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2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: Illicit Arms Turn

End use monitoring solves the weapons the aff increases – everything else is thumped by the squo

Cohen 22 – Jordan Cohen is a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute. His research interests include arms sales, alliances, foreign policy entanglements, and Middle East politics. (Jordan Cohen, "Sending Weapons to Ukraine Could Have Unintended Consequences," Cato Institute, 3-1-2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/sending-weapons-ukraine-could-have-unintended-consequences, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

DOD has been able to monitor just three types of weapons: Javelin missiles, Javelin launch units, and night vision devices. This is because these are the three types of weapons transferred under DOD’s purview that qualify for Enhanced End Use Monitoring, which is a black box. The DOD, however, notes that this is due to the “sensitivity of the technology associated with the article.” According to international watchdogs, the following have gone unmonitored: Patrol aircraft, mobile radar systems communication devices, counter‐​IED equipment, military vehicles, weapons storage facilities, and other physical equipment.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: Illicit Arms Turn

Russia makes the impact inevitable

Hudson 22 – John Hudson is a national security reporter focusing on the State Department and diplomacy. (John Hudson, "Flood of weapons to Ukraine raises fear of arms smuggling," Washington Post, 5-14-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/14/ukraine-weapons-trafficking/, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

There are additional concerns among watchdog groups about arms proliferation stemming from Moscow amid reports it has enlisted mercenaries from Libya, Syria and Chechnya, as well as the Wagner Group, a Russian contractor.

During a televised meeting of Russia’s Security Council in March, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 16,000 volunteers in the Middle East stood ready to fight alongside Russian-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: Current Arms Solve Ukraine

Only unified defense strategy solves Ukraine – current promises are empty.

Erlanger 22 – Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels. (Steven Erlanger, "U.S. and Allies Pledge Additional Arms for Ukraine, but Kyiv Wants More," New York Times, 6-15-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/world/europe/biden-ukraine-weapons.html, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

“I think the international community has done a pretty good job of providing that capability. But it’s never enough,” Mr. Austin said. “And so we’re going to continue to work hard to move as much capability as we can as fast as we can.”

But promising weapons and delivering them are two different things.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: Arms Escalate Ukraine

More arms are key to continued deterrence

The Economist 22 – The Economist newspaper was founded by a Scottish hat manufacturer to further the cause of free trade, The Economist Group has evolved into a staunchly independent global media and information-services company with intelligent brands for an international audience. (Listening To, "Is the West supplying Ukraine with enough weapons?" Economist, 6-19-2022, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/19/is-the-west-supplying-ukraine-with-enough-weapons, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

When the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Romania visited Kyiv on June 16th, they came bearing gifts. They endorsed Ukraine’s bid to become a candidate for membership of the European Union, a position echoed the following day by Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission. They also offered full-throated support for Ukraine’s military effort. “We are doing everything so that Ukraine wins this war,” declared Emmanuel Macron, France’s president. And they pledged more of the weapons that Ukraine says it desperately needs to make that happen. Mr Macron vowed to send six more state-of-the-art caesar artillery pieces “in the coming weeks”, on top of the dozen delivered so far. Unwilling to be outshone, Boris Johnson, Britain’s prime minister, turned up to Kyiv a day later and promised a big new military-training programme.

Such help is desperately needed. In recent weeks Ukraine has made some gains in southern Kherson province, and on June 17th it claimed to have sunk a Russian vessel reinforcing Snake Island, a small Russian-occupied fortress in the Black Sea. But these are small consolations next to the steady gains that Russia’s army has made in the eastern Donbas region, where fighting is concentrated. Russia now controls two-thirds of Severodonetsk, a town that lies deep in a Ukrainian salient under attack from three sides, with resistance confined to an industrial zone in the west. Russian forces are also making gains west of Severodonetsk around Slovyansk, attacking the same salient from the north.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: Arms Escalate Ukraine

Russia threats have no backing – squo thumps the link and proves only a risk deterrence is true

Burns 22 - Robert Burns is a reporter for the Associated Press. (Robert Burns, "Russia has yet to slow a Western arms express into Ukraine," AP NEWS, 4-13-2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-nato-europe-e335d774954f6403c38e88a3a6bfbcff, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

“It’s not as easy to stop this assistance flow as it might seem,” said Stephen Biddle, a professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University. “Things like ammunition and shoulder-fired missiles can be transported in trucks that look just like any other commercial truck. And the trucks carrying the munitions the Russians want to interdict are just a small part of a much larger flow of goods and commerce moving around in Poland and Ukraine and across the border.

