2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › ukraine scenario
Margarita Konaev and Tate Nurkin 22, Research Fellow & Research Analyst, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University. The founder of OTH Intelligence Group and a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. “EYE TO EYE IN AI: Developing Artificial Intelligence for National Security and Defense” May. //barn
Engaging allies and partners: As noted at the outset of this paper, the war in Ukraine has reinforced the importance of allies and partners in enforcing geopolitical norms and standards. The same is likely to be true of the future of AI development and adoption. The DoD will benefit not only from collaboration across industry and the national security community, but also with allies and foreign partners to ensure establishment and promulgation of norms and standards that will enable trusted, responsible, and interoperable AI development and deployment.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › ukraine scenario
Benjamin Jensen 22, Senior Fellow, Future War, Gaming, and Strategy, and International Security Program. “The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War” May 26. //barn
Crises such as Ukraine will become more acute and risk prone over time without investing time and resources into understanding competition and escalation for the twenty-first century. Strategy must start with problem framing and creating a clear description of the ends, ways, and means within the context of a crisis in a manner that allows for clear-eyed assessments of how to achieve a competitive advantage. This process starts with reimagining competition, crises, and escalation in the twenty-first century.
First, the larger national security community needs new models and ways of thinking about deterrence, competition, and risk. Current defense planning and academic analytical frameworks are the legacy of Cold War dynamics that may not match a new era of competition. Unlike the Cold War, nuclear-armed states in a multipolar world will likely use nonnuclear weapons (e.g., cruise missiles, space capabilities, and cyber operations) to produce strategic effects.20 Beyond capabilities, these studies should bring the individual back in and assess risk attitudes.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › industry signaling scenario
Eileen Donahoe 21. Eileen is the Executive Director at Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator. Eileen previously served as the first US Ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva. “System Rivalry: How Democracies Must Compete with Digital Authoritarians” September 27. //barn
An essential point here: We do not need new principles. Rather, we need to reinforce confidence in the continued relevance and applicability of existing international human rights law framework — which is globally recognized and has the status of international law. That said, we do need to undertake the hard work of articulating how to adhere to our existing international human rights framework in practice, in a radically changed digital context. A global multistakeholder process must be initiated to resolve disagreements among democratic actors about the legitimacy of different data practices, platform regulations, and applications of AI-enabled tools. Rebuilding the democratic alliance around a shared understanding of how to adhere to international human rights law in digital society should be treated as a strategic priority, on par with cybersecurity and more traditional dimensions of national security.
Last, but not least, democracies need to recognize that normative leadership and technological leadership go together. If our goal is to spread democratic values rather than authoritarian norms, we must lead in technological innovation, particularly in AI and quantum computing. Dominance in those realms will translate into leverage and influence in normative realms and tech standard setting bodies. In addition, we need to become far more proactive in exporting democratic digital infrastructure as part of our trade and economic development aid programs, rather than ceding the opportunity to China to embed values into digital infrastructure in the developing world.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › industry signaling scenario
Joshua Meltzer and Cameron Kerry 21, Joshua’s a Senior Fellow in Global Economy and Development for Brookings. “Strengthening international cooperation on artificial intelligence” February 17. //barn
The U.S. is the world leader in AI. Its strength in AI has been built on a global, open, and distributed system of innovation. However, this leadership is being challenged on two main fronts. The first is from China, which has targeted development of strong AI capacity as a strategic and economic priority and source of global power. China has benefited from global cooperation on AI research and has expanded domestic innovation capacity. At the same time, China combines a restricted domestic market with an international approach to AI that includes aggressive acquisition of intellectual property (IP) and innovation from rivals, government subsidies that tilt the playing field towards Chinese companies, and strategic engagement in international forums for standards and norms that support China’s applications of AI. These tactics are often at odds with the interests of the U.S. and other leading economies, and the use of AI in applications like repressive surveillance is at odds with American values and those of other democracies.
The second challenge comes from other governments whose AI policies could lead to prescriptive regulation that may stifle AI innovation and discriminate against U.S. technology firms. Such policies also disregard the global nature of AI development. Without international coordination and integration, AI policies are unlikely to realize their potential and instead create barriers to AI diffusion globally.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › industry signaling scenario
Meredith Broadbent 21, Meredith serves as a senior adviser with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is a former chair of the U.S. International Trade Commission. “What’s Ahead for a Cooperative Regulatory Agenda on Artificial Intelligence?” March 17. //barn
Responding to Commission plans to enact stricter rules for high-risk AI technologies, such as compliance tests and controls, 14 EU member states published a paper outlining their position urging the Commission to adopt a “soft law approach” consisting of “self-regulation, voluntary labeling and other voluntary practices, as well as a robust standardization process as a supplement to existing legislation that ensures that essential safety and security standards are met.”1 The countries recommend a European approach to AI regulation in which innovation and trustworthiness work together in a “coherent and borderless single AI market.”
For several reasons, AI giants such as Google and Facebook, as well as startups, tech companies, and associations, have raised concerns that meeting regulatory requirements considered in the AI white paper will stifle innovation and may require actions that breach EU data privacy rules.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › industry signaling scenario
Meredith Broadbent 21, Meredith serves as a senior adviser with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is a former chair of the U.S. International Trade Commission. “What’s Ahead for a Cooperative Regulatory Agenda on Artificial Intelligence?” March 17. //barn
In light of the AI white paper, it appears that the Commission is moving forward with broad, horizontal, and relatively intrusive regulation of AI applications. Ex-ante conformity assessments to control access to the EU market for AI applications originating outside of the EU are proposed. The Commission is also considering data quality and traceability requirements that would require non-EU firms to train AI applications on GDPR compliant data as a condition of market access in the European Union. Sectors that will likely be impacted by EU regulation of AI are healthcare, transportation/autos and parts producers, energy, services that rely on consumer data, the public sector, and more.
To complement the AI white paper, the European Commission released a set of documents on the regulation of AI, including:
2022
Michigan
Negative
Aff › Advantage Updates › industry signaling scenario
Daniel Castro et al 19, Castro is the director of the Center for Data Innovation and vice president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Michael McLaughlin is a research analyst at the Center for Data Innovation. Eline Chivot is a former senior policy analyst at the Center for Data Innovation. “Who Is Winning the AI Race: China, the EU or the United States?” August 19. //barn
The United States leads for several reasons. First, it has the most AI start-ups, with its AI start-up ecosystem having received the most private equity and venture capital funding.[3] Second, it leads in the development of both traditional semiconductors and the computer chips that power AI systems.[4] Third, while it produces fewer AI scholarly papers than the EU or China, it produces the highest-quality papers on average.[5] Finally, while the United States has less overall AI talent than the European Union, its talent is more elite.[6]
China is ahead of the European Union in AI and appears to be quickly reducing the gap between itself and the United States. It has more access to data than the European Union and the United States, which is important because many of today’s AI systems use large datasets to train their models accurately. In venture capital and private equity funding, Chinese AI start-ups received more funding than U.S. start-ups in 2017, but not in 2016 or 2018.[7] China, however, is clearly behind both the United States and the European Union in high-quality AI talent. Several European Union member states, including Italy, had more AI researchers ranked in the top 10 percent internationally than China as of 2017.[8] Nonetheless, China has made clear progress relative to the United States in most metrics, and significantly outpaces the European Union in funding and AI adoption.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › No escalation
Matthew Holroyd 22, Correspondent for Euronews. “Ukraine war: False claims spread about military movements in Poland and Finland” June 05. //barn
Online misinformation about the armies of Poland and Finland has circulated online amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Social media users have falsely suggested that both European Union member states are preparing to enter the war or engage in military conflict.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › no ai
Julia Ciocca et al 21, Michael C. Horowitz, and Lauren Kahn, Julia Ciocca is a Research Fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Michael C. Horowitz is Richard Perry Professor and Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Lauren Kahn is a Research Fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. 4-6-2021, "The Perils of Overhyping Artificial Intelligence," Foreign Affairs, , nihara
In 1983, the U.S. military’s research and development arm began a ten-year, $1 billion machine intelligence program aimed at keeping the United States ahead of its technological rivals. From the start, computer scientists criticized the project as unrealistic. It promised big and ultimately failed hard in the eyes of the Pentagon, ushering in a long artificial intelligence (AI) “winter” during which potential funders, including the U.S. military, shied away from big investments in the field and abandoned promising areas of research.
Today, AI is once again the darling of the national security services. And once again, it risks sliding backward as a result of a destructive “hype cycle” in which overpromising conspires with inevitable setbacks to undermine the long-term success of a transformative new technology. Military powers around the world are investing heavily in AI, seeking battlefield and other security applications that might provide an advantage over potential adversaries. In the United States, there is a growing sense of urgency around AI, and rightly so. As former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper put it, “Those who are first to harness once-in-a-generation technologies often have a decisive advantage on the battlefield for years to come.” However, there is a very real risk that expectations are being set too high and that an unwillingness to tolerate failures will mean the United States squanders AI’s potential and falls behind its rivals.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › 2nc – dod fails – data / talent
Danielle C. Tarraf 19, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, Ali Wyne, Daniel Elinoff, Edward Geist, Benjamin N. Harris, Eric Hui, Cedric Kenney, Sydne Newberry, Chandler Sachs, Peter Schirmer, Danielle Schlang, Victoria M. Smith, Abbie Tingstad, Padmaja Vedula, and Kristin Warren, The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019. , nihara
DoD lacks clear mechanisms for defining and tracking AI talent. This situation is because of the lack of an AI workforce classification and the lack of consensus on the definition and requisite skills of an AI worker. Currently, the technical AI talent that exists is being placed inconsistently in military and civilian occupational specialties.
For example, our interviewees across the services noted that civilian AI talent is found across occupations, including operations researchers, program analysts, scientists, software developers, and engineers. On the uniformed side, the Army and Navy are actively considering a new occupational specialty for servicemembers just for AI, but the Air Force and Marines are not. Adding to this complicated picture, some existing uniformed and civilian occupations that might have a role to play in developing AI technologies, such as software engineers, are classified as cyber talent (see section “DoD Posture for Cyber” in Appendix D). On this note, although it is not prevalent, we observed an inclination among some of our interviewees to view AI, software, cyber, and data science as somewhat interchangeable, particularly with regard to technical talent.37
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › 2nc – dod fails – data / talent
Danielle C. Tarraf 19, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, Ali Wyne, Daniel Elinoff, Edward Geist, Benjamin N. Harris, Eric Hui, Cedric Kenney, Sydne Newberry, Chandler Sachs, Peter Schirmer, Danielle Schlang, Victoria M. Smith, Abbie Tingstad, Padmaja Vedula, and Kristin Warren, The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019. , nihara
There is ambiguity in data ownership where external vendors are involved. In theory, data that originate in DoD should be owned by DoD. In practice, when DoD data are analyzed or otherwise worked on by external vendors, the ownership of the data, albeit in a new modified form, becomes murky. This issue was highlighted in recent unpublished RAND work addressing weapon system intellectual property and data rights. This ambiguity of ownership leads to multiple problems beyond the specific ownership and potential loss of control of the data, including vendor lock to retain use of the data, the inability to aggregate data across multiple vendors, and the inability to use the data for additional internal purposes, among others. Although this problem is not unique to DoD, as some of our industry interviewees described (see section “Industry: Data” in Appendix C), it is one that DoD also needs to come to terms with.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › 2nc – dod fails – data / talent
Danielle C. Tarraf 19, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, Ali Wyne, Daniel Elinoff, Edward Geist, Benjamin N. Harris, Eric Hui, Cedric Kenney, Sydne Newberry, Chandler Sachs, Peter Schirmer, Danielle Schlang, Victoria M. Smith, Abbie Tingstad, Padmaja Vedula, and Kristin Warren, The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019. , nihara
The data that exist are not always understandable or traceable. DoD systems frequently lack the documentation or metadata required to provide context as to what particular data actually mean or how they were generated. For example, an Army database might store a numeric value for the number of tanks at a particular facility, but it might not explain whether this number indicates all functional tanks, all tanks assigned to a particular unit, or all tanks of any status present at the location. Other data values with less descriptive names will frequently be even more difficult to comprehend and use. The lack of any centralized tool for data service means that it is difficult for DoD personnel, even in leadership, to discover what data might be available to inform a question. Instead, discovering new data sources and interpreting them typically requires personal networks or other informal mechanisms.
In sum, all indications are that DoD data are not currently being used to their full potential. Overall, the problems we noted here represent a formidable obstacle to implementing AI algorithms,35 even at the level of enterprise AI. Both Project Maven and the JAIC’s preventative maintenance prototype have found that issues around data quality and availability are a primary barrier to progress (see section “Data” in Appendix B). These issues, if left unresolved, will continue to hamper the development and deployment of AI throughout DoD. Additionally, we highlight the following friction point.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › 2nc – dod fails – data / talent
Danielle C. Tarraf 19, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, Ali Wyne, Daniel Elinoff, Edward Geist, Benjamin N. Harris, Eric Hui, Cedric Kenney, Sydne Newberry, Chandler Sachs, Peter Schirmer, Danielle Schlang, Victoria M. Smith, Abbie Tingstad, Padmaja Vedula, and Kristin Warren, The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019. , nihara
Lack of interoperability in systems across DoD creates challenges. Interoperability of data collected by different systems, even within the same functional domain, remains a problem. Software applications within DoD have not typically been designed to work with other DoD applications—even applications in the same functional domain. Consequently, establishing relationships between data collected by one system and data collected by another can be virtually impossible. Even worse, it appears that DoD leadership is often presented with inconsistent values originating from different systems for the same data point, undermining leadership’s willingness to trust data from DoD systems or make decisions based on data at all (see section “Data” in Appendix B).
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › 2nc – dod fails – data / talent
Danielle C. Tarraf 19, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, Ali Wyne, Daniel Elinoff, Edward Geist, Benjamin N. Harris, Eric Hui, Cedric Kenney, Sydne Newberry, Chandler Sachs, Peter Schirmer, Danielle Schlang, Victoria M. Smith, Abbie Tingstad, Padmaja Vedula, and Kristin Warren, The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations, RAND Corporation, 2019. , nihara
Access to existing data is limited. Several barriers within DoD present substantial obstacles to data-sharing today. First, personnel might view data as a means of retaining power or value in DoD or of protecting their work from extensive oversight, and therefore those personnel resist data-sharing. Additionally, many data owners resist sharing their data out of security concerns and the worry that another organization might suffer a security breach. Finally, the security clearance process and other bureaucratic procedures can introduce a significant lag before an individual will be allowed to access data. This problem presents a particular difficulty in recruiting new talent into DoD, and substantially lowers productivity, even for long-standing DoD personnel. Some of these issues, as they pertain to acquisition data, were highlighted in a recent RAND report.34 Informal networks can substantially reduce the delay in gaining access to data, but based on our interviews, these workarounds appear to be haphazard.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › 1nc – no operationalization
--OE: operational environments
Courtney Crosby 20, Courtney Crosby, PhD, is the chief scientist with Booz Allen Hamilton’s Strategic Innovation Group. She has a PhD in decision sciences, with a focus on battlefield artificial intelligence (AI) systems for the Department of Defense. Crosby has deployed several times in support of various overseas missions. In her current role, she spearheads AI operationalization and innovation within the military C5ISR domain. Her previous experience includes research and development of emerging capabilities and social science analysis relevant to human machine teaming, 2-5-2020, "Operationalizing Artificial Intelligence for Algorithmic Warfare," Military Review, Army University Press, , nihara
Conflict can be won or lost based on military offsets, or means with which defense units can asymmetrically combat adversarial advantages. With great-power competition, adversarial technology overmatch, and ever-expanding theaters, conventional offsets are often augmented by artificial intelligence (AI).1 Yet, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ability to operationalize AI is nascent.2 Initial AI programs adopted by the Pentagon focus on the transfer of commercial capabilities to the defense sector, thus highlighting technical performance and deemphasizing mission-oriented function.3 As a result, initial pilot projects have failed to move into real-world operational environments (OE).
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › 1nc – testing fails
Danielle C. Tarraf 21, William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, Ali Wyne, Daniel Elinoff, Edward Geist, Benjamin N. Harris, Eric Hui, Cedric Kenney, Sydne Newberry, Chandler Sachs, Peter Schirmer, Danielle Schlang, Victoria M. Smith, Abbie Tingstad, Padmaja Vedula, and Kristin Warren, The Department of Defense's Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations for Improvement. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. , nihara
Once again, artificial intelligence (AI) is at the forefront of our collective imaginations, offering promises of what it can do to solve our most challenging problems. As the news headlines suggest, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is no exception when it comes to falling under the AI spell. But is DoD ready to leverage AI technologies and take advantage of the potential associated with them, or does it need to take major steps to position itself to use those technologies effectively and safely and scale up their use? This is a question that Congress, in its 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and the Director of DoD's Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) asked RAND Corporation researchers to help them answer. This research brief summarizes that report.
Artificial Intelligence and DoD
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Case Answers › 1nc – pilot projects fail
--title of card is specific to digital health system integration
--BUT, this section of the card is applicable to pilot projects broadly – all the warrants for why pilot projects are bad are reasons that would apply to the plan i.e. there’s no monitoring once deployed limiting the impact of investment, there’s no longevity so we can’t assess durability of cost due to short-term nature and it doesn’t represent data or provide enough information
Alain Labrique et al 18, “Establishing Standards to Evaluate the Impact of Integrating Digital Health into Health Systems.” Global health, science and practice vol. 6,Suppl 1 S5-S17. 10 Oct. 2018, doi:10.9745/GHSP-D-18-00230, nihara
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › ---eu !
--stolen from the EU CP file
Dr. Rosa Balfour 19, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, MA in History from Cambridge University, MSc in European Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science, Senior Advisor to the European Policy Centre, Associate of LSE Ideas, “The European Foreign Policy in a Hostile Environment”, The Progressive Post, 4/11/2019, https://progressivepost.eu/debates/next-economy/european-foreign-policy-hostile-environment
In a brittle world without enduring strong international alliances, the debate on Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ has gained new resonance, but it should not shadow the EU’s unique key international assets in the global economy and multilateral order. Working with global networks to promote norms and public goods is key to push back on nationalism, the rise of geopolitics and transactionalism.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › ---lio !
Harari ’18 [Yuval; September 26; Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; "We need a post-liberal order now," https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now]
Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind.
An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › airpower projection
---AOC = air operations center, the senior element of the theater air control system
Matthew R. Voke 19, Major, USAF, 2019-11-01, “Artificial Intelligence for Command and Control of Air Power,” Air University Press, , nihara
Centralization Versus Decentralized Airpower