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2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › DIB Low---2NC

DIB is dead now.

Clark 21 (Maya,research assistant in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, focusing on defense industrial base issues. Rhttps://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/bidens-supply-chain-executive-order-doesnt-boost-the-defense-industrial-base-and)

Last week, President Joe Biden signed a far-reaching executive order calling for supply chain reviews across many economic sectors deemed strategically significant. For some sectors, these efforts are unprecedented—and problematic. But such reviews are nothing new within the defense industry—and that’s what makes the defense aspects of this order such a good move.

The “Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains” has two parts. First, it calls for a one-hundred-day supply chain reviews for four strategic sectors: semiconductors; critical minerals, including rare earth elements; pharmaceuticals, and high-capacity batteries (like those used in electric vehicles).

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › AT: DIB Adv---1NC

Pentagon, Middle East and Asian allies fill in

Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“Do U.S. Defense Firms Really Need To Export Arms To Saudi Arabia?,” Forbes, June 24th, Available Online at https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2019/06/24/do-u-s-defense-firms-really-need-arms-exports/#2eeb1e7c63eb, Accessed 06-24-2019)

Is this just another case of Trumpian exaggeration, aimed at portraying him as a master deal maker who can bring good jobs to America in general and the heartland in particular, or is there more to it? There’s no question that particular companies benefit from Saudi sales. The bulk of the more than $150 billion in U.S. arms offers to Riyadh since 2009 have involved four of America’s top five defense contractors – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and General Dynamics – in deals that have involved everything from combat aircraft to tanks to missile defense systems to armored vehicles to combat ships. The most controversial deals have involved precision-guided munitions that have been used by Saudi Arabia in its brutal war in Yemen, which has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes. And all of these firms are seeking to grow their export markets, both to increase profits and to provide insurance against the ups and downs of the Pentagon procurement budget. But the truth of the matter is that U.S. firms could do without sales to Saudi Arabia and other repressive regimes, and they’d still be doing just fine financially. The current Pentagon budget is at one of the highest levels since World War II, and it provides ample funding for procurement and R&D, much of which lands in the coffers of major defense firms that are the leading weapons exporters. This is particularly true when one considers that the most likely outcome would not be a total ban on sales to Saudi Arabia, but a prohibition on weapons most relevant to the Yemen war – precision-guided munitions in particular. Other deals, like a lucrative $15 billion sale of the Lockheed Martin THAAD missile defense system to Riyadh, would likely remain untouched. Arms sales in general are important to key firms like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which got roughly one-quarter to one-third of their revenues, respectively, from foreign sales in 2018. But the biggest export earners were missile defense systems to Riyadh, would likely remain untouched. Arms sales in general are important to key firms like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which got roughly one-quarter to one-third of their revenues, respectively, from foreign sales in 2018. But the biggest export earners were missile defense systems and combat aircraft exported to allies in Europe and Asia, not bombs being used in war zones.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › AT: DIB Adv---1NC

Thumps.

Mehta 3/15 (Aaron, deputy editor and senior Pentagon correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Defense Department and its international partners. https://www.defensenews.com/global/2021/03/15/us-increases-dominance-of-global-arms-exports/)

The United States has increased its share of the global arms market, while the Middle East is showing steady growth as a customer, according to new information released March 15 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

From 2015 to 2019, the U.S. contributed about 35 percent of global arms sales. SIPRI’s new figures, studying the years 2016-2020, show the U.S. contributing about 37 percent of the overall arms market. American arms customers included 96 different states during this time period, with 47 percent of those sales going to the Middle East, according to the think tank.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › AT: DIB Adv---1NC

Biden ended sales to Saudi Arabia

Abramson 21 (Jeff, March. Senior fellow for conventional arms control and transfers at the Arms Control Association. He also directs the Forum on the Arms Trade, a global network of civil society experts he helped found in 2015 for strengthening public efforts to address the humanitarian, economic and other implications of arms transfers, security assistance, and weapons use. "U.S. Arms Sales Under Review" )

In a significant reversal from the Trump administration, President Joe Biden said that the United States would end its support for “offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales.” His announcement came a week after Secretary of State Antony Blinken indicated that the administration was pausing recent arms sales in order to review them, putting in question the fate of billions of dollars of Trump-era deals with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › AT: DIB Adv---1NC