“So the Russians have to find the needle in this very big haystack to destroy the weapons and ammo they’re after and not waste scarce munitions on trucks full of printer paper or baby diapers or who knows what.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: Arms Escalate Ukraine

Arms key to deterrence

Mahshie 22 – Abraham Mahshie is the Pentagon Editor for Air Force Magazine. As a journalist with two decades of experience, he has covered national security and political affairs across the United States and Latin America for a variety of media. (Abraham, "Past NATO Commander: US Can Deter Russia in Ukraine By Taking These 3 Steps," Air Force Magazine, 2-16-2022, https://www.airforcemag.com/past-nato-commander-us-can-deter-russia-in-ukraine-by-taking-these-3-steps/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

It matters that “NATO gets its skin in the game with NATO forces, not individually offered NATO contributions, bilaterally to the effort, which is what’s going on now,” Breedlove said.

Breedlove applauded German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s announcement, in response to Russia’s entering the Donbas region, that Germany would rescind certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to bring natural gas from Russia to Germany. It will be harder, Breedlove said, for European states dependent on Russian petroleum and gas to make similar decisions.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC – AT: France, Germany, Britain Says No

France, Germany, and Britain are dedicated to allied innovation

Aronsson 18 – Lisa Aronsson is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University. (Lisa A., "Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Services, 4-24-2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45177/4, Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)

Russia, China, and others are modernizing their militaries, investing in new and emerging technologies, and exploring their applications for defense. In addition, NATO faces rising operating costs, and both conventional and hybrid challenges in operating domains that have expanded to include cyberspace as well as land, sea, and air. NATO must also contend with a growing group of nonstate challengers empowered by the pace of technological change and the global diffusion of technology. Increasingly dependent on ubiquitous technology, NATO is adapting to a world in which commercial investments in research and development (R&D) outpace those of governments, innovation cycles are shortening, and there is more international competition for technology and innovation. Since 2014, the United States has promoted defense innovation as a strategy to integrate new technologies into military capabilities and strengthen U.S. technological superiority over its potential adversaries. Today, many European allies acknowledge the importance of technology and innovation in defense, and they are beginning to respond to the changing environment by committing more resources to defense, and a few have national defense innovation strategies of their own. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany—NATO’s largest European defense spenders—are investing more in R&D and reforming their defense ministries to take more risk, procure technology faster, develop innovative concepts, and strengthen their links with commercial industry. Generally speaking, however, European governments are still in the early stages of developing what are predominantly national strategies. NATO seeks to harmonize the allies’ national strategies and defense investments, promote collaboration, and build a shared vision for the future. Its member states have sophisticated militaries, institutional frameworks for collaboration, and dynamic economies that attract talent, and support innovation. Innovation challenges persist, however, such as those related to NATO’s limited budgets and its bureaucratic processes, which make it difficult for NATO to attract the attention of commercial industry and global technology companies. NATO is also working to balance its member states’ concerns over national sovereignty with the need for more multinational cooperation, both from a cost and from an interoperability point of view. NATO also seeks to enhance interoperability among allied militaries and balance short-term priorities with preparations for future warfare. In the future, NATO might have to rely as much on its agility and on its capacity for innovation as it has relied on its military technological advantage in the past. Congress may consider what role the United States can play to support NATO’s adaptation, and what channels Congress could pursue to exert influence over NATO’s direction. There are both risks and opportunities associated with sharing technology or developing it jointly with NATO allies, and there are questions about what the United States and its allies expect from one another in terms of technology and innovation. Technology has the potential to enhance NATO’s effectiveness, but it also has the potential to undermine interoperability or political cohesion if the United States develops a technology-driven strategy and its NATO allies either do not keep pace, or do not adapt to strategic, political, and technological change.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › More Thumpers › 2AC---AT: Say No

Say yes---the current political climate in NATO member states is one that’s very willing to increase burden sharing. NATO’s supreme commander agrees.

