Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Settler Colonialism K › 1NC---Shell

The affirmative’s free flowingness and multiplicity places indigeneity as a transient quality – “becoming” reduces the native to a colonial reverent, but never as a milieu from which becoming emerges.

Byrd 11 [Jodi A. Byrd (Chickasaw) is assistant professor of American Indian studies and English at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign.; “The Transit of Empire”; pp. 17-21; 2011; https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-transit-of-empire#:~:text=Jodi%20Byrd's%20book%20The%20Transit,the%20larger%20project%20of%20decolonization.]//eleanor

The Indian—as a threshold of past and future, regimes of signs, alea, becoming, and death—combats mechanisms of interpretation through an asignifying disruption that stops, alters, and redirects flow. This stopping of the world of signification is the same as Derrida’s “tattooed savage” at the beginning of deconstruction. The Indian sign is the field through which poststructuralism makes its intervention, and as a result, this paradigmatic and pathological Indianness cannot be circumvented as a colonialist trace. In fact, this colonialist trace is exactly why “the Indian” is so disruptive to flow and to experimentation. Every time flow or a line of flight approaches, touches, or encounters Indianness, it also confronts the colonialist project that has made that flow possible. The choice is to either confront that colonialism or to deflect it. And not being prepared to disrupt the logics of settler colonialism necessary for the terra nullius through which to wander, the entire system either freezes or reboots. It seems slightly ironic, then, that many who pick up Deleuze and Guattari’s work use language similar to “Experiment, don’t signify and interpret!” to describe the possibilities of reframing the world through affect and affective relationships that move toward the states of enchantment, ecstasy, and the everyday. Brian Massumi’s cultivation of deviation and contagion to foster radicalism at the crossroads between science, humanities, and cultural studies contains similar Castanedian staccato imperatives: “Let it. Then reconnect it to other concepts, drawn from other systems, until a whole new system of connection starts to form. Then, take another example. See what happens. Follow the new growth. You end up with many buds. Incipient systems.”⁶⁶ In a gesture towards “a thousand tiny races” in which he provides an alternative future for race to that of Paul Gilroy’s After Race, Arun Saldanha writes, “Race should not be eliminated, but proliferated, its many energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic.”⁶⁷ Jasbir Puar’s delineation of the biopolitics of the now in Terrorist Assemblages depends on A cacophony of informational flows, energetic intensities, bodies, and practices that undermine coherent identity and even queer anti-identity narratives . . . assemblages allow for complicities of privilege and the production of new normativities even as they cannot anticipate spaces and moments of resistance, resistance that is not primarily characterized by oppositional stances, but includes frictional forces, discomfiting encounters, and spurts of unsynchronized delinquency.⁶⁸ Each of these cultural studies moments flow from the phrase “Experiment, don’t signify and interpret!” that functions as a call for transformational new worlds of relation and relationship that move us toward a joyously cacophonic multiplicity and away from the lived colonial conditions of indigeneity within the postcolonizing settler society.⁶⁹ This Deleuzian and Guattarian motif, even if it acknowledges all the divergent discourses that come into race, gender, sexual, and class assemblages, smoothes once again into uncultivated wilderness that allows any trajectory or cultivation to enter it, but not arise from it. By extension, and even if one cannot access how these evocations of “the Indian” function within the plateaus opened by Deleuze and Guattari, “the Indian” serves as an errant return of the repressed that spreads along its own line of infection once the theory is taken up.⁷⁰ For example, Jasbir Puar, by restricting her analysis to the biopolitics of the post-9/11 coming out of U.S. empire as “an event in the Deleuzian sense, privileging lines of flight, an assemblage of spatial and temporal intensities, coming together, dispersing, reconverg- ing,” can discuss as sui generis the monster-terrorist-fag that emerges in the twenty-first century as a new phenomenon, despite the Wanted posters in New York the week after 9/11 that compared Osama bin Laden to Geronimo.⁷¹ Additionally, Puar discusses Jessica Lynch as a “heroic girlnext-door” in conversation with a “depraved, cigarette-toting, dark-haired, pregnant and unmarried, racialized” Lynndie England at Abu Ghraib. Puar does not even acknowledge Hopi Lori Piestewa, reportedly the first American Indian woman to die in combat while fighting for the United States. Piestewa died in the same attack in which Jessica Lynch was captured, and her absence is a telling amnesia within Puar’s discussion of how “nostalgically mourning the loss of the liberal feminist subject” converges “white liberal feminists and white gay men” and “unwittingly reorganizes the Abu Ghraib tragedy around their desires” through the now racialized body of the no longer white Lynndie England.⁷² Piestewa’s absence is yet another deferral that vanishes the violences done to indigenous women, and those same indigenous soldiers’ cathexis of U.S. nationalism and imperialism that signals an indigenationalism compatriot to the homonationalism that Puar defines as “the arrangements of U.S. sexual exceptionalisms [marked] explicitly in relation to the nation” that demobilize queer identities by normativizing certain bodies but not others within the enfranchisements of the state.⁷³ To phrase this slightly differently, the Indian is simultaneously, multiply, a colonial, imperial referent that continues to produce knowledge about the indigenous as “primitive” and “savage” otherness within poststructuralist and postcolonial theory and philosophy. As a philosophical sign, the Indian is the transit, the field through which presignifying polyvocality is re/introduced into the signifying regime, and signs begin to proliferate through a series of becomings—becoming-animal, becoming-woman, becoming-Indian, becoming-multiplicity—that serves all regimes of signs. And the Indian is a ghost in the system, an errant or virus that disrupts the virtual flows by stopping them, redirecting them, or revealing them to be what they are and will have been all along: colonialist. The Indian, then, is a Deleuzian event within poststructuralism: “To the extent that events are actualized in us,” Deleuze writes, “they wait for us and invite us in.”⁷⁴ For Derrida, as he grieved and mourned the loss of his friend and colleague, and saw in that loss the passing of a generation of thought, the event in Deleuze’s work becomes the Event, death, the paradox of humorous conformity of a leaping in place, an apotheosis of will. “‘It is in this sense that Amor fati is one with the struggle of free men,’” Derrida quotes from Deleuze.⁷⁵ Nietzsche’s love of fate, the invitation inherent in the will of the event opposes the ressentiment of resignation to become the point “at which war is waged against war, the wound would be the living trace of all wounds, and death turned on itself would be willed against all death.”⁷⁶ On the threshold, then, of “the necessity with the aleatory, chaos and the untimely” that is both the work of Derrida’s mourning of Deleuze and the haksuba of Southeastern cosmologies that Choctaw scholar LeAnne Howe defines in her work as headache, chaos, the collision of Upper and Lower Worlds initiated by colonialism, the Indian wills against the signifying system.⁷⁷ That the Indian represents the violent slamming of worlds in what might otherwise be fluidity and flow helps us frame the problem within a U.S. empire, with ties to Enlightenment liberalism, that continues to transit itself globally along lines put to flight by “the Indian without ancestry” that makes everyone its progeny. It is untimely as a site of the death of signification. That haksuba can additionally mean “to be stunned with noise, confused, deafened” signals the degree to which cacophony, whether joyous or colonialist, hinges upon the disruptions caused when “the Indian” collides with the racial, gendered, classed, and sexed normativities of an imperialism that has arisen out of an ongoing settler colonialism.⁷⁸ The Southeastern cosmologies of the Chickasaw and Choctaw imagine worlds with relational spirals and a center that does not so much hold as stretches, links, and ties everything within to worlds that look in all directions. It is an ontology that privileges balance, but understands that we are constant movement and exist simultaneously among Upper and Lower Worlds, this world and the next. In her poem “The Place the Musician Became a Bear,” Mvskoke poet and musician Joy Harjo sings about how Southeastern Indians have always known “where to go to become ourselves again in the human comedy. / It’s the how that baffles, the saxophone can complicate things.”⁷⁹ Harjo reminds us that there is always a prior “becoming-human” within Southeastern worlds that links us to the complications and improvisations of stars, spirals, and jazz. Much of the scholarship on U.S. imperialism and its possible postcoloniality sees it as enough to challenge the wilderness as anything but vacant; to list the annihilation of indigenous nations, cultures, and languages in a chain of –isms; and then still to relegate American Indians to the site of the already-doneness that begins to linger as unwelcome guest to the future. This last is particularly relevant to understanding how the United States propagates itself as empire transhemispherically and transoceanically, not just through whiteness, but through the continued settling and colonizing of indigenous peoples’ lands, histories, identities, and very lives that implicate all arrivants and settlers regardless of their own experiences of race, class, gender, colonial, and imperial oppressions. My point in tracing the Deleuzian wilderness and the Indian deferred is to detail the ways in which “the Indian” is put to flight within Western philosophical traditions in order to understand how the United States transits itself globally as an imperial project. As Derrida and Deleuze are evoked within affect theories, the “Indian” and “tattooed savages” remain as traces. Any assemblage that arises from such horizons becomes a colonialist one, and it is the work of indigenous critical theory both to rearticulate indigenous phenomenologies and to provide (alter)native interpretative strategies through which to apprehend the colonialist nostalgias that continue to shape affective liberal democracy’s investment in state sovereignty as a source of violence, remedy, memory, and grievability.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Settler Colonialism K › 1NC---Shell

The 1AC is a performance of white fluidity – their forwarding of “becoming” is a ruse of subjectlessness that allows Settler’s to rescue settler futurity at the expense of genocide.