Arm sales not key to the DIB

Eugene Gholz, 2019 Associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, and he was awarded the US Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal for his service as senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, “Conventional Arms Transfers and US Economic Security” https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-1/Gholz.pdf

Conventional arms transfers can have separate, microeconomic effects of interest to a discussion of economic security, including effects on innovation and manufacturing highlighted in the Presidential Memorandum. The defense industry is not like a normal commercial industry, where corporations use retained earnings from their past sales—or borrowing from investors, who expect to be repaid from future sales revenue—to invest in research and development.18 Innovation in the defense industry is mostly supported by direct government research and development (R&D) contracts. That is, the DOD customer directs the trajectory of innovation and pays for specific R&D effort. Another fraction of total defense R&D comes from companies’ Independent Research and Development (IR&D) expenditures, reimbursed by the government as part of the overhead cost of other government-funded defense projects. IR&D spending is company directed, but it is also paid for by the DOD customer, not drawn from the company’s retained earnings. As a result, general increases in defense firms’ profitability—which might stem from arms sales approved under the CAT policy—do not generally have much effect on defense innovation at the systems level. However, many suppliers in the defense supply chain operate on commercial terms, and for them, the general added revenues from expanded defense sales contribute to the retained earnings that support their R&D investment.19 Thus, at the supplier level, arms sales can contribute to US innovation. However, generally, the suppliers are less visible, as are the innovations they might choose to invest in with the marginal dollar of income. Due to that lack of visibility, it would be difficult for an economic assessment, as part of the CAT approval process, to give much weight to the potential innovation-related investments by commercial firms at lower tiers of the defense supply chain

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › AT: Turkey – 2NC

Turkey is actively working to help Russia and Iran, against US interests

Rubin 21 - is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (Michael Rubin, “To Use Turkey as a Bulwark Against Russia and Iran Is Wishful Thinking,” July 12 2021,

