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2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Inevitability of Violence

Claiming violence is inevitable is what justifies the logic of “the worse of two evils” and necessitates a security state to protect against such violence.

Wright ’10 (Susan is Research Scientist in History of Science and International Relations in the Institute for Research on Women and Gender at the University of Michigan. “10 Feminist theory and arms control.” In Gender and International Security. Pg. 206-207. 2010.)-GirlsDebate

Bull and Schelling justify the use of “power over” states that are treated as adversaries, or potential adversaries, in several ways. First, violence in the state system, and therefore the need to defend against it, are taken as given. As Bull wrote: It is true that strategists take the fact of military force as their starting point … The capacity for organized violence between states is inherent in the nature of man and the environment. The most that can be expected from a total disarmament agreement is that it might make armaments and armed forces fewer and more primitive.75 This claim of the inevitability of violence and the consequent need for military protection have been extensively analyzed by feminist theorists. If violence is inevitable, then someone or something is required to defend against it. Jean Elshtain, Laura Sjoberg, and other feminist theorists have demonstrated the pervasive tradition of western political thought that claims that the inevitability of violence calls for the services of a Just Warrior (representing variously the state military apparatus or the soldier) who is “engaged in the regrettable but sometimes necessary task of collective violence in order to prevent some greater wrong” to the Beautiful Soul, representing variously patria or the homeland or innocent civilians.76 Bull’s political philosophy falls completely within this tradition.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Gendered Language

Their ______ evidence uncritically uses gendered language, which is a reason to reject their argument entirely. Gendered language discourages women to enter the field of IR and naturalizes patriarchal norms.

Mendenhall 15

(Beth, 2-26-25, Elizabeth Mendenhall is a PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins University, working with Daniel Deudney on a dissertation about the challenge of scientific and technological change for global commons regimes., THE BADASS HERSELF, , , JKS)

“Gendered language” refers to words that carry unnecessary masculine connotations, but are purportedly gender-neutral according to users and dictionaries. But the intention of the speaker and the denotation of a word that is received and internalized by listeners. Research in psychology suggests that word choice influences our and , such that gendered language actually reinforces patriarchal attitudes about is qualified or expected to be a “congressman” or “statesman.” In other words, the connotation shapes the meaning of words, which shapes our understanding of concepts. Many gendered words, like “mankind,” have perfectly good alternatives that eschew any reference to gender, like “humankind” or “humanity.” These linguistic options, in addition to the in the social sciences, present a puzzle for IR: why are so many IR academics still using gendered language, when they don’t have to, and when they should know better? The list of gendered IR terms is long: “statesman,” “brinksmanship,” “man-made,” “mankind,” “manning,” and “manpower” are some of the most common. As a young woman pursuing a career in mainstream IR, and with an interest in security studies, these words add insult to the injury of seeing panels, syllabi, and the dominated by men. These discouragements to women entering a male-dominated field are often overlooked because they are psychological. Being one of few women in an ISA panel makes one feel highly visible at best, and unwelcome at worst. Gendered language sends the message that I am not expected to be a foreign policymaker (because authors choose “statesman”) or the chair of a committee (because authors choose “chairman”). These kinds of daily exclusions weigh on my psyche. I am often told, in response to such complaints, that I should take a class, attend a panel, or contact a scholar who works on Feminist IR theory. I am a materialist, a theorist of geopolitics. I should not have to change my scholarly interest in order to find an inclusive community. No subject or topic is inherently male-dominated, so there must be something discouraging women from pursuing the most masculinized areas of study. It is the responsibility of all IR scholars to help identify and extirpate the reasons young women are deterred from particular topics. The best places to look are those where we make active choices, choices that can be re-thought and re-directed to neutralize the highly gendered spaces we create with our words and actions. Replacing “man-made” with “anthropogenic,” or coining “brinkship” to replace “brinksmanship,” will not solve the gender problem in International Relations, but it will increase the visibility of . What we read reinforces what we see, and what we write . I do not see myself in most of the texts that I study and engage with. I do not see people who look like me on the Presidential Theme Panels at the ISA. Affirmative action in admissions, hiring, and panel placement can only do so much because there is problem of “self selection.” We need to seriously consider the idea that women select their field at least partially because of the “man-made” social environment that surrounds it. My power is not “manpower,” but it is just as strong.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Econ

Reducing life to existing economic markers disavows the really-existing labor such as care and nurturing which aren’t given an economic valuation. Such a masculine measure of economics epistemically guarantees their predictions are false while sustaining exploitation and violence against women.

Roberts 15

(Adrienne Roberts is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Manchester. (2015) Gender, Financial Deepening and the Production of Embodied Finance: Towards a Critical Feminist Analysis, Global Society, 29:1, 107-127, DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2014.975189, JKS)

Theorising Finance as Gendered and Embodied The centrality of bodies to economic processes is a basic ontological premise that underpins the great majority of feminist economics and feminist International Political Economy (IPE), though this is often implicit rather than explicit. Drawing on fem- inist and historical materialist scholarship, we can identify three theoretical entry points, or premises, that are useful for thinking about both the inherently embodied nature of finance and the specific ways in which TBF agendas work to produce, or at times to disappear, bodies. The first premise is that all economies, including financial economies, are constituted by productive and reproductive labour, including the labour associated with biological reproduction. Insofar as many of the projects associ- ated with TBF remove from view the vast amounts of labour linked to social reproduction, they intensify the demands placed on women as workers and nurturers. The second premise is that we are witnessing the increasing “financialisation of social reproduction”, which is contributing to the commodification of women’s bodily capacities as they are projected as “untapped resources” in need of exploitation by (Western) capital. The third premise is that financial deepening contributes to the differential production of bodies, which includes the production of differences between bodies that stem from the differential valuation of their labour (the valuation of paid above unpaid, productive above reproductive, etc.). The production of differ- ence also takes shape here through processes that work to ostensibly erase the bodies of financial consumers in the Global North (i.e. through “abstract” assessments of risk) while actively producing financial consumers in the Global South as “people of the body” who make good investments precisely because of their association with maternalism. I will elaborate each of these in turn. (1) Economies are constituted by productive and reproductive labour, including the labour associated with biological reproduction. The first theoretical entry point is based on the observation first made by socialist feminists in the 1970s and 1980s that the economy is constituted by the social relations of labour that are involved in the production and exchange of commod- ities and the meeting of human needs on a daily and generational basis.8 These latter forms of labour are now more commonly described as “social reproduction”, which has a distinctly embodied dimension as it includes the work associated with: (a) biological reproduction (including social constructions of motherhood); (b) the reproduction, socialisation and education of the labour force; and (c) the reproduc- tion and provisioning of care.9 This work is linked to historically specific ideals regarding the gendered division of labour that feminise the (paid and unpaid) work of social reproduction and contribute to its devaluation.10 Given that finance is deeply connected to other forms of production and exchange, it should also be seen as structurally linked to labouring bodies, as well as to the mothering and caring bodies that together perform the productive and reproductive labour underpinning accumulation in capitalist societies. Most mainstream economics would reject this view of finance, as finance tends to be treated as an objective (and pseudo-scientific) tool that is used to allocate assets and liabilities across time. Bodies, as bearers of productive and reproductive labour, do not generally appear at all, though an abstract figure of homo oeconomicus does figure into the analysis. In this andocentric model, homo oeconomicus is presumed to represent all people, appearing as both disembodied and socially disembedded. Feminist economists have called this the “separative-self model”, as it abstracts the utility-maximizing rational actor away from all other social forms and leaves little to no room for considering non-maximizing behaviour and motivations (i.e., love, nurture, altruism, etc.).11 Yet, in the process of removing the material body from economic analysis, it simultaneously works to devalue the bodies of those tradition- ally associated with “non-rational” and “emotional” behaviour, which have historically included the poor, women and non-European “others”.12 What is particularly interesting when using this lens to look at the gender dis- courses of TBF is that while it tends to adhere to a neoclassical view of markets as coordinating mechanisms that are fundamentally disembodied and gender- neutral, it also draws on a historically constructed view of female economic actors as mothering and nurturing. That is, the body reappears here as women’s higher aversion to risk and greater likelihood to invest in their children is natura- lised, and implicitly linked to their (socio-)biological role as mothers. Yet, as I will further evidence in the third section, this does not lead the proponents of TBF to see markets as inherently gendered, but rather, gender continues to be externalised from broader economic processes. (2) The “financialisation of social reproduction” is rendering women’s bodies particularly susceptible to processes of commodification and exploitation A second theoretical entry point for thinking about the relationship between finance, gender and bodies has been opened up by recent writing on what we might refer to as “the financialisation of social reproduction”, by which I mean the mediation of social reproduction through financial markets and interest- paying financial transactions.13 For instance, it has been well documented in the academic and policy literature that finance has become increasingly important in mediating the social relations of housing (i.e. through privatised and securitised mortgage financing), forms of consumption (i.e. by using credit cards to pay for food), education (i.e. though student loans and, in the US, loans to pay for all levels of schooling), security in old age (i.e. through the privatisation of pension plans), and so on.14 In one of the clearest theoretical engagements with this trend, Bryan, Martin and Rafferty point out that the linking of financial circuits of accumulation to the reproduction of labour—though interest payments made on credit used to buy the commodities necessary for reproduction and other means—is helping to reconstitute labour as a form of capital.15 Although very little of this literature deploys a gender analysis or uses a frame- work of social reproduction per se, it is important in offering empirical evidence regarding the ways in which social reproduction, which has always been structu- rally linked to the accumulation of capital, is increasingly being structurally linked to finance. Given women’s positioning at the crossroads of production and social reproduction, it is therefore rather unsurprising that women’s bodies are increasingly being framed as “untapped resources” that offer potential profits to financial and other firms.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Warming/Climate Change

GCMs and mainstream climate science are entrenched in masculinity which distorts their conclusions and erases the gendered nature of warming

Nagel 16

(Joane, 2016, Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas, is the author of Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality: Intimate Intersections, Forbidden Frontiers., Gender and Climate Change: Impacts, Science, Policy, Routledge, hardback, JKS)

Gender Critique of Climate Change Science

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Realism

Seriously, our understanding of IR is just more accurate

Sjoberg 12

(Laura, March, Associate Professor of Political Science with a courtesy affiliation in Women’s Studies and Gender Research at the University of Florida. Her research on gender and international security has been published in more than three dozen journals in political science, international rela- tions, and gender studies. She is the author or editor of nine books, most recently, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War (Columbia University Press, 2013) and Gender, War and Conflict (Polity Press, 2014). Dr. Sjoberg is the homebase editor of the International Feminist Journal of Politics and the 2015–2016 Vice President of the International Studies Association, Gender, structure, and war: what Waltz couldn't see, International Theory / Volume 4 / Issue 01 / March 2012, pp 1 – 38, JKS)