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King is assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies; “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”; Critical Ethnic Studies; Spring 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?casa_token=Ayg-S-eXLu4AAAAA%3AaGlHrzMA9tWXklUEbQHL0P7GcNfaYbAs9EQAog6pgi3kUWD0hjWhL3xATIEZ963qYqlLTAlQTz2zxgcJIMo5i1APwp3OEbbEwfkmhNFDocRcFeKS&seq=1]//eleanor

Poststructuralist traditions that attempt to transcend identity actually function as a ruse of subjectlessness. In fact, queer subjectlessness and nonrepresentational rhizomes are an expression of a posthumanism that resuscitates normative subjects through the death of Black and Indigenous peoples. Continental theory has not typically had the stomach for sustaining an investigation of the kind of unspeakable violence that enabled the Marxist worker, queer, and affective subjectless discourses (one can only strive for subjectlessness if you possess it) to exist. The erasure of the (white) body-as- subject- as- ontology has been more effective in covering the bloody trail of white/human- self- actualization than it has been at successfully offering a way around and beyond the entrapments of liberal humanism. According to Amber Jamilla Musser, even in its postidentitarian and subjectless modes, continental theories’ transgressive moves (affective, sensational, masochistic) tend to reinstantiate the white male (sometimes queer) subject that it hopes to overcome.44 While not throwing away affect theory in Sensational Flesh, Musser scrutinizes white queer theory’s moves toward subjectless, futurelessnes, and masochism as gestures that actually recover and reify a subject (often white male gay) as they seek to annihilate the subject. Because of this, Musser refuses to read sensations like masochism in an exceptional vein. She explains, “I seek to reinvigorate these other ways of reading masochism, particularly because reading it as exceptional reifies norms of whiteness and masculinity and suppresses other modes of reading power, agency, and experience.”45 As Musser suspects, those who claim a radical subjectless must do so through the abjection of others. Men who claim masochism must become like (or reify) the position of the feminine-as- debased other without a self in order to then occupy this position of subjectlessness. A fixing of an abject position through the (female, Black, Indigenous) body of the other must occur; then, an evacuation of the other’s body must take place in order for the embalming of or supplanting of the body with the white normative male figure. While Musser does not entirely refuse Deleuze and Guattari’s nonrepresentational gesture, she does practice a kind of detached and suspicious read of the forms of violence that can be enacted in white moves beyond the human. Musser treats queer theories’ evangelists of loss and futurelessness, Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman, as nonexceptional and even potentially dangerous to subjects who inhabit the abject spaces that white bourgeois men try to occupy. In the 2015 GLQ roundtable discussion titled “Queer Inhumanisms,” Zakiyyah Iman Jackson reiterated the suspicion that posthumanism is a ruse for white human ascendency. Similar to Musser, Jackson knows that there is often a subject lurking within the bowels or lines of nonrepresentational discourse. Jackson indicts posthumanist calls to move to the “beyond” for reproducing a false and dishonest European transcendentalism. Thus a call for movement in the direction of the “beyond,” issued in a manner that suggests that this call is without location, and therefore with the appearance of incognizance regarding its situated claims and internal limits, returns us to a Eurocentric transcendentalism long challenged.46 Jackson argues that a call for movement beyond always happens from a very specific place. The posthumanist’s horn often blows from a place situated securely within the folds of humanity. This is a very different place than the space of nonbeing from which Black and Indigenous peoples moan, sing, or speak. Native feminist refusal and Black feminist abolitionist skepticism function as intervening comportments, dispositions, and modes of critique that expose the violent and unself- conscious ways that Western theory attempts to move beyond the human through the annihilation of the Other. Because the crafting of the human is a process of relations, specifically the relations of negation, then moving beyond the violence of the human is also a relational process. Transcendence is a relational process of accountability. White subjects cannot transcend identity (e.g., whiteness, queerness), the subject (self- writing and autonomy), or the human (self- actualization) without ending Native genocide and anti- Black racism. Identities, subjects, and the human as they are currently configured come into formation through processes of negation. If there is no plan to enable Black and Indigenous life, then there is no transcending the violence of the human. The scholarship of Native/Indigenous and Black feminists force continental theory to come outside itself and gaze on the way even the various attempts of nonrepresentational theory to annihilate the self actually end up reinventing the subject and the human through new forms of violent invention. This article argues that both refusal and skepticism can work in tandem and interrupt the performance of white innocence through less- than- effective attempts to evade representation that jettison the garb of the human without abolishing the need for Black and Indigenous death.47

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Settler Colonialism K › 1NC---Shell

Lines of flight are colonial imaginings that require a structural opposition to indigeneity, giving geospatial birth to the ‘line’ itself

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King is assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies; “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”; Critical Ethnic Studies; Spring 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?casa_token=Ayg-S-eXLu4AAAAA%3AaGlHrzMA9tWXklUEbQHL0P7GcNfaYbAs9EQAog6pgi3kUWD0hjWhL3xATIEZ963qYqlLTAlQTz2zxgcJIMo5i1APwp3OEbbEwfkmhNFDocRcFeKS&seq=1]//eleanor

If Byrd’s refusal is a first- order engagement and argument, then Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s interrogation of the spatial vocabularies of the human and colonialism is a second- order analysis and practice of refusal, one that reroutes us and makes us ask new questions. As Smith has argued in her classic work Decolonizing Methodologies, “there is a very specific spatial vocabulary of colonialism which can be assembled around three concepts: (1) the line, (2) the centre, and (3) the outside.”33 The Deleuzian and Guattarian line of flight then also emerges from the colonial spatial imaginings of the colonizer. Within Western ideas and philosophical conceptions of temporality and spatiality, like Deleuze and Guattari’s line, time and space have been categorized and imagined as entities that can be measured. In Smith’s account, “Space came to be seen as consisting of lines which were either parallel or elliptical.”34 Rather than escaping the reterritorializing capture of colonial and state power, Deleuzian and Guattarian “lines of flight” coalesce with the line’s emergence as a way to map “territory, to survey land, to establish boundaries, and mark the limits of colonial power.”35 While not intended to mark boundaries or colonize Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the line of flight, rhizomatic and violent movements to produce a land of Indigenous peoples without ancestors continues rather than ruptures colonial violence.36 As Deleuze and Guattari attempt to move away from an “I” or “a subject,” through the use of nonrepresentational and nomadic “lines of flight,” they successfully resurrect the human through the geo- epistemology of the “line.” Within humanist cognitive frames, lines emerge in response to chaos. The line, which seeks to separate “order” from “chaos,” falls into formation with what Sylvia Wynter identifies as “the structural oppositions” that order humanist thought.37 Even the “line of flight” establishes a linear/nonlinear structural opposition that demarcates the “order” of the invisible white “self ” in opposition to the “chaotic” realm of the dead Indigenous and Black “nonbeing.” The line in all of its Deleuzian and Guattarian “molar, molecular, and nomadic” iterations is a humanist geospatial and epistemic configuration. The molar lines that make smooth space do so through the clearing of Indigenous peoples (clear to smooth) in order to produce a colonial grid of order. Deleuze and Guattari even fret over the potential susceptibility of the molecular (a more supple and ambiguous line not so prone to segmentation and rigidity) and the liberatory line of flight to become susceptible to the pull of the state. In A Thousand Plateaus, one can sense the anxiety they have about the molecular and nomadic line of flight. There is one last problem, the most anguishing one, concerning the dangers specific to each line. There is not much to say about the danger confronting the first [molar line], for the chances are slim that its rigidification will fail. There is not much to say about the ambiguity of the second [molecular line]. But why is the line of flight, even aside from the danger it runs of reverting to one of the other two lines, imbued with such singular despair in spite of its message of joy, as if at the very moment things are coming to a resolution its undertaking were threatened by something reaching down to its core, by a death, a demolition?38 The “something” that is reaching down and can be found in its core are the very traces of the human. Humanist secular thought that emerged from the fifteenth- century conquest and enslavement of Native and Black peoples produced the geometry of the line. The line is a way or an episteme used by the human to distinguish self from the other and produce the very structural oppositions that Sylvia Wynter names as essential to the human and its various genres. Smith’s deconstruction of the geo- epistemologies of “the center, the line,” and the “outside” poses questions and prods Western critical theory in ways that Western theory has yet to do itself, particularly about its subjectless and more specifically nonrepresentational moves. In addition to Wynter’s structural oppositions, it is also productive to think about how Wynter’s “beyond” has us contend with the underlying epistemes that make the human possible. Zakiyyah Iman Jackson’s engagement with Wynter’s “beyond” also interrogates the call to transcend the human. In a recent GLQ roundtable discussion titled “Queer Inhumanisms,” Jackson asks what it means when Black life is asked to make this transcendent move.39 Finally, I more carefully consider the work of Amber Jamilla Musser, who makes room for Deleuze and Guattari’s influence while being skeptical of and drawing attention to the specific ways that affect, sensation, and other nonrepresentational theories end up hailing and producing subjects even as they try and avoid systems of representation. GETTING ON AND BEYOND Throughout Sylvia Wynter’s body of work, particularly the portion that Greg Thomas calls the “beyond” work,40 Wynter attends to the epistemic, aesthetic, performative, and moral technologies such as structural oppositions, which are needed in order to write the human as an exclusive mode of being. Sylvia Wynter is concerned with getting rid of the epistemic systems and orders of knowledge (e.g., biological determinism, economic rationalization, performances, and epistemes) that make the very emergence of exclusionary categories like the human possible. Without getting rid of these systems or artifacts, even if the category of the human is eliminated from language, it will be replaced with something else as long as biological determinism, economic rationalization, oppositions, and lines continue to order and govern thought. The problem with the human is its scaffolding, not the category itself. The emergence of the human and specifically the overrepresentation of the human as man depends on the continual reproduction of and sometimes destruction of oppositional frames— in order to replace a structural oppositional with another. Wynter contends that “all founding oppositions . . . express the fact that humans as organized orders not only struggle against the opposing “chaos,” but have need of it as well, not only destroying but also continually creating it.”41 Over the course of Wynter’s work, there is a protracted discussion about the usefulness of the opposition “order/chaos” as a primary ordering force, which has persisted throughout time yet makes adjustments to what it posits as abject difference or the chaotic outside of man at any given moment. Within the secular human’s mode of man, the ordered self, culture, or “we” needs the chaotic, not- us, or them in the Negro and the Indian in order to know itself as culture— Logos, Reason— and therefore as human. The human as man, in its ordered, rational, gendered, sexed, European, bourgeois form, needs chaos in order to secure a self, even as what is human changes. While the human as man may become elastic and more diverse (as proletariat and woman), it still requires an outside. It still requires chaos, even if those who were previously a part of the realm of chaos enter into the zone of order. It is within this lineated orbit of chaos and order that even nonrepresentational poststructuralist theories retain the trace of the human as a narrow ordering line of the self (even in subjectless guise). The line is but one geo- epistemology of white posthumanist thought. The Deleuzoguattarian “lines of flight,” even as a nomadic line though supposedly not attached to a self or a subject, carry the specter and trace of the human in the ordering and disciplining colonial lines of flight of conquest. As Wynter argues, there are often reversals of the order and hierarchies of structural oppositions; the reversals fail to actually overcome and annihilate the need and desire for structural opposition as an actual order of knowledge.42 While “natural man” may prevail over ecclesiastical, clergical, or theological man, natural or rational man still needs to create himself as the center or norm in relation to those who lack rationality and reason (the Black and Native). Similarly, poststructuralist theory may prevail over structuralist narratives that center the self or the “I”; however, the impulse to kill and create the Indian without ancestors alongside crafting a new self- annihilating posthumanist subject is still part of the order of knowledge of structural opposition. The selfless, subjectless, posthuman still persists as the realm of life because of the annihilation of Indigenous and Black life. Within critical theories, Black and Native people are rendered structuralist (or modernist and dead) as white self- actualizing subjects disguise themselves as rhizomatic movements that transcend representation and the human. Epistemes such as the line segregate the chaotic realm of death (Black and Native) from the poststructuralist realm of life (white transcendence) through structural opposition marked with blood. The line is a humanist geo- form and geo- episteme, which makes the kinds of segmentation that structural oppositions are based on possible.43 Humans must perceive and come to some social or human agreement that lines even exist in the social (cultural) and natural world. Even in Deleuze and Guattari’s ideal scenario in which lines are drawn and (re)drawn again outside the state’s mandates, someone (as a subject) must still render them as an outside to something.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Settler Colonialism K › 1NC---Shell