For decades, Turkey was a staunch Cold War ally. One of only two NATO members to border the Soviet Union, Turkey went above and beyond in its partnership with the United States: Turkey contributed more men under arms to NATO than Germany and France combined. Turkey subsequently joined the Baghdad Pact and Turks fought alongside the United States in the Korean War. Behind the scenes, Turkey proved crucial to numerous intelligence and counter-terror operations. With the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations remained strong, at least until the rise of Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Slowly but deliberately, Erdoğan turned away from the West. He picked fights like a master tactician, confident that he could find former ambassadors and others in the State Department, White House, or pay-to-play think tanks. He artfully played and rewarded those inclined to apologize for any Turkish outrage or desperate to preserve the alliance. The frequency of U.S. elections and new U.S. administrations—at least in comparison to the last two decades in Turkey—meant Erdoğan could always find an American official eager for a reset. Often, those seeking to promote rapprochement with Turkey argue that repairing the relationship is necessary given the broader strategic imperative of checking Russia’s and Iran’s geopolitical ambitions. The idea that Turkey can be a bulwark against either is magical thinking. It rests upon an embrace of an Istanbul bubble not representative of broader Turkish thinking, a wholescale embrace of the notion that Turkey’s depiction of its enemies and its narrative of history is accurate, and an anachronistic idea that Turkey has not changed over the decades. The idea that it is possible to ignore the ideology and volatility in Erdoğan is analogous to embracing Iranian reformists in the hope that they will somehow nullify the influence of the supreme leader. Likewise, to believe that nearly two decades of Erdoğanism has not changed Turkish society is to believe that twenty years of Khomeinism did not change Iran. Both are foolish delusions. Consider, for example, the notion that Turkey checks Russia’s interests. In May 2010, Russia and Turkey signed energy cooperation agreements to give Turkey its first nuclear power plant, with help from Russian energy companies. Earlier this year, Russian president Vladimir Putin and Erdoğan jointly celebrated the start of the construction of the new Akkuyu power plant. Such cooperation has become the rule rather than the exception. Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia has made headlines not because it represents a lucrative contract for Russia, but because the integration of S-400s into Turkey’s air defense would require compromising NATO electronics and computer codes to Russian engineers. Even if Turkey kept the S-400s on a separate system, they might be used to track and gather data on NATO air platforms. In 2016, the two counties signed an agreement on the TurkStream gas pipeline and, on January 8, 2020, they launched the pipeline. To suggest Germany’s pursuit of Nord Stream 2 is pro-Putin (it is) but, by omission, bless Turkey’s involvement in the TurkStream pipeline defies logic. Syria has become a flashpoint for Turkey’s Islamist ambitions. The reason why American officials from both parties ignore Turkish complaints about U.S. partnership with pro-PKK groups is not because of some conspiracy to promote Russian or Iranian interest as some suggest, but rather because Turkey’s partnership with the Islamic State forced that cooperation in the first place. Given how Turkey and Russia often appear on separate sides in the Syria conflict, it might be possible to argue that Turkey’s involvement checks Russian ambitions. The problem, however, is that Turkey’s approach to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is inconsistent. In May 2007, the PKK derailed a train in Turkey that was carrying rocket launchers, mortar shells, and light arms to Syria, likely destined to Hezbollah. For example, in 2008 and 2009 Erdoğan was hosting joint cabinet meetings with Assad and vacationing with the Syrian dictator on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Certainly, the Syrian civil war changed perspectives but, on January 24, 2017, Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement to establish de-escalation zones and essentially cooperate to create spheres of influence in Syria. Damascus and Ankara replicated the same model in Libya and in Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Officials in both Armenia and Artsakh—as the self-styled Armenian state in Nagorno-Karabakh calls itself—openly speculate that Turkey traded influence in Idlib to Russia in exchange for the Kremlin agreeing to greater Turkish involvement in the South Caucasus. It is true that Turkey’s relationship with Russia has not always gone smoothly. In October 2012, Turkey forced a Syrian passenger plane to land, accusing it of carrying Russian munitions leading Russian officials to accuse Turkey of endangering Russian passengers. Three years later, Turkey shot down a Russian military jet close to the Syrian border. Putin called the move a “stab in the back.” Russia suspended military contracts, instituted a travel ban against Turkey, and implemented sanctions in response. After Erdoğan apologized, however, Russo-Turkish relations resumed where they had left off. Erdoğan’s use of the Gülen bogeyman to deflect blame from the consequences from his own policy choices proved useful in papering over other crises, such as when an off-duty Turkish police officer assassinated the Russian ambassador to Turkey. Certainly, tensions remain and the Kremlin is not afraid to play hardball with Erdoğan but whether out of ideological symbiosis or trade, neither Erdoğan nor Putin appears willing to break their embrace. The two leaders have met nearly two dozen times in either Turkey or Russia since 2012, and that figure does not include phone calls, video conferences, or mutual attendance at multiparty summits in third countries. Nor does it factor in Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan’s frequent travels to Moscow. The money at stake is significant. In 2019, Turkey’s exports to Russia totaled $4.15 billion, and Russian exports to Turkey were five times that amount. It is likewise farcical to believe Turkey can be a bulwark against Iranian influence. When, in 2010, Erdoğan appointed Fidan to be his intelligence chief, alarm bells sounded in Western capitals where his Western counterparts knew him as an Iran sympathizer if not an asset. To couch a renewed Turkish alliance as good for Israel or Jews is absurd. Fidan not only personally supervised efforts to unravel Turkey-Israel ties but also ordered Turkish intelligence actively to monitor Jews. He killed two birds with one stone when he allegedly exposed an Israeli spy ring targeting Iran’s nuclear program and has also betrayed intelligence to Hamas and China. Under Fidan, Turkey also endangered American forces by exposing the locations and supplies of U.S. forces operating in Syria. To suggest, in each case, that Turkey is simply acting in pique toward some sleight or following its own interests misses the point. Strong allies share not only short-term interests but also a broader ideological base. This has been the key to ensuring the stability of the post–World War II liberal order. The Turkish government, however, no longer shares common values with the United States or the West. Nor after two decades bombarded by vile anti-Western, anti-Semitic propaganda does a Turkish public, at least that beyond a few central Istanbul neighborhoods, some more cosmopolitan areas in Ankara, and the Mediterranean coast. Forty percent of the Turkish population has lived the entirety of their conscious lives under Erdoğan’s domination. To excuse Erdoğan as transactional is equally bizarre. In times of crises, allies do not seek to engage both sides in a bidding war for Turkey’s affection but that is at best what Erdoğan now tries to do. Turkey is skilled at caviar diplomacy; I know. While I never solicited nor received Turkish money (or that of any other foreign state), I was a frequent guest at Turkish conferences until the Erdoğan regime grew frustrated with both my refusal to promote its party line and my willingness to talk directly in the spirit of independent research to those it deemed enemies. Turkey continues to throw out the red carpet for those who amplify its narrative and offers golden parachutes for diplomats who amplify Turkish interests. Conversely, it restricts access to academics and policy analysts who do not tow its party line. Such enticement, however, is not only intellectually dishonest but also makes for buffoonish policy prescriptions, the notion that Turkey today can be a bulwark against Russia and Iran chief among them.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › AT: Turkey – 1NC

