2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Biotech
Alex Zhavoronkov, 2022 (Zhavoronkov, author, writer of over 150 peer-reviewed journals and an expert in AI in relation to healthcare, longevity biotechnology, drug discovery and aging research. “Nature is Sexist. Can Advances In Longevity Biotechnology Help Restore Reproductive Equality?” Forbes. January 12, 2022. /// MF)
Evolution is a great concept. As AI scientists we use it all the time to develop better algorithms rewarding and punishing them according to their actions in simulated environments. But when nature does it to us it feels very cruel. Our objective is to master our environment, compete, reproduce, take care of our young, the young of our young, and then gracefully decline and die. And when it comes to females nature is especially unfair as they carry much of the burden of reproduction and caring for the young. And while males can reproduce almost as long as they can live, the female reproductive period is limited and while they generally live longer, after reaching menopause they need to adjust to the new realities as their bodies shift gears.
Aging is generally unfair but it is especially unfair to women.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Backlash
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Introduction, pg 1/// MF)
Why does gender matter in global politics? What difference does it make to view global politics through a gendered lens? What becomes visible when we see “international relations” as interconnected relations of inequality—among genders, races, classes, sexualities, and nationalities—as opposed to simply interactions between and among self-interested states? What are the costs of being inattentive to gendered dynamics in global politics for addressing a myriad of world problems that ultimately aff ect us all?
In this introductory chapter, an overview is presented of the contemporary relationships between gender and global politics. It begins with a conceptual discussion of gender as a dichotomous power relation and normative ordering power, referred to as the power of gen-der , a meta-lens that fosters dichotomization, stratifi cation, and depoliticization in thought and action through the processes of masculinization and feminization , thereby sustaining global power structures and crises that prevent, militate against, or reverse meaningful advances in social equality and justice. It then addresses why adopting not only a gender lens , but more importantly a gendered lens , informed by intersectional thinking, is important for understanding how the gender interacts with other power relations, such as race, class, sexuality, and nationality (including power relations among nations as well as those based on national origin) to produce both gender and gendered divisions of power , violence , and labor and resources in global governance, global security, and global political economy, the principal areas of inquiry in the study of International Relations (IR). These divisions, in turn, keep in place and exacerbate the crises of representation, insecurity, and sustainability in global politics, which are also introduced.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Essentialism
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pgs 85-86/// MF)
As argued in this chapter, the power of gender obscures and militates against the potential alliances between diverse women and men and among them across borders to resist war and other forms of violence. In the process, this chapter problematizes dominant constructions of security, examines the strategy of “adding women” to security structures and policies, desta-bilizes assumptions undergirding the gendered divisions of violence, and takes on contempo-rary forces that are expanding the crisis of insecurity. It is critical of “solutions” that put peacemaking and peacebuilding solely on the backs of poorly resourced and marginalized women and vilify only certain men to defl ect attention away from elites (including some women) who promote militarism and war in the name of security. But it also sees some value in what has been called “strategic essentialism” (Spivak 1987), which refers to the way groups of people like “women,” who are, in reality, non-homogeneous, have diverse experiences, and have multiple and even confl icting interests, can still make political claims as a group on the basis of what they perceive as their shared perspectives and conditions on the understanding that the commonalities they identify and strategically mobilize to make political demands for change are not timeless or the result of innate traits. As such, strategic essentialism constitutes a political strategy for diverse women to articulate interests in and paths to peace and act together (with supportive men) to bring about disarmed security.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Essentialism
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pgs 85-86/// MF)
As argued in this chapter, the power of gender obscures and militates against the potential alliances between diverse women and men and among them across borders to resist war and other forms of violence. In the process, this chapter problematizes dominant constructions of security, examines the strategy of “adding women” to security structures and policies, desta-bilizes assumptions undergirding the gendered divisions of violence, and takes on contempo-rary forces that are expanding the crisis of insecurity. It is critical of “solutions” that put peacemaking and peacebuilding solely on the backs of poorly resourced and marginalized women and vilify only certain men to defl ect attention away from elites (including some women) who promote militarism and war in the name of security. But it also sees some value in what has been called “strategic essentialism” (Spivak 1987), which refers to the way groups of people like “women,” who are, in reality, non-homogeneous, have diverse experiences, and have multiple and even confl icting interests, can still make political claims as a group on the basis of what they perceive as their shared perspectives and conditions on the understanding that the commonalities they identify and strategically mobilize to make political demands for change are not timeless or the result of innate traits. As such, strategic essentialism constitutes a political strategy for diverse women to articulate interests in and paths to peace and act together (with supportive men) to bring about disarmed security.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › alt fails