Deleuze’s lines of flight run through the graveyard of the native – rhizomatic movement disavows indigenous claims to the land and history.

King 17 [Tiffany Lethabo King is assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies; “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”; Critical Ethnic Studies; Spring 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162?casa_token=Ayg-S-eXLu4AAAAA%3AaGlHrzMA9tWXklUEbQHL0P7GcNfaYbAs9EQAog6pgi3kUWD0hjWhL3xATIEZ963qYqlLTAlQTz2zxgcJIMo5i1APwp3OEbbEwfkmhNFDocRcFeKS&seq=1]//eleanor

Taking a cue from Simpson and Tuck and Yang, I turn to Tuck’s 2010 critique of Deleuze’s notion of “desire” as an example of the theoretical practice of refusal, which Simpson wonders about and which Tuck and Yang elaborated on in 2014. Eve Tuck’s 2010 article “Breaking Up with Deleuze” refuses Deleuze’s understanding and imposition of his definition of desire for Native studies and Native resurgence in particular. Tuck refuses the Deleuzoguattarian nomadic due to its totalizing moves and specifically its evasion and refusal of Native and alternative notions of refusal that emerge from Native struggles for survival.24 For Tuck, paying attention to “the continuity of ancestors,” or genealogies, in Native and in all modes of knowledge production is imperative. For Indigenous and Native studies, it reverses the erasure enacted by continental European and settler- colonial theory, which uses a tradition of ongoing genocide to annihilate Native thinkers and subsequently their epistemologies and theories. Prior to Byrd’s indictment of Deleuzoguattarian laudatory accounts of America’s terrain of “Indians without Ancestry,” Tuck reroutes us back to ancestral and genealogical thinking as a way of asserting Indigenous presence and its epistemological systems and traditions, devoid of Cartesian boundary- making impulses and desires. Tuck’s work also prepares us in 2010 for the critique that Byrd levies in 2011, which exposes the traditions, roots, and genealogies of Western poststructuralist theory. Such theory created the conditions of possibility and emergence for Deleuzoguattarian genocidal forms of rhizomatic and nonrepresentational thought. Black Caribbean feminist Michelle V. Rowley argues we need to especially attend to a theory’s “politics and conditions of emergence.”25 In other words, we need to consider on whose backs or through whose blood a theory developed and then circulated while hiding its own violence. Jodi Byrd in particular attends to the colonialist, genocidal, and therefore humanist impulses of the rhizome in her book Transit of Empire.26 What is particularly instructive is the way that Byrd operationalizes her critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s first chapter, “Rhizome,” in their tome A Thousand Plateaus.27 Byrd’s deconstruction, or picking apart, of the poststructuralist and nonsubject- and nonobject- related Deleuzoguattarian rhizomatics are a masterful (and frankly thuggish and rude) demonstration of refusing to adapt or “repair” colonial epistemologies and geographies. Byrd’s refusal is a moment that further helps one distinguish between the works of postcolonial and decolonial studies. Byrd performs an outright refusal that short circuits the colonial and postcolonial comportments of politesse, which allow genocidal Western thought to continue uninterrupted. Byrd’s interrogation of the “colonial nostalgia” latent in poststructural and nonrepresentational forms of thought like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome is an explicit example of how the violence of white nonrepresentational theory creates an immediate space of impasse for Indigenous, decolonial, Black, and abolitionist intellectual traditions. As Byrd argues, the Deleuzian and Guattarian rhizome assumes its errant, untraceable, and de/reterritorializing path through Native genocide. The rhizome obtains its metaphorical and theoretical elasticity from the discursive genocide of Indigenous peoples. The territory of maneuver or ground that the rhizome gains its bearing on is unwittingly or perhaps indifferently anchored in the disavowal of the Indigenous ancestral claims, history, presence, and ongoing relationship with the land in North America. Deleuze and Guattari covet the free- range and bloody movements in the West, described as a land of “Indians without Ancestry” primarily because they do not have to contend with the presence of Indigenous peoples and their prior relationships (ancestors) to the land and space through which they move and clear as nomads. There are no existing people to which Deleuze and Guattari have to be accountable. Therefore, their own and others’ self- actualizing, free- form whiteness can proceed unimpeded. The rhizomatic West— terra nullius— is without a people, history, or a cosmology to navigate. Byrd’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s reproduction or transit of the “Indian” in their book A Thousand Plateaus limns some of the methods in which colonialism and modes of conquest are enacted on behalf of the self-actualization of white subjects who produce nonrepresentational theory. In fact, Byrd argues that the “Indian is the ontological prior through which poststructuralism functions.”28 Byrd traces the appearance or deployment of the Indian as a simulation or “present absent” in Jacques Derrida’s and then Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which creates space for the white subject and the unending frontier. Byrd also argues that nonrepresentational theory heralded as a liberatory path beyond the subject is colonialist. Byrd indicts Deleuze and Guattari’s use of Leslie Fiedler’s work in order to invoke the American West and the Indian as exceptional cases that inspire rhizomatic movement through the notion of an ever- receding frontier.29 It is colonialist on (at least) two accounts: in its need to render the Indian already and inevitably (ontologically) dead as “it” has no ancestors or living community to whom one needs to be accountable; and in its invocation of the vanishing “Indian,” which opens up the possibility of an “ever- receding frontier” and inspiration for the metaphor of the rhizome. This logic and mode of conquistador thought undergirds the Deleuzian and Guattarian ethos of experimental and rhizomatic lines of flight. Their nonrepresentational theory of lines of flight are only possible as a form of white self-actualizing posthumanism due to the death of Indigenous peoples and their excision from the Earth/land. White posthumanism and its flows and lines of flight are made possible through Native death.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1nc---AT: Future Military Tech

It causes a net reduction in violence

Nayyar et al 17, Hira Nayyar, Samuel Wakerley, Pritha Banerjee, Boboi Rahedi, Student Conversations about Professional Responsibilities of the Engineer @ The University of Sheffield, “THE ETHICS OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY: SHOULD WE EXPECT BAE SYSTEMS TO CARE?”, https://prestudentconversation.wordpress.com/2017/04/07/group-2/