The alliance is over. Any benefit to Turkish membership is long-dead. Kicking them out just formalizes it.

GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,”

As such, many claim that ousting Ankara from NATO is an option to be seriously considered. In principle, this raises costs in the form of losing a powerful partner in a strategic position, but in practice the problem may be less serious than it appears. The assets currently based on Turkish territory can be moved to more trustworthy partners, even though this would have some operational consequences. Most importantly, Turkey’s own uncooperative, if not outright abrasive, attitude already offsets the advantages its membership is supposed to bring. At the same time, expelling Turkey would allow the Organization and its members to simply counter Ankara whenever the latter’s actions go against its common interests, and NATO would be freed from any obligation to protect an untrustworthy ally that does little to promote the common interest and often acts openly against it in a manner that undermines NATO’s cohesion and policies. As such, Ankara’s exit from NATO would put an end to the numerous problems linked to its membership. And, arguably, it’s the Turkish government itself that is choosing this path. Ankara’s recent tilts toward rival powers like Russia and Iran seems to indicate that it is already drifting away from its trans-Atlantic commitments; therefore, expelling the country from NATO would simply make official the de facto break-up that Turkey has been actively seeking over the past decade.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC – AT: Hybrid War

In fact, it failed in 2014.

Kofman 16 – Michael Kofman, an analyst at the CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, formerly Program Manager at National Defense University. [Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts, 3-11-2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/]//BPS

By August 24, the hybrid approach had demonstrably failed in the vein of previous efforts. Moscow traded it in for a conventional invasion by regular Russian units, which it had sought to avoid. The invasion in August of 2014 marked the transition to conventional war as the deciding approach, but with limited political and territorial objectives. Russian forces defeated Ukraine’s army in the field, but more importantly they demonstrated the ineffectiveness of a hybrid approach in achieving political objectives. In subsequent months, hybrid approaches did not disappear from the battlefield, but they were of little consequence compared to Russian conventional forces. If Russia doesn’t do hybrid, then what? Ukraine was decided by large-caliber artillery, MLRS systems, and tanks; not innovative hybrid approaches. Upon review, we should file Ukraine as a case study in the failure of hybrid warfare to achieve desired political ends. If it could not be accomplished there, given the country’s political and military weakness at the time, why do we think Moscow can succeed elsewhere? Is there an example of Russia using anything other than conventional war to successfully achieve its political objectives, be they in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, or Syria? The mythology of Russian hybrid warfare stands in stark contrast to the historical track record of how Russia uses military power to achieve desired political ends at home and abroad. Simply put, what Russia does best is conventional war, and if a conflict does not start that way, it is how it always ends. In analyzing the presence of hybrid approaches in this conflict, the West has broadly confused Russian activity for achievement. Let’s talk less about what Russia tries and more about how Russia wins.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC – AT: Hybrid War

Russian hybrid war is treated as a dark art, BUT it’s barely a magic trick.

Kofman 16 – Michael Kofman, an analyst at the CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, formerly Program Manager at National Defense University. [Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts, 3-11-2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/]//BPS