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pgs 40-41/// MF)
Over a half-century since feminist studies emerged and became institutionalized in the academy, feminist scholarship is now produced within and across most academic disciplines. Both within and outside IR, feminist critiques have altered disciplinary givens, challenged conventional explanations, and expanded the reach of intellectual inquiry. As noted earlier, feminists share a commitment to investigating gendered inequalities and to improving the conditions of women’s lives. But neither feminists nor women constitute a homogeneous category, and there is no single meaning of feminism. Like theoretical lenses or perspectives in IR, feminist approaches vary and have been characterized in a number of ways. 1 Most importantly, endless mixing is the rule, not the exception, so assuming that lenses constitute discrete “boxes” misrepresents the diversity, the range, and especially the extensive overlap among many perspectives. Individuals make assumptions that may be common to various lenses, they may make diff erent assumptions when focusing on diff erent substantive topics or normative issues, and how assumptions are mixed is an eff ect of learning, objectives, experience, and context. With these thoughts in mind, the following presents a very brief introduction to feminist lenses, especially those applied in the context of IR work, though transgressing the conventional boundaries of it.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › alt fails
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pgs 42-43/// MF)
Asking initially “Where are the women?” and subsequently “adding women”—and com-paring their positions to those of men—were and remain productive orientations. They make embodied women (and men) visible in our picture of world politics, illuminate how women and men are diff erently engaged with and aff ected by international politics, and reveal women as agents and activists, as well as victims of sociocultural, economic, and political oppres-sions. But adding women to existing paradigms also raised deeper questions by exposing how the conceptual structures themselves presuppose masculine experience and perspective. For example, women/femininity cannot simply be added to constructions that are constituted as masculine: the public sphere, rationality, political identity, objectivity, “economic man.” Either women as feminine cannot be added (e.g., women must become like men) or the con-structions themselves are transformed (e.g., adding women as feminine alters the masculine premise of the constructions and changes their meaning). In this sense, the exclusions of fem-ininity are not accidental or coincidental but rather are required for the analytical consistency of reigning explanatory frameworks.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › alt fails
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Introduction, pg 24/// MF)
The gender(ed), or intersectional feminist, lenses that arise from feminist in combination with other critical perspectives on global politics are applied to the traditional categories of global politics inquiry: global governance ( Chapter 3 ), global security ( Chapter 4 ), and global political economy ( Chapter 5 ). It is within these chapters that historical and contemporary gender(ed) divisions of power, violence, and labor and resources and the global crises of representation, insecurity, and sustainability they spawn are fl eshed out empirically and ana-lytically. The employment of multiple feminist perspectives and the empirical research they are generating foregrounds the substantial body of work that now exists in feminist IR, 6which is contributing to, as well as based on, data now being produced by IGOs and NGOs on the gender(ed) eff ects of global political priorities, processes, and institutions and attempts to ameliorate them. The diversity of feminist IR thought and research also aff ords more com-plex and sometimes confl icting gender or gendered analyses of global politics. The benefi ts of this diversity are that it militates against resorts to “quick fi xes” that can do more harm than good and ensures no single or hegemonic analysis that forecloses debate and further investigation within feminist inquiry. At the same time, weaknesses in feminist inquiry and appropriations of gender analysis in policymaking are raised when they fail to address the gendered power relations among women and among men that forestall more comprehensive critiques and resistances to processes that widen and deepen global and local inequalities.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › alt fails
Anne Runyan, 2019 (Runyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Interview – Anne Sisson Runyan” E-International Relations. March 8, 2019. /// MF)
In my work with V. Spike Peterson over several editions of Global Gender Issues between 1993 and 2014 and in my most recent , I came to make a distinction between a gender lens, which foregrounds masculine and feminine dynamics through which hierarchical dichotomies are naturalized and enforced in world politics, and a gendered lens, which attends to the ways in which race, class, sexual, and national power relations intersect with gender power relations to produce multiple, differing, and shifting femininities and masculinities. A gendered lens is necessary for seeing how gender combines in complex ways with other structural power relations, such as colonialism, imperialism, racism, and economic and environmental exploitation, to normalize a range of social, political, and economic divisions, inequalities, and injustices.
A gendered lens also resists the reduction of gender to “adding women” as is popular and problematic in policymaking circles. And it alerts us to the work that gender does, especially when deployed in this fashion, to cover up and smooth over what Spike and I termed global and systemic crises of representation, insecurity, and sustainability. An exemplar of how this works, which I address in the postscript of the second edition of , is in the case of the immediate aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, when increasing the number of risk-averse women financial managers was briefly trumpeted as a panacea for avoiding such crises in future, relying on biologically determinist constructions of women saviors from testosterone-fueled men. This discursive move (which did not result in any serious material change in the gender make-up of financial services personnel) served to sidestep critical analysis of the systemic nature and costs of gendered financialization.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › perm
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pg 46 /// MF)
Recent generations of feminist IR researchers (some of whom have worked in or with international agencies) also engage in a signifi cant amount of quantitative research to have a greater and more meaningful impact on international policymaking (Den Boer 2016). Although feminist IR scholars have long relied on governmental, non-governmental, and UN gender-diff erentiated data produced during and continuously since the UN Decade for Women (which are also used in this text), but knowing how incomplete and insuffi cient this most often statistical information can be, some are now producing extensive and continuously expanded and updated databases, such as WomanStats (see Box 2.1 ). Some have also engaged in large-scale studies, drawing upon existing, and creating new, databases, on the impact of international policymaking on women and the relationship between women’s status and global problems. For example, in the last decade, such research has showed that women’s literacy, access to reproductive health services, and employment have increased in states that have ratifi ed and observed CEDAW, most markedly in secular states with eff ective legal systems (Simmons 2009), and that the higher the level of violence against women within a state, the higher the likelihood it will engage in war, with violence against women rates being more signifi cant than levels of democracy, religion, wealth, and racial disparities as predictors of state peacefulness or bellicosity (Hudson et al. 2008/9). Such research is positivist to the degree that it treats gender (as well as race, class, nationality, and so on) as a variable, operationalizing it often as female sex and women’s rights in relation to a host of other variables. While this has yielded major fi ndings which tell us gender not only matters, but centrally matters in global politics, fem-inist IR researchers cannot control if and how policymakers make use of such fi ndings, nor does it particularly challenge the preference for positivist, quantitative measures in inter-national policymaking.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › uq
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pgs. 103-104 /// MF)
Although part of a longer and wider struggle for women’s security from militarized violence, the NGO Working Group on Women and International Peace and Security, consisting of the century-old WILPF, the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, Amnesty International, International Alert, the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Hague Appeal for Peace in collaboration with UNIFEM, is credited with the fi nal push to have the UN Security Council pass Resolution 1325 in 2000 (Cohn 2008: 187). Although non-binding, 1325 “calls on” the UN and member countries to do the following: protect women from gender-based violence (GBV) in war zones and include women (and gender perspectives) in peace negoti-ations, support their peacemaking initiatives in addition to providing gender-sensitive train-ing to peacekeepers, and engage in gender mainstreaming through UN monitoring of and reporting on the gender dimensions of confl ict and confl ict resolution, including the impact of armed confl ict on women and girls and the roles of women in peacemaking. As noted in Chapter 1 , this is part of the larger UN Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, which promotes the implementation of such resolutions, including the development of national action plans on women, peace, and security. 12 Within the context of this, TFNs have also been successful in having GBV included in the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty that obligates ratifying countries to ensure that the small arms they export are not used to conduct widespread GBV (Enloe 2014: 27).