BAE Systems engages in sales of advanced weaponry to the United Kingdom’s allies globally, directly contributing to the 7,665 airstrikes that have hit Syria in the last two years. Is it ethically accountable for the UK to be a leading power in creating advanced weaponry when it gives rise to unfavorable impacts on human life? Or are the net benefits of weapons as deterrents and economic stimuli a force for good? This article aims to create discussion around BAE Systems’ role as a weapons manufacturer and its impact around the world. Weapons as deterrents “There is, in the world in which we all live, the principle of speaking softly but carrying a big stick – and that very often encourages people to negotiate” argued Sir Roger Carr at the recent BAE Systems annual general meeting – “we try and provide our people, our government, our allies with the very best weapons, the very best sticks they can have, to encourage peace.” Applying ethics of care principles to the business of warmongering is useless in the realm of engineering, rather, one must take a pragmatic view of the ethical cycle. The question of whether BAE Systems conducts its advanced weaponry business ethically is grounded by the principle that conflict will always exist; as such, it is human nature for distrust to fester. Hence, a case can be made that to cease the supply of advanced weaponry to responsible nations would in fact not be principled martyrdom, but ethical suicide. As Carr points out, advanced weaponry can often prove a very effective deterrent to conflict in the first place – but furthermore, as an influential western arms dealer, BAE Systems also has the opportunity to minimize collateral damage in war zones. The supply of advanced weaponry with high levels of precision allows for targeted airstrikes that eliminate the specific threat to life posed by the target, with a minimal loss of civilian life. Now contrast this with the alternative of withdrawing supply. Undoubtedly, unprincipled arms distributors would step into cover the gap in the market, supplying less precise weaponry. The most recent major example of aging, unguided weaponry being supplied to a war zone is Russian support of President Assad’s disputed and morally reprehensible regime in Syria – which has since caused a humanitarian crisis in Aleppo. Permitting the growth of such regressive means of conflict (potentially including the rise of chemical weaponry) is the alternative to BAE supplying advanced weaponry, and so abandoning western influence on the global arms market can only lead one way – to a greater disregard for international humanitarian law. In any case, this cannot be considered a morally acceptable action – and so by default, if nothing else, the alternative of BAE Systems supplying sophisticated weaponry must be considered ethical. Such rationality illustrates why ethics of care fails to provide an acceptable moral solution in this case. Utilitarianism and regulation of the arms market From a utilitarian viewpoint, the sustainment of powerful weaponry enables a country to defend its people and provide assistance in foreign conflicts where there is a suffering population. Doing so arguably protects a majority of people. Furthermore, with the FTSE 100 index about to suffer from Brexit uncertainty, the nation’s industrial future is at risk. BAE System’s economic contribution is critical for jobs in turbulent times. The UK defence industry employs 300,000 people, supplies 10 per cent of the country’s manufacturing and engineering jobs, and has a turnover of £35bn through 9,000 different companies. BAE Systems has a pivotal role in ensuring the UK economy’s prosperous future by being the real driver of the next skills generation: promoting STEM subject pathways, through which graduates get into engineering. Additionally, as a result of the profits from the manufacture and sale of arms, BAE Systems provides a backbone of technical support to other market sectors – for example building solutions for other industries such as transport; including the digital transformation of the UK rail network. There are a number of key international weapons regulations, whereby some governments have very robust arms trade control systems in place, but other governments are fuelling the illicit and irresponsible trade in arms by having weak control systems or none at all. BAE Systems ensures risks like this are minimised by implementing an Arms Trade Treaty that reduces and prevents excessive conflict, via making it difficult for armed groups that commit human rights abuses to acquire a ready flow of arms. The treaty provides an important framework for well-regulated defence trade and the reduction of illegal arms sales around the world. Money should be invested in diplomacy instead of fuelling war and destruction. BAE Systems deals with numerous countries which do not rank favorably on the human freedom index. The sale of advanced weaponry demonstrates, solely, an archaic form of diplomacy which is not apt for the modern world, where conflict is rife and human life is priceless. Arms do not have to be the prime medium through which diplomacy is navigated. The UK should explore other avenues; China for all its prowess utilizes Pandas as a bargaining tool to advance their agenda with other world powers. Joseph Nye, named this “Soft Power”. By using civilian instruments of national security such as strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction – relationships are built on the exchange of culture and knowledge as opposed to exploiting their perceived insecurity. BAE Systems could incorporate promotion of this moral intellectualism into their budget, where exchange of intelligence and civic action lead to stronger mutual relationships developing without the transfer of arms. Destruction created by the weaponry not only physically affects those that are targeted but also creates a long-term drop in quality of life for citizens. Millions of civilians have fled Syria due to the destruction of their homes and lack of basic amenities. Around two million people struggle to find clean water in Aleppo, as airstrikes have been targeted the water infrastructure of the city and this has cut civilian access to clean drinking water. Furthermore, refugee camps such as those in Za’atari camp in Jordan contain only temporary solutions for progressively longer-term issues such as maternity centres and wash blocks. This is the environment the next generation are being born into and are therefore starting life with an inherent handicap. BAE Systems could adopt an ethics of care framework which would allow them to reconsider and understand the severity of the consequences of their actions; principally selling such weapons. There is no foolproof way of determining the end user of advanced weaponry, or of usage intentions – but by not producing such weaponry, BAE Systems could avoid any risk of misuse.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1nc---AT: Future Military Tech

No offense: norms

David Lonsdale 17, School of Law and Politics, University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Lonsdale, David J. “Warfighting for Cyber Deterrence: A Strategic and Moral Imperative.” Philosophy & Technology, Feb. 2017. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/s13347-017-0252-8.

3.4 The Failure of Cyber Deterrence? The potency of cyber deterrence is difficult to judge. This is partly because there exists no consensus on what constitutes an act of sufficient cyber aggression. Therefore, it is not entirely clear what is to be deterred. Where exactly the threshold for response should be will be discussed in section three of this paper. For now, we can state that low-level nuisance attacks are a daily occurrence. For example, U.S. military networks are probed and scanned millions of times each day (Work 2015, 1). Similarly, acts of cyber espionage are reasonably common. However, what is also evident is the lack of major cyber attacks. For a while, Stuxnet, Wiper, Shamoon and Bronze Soldier appeared to signal the rise of cyber attack as a potent new instrument of policy. However, medium to large-scale attacks have essentially dried-up. Indeed, reflecting the empirical evidence, and marking a shift in tone, in his September 2015 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, talked down the possibility of an ‘electronic Pearl Harbor’. Instead, he focused on ongoing ‘low-to-moderate’ level threats (Clapper 2015, 2). What does this all tell us? Is deterrence working? If one considers low-to-moderate threats as deterrable, then the answer would seem to be no. From this perspective, and according to some policy makers, deterrence is already failing. In a 2015 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Chairman John McCain was scathing in his assessment: ‘Our adversaries view our response ... as timid and ineffectual. Put simply, the problem is a lack of deterrence. The administration has not demonstrated to our adversaries that the consequence of continued cyber attacks against us outweigh the benefit.’ (Takala 2015) However, if we take the view that cyber deterrence should really concern itself only with large-scale attacks, the picture is more positive. Indeed, Valeriano and Maness (2015) have identified considerable levels of restraint in state cyber behaviour. This could be due to a lack of confidence in the strategic utility of cyber attack. It may also reflect the development of norms against aggressive forms of cyber behaviour and the efficacy of deterrence. Indeed, norms increasingly form part of ‘complex deterrence’, within which military and non-military elements operate together. In cyberspace, although a settled understanding of universal rules of behaviour is still lacking, norms appear to be crystalising around acceptable forms of intrusion rather than a blanket non-use position (Stevens 2012, 25). This may explain the continuance of lowlevel probes whilst large attacks have trailed off.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1nc---AT: Future Military Tech

Increasing informatization of war net reduces violence---alternative’s worse

Thomas Rid 13, THOMAS RID is a Reader in War Studies at King’s College London, 12-1-2013, "Cyberwar and Peace," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-10-15/cyberwar-and-peace