In trying to separate hybrid warfare from the classical bins of conventional or irregular war, I prefer to use Frank Hoffman’s definition, “a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to obtain [a group’s] political objectives.” There are other definitions out there, but you will find they are not being applied correctly to analysis of Russian tactics. Unfortunately, what Russian hybrid warfare is, and how it works, varies dramatically depending on what article, report, or PowerPoint brief you are reading. The more we have talked about it, the less we understand it as a useful concept or framework for looking at Russian actions. What’s wrong with a little hybrid warfare? If you torture hybrid warfare long enough it will tell you anything, and torture it we have. The term now covers every type of discernible Russian activity, from propaganda to conventional warfare, and most that exists in between. What exactly does Russian hybrid warfare do, and how does it work? The short answer in the Russia-watcher community is everything. The church of Russian hybrid warfare has a broad and influential following these days, but finds few worshippers among experts who study the Russian military. There’s a reason for that: Many don’t believe it exists as described. I’m not the first to point out the problems with applying this lens to Russian tactics , and I have criticized it elsewhere, but in this piece I hope to offer a fresh perspective on why the national security establishment continues to do itself a disservice by thinking about Russia through a hybrid warfare lens.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC – AT: Hybrid War

Statistically proven to be meaningless.

Caliskan & Cramers 18 – Murat Caliskan, international relations PhD Candidate at Universite Catholique de Louvain and Senior Research Fellow at Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies, retired in 2016 after serving more than 20 years in the Turkish Army as a military officer, & Paul Alexander Cramers, international security and defence Master student at Institut Libre d’Etude des Relations Internationales [What Do You Mean by “Hybrid Warfare”? A Content Analysis on the Media Coverage of Hybrid Warfare Concept, Horizon Insights, https://www.academia.edu/38008898/What_Do_You_Mean_by_Hybrid_Warfare_A_Content_Analysis_on_the_Media_Coverage_of_Hybrid_Warfare_Concept]//BPS

The results show that in only 20 (30%) media items, the term “hybrid warfare” is used correctly and in accordance with its true definition. In other items, when the authors used the term “hybrid warfare”, they were implying other types of warfare such as “information warfare” in 18 (27%) items, “political warfare” in 14 (21%) items, “unconventional warfare” in 5 (6%) items. The results clearly demonstrate that hybrid warfare is an ambiguous concept and is not clearly understood by different stakeholders in defense community. In other words, there is not an agreed definition or understanding. Most of the time (70%), the authors imply another concept when they use hybrid warfare.10 These results suggest two potential reasons for the miscommunication. It is either because the authors have insufficient knowledge on military concepts or the concept is too weak ambiguous to explain current events that the authors imply different meanings. We believe that both options are valid. For instance, hybrid warfare is confused with political warfare in 14 media items, which is understandable as there is a similarity between two terms. Although it is author’s responsibility to know the difference between two terms, big part of the problem stems from the broadness of the term. Hybrid concept has such an inclusive definition that it allows authors to label any conflict as hybrid warfare even when the conflict in question includes only some part of the all characteristics. However, mistaking hybrid warfare for information warfare is a clear indication of the authors’ lack of knowledge on military concepts as there is a clear difference between two terms. Table 3- The Results of “author”, “media type” and “country” categories As it is shown in Table-3, there is no meaningful difference between academics and journalists in their capacity to use the term in its proper meaning. In both groups, only 29% of the population uses the term correctly, which is very close to the general average (30%). This ratio is even less in other groups, namely in experts or officials (11%-14%). Similarly, media types also do not suggest a meaningful difference in terms of correct use of the term. It is likely to infer in-depth implications if the sample size is enlarged. But current numbers do not suggest any implication. But as it stands for now, current numbers do not suggest any implication between the degree of expertise of the author and the correctness of the use of the term “hybrid warfare”.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 1NC – AT: Hybrid War

Hybrid war is meaningless and exaggerated.

Caliskan 17 – Murat Caliskan, international relations PhD Candidate at Universite Catholique de Louvain and Senior Research Fellow at Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies, retired in 2016 after serving more than 20 years in the Turkish Army as a military officer. [A Critique of Hybrid Warfare in the Light of Russia-Ukraine Crisis and Military Strategy, 5-27-2017, https://www.behorizon.org/a-critique-of-hybrid-warfare/]//BPS