However, the eff ects of 1325 have been muted at best. Widespread rapes in the DRC con-fl ict as well as in the Darfur genocide in Sudan and increased reports of rape by peacekeeping forces were featured in subsequent UN secretary-general studies and reports on women, peace, and security that were mandated by 1325. This acknowledgment of worsening gender violence in war led to the passage of additional UN Security Council resolutions that codify sexual violence as a matter of peace and security, call for the development and strengthening of measures to address sexual violence and to have more women present in peace operations and negotiations, mandate tracking of the implementation of 1325 and documenting of “credibly suspected” perpetrators of sexual violence in armed confl icts, and make HIV/AIDS resulting from sexual violence in armed confl icts a focus in peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes (DeLargy 2013).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – DA › AT: Politics › 2AC – Cyber Popular
Daniel Kroese 1/25, Associate Director of CISA's National Risk Management Center focusing on strategic engagement, 1/25/2022, “Bipartisan Cybersecurity Legislation — Continuing the Progress in 2022”, Paloalto Networks, https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2022/01/bipartisan-cybersecurity-policy/
Whether it’s government networks storing sensitive information or critical infrastructure systems, no entity is immune to cyber adversaries. Fortunately, the strong bipartisan consensus on cybersecurity threats has led to bipartisan interest in cybersecurity legislation.
At Palo Alto Networks, we appreciate the collaborative spirit on Capitol Hill, working with a wide range of stakeholders to get policy right. With the 2022 legislative calendar now in full swing, we see cybersecurity policy activity coalescing around several worthwhile pillars of activity.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – DA › AT: Politics › 2AC – Cyber Popular/Thumper
Jacky Rosen 6/3, American politician serving as the junior United States senator from Nevada since 2019, “Rosen, Young Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Strengthen Cybersecurity for Medical Devices”, Jacky Rosen, https://www.rosen.senate.gov/rosen-young-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-strengthen-cybersecurity-medical-devices
WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV), a member of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, recently introduced her bipartisan Strengthening Cybersecurity for Medical Devices Act with Senator Todd Young (R-IN), which would require the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review and update medical device cybersecurity guidelines and suggestions to ensure devices are protected from possible hacking and cyber attacks.
“In light of increased cyber threats, we must strengthen the security of our health care system’s cyber infrastructure,” said Senator Rosen. “This bipartisan bill I introduced with Senator Young will ensure that medical devices and technologies are up to date with the latest cybersecurity, protecting patients and health care systems.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – DA › AT: Politics › 2AC – Cyber Popular/Thumper
Stephen Silver 6/23, technology writer for the National Interest, 6/23/2022, “Cyber in Focus: Biden Signs Pair of Bipartisan Cybersecurity Bills”, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/cyber-focus-biden-signs-pair
This week, President Biden signed a pair of new bipartisan cybersecurity bills into law. According to The Hill, the bills are the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program Act and the State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act. The two bills were generally noncontroversial and passed without much vocal opposition from members of either party.
In May, Biden issued an executive order on cybersecurity, titled Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity. The president also thanked the bipartisan sponsors of the legislation.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – DA › AT: DoD Tradeoff › 2AC – Thumper
Demetri Sevastopulo ’22, US-China Correspondent, “US and Australia boost space and cyber co-operation to counter China”, Financial Times, Ali
The US and Australia are boosting security co-operation in space and the cyber domain as the Indo-Pacific allies strengthen efforts to counter China, which is investing heavily in space and weapons such as hypersonic missiles. Admiral John “Lung” Aquilino, head of US Indo-Pacific Command, said the nations wanted to accelerate what the Pentagon calls “integrated deterrence”, combining all the elements of the military power of the US and its allies. “We’ve come a long way in a short time to be able to integrate the space and cyber domains,” said Aquilino, adding that Australia had capabilities that made it an “extremely high-end partner”. “We’re going to continue to work that and move the ball even further to synchronise those domains with our allies and partners,” the former Navy “Top Gun” fighter pilot told the Financial Times in an interview. Aquilino was joined by General James Dickinson, head of US Space Command, and Lieutenant General Charles “Tuna” Moore, an Air Force fighter pilot who serves as deputy head of US Cyber Command. The three flag officers were speaking ahead of meetings with Australian military and intelligence officials at Pine Gap, a top-secret joint US-Australia intelligence facility near Alice Springs that is instrumental in operating American reconnaissance satellites. Dickinson said Australia, which has just launched its own Space Command, was a critical partner in efforts to improve “space domain awareness” and monitor Chinese space operations. He said Australia helped allies overcome what the military calls the “tyranny of distance”.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – DA › AT: Ambiguity DA › 2AC – Article IV Solves
John R Deni 19; Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute; November 1st, 2019 “The Paradox at the Heart of NATO’s Return to Article 5”.
However, in several important aspects, the Alliance response remains handicapped. Although NATO declared in 2016 and again in 2018 that it could consider a hybrid attack as grounds to invoke Article 5, the bar seems high – perhaps impossibly so. Achieving consensus – and quickly – in the face of an ambiguous attack or in response to ostensibly unrelated low-level provocations will not be an easy task. Perhaps more importantly, NATO remains in a defensive crouch when it comes to grey-zone challenges – Alliance rhetoric, exercises and actions emphasise response and reaction. It is precisely for this reason that grey-zone challenges against NATO are likely to be effective – actors such as Russia and China are evidently undeterred by the Alliance’s defensive posture, and attacks on Western institutions continue to this day. To be clear, defence is important, but in the current international security environment, offense and the competitive actions in between the two are equally important.
Given the arguably inadequate Alliance response to date, some guideposts may be helpful to illuminate the path ahead as NATO attempts to ensure collective defence remains robust into its eighth decade. First, Article 5 is an imperfect tool for determining when and where the West must spend blood and treasure in defence of its interests and way of life. Despite Alliance rhetoric regarding hybrid warfare as a potential Article 5 trigger, the threshold for Alliance-wide action is too high, and adversaries like Russia and China know it – this is why they pursue grey-zone tactics in the first place. To facilitate the speedy response that will be necessary to meet the needs of Allied defence against grey-zone challenges, greater, routine use can be made of Article 4 and Alliance-wide consultations and coordination on issues and topics that go beyond conventional military operations that are NATO’s bread and butter. For instance, the Alliance can and should conduct more vigorous, regular consultations and intensified coordination on topics such as keeping Chinese investment out of sensitive information-technology and logistics sectors, limiting and rolling back Russian broadcast and print media penetration of Western markets, undermining the Kremlin’s and Putin’s trustworthiness within Russia, and exposing Russian and Chinese official corruption at home and abroad, all as mechanisms to compete and thereby strengthen collective defence.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – DA › AT: Ambiguity DA › 2AC – Ambiguity Bad
Whitney L. Cissell 20; MA thesis in Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Army Major, Nuclear Nonproliferation Officer, March 2020, "DETERRENCE IN THE DANGER ZONE: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN DETER RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE CONFLICT", https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/64844
The stability–instability paradox applies to the nuclear and conventional level, and indeed, Russia’s effort to avoid conventional-level warfare with the United States strengthens stability between the states at the conventional level similar to the strategic nuclear level. While U.S.–Russian nuclear stability is based on parity, conventional stability in this relationship is more complex. As shown in Chapter II, Russia has a strong aversion to conflict with the United States and NATO at the conventional level. Russia would be outmatched in military superiority after two to three weeks of conflict and beyond its near abroad and, thus, prefers to operate at the sub-conventional level below the threshold of armed conflict.227 In effect, Russia’s strategy of avoiding any actions that might trigger conventional conflict aims to bolster a sort of “firewall” between conventional warfare and gray zone conflict. NATO, up to now, has effectively obliged this Russian strategy by not brandishing threats of conventional escalation in response to Russian gray zone aggression, let alone undertaking conventional responses. As much as Russia seeks to avoid escalation to conventional warfare it could not win, it is also learning how averse NATO is to threaten such escalation. This aversion is ironic insofar as Cold War–era extended deterrence relied on NATO’s threat of escalatory nuclear responses to conventional attacks.
These respective Russian and NATO postures enhance conventional stability, but at the cost of fueling instability at the gray zone level, reflecting a form of the stability– instability paradox familiar in nuclear strategies. This tailored application of the stability– instability paradox to the specific Russian context yields a tiered relationship of stability between the United States and Russia at each level of warfare, as depicted in Figure 1, and helps explain why the United States and Russia are the most unstable at the subconventional level, on which this research focuses.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – CP › AT: Unilat CP › 2AC – NATO Key
-National action can’t solve questions of international legitimacy, protecting the environment, and joint operations. CP key to beat out Russia and China
James Clay Moltz 11, professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, October 2011, “Coalition Building in Space: Where Networks are Power,”
The issue of spacecraft vulnerability relates to certain basic facts of orbital physics combined with the relative transparency of space to radar, optical, and infrared observation. 6 These conditions make spacecraft liable to tracking by even amateur astronomers with only moderately sophisticated equipment, which is easily obtainable by any entry-level space power. While more complex guidance technology is required for actual attacks on space assets and a global network of radars is needed for conducting post-attack assessments of damage done, the ability of even moderately advanced space powers to conduct significant counterspace activities is not in question. Thus far, only Russia, the United States, and China have tested kinetic capabilities, but a number of other countries (including Iran) have carried out lesser forms of electronic interference. As a major space assessment conducted by NATO's Joint Air Power Competence Centre in 2009 reported on some of the current vulnerabilities faced by the alliance in space:
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – CP › AT: Unilat CP › 2AC – NATO Key
Dr. Beyza Unal 19, Former Deputy Director of the International Security Program, July 1 2019, “Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets”, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/07/cybersecurity-natos-space-based-strategic-assets-0/2-cyber-risks-space-based-strategic \\SYang
Space systems, which include both satellites and ground stations, as well as related space products and services, provide mission-critical information both for NATO’s member states and for the alliance as a whole. NATO relies on space-based assets for almost all of its operations and missions.29 Some of the critical missions that rely on space assets include: defence of NATO’s territory and the neighbouring regions; peacekeeping missions; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; counterterrorism; and conflict prevention activities.
NATO does not own satellites. It owns and operates a few terrestrial elements, such as satellite communications (SATCOM) anchor stations and terminals. It requests access to products and services but does not have direct access to satellites, leaving it up to its allies to determine whether they provide access to their satellite capabilities. NATO has established memoranda of understanding with allies for possible use of space products and services.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – CP › AT: Unilat CP › 2AC – NATO Key
Liina Lumiste 19, Legal researcher on international law and advisor on domestic public law, xx/xx/2019, “Space – NATO cyber security’s weak spot”, https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/chatham-house-report-space-nato-cyber-securitys-weak-spot/ \\SYang
In 2018, Norwegian military and allied officials confirmed that Russia had disrupted NATO’s Trident Juncture exercise in Europe’s High North region by persistently jamming GPS signals during the exercise. China has claimed ‘the ability to use space-based systems and to deny them to adversaries as central to modern warfare’. As the dependence of military operations on space-based assets has increased exponentially over the last few decades and space-based assets are potential targets for cyber attack, the newly released Chatham House research paper ‘Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets‘ suggests that NATO should bring space more to the spotlight. The research paper lists cyber threats to space-based strategic assets and capabilities, analyses capability requirements and gives concrete recommendations for ways improve the resilience of the space-based systems.¶ Space-based assets as targets for cyber attacks¶ Strategic military systems depend on space-based assets for the provision of data and for many capabilities, such as positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile defence, communications, space situational awareness (SSA) as well as environmental monitoring. For accurate timing and navigation in PNT systems, NATO uses the global positioning system (GPS) which is also well known and widespread in civil use. ISR information and imagery is collected through surveillance and reconnaissance sensors. Both systems are satellite-based. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems also rely on satellite-based ‘beyond-line-of-sight’ communication. These are only a few of the possible examples. In addition to the abundance of capabilities, it is noteworthy that the capabilities are also linked and therefore affecting one capability may cause collateral effects on others.¶ As explained in the Space Threat Assessment 2018 published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), there are several intrusion points for space-based assets: antennas on satellites and ground stations, landlines that connect ground stations to terrestrial networks, and user terminals that connect to satellites. This can result in data or data traffic monitoring, inserting false or corrupted data in the system, or even the permanent loss of a satellite. As with every other technology, people have the potential to be the weakest link in the cyber defence of space-based assets – social engineering is an important tool for the adversary.