David Vergun 3-29-2022, Associate Writer at Department of Defense, "General Says NATO Is Stepping Up Defense Investments", U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2981576/general-says-nato-is-stepping-up-defense-investments/, DL

"We are witnessing a generational moment, a historic demonstration of unity in will and an unprecedented effort by allies to strengthen defense while simultaneously helping those in need," said Wolters, commander of U.S. European Command and NATO supreme commander in Europe.

For instance, NATO ally Germany has committed to meeting the alliance's 2% benchmark for military spending, he said. "We expect other allies will follow and redouble efforts to adequately invest in defense to generate peace — from Turkey in the southeast, to Norway, Sweden and Finland."

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › Case › 2AC – AT: Say No

Cooperation over arms lowers the cost for everyone and ensures states agree.

DoD 20 – The United States Department of Defense is an executive branch department of the federal government charged with coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government directly related to national security and the United States Armed Forces. (U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Alliances, Partnerships Strengthened Through Defense Strategy Execution," 8-5-2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2300352/military-alliances-partnerships-strengthened-through-defense-strategy-execution/, Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)

In a rapidly changing world, the United States must defend its interests and values against new threats and new competitors, especially from China and Russia. But it can't do it alone. Instead, the U.S. must strengthen relationships with existing partners and allies while also building new partnerships.

Strengthening alliances and attracting new partners is one of three lines of effort central to the National Defense Strategy laid out in 2018. It's something Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper has been focused on since he took office last year. The secretary said developing a coordinated strategy for American allies and partners is among his top priorities.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – DIB ADV

Cooperation with NATO over defense base is key to collective security

Low 22 – Thomas Low is a junior fellow at NDIA. (Thomas, “U.S. Must Ready Defense Industrial Base to Aid NATO,” National Defense, 3-25-2022, , Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

People across the globe have witnessed first-hand Russia’s renewed aggression towards Ukraine, a conflict resulting in the largest land war in Europe since World War II.

If the United States and its NATO allies cannot deter such action, it could be possible for similar scenes to occur in other countries bordering Russia. A prime example are the Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Though now tied to the West through economic cooperation, as well as military alliances such as NATO, these nations previously existed as part of the Russian sphere of influence. They have sizable Russian minorities who speak Russian and consume Russian news.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – DIB ADV

NATO cohesion is key to prevent Russian miscalc and extinction

Farmer 15 (Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war,” Business Insider, 2-20-2015, )

Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyze Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of course a classic Soviet technique.” He went on to say that “the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being.” Nato has agreed to set up a rapid reaction force of around 5,000 troops ready to move at 48 hours notice, in case of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Supplies, equipment and ammunition will be stockpiled in bases in the region. Alliance leaders hope the force will deter any incursion. David Cameron warned Vladimir Putin there will be more sanctions and "more consequences" for Russia if the ceasefire in Ukraine does not hold. The Prime Minister vowed that the West would be "staunch" in its response to Russia and was prepared to maintain pressure on Moscow "for the long term". He rejected the findings of a scathing parliamentary committee report that the UK found itself "sleep-walking" into the crisis over Ukraine. The EU Committee of the House of Lords found there had been a "catastrophic misreading" of mood by European diplomats in the run-up to the crisis. Earlier this week, Mr Fallon said the Russian president might try to test Nato’s resolve with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A murky campaign of infiltration, propaganda, undercover forces and cyber attack such as that used in the early stages of the Ukraine conflict could be used to inflame ethnic tensions in Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, he said. The military alliance must be prepared to repel Russian aggression “whatever form it takes”, Mr Fallon said, as he warned that tensions between the two were “warming up”. His comments were dismissed in Moscow. Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the country does not pose a threat to Baltic countries and accused Mr Fallon of going beyond “diplomatic ethics” . Alexander Lukashevich said: "His absolutely unacceptable characteristics of the Russian Federation remind me of last year's speech of US president Barack Obama before the UN general assembly, in which he mentioned Russia among the three most serious challenges his country was facing.” "I believe we will find a way to react to Mr Secretary's statements."