Another flaw in the Hybrid warfare concept is that it attributes too much power to the enemy. A hybrid threat becomes an enemy almost with mystical powers (Cox et al., 2012). As it is indicated in the definition, a hybrid threat, which is a state or non-state, could employ conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal activities simultaneously, even by the same unit. This argument could be admitted for a state actor like Russia to some extent, but for non-state actors like ISIL and Hezbollah, it is hard to imagine. If they could have this ability, they would not apply suicide missions. Almost every Russian action is interpreted as part of a well-coordinated “hybrid warfare” campaign. This approach gives the Russian leadership an unrealistic degree of strategic prowess. Renz (2016) successfully points to the similarities between today and 1960s by quoting the following text from John F. Kennedy’s speech. We are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence – on intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day. It is a system which has conscripted vast human and material resources into the building of a tightly knit, highly efficient machine that combines military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and political operations. (Kennedy, 1961) Bear in mind that what Kennedy implies in his speech was the Soviets. It is interesting to see the similarities of enemy’s capabilities referred such as “covert means”, “intimidation”, “combining military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and political operations”. Today’s strategic prowess, Russia is also frequently referred to have covert means and to conduct combined military and non-military operations. A deeper problem with the concept is that it is more about tactics than strategy. Strategic thinking must include not only the capabilities of forces but also the characters of forces. Professional armies do “estimate of situation” formally for over a century and it includes mission, friendly forces, terrain, weather, technologies and enemy. Estimation of just enemy includes strength, intentions, morale, technologies and tactical capabilities Strategy, as it has been already implemented by armies, should cover, at a minimum, all the factors in the “estimate of situation. “Hybrid warfare instead, focuses on just the tactical capabilities of enemy, which disconnects from the enemy itself. Within this line of thinking, so many pet theories have been crammed into the military literature that it becomes nearly impossible to make a clear strategic thinking for anybody who adheres to the concepts like hybrid warfare (Cox et al., 2012). Renz argue that hybrid warfare gained such a popularity that it became a concept counterproductive to decision making and strategic thought. It might be useful to highlight Russia’s new approach in Crimea, when compared to its less successful operations in Chechnya and Georgia, which were characterized by excessive use of force, outdated equipment and lack of coordination. However, it is not true to jump to the conclusion that Russia had found a ‘new art of war’ that made up for its shortcomings in conventional capabilities and posed a significant threat to the West. (Renz, 2016) Hybrid war term blurs the distinctions within war, but it has the fatal risk of becoming another category, as it happened by Revolution in Military Affairs, an answer rather than the basis for questions. (Strachan, 2009) Every war is unique and requires its own logic. It is impossible to conduct the same strategy at every war. If we stick to a standard description (like hybrid warfare), we might have difficulty in understanding the character of war and the potential for change as each war is waged. It would not work for Russia elsewhere to use the same strategy she used in Crimea. Echevarria resembles “hybrid warfare” to “blietzkrieg” of 1940s, a label that was never an official term in German Military Doctrine, but polished by media and commentators. In fact, what makes Germans successful in 1940s and Russians in 2014-2015 was not to create new conceptions of war, what makes them successful was conducting the main principles of war; recognizing their enemies correctly, then developing campaign plans that avoiding the strengths and exploiting the weaknesses of adversaries. (Echevarria, 2016) Although Hoffman states that his concept is consistent with the strategic theory, few analysts based their conclusions on Hoffmann’s specific understanding of the term and referred loosely to the general idea of ‘hybridity’. This resulted in widely varying understandings on what exactly hybrid warfare is. Analysts sometimes refer hybrid warfare to imply the complexity war, while sometimes just to note irregular activities in the war.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Entrapment

Entrapment is wrong – keeping conditions vaguer solves.

Rapp-Hooper 20 – Mira Rapp-Hooper, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center. [Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, Harvard University Press, ProQuest Ebook Central]//BPS

If America’s Cold War alliances involved serious entrapment costs, the historical record would include cases in which the United States had been dragged into conflicts and crises despite having no direct stake in them. There are few such cases. American allies have proven no more likely to become engaged in conflicts with adversaries than are other states, suggesting that US security guarantees have not provoked adventurism.13

True, during the Cold War, the United States faced serious national security challenges in allied territory, including the Berlin Crisis and the Taiwan Straits Crises. But as we saw in Chapter 2, the strong US stand over Berlin was not a product of beneficent obligation to West Germany; US policymakers saw US national interests at stake. Alliance with Bonn helped to make the US commitment to West Germany more credible, but it did not entangle the country in an uninvited fracas. Likewise during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, Washington had an independent interest in averting a conflict between Taipei and Beijing; it was not simply ensnared in an ally’s woes.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Entrapment

That’s empirically and theoretically true.