One element of a gender-hierarchical international system would be that that assumptions about gender underlie the structure and ordering prin-ciples of the international system and provide commonsense ground for theorizing them. This is an observation consonant with feminist observations of global politics, which have characterized the global political arena as a ‘patriarchal structure of privilege and control’ (Enloe 1993, 70). Others see the global political arena a place where ‘the structure of political communities has assumed gendered forms’ (Steans 2003, 43), and ordered by ‘gender relations [which] structure social power’ (Pettman 1996, 43). These observations are rooted in feminist work which shows gender operating in how political leaders are chosen (Tickner 1992), how state governments work (Peterson 1992), how militaries function (Enloe 1989), and how economic benefit is distributed (Pettman 1996). States have been shown their relative military prowess, judged and asserted their relative power, and demonstrated and adjusted their relative economic status through gendered competition using gendered language (e.g. Cohn 1988). The gender hierarchy in the world ‘out there’ can be read as replicated in the ‘commonsense ground’ or traditional theorizing in IR, which feminist theorists (e.g. Tickner 1988) have characterized as partial at best and unre- presentative at worst because it often analyzes the perspectives and lives of only a small, elite, male portion of the global population. This theme in feminist theorizing in IR suggests that there might be something to the idea that international structures are theorized as gender- neutral because men take their perspectives to represent the human. Feminists have characterized conventional knowledge in IR as problematic because it is constructed only by those in a position of privilege, which affords them only distorted views of the world.14 As such, it has been a crucial part of the feminist project in IR to ‘not only add women but also ask how gender – a structural feature of social life – has been rendered invisible’ by working to ‘distinguish ‘‘reality’’ from the world as men know it’ (Peterson and True 1998, 23). Often, in disciplinary knowledges, ‘gender’ is seen as a proxy for ‘women’ because ‘women’ are perceived to have gender, where men are not. Another element of a gendered international system structure would be that, when it is acknowledged that gender plays a role in global politics, it is often discussed as a corruption of a gender-neutral system rather than a product of a gendered system. For example, work like that of Inglehart and Norris (2002) and Hudson et al. (2009)15 argues that it is states that treat their women the worst that corrupt not only the gender order but the potential for interstate peace, cooperation, and development. This logic is replicated in many discussions of gender in the policy world as well. For example, ‘gender mainstreaming’ agendas (see True and Mintrom 2001; Shepherd 2008) engage in a process of integrating gender concerns into the structures that already exist in governments and organizations. The scenario derived from Acker’s theorizing suggests that when gender sub- ordination is characterized as the exception, rather than the rule, in international political interactions, gender is difficult to see because the masculine is at once assumed and invisible. The recurrent focus in feminist work on the need to ask IR theory ‘where are the women?’ (Enloe 1983) and ‘where is gender?’ (Bell and O’Rourke 2007) suggests that it is plausible that gender is difficult to see in IR because the masculine dominates our visions of the international system. It is important to note that the masculine here involves and implicates, but is not reducible to, men. Waltz ‘tests’ his idea of structure primarily by its predictive power and its indirect manifestations (1986, 72). He argues that, since the anarchical nature of the international system is invisible and thus cannot be directly verified or proven, it must be verified by its manifestations and implica- tions (Waltz 1986, 73). This verification, to Waltz, comes by examining unit function, distribution of capabilities across units, and political pro- cesses of unit interaction. The remainder of this section considers whether there is evidence in those three observable parts of global politics that the international system may be gender-hierarchical. Unit function: does state identity have gendered components? In Waltz’s account, ‘a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units’ where ‘the structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think about the system as a whole’ and ‘the arrangement of units is a property of the system’ (1986, 70, 71). Waltz sees the system as an anarchy, which by definition specifies that units have the same function. Still, Waltz gives a sense of what would be different if the system was a hierarchy, since ‘hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation’ (1986, 87). Calling states ‘like units’ in Waltz’s terms is ‘to say that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit’ (Waltz 1986, 89). Waltz sees states as performing fundamentally similar tasks in similar ways, and argues that the differences between states are in capabilities not in function or task (1986, 91). This section explores two arguments about gender and the function of the units of the international system. First, it argues that gender can be seen as constituting unit ‘function’ in the international system, whether the units are ‘like’ or differentiated. Second, it proposes that gender hierarchy actually differentiates unit function in the international system. The argument that gender constitutes the function of all units in the international system is supported by the degree to which states define their identities (and therefore the tasks of domestic and foreign policy) in gendered ways. A growing literature on ontological security (e.g. Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008) characterizes state identity in terms of ‘sense of self,’ a language that has long been used in feminist accounts of nation and nationalism. Feminists who have worked on nationalism have argued that national identity and gender are inextricably linked, and that ‘all nationalism are gendered, all nationalisms are invented, and all are dangerous’ (McClintock 1993).16 Feminists have shown that gendered imagery is salient in the construction national identities, particularly when, often, women are the essence of, the symbols of, and the reproduction of state and/or national identity (Yuval-Davis 1997; Wilcox 2009). A number of examples illustrate the link between national identity and gender. Feminist studies have demonstrated that gender has been essential to defining state identity in Korea (Moon 1997), modernizing Malaysia (Chin 1998), Bengal (Sen 1993), Indonesia (Sunindyo 1998), Northern Ireland (Porter 1998), South Africa (Meintjes 1998), Lebanon (Schulze 1998), Armenia (Tachjian 2009), and a number of other states. For example, Niva has noted that, during the First Gulf War, the United States’ identity was understood as a ‘tough but tender’ masculinity where it was expected that the United States military would courageously defeat the Iraqi military, but would at the same time rescue the feminine state of Kuwait from the hypermasculine clutches of the Iraqi state (1998). On the other hand, responding to the United States’ and United Nations’ threats of military intervention in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq consistently used gendered references to hypermasculine understandings of state identity (Sjoberg 2006b). Gendered nationalisms, however, do not just arise in conflict situations. Bannerji has noted that Canadian national identities are constructed through ‘race,’ class, gender, and other relations of power, where subordinate classes and ‘races’ are feminized in relation to the dominant image of Canadian identity, not only within the Canadian state but also in Canada’s external projection of nationalist identity (2000, 173). Taylor’s analysis of the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina characterizes identity in the conflict as ‘predicated on the internalization of a rigid hierarchy’ of gender and argues that ‘the struggle, as each group aimed to humiliate, humble, and feminize its other, was about gender’ (1997, 92, 34). A brief look at one example recently used in the literature might further illustrate the point. In his book, Ontological Security in International Relations, Steele (2008) notes that honor and shame shape states’ self- perception of their identities. Contrary to the realist logic that state prioritizes prudence and survival over honor and justice, Steele sees honor as a universal part of state self-identity, where states look for honor even sacrificing physical integrity. To illustrate the role of honor in state self- identity, Steele uses the example of the Belgian choice to fight a losing war against the Germans in 1914 rather than allow Germany access to Belgian territory and avoid the casualties and terror involved in their inevitable defeat. Steele notes that honor was implicated in Belgium’s response to Germany’s ultimatum, given that most policy statements stressed their need to ‘fight for the honor of the flag’ and ‘avenge Belgian honor’ (Steele 2008, 112). Feminist analysis suggests that we cannot understand the role of honor in state self-identity without reference to both masculine and feminine conceptions of honor in the state (Jowkar 1986). Masculine conceptions of honor vary between chivalric and protection-oriented and aggressive and prideful, while feminine conceptions of honor often focus on the purity and innocence of the territory of the state and/or the women and children inside (see Elshtain 1985). Through gender lenses, the Belgian discussion of national honor in 1914 was one where the leaders’ (mas- culine) honor was tied to not giving in to, and even resisting, the would-be violators of the territory’s (feminine) honor, which was tied to purity. The ‘honor’ of the Belgian government then was tied to unwillingness to sacrifice the ‘honor’ of the innocent, neutral, vulnerable, and untouchable identity and position of Belgium vis a vis its neighboring Germany. It is no coincidence that the following attack was referred to as the ‘Rape of Belgium’ (Niarchos 1995). In the ‘Rape of Belgium’ narrative, the German invasion spoiled the feminine elements of Belgian state identity, and emasculated Belgian leaders as protectors of its feminized territory. Survival or prudence cannot account for Belgium’s actions in 1914; in fact, as Steele pointed out, Belgium acted contrary to both. Honor can explain the behavior, but neither the form nor function of that honor is clear without accounting for the gendered elements of Belgian state identity. The story about gendered state identity can also be read onto Germany (as a hypermasculine aggressor) and Britain (as a chivalrous protector). While some might see the influence of gender on state or national identity as a ‘second-image’ or unit-level explanation,17 Waltz explains that a factor is structural if it is not influencing state identity (and therefore state function) in states individually, but instead influencing the identities (and therefore functions) of states generally. In other words, forces that define one state’s identity or five states’ identities are second- image; forces that influence all states identities are third-image. Feminist scholars have shown that ‘nationalism is naturalized, and legitimated, through gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine’ (Peterson 1999). These gender hierarchies are always present even if specific genders and their orders in hierarchies are fungible. In other words, it is not particular nationalisms that are gendered (and some nationalisms that are not), it is that gender hierarchy as a structural feature of global politics defines the properties and functions of the system’s constituent units, including their national identities. All nationalisms being gendered does not mean that all nationalisms are the same, however. The mechanism through which gender hierarchy can be seen to influ- ence national identity and state function is through the link between any given state’s national identity and the ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ or parti- cular ideal-typical gender that is on top of the gender hierarchy that state ‘units’ are situated in at any given time and place (Hooper 1998, 34). The argument that states’ structures and functions are often defined by mas- culinities (see Peterson 1992) is not based on the observation that states are (mostly) governed by men. Instead, as Connell explains, ‘the state organizational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena’ (1995, 73). Some states’ hegemonic masculinities are aggressive and projected, others are tough but tender, and still others are stoic and reserved. All hegemonic masculinities relate to a feminized other, but they do so in different ways: some encourage violating it, some define themselves in opposition to it, some understand it as treasured and to be protected, and some mix elements of all of the above. The gendered nature of national identities influences the function of states, particularly in the areas of war- making and war-fighting, but also in terms of citizenship, economic organization, diplomatic relations, and involvement in international organizations.18 For example, feminists have catalogued throughout the history of the modern state system a relationship between military service, masculinity, and full citizenship (either de jure or de facto) in states (Moscovici 2000). Though the relationship between gender and nationalism generally (and genders and nationalisms specifically) influences the function of units whether they are like units (in anarchy) or not like units (indicative of a hierarchical system in Waltz’s terms), evidence of different gendered nationalisms suggests that gender hierarchy in global politics differentiates between functions of units in the system rather than dictating that all units function similarly. Units in the system (even defined in the narrow realist terms where only states count as units) do have many similar functions in terms of governance, education, health care, and the like. But especially in their external relations, states also have a number of differentiated functions. Some states were/are colonizers, some states were colonized and still deal with remaining markers of colonization. Some states are aggressors, while other states are the victims of aggression. Some states are protectors, while other states require protection. Some states provide peacekeeping troops, international humanitarian aid, and other public goods, while other states do not serve those functions, depending on state identity (e.g. Savery 2007). Some states serve to facilitate international cooperation while others act as cogs in cooperation’s wheels. Some states see their masculinity as affirmed in the interstate equivalent of rape and pillage, while other states see it in chivalry, honor, and a sense of the genteel. While Waltz might classify these differences as merely capabilities gaps, different state functions in the community of states do not map one-to- one onto capabilities. Instead, I propose that they map onto the ways that gender shapes state identities and functions. As Peterson (2010) notes, ‘not only subjects but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, ways of knowing y can be [masculinized or] feminized,’ such that states’ ontological security is related to their gendered identities. For example, a number of feminist analyses of the United States during the first Gulf War identify its policy choices and military strategies as consonant with a new, post-Cold War ‘tough-but-tender’ image of the United States’ masculinity, which maintained the Cold War-era projection of strength, but added an element of sensitivity and a chivalric conception of protecting the weak (e.g. Niva 1998; Sjoberg 2006a). Seemingly inconsonant functions for the US military as at once an attack force and a tool for protection then make sense, because the state does function differently based on its self-perception of identity, which might be seen as (at least in part) a product of structural gender hierarchy in the international arena.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Realism

Realism isn’t inevitable, but their assertion is informed by masculinity—it assumes that each actor perceives its national identity in the same away, as separate from gender hierarchies that make states compete for survival in the first place.