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – DIB ADV

Current ambiguity over US alliance commitments creates division within NATO – the affs military support overcomes those barriers

Anderson and Larson 13 (Justin V. Anderson and Jeffrey A. Larsen 13 {Justin V. Anderson is a Senior National Security Policy Analyst with SAIC in Arlington, VA, providing contract support to government clients on nuclear arms control, deterrence, and WMD proliferation issues. Jeffrey A. Larsen is a Senior Scientist with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Colorado Springs. September 2013. “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy.” https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP69.pdf)

Trading New York for Hamburg? The U.S. ability to defend Western Europe with nuclear forces capable of deterring a superior conventional opponent (and, in time, a nuclear peer) thus represented the cornerstone of NATO Cold War defense strategies. It was also vital to U.S. efforts to assure each of the alliance’s member states that they enjoyed the protection of a nuclear-armed superpower. With the United States representing far and away the most powerful member of NATO, the cohesion of the alliance depended on member states believing that U.S. political leaders were prepared to put their military forces – and perhaps even their homeland – at risk in order to defend allies on the other side of the Atlantic. As the Soviet Union began developing nuclear forces capable of ranging U.S. cities, however, not all U.S. allies were convinced this was the case. By the 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle of France was openly speculating the United States would never trade New York for Hamburg – i.e. it would never risk a Soviet nuclear strike against a major U.S. city in order to protect a vulnerable allied target from an attack by the Warsaw Pact.92 He also argued that NATO was dangerously dependent on the United States and its uncertain (in his mind) nuclear deterrent, effectively ceding sovereign decision-making and national security decisions to American policymakers in Washington. This, he asserted, was extremely dangerous given tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, holding NATO’s European members hostage to decisions in foreign capitals. De Gaulle’s doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to NATO led him to strongly support France’s development of an independent nuclear deterrent. Neither assured destruction nor flexible response appeared credible to him in light of the Soviet Union’s ability to directly threaten the United States with nuclear attack. These doubts and his broader concerns that France’s membership in the alliance hindered its national security and ability to independently engage in Cold War geopolitics informed his decision to withdraw France from the NATO’s military structure in 1966.93 The questions raised by de Gaulle posed a significant challenge to U.S. efforts to assure its European allies as the Soviet Union began to develop ICBMs and other long-range nuclear forces.94 By the late 1960s Moscow possessed a significant edge in conventional forces and appeared capable of credibly threatening the United States, even if its overall numbers of forces were still several years from catching up to the U.S. arsenal. Some allies wondered if an American president would engage in brinkmanship with the Kremlin over Hamburg, Berlin, or other vulnerable areas of the alliance. U.S. domestic politics also contributed to allied unease in the 1960s, with a number of members of Congress voicing their displeasure over what they viewed as a failure of other NATO states to shoulder what they considered a fair share of the burden of defending Europe.95 The loss of one of its strongest members was a blow to NATO, but it remained intact through the end of the Cold War because U.S. leaders clearly demonstrated their willingness to risk blood and treasure on behalf of Germany and other members of NATO. When France’s exit from NATO threatened to leave the alliance homeless and deprive it of a number of key military facilities, the Johnson administration worked to quickly and seamlessly transition NATO’s headquarters from Paris to Brussels and U.S. forces stationed in France to the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany. President Lyndon Johnson also used his skills in domestic politicking to head off efforts in the Congress to halve the number of U.S. forces in Europe, and ensured the provision of continued military and economic support to key NATO members.96 Furthermore, for many European allies de Gaulle’s argument that nuclear weapons represented the only true guarantee of national security in the superpower era ultimately solidified their commitment to NATO. Like de Gaulle, they had become convinced of the importance of nuclear deterrence to the defense of their home countries. They differed from de Gaulle, however, in their assessment of the U.S. commitment to their defense. For most NATO states during the Cold War, U.S. conventional and nuclear forces posted to bases on or near their home territory provided a visible demonstration of Washington’s preparedness to fight for Western