international to internal biological threats. Many of these developments are already occurring without an informed public debate and, indeed, many of the biotechnologies outlined in this paper doubtless seem too fantastical to warrant serious consideration. But just as most of the public and decision- makers would have dismissed the plausibility of atomic weapons before Hiroshima, and were unaware before the invasion of Afghanistan that drones were already in existence, so too are the seemingly far-fetched qualities of advanced biotechnology already manifesting themselves in super-solider planning and budgeting in the United States and elsewhere.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 1NC – ! – Biotech

Extinction

Achim Rosemannn et al 17, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK; Li Jiang, Soochow University, Suzhou, China; Xinqing Zhang, Peking Union Medical College / Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, Beijing, China“The regulatory and legal situation of human embryo, gamete and germ line gene editing research and clinical applications in the People’s Republic of China” May 2017, Nuffield Council on Bioethics https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/GEHR-background-paper-gene-editing-in-China.pdf

3. Still others thought that human germ line research will be difficult to stop: Chen Guoqiang, a professor of biology at the School of Life Sciences at Tsinghua University states: ‘If this technology is used in people in the future, the first mature [genetically modified] individual will be a much-desired breakthrough. While this step may probably bring about some problematic effects and repercussions, every technology undergoes a period from premature to mature. Currently, many heritable diseases do not have well-developed treatments. This [embryo gene editing] is a possibility of exploration. But [at present] used embryos should not be allowed to grow beyond the embryonic stage. Scientific research is always risky. If it is forbidden, for fear of risks, then it is difficult for science to progress’.131

Professor Zhao Shimin, a biologist at Fudan University in Shanghai, stated that the advent of human germ line gene editing is inevitable: ‘This technology has already been used on plants and animals. The next will be human beings’. But he also cautioned that there are limitations and risks: ‘Changing the sequence of genes can lead to unexpected problems that could spread from generation to generation and cause other defects or illnesses. […] While such studies should be allowed, they must be strictly controlled in the laboratory. […] A large number of uncontrolled editing of DNA can potentially lead to human extinction’.132

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 1NC – ! – Biotech

China is developing groundbreaking biotechnology, results in the most dangerous versions of CRISPR, nanotech, super soldiers, and cognitive warfare.

Ken Dilanian 20, intelligence and national security correspondent for NBC News, based in Washington, “China has done human testing to create biologically enhanced super soldiers, says top U.S. official”, , //lenox

WASHINGTON — U.S. intelligence shows that China has conducted "human testing" on members of the People's Liberation Army in hope of developing soldiers with "biologically enhanced capabilities," the top U.S. intelligence official said Friday.

John Ratcliffe, the director of national intelligence, included the explosive claim in a long Wall Street Journal op-ed in which he made the case that China poses the pre-eminent national security threat to the U.S.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 1NC – ! – Autonomous Nukes

AI risks accidental launches AND hair-trigger readiness posture – extinction.

Yonah Bob 19, Jerusalem Post's intelligence, terrorism and legal analyst and Literary Editor, 12/25/2019, "Scientists warn AI control of nukes could lead to ‘Terminator-style’ war," https://www.jpost.com/international/nuke-scientists-warn-ai-control-could-lead-to-terminator-style-nuke-war-612123, sg

The world may be inching closer to an era where a Terminator-style apocalyptic nuclear war could be possible due to yielding control over nuclear weapons to artificial intelligence (AI), according to publications by nuclear scientists and defense experts.

While numerous AI experts have told the Jerusalem Post over the years that people worried about AI turning on humanity as in the famous “Terminator” movies simply misunderstand the technology, the likelihood of AI making a catastrophic mistake with nuclear weapons is no fairytale.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 1NC – ! – Autonomous Nukes

AI-controlled nuclear weapons auto-launch at the slightest provocation.

John Allen 21, president of the Brookings Institution, distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings; Darrell West, vice president and director of Governance Studies and holds the Douglas Dillon Chair in Governmental Studies, 3/24/2021, "It is time to negotiate global treaties on artificial intelligence," https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/03/24/it-is-time-to-negotiate-global-treaties-on-artificial-intelligence/, sg

With the rise of artificial intelligence, supercomputing, and data analytics, the world today is at a crucial turning point in the national security and the conduct of war. Sometimes known as the AI triad, these characteristics and other weapons systems, such as hypersonics, are accelerating both the speed with which warfare is waged, and the speed with which warfare can escalate. Called “hyperwar” by Amir Husain and one of us (John R. Allen), this new form of warfare will feature levels of autonomy, including the potential for lethal autonomous weapons without humans being in the loop on decision-making.

How artificial intelligence is transforming the world

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 1NC – ! – Autonomous Nukes

China is developing autonomous nuclear weapons that will upend strategic stability.

Jamey Keaten 21, AP chief correspondent in Geneva, 7/8/2021, "US envoy warns China 'looking at' new nuclear technologies," https://apnews.com/article/europe-china-technology-government-and-politics-39029491f5863f10809dbbfc40862693, sg

GENEVA (AP) — A U.S. diplomat focusing on disarmament said Thursday that China is “looking at” developing naval and aerial autonomous nuclear weapons systems, warning any such development could disrupt strategic stability.