Sjoberg 14

(Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science with an affiliation with the Center for Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Florida. Her research has focused on theoretical and empirical approaches to gender and security, including war theorizing and the study of women’s violence, Gender, War, and Conflict, Polity Press, JKS)

This discussion (albeit briefly) makes the case that a struc- tural gender order can be seen as reflected in state identities, state relative power, and processes of state interaction, the places where Waltz suggests structure shows. Most mainstream scholarship on the causes of war at the international system level comes from the tradition of structural realism (see Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). I argue that gender analysis has something to add both to neorealist system-level theories of war and to system-level theories that fall outside of the neorealist paradigm. In order to see the value-added of gender analysis, a brief discussion of those theories is necessary. Structural realists suggest that the international system structure (how it works) is anarchical - that there is no government among states, and that this anarchy is key in shaping how states behave (Waltz 1986). Drawing from political theory that suggests that, before government, life for people was "nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 1996 [1651]), realists contend that a similar reality currently rules in the inter- national system. Without a government to protect their rights, enforce rules, and defend their survival, states can only rely on and trust themselves (Waltz 1979). This creates an incentive to behave competitively with other states, since survival in anarchy is, in this interpretation, a game where one either kills or is killed (Waltz 1979). Some structural realists are called offensive realists - they suggest that states go out, find, and take resources in order to maximize their relative power (Elman 2004; Mearsheimer 2001). Others are defensive real- ists - they suggest that states amass resources to defend themselves in the event that other states attack them (Walt 1987; Taliaferro 2000/1). Both see states as fundamentally competitive, and that competition as deriving from the anarchical international system structure. They therefore see sur- vival as states' primary concern, and relative power as the way that states ensure survival. While neorealist approaches dominate system-level war theorizing, their critics also sometimes theorize the causes of war at the system level. Neoliberal system-level theorist David Lake (1996, 2009), for example, agrees with the realists that the international system anarchy causes conflict, but dis- agrees with the realist assertion that the resultant conflict is inevitable. Lake and other neoliberal war theorists suggest that the violence of anarchy can be tempered by positive state relationships and effective utilization of international law (e.g., Keohane 1986). Marxist theorists also sometimes see a system-level cause of war, but they locate it in what they have identified as the capitalist world-system, rather than interna- tional anarchy (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995; Wallerstein 1984). These theorists are arguing that the international system is not anarchic, but organized by global capitalist trade, and that it is that organization which inspires state competitiveness and (therefore) violence. All of these theories share the assumption that the international system struc- ture is gender-neutral; an assumption I argue is problem- atic. I suggest that gender order is part of the international system structure (see Sjoberg 2012 for an expansion of this argument). It is possible to use Waltz's properties of the international system to build an understanding of the ways that system is gendered. Waltz describes system anarchy as "invisible" (1979: 82) and suggests that the invisibility of the interna- tional structure is how observers know that it does not exist - that the system is anarchical. He then explains that, though no one can see anarchy, it has observable implications: a structure is the principle by which the system is ordered, the mechanism of specification of functions of different units within the system, and the distributor of capabilities across those units (Waltz 1979: 81). More accessibly, Waltz expects an international system (whether anarchy or government, which are in his mind the only possible structures) to be the logic by which states function, the determinant of what states do, and the distributor of relative power among them. Waltz sees anarchy as playing this role, where, because there is no government, states' logics prioritize survival, states become primarily providers of order and defense, and states' relative power is measured by military capability (Waltz 1959: 233). The biggest faulty assumption that Waltz and other sys- tem-level scholars of war make in this logic is that a structure must be visible to exist. In the discussions of women's and men's roles in wars in Chapters 2 and 3, gender analysis routinely confronted roles that people play in wars that are invisible in war narratives. It also revealed narrative limits on people's roles in wars that come from the invisible gendered logics of war. In other words, no one writes out wars' gen- dered scripts; wars have just come to function with those ideal-typical gender roles as a crucial element. While it is possible to see manifestations of gender orders everywhere - from women's economic inequalities to the ways men and women are expected to dress - it is not possible to see gender orders. Perhaps the international system contains a gender order that Waltz could not see? The evidence discussed above that gender hierarchy provides an ordering principle for the international system, specifies the functions of units, and distributes capabilities among them suggests the existence of such a gender order. Seeing a gender order as part of the international system structure has implications for ways to think about war and conflict. Structural IR theorists see international anarchy as a permissive cause of war - war is possible because there is no government between states. Though that may be true, other theorists (e.g., Suganami 1996) argue that there is nothing inherent in anarchy that necessitates the competition that we see between states. There is, however, something essential about structural gender hierarchy that necessitates (gendered) competition. Since gender-based traits are often measured relatively, structural gender hierarchy provides an incentive for not only competition but also competition for relative position along gender hierarchies - the very sort of competition that states engage in regularly in the interna- tional arena. Seeing gender hierarchy as a permissive cause of war, then, explains more about the possibility of war than seeing anarchy as the only system-structural principle.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Hegemony

Hegemony does not create peace- their theorization uses masculine assessments for war and obscures ongoing structural violence.

Sjoberg 10

(Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science with an affiliation with the Center for Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Florida. Her research has focused on theoretical and empirical approaches to gender and security, including war theorizing and the study of women’s violence “Gendering Power Transition Theory”, JKS)

Hegemony and peace PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PTT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict 'between great powers. As such, the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers." The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that PTT ignores all but the most powerful states. Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), feminists pay attention to the entire global political community. The PTT understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena. Feminist work has consistently shown that, as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence. Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of War between great states does not automatically create peace within them,"mind that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers."1°3 Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a' mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges.1°"' A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge."˜Â°5 An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics. These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear then their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US governments decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes.1 Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease." Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world." In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.1°9 Because of the these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Deterrence

The language used to describe nuclear war is full of sexual undertones that exacerbate hegemonic masculinity

Cohn 87 - Dr. Carol Cohn is the founding director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, and a leader in the scholarly community addressing issues of gender in global politics, armed conflict and security. Dr. Cohn’s research and writing has focused on gender and security issues ranging from work on the discourse of civilian nuclear defense intellectuals and U.S. national security elites to gender integration issues in the US military, feminist approaches to thinking about weapons of mass destruction, the gender dimensions of contemporary armed conflicts, the concept of “vulnerability” in security and humanitarian discourse, and gender mainstreaming in international peace and security institutions, including the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security and the on-going efforts to ensure its implementation at the international, national, and grassroots levels. Dr. Cohn’s work has been published in a number of arenas in both the academic and policy world., Summer 1987, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," The University of Chicago Press,

Feminists have often suggested that an important aspect of the arms race is phallic worship, that "missile envy" is a significant motivating force in the nuclear build-up.12 I have always found this an uncomfortably reductionist explanation and hoped that my research at the Center would yield a more complex analysis. But still, I was curious about the extent to which I might find a sexual subtext in the defense professionals' discourse. I was not prepared for what I found. I think I had naively imagined myself as a feminist spy in the house of death-that I would need to sneak around and eavesdrop on what men said in unguarded moments, using all my subtlety and cunning to unearth whatever sexual imagery might be underneath how they thought and spoke. I had naively believed that these men, at least in public, would appear to be aware of feminist critiques. If they had not changed their language, I thought that at least at some point in a long talk about "penetra- tion aids," someone would suddenly look up, slightly embarrassed to be caught in such blatant confirmation of feminist analyses of What's Going On Here.'3 Of course, I was wrong. There was no evidence that any feminist critiques had ever reached the ears, much less the minds, of these men. American military dependence on nuclear weapons was explained as "irresistible, because you get more bang for the buck." Another lecturer solemnly and scientifically announced "to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff." (This may, in turn, explain why they see serious talk of nuclear disarmament as perfectly resistable, not to mention foolish. If disarmament is emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?) A professor's explanation of why the MX missile is to be placed in the silos of the newest Minuteman missiles, instead of replacing the older, less accurate ones, was "because they're in the nicest hole-you're not going to take the nicest missile you have and put it in a crummy hole." Other lectures were filled with discussion of vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of pro- tracted versus spasm attacks-or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has called "releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump."14 There was serious concern about the need to harden our missiles and the need to "face it, the Russians are a little harder than we are." Disbelieving glances would occasionally pass between me and my one ally in the summer program, another woman, but no one else seemed to notice. If the imagery is transparent, its significance may be less so. The temptation is to draw some conclusions about the defense intellectuals themselves-about what they are really talking about, or their motivations; but the temptation is worth resisting. Individual motivations cannot neces- sarily be read directly from imagery; the imagery itself does not originate in these particular individuals but in a broader cultural context. Sexual imagery has, of course, been a part of the world of warfare since long before nuclear weapons were even a gleam in a physicist's eye. The history of the atomic bomb project itself is rife with overt images of competitive male sexuality, as is the discourse of the early nuclear physi- cists, strategists, and SAC commanders.'5 Both the military itself and the arms manufacturers are constantly exploiting the phallic imagery and promise of sexual domination that their weapons so conveniently suggest. A quick glance at the publications that constitute some of the research sources for defense intellectuals makes the depth and pervasiveness of the imagery evident. Air Force Magazine's advertisements for new weapons, for example, rival Playboy as a catalog of men's sexual anxieties and fantasies. Consider the following, from the June 1985 issue: emblazoned in bold letters across the top of a two-page advertisement for the AV-8B Harrier II-"Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick." The copy below boasts "an exceptional thrust to weight ratio" and "vectored thrust capability that makes the . .. unique rapid response possible." Then, just in case we've failed to get the mes- sage, the last line reminds us, "Just the sort of'Big Stick' Teddy Roosevelt had in mind way back in 1901. "16 An ad for the BKEP (BLU-106/B) reads: The Only Way to Solve Some Problems is to Dig Deep. THE BOMB, KINETIC ENERGY PENETRATOR "Will provide the tactical air commander with efficient power deny or significantly delay enemy airfield operations." "Designed to maximize runway cratering by optimizing penetration dynamics and utilizing the most efficient warhead yet designed."17 (In case the symbolism of "cratering" seems far-fetched, I must point that I am not the first to see it. The French use the Mururoa Atoll in South Pacific for their nuclear tests and assign a woman's name to eac the craters they gouge out of the earth.) Another, truly extraordinary, source of phallic imagery is to be found in descriptions of nuclear blasts themselves. Here, for example, is o journalist William Laurence, who was brought to Nagasaki by th Force to witness the bombing. "Then, just when it appeared as though thing had settled down in to a state of permanence, there came sh out of the top a giant mushroom that increased the size of the pillar to of 45,000 feet. The mushroom top was even more alive than the seething and boiling in a white fury of creamy foam, sizzling upward then descending earthward, a thousand geysers rolled into one. It kept struggling in an elemental fury, like a creature in the act of breaking the bonds that held it down."'8 Given the degree to which it suffuses their world, that defense intellec- tuals themselves use a lot of sexual imagery does not seem especially surprising. Nor does it, by itself, constitute grounds for imputing motiva- tion. For me, the interesting issue is not so much the imagery's psychody- namic origins, as how it functions. How does it serve to make it possible for strategic planners and other defense intellectuals to do their macabre work? How does it function in their construction of a work world that feels tenable? Several stories illustrate the complexity. During the summer program, a group of us visited the New London Navy base where nuclear submarines are homeported and the General Dynamics Electric Boat boatyards where a new Trident submarine was being constructed. At one point during the trip we took a tour of a nuclear powered submarine. When we reached the part of the sub where the missiles are housed, the officer accompanying us turned with a grin and asked if we wanted to stick our hands through a hole to "pat the missile." Pat the missile? The image reappeared the next week, when a lecturer scornfully declared that the only real reason for deploying cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe was "so that our allies can pat them." Some months later, another group of us went to be briefed at NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense Command). On the way back, our plane went to refuel at Offut Air Force Base, the Strategic Air Command head- quarters near Omaha, Nebraska. When word leaked out that our landing would be delayed because the new B-1 bomber was in the area, the plane became charged with a tangible excitement that built as we flew in our holding pattern, people craning their necks to try to catch a glimpse of the B-1 in the skies, and climaxed as we touched down on the runway and hurtled past it. Later, when I returned to the Center I encountered a man who, unable to go on the trip, said to me enviously, "I hear you got to pat a B-I." What is all this "patting"? What are men doing when they "pat" these high-tech phalluses? Patting is an assertion of intimacy, sexual possession, affectionate domination. The thrill and pleasure of "patting the missile" is the proximity of all that phallic power, the possibility of vicariously appro- priating it as one's own. But if the predilection for patting phallic objects indicates something of the homoerotic excitement suggested by the language, it also has another side. For patting is not only an act of sexual intimacy. It is also what one does to babies, small children, the pet dog. One pats that which is small, cute, and harmless-not terrifyingly destructive. Pat it, and its lethality disappears. Much of the sexual imagery I heard was rife with the sort of ambiguity suggested by "patting the missiles." The imagery can be construed as a deadly serious display of the connections between masculine sexuality and the arms race. At the same time, it can also be heard as a way of minimizing the seriousness of militarist endeavors, of denying their deadly conse- quences. A former Pentagon target analyst, in telling me why he thought plans for "limited nuclear war" were ridiculous, said, "Look, you gotta understand that it's a pissing contest-you gotta expect them to use every- thing they've got." What does this image say? Most obviously, that this is all about competition for manhood, and thus there is tremendous danger. But at the same time, the image diminishes the contest and its outcomes, by representing it as an act of boyish mischief.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › Deterrence

Deterrence analysts use “clean language” do separate emotions from decision making

Cohn 87 - Dr. Carol Cohn is the founding director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, and a leader in the scholarly community addressing issues of gender in global politics, armed conflict and security. Dr. Cohn’s research and writing has focused on gender and security issues ranging from work on the discourse of civilian nuclear defense intellectuals and U.S. national security elites to gender integration issues in the US military, feminist approaches to thinking about weapons of mass destruction, the gender dimensions of contemporary armed conflicts, the concept of “vulnerability” in security and humanitarian discourse, and gender mainstreaming in international peace and security institutions, including the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security and the on-going efforts to ensure its implementation at the international, national, and grassroots levels. Dr. Cohn’s work has been published in a number of arenas in both the academic and policy world., Summer 1987, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," The University of Chicago Press,

Entering the world of defense intellectuals was a bizarre experience- bizarre because it is a world where men spend their days calmly and matter- of-factly discussing nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and nuclear war. The discussions are carefully and intricately reasoned, occurring seemingly without any sense of horror, urgency, or moral outrage-in fact, there seems to be no graphic reality behind the words, as they speak of "first strikes," "counterforce exchanges," and "limited nuclear war," or as they debate the comparative values of a "minimum deterrent posture" versus a "nuclear war-fighting capability." Yet what is striking about the men themselves is not, as the content of their conversations might suggest, their cold-bloodedness. Rather, it is that they are a group of men unusually endowed with charm, humor, intelligence, concern, and decency. Reader, I liked them. At least, I liked many of them. The attempt to understand how such men could contribute to an endeavor that I see as so fundamentally destructive became a con- tinuing obsession for me, a lens through which I came to examine all of my experiences in their world. In this early stage, I was gripped by the extraordinary language used to discuss nuclear war. What hit me first was the elaborate use of abstraction and euphemism, of words so bland that they never forced the speaker or enabled the listener to touch the realities of nuclear holocaust that lay behind the words. Anyone who has seen pictures of Hiroshima burn victims or tried to imagine the pain of hundreds of glass shards blasted into flesh may find it perverse beyond imagination to hear a class of nuclear devices matter-of- factly referred to as "clean bombs." "Clean bombs" are nuclear devices that are largely fusion rather than fission and that therefore release a higher quantity of energy, not as radiation, but as blast, as destructive explosive power.7 "Clean bombs" may provide the perfect metaphor for the language of defense analysts and arms controllers. This language has enormous de- structive power, but without emotional fallout, without the emotional fallout that would result if it were clear one was talking about plans for mass murder, mangled bodies, and unspeakable human suffering. Defense analysts talk about "countervalue attacks" rather than about incinerating cities. Human death, in nuclear parlance, is most often referred to as "collateral damage"; for, as one defense analyst said wryly, "The Air Force doesn't target people, it targets shoe factories."8 Some phrases carry this cleaning-up to the point of inverting meaning. The MX missile will carry ten warheads, each with the explosure power of 300-475 kilotons of TNT: one missile the bearer of destruction approx- imately 250-400 times that of the Hiroshima bombing.9 Ronald Reagan has dubbed the MX missile "the Peacekeeper." While this renaming was the object of considerable scorn in the community of defense analysts, these very same analysts refer to the MX as a "damage limitation weapon."'? These phrases, only a few of the hundreds that could be discussed, exemplify the astounding chasm between image and reality that character- izes technostrategic language. They also hint at the terrifying way in which the existence of nuclear devices has distorted our perceptions and rede- fined the world. "Clean bombs" tells us that radiation is the only "dirty" part of killing people. To take this one step further, such phrases can even seem healthful/ curative/corrective. So that we not only have "clean bombs" but also "surgically clean strikes" ("counterforce" attacks that can purportedly "take out"-i. e., accurately destroy-an opponent's weapons or command cen- ters without causing significant injury to anything else). The image of excision of the offending weapon is unspeakably ludicrous when the surgi- cal tool is not a delicately controlled scalpel but a nuclear warhead. And somehow it seems to be forgotten that even scalpels spill blood.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Disadvantages** › **2AC – K of Disads Toolbox** › War – Positive Peace

Sexual violence happens on a continuum – focus on systemic impacts is key since patriarchal warmaking causes endless violence.

Sheperd 09

[Laura J. Dept of Political Science and International Studies, U of Birmingham (UK), “Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies,” Political Studies Review, V7 I2, Apr]

According to conventional accounts of international relations (IR), scholars focus on war (predominantly as a means to providing the sovereign state with security) and the existence of war's corollary is a foundational assumption that goes largely unquestioned. Peace must exist, for international relations are not characterised by perpetual conflict. However, peace is implicitly defined, in dichotomous terms, by the absence of violent conflict, as 'not-war'. Of more analytical interest is conflict, which is always a possibility and which, moreover, occurs between states. International relations as a discipline, narrowly conceived, is largely unconcerned with activities that occur within the state. Minimally, feminist and other critical approaches to IR seek to correct such disciplinary myopia. While classical realism theorises the political actor –Hans Morgenthau's 'political man' (1973, pp. 15–6) – in order to construct the state as actor, the now dominant neo-realism abstracts the human subject from its disciplinary musings, leading to the infamous 'black box' model of the state. Early feminist scholarship challenged this assumption as well, arguing that individuals, as human subjects in all their messy complexity, are an integral part of international relations (see Shepherd, 2007, pp. 240–1). Attention to the human subject in I/international R/relations – or, as Christine Sylvester phrases it, 'relations international', to emphasise the embedded nature of all kinds of relations in the international sphere, including power relations and gender relations (Sylvester, 1994, p. 6; see also Enloe, 1996) – allows critical scholars to look beyond the disciplinary obsession with war. Further, it allows us to investigate one of the simplest insights of feminist IR, which is also one of the most devastating: the war/peace dichotomy is gendered, misleading and potentially pathological. In this essay, I address each of these concerns in turn, developing a critique of the war/peace dichotomy that is foundational to conventional approaches to IR through a review of three recent publications in the field of feminist security studies. These texts are Cynthia Enloe's (2007) Globalization and Militarism, David Roberts' (2008) Human Insecurity, and Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics by Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2008). Drawing on the insights of these books, I ask first how violence is understood in global politics, with specific reference to the gendered disciplinary blindnesses that frequently characterise mainstream approaches. Second, I demonstrate how a focus on war and peace can neglect to take into account the politics of everyday violence: the violences of the in-between times that international politics recognises neither as 'war' nor 'peace' and the violences inherent to times of peace that are overlooked in the study of war. Finally, I argue that feminist security studies offers an important corrective to the foundational assumptions of IR, which themselves can perpetuate the very instances of violence that they seek to redress. If we accept the core insights of feminist security studies – the centrality of the human subject, the importance of particular configurations of masculinity and femininity, and the gendered conceptual framework that underpins the discipline of IR – we are encouraged to envisage a rather different politics of the global. From Boudica to Bhopal As Sjoberg and Gentry recount (2008, pp. 38–9), Boudica was an Iceni queen who led an uprising against the Roman forces occupying the British Isles circa 61 AD. Prior to launching the attack, Boudica's refusal to allow a Roman general to claim ownership of her land resulted in the rape of her two daughters as punishment. However, 'many inherited tales about Boudica do not emphasise her personal or political motivations, but the savage and unwomanly brutality of her actions' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 39). Almost two thousand years later and half a planet away, a toxic gas leak in 1984 at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India caused the immediate deaths of approximately 3,000 people and left tens of thousands suffering the after-effects for decades (Roberts, 2008, p. 10). At first reading, little links these two accounts of quite different forms of violence. The first is an instance of violent resistance against imperial oppression, and Boudica has been vilified, her efforts delegitimised, in much the same way as many actors in 'small wars' tend to be in global politics today (see Barkawi, 2004). The second is perhaps more usefully seen as the result of structural violence, following Johan Galtung's explanation of the same, as 'violence where there is no such actor' (cited in Roberts, 2008, p. 18). However, by asking questions about Boudica and Bhopal that are born of a 'feminist curiosity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 1, p. 11), these texts demonstrate connections beyond the simplistic equation that is applicable to both: actor/structure plus violence equals death. In Human Insecurity, Roberts poses the question, 'What is violence?' (2008, p. 17). This is a question rarely asked in international relations. Violence is war: large-scale, state-dominated, much studied, war. However, the three texts under review here all offer more nuanced theories of violence that focus analytical attention on complex constructions of agency (institutional and international), structure, and the global context that is product and productive of such violence. Through an intricate and beautifully accessible analysis of modernity –'that pot of gold at the end of the global rainbow' (Enloe, 2007, p. 64) – Enloe encourages her readers to seek the connections between globalisation and militarisation, arguing that at the heart of this nexus lie important questions about violence and security. Roberts notes a broad dissatisfaction with the concept of 'human security' (2008, pp. 14–7), offering instead his investigative lens of 'human insecurity', defined as 'avoidable civilian deaths, occurring globally, caused by social, political and economic institutions and structures, built and operated by humans and which could feasibly be changed' (p. 28). Placing the human at the centre of concerns about security immediately challenges a conventional state-based approach to security, as Enloe explains. In a convincing account of the hard-fought expansion of the concept of security, mapped on to strategic and organisational gains made by various feminist organisations, Enloe reminds us that if we take seriously the lives of women – their understandings of security – as well as on-the-ground workings of masculinity and femininity, we will be able to produce more meaningful and more reliable analyses of 'security'– personal, national and global (Enloe, 2007, p. 47). This latter quote typifies an approach for which Enloe has become somewhat famous. In the early 1980s, Enloe began asking the questions for which she is rightly acknowledged as a key figure in feminist security studies, including Does Khaki Become You? (Enloe, 1983) and 'where are the women?' (Enloe, 2000; see also Enloe, 2004). Inspired by her own curiosity about the roles played by women and the functions performed by gender in the militarisation of civilian life, Enloe has explored prostitution, marriage, welfare and war making with an eye to the representation (both political and symbolic) of women. In Globalization and Militarism she offers detailed vignettes that illuminate just how interwoven violence is with the quest for (various types of) security, and demands that nothing is left unquestioned in a critical analysis of these concepts. Even baby socks (embossed with tiny fighter planes, a gift to the parent of a small boy) have something to tell us about gender, militarism and the casual representations of violence and war that society accepts (Enloe, 2007, pp. 143–4). Following a similar logic, although he initially defines human insecurity as avoidable civilian deaths, Roberts focuses on 'preventable female deaths ... and avoidable deaths in children under five' (2008, p. 31). While this conflation of 'civilian' with 'women and children' is rather problematic (see Carpenter, 2006), in asking not only, where are the women? but also, why are they dying in such disproportionate numbers? Roberts enhances his critique of 'most security studies ... [that] largely [miss] the scale of avoidable human misery and avoidable human death' (2008, p. 4). As mentioned above, Roberts uses Galtung's concept of structural violence to draw attention to the manifest ways in which an increasingly interconnected global system relies on gender and violence (and gendered violence) for its perpetuation: 'The process of globalization, to which few are ideologically or otherwise opposed, is an essential conveyor and articulator of the masculinity that underpins andrarchy' (Roberts, 2008, p. 157). Whereas Enloe offers a persuasive and accessible account of patriarchy, a concept familiar to feminist and non-feminist scholars alike (Enloe, 2007, pp. 66–8), Roberts suggests 'andrarchy' as an alternative, which he defines as 'the gender-partisan ideological domination and rule structure that determines and sustains the general relative power of males over females globally' (Roberts, 2008, p. 140). However, it is difficult to see how this reformulation either differs substantively from patriarchy as an analytical tool or assists in the construction of an alternative theory of global violence that centralises the individual, and therefore takes gender seriously, in that it seems to essentialise violent actors (males) and violated victims (females). In contrast, Enloe's explanation of patriarchy challenges such essentialism as its first point of critical intervention. That is, the assumption of essential differences between men and women is part of patriarchal ideology, feeding into stereotypical notions of how such men and women should behave, which in turn constitute recognisable discourses of gender: sets of narratives about masculinity and femininity and how these are, in general, respectively privileged and marginalised. The most theoretically coherent account of gender and violence offered in these three texts comes from Sjoberg and Gentry and employs the notion of discourse to great effect. Whereas Roberts seeks to map out a consciously structural account of global violence, where the structure in question is a hybrid of andrarchy and a 'rapacious, increasingly competitive and hyper-masculine' neoliberalism (Roberts, 2008, p. 118), Sjoberg and Gentry offer a more sophisticated analysis of structure and agency in their 'relational autonomy framework' that accounts for both individual agency and structural constraint (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 189–98). When people perform acts of political violence, they argue, this is a conscious choice, but crucially individuals 'choose within a specified spectrum of socially acceptable choices' (p. 190). 'In its simplest form, relational autonomy is the recognition that freedom of action is defined and limited by social relationships' (p. 194) and this has profound implications for the study of violence in global politics. Sjoberg and Gentry use this insight to demonstrate that women's violence in global politics is rendered unintelligible, through narrative representations of the perpetrators as mothers, monsters or whores (in media discourse and academic discussion), rather than as autonomous agents. From the abuses of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, via the 'black widows' of Chechnya, to female perpetrators of genocidal violence in Rwanda, the authors show how representations of women's violence conform to and further confirm the stereotypes of violent women as either mothers (supporting or vengeful), monsters or sexually deviant whores (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 30–49). The very different theories of violence outlined in these three texts all contribute to the development of a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of violence in global politics. By insisting that international relations are also gender relations – by demanding that we recognise that states are an analytical abstraction and politics is practised or performed by gendered bodies – all of the authors put forward theories of violence that are corrective of gender blindness, in that the violences in question are simultaneously gendered and gendering (see Shepherd, 2008, pp. 49–54). They are gendered because they have different impacts on male and female bodies (Enloe, 2007, p. 13), both materially as people experience violence differently depending on their gender (and race, class, sexuality and so on) and also discursively, as what we expect of men and women in terms of their behaviours, violent and otherwise, is limited by the meaning(s) ascribed to male and female bodies by society. Regarding the former, Roberts proposes that we term the global victimisation of women 'structural femicide' (Roberts, 2008, p. 65), but does not sufficiently engage with the question of whether defining gendered violence as violence against women (and children) functions to constitute the subject of 'woman' as a perpetual victim, in need of protection and lacking in agency (Shepherd, 2008, p. 41). In contrast, Sjoberg and Gentry neatly articulate the interplay between material and discursive violence as they write a theory that accounts 'for people's impact on global politics and for the impact of narratives others construct for and about them' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 216, emphasis in original). Thus, violence is gendering as our understanding of politics is in part reproduced through violent actions. Through discursive violence against individuals – for example, representing Chechen women suicide terrorists as 'black widows', which demands that they are attributed the characteristics of the venomous and deadly black widow spider and, further, that their violence is grounded in familial loss, 'born directly of a desire for vengeance for the deaths of their husbands and sons' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 100) rather than as the result of a process of political decision making – our understanding of that individual and of the act of violence itself is produced. Similarly, through material acts of violence, discourses of gender are given physical form; the detainees at Abu Ghraib who were forced to simulate oral sex with each other were forced to do so in part because of crude cultural understandings of homosexuality as deviant and homosexuals as lesser men – that is, as women. To force a man to perform oral sex on another man is to undermine his masculinity and simultaneously to reinforce the gendered power relations that claim privilege for masculinity over femininity, heterosexuality over homosexuality – power relations that render such an act intelligible in the first instance. Such understandings of violence are beyond the remit of conventional state-based approaches to international relations. However, 'it is by tracking the gendered assumptions about how to wield feminization to humiliate male[s]' (Enloe, 2007, p. 115) and how to represent gendered individuals in such a way as to render some acts of violence intelligible as political and others as monstrous that we can begin to piece together a useful feminist account of global violence, which is a necessary component of understanding security. Everyday Violence and In-Between Days In addition to questioning what violence is, how it is represented and with what effects, feminist security studies scholarship also asks which violences are considered worthy of study and when these violences occur. Expanding the concept of violence that underpins feminist analysis, as outlined above, allows us to take seriously what Arthur Kleinman (2000) refers to as 'the violences of everyday life'. Beyond a narrow focus on war and state-based violence lies a plethora of everyday violences that feminist security studies seeks to address. In the field of security studies the broadening and deepening of the concept of security, such that it is no longer assumed to apply only to the sovereign state, has demonstrated the multiple insecurities experienced by individuals and social collectives (Booth, 2005, pp. 14–5). The development of the concept of 'human security' largely took place within the parameters of a wider disciplinary debate over the appropriate referent object for security studies (the individual, society, the state) and the types of threat to the referent object that would be recognised. In a move similar to Ken Booth's (1991) reformulation of security as emancipation, Roberts' quest for individual empowerment seeks to overcome the 'élite-legitimized disequilibrium' that results in the manifest insecurity of the majority of the world's population (Roberts, 2008, p. 185). As might be expected, the violences Roberts identifies are innumerable. In addition to the physical violences of 'infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate ("domestic", "honour" and "dowry") killings and lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five' (Roberts, 2008, p. 31), his analysis attacks the institutional structures of the dominant international financial institutions (pp. 117–35) and the andrarchal and neoliberal discourses that sustain them (pp. 136–58). In short, Roberts' answer to the question of which violences matter in global politics is quite simple: all of them. However, while studies of human security, he argues, seek to provide the human with security, his reformulated analytic takes as its starting point human insecurity; that is, he starts with the threat(s) to the sovereign subject rather than the subject's ontological condition. Roberts suggests that this circumvents the disciplinary definitional problem with human security – identified by Roland Paris (2001), Edward Newman (2001; 2004) and others – but I cannot see how this is the case, given that the answer to the question 'what is it that humans do to make the world a more dangerous and dysfunctional place?' (Roberts, 2008, p. 28) is also quite simple: we live in it. Thus Roberts' analytic seems to suffer the same lack of definitional clarity – and therefore policy relevance – that he ascribes to more conventional approaches; it is no easier to identify, quantify and ultimately reduce the threats experienced by coexisting human subjects than it is to provide those human subjects with security, if security can first be defined as freedom from fear or want. I do not espouse some construction of human nature (if such a thing were to exist) that assumes essential selfishness and a propensity for violence, nor do I assume that security is a zero-sum game, in that one person's security must always be at the expense of another's, but I recognise that even the most well-intentioned security policy can have unforeseen and sometimes disastrous effects. Sometimes, moreover, as Sjoberg and Gentry demonstrate, the decision to perform acts of political violence that are a source of insecurity for the intended victims can be understood if not condoned. Enloe's analytical remit is similarly wide-ranging to Roberts', in that she focuses on processes – globalisation and militarism – that are inherently violent. However, although Enloe also insists that all violences should count in the study of global politics, she grounds this claim in an analysis of specific sites of violence and demonstrates with startling clarity just how everyday items – for example, sneakers – are both globalised and militarised: Threaded through virtually every sneaker you own is some relationship to masculinized militaries. Locating factories in South Korea [in the 1960s and 1970s] was a good strategic decision in the eyes of those Oregon-headquartered male Nike executives because of the close alliance between male policymakers in Washington and Seoul. It was a relationship – unequal but intimate – based on their shared anticommunism, their shared commitment to waging the Cold War, and their shared participation in an ambitious international military alliance (Enloe, 2007, p. 28). By drawing her readers' attention to the ways in which discourses of gender (ideas about how 'proper' men and women should behave) function, Enloe reminds us that adhering to ideals of masculinity and femininity is both productive of violence and is a violence in itself, a violence against the empowered human subject. 'Ideas matter', she concludes, ideas about modernity, security, violence, threat, trust. 'Each of these ideas is fraught with blatant and subtle presumptions about masculinity and femininity. Ideas about both masculinity and femininity matter. This makes a feminist curiosity a necessity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 161). While conventional studies of IR and security may be willing to concede that ideas matter (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001), paying close attention to the work that gender does allows for a fuller understanding of why it is that particular violences fall outside the traditional parameters of study. As to the question of when violence is worthy of study, all three texts implicitly or explicitly draw on the popular feminist phrase: 'the personal is political'. This slogan neatly encapsulates the feminist critique of a supposed foundational divide between the private and the public realms of social life. In arguing that the personal is political, feminist theory refuses to accept that there are instances of human behaviour or situations in social life that can or should be bracketed from study. At its simplest, this critique led to the recognition of 'domestic violence' as a political, rather than a personal issue (see, for example Moore, 2003; Youngs, 2003), forming the foundation for critical studies of gendered violence in times of war and in times of peace that would otherwise have been ignored. Crucially, Enloe extended the boundaries of critique to include the international, imbuing the phrase with new analytical vitality when she suggested, first, that the phrase itself is palindromic (that is, that the political is also personal, inextricably intertwined with the everyday) and, second, that the personal is international just as the international is personal. 'The international is personal' implies that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. ... To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments' recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinised dignity and feminised sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood (Enloe, 2000, pp. 196–7). These ideas about dignity and sacrifice are not neatly contained within the temporal boundaries of any given war, nor are they incidental to the practice of warfare. Further, there is of course also the question of who gets to define or declare war, or peace. While some of the violent women whose actions are analysed by Sjoberg and Gentry perform their violences in wartime (for example, Lynndie England, who received the most attention from global media of the women involved in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib; see Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 67–70), others are fighting wars that are not sanctioned by the international community (such as the Chechen women [pp. 97–111] and female Palestinian suicide bombers [pp. 112–40]). As discussed above, ideas about masculinity and femininity, dignity and sacrifice may not only be violent in themselves, but are also the product/productive of physical violences. With this in mind, the feminist argument that 'peacetime' is analytically misleading is a valid one. Of interest are the 'in-between days' and the ways in which labelling periods of war or peace as such can divert attention away from the myriad violences that inform and reinforce social behaviour. [W]ar can surely never be said to start and end at a clearly defined moment. Rather, it seems part of a continuum of conflict, expressed now in armed force, now in economic sanctions or political pressure. A time of supposed peace may come later to be called 'the pre-war period'. During the fighting of a war, unseen by the foot soldiers under fire, peace processes are often already at work. A time of postwar reconstruction, later, may be re-designated as an inter bellum– a mere pause between wars (Cockburn and Zarkov, cited in El Jack, 2003, p. 9). Feminist security studies interrogates the pauses between wars, and the political processes – and practices of power – that demarcate times as such. In doing so, not only is the remit of recognisable violence (violence worthy of study) expanded, but so too are the parameters of what counts as IR. Everyday violences and acts of everyday resistance ('a fashion show, a tour, a small display of children's books' in Enloe, 2007, pp. 117–20) are the stuff of relations international and, thus, of a comprehensive understanding of security. In the following section I outline the ways in which taking these claims seriously allows us to engage critically with the representations of international relations that inform our research, with potentially profound implications. The Violent Reproduction of the International As well as conceiving of gender as a set of discourses, and violence as a means of reproducing and reinforcing the relevant discursive limits, it is possible to see security as a set of discourses, as I have argued more fully elsewhere (Shepherd, 2007; 2008; see also Shepherd and Weldes, 2007). Rather than pursuing the study of security as if it were something that can be achieved either in absolute, partial or relative terms, engaging with security as discourse enables the analysis of how these discourses function to reproduce, through various strategies, the domain of the international with which IR is self-consciously concerned. Just as violences that are gendering reproduce gendered subjects, on this view states, acting as authoritative entities, perform violences, but violences, in the name of security, also perform states. These processes occur simultaneously, and across the whole spectrum of social life: an instance of rape in war is at once gendering of the individuals involved and of the social collectivities – states, communities, regions – they feel they represent (see Bracewell, 2000); building a fence in the name of security that separates people from their land and extended families performs particular kinds of violence (at checkpoints, during patrols) and performs particular subject identities (of the state authority, of the individuals affected), all of which are gendered. All of the texts under discussion in this essay argue that it is imperative to explore and expose gendered power relations and, further, that doing so not only enables a rigorous critique of realism in IR but also reminds us as scholars of the need for such a critique. The critiques of IR offered by feminist scholars are grounded in a rejection of neo-realism/realism as a dominant intellectual framework for academics in the discipline and policy makers alike. As Enloe reminds us, 'the government-centred, militarized version of national security [derived from a realist framework] remains the dominant mode of policy thinking' (Enloe, 2007, p. 43). Situating gender as a central category of analysis encourages us to 'think outside the "state security box"' (p. 47) and to remember that 'the "individuals" of global politics do not work alone, live alone or politic alone – they do so in interdependent relationships with others' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 200) that are inherently gendered. One of the key analytical contributions of all three texts is the way in which they all challenge what it means to be 'doing' IR, by recognising various forms of violence, interrogating the public/private divide and demanding that attention is paid to the temporal and physical spaces in-between war and peace. Feminist security studies should not simply be seen as 'women doing security', or as 'adding women to IR/security studies', important as these contributions are. Through their theorising, the authors discussed here reconfigure what 'counts' as IR, challenging orthodox notions of who can 'do' IR and what 'doing' IR means. The practices of power needed to maintain dominant configurations of international relations are exposed, and critiquing the productive power of realism as a discourse is one way in which the authors do this. Sjoberg and Gentry pick up on a recent theoretical shift in Anglo-American IR, from system-level analysis to a recognition that individuals matter. However, as they rightly point out, the individuals who are seen to matter are not gendered relational beings, but rather reminiscent of Hobbes' construction of the autonomous rational actor. '[T]he narrowness of the group that [such an approach] includes limits its effectiveness as an interpretive framework and reproduces the gender, class and race biases in system-level international relationship scholarship' (Sjoberg and Gentry 2008, p. 200, emphasis added). Without paying adequate attention to the construction of individuals as gendered beings, or to the reproduction of widely held ideas about masculine and feminine behaviours, Sjoberg and Gentry remind us that we will ultimately fail 'to see and deconstruct the increasingly subtle, complex and disguised ways in which gender pervades international relations and global politics' (2008, p. 225). In a similar vein, Roberts notes that 'human security is marginalised or rejected as inauthentic [because] it is not a reflection of realism's (male) agendas and priorities' (2008, p. 169). The 'agendas and priorities' identified by Roberts and acknowledged by Sjoberg and Gentry as being productive of particular biases in scholarship are not simply 'academic' matters, in the pejorative sense of the term. As Roberts argues, 'Power relationships of inequality happen because they are built that way by human determinism of security and what is required to maintain security (p. 171). Realism, as academic discourse and as policy guideline, has material effects. Although his analysis employs an unconventional definition of the term 'social construction' (seemingly interchangeable with 'human agency') and rests on a novel interpretation of the three foundational assumptions of realism (Roberts, 2008, pp. 169–77), the central point that Roberts seeks to make in his conclusion is valid: 'it is a challenge to those who deny relationships between gender and security; between human agency (social construction) and lethal outcome' (p. 183). In sum, all three texts draw their readers to an inescapable, and – for the conventional study of IR – a devastating conclusion: the dominance of neo-realism/realism and the state-based study of security that derives from this is potentially pathological, in that it is in part productive of the violences it seeks to ameliorate. I suggest that critical engagement with orthodox IR theory is necessary for the intellectual growth of the discipline, and considerable insight can be gained by acknowledging the relevance of feminist understandings of gender, power and theory. The young woman buying a T-shirt from a multinational clothing corporation with her first pay cheque, the group of young men planning a stag weekend in Amsterdam, a group of students attending a demonstration against the bombing of Afghanistan – studying these significant actions currently falls outside the boundaries of doing security studies in mainstream IR and I believe these boundaries need contesting. As Marysia Zalewski argues: International politics is what we make it to be ... We need to rethink the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both that which we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world (Zalewski 1996, p. 352, emphasis in original). Conclusion: 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend' (Mao Tse-Tung) In this essay, I have used the analysis of three contemporary publications in the field of feminist security studies to demonstrate three significant sets of analytical contributions that such scholarship makes to the discipline of IR. Beyond the war/peace dichotomy that is frequently assumed to be definitive of the discipline, we find many and various forms of violence, occurring in and between temporally distinct periods of conflict, which are the product/productive of socially acceptable modes of gendered behaviour, ways of being in the world as a woman or man. I have also argued that critical engagement with conventional, state-based approaches to (national) security must persist as the academic discourses we write are complicit in the construction of the global as we understand it. Further, 'if all experience is gendered, analysis of gendered identities is an imperative starting point in the study of political identities and practice' (Peterson, 1999, p. 37). To this end, I conclude by suggesting that we take seriously Enloe's final comment: 'Tracking militarization and fostering demilitarization will call for cooperative investigations, multiple skills and the appreciation of diverse perspectives' (2007, p. 164). While there has been intense intra-disciplinary debate within contemporary feminist security studies over the necessary 'feminist credentials' of some gendered analyses, it is important to recognise the continual renewal and analytical vigour brought to the field by such debates.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: Ukraine PIC** › Not Being Used

No evidence that they are being used in Ukraine

Gregory C. Allen 22, , AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, “Russia Probably Has Not Used AI-Enabled Weapons in Ukraine, but That Could Change”, Center for Strategic and International Studies., 5-26-2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-probably-has-not-used-ai-enabled-weapons-ukraine-could-change)/maze

The WIRED story understandably attracted a lot of attention, but those who only read the sensational headline missed the article’s critical caveat: “It is unclear if the drone may have been operated in this [an AI-enabled autonomous] way in Ukraine.” outlets re-reported the WIRED story, but irresponsibly did so without the caveat. WIRED’s assessment that Kalashnikov claims the KUB-BLA “boasts the ability to identify targets using artificial intelligence” is based on two main pieces of evidence: a Kalashnikov about ZALA Aero’s “Artificial Intelligence Visual Identification (AIVI)” capabilities for its unmanned aircraft, and the original Kalashnikov press release the KUB-BLA in 2019. However, these two pieces of evidence are less than they seem. The Russian-language AIVI press release never mentions the KUB-BLA or military applications. Instead, it describes a ZALA Aero machine-learning AI drone product line that is marketed to industrial and agricultural sectors. Incorporating modern machine-learning AI into military applications is significantly more difficult than in industrial or agricultural applications. Modern machine-learning AI using deep neural networks offers the opportunity for incredible gains in performance, but that performance depends on having lots of training data during development. Moreover, that training data needs to closely resemble operational conditions. In general, it is much easier to get such training data from commercial customers than from an enemy military, especially if friendly weapons systems and sensors do not often come within range of enemy ones. The most mature military AI applications are ones like satellite reconnaissance: even in peacetime, satellites get to take a lot of pictures of Russian and Chinese military forces, and those pictures can be digitally labeled by human experts to turn them into training data. Training data is what machine learning AI systems learn from. The combination of a learning algorithm and training data is how AI systems learn to recognize what is in the image. But training data is generally application-specific. Satellite image recognition training data only helps build satellite image recognition AI. One cannot magically use labeled satellite image data to train an AI for a robotic drone’s targeting computer (at least not with today’s technology).

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: NC3 PIC** › Machine Learning

NC3s are dangerous and vulnerable because they are trained through machine learning

Vincent Boulanin, May 2019, "," No Publication, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/sipri1905-ai-strategic-stability-nuclear-risk.pdf

It is already known that a broad range of models trained through machine learning are susceptible to a new kind of vulnerability, termed ‘adversarial examples’: an adversary can craft a malicious input that reliably causes a trained model to produce the wrong behaviour (e.g. misclassify an object in an image or take an inappropriate action in the environment).7 While this vulnerability has been known and researched heavily for several years, no robust solution has yet been found. Nonetheless, given the promise of new capabilities that machine learning and automation offer, the pressure to deploy potentially insecure systems may present itself.8 When considering threats that might be introduced from increased autonomy and use of machine learning, it is important to consider the entire sprawling range of systems and functions that make up and support NC4ISR. Specific attention has been given to delivery systems and to nuclear command, control and communications (NC3).9 The awareness of potential threats to ‘core’ computer systems in NC3 has led to significantly improved security for such systems, and some reluctance to introduce autonomy and machine learning into them.10 However, more peripheral systems can also pose a threat, especially as they are more likely sites for the introduction of autonomy and machine learning. These include, for example, systems onboard satellites that relay communications and images or the simulators used to plan and test strategies. They can also extend as far as the vast computer systems and networks that provide news information to the public and to civilian officials, which may affect tactical or strategic decision-making. Admittedly, it is not always easy to chart a scenario that begins with a compromise of a particular peripheral system and ends with the unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon.11 It is similarly difficult to describe a scenario whereby an adversary would intervene in the authorized launch of a nuclear weapon. However, these systems are present for the well-funded and patient adversary to explore and exploit. In particular, there is increasing concern about attacks that initially target command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems that are ‘entangled’—that is, used for both nuclear and conventional weapons—such as satellites, intelligence gathering and logistics.12 Entangled systems present two challenges here: first, they are often not considered ‘nuclear’ systems, so are subject to a lower level of security scrutiny than nuclear systems. Second, attacks on such systems may be considered by an adversary as unlikely to trigger a nuclear escalation, leading to a miscalculation—the adversary may not even know that the system has an NC4ISR purpose and may therefore consider the attack to be conventional while the targeted state may perceive the attack as an attack on its nuclear capabilities.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: NC3 PIC** › War/Conflict

Even suspected development of nuclear AI causes war

Boulanin, PhD, 18

(Vincent, Senior Researcher at SIPRI, , 12-7)

On the other, the adoption – or even suspected adoption – of new AI capabilities by one or several nuclear-armed states could incentivize other states (be they nuclear-armed or not) to respond with destabilizing measures that could increase the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. This could include entering into an arms race, doubling down on the modernization of nuclear arsenals, renouncing a ‘no first use’ policy, increasing alert statuses, or further automating nuclear launch policies. Historical events like the 1983 Petrov incident (where the Soviet early warning systems wrongly detected a US nuclear attack) have also shown that AI technology could be the cause of an accidental or inadvertent escalation into a nuclear conflict.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: NC3 PIC** › War/Conflict

AI control of nuclear weapons makes escalation more likely by removing humanity from decisions

Rodriguez, PhD, 19

(Jonathan founded Vergence Labs in 2011, which developed computerized smartglasses. Vergence was acquired by Snap Inc., where he is now manager of new device prototyping. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-04/features/keep-human-control-over-new-weapons)

Michael T. Klare’s article “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” (ACT, March 2019) highlights important issues, but omits enormous strategic risks inhearent to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in a role of command. In a war between major powers, both sides’ AI systems would be able to outperform humans in the application of game theory, similar to state-of-the-art poker-playing AI, which can now readily defeat the top human players. Nation-states would be tempted to endow these genius-level autonomous killing systems with the authority to escalate, bringing the risk of bad luck causing misunderstandings that lead to uncontrolled escalation. Exacerbating the risk of near-instant autonomous escalation is the risk of an AI system deciding that it, unlike a human, may have nothing to lose. A human commander might be a father or mother who might choose to put the preservation of the human race above nationalistic warmongering. Recall how Soviet air defense officer Stanislav Petrov (a father of two) saved the world in 1983 by choosing to disbelieve a computerized system that claimed a U.S. nuclear first strike was in progress. His decision may have included a desire to put mercy over patriotism and not to participate in the annihilation of the human race. Unfortunately, an AI system would have no such qualms. An AI system might or might not be trained with a self-preservation instinct. If not, it would not care if it is destroyed, and it could take needless risks, carelessly bluffing and escalating, seeking to make the adversary back down through suicidal brinksmanship. One might think, therefore, that it is important to endow battlefield AI systems with a self-preservation instinct, but the consequences of doing so could be even worse. Once a weaponized AI system is given a self-preservation instinct, it may become impossible to shut down, as it would kill anyone who tried to shut it off, including its own country’s military or government leaders. These killings might play out in several ways. On a small scale, the system could limit its “self-defense” killings by targeting only the officials trying to disable the AI system. Worse, the AI system could try to preserve itself by threatening mutually assured destruction: if it ever suspected, even incorrectly, that its shutdown was imminent, the AI system could retaliate with the launch of nuclear weapons. A dying AI system, still energized for a few milliseconds by the last electrical charge remaining in its internal capacitors, could even nuke not just its own nation but the entire surface of Earth.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: NC3 PIC** › War/Conflict

Klare, PhD, 20

(Michael T., SecurityStudies@hampshireEmeritus, , April)

Given these multiple risks, U.S. policymakers and their Chinese and Russian counterparts should be very leery of accelerating NC3 automation. Indeed, Shanahan acknowledged as much, saying nuclear command and control “is the ultimate human decision that needs to be made…. We have to be very careful,” especially given “the immaturity of technology today.” Exercising prudence in applying AI to nuclear command and control is the responsibility, first and foremost, of national leaders of the countries involved. In the United States, military officials have pledged to expose all new AI applications to rigorous testing, but Congress needs to play a more active role in overseeing these endeavors and questioning the merits of proposed innovations. At the same time, all three nuclear powers would benefit from mutual consultations over the perils inherent in increased NC3 automation and what technical steps might be taken to reduce the risk of inadvertent or accidental war. This could occur as an independent venture or in the context of the irregular strategic stability talks held by senior U.S. and Russian representatives. There is no more fateful decision a leader can make than to order the use of nuclear weapons. Ideally, such a decision will never have to be made. But so long as nuclear weapons exist, humans, not machines, must exercise ultimate control over their use.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: NC3 PIC** › War/Conflict

Negative turns are nonsense and should be assigned zero risk- even the head of the DOD AI program says no to autonomous nuclear weapons

Klare, PhD, 20

(Michael T., SecurityStudies@hampshireEmeritus, , April)

The quest to further automate key elements of the U.S. NC3 architecture is being driven largely by an altered perception of the global threat environment. Although the existing framework was always intended to provide decisionmakers with prompt warning of enemy nuclear attack and to operate even under conditions of nuclear war, the operational challenges faced by that system have grown more severe in recent years. Most notably, the decision-making system is threatened by the ever-increasing destructive capacity of conventional weapons, the growing sophistication of cyberattacks, and, as a result of those two, the growing speed of combat. The existing NC3 architecture was designed in the previous century to detect enemy ICBM and bomber launches and provide decision-makers with enough time, as much as 30 minutes in the case of ICBM attacks, to assess the accuracy of launch warnings and still ponder appropriate responses. These systems did not always work as intended—the history of the Cold War is replete with false warnings of enemy attacks—but the cushion of time prevented a major catastrophe.2 The reasonably clear distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, moreover, enabled military analysts to avoid confusing non-nuclear assaults with possibly nuclear ones. With the introduction of increasingly capable conventional weapons, however, the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons is being blurred. Many of the new conventionally armed (but possibly nuclear-capable) ballistic missiles now being developed by the major powers are capable of hypersonic speed (more than five times the speed of sound) and of flying more than 500 kilometers (the limit imposed by the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) and are intended for attacks on high-value enemy targets, such as air defense radars and command-and-control facilities. With flight durations of as little as five minutes, defensive NC3 systems have precious little time to determine whether incoming missiles are armed with nuclear or conventional missiles and to select an appropriate response, possibly including the early use of nuclear weapons.3 Cybercombat occurs at an even faster speed, potentially depriving nuclear commanders of critical information and communication links in a time of crisis and thereby precipitating inadvertent escalation.4 In the highly contested environment envisioned by the 2018 NPR report, decision-makers may be faced with an overload of inconclusive information and have mere minutes in which to grasp the essential reality and decide on humanity’s fate. Under these circumstances, some analysts argue, increased NC3 automation will prove essential. They claim that increased reliance on AI can help with two of the existing system’s most acute challenges: information overload and time compression. With ever more sensors, (satellite monitors, ground radars, and surveillance aircraft) feeding intelligence into battle management systems, commanders are being inundated with information on enemy actions, preventing prompt and considered decision-making. At the same time, the use of more hypersonic missiles and advanced cyberweaponry has compressed the time in which such decisions must be made. AI could help overcome these challenges by sifting through the incoming data at lightning speed and highlighting the most important results and by distinguishing false warnings of nuclear attack from genuine ones.5 Automation could be even more useful, advocates claim, in helping commanders, up to and including the president, decide on nuclear and non-nuclear responses to confirmed indications of an enemy attack. With little time to act, human decision-makers could receive a menu of possible options devised by algorithms. “As the complexity of AI systems matures,” the Congressional Research Service noted in 2019, “AI algorithms may also be capable of providing commanders with a menu of viable courses of action based on real-time analysis of the battle-space, in turn enabling faster adaptation to complex events.”6 Some analysts have gone even further, suggesting that in conditions of extreme time compression, the machines could be empowered to select the optimal response and initiate the attack themselves. “Attack-time compression has placed America’s senior leadership in a situation where the existing NC3 system may not act rapidly enough,” Adam Lowther and Curtis McGiffin wrote in a commentary at War on the Rocks, a security-oriented website. “Thus, it may be necessary to develop a system based on [AI], with predetermined response decisions, that detects, decides, and directs strategic forces with such speed that the attack-time compression challenge does not place the United States in an impossible position.”7 That commentary provoked widespread alarm about the possible loss of human control over decisions of nuclear use. Even some military officials expressed concern over such notions. “You will find no stronger proponent of integration of AI capabilities writ large into the Department of Defense,” said Lieutenant General Jack Shanahan, director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), at a September 2019 conference at Georgetown University, “but there is one area where I pause, and it has to do with nuclear command and control.” Referring to the article’s assertion that an automated U.S. nuclear launch ability is needed, he said, “I read that. And my immediate answer is, ‘No. We do not.’”8 Shanahan indicated that his organization was moving to integrate AI technologies into a wide array of non-nuclear capabilities, including command-and-control functions. Indeed, JAIC and other military components are moving swiftly to develop automated command-and-control systems and to ready them for use by regular combat forces. Initially, these systems will be employed by conventional forces, but the Pentagon fully intends to merge them over time with their nuclear counterparts.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: Regulations CP** › Enforcement

Only a ban can solve---norms and robust enforcement prove.

Freedberg, 19 [Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is the deputy editor for Breaking Defense, 3-11-2019, accessed on 6-30-2022, Breaking Defense, "Should We Ban 'Killer Robots'? Can We? - Breaking Defense", https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/should-we-ban-killer-robots-can-we/]/ISEE

UPDATED with Russell rebuttal WASHINGTON: We now live in a world where a Campaign To Stop Killer Robots is a deadly serious thing, officially endorsed by 26 national governments. (28, if you count Palestine and the Vatican). China is on that list, albeit with a huge asterisk: It wants to ban only the use of “lethal autonomous weapons systems,” not research, development and production. (After all, Beijing has an enormously ambitious plan to dominate AI by 2030.) The US is not on the list of countries who want to ban killer robots. Nor is Russia. Nor is the UK, nor are any of our leading allies. Should we be? Robert Work There’s a strong argument that the US has already sworn off “killer robots.” Civilian officials and military leaders alike have said for years the US will always keep a “human in the loop” for any use of lethal force. There is a waiver provision in Pentagon policy, but no one’s ever used it. Plus arms control is a hard sell in Washington these days. The US has finally abandoned the landmark INF Treaty after years of futilely complaining about well documented Russian violations. “The Department of Defense has no intention…. to go after what are now called ‘lethal autonomous weapons systems,'” says Bob Work, who as deputy secretary of defense under Obama did more than any other person to push the Pentagon to embrace AI. “What commander would want that?” But there’s a contradiction here, argues Stuart Russell, a Berkeley AI scientist and activist. “At present, the US is opposed to discussions on a Lethal Autonomous Weapons System treaty, while officially claiming not to be developing LAWS,” Russell told me. “This amounts to military suicide,” he argued: If you won’t build a new weapon yourself, why leave potential adversaries free to pursue it? The cynical answer, of course is that a ban would be so difficult to enforce it would only create a sense of false security. But might it have real benefits? XQ-58A Valkyrie “loyal wingman” drone, built by Kratos for Air Force Research Lab Benefits of a Ban? Russell emphasizes he doesn’t oppose all military uses of artificial intelligence, only AI that can kill without a human authorizing each attack. And if the US did agree to a ban on lethal artificial intelligence, it would make it much easier for computer scientists and engineers to work with their Pentagon on those other kinds of military AI, Russell argued, just as the Biological Weapons Convention let biologists develop defenses against germ warfare without fear their work would be perverted for offense. (In the US, that is. The Soviet Union massively violated the BWC, which had no inspection mechanism: just ask around about Bio Preparat and Ken Alibek). Stuart Russell “Having a ban in place would make it much easier to develop ATLAS-like technologies that can protect soldiers’ lives,” Russell said, citing an Army program to use AI to assist in aiming and targeting (but not firing) weapons. “Quite possibly there would have been much less pushback against Project Maven at Google, because researchers would have some assurance that the technology would not be used in autonomous weapons. There would be a big steel gate closing off the slippery slope.” Certainly, US civilian and military leaders insist, over and over, they want a “human in the loop” at all times for reasons both ethical and tactical. “The last thing I want is you to go away from this thinking this is all about technology,” Work said during a speech on his AI push back in 2015. “The number one advantage we have is the people in uniform, in our civilian work force, in our defense industrial base, and the contractors who support us.” If Russia or China decide to take their people out of the loop and rely on automation alone, Work argued, then we can beat them with our combination of humans plus machines — creativity and calculation, intuition and precision. Then there’s the ethical aspect — which also ties to the military’s deep cultural need to control the chaos of battle as much as possible. “The commander who uses a lethal autonomous weapons system that chooses its own target [is] delegating for his culpability for a law-of-war violation to a free-willed machine,” Work said at CNAS. “I’ve never talked to any commander in the West who’s said, ‘hey, that’s a real good idea.’” So if the US military doesn’t really want lethal AI, should we ban it? Well, one former defense official told me, that depends on what kind of AI you mean. What Work and other national security insiders are objecting to is an AI that can choose and revise its own objectives — in rough terms, what scientists mean when they talk about artificial general intelligence. US military leaders are not objecting to so-called narrow AI that can only perform certain pre-defined tasks: shoot down incoming missiles (which the Navy’s Aegis, not even an AI, can do already), for example, or hear a rifle fire, instantly calculate a return trajectory, and kill the sniper before he gets off a second shot. A drone’s eye view of the target in the anti-lethal AI video “Slaughterbots” Even a swarm of drones that hunt and kill specific individuals — one of Russell’s nightmare scenarios — would count as narrow AI, at least as long as human beings drew up the target list. (An AI that decides for itself who needs to die, perhaps based on a big-data analysis of terror suspects, might still not qualify as general AI, but it would give most generals a heart attack). And a drone that can recognize a “high value target” on sight, then kill him with three grams of explosives to the face, may be less likely to kill civilians by accident than human beings watching a long-distance video feed, then launching a Hellfire with a 20-pound warhead. UPDATE “This strategy of saying it’s not really autonomous unless it’s conscious/superhuman/mysterious is just a deflection tactic,” Russell told me after the original version of this article appeared. A “narrow” AI, he argued, is quite capable of carrying out genocidal orders — like killing every light/dark-skinned adult male — or making catastrophic errors — like mistaking children for adults — and repeating them with mindless efficiency long after a human would have starting asking questions. “I don’t think we should declare we will never use a lethal artificial narrow intelligence weapon, designed for specific battlefield missions,” the former defense official said. As for general AI, “we should debate whether or not we should pursue such a weapon, and if the answer is no, we should state it as policy.” What about an international treaty banning lethal AI, which would have the force of law? “Such a treaty would be very difficult to monitor and enforce,” the official said. “That doesn’t mean an international treaty should be ruled out.” Inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a potential model for the monitoring of military AI. The Enforcement Problem “Autonomous weapons have all of the features that make arms control hard,” said Paul Scharre, a former Army Ranger, now at CNAS, who worked on the current Pentagon policy. International inspectors can’t tell by looking at an unmanned tank, plane, or warship whether it’s programmed to ask a human for permission before opening fire. Even if they get to see the actual code — a security breach few countries would allow — “there’s nothing to stop you from upgrading the software as soon as the inspectors leave,” he told me. Paul Scharre “Having said that,” Scharre continued, “I think that the kind of arms control that Stuart Russell is advocating for is actually more feasible.” If someone’s building vast swarms of lethal mini-drones, you don’t have to see the code to know they have to be fully autonomous: There’s no practical way, Scharre told me, for humans to review and approve “a million targets.” Conversely, such mini-drones are only truly threatening in vast numbers. “A country or an individual… might be able to build a few hundred of these,” Scharre said, “but if you’re going to build millions of them, there’s no way to hide that.” So how would you find them? The best model is probably the Chemical Weapons Convention, which, unlike many other treaties — the Biological Weapons Convention, the landmine ban, and so on — has a robust enforcement mechanism. The scope of the problem is similar. Lethal chemicals like chlorine and phosgene are widely used in legitimate industry, so you can’t ban them outright any more than mini-drones; they’re relatively easy to turn into weapons, again like drones; and yet only rogue states like Syria and Iraq have used them since the end of World War I. Much of the reason militaries abandoned poison gas is that a weapon that blows with the wind is hard to control — yet another similarity with AI, since even “narrow” machine-learning algorithms modify themselves in ways beyond human understanding. But there is also a robust monitoring regime, run by the Organisation to Prevent Chemical Weapons, which has about 250 inspectors who can rapidly respond to reported violations. Such “challenge inspections” are a crucial tool, said Irakli Beridze, a Georgian-born veteran of both OPCW and the UNICRI chem, bio, radiological, & nuclear program — with service in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria — who now runs the Centre for AI & Robotics at UNICRI, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (Beridze emphasized he was only expressing his personal opinion as an expert, not as a UN official). Mini-drone production would be easier to hide than chemical plants — for one thing, it doesn’t stink like a lot of toxic chemicals — but investigative techniques have advanced since the CWC entered into force in 1997. It might even be possible, Beridze said, to set an AI to catch an AI: use artificial intelligence to crunch big data — social media or parts orders, for example — and correlate subtle clues no human inspector could catch. Irakli Beridze Robust inspections, however, are only one part of the solution, he told me. Countries need not only to sign the treaty but use their own intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement to watch for violations. And, after initial reluctance in the private sector, “buy-in and participation of the chemical industry… was absolutely essential,” he said. “Otherwise this treaty would not work.” Once compliance became a norm in the chemical industry, in large part because of the moral stigma that attached to chemical weapons, it became much harder to produce poison gas in militarily significant amounts. Given widespread anxiety in the tech community about lethal AI, it should be possible to reach a similar consensus among drone manufacturers — eventually. Getting private industry, law enforcement, and national governments on board, even simply making them aware of the problem, would take years. “We don’t have too much time,” Beridze warned. In a few years, “we will have a widespread technology where criminals can use small drones [for] mass terrorist attacks, assassinations, contract killing, you name it.” Emerging threats and complex challenges to situational awareness require a next generation of sensor systems. While it’s comforting to imagine that US hardware will only be directed at terrorists and Iranian threats, “Bahrain’s history of suppressing internal dissent with external weaponry suggests that these choppers may end up serving a police function during times of crisis, as well.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: Regulations CP** › Perm

Perm do the counterplan. Including meaningful human control is a way to mitigate the autonomy of the weapon.

Sauer, 21 [Frank Sauer is a Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University in Munich, March 2021, accessed on 6-30-2022, International Review of the Red Cross, "Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible", https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913]/ISEE

It should be noted up front that the term LAWS itself is problematic. After all, neither “lethality” nor “autonomy” are decisive factors in the debate. The military application of non-lethal force raises concerns as well (take the prohibition against blinding lasers as just one example), and the term “autonomy”, philosophically speaking, inappropriately anthropomorphizes machines that have limited agency and are incapable of reasoning and reflecting, as well as being unable to take on responsibility. Nonetheless, at this point the term LAWS is widely used as a shorthand, so the article will stick to this common vocabulary. Also, the article uses the term “regulation” – rather than, for instance, “ban” – because what potential new, binding international law on this issue is commonly understood to eventually codify is not a prohibition of a category of weapons. Instead, it is a positive obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of military force. And while one might argue that ensuring meaningful human control and prohibiting autonomous weapons (AKA “killer robots”) are two sides of the same coin, these two sides nevertheless represent different ways of approaching the issue, as I will argue further below. Lastly, I use the term “technology diffusion” rather than “proliferation” because the latter suggests a distribution from one or only a few points of departure (as in the case of nuclear proliferation) whereas the former suggests an omnidirectional spread from multiple sources, a more fitting picture in this case of widely (and oftentimes even commercially) available hardware and software.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: Regulations CP** › Gendered Stereotypes

They cannot regulate their way out of gendered warbots

Roff, 16 [Heather M. Roff works for the global security imitative at Arizona State University, 1-11-2016, accessed on 6-21-2022, Taylor & Francis, "Gendering a Warbot", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246]/ISEE

Finally, one might claim my arguments here are overstated. Some might argue that the gender of the warbot is the least of our issues. I think, however, that this objection misses the larger problems of gendered humanoid warbots. First, there is no ostensibly good reason to create masculinist humanoid robot fighters. If their function were to instill terror and be effective fighters, a variety of biomimetic robots would be far superior in this task and easier from a design standpoint. One could imagine a giant robot spider easily maneuvering around debris, as well as being generally terrifying (Dvorsky 2014). Second, the gendering of a humanoid warbot is a conscious political decision to perpetuate practices of domination. We have ample work from feminist philosophy, feminist IR and feminist security studies that shows the wide-ranging impact of such a decision. Implications will extend to areas such as targeting decisions during war, to leadership positions in government offices or to ideals of a republican citizenry. We must be critical of the beginnings of this process, for if Sjoberg (2013) is correct, and gender is “not just in war and/or our theories of it, but is fundamental to them, legitimating of them, and inseparable from them” (13–14), then gendered humanoid warbots will impact how we fight, when we fight and who we fight.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: Regulations CP** › Gendered Stereotypes

War programmers rely on gendered stereotypes posit the image of the child as the center of protection.

Roff, 16 [Heather M. Roff works for the global security imitative at Arizona State University, 1-11-2016, accessed on 6-21-2022, Taylor & Francis, "Gendering a Warbot", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246]/ISEE

Recently, concerns about weapons technology and “postmodern” war have come to the fore, and with them a crosspollination of particular feminist critiques between disciplines (Gray 1997; Wilcox 2009; Blanchard 2011; Manjikan 2013). I follow this trend here. As the vision of the humanoid robot fighter I am working from is one that is both physically humanoid and artificially intelligent (AI), we must look to how both the body and the artificial mind are constructed, and the gendered assumptions and practices involved in each. As to the physical body, I have already argued that designers of the DRC robots are explicitly and implicitly gendering their machines. A weapon becomes an artificially intelligent learning machine through its software architecture. There are two ways of considering how a gendered AI would arise: one where the programmers believe they are creating a genderless AI but it emerges gendered, and one where they purposefully create a gendered AI. Let us refer to the first as the Unintended Case and to the second as the Intended Case. The Unintended Case is one in which software designers, programmers or engineers (hereafter “programmers”) believe that they are creating AIs that are merely learning machines. Programmers are concerned with creating an AI that can fight effectively, reduce the monetary and manpower costs of war and extend the military’s and warfighter’s range. Gender has nothing to do with it. To reach these goals, programmers must find a way to make the warbot capable of: reasoning about its goals (and perhaps creating its own goals or subgoals); planning; learning from its experiences and thus formulating memories from which to draw; understanding communications through natural language (as opposed to symbolic language); perceiving the world around it through its sensors; and moving and manipulating objects, including but not limited to objects in the battlespace and its own weapons.14 They are attempting to make the warbot intelligent in order to be capable of “doing things that would require intelligence if done by men” (Minsky 1968, v). To reach this goal, programmers can draw from a variety of existing software programming techniques, such as creating symbolic systems, sub-symbolic systems or using statistical methods.15 Within each of these approaches there are also a variety of types, but for present purposes I will limit the discussion to the broader classes to show how gendered knowledge is transmitted into the system. A programmer working with a symbolic system will begin from a sufficiently large dataset (Adam 1998; Storrs Hall 2007). The general idea behind this approach is that an AI can simulate the problem-solving capacities of human minds, such as through searching for a solution by way of deduction (through logic), or reasoning by way of analogy or example when there is no general inference from logical predicates. The programmer provides a large dataset of “facts” and writes in a “fixed set of concepts” to the software architecture from which the AI can draw when confronted with a task or problem. For a warbot, this will of course mean a very complex set of factors and concepts, as it will require not merely information about its potential physical environment (e.g. hill, valley, road, building, stairs) but also more abstract concepts such as combatant and noncombatant. The base knowledge provided and the process by which it is accessed is key. What “facts” or pieces of information go into the database will affect the actions of the machine. If a data point or “piece” is not present, there is no opportunity for it to get there. An AI might be able to rearrange existing bits of information to combine them into new insights, but it will never generate something outside of its existing set of information structures. There is a gatekeeping function present in the construction of all symbolic representations. As Adam (1998) notes, “A formal system, in other words a computer system, is a political choice to maintain existing power structures” (108).16 To bring this back to gendered warbots, if programmers decide that “child” as an object or representation can never be paired with “combatant,” then the machine will not be capable of identifying child soldiers. Moreover, what constitutes “child” will have to be represented in some way. The process by which such “knowledge” is represented is thus crucial. As Adam (1998) explains, the problem about deciding “what sort of objects there are in the world” becomes another problem about knowledge about “facts,” and how a knowledge base about “facts” is recreated within a system of purely propositional knowledge” (39).17 The purely propositional knowledge approach is open to all of the feminist critiques from feminist epistemology, in particular, that there is some sort of Truth about which the facts must correspond and that knowledge derived from skills (such as a “knowing how”) is not real knowledge (Adam 1998, 114). Warfighting is as much an art as it is a science, and so prohibiting this kind of embodied or practical knowledge would appear to undermine the ability of a warbot to fight effectively. The most pressing problem for symbolic systems, however, comes from the direction of analogical reasoning. Faced with the certainty that warbots will encounter complex situations, which they cannot have prior knowledge of, they will require some mechanism to abstract the situation to one about which they do have some higher order representation. This is done by way of analogy. A program will have to break down the situation into smaller objects that it can represent, and then it will search its database for something that is analogous where the concepts are equivalent or appropriate. To find such an abstract analogy, the AI uses stereotypes (Adam 1998, 39).18 Programmers may not readily admit to this, claiming that “the important thing is to break the overall experience reflected in the memory into composable regularities” (Storrs Hall 2007, 221). “Composable regularities” might be that all hills are convex physical structures, but they might also be that “all women speak with a high voice” or “all combatants are men between 18 and 35.” Reasoning by analogy is a heuristic that humans employ when they are being cognitive misers and is not appropriate for complex situations requiring critical thought.