Cyberwar Is Coming!” declared the title of a seminal 1993 article by the RAND Corporation analysts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who argued that the nascent Internet would fundamentally transform warfare. The idea seemed fanciful at the time, and it took more than a decade for members of the U.S. national security establishment to catch on. But once they did, a chorus of voices resounded in the mass media, proclaiming the dawn of the era of cyberwar and warning of its terrifying potential. In February 2011, then CIA Director Leon Panetta warned Congress that “the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyberattack.” And in late 2012, Mike McConnell, who had served as director of national intelligence under President George W. Bush, warned darkly that the United States could not “wait for the cyber equivalent of the collapse of the World Trade Centers.” Yet the hype about everything “cyber” has obscured three basic truths: cyberwar has never happened in the past, it is not occurring in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb the future. Indeed, rather than heralding a new era of violent conflict, so far the cyber-era has been defined by the opposite trend: a computer-enabled assault on political violence. Cyberattacks diminish rather than accentuate political violence by making it easier for states, groups, and individuals to engage in two kinds of aggression that do not rise to the level of war: sabotage and espionage. Weaponized computer code and computer-based sabotage operations make it possible to carry out highly targeted attacks on an adversary’s technical systems without directly and physically harming human operators and managers. Computer-assisted attacks make it possible to steal data without placing operatives in dangerous environments, thus reducing the level of personal and political risk. These developments represent important changes in the nature of political violence, but they also highlight limitations inherent in cyberweapons that greatly curtail the utility of cyberattacks. Those limitations seem to make it difficult to use cyberweapons for anything other than one-off, hard-to-repeat sabotage operations of questionable strategic value that might even prove counterproductive. And cyber-espionage often requires improving traditional spycraft techniques and relying even more heavily on human intelligence. Taken together, these factors call into question the very idea that computer-assisted attacks will usher in a profoundly new era. THE THIN CASE FOR CYBERWAR One reason discussions about cyberwar have become disconnected from reality is that many commentators fail to grapple with a basic question: What counts as warfare? Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, still offers the most concise answer to that question. Clausewitz identified three main criteria that any aggressive or defensive action must meet in order to qualify as an act of war. First, and most simply, all acts of war are violent or potentially violent. Second, an act of war is always instrumental: physical violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack must have some kind of political goal or intention. For that reason, acts of war must be attributable to one side at some point during a confrontation. No known cyberattack has met all three of those criteria; indeed, very few have met even one. Consider three incidents that today’s Cassandras frequently point to as evidence that warfare has entered a new era. The first of these, a massive pipeline explosion in the Soviet Union in June 1982, would count as the most violent cyberattack to date -- if it actually happened. According to a 2004 book by Thomas Reed, who was serving as a staffer on the U.S. National Security Council at the time of the alleged incident, a covert U.S. operation used rigged software to engineer a massive explosion in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline, which connected Siberian natural gas fields to Europe. Reed claims that the CIA managed to insert malicious code into the software that controlled the pipeline’s pumps and valves. The rigged valves supposedly resulted in an explosion that, according to Reed, the U.S. Air Force rated at three kilotons, equivalent to the force of a small nuclear device. But aside from Reed’s account, there is hardly any evidence to prove that any such thing happened, and plenty of reasons to doubt that it did. After Reed published his book, Vasily Pchelintsev, who was reportedly the KGB head of the region when the explosion was supposed to have taken place, denied the story. He surmised that Reed might have been referring to a harmless explosion that happened not in June but on a warm April day that year, caused by pipes shifting in the thawing ground of the tundra. Moreover, no Soviet media reports from 1982 confirm that Reed’s explosion took place, although the Soviet media regularly reported on accidents and pipeline explosions at the time. What’s more, given the technologies available to the United States at that time, it would have been very difficult to hide malicious software of the kind Reed describes from its Soviet users. Another incident often related by promoters of the concept of cyberwar occurred in Estonia in 2007. After Estonian authorities decided to move a Soviet-era memorial to Russian soldiers who died in World War II from the center of Tallinn to the city’s outskirts, outraged Russian-speaking Estonians launched violent riots that threatened to paralyze the city. The riots were accompanied by cyber-assaults, which began as crude disruptions but became more sophisticated after a few days, culminating in a “denial of service” attack. Hackers hijacked up to 85,000 computers and used them to overwhelm 58 Estonian websites, including that of the country’s largest bank, which the attacks rendered useless for a few hours. Estonia’s defense minister and the country’s top diplomat pointed their fingers at the Kremlin, but they were unable to muster any evidence. For its part, the Russian government denied any involvement. In the wake of the incident, Estonia’s prime minister, Andrus Ansip, likened the attack to an act of war. “What’s the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?” he asked. It was a rhetorical question, but the answer is important: unlike a naval blockade, the disruption of websites is not violent -- indeed, not even potentially violent. The choice of targets also seemed unconnected to the presumed tactical objective of forcing the government to reverse its decision on the memorial. And unlike a naval blockade, the attacks remained anonymous, without political backing, and thus unattributable. A year later, a third major event entered the cyber-Cassandras’ repertoire. In August 2008, the Georgian army attacked separatists in the province of South Ossetia. Russia backed the separatists and responded militarily. The prior month, in what might have been the first time that an independent cyberattack was launched in coordination with a conventional military operation, unknown attackers had begun a campaign of cyber-sabotage, defacing prominent Georgian websites, including those of the country’s national bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and launching denial-of-service attacks against the websites of Georgia’s parliament, its largest commercial bank, and Georgian news outlets. The Georgian government blamed the Kremlin, just as the Estonians had done. But Russia again denied sponsoring the attacks, and a NATO investigation later found “no conclusive proof” of who had carried them out. The attack set off increasingly familiar alarm bells within American media and the U.S. national security establishment. “The July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out cyberwar,” an article in The New York Times declared. Richard Clarke, a former White House cybersecurity czar, warned that the worst was yet to come: the Georgian attack did not “begin to reveal what the Russian military and intelligence agencies could do if they were truly on the attack in cyberspace.” Yet the actual effects of these nonviolent events were quite mild. The main damage they caused was to the Georgian government’s ability to communicate internationally, thus preventing it from getting out its message at a critical moment. But even if the attackers intended this effect, it proved short-lived: within four days after military confrontations had begun in earnest, the Georgian Foreign Ministry had set up an account on Google’s blog-hosting service. This move helped the government keep open a channel to the public and the news media. What the Internet took away, the Internet returned. ISTOCK.COM / -ANTONIO- Overblown: keyboard as grenade. IN CODE WE TRUST? Perhaps the strongest evidence presented by advocates of the concept of cyberwar is the Stuxnet operation launched against Iran by the United States and Israel. Stuxnet, part of a set of attacks known as Operation Olympic Games, was a sophisticated multiyear campaign to sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz by inserting a harmful computer worm into the software that ran the facility’s centrifuges, causing them to overload. American and Israeli developers started designing the project as early as 2005, and it launched in 2007, growing more sophisticated until its discovery in 2010. The attack was groundbreaking in several ways. The developers built highly target-specific intelligence into the code, enabling the Stuxnet software to make autonomous decisions in its target environment. Most important, Stuxnet represented the first and only physically destructive cyberattack launched by one state (or, in this case, two states) against another. Yet even cyberattacks that cause damage do so only indirectly. As an agent of violence, computer code faces a very basic limit: it does not have its own force or energy. Instead, any cyberattack with the goal of material destruction or harming human life must utilize the force or energy embedded in its target: for example, shutting down an air traffic control system and causing trains or planes to crash or disrupting a power plant and sparking an explosion. Yet besides Stuxnet, there is no proof that anyone has ever successfully launched a major attack of this sort. Lethal cyberattacks, while certainly possible, remain the stuff of fiction: none has ever killed or even injured a single human being. Thanks to its lack of direct physical impact, code-induced violence also has less emotional impact. It would be difficult for a cyberattack to produce the level of fear that coordinated campaigns of terrorism or conventional military operations produce. Owing to their invisibility, cyberweapons also lack the symbolic power of traditional ones. Displays of weaponry, such as the elaborate military parades put on by China and North Korea, sometimes represent nothing more than nationalist pageantry. But revealing one’s arsenal can also serve tactical and strategic ends, as when countries deploy aircraft carriers to demonstrate their readiness to use force or carry out operations designed to intimidate the enemy, such as using military aircraft to conduct deliberately low flyovers. Indeed, displaying weapons systems and threatening to use them can prove more cost-efficient than their actual use. But cyberweapons are hard to brandish. Perhaps the most crucial limitation of violence in cyberspace is its almost entirely destructive quality: unlike traditional political violence, which can maintain trust in institutions and states as well as undermine it, violence in cyberspace can do only the latter. Any established political order comes with a certain degree of inherent violence; consolidated states, after all, survive only if they maintain monopolies on the legitimate use of force. By encouraging trust in the ability of state institutions to protect property and safeguard citizens, this inherent violence buttresses a state’s power and allows the state to establish the rule of law. But cyber-violence lacks this ability, since it does little or nothing to build up trust in institutions; indeed, it is very difficult to imagine how cyberattacks could be used to enforce rules or laws, either domestically or internationally. Digital surveillance presents a more complicated picture. In democracies, intelligence agencies tread a thin line between providing security and eroding public trust in the state, as demonstrated by the recent controversy over the U.S. National Security Agency’s data-collection practices. In authoritarian countries, digital surveillance can assist the state’s coercive use of force, but it cannot replace it. Such limitations, however, should not lead anyone to dismiss the corrosive potential of cyberattacks. Indeed, such assaults can undermine social trust in a more direct way than traditional political violence. Cyberattacks are more precise; they do not necessarily undermine the state’s monopoly of force in a wholesale fashion. Instead, they can be tailored to attack specific companies or public-sector organizations and used to undermine those groups’ authority selectively. Stuxnet provides a good example of this dynamic. Putting aside the question of whether the attack was an act of war, its primary intention was to undermine the trust of the Iranian scientists in their systems and in themselves and the trust of the Iranian regime in its ability to build nuclear weapons. The original intention was to cause physical damage to as many Iranian centrifuges as possible. But the American and Israeli attackers knew that the physical effect could be exploited to unleash a much more damaging psychological effect. “The intent was that the failures should make them feel they were stupid, which is what happened,” an American participant told The New York Times. The Americans and the Israelis hoped that once a few machines failed, the Iranian engineers would shut down more machines because they distrusted their own technology or indeed their own skills. At the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Vienna, rumors circulated that the Iranians had lost so much confidence in their own systems and instruments that the management of the Natanz facility took the extraordinary step of assigning engineers to sit in the plant and radio back what they saw to confirm the instrument readings. “They overreacted,” one of the attackers revealed to David Sanger of The New York Times, “and that delayed them even more.” The Iranians also began to assign blame internally, pointing fingers at one another and even firing some personnel. DIGITAL UNDERGROUND Damaging though it may have been, Stuxnet, along with the cyber-scuffles in Estonia and Georgia, represents not a new form of warfare but something more akin to other, less lethal forms of aggression: sabotage and espionage. Unlike acts of war, these political crimes, which are often committed by nonstate actors, need not be violent to work. And although saboteurs and spies do act politically, they often seek to avoid attribution, unlike those who launch acts of war. For those reasons, the cyber-era has been a boon for political crime. Consider sabotage. Before the computer age, saboteurs had trouble calibrating and controlling the effects of their actions. Sabotage had to target physical property and relied on physical violence, which often proves unpredictable. During postal and railway strikes in France in 1909 and 1910, for instance, saboteurs cut signal wires and tore down telegraph posts. Destroying property risked running afoul of public opinion, and the tactic ultimately divided the workers. The strikes themselves, as a form of sabotage, also ran the risk of leading to unpredictable violence: indeed, labor demonstrations often intensified into riots, making it easier for opponents to portray the strikers as uncompromising radicals. It is much easier for saboteurs to avoid counterproductive side effects in the age of computer-assisted attacks, which can contain violence and generally avoid it altogether. Cyberattacks can maliciously affect software and business processes without interfering with physical industrial processes, remaining nonviolent but sometimes still causing greater damage than a traditional assault. A 2012 attack against the computer network of the oil company Saudi Aramco illustrates this potential. The attack physically harmed neither hardware nor humans. Yet by allegedly erasing the hard disks of some 30,000 computers, the attackers likely did much more monetary damage to Saudi Aramco than they could have through an act of traditional sabotage against machinery in one of the company’s plants. The oil giant reportedly had to hire six specialized computer security firms to help with its forensic investigation and post-attack cleanup. Despite such potential, it is also important to remember the inherent limitations of computer-assisted political crime and to note that human agents remain critical in the age of digital violence. Even Stuxnet, the most successful example of cyber-sabotage, demonstrates this fact. For the United States and Israel, the “holy grail,” in the words of one of the attack’s architects, was getting a piece of malicious software into the control system at Natanz. The Americans and Israelis needed fine-grained data from inside the Iranian plant to develop their weaponized code. The problem was that the control system was protected by an air gap: it was not connected to the Internet or even internal networks. As a result, the attackers had to deliver the malicious code via a removable hard drive such as a USB flash drive -- delivered by a human hand. To make this happen, U.S. intelligence operatives first obtained a list of the people who were visiting the targeted plant to work on its computer equipment and who could carry the payload there. “We had to find an unwitting person on the Iranian side of the house who could jump the gap,” one planner later told Sanger. The list of possible carriers included engineers from the German company Siemens, who were helping their Iranian colleagues maintain the control system -- work that required the Siemens engineers to bring portable computers into the plant. Precisely how the U.S.-Israeli team managed to exploit this vulnerability remains unknown. Suffice it to say that although “Siemens had no idea they were a carrier,” in the words of one U.S. official quoted by Sanger, “it turns out there is always an idiot around who doesn’t think much about the thumb drive in their hand.” SAFETY IN ONES AND ZEROS If cyberattacks reduce the amount of violence inherent in conflict, and if they often take the form of sabotage or espionage, then many officials and commentators who have been warning about the dawn of cyberwar have been ringing false alarms. Digital violence does have implications for ethics and for national security strategy, however. Weaponized code, or cyberattacks more generally, can achieve goals that used to require conventional force. The most sophisticated cyberattacks are highly targeted, and cyberweapons are unlikely to cause collateral damage in the same way conventional weapons do. Therefore, in many situations, the use of computers would be ethically preferable to the use of conventional weapons: a cyberattack might be less violent, less traumatizing, and more limited.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1nc---AT: Future Military Tech