Kim 11 – Tongfi Kim, Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy. [Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States, Security Studies, 20(3), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143890586.pdf]//BPS

This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. While alliances deter aggression, they are also considered to be a contagion mechanism for war expansion.3 The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment—“being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interest that one does not share”—is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners.4 There is, however, little accumulation of knowledge on the phenomenon of entrapment, and contractual aspects of alliances in the current literature are reduced to the issue of commitment as a solution to the danger of abandonment, a concept often coupled with entrapment.5

Theorists as well as policy makers talk about the danger of entrapment, but strangely, it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. My explanation is two-fold: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests. Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and either do not form alliances when it would be a problem or demand escape clauses to minimize the problem, though only to the extent that they can afford to refrain from such alliances. Several conceptual problems have made entrapment difficult to even observe. Most problematically, alliance literature currently has at least two types of entrapment – what I call entanglement and entrapment – without establishing explicit analytical criteria for the phenomenon. I argue that the literature’s use of the term “entrapment” is a mislabeling of the issue and that we need to distinguish among phenomena loosely explained by the term. The risk of entanglement (or entrapment broadly defined) is a necessary component of all military alliances, but states do not have to accept the risk of entrapment narrowly defined when entering alliances. My arguments and findings are intuitive, but they have important theoretical and policy implications on the issue of how states avoid undesirable military involvement in their allies’ conflicts. By explaining how to observe entrapment analytically, this paper also illuminates the reason why entrapment is rare and yet not an illusory concept.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Entrapment

Alliance commitments solve entrapment.

Cohen 18 – Jordan Cohen, Political Science PhD student at George Mason University. [Alliances Are a Net Gain, Not a Loss, for America, 6-28-2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/alliances-are-net-gain-not-loss-america-24562]//BPS

Furthermore, because of Washington’s dominant position in its alliance hierarchies, it can effectively restrain its allies from great conflicts. Smaller countries that do not want to increase their security risk will not engage in wars that their stronger allies wish to avoid. These small countries see a security benefit from great power alliances, and the former is subservient to the latter. For example, in Asia after World War II, Washington restrained South Korea from attacking North Korea and Taiwan from fighting China via threats to reduce American military and economic support. Moreover, the United States threatened to end its arms sales to Iran, thus forcing Tehran to avoid joining the 1973 oil embargo. Accordingly, America’s alliances provide it leverage that increases its immediate security and decrease global conflict.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 1NC -- AT: Entrapment

NATO isn’t entrapping – their explanation is endogenous which means the aff could never solve

Lanoszka 17 – Alexander Lanoszka, International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo. [Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Contemporary Security Policy, 39(2), December 2017, Taylor & Francis]//BPS

Critics charge that NATO has been reckless in its outreach to countries like Georgia and Ukraine. In so doing, it has encouraged those countries to behave more aggressive towards Russia, risking war in such a way that implicates NATO members against their own interests. The dangers of entrapment abound.

This article analyzes the different causal pathways and variables that scholars have invoked to describe how entrapment risks arise. According to the international relations literature, four broad sources of risk exist. The strength of the commitment given to the ally—actual or potential—is an institutional source. The greater the commitment, the more perverse incentives it creates for the ally to behave recklessly. System polarity and the offense-defense balance are systemic factors insofar as no one country can manipulate them. Multipolarity raises the value of allies for maintaining the balance of power, whereas the offense-defense balance affects how a defender might manage its ties with its ally. Reputational sources of risk arise when an ally exploits the defender’s interest to defend its commitments for intrinsic reasons. Finally, entrapment risks can have ideological sources: An ally strategically appeals to the ideological prejudices of its defender, thereby reshaping the defender’s own sense of strategic interests on favorable terms. Some of these arguments regarding how entrapment unfolds have already been subject to criticism on empirical and logical grounds. Besides organizing these arguments typologically, I demonstrate how uncovering clear evidence of entrapment is a difficult enterprise, even when the theories themselves seem straightforward.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Risk-Taking

Russia is cost-averse.