Europe. In addition, the support of U.S. leaders, beginning with President Eisenhower, for NATO “nuclear sharing” arrangements (which would make certain types of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe available to allies in the event of a major Warsaw Pact attack) also addressed concerns the United States would reserve nuclear forces for use only in defense of its narrow national interests.97 As aptly summarized by Sir Lawrence Freedman in his study The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, most NATO allies during the Cold War “prefer[ed] to live with the known uncertainties of the US nuclear guarantee than with the political and strategic uncertainties of nuclear independence.”98 Despite significant stresses upon the alliance later in the Cold War, after 1966 no other states would defect from NATO, and U.S. nuclear forces would remain the linchpin of NATO defense strategies and plans until the fall of the Berlin Wall. De Gaulle’s defection also raised questions about the role of U.S. extended deterrence strategies within the broader geopolitics of the Cold War. The French president charged that these strategies could actually interfere with the development of stable, productive relations between European states and the Soviet Union. While disagreeing with de Gaulle’s decision to break away from the alliance, other members of NATO agreed the alliance needed to determine its views on the relationship between deterrence and diplomacy during an era of competition between two superpowers and their respective blocs. Recognizing the importance of this relationship to assuring its NATO allies, the Johnson administration supported Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel’s suggestion in late 1966 that the members of the alliance conduct a comprehensive study of its first 20 years and use the results to assess its future military and diplomatic goals. The initiative was recognized as a key effort to rally the alliance in the wake of France’s withdrawal and internal disagreements over whether and how to diplomatically engage the Soviet Union. The report found that the alliance could exercise deterrence and conduct diplomacy at the same time, concluding that “military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.”99 While the Johnson administration would have preferred stronger language in support of deterrence, the report’s findings generally aligned with the president’s conviction that the alliance’s bargaining power was directly linked with its military strength: [a] strong NATO remains essential if we are to reach a solid agreement with the Soviet Union that reflects the common interests of each of the allied nations in peace and security.100 The United States’ endorsement of the report and its unanimous acceptance by the other members of NATO in late 1967 effectively ended questions about the alliance’s viability in the wake of France’s departure. It also addressed allied concerns regarding the superpower relationship. NATO members believed the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the alliance was important to their national security. However, they also wanted the United States to leave the door open for diplomacy with the Soviet Union, arguing that a cold peace with the Soviet bloc was better than a hot war that would destroy Europe. As a result, the willingness of U.S. leaders in the late 1960s and beyond to stake political capital on both the defense of NATO and on diplomacy with the Kremlin was an important component of U.S. assurance strategies during the remainder of the Cold War.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – DIB ADV

Unrestrained great power competition causes extinction

Robert S. Litwak 21, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center. Dr. Litwak is also a consultant to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He served on the National Security Council staff as director for nonproliferation in the first Clinton administration. He was an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and has held visiting fellowships at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Oxford University. "Geostrategic Competition and Climate Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable" September 15. //pipk

Humanity faces two catastrophic, indeed existential, threats—climate change and nuclear war. These risks play out before us as if on split screen. On one side are the here-and-now impacts of climate change: wildfires from Siberia to California to southern Europe, scorching “heat domes” over the Pacific Northwest, and “once in a thousand years” flooding in China. On the other, heightened geostrategic competition carrying the greatest risk of war between nuclear powers since the depths of the Cold War: in the month of April 2021 alone, a Russian troop surge on the Ukraine border triggered an “imminent crisis” alert in NATO while Chinese naval vessels and bombers conducted a largescale war-game encircling Taiwan. Though ostensibly discrete, the events playing out on the split screen are linked. This new nexus between geostrategic competition and climate change must be understood and integrated in policy if the twin threats are to be averted.