No impact to future military tech – it’s non-unique and inevitable – but, testing and safeguards solve.

Ackerman, 15—senior writer for IEEE Spectrum’s award-winning robotics blog, Automaton (Evan, “We Should Not Ban ‘Killer Robots,’ and Here’s Why,” , dml)

The problem with this argument is that no letter, UN declaration, or even a formal ban ratified by multiple nations is going to prevent people from being able to build autonomous, weaponized robots. The barriers keeping people from developing this kind of system are just too low. Consider the “armed quadcopters.” Today you can buy a smartphone-controlled quadrotor for US $300 at Toys R Us. Just imagine what you’ll be able to buy tomorrow. This technology exists. It’s improving all the time. There’s simply too much commercial value in creating quadcopters (and other robots) that have longer endurance, more autonomy, bigger payloads, and everything else that you’d also want in a military system. And at this point, it’s entirely possible that small commercial quadcopters are just as advanced as (and way cheaper than) small military quadcopters, anyway. We’re not going to stop that research, though, because everybody wants delivery drones (among other things). Generally speaking, technology itself is not inherently good or bad: it’s what we choose to do with it that’s good or bad, and you can’t just cover your eyes and start screaming “STOP!!!” if you see something sinister on the horizon when there’s so much simultaneous potential for positive progress.

What we really need, then, is a way of making autonomous armed robots ethical, because we’re not going to be able to prevent them from existing. In fact, the most significant assumption that this letter makes is that armed autonomous robots are inherently more likely to cause unintended destruction and death than armed autonomous humans are. This may or may not be the case right now, and either way, I genuinely believe that it won’t be the case in the future, perhaps the very near future. I think that it will be possible for robots to be as good (or better) at identifying hostile enemy combatants as humans, since there are rules that can be followed (called Rules of Engagement, for an example see page 27 of this) to determine whether or not using force is justified. For example, does your target have a weapon? Is that weapon pointed at you? Has the weapon been fired? Have you been hit? These are all things that a robot can determine using any number of sensors that currently exist.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---AT: Will to Technology

They also link, which demonstrates the alt’s futility---the structure of their argument, the process through which it was written and the context in which they are articulating it in pursuit of the ballot obviously technologize communicative thought---AND their ability to dismiss this by saying sure, but self-awareness and reflexivity inoculates us is precisely why we the perm solves

James Tully 6, “Communication and Imperialism,” CTheory, 2-22-2006, http://ctheory.net/communication-and-imperialism/

Arthur Kroker suggests that the genetic engineering of the “codes” of life in humans and other organic resources, at one end, and the monitoring, surveillance and precision targeting of the global population in space-based network warfare through full spectrum global dominance at the other, represent the two extremes of this way of being in the world (legitimated in terms of “openness” of scientific inquiry and “security” of individuals and the species). Here life itself is pictured as both a network and an object of manipulation and control by informational technologies. Human nature and the environment are absorbed into culture, and so culture/nature is pictured as a kind of standing reserve of manipulable networks. [21] [22] This is not a form of subjectivity and intersubjectivity that a person bears in one particular role among many. It is a communicative habitus that communicators tend to operate within at work and leisure, on the home computer, the cell phone, the wireless laptop, and the BlackBerry. When networkers put these more interactive modes of communication down, they tend to turn to the technology of the communication of “affects”: radio, television, movies and videos. As a result, this worldview and skill set is carried into other areas of life, either colonizing them or disregarding them if they are inaccessible through the network technology. The form of subjectivity and intersubjectivity of network communicators is not an ideology or a worldview in the traditional sense. It is rather the opposite: a mode of being that is skilled in and accustomed to “worldviewing” — surfing through, interacting with and negotiating a kaleidoscope of shifting ideologies and worldviews. Secular modernists, western scientists, indigenous peoples, neo-liberals, non-governmental organizations, anti-globalization activists, hyper-globalisers, deep ecologists, apocalyptic religious fundamentalists in the Bush administration and Bin Laden terrorist networks are all at home in this habitat. Yet, it is not a neutral, all-inclusive medium of communication. It substantially modifies the pre-network forms of subjectivity it includes, transforming them into contingent and malleable worldviews, civilizations, codes, programs, and “scapes”, yet, paradoxically, placing beyond question its own background horizon of disclosure of the world as a complex system of contingent and programmable networks. This taken-for-granted form of subjectification tends to come with the network and goes without saying. It is the characteristic form of subjectivity of network imperialism. We are just beginning to study and make explicit the tacit ways communication networks are re-organizing human subjectivity. Boaventura de Sousa Santos and other critical sociologists of network communication and control argue that the net brings with it, in tandem with programmability, other taken-for-granted ways of organizing and imagining experience, privileging certain forms of communication, communicative rationality, knowledge, problem solving, cooperation and competition, and production and consumption, and discounting or excluding others.[23] Finally, although this is a powerful new form of subjectivity and social ordering, it is one form among many that we bear as modern subjects, and we are not passive recipients of it (as we will see in section 3).

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 2NC---Tech Good---Warming AO

A.I. Critical to mitigating the impact of Climate Change--- Leads to new technology and predicts harmful weather to mitigate escalation.

Bernard Marr 18, 2-21-2018, Bernard Marr is a best-selling author & keynote speaker on business, technology and big data. His new book is Data Strategy.,"The Amazing Ways We Can Use AI To Tackle Climate Change," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/21/the-amazing-ways-we-can-use-ai-to-tackle-climate-change/#7c27122f4a35

While there are still some on the earth who claim climate change is a farce, the majority of us believe we need to throw everything possible into slowing down or solving the problem. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are two tools in our climate-change-halting toolbox. The more we utilize AI and machine learning technology to help us understand our current reality, predict future weather events and create new products and services to minimize our human impact our chances of improving and saving lives, creating a healthier world and making businesses more efficient, the better chance we have to stall or even reverse the climate change trajectory we’re on. Here are just a few of the ways AI and machine learning are helping us tackle climate change. Machines can analyze the flood of data that is generated every day from sensors, gauges and monitors to spot patterns quickly and automatically. By looking at data about the changing conditions of the world’s land surfaces that is gathered by NASA and aggregated at Landsat, it provides a very accurate picture of how the world is changing. The more accurate we’re able to be at the current status of our climate, the better our climate models will be. This information can be used to identify our biggest vulnerabilities and risk zones. This knowledge from climate scientists can be shared with decision-makers so they know how to respond to the impact of climate change—severe weather such as hurricanes, rising sea levels and higher temperatures. Artificial intelligence and deep learning can help climate researchers and innovators test out their theories and solutions about how to reduce air pollution and other climate-friendly innovations. One example of this is the Green Horizon Project from IBM that analyzes environmental data and predicts pollution as well as tests “what-if” scenarios that involve pollution-reducing tactics. By using the information provided by machine learning algorithms, Google was able to cut the amount of energy it used at its data centers by 15%. Similar insights can help other companies reduce their carbon footprint. While businesses and manufacturing might contribute significantly to greenhouse gas levels, it’s still imperative that each citizen commits to reducing their impact as well. The easier we make green initiatives for each person, the higher the adoption rate and the more progress we make to save the environment. Artificial intelligence and machine learning innovations can help create products and services that make it easier to take care of our planet. There are several consumer-facing AI devices such as smart thermostats (which could save up to 15% on cooling annually for each household) and irrigation systems (which could save up to 8,800 gallons of water per home per year) that help conserve resources. Everyone doing their part over time will add up. The damage to human lives and property can be reduced if there are earlier warning signs of a catastrophic weather event. There has been significant progress in using machine-learning algorithms that were trained on data from other extreme weather events to identify tropical cyclones and atmospheric rivers. The earlier warning that governments and citizens can get about severe weather, the better they are able to respond and protect themselves. Machines are also being deployed to assess the strengths of models that are used to investigate climate change by reviewing the dozens of them that are in use and extracting intelligence from them. They also help predict how long a storm will last and its severity. Since machines can’t tell you “how” it arrived at its prediction or decisions, most climate professionals don’t feel comfortable relying on only what the machines suggest will happen, but use machine insight along with their own professional analysis to complement one another. Climate change is a gargantuan problem and its complexity is exacerbated by the many people and players involved from divergent worldwide government entities to profit-driven corporations and individuals who aren’t always open to change. Therefore, the faster and smarter we can become through the use of AI and machine learning the higher our probability of success to at least slow down the damage caused by climate change.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 2NC---Tech Good

Extinction outweighs – any risk is a reason to err neg

Seth D. Baum and Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184, thanks Eyan

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 2NC---Tech Good

Conversations are uniquely key towards making the AI cybernetic world possible

Bell 20 (Genevieve Bell – Distinguished Professor and Violet McKenzie Chair at the Australian National University, “Why we need a cybernetic future”, Australian National University, 14 November 2020, , MG)

Making cybernetics real, however, required more than just a name. It required conversations, champions, and framing questions in such a way as to reveal the edges of the cybernetics potential. From 1946 to 1953 a series of conferences took place to try to do just that. Created and curated by anthropologists Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, in collaboration with Wiener, these conferences, later known as the Macy cybernetics conferences, took place in New York. And the participants were strikingly diverse — there were mathematicians and philosophers, physicists and psychologists, anthropologists and historians, hailing from North America including Mexico, Europe and Asia. They were at different points in their careers and they had different lived experiences. What Mead, Bateson and Wiener knew was that building something new like this was not a task for one scientific discipline. It could, in fact, only be built in the intersections between fields and existing ideas.

Cybernetics or AI?

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Tech Good

Unsustainability claims are suspect because our brains are wired for techno-pessimism – digital synchronicity can fix racism embedded in cybernetics thru human ingenuity and make the world materially better

Reinhart 18 (Will Rinehart is Director of Technology and Innovation Policy at the American Action Forum, where he specializes in telecommunication, Internet, and data policy, with a focus on emerging technologies and innovation. Rinehart previously worked at TechFreedom, where he was a Research Fellow. He was also previously the Director of Operations at the International Center for Law & Economics. In Defense of Techno-optimism. 10-10-2018. //shree)

Many are understandably pessimistic about platforms and technology. This year has been a tough one, from Cambridge Analytica and Russian trolls to the implementation of GDPR and data breaches galore. Those who think about the world, about the problems that we see every day, and about their own place in it, will quickly realize the immense frailty of humankind. Fear and worry makes sense. We are flawed, each one of us. And technology only seems to exacerbate those problems. But life is getting better. Poverty continues nose-diving; adult literacy is at an all-time high; people around the world are living longer, living in democracies, and are better educated than at any other time in history. Meanwhile, the digital revolution has resulted in a glut of informational abundance, helping to correct the informational asymmetries that have long plagued humankind. The problem we now face is not how to address informational constraints, but how to provide the means for people to sort through and make sense of this abundant trove of data. These macro trends don’t make headlines. Psychologists know that people love to read negative articles. Our brains are wired for pessimism. In the shadow of a year of bad news, it helpful to remember that Facebook and Google and Reddit and Twitter also support humane conversations. Most people aren’t going online to talk about politics and if you are, then you are rare. These sites are places where families and friends can connect. They offer a space of solace – like when chronic pain sufferers find others on Facebook, or when widows vent, rage, laugh and cry without judgement through the Hot Young Widows Club. Let’s also not forget that Reddit, while sometimes a place of rage and spite, is also where a weight lifter with cerebral palsy can become a hero and where those with addiction can find healing. And in the hardest to reach places in Canada, in Iqaluit, people say that “Amazon Prime has done more toward elevating the standard of living of my family than any territorial or federal program. Full stop. Period” Three-fourths of Americans say major technology companies’ products and services have been more good than bad for them personally. But when it comes to the whole of society, they are more skeptical about technology bringing benefits. Here is how I read that disparity: Most of us think that we have benefited from technology, but we worry about where it is taking the human collective. That is an understandable worry, but one that shouldn’t hobble us to inaction. Nor is technology making us stupid. Indeed, quite the opposite is happening. Technology use in those aged 50 and above seems to have caused them to be cognitively younger than their parents to the tune of 4 to 8 years. While the use of Google does seem to reduce our ability to recall information, studies find that it has boosted other kinds of memory, like retrieving information. Why remember a fact when you can remember where it is located? Concerned how audiobooks might be affecting people, Beth Rogowsky, an associate professor of education, compared them to physical reading and was surprised to find “no significant differences in comprehension between reading, listening, or reading and listening simultaneously.” Cyberbullying and excessive use might make parents worry, but NIH supported work found that “Heavy use of the Internet and video gaming may be more a symptom of mental health problems than a cause. Moderate use of the Internet, especially for acquiring information, is most supportive of healthy development.” Don’t worry. The kids are going to be alright. And yes, there is a lot we still need to fix. There is cruelty, racism, sexism, and poverty of all kinds embedded in our technological systems. But the best way to handle these issues is through the application of human ingenuity. Human ingenuity begets technology in all of its varieties. When Scott Alexander over at Star Slate Codex recently looked at 52 startups being groomed by startup incubator Y Combinator, he rightly pointed out that many of them were working for the betterment of all: Thirteen of them had an altruistic or international development focus, including Neema, an app to help poor people without access to banks gain financial services; Kangpe, online health services for people in Africa without access to doctors; Credy, a peer-to-peer lending service in India; Clear Genetics, an automated genetic counseling tool for at-risk parents; and Dost Education, helping to teach literacy skills in India via a $1/month course. Twelve of them seemed like really exciting cutting-edge technology, including CBAS, which describes itself as “human bionics plug-and-play”; Solugen, which has a way to manufacture hydrogen peroxide from plant sugars; AON3D, which makes 3D printers for industrial uses; Indee, a new genetic engineering system; Alem Health, applying AI to radiology, and of course the obligatory drone delivery startup. Eighteen of them seemed like boring meat-and-potatoes companies aimed at businesses that need enterprise data solution software application package analytics targeting management something something something “the cloud”. As for the other companies, they were the kind of niche products that Silicon Valley has come to be criticized for supporting. Perhaps the Valley deserves some criticism, but perhaps it deserves more credit than it’s been receiving as-of-late. Contemporary tech criticism displays a kind of anti-nostalgia. Instead of being reverent for the past, anxiety for the future abounds. In these visions, the future is imagined as a strange, foreign land, beset with problems. And yet, to quote that old adage, tomorrow is the visitor that is always coming but never arrives. The future never arrives because we are assembling it today. We need to work diligently together to piece together a better world. But if we constantly live in fear of what comes next, that future won’t be built. Optimism needn’t be pollyannaish. It only needs to be hopeful of a better world.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Tech Good

Using technical data and information to drive policymaking is good

Reiter 15—Professor of Political Science at Emory University [Dan, “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools,” War on the Rocks, 27 Aug, , accessed 11 Jan 2017]

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s.

But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether:

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Tech Good

AI solves every existential threat and inevitable death – leads to immortality

Tzimas 21 (Themistoklis Tzimas PhD - post- doc researcher in international law at the University of Macedonia and assistant professor at the Law School of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, “Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective”, Law Governance and Technology Series Volume 46, 30 July 2021, , MG)

However, we need to consider the expectations as well. The positive side focuses on the so-called friendly AI, meaning AI which will benefit and not harm humans, thanks to its advanced intelligence.23

AI bears the promise of significantly enhancing human life on various aspects, beginning from the already existing, narrow applications. The enhanced automation24 in the industry and the shift to autonomy,25 the take—over by AI of tasks even at the service sector which can be considered as “tedious”—i.e. in the banking sector—climate and weather forecasting, disaster response,26 the potentially better cooperation among different actors in complicated matters such as in matters of information, geopolitics and international relations, logistics, resources ex.27

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 2NC---Aesthetics Fails

Aesthetics as a method is dead in the 21st century

Zubatov 19 (Alexander Zubatov - practicing attorney specializing in general commercial litigation, “Politics vs. Aesthetics: Why Great Art Cannot Conform to Our Political Views”, Aero Magazine, 26 July 2019, , MG)

The Aesthetic Achieves Lift-Off and Comes Back Down with a Thud

This exalted vision of the purity and autonomy of art, in which the artist is a creative visionary, a Promethean hero, gave rise to the Romantic sensibility of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—and to much that followed. It informs Swinburne’s bold pronouncement, “Art for Art’s sake first of all, and afterwards the rest shall be added to her … but from the man who falls to artistic work with a moral purpose shall be taken away even that which he has”; the Russian formalists’ elevation of the self-referential patterns of aesthetic form as art’s singular guiding light; and even Carl Jung’s vision of the artist as the expression of the highest truths of our collective unconscious, “the unwitting mouthpiece of the psychic secrets of his time.”