Ambassador Robert Wood, the U.S. envoy to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, said China hasn’t developed or been able to weaponize the technology yet. But his comments suggested that China is interested in such so-called “exotic nukes” like nuclear-powered underwater drones and nuclear-powered cruise missiles being developed by Russia.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 2NC – ! – AI

Chinese lead encourages the worst misuses of AI – extinction

James Johnson 19 {Dr. Johnson holds a Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from the University of Leicester, an M.A. in Asia-Pacific Studies from the University of Leeds. 4-24-2019. “Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security.” https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600800}//JM

China’s initial approach to AI has been heavily influenced by its assessment of U.S. military initiatives; in particular, those associated with the DoD’s Third Offset Strategy, and more recently, “Project Maven” (e.g. human-machine collaboration; convolutional neural networks; big-data analytics; machine-learning; human-assisted operations; combat-teaming; and autonomous weapons).108 108. China’s long-standing approach to military innovation has been based on a “leap-frogging” strategy; designed to encourage civil-military collaboration in the development of dual-use asymmetric capabilities. View all notes As China’s approach to AI matures, however, it will more likely align closer with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) unique organisational, command and control, and strategic cultural traditions.109 109. Johnson, The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency, chap. 4. View all notes Beijing, like the U.S., has yet to formally articulate a coherent strategic framework, operational concepts, or the establishment of institutions and mechanisms to support the use of AI for warfighting.110 110. For a recent study on Chinese approaches to weapon system-related operational concepts see, Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems confrontation and system destruction warfare (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018). View all notes That said, the intensity of discussion and research within the PLA surrounding military-use AI is indicative of the high-level importance attached to this ubiquitous dual-use technology.111 111. ‘National People’s Congress Representative Liu Guozhi: Artificial Intelligence Will Accelerate the Process of Military Transformation’, PLA Daily, March 7, 2017, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/zhuanti/content/2017-03/07/content_7517615.htm/. View all notes As China and the U.S. internalise these emerging technological trends, it is likely that each side will conceptualise them very differently. Scholarship on military innovation has demonstrated that – with the possible exception of nuclear weapons – technological innovation alone rarely causes the military balance to shift; rather how militaries employ a technology usually proves critical.112 112. See, Barry R. Posen, The sources of military doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars (Ithaca: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 1986). View all notes A major cause for concern is that if the many national, cultural, and normative differences that separate Sino-American approaches to military innovation are reflected in the software used to teach AI programmes, the resultant prejudices and preferences might become baked into the weapon systems they support. 113 113. For example, Microsoft’s racist “Chatbot Tay” is the most infamous example of this kind of prejudice displayed based on the data and parameters used by developers. View all notes As a corollary, even if AI systems are designed to produce bias-free analysis, human bias inherent in data sampling, sensor types, and other uncontrollable factors, might nonetheless result in subjective decision-making.114 114. However, if future AI is able to collect and categorise its own data via sensors, then the susceptibility of machines to human biases will likely decrease. For a history of AI and the military see, Ayoub and Payne, ‘Strategy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence’, 793–819. View all notes Under crisis and conflict conditions, these kinds of cognitive biases might exacerbate underlying U.S.-China mutual mistrust, suspicion, and misperceptions. In the race to innovate in AI, uncertainties surrounding U.S and China progress (and setbacks) will have profound and potentially destabilising implications for the strategic balance.115 115. China and the United have developed the capability to leverage AI to achieve asymmetric combat advantages, but its employment will also introduce certain vulnerabilities. Moreover, there will likely be continued obstacles to the effective sharing, acquisition, and fielding of AI systems for military applications. View all notes For now, at least, the U.S. retains the upper-hand in AI innovation,116 116. The U.S. leads China in the number of AI patent applications, the number of AI-related organisations, the amount of funding provided, but China is quickly closing this gap. View all notes but in this emerging innovation arms-race, China is no longer the inferior party. Instead, China is fast becoming a true peer-competitor in AI and is expected to soon overtake the U.S. in this emerging strategic domain.117 117. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 2018 (London: IISS, 2018), 10–3. View all notes By its own estimates, Beijing has set 2020 as a target to achieve “major breakthroughs in a series of landmark AI products”, and to establish an “international competitive advantage” in the development of dual-use technologies and applications – especially those which target the United States.118 118. From 2014, China has surpassed the United States in the output of published research papers on deep learning - by circa 20 per cent in 2016 alone. While increases in the quantity of AI-related publications do not necessarily correspond to advances in quality, this trajectory nonetheless, clearly demonstrates that China is resolutely committed to its AI development agenda. View all notes To be sure, China’s innovation ambitions could be expedited by a fundamental mismatch (even dissonance) analysts have identified between the rapid pace of commercial innovation and academic research into AI and the lagging timescales and assumptions that underpin the Pentagon’s existing procurement processes and practices.119 119. Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots, and Swarms - Issues, Questions, and Recommended Studies (Washington: CNA Analysis and Solutions, 2017), xiv. View all notes Chinese centralised planning, socialist market economy, and in particular, a vast pool of data-sets, could offer Beijing significant scope to leverage China’s market forces and human capital to realise its “civil-military fusion” objective in AI.120 120. Beijing’s approach to AI is, however, far from perfect. Chinese state-led resource management characterised as inefficient and intrinsically corrupt (with government-favoured research institutions receiving a disproportionate share of state-funding) might cause the government to misallocate resources, over-invest in non-productive and poorly conceptualised AI projects. View all notes While vast data is clearly an advantage, however, it remains an open question whether China’s national strategic planning, and socialist market economy will prove advantageous in the development of AI. According to a recent report, China is on track to possess twenty per cent of the world’s entire data by 2020 – and thirty per cent by 2030.121 121. In contrast, between 2012–2017 U.S. DoD expenditure on AI-related contracts was relatively flat. Govini, ‘Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and Cloud Taxonomy’, December 3, 2017, 9, http://www.govini/home/insights/. View all notes The head of the U.S. DoD’s Strategic Capabilities Office, William Roper, highlighted the pivotal role the accumulation of, and competition for, information for machine learning will play in future warfare. Roper stated: “It’s wealth and fuel. Your data keeps working for you. You stockpile the most data that you can and train that to teach and train autonomous systems”.122 122. Patrick Tucker, ‘The Next Big War Will Turn on AI, Says US Secret-Weapons Czar’, Defense One, 28, March 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/03/next-big-war-will-turn-ai-says-pentagons-secret-weapons-czar/136537/. View all notes In contrast to the nuclear arms race that defined the Cold War-era, states competing in the AI arms race will be less concerned with sustaining the qualitative and quantitative lead in warheads, but instead will be more concerned with maintaining information superiority – to feed machine-learning algorithms.123 123. Sharikov, ‘Artificial intelligence, cyberattack, and nuclear weapons - A dangerous combination’, 370. View all notes Chinese President Xi Jinping recently stated that AI, “big data”, cloud storage, cyberspace, and quantum communications were amongst the “liveliest and most promising areas for civil-military fusion”, and towards this end, he pledged additional state support and resources.124 124. For example, in collaboration with Baidu, Beijing established a “National Engineering Laboratory of Deep Learning Technology” initiative. Robin Li, ‘China brain project seeks military funding as Baidu makes artificial intelligence plans’, South China Morning Post, 3 March, 2015, https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/1728422/china-brain-project-seeks-military-funding-baidu-makes-artificial. View all notes In contrast, the increasingly strained relationship between the Trump administration and Silicon Valley will likely pose additional challenges to this critical partnership in the development of AI technologies for the U.S. military.125 125. For example, when Google acquired DeepMind it specifically prohibited the use of its research for military purposes. Loren DeJonge Schulman, Alexandra Sander, and Madeline Christian, ‘The Rocky Relationship Between Washington & Silicon Valley: Clearing the Path to Improved Collaboration’, (Washington: CNAS, July 2015). View all notes Following a recent high-profile backlash from employees at Google, the company recently announced that it would discontinue its work with the Pentagon on Project Maven.126 126. Jeremy White, ‘Google Pledges not to work on weapons after Project Maven backlash’, The Independent, 7 June, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-ai-weapons-military-project-maven-sundar-pichai-blog-post-a8388731.html. View all notes As a first mover AI-power, therefore, China will likely chart a course to be at the vanguard in the development of technical standards, mechanisms, and governance of AI that will likely strengthen the competitiveness and quality of China’s military capabilities.127 127. Given the lack of empirical open-sources that relates to Chinese view on military applications of AI, this paper highlights some of the key observable trends, and proffers areas for future research that relates to these issues. View all notes China’s early approach to AI suggests a wide-reaching conceptualisation that the PLA will synthesise into its entire force structure; to support future “intelligentised” operations, and seise the “commanding heights” of future strategic competition.128 128. ‘National People’s Congress Representative Liu Guozhi: Artificial Intelligence Will Accelerate the Process of Military Transformation’, PLA Daily, March, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/zhuanti/content/2017-03/07/content_7517615.htm/. View all notes Specifically, Chinese researchers have focused on AI applications for war-gaming, training, command and control, intelligence analysis, and augmenting autonomous weapons systems.129 129. Shou Xiaosong, ed., The Science of Military Strategy, 3rd ed. (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013). View all notes President Xi’s “One Belt One Road”, and the virtual dimension the “digital Silk Road”, are high-level efforts designed to ensure that the mechanisms, co-ordination, and support for this agenda will become increasingly normalised.130 130. China’s recent five-year plan reportedly committed over USD$100 billion to AI. Moreover, as China moves forward with its One Belt One Road related projects that extend to potentially more than eighty countries AI would become an integral part of these international infrastructure projects. Wenyuan Wu, ‘China’s Digital Silk Road: Pitfalls Among High Hopes’, The Diplomat, 3 November, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinas-digital-silk-road-pitfalls-among-high-hopes/. View all notes Moreover, in 2017 Xi explicitly called for the acceleration of the military “intelligentisation” agenda, to better prepare China for future warfare against a near-peer adversary like the United States.131 131. ‘Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th Chinese Communist Party National Congress’, Xinhua, October 27, 2017, http://www.china.com.cn/19da/2017-10/27/content_41805113_3.htm. View all notes China’s pursuit of AI (especially dual-use capabilities) will fuel the perception (accurate or otherwise) in Washington that Beijing is intent on exploiting this strategically critical technology to fulfil its broader revisionist goals. Despite a brief pause in the development of the U.S.’s AI strategic roadmap, the White House recently announced the creation of a new committee of AI experts to advise it on policy choices.132 132. Aaron Boyd, ‘White House Announces Select Committee of Federal AI Experts’, Nextgov, May 10, 2018, https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2018/05/white-house-announces-select-committee-federal-ai-experts/148123/. View all notes In 2017, following the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., President Trump blocked a Chinese firm from acquiring Lattice Semiconductor; a company that manufactures chips critical in the operation of AI applications.133 133. Ana Swanson, ‘Trump Blocks China-Backed Bid to Buy U.S. Chip Maker’, The New York Times, September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.html. View all notes This action typifies a broader concern that synergies created by China’s civil-military fusion strategy could allow the technology, expertise, and intellectual property shared between American and Chinese commercial entities to be transferred to the PLA.134 134. Bartholomew and Shea, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission - 2017 Annual Report, 507. View all notes Though Chinese strategic writings have emphasised the importance of human-machine collaboration and teaming (or keeping humans “in the loop”),135 135. “Keeping humans in the loop” refers to maintaining human control of autonomous weapons; both in the design of the rules that govern these systems, and the execution of those rules when firing. That said, human decision-making and automation are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, the human-machine teaming cognitive design envisaged by the Pentagon, in theory at least, could leverage the predictability, reliability, and speed of full-automation while retaining the robustness and flexibility of human intelligence. View all notes the PLA’s historical resistance to command and control decentralisation, and general mistrust of human personnel could prompt military leaders to gravitate more quickly towards full-battlefield autonomy.136 136. For a recent comprehensive examination of the PLA’s shortcomings see, Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstorm, Tai Ming Cheung, Kirsten A. Gunness, Scott W. Harold, Susan Puska, and Samuel K. Berkowitz, China's incomplete military transformation- assessing the weaknesses of the people's liberation army (PLA) (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015). View all notes The opposite conclusion could also be drawn, however: if Chinese commanders were unwilling to give up centralised control to junior officers, why would they give such control to machines? Recent reports indicate China’s navy is contemplating fitting its nuclear-powered submarines (and possibly nuclear-armed ones) with a so-called “AI-augmented brainpower”.137 137. Stephen Chen, ‘China’s plan to use artificial intelligence to boost the thinking skills of nuclear submarine commanders’, South China Morning Post, 4 February, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2131127/chinas-plan-use-artificial-intelligence-boost-thinking-skills. View all notes This capacity could, in theory, synthesise and interpret large quantities of data generated by sonar signals and sound pulses, to detect submerged objects, and support a broad range of maritime operations. To be sure, the kinds of operations and the level of autonomy afforded to AI-augmented systems to support China’s strategic underwater forces will have profound implications for future crisis and conflict in the increasingly contested undersea domain. In extremis, if military command and control systems came under attack (possibly from AI-augmented cyber-weapons), military commanders may decide to pre-delegate decision-making to machine-learning systems. Russia, for example, operates a so-called “dead hand” designed to automatically launch its nuclear missiles at hyper-speed, if its pressure sensors were to detect an imminent nuclear attack.138 138. Fontaine and Miller, A new era in U.S.-Russian strategic stability, 26. View all notes The evidence suggests that China (and Russia) has relatively few moral, legal or ethical qualms in deploying lethal autonomous weapons.139 139. To date, there have been few publications on the legal and ethical implications for military-use AI, which have dominated the discourse in the West. Bendett, ‘Get Ready, NATO.’ View all notes Moreover, and in contrast to the U.S., discussion on the potential limitations and risks associated with AI, autonomy and cyber-warfare appears largely absent from Chinese open-sources.140 140. For example, Johnson, The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency, chap. 4. View all notes Reports suggest that China has already begun to incorporate AI into its next-generation conventional missiles and missile-defense intelligence gathering systems, to enhance their precision and lethality.141 141. Kania, Battlefield singularity. View all notes By contrast, the U.S. will likely be much more constrained in the development of these technologies. Resistance within the U.S. military to incorporate AI stems in large part from the prevailing liberal-democratic norms governing the use of military force, and the growing concerns surrounding the many “black box” aspects of AI-machine learning, and in particular, to avoid the so-called “Terminator Conundrum” – the implications of weapons that could operate independently and beyond the control of their developers.142 142. Colin Clark, ‘“The Terminator Conundrum:” VCJCS Selva On Thinking Weapons’, Breaking Defense, January 21 2016, https://breakingdefense.com/2016/01/the-terminator-conundrum-vcjcs-selva-on-thinking-weapons/. View all notes Chinese analysts, by overlooking the potential shortcomings, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities associated with AI, and overstating (even overdramatising) the utility of AI and autonomy (or taking humans “out of the loop”), could under crisis and conflict conditions complicate escalation management,143 143. For example, whilst much has been written by Chinese analysts on the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy programmes (including AI) there has been very little discussion on the potential limitations of these advanced systems - including those associated with reducing human control. View all notes and worsen strategic stability in future warfare.144 144. Geist and Lohn, How might artificial intelligence affect the risk of nuclear war? (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018), 5. View all notes That said, given the aggressive pursuit of military-use AI by its strategic rivals, America’s current commitment to having humans in charge might waver.145 145. It remains unclear, however, what operational contexts and applications, and to what degree China and Russian might pursue fully autonomous weapon systems. View all notes Moreover, international law remains unclear and indeterminate on lethal autonomy, and in its absence, militaries (including the U.S.) will continue to develop weapon systems with varying degrees of autonomy.146 146. Kelsey Atherton, ‘3 big takeaways from the Navy’s new robot road map’, C4ISRnet, 30 May, 2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2018/05/30/three-big-takeaways-from-the-navys-new-robot-roadmap/. View all notes Ultimately, militaries will need to consider the trade-off between the risks associated with autonomous weapons, with the possibility of affording an adversary using fully autonomous weapons the asymmetric upper hand. At this early stage, it is impossible to know for certain when, whether, and under what circumstances greater degrees of autonomy in human-machine collaboration will provide a distinct strategic battlefield advantage.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 1NC – ! – AI

Worse than extinction.

Di Minardi 20, MA Political Science at Boston College, 10-15-20, “The grim fate that could be ‘worse than extinction’,” https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence

What would totalitarian governments of the past have looked like if they were never defeated? The Nazis operated with 20th Century technology and it still took a world war to stop them. How much more powerful – and permanent – could the Nazis have been if they had beat the US to the atomic bomb? Controlling the most advanced technology of the time could have solidified Nazi power and changed the course of history.

When we think of existential risks, events like nuclear war or asteroid impacts often come to mind. Yet there’s one future threat that is less well known – and while it doesn’t involve the extinction of our species, it could be just as bad.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Impact › 1NC – ! – AI

China is racing toward developing general AI.

Maximilian Schreiner 22, A studied philosopher who writes about artificial intelligence and virtual reality, 3-27-2022, "Artificial Intelligence: China researches "brain-scale" AI," , cy

In China, the state and companies are researching AI models with trillions of parameters. They want to prove that they can develop “brain-scale” AI.

In the race to build ever-larger AI models, China is showing that cooperation between the state, universities and the private sector holds the potential for gigantic AI models. The researchers are talking about “brain-scale” AI: according to their definition, these are AI models with parameters beyond the 100-trillion mark.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Yes Counterforce › 2NC – Tech

Growing transparency over military operations has increased counterforce effectiveness – especially over remote-sensing

Lieber and Press, 20 (Keir A. Liber and Daryl G. Press, 2020, Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Faculty Fellow at the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame, associate professor of government at Dartmouth, “The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution,” https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Myth_of_the_Nuclear_Revolution/2gK0DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0//mahimahi)

Five trends are ushering in an age of unprecedented transparency. First sensor platforms have become more diverse. The mainstays of Cold War tech- nical intelligence—satellites, submarines, and piloted aircraft—continue to play a vital role, and they are being supplemented by new platforms. For example, remotely piloted aircraft and underwater drones now gather in- telligence during peacetime and war. Autonomous sensors, hidden on the ground or tethered to the seabed, monitor adversary facilities, forces, and operations. Additionally, the past two decades have witnessed the development of a new “virtual” sensing platform: cyberspying. Second, sensors are collecting a widening array of signals for analysis using a growing list of techniques. Early Cold War strategic intelligence relied heavily on photoreconnaissance, underwater acoustics, and the col- lection of adversary communications, all of which remain important. Now, modern sensors gather data from across the entire electromagnetic spec- trum; they employ seismic and acoustic sensors in tandem; and they emit radar at various frequencies depending on their purpose—for example, to maximize resolution or to penetrate foliage. Modern remote sensing exploits an increasing number of analytic techniques, including spectroscopy to identify the vapors leaking from faraway facilities, interferometry to discover underground structures, and signals-processing techniques (such as those underpinning synthetic aperture radars) that allow radars to perform better than their antenna size would seem to permit. Third, remote-sensing platforms increasingly provide persistent observation. At the beginning of the Cold War, strategic intelligence was hobbled by sensors that collected snapshots rather than streams of data. Spy planes sprinted past targets, and satellites passed overhead and then disappeared over the horizon. Over time those sensors were supplemented with plat- forms that remained in place and soaked up data, such as signals-intelligence antennas, undersea hydrophones, and geostationary satellites. The trend toward persistence is continuing. Today, remotely piloted vehicles can loiter near enemy targets and autonomous sensors can monitor critical road junctures for months or years. Persistent observation is essential if the goal is not merely to count enemy weapons but also to track their movement. The fourth factor in the ongoing remote sensing revolution is the steady improvement in sensor resolution. In every field that employs remote-sensing technology, including medicine, geology, and astronomy, improved sensors and advanced data processing are permitting more accurate measures and fainter signals to be discerned from background noise. The leap in satellite image resolution is but one example. The first U.S. reconnaissance satellite (Corona) could detect objects as small as 25 feet wide; today, commercial sat- ellites (e.g., DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-3 and WorldView-4) can collect im- ages with 1-foot resolution and U.S. spy satellites are reportedly capable of resolutions of less than 4 inches. Advances in resolution are not merely transforming optical remote-sensing systems; they are extending what can be seen by infrared sensors, advanced radars, interferometers and spectro- graphs, and many other sensors. The fifth key trend is the huge increase in data transmission speed. During the first decades of the Cold War, it took days or longer to transmit information from sensors to analysts. At least a full day passed before the photographs snapped by U-2 aircraft were developed and analyzed. Early satellites were slower: the satellite had to finish its roll of film and then eject the canister, which would be caught midair and flown to a facility for development and analysis; all told, it might take weeks before images collected at the begin- ning of a satellite mission arrived at an analyst’s desk. Today, by contrast, intelligence gathered by aircraft, satellites, and drones can be transmitted in nearly real time. The data can be transmitted to intelligence analysts, to politi- cal leaders, and in some cases directly to military commanders conducting operations.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Yes Counterforce › 2NC – Subs

Deterrence against China submarines is successful—ASW forces prove

Carnegie Endowment, 18 (Carnegie endowment for International peace, 10-24-18, “US Anti-submarine Warfare and Its Impact,” )

Geography lends various advantages to the United States’ and its allies’ efforts to block Chinese SSBNs from patrolling in the Pacific Ocean. The biggest roadblock is the existence of major chokepoints separating China’s coastal waters from the Pacific Ocean. Along the First Island Chain, there are only a limited number of waterways—including the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel (in the Luzon Strait near the Philippines)—through which Chinese SSBNs can transit. All of these waterways are adjacent to land features possessed or controlled by U.S. allies, so the passages are under close surveillance by U.S. or U.S.-friendly ASW forces.

In fact, some Japanese defense officials used to boast that Chinese submarines would not be able to slip into the Pacific through the Ryukyus, a chain of islands scattered along the north and south of Taiwan, or through the Bashi Channel without being detected by U.S. and Japanese ASW systems.1 Indeed, there have been cases when foreign countries have reportedly detected Chinese SSNs in transit. In 2004, for example, a Chinese 091-class nuclear attack submarine was reportedly detected by Japanese, Taiwanese, and U.S. ASW platforms as the submarine sailed from the Western Pacific back to China, passing through Japanese waters.2 Similarly, in January 2018, a Chinese 093-class SSN—which is believed to be considerably quieter than the 091-class SSN, and which may have a noise level similar to that of the 094-class SSBN—was reportedly detected by Japan while it was submerged near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.3 Notably, Chinese SSBNs face greater geographical constraints today than Soviet SSBNs did during the Cold War. The barrier formed by Greenland, Iceland, and the UK that Soviet SSBNs needed to pass through to reach the North Atlantic Ocean is much wider than the waterways in the First Island Chain.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Yes Counterforce › 2NC – Subs

Counterforcing through US ASW efforts has been key to regain undersea superiority.

Lieber and Press, 20 (Keir A. Liber and Daryl G. Press, 2016, Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Faculty Fellow at the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame, associate professor of government at Dartmouth, “The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution,” https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Myth_of_the_Nuclear_Revolution/2gK0DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0//mahimahi)

During the Cold War, the competition between submariners and antisubmarine warfare operators was shrouded in secrecy, but that history is finally being revealed. We now know that the United States was able to locate, and even track, Soviet SSBNs during extended periods of the Cold War.67 The core of U.S. ASW efforts against the Soviet Union lay in a series of breakthroughs in passive sonar and signals processing, as well as doctrine and tactics to exploit those advances. Starting in the 1950s, the United States deployed an expanding network of underwater hydrophones designed to identify and locate adversary submarines. Data from the hydrophones were transmitted across undersea cables to onshore computing facilities, where powerful computers discerned the faint sounds of submarines from ocean noise. Potential targets were then passed along to aircraft and attack submarines (SSNs) for further location and tracking. U.S. capabilities to track Soviet submarines leapt forward in the late 1960s and 1970s, as the United States deployed new attack submarines, which were equipped with powerful sonars in their bows, towed sonar arrays, and improved on-ship computing power, giving U.S. SSNs an unprecedented combination of acoustic gathering and data processing capabilities.68 The competition between Soviet SSBNs and the pack of U.S. submarines, aircraft, and surface ships hunting them varied throughout the Cold War. There were periods in which U.S. forces were winning, trailing every Soviet SSBN on patrol, from port to sea and back. In later periods, after discovering their vulnerability, the Russians pulled their forces into protected “bastions” near Soviet territory to counter the U.S. ASW strategy. The United States did not give up, and worked until the end of the Cold War (and beyond) to regain undersea superiority.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Yes Counterforce › 2NC – Subs

China’s subs fail miserably at second strike.

Robert Farley 19, professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, "Why China’s SSBN Force Will Fall Short for the Foreseeable Future," , cy

Title: Why China’s SSBN Force Will Fall Short for the Foreseeable Future

China simply cannot rely on its SSBN force to act as a reliable second-strike deterrent against the United States.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Yes Counterforce › 2NC – Empirics

Counterforce can thwart nuclear superiority, empirics prove – the US dismantled Soviet command and control systems.

Lieber and Press, 20 (Keir A. Liber and Daryl G. Press, 2020, Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Faculty Fellow at the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame, associate professor of government at Dartmouth, “The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution,” https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Myth_of_the_Nuclear_Revolution/2gK0DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0//mahimahi)

One might think that only weak countries need to worry about an adversary “escaping stalemate”; surely, powerful countries have the resources to thwart any adversary’s efforts to attain nuclear superiority. But history is not reassuring. In the Cold War, once the Soviet Union had built robust nuclear retaliatory forces, many observers assumed that stalemate could not be undermined and that U.S. leaders would recognize and respect the “objective” reality that mutual assured destruction was a permanent fact. Instead, American officials constantly sought counterforce weapons and technologies to gain a disarming first-strike or significant damage-limitation capability—such as more accurate missiles, missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), sensors for hunting mobile missiles at sea and on land, and a variety of weapons and innovations designed to undermine Soviet command and control and early warning systems. By the end of the Cold War, Soviet leaders had little faith in their own retaliatory capabilities.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › Yes Counterforce › 1NC – Generic

We’d respond with a devastating counterforce attack that would crush China

David J. Lonsdale 19; Director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull, UK. 5/17/2019. “The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?” Comparative Strategy Volume 38, 2019 Pages 98-117

The important question is: what objectives would the U.S. pursue within a nuclear conflict, and how would they be achieved? It appears that the primary objectives sought would be damage limitation (an important component of warfighting) and the reestablishment of deterrence. This fits with the preliminary qualifying statement to this section of the review, in which it is stated that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in compliance with the law of armed conflict.86 Indeed, the NPR is at pains to note that nuclear forces would only be used for defensive purposes. One assumes that this rules out counter-value targeting (deliberate attacks against enemy population centers). This leaves counterforce operations as the only option. Strikes against enemy nuclear forces and their command and control, in conjunction with active ballistic missile defenses (BMD), would help ensure damage limitation for the U.S. and its allies.87 A focus on counterforce options is reminiscent of later Cold War strategy, when the U.S. increasingly procured weapon systems with increased accuracy and penetrative capability designed for warfighting. Indeed, Lieber and Press argue that increases in accuracy and remote sensing have enhanced the potency of counterforce options, to the point that low-casualty counterforce options are possible for the first time.88 One can reasonably assume, although it is not explicitly noted in the review, that the restoration of deterrence would be achieved through a combination of intra-war deterrence by denial (as noted above in relation to counter-escalation strategies) and punishment for coercive purposes. Inclusion of the latter is premised on references to “unacceptable consequences” resulting from nuclear attack elsewhere in the NPR. 89 However, in the face of no counter-value targeting, it is reasonable to question how these costs would be inflicted. There are three possible answers, although none of them is discussed in the NPR. First, it may be that the enemy values highly their nuclear forces; so that the loss of them would inflict unacceptable costs. Alternatively, there may be an unwritten assumption that counterforce strikes would inevitably produce “bonus” counter-value damage. Much of the nuclear force infrastructure (including command and control, airbases, etc.) is within or near population centers. Thus, even a limited counterforce strike is likely to have a significant detrimental effect on counter-value targets. This assumption, however, is somewhat thrown into question by the stated desire to procure accurate limited-yield weapons and to operate within the norms of the war convention. Low-yield accurate weapons would be ideal for counterforce missions and would minimize damage to counter-value target sets. Thus, bonus damage is likely to be limited. Finally, although again not explicitly noted in the NPR, perhaps there is a return to the notion of attacking targets associated with political control. Yet again, though, concerns over collateral damage would likely restrict a campaign aimed at the means of political control. We are, thus, left with many questions concerning how the coercive effects of nuclear weapons would be administered. This is problematic, for as Thomas C. Schelling eloquently noted, “The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force.” 90 It has to be concluded that the uncertainties in this area of strategy reflect either a paradox or incomplete strategic thinking in the NPR. Clarity on these matters would be welcome, especially as it would enhance deterrence credibility still further. Although countervailing is back on the agenda in the 2018 NPR, there is no mention of prevailing in a nuclear conflict. Indeed, the review quotes Defense Secretary Mattis, echoing the early thoughts of Brodie, that nuclear war can never be won, and thus must never be fought.91 This is both curious and disappointing from a warfighting perspective, and speaks to the need for the further development of strategic thinking in U.S. nuclear strategy under Trump. Damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence are perfectly admirable goals within the context of nuclear conflict. However, if the U.S. is to achieve its objectives in a post-deterrence environment, it must have a comprehensive theory of victory. Damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence are limited negative objectives. They do not provide a positive driving force for the use of nuclear weapons. To reiterate, victory refers to a policy objective that must be achieved in the face of the enemy. And, as Clausewitz reminds us, the will of the enemy must be broken by destroying his ability to resist, or putting him in such a position as his defeat is inevitable.92 If we consider the conditions under which U.S. nuclear weapons could be used, as stipulated by the 2018 NPR, then we can assume that an enemy power (likely Russia, China, North Korea, or a state-sponsored terror group) has launched a substantial attack on either the U.S. or one of its allies. We can think in terms of a Russian assault on the Baltic States, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or perhaps a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Alternatively, the U.S. may have been subjected to a substantial strategic attack, involving either weapons of mass destruction (including biological or chemical) or a crippling cyberattack. In any of these scenarios, more expansive objectives would be required. As Lieber and Press note, “In some cases, wars may be triggered by events that compel U.S. leaders to pursue decisive victory, conquest, and/or regime change.” 93 Thus, in order to achieve its objectives, the U.S. would variously need to: punish an aggressor to reinstate deterrence; defeat enemy forces for damage limitation or to reclaim lost territory; and, in the North Korean case, presumably overthrow a communist regime. In some of these cases, damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence would not be enough. Enemy forces would have to be defeated, removed, destroyed, or coerced (to withdraw from allied territory). Any operations in pursuit of these goals would need a theory of victory built on a detailed understanding of the use of nuclear weapons in the service of military objectives; i.e., nuclear warfighting. This could include defeating enemy nuclear forces for force protection of U.S. and allied conventional forces. Alternatively, U.S. nuclear forces may be required to defeat regionally superior enemy conventional forces. And yet, as previously noted, the NPR rules out a return to nuclear warfighting. This is a significant disjuncture in U.S. nuclear strategy. It is even more curious when one considers the range of modern forces the Trump administration seeks to acquire under the 2018 NPR.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Neg › War Inevitable › 2NC – AT: China Has NFU

China’s NFU is a sham – they are modernizing to bloody nose nuclear first strike the United States homeland

Peter Pry 20; Staffer of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, and the Central Intelligence Agency; former director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum and president of EMPACT America., “China's 'no first use' nuclear fiction”, The Hill, 6/24/20, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/502503-chinas-no-first-use-nuclear-fiction

Many China experts in government and academia, and anti-nuclear activists such as the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Federation of American Scientists, appear not to be worried by China’s rapidly growing nuclear capabilities, because Beijing’s official policy promises that China will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. Beijing promises that its nuclear forces are for deterrence and retaliation only, not for aggression. Western analysts consistently fail to understand that, for both Beijing and Moscow, nuclear war plans are national security “crown jewels” that they try to protect and conceal behind a bodyguard of lies and disinformation. Trusting open sources and commentary — especially when they are intended to cast nuclear doctrine in the most benign possible way — is a big mistake. For example, during the Cold War the USSR went to extraordinary lengths to misinform Western policymakers and the public that Moscow had a nuclear “no first use” doctrine. This was intended to conceal its real nuclear war plans — that we now know entailed a massive nuclear first strike early in a conflict. The “no first use” disinformation campaign also was intended to mobilize Western anti-nuclear activists, in and out of government, to constrain U.S. nuclear programs and operational plans. China’s alleged nuclear “no first use” doctrine, like the USSR’s during the Cold War, is almost certainly disinformation. “No first use” for China does not withstand the test of common sense. No conservative military planner would adopt “no first use” when China lacks ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) radars and satellite early warning systems that would enable China to launch on tactical warning. “No first use” would doom China’s nuclear deterrent to certain destruction by a U.S. or Russian conventional or nuclear first strike, or to a nuclear first strike by India. China’s nuclear posture, especially the lack of early warning radars and satellites, is “use it or lose it,” which logically should drive Chinese military planners toward nuclear first use — indeed, toward surprise first use early in a crisis or conflict, based on strategic warning. Regardless of China’s “no first use” declaration, it strains credulity that Beijing’s political leaders would adhere to such a policy if confronted with compelling political and military intelligence of an imminent U.S. attack. Such strategic warning was the basis for the former USSR’s secret plans for a disarming nuclear first strike under their VRYAN (surprise nuclear missile attack) intelligence program, that nearly resulted in a nuclear apocalypse during NATO’s theater nuclear exercise Able Archer 83. Fortunately, at least some U.S. military leaders are not as naïve as academics about China’s “no first use” pledge. Adm. Charles Richard, chief of U.S. Strategic Command, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February that he could “drive a truck through China’s ‘no first use’ policy.” China’s unprecedented rapid expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities is not consistent with a belief in “minimum deterrence” and “no first use.” It looks imitative of Russia’s policy seeking escalation dominance for nuclear diplomacy and nuclear warfighting. Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, warned in May 2019: “China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China’s history. … China launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined.” China’s political and military leaders often have threatened nuclear war. In 2011, columnist Gordon Chang reported: “Former Chinese general Xu Guangyu … suggested China was planning a surprise missile attack on the American homeland.” The People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps — now the PLA Rocket Force, equivalent to U.S. Strategic Command — leaked a planning document, “Lowering the Threshold of Nuclear Threats,” that stipulated some conditions under which, in response to U.S. conventional attacks, China would launch a nuclear first strike. For example: “Targets that could draw such a response include any of China’s leading urban centers or its atomic or hydroelectric power facilities.” China’s military doctrine — including numerous examples of using nuclear EMP attack to win on the battlefield, defeat U.S. aircraft carriers, and achieve against the U.S. homeland a surprise “Pearl Harbor” writ large — is replete with technical and operational planning consistent with a nuclear first strike. Indeed, China’s classification of nuclear EMP attack in military doctrine as “electronic warfare” or “information warfare” indicates that EMP is not even considered a form of nuclear attack, but would be equivalent to non-nuclear EMP weapons and cyber warfare. In March, a panel of China’s military experts threatened to punish U.S. Navy ships for challenging China’s illegal annexation of the South China Sea by making an EMP attack — one of the options they considered least provocative because the crew would be unharmed, but most effective because the ship would be disabled. Like other evidence, this, too, suggests Beijing considers EMP attack as something short of nuclear or even kinetic conflict, akin to “gray zone” threats such as electronic and cyber warfare.