Frederick et al. 17 – Bryan Frederick, Political Science PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Matthew Povlock. Stephen Watts, Government PhD from Cornell University, formerly in the State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Miranda Priebe, Political Science PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Edward Geist, History PhD from the University of North Carolina. [Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1879.html?adbsc=social_20171018_1878401&adbid=920665026620301317&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453]//BPS

• Cost sensitivity of current Russian leadership. Although Russian actions since 2014, and arguably since 2008, have shown an increasing willingness to take calculated risks to achieve strategic goals, these actions have all had very limited military costs. Russian campaigns in Ukraine and Syria exceeded in scope what most analysts would previously have considered likely, but they have remained militarily limited affairs and have targeted adversaries with capabilities clearly inferior to Russia’s. Indeed, Russian assistance to rebels in eastern Ukraine appears to have been gradually calibrated to give enough assistance to stave off defeat, but little more. Where Russia has been willing to accept large costs is in the economic realm, where Western sanctions have limited Moscow’s ability to cope with and respond to the decline in the price of hydrocarbons, harming the Russian economy. Militarily, however, Russia has yet to risk substantial resources in any of its aggressive actions.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 1NC -- AT: Risk-Taking

Russia won’t pass redlines.

Frederick et al. 17 – Bryan Frederick, Political Science PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Matthew Povlock. Stephen Watts, Government PhD from Cornell University, formerly in the State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Miranda Priebe, Political Science PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Edward Geist, History PhD from the University of North Carolina. [Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1879.html?adbsc=social_20171018_1878401&adbid=920665026620301317&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453]//BPS

Furthermore, there is currently little evidence that Russia is interested in a direct military conflict with the United States. Russia does not appear to count any current NATO territory, including the Baltic States, within the sphere where it is willing to use force to preserve its influence. Although Russia has used military force in post-Soviet states over the past two decades and has conducted numerous lower-level provocations involving NATO allies (including limited cyber attacks), it has taken no actions that approach announced U.S. or NATO redlines for invoking Article 5. Moreover, in the operations that Russia has undertaken, such as in Ukraine, Russia’s behavior appears to have been highly sensitive to military costs. A direct attack on a NATO member in response to posture enhancements currently in progress would represent a level of cost and risk acceptance that has no precedence in prior Russian behavior. Further enhancements could send a stronger signal of U.S. and NATO willingness to defend Alliance members and could alter Russian calculations regarding what immediate military aims it could achieve through aggression, but under current strategic and Russian domestic conditions, such benefits are likely to be marginal.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Invasion (Narva)

No Russian invasion

Coffey 2015 - research fellow specialising in transatlantic and Eurasian security Luke, "Why Narva is probably not next on Russia’s list," Apr 20, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/4/20/why-narva-is-probably-not-next-on-russias-list/

While Narva might look like low hanging fruit for Russia, there are four very good reasons why it will probably not be the next place for a Russian invasion.

Out of the three so-called “Baltic Tigers”, Estonia is the economic leader. The country bucked the trend of economic decline in the eurozone during the recent financial crisis. Estonia ranked eighth in the world for economic freedom in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal’s 2015 Index of Economic Freedom. The country oozes with enterprise and creativity – it is, after all, the birthplace of Skype. It is true that ethnic Russians living in Estonia do not do as well economically as their ethnic Estonian counterparts, but the gap is slowing closing.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Invasion

They won’t invade and it would fail.

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” ; RP]

Between February and April 2014, the Russian General Staff demonstrated its competence in deploying a force of roughly  on Ukraine’s borders and dispersing it over the course of several weeks. There are lessons to be learned from the Russian war in Ukraine, but we should take great care in extrapolating them to a hypothetical high-end fight in the Baltics between Russia and NATO. In contrast to Ukraine, it is unlikely that Russia would invade NATO as a response to an unexpected contingency with little more than an ad hoc grouping of battalion tactical groups. It is equally unlikely that an ad hoc grouping of Russian battalions — the army RAND built — would easily invade and occupy the Baltics, which have been working quite hard on conscription and mobilization to make themselves difficult to digest in such a scenario.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage One › 2NC -- AT: Invasion

Empirically disproven.

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” ; RP]

Yet much of this discussion, , strikes me as conventional wisdom. Frankly, it’s much easier to adjust the narrative on the Russian threat for a policy prescription than it is to determine the right U.S. force posture to address the Russian threat. When did NATO lose its deterrence, and if it’s gone, why have the Russians not invaded all these years? These mysteries suggest there are still large blind spots in the “reinforce deterrence” debate. The reason is that these arguments rest on a contrived vision of Russia and one version of a high-end fight in the Baltics.