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Aesthetics Fails

Aesthetics doesn’t solve anything but attempting to endorse it both reentrenches capitalism and enables racialized capitalist oppression

Bromberg 13 (Svenja Bromberg PhD - social theorist and philosopher with expertise in French and German thought from the 19th to the 21st century, “THE ANTI-POLITICAL AESTHETICS OF OBJECTS AND WORLDS BEYOND”, MetaMute, 25 July 2013, , MG)

There is at first a very material sense in which its advocates justify the turn to objects. We are at a point where our faith in the powers of the subject to critique and subvert reality, as grounded in Enlightenment theory, has been truly defeated, not least by capitalism’s now much discussed ability to demand precisely subjective – emotional or affective – investments in its exploitative machinery.5 Thus, it is not only the fact that ‘subjects are always already subjected’, which we have learned from Foucault, Butler and other poststructuralists.6 But if capitalism wants us to be ever more alive, happy and truly engaged in shaping our own lives on the basis of the endless possibilities this world has to offer, then the critique offered by vitalist theories, aesthetic modes such as Bourriaud’s ‘relational aesthetics’ and more critical forms of emancipated spectatorship against an objectifying and alienating capitalist reality appear assimilated and defused.7 As Diedrich Diederichsen outlines in a recent e-flux article, it is precisely what was still antithetical to the Fordist assembly line – different modes of dreaming ‘dangerously’ or living authentic or alternative lives – that seems to have become part of the post-Fordist ‘imperative to produce a perfect self as a perfect thing’.8 Smiles or grins, day-dreams and ways of being that could formerly help alleviate or escape the alienated existence of the labourer have themselves become reified as part of the requisite service we are compelled to provide.9 Diederichsen describes a sense, similar to the German theatre director René Pollesch in his play Love is Colder than Capital in which all relations have become toxic and emotions have been rendered cold objects for capital.10 Thus, the primary concern seems to be with oppressive, exploitative and reified capitalist social relations and how to break out of them – but the solutions we’re confronted with from the diverse strands of the ‘new materialisms’ no longer lie in the critique of these relations, but rather in a nonrelational and un-dialectical gesture that posits the world of matter against the man-made disaster of a neoliberal existence.11

The search for what Diederichsen calls ‘de-reification’ ventures towards that which evades representation, which is not rendered object qua instrumental reason but qua its own force, the dark, the mystic, the animate but soul-less – something that is more truly cold and yet not cold at all. This line of argument, however – which is echoed in Hito Steyerl’s emphatic call for us to finally accept the death of the subject and embrace the forces of construction and destruction, of violence and the possibility stored within things – problematically sidelines the classed, racialised and gendered oppressions of capitalist reality. Within this, masses of people have never been granted any ‘subject status’ in the first place and are, instead, rendered mere objects or even superfluous, because not productive, for capital. From the point of view of these relations, the move towards accepting or even embracing objectification as in itself emancipatory can be nothing more than a bad joke.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 2NC---Tech Debates Good

Attempts to manage technological problems are inevitable and good – they tend to a fragile working order WITHOUT falling into a strictly managerial approach. That uniquely lets us recognize complexity and accept insecurity

Nordmann, Professor of Philosophy and History of Science and Technoscience at Darmstadt Technical University, ‘18

(Alfred, “Four Horsemen and a Rotten Apple. On the Technological Rationality of Nuclear Security,” in Jahrbuch Technikphilosophie: Arbeit und Spiel, pg. 279 – 294)

The apple is rotting. During the times of the Cold War, the precarious equilibrium of strategic threats had its own working order. It could be trusted and, in fact, had to be trusted in many ways. The weapons were carefully monitored, subject to permanent surveillance from many points of view. They were closely watched through the eyes of one's own strategists, technicians and engineers, military personnel, local opposition forces, but also through the eyes of friends and foes, international agencies and monitoring groups. Everyone was attending to the weapons for different, perhaps conflicting reasons, and yet the many observations were maintained in a relation of mutual support. The weapons themselves became fixated and paralyzed at their center of attention.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Tech Debates Good

Having debates over technology better prepares us to deal with it through technological literacy

Dakers 6 (John R. Dakers – Professor of the Philosophy of Technology at the Technology University of Delft, “Towards a Philosophy for Technology Education”, Springer Link, 2006, , MG)

Heidegger (1962) and Feenberg, in his critical theory (2003), suggest that a synthesis between these opposing polarities of rules versus interpretation is possible. Both argue that, in association with the instrumental role a technology may have, we must also give consideration to the essence of the technology in terms of its social and cultural implications. Out of this emerges a synthesis that leads to an anamorphosis in technology education. In other words, the technologies that we simply accept as presented are often distortions of the truth, much as the lettering used in road markings appears to be elongated and distorted from the point of view of a pedestrian. However, the same markings when viewed from a driver’s point of view, seen head on and from a different perspective, appear, as a result of foreshortening, to be perfectly in proportion. This is deliberate on the part of the designers, but significantly, very few of us, drivers or pedestrians, are actually aware of this. It is only by repositioning ourselves that we may begin to see a different perspective, and this may, in turn, serve to transform our previously distorted values by illuminating and clarifying the controlling logic of the technologically mediated world we inhabit (Dakers, 2005a). A technological literacy in which the dialectics of “calculation versus meditation, objectification versus art, ‘world’ versus ‘earth’, identity versus difference” (Kroker, 2004: 38) are explored is therefore a crucial part of a learner’s technological development.

Technology education in this synthesis should have a “relationship” with industry, but not a subservient one, not one that is simply in the service of industry. Critical debate about technology and the role that industry has in its development must be encouraged. These debates must engage with global issues relating the sustainable development of technology, methods and patterns of consumption, and their relationship to ecological sustainability. Technology is not neutral, and its proliferation in terms of mass production, if not challenged, threatens the democratic process.

2022 Michigan Negative
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR › Case › 1NC---Improvement Good

Productivity is good for global quality of life and reducing structural violence—they’re reductionist.

Iacono ‘16, Corey Iacono is a student at the University of Rhode Island studying Pharmaceutical Science and Economics, “How Capitalism and Globalization Have Made the World a Better Place,” Quillette, January 16, 2016, , msm

Just kidding, that’s not what happened at all. In fact, as the world has become more capitalist and more globalized, the quality of life for the average person, and especially for the average poor person, has increased substantially. In 1990, 37% of the global population lived on less than $1.90 per day. By 2012, that number had been reduced to 12.8%, and in 2015 it was under 10%. The source of this progress isn’t a massive wealth redistribution program; it’s massive wealth creation — that is, economic growth. Economists David Dollar and Aart Kraay found that, in a global sample of over 100 countries, changes in the income growth of the bottom 40% of the world’s income earners are highly correlated with economic growth rates. On the other hand, changes in inequality contributed relatively little to changes in social welfare of the poor over the last few decades. There is good reason to believe that the expansion of free trade, facilitated by international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have had a considerable impact in accelerating the economic development of developing countries. In the 1990s GATT facilitated reforms which moved 125 countries towards freer trade by reducing the burden of government imposed trade barriers like tariffs. This was the first serious attempt at trade reform for most developing countries at the time, and arguably presents a unique natural experiment on the economic effects of trade reform. In fact, a paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), specifically examined how trade reforms facilitated by GATT affected the economic development of the reforming countries. In the paper, the authors compared the trends in economic growth before and after trade reform in the reforming countries. Then they compared those results to trends in economic growth of a control group of countries which didn’t undergo trade reform. What they found was very encouraging for proponents of free trade. Prior to reform, the economic development of reformers and non-reformers was practically identical, but after reform, the economic development of reforming countries accelerated while non-reforming countries saw their economies stagnate and decline. The results suggest that the reforms towards freer trade lead to an increase in income per capita of around 20% in the long-run, an effect so large that it almost certainly had a positive and non-trivial impact on poverty reduction. Similarly, other research has shown that more free market trade policies result in lower rates of extreme poverty and child mortality in developing countries. There are other benefits as well. One study on trade reform in Indonesia found that reductions of import tariffs led to an increase in disposable income among poor households, which allowed them to pull their children out of the labor force, leading to “a strong decline” in the incidence of child labor. Unfortunately, many activists have reflexively taken up the cause of opposing the expansion of global capitalism, for a number of reasons. Western anti-sweatshop activists, for example, will often argue in favor of government imposed barriers to trade with poor countries because their working conditions are terrible in comparison to those in developed Western nations. In their view, western consumers should not be promoting a cycle of capitalist exploitation by buying products made in Vietnamese sweat-shops. But satisfactory working conditions aren’t the natural state of mankind; they are a consequence of decades of economic development. Erecting barriers to trade with poor countries is surely a large impediment to their development, in fact, research suggests that existing developed world tariffs depress economic growth rates in the developing world by 0.6 to 1.6 percent per person, a considerably large effect. Moreover, the sweat-shops which produce clothing for Westerners are often much better than alternative forms of domestic employment. In poor countries like Bangladesh, China, and Vietnam, the apparel industry consistently pays more than most other domestic industries. According to research by economist Ben Powell, in poor countries “most sweatshop jobs provide an above average standard of living for their workers.” Notably, a paper published in the Journal of Development Economics found that the expansion of the garments industry in Bangladesh lead to an increase in employment and income among young women, giving them the means to finance their own education. Remarkably the authors found that, “the demand for education generated through manufacturing growth appears to have a much larger effect on female educational attainment compared to a large-scale government conditional cash transfer program to encourage female schooling.” Foreign investment is also more desirable than opponents of capitalism and globalization give it credit for. The conventional wisdom among activists in wealthy countries is that multinational corporations exploit poor workers in third world countries for cheap labor, profiting off people working in sweatshop conditions. It should come as a surprise to the individuals who hold this view to learn that 85% of people in developing countries believe that foreign companies building factories in their countries is a good thing, according to Pew Research. In fact, for all the talk of exploitative multinational corporations, research shows that, in general, these corporations provide higher wages and better working conditions than domestic employers in developing countries. Additionally, when multinational corporations build factories in poor countries, it raises the demand for low-skilled workers, resulting in higher wages for local workers. Consistent with this fact, recent empirical evidence demonstrates that investment by foreign companies in developing countries reduces both poverty and income inequality by raising the incomes of low-skilled workers. Foreign investment can also make people in relatively low-income countries better off by providing better or more inexpensive products. A recent analysis published by the NBER found that foreign retailers like Wal-Mart greatly reduce the cost of living for both the rich and poor in Mexico, making everyone along the income distribution better off. Global capitalism is by no means a perfect phenomenon. Many businesses do have questionable labor practices that are worthy of contempt. And free market policies may in many instances lead to socially undesirable outcomes, sometimes on a large scale. However, the one-dimensional, automatic denunciation of capitalism and the accompanying refusal to give it any credit for its successes — as social media activists have done — reflects an uncompromising, and quite frankly ignorant worldview. It is one in which capitalism is always bad, no matter what the evidence tells us.