¶ Vulnerabilities¶ The research paper highlights some of the most important vulnerabilities: use of commercial companies; ‘back-doors’; dual use of satellites; and supply chain security of space technology. Chatham House reports have touched on these topics before. The question of supply chain was raised in the Livingstone and Lewis 2016 report, which observed that there was no coherent global organisation with regard to cyber security in space and that existing approaches had only limited reach into the supply chain. In this year’s research paper, it is again stressed that when the supply chain does not ensure that military security standards are met, items procured may expose NATO systems to vulnerabilities.¶ NATO by itself does not own satellites, but is dependent on member states. In case of need, NATO requests access to products and services from the allies. NATO allies procure equipment and software, which will be integrated into their national defence infrastructure. In most cases, military and commercial assets are not separate. Therefore, NATO does not rely only on military assets, but also uses commercial, civilian and national or multinational assets for operations. Even though commercial methods have proven to be effective, they are accompanied by the inherent risk of lower security requirements. Data exchange between civil and military sectors may cause extra vulnerabilities. As most of the space-based capabilities are dual-use, meaning that assets are used both for military and civilian purposes, the Chatham House research paper recommends that operators ‘apply higher-grade military hardening and cyber protection specifications to civilian capabilities that have the potential to be used in support of military applications’.¶ The research paper also highlights the aspect of NATO’s dependency on member states for communication capacity as a possible source of vulnerabilities. NATO owns satellite communications (SATCOM) ground stations, but no satellites; it is therefore highly reliant on allies to provide space-sourced data, information and services. In addition, ensuring the security of space capabilities is mostly in the hands of the allies. This puts NATO into a position where its main option to protect capabilities of vital importance is to encourage allies to put effort into securing the space-based assets and foster cooperation in space-based systems cyber security.¶ Space as a domain of operations?¶ During the Brussels Summit in 2018, the Alliance recognised space as a ‘highly dynamic and rapidly evolving area, which is essential to a coherent Alliance deterrence and defence posture’ and on 27 June 2019, it approved new space policy. As claimed by NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, the space policy gives guidance on opportunities and challenges and is not about militarising space, but about information sharing and increasing interoperability. The research paper suggests that, in addition to policy, NATO needs to agree upon space doctrine. While policy directs, assigns tasks and prescribes desired capabilities, doctrine provides principles of how operations should be planned, prepared, commanded, conducted, sustained, terminated and assessed.1¶ This suggestion becomes even more relevant when taking into consideration recent announcements by some NATO diplomats about NATO’s aims to recognise space as a domain of warfare during the London summit at the end of 2019. This indeed would be a big step towards focusing more on space-based assets and their vulnerabilities. Considering the current context, in which China and Russia are increasing their presence in space, this action by NATO is inevitable. Whether or not NATO claims space as a domain, adversaries will nevertheless develop their aggressive capabilities, from cyber operations to anti-satellite missiles. Therefore, it is prudent to update the approach towards space and space-based assets to face new challenges.¶ Yet, claiming space to be a domain of warfare highlights legal considerations. The Chatham House research paper raises a question from the cyber perspective: whether a cyber attack on a space system has to have kinetic consequences in order to give grounds for collective self-defence according to the Washington Treaty. This can be supplemented with a question on whether causing kinetic consequences that result in debris breaches the responsibility not to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, as stipulated in article 35 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.2¶ Another question raised is targeting dual-use space technology in international humanitarian law (IHL). The principle of distinction foresees the duty to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civil and military objects. As in the case of cyber objectives,3 dual-use satellites should be counted as military objectives, but would be subject to the rule of proportionality and requirement to take precautions in attack.4¶ Conclusion¶ The Chatham House research paper makes recommendations that more or less all stress the same things: NATO is highly dependent on space capabilities; space-based systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks and will become more and more appetising targets for adversaries; and NATO must foster cooperation and information sharing between member states. Overlooking these aspects could undermine the credibility of the information provided through the space-based systems, which would in turn affect deterrence and strategic liability. In the broader view, destabilising space-based assets would not only affect military conduct, but also have severe effects on civil infrastructures.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – CP › AT: Unilat CP › 2AC – NATO Key
Nicholas Nelson 22, Senior Fellow for Emerging Tech and Policy at the Center for European Policy Analysis, 1/27/2022, "Space — NATO’s Fuddled Frontier," https://cepa.org/space-natos-fuddled-frontier/, sg
First and foremost, whether or not NATO should pursue its own indigenous capabilities within the space domain is an ongoing dialogue. This is not without precedent, as NATO still operates its own airborne early warning (AWACS) and RQ-4D Global Hawk drones. That said, it seems those arguing for a minimalist approach are winning the strategy discussions. This is unfortunate for an alliance that continues to evolve: without its own space capabilities, NATO could be relegated to observer status in a future conflict.
This leads to the critical issue of Article 5. The policy statement says: “A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” This leaves much to the imagination.