In his landmark book, Hot, Flat, and Crowded, New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman stated that the central challenge of climate change to humanity is now “to manage what is already unavoidable and avoid what will truly be unmanageable.” To that compelling formulation can be added a corollary reflecting the new nexus: avoiding unconstrained geostrategic competition is a prerequisite for managing the climate threat.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – DIB ADV

Otherwise, continued decline will cause the base to collapse BUT allied innovation solves competition with China and Russia

Gill 22 – Jaspreet Gill was the senior technology reporter for Inside the Army. (Jaspreet Gill, "The health of the Defense Industrial Base is failing, trade group says," Breaking Defense, 2-22-2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/the-health-of-the-defense-industrial-base-is-failing-trade-group-says/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

The health of the defense industrial base has received a “failing” grade from a lead defense trade group for the first time, largely due to unprecedented and ongoing challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic and strategic competition from China and Russia.

That conclusion is part of the National Defense Industrial Association’s third annual Vital Signs 2022 report, which offers an analysis of the US’s defense industrial base. For this year’s report, NDIA and data firm Govini worked together to grade eight “vital signs” that shape the performance of defense contractors, on a 0 to 100 scale, where an average score of 70 is considered passing.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – DIB ADV

Second, allied sales and technology plug the gap

Greenwalt and Walker 22 – Bill Greenwalt, long the top Republican acquisition policy expert on the SASC, rose to become deputy defense undersecretary for industrial policy. A member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, he’s now a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Dustin Walker is a non-Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. ("How Biden’s ‘Buy American’ is undermining the arsenal of democracy," Breaking Defense, 5-3-2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/how-bidens-buy-american-is-undermining-the-arsenal-of-democracy/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

The arsenal of democracy is making a comeback. As it did in past moments of global crisis, the United States is arming a sovereign nation in its struggle for survival against the depredations of a dictator. But it is not doing so alone.

In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US is coordinating with its allies and partners on the urgent production, modification, donation and delivery of military equipment from across the world to Ukraine. It is working to rapidly replace equipment donated from its own inventory as well as those of its allies and partners. As many European nations consider increasing defense spending in future years, the US is helping lead discussions on how best to bolster capabilities needed to deter and defend against Russian aggression. And it is attempting to glean lessons from the war in Ukraine to prepare itself, as well as allies and partners such as Taiwan, for the possibility of Chinese aggression. This new arsenal of democracy is a multinational effort.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – DIB ADV

First, military innovation lowers costs – NATO is the key forum to foster development

Lombardi 19 – Chris Lombardi is the vice president of European Business Development. (Chris, "Keeping NATO’s competitive edge through cooperation, not isolation," Euractiv, 12-2-2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/keeping-natos-competitive-edge-through-cooperation-not-isolation/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

An increasingly assertive Russia has conducted hybrid warfare against its adversaries on a global scale. China is building up its reach and ambition. Rogue state and non-state actors have growing access to capabilities – cyber, drones, or long-range missiles for instance – enabling them to threaten Europe’s strategic networks. The Alliance, its member states, and their defence industry partners have a long road ahead in arenas such as hypersonics, space, and artificial intelligence. However, one thing remains steadfast: we must maintain our competitive edge through coordinated investments, sharing of best practices – both successes and failures – and shaping policies that promote optimal innovation in timely cost-effective ways. Now is not the time for isolation among allied nations and industry partners, but for cooperation.

Competition and cooperation across the transatlantic supply chain are vital to foster a climate of innovation and keep our competitive edge over those who challenge our collective security. It is essential that these channels of cooperation remain free and open – not only for larger industry partners such as Raytheon – but also for our small and medium-sized industry partners in Europe. Isolating countries with a sophisticated industrial base – that could help realise the most advanced technologies – is detrimental to keeping NATO and its member states safe.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – DIB ADV

Expanding the US industrial base is key to continue supporting American allies – only expanding cooperation can solve

Khalilzad 22 – Zalmay Khalilzad is an Opinion Contributor for The Hill. (Zalmay Khalilzad, Opinion Contributor, "Putin’s war sparked an urgent need to expand the US military-industrial base," Hill, 4-26-2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3463491-putins-war-sparked-an-urgent-need-to-expand-the-us-military-industrial-base/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

Senior Pentagon officials​ recently invited leaders of the U.S. defense industry to discuss the need for replenishing the stockpiles of weapons that have been sent to Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. This and the pacing threat of China are necessary for planning the production of weapons and services by our military industry. But they are not nearly enough for the new era ushered in by​ Vladimir Putin’s war.

True, the supplying of two particular weapon systems so far has put a significant dent in our stockpiles. We have sent Ukraine 33 percent of our Javelins — a portable anti-tank missile — and around 25 percent of our Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The Pentagon has quite rightly said these must be replenished — or better still, replaced by more capable newer models. And as there is no indication that the war will end any time soon, we must assume the requirement for resupply will continue and even increase.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV

The plan prevents escalation in multiple scenarios BUT collaboration with NATO is necessary for proper implementation

Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312_(Deterrence_Defense_Baltic)_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

Establish stocks of common-use munitions and equipment. NATO and the United States should preposition munitions in the Baltics for use by reinforcing units. These stocks could include anti-tank and anti-air missiles like Javelins and Stinger as well as similar munitions produced by European NATO states, loitering munitions, armed UAS, cannon and rocket artillery munitions, and small arms ammunition. Inventories could also be used to supply and restock the training expenditures of Baltic forces. The cost of a munitions sharing program would be a relatively minor expense for NATO but could save the Baltics valuable training funds to be allocated toward high-priority capabilities or to training facilities for Alliance use or NATO Center of Excellence operations. This would have the dual advantage of enhancing peacetime training while constituting important prepositioned stocks. Ramp up U.S. and European production capacity for G-RAMMs. NATO and other states donated tens of thousands of G-RAMMs such as Stingers, NLAWs, and Javelins to the Ukrainian military, with resultant heavy depletion of their own inventories. Consistent with historical experience, the expenditure rates of those weapons in Ukraine have reportedly been very high. There is currently little surge production capacity, both for replacement of older G-RAMM types such as those sent to Ukraine or for more advanced versions for reasons both of supply chain issues and certain required materials.134 Current estimates are that large replacement orders will not be filled until 2023 or even 2024. Given that such weapons will play an increasingly important role on future combat operations, expanding production capacity should become a high priority for both U.S. and European producers.135 Bolster NATO’s ability to reinforce its eastern front and the Baltic region. NATO and the European Union should further invest in defense infrastructure along the eastern front using programs such as the NATO Security Investment Program, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the Three Seas Initiative. The United States should continue to support improvements to European logistics and training infrastructure through European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding. These projects should focus on NATO’s ability to rapidly move and sustain forces in eastern and northern Europe and might include improvements to airbases, seaports, rail infrastructure, fuel distribution systems, command and control networks, expedient bridging equipment, and hardening of critical nodes. NATO should continue to stress-test reinforcement scenarios in annual exercises and rehearse securing sea lines of communication in the Baltic Sea. Several nations bordering the Baltics have ongoing technology and commercialization initiatives to develop and operate uncrewed cargo ships, which may prove vital in contested logistics scenarios. Finally, sealift capacity is a crucial aspect of any U.S. effort to reinforce and defend Europe. Recapitalizing the U.S. sealift force is long overdue and necessary for contingencies in both Europe and other theaters.13

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV

Extinction

Owen Cotton-Barratt et al. 17 - PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,”

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV

Otherwise, Russia escalates

Stavridis 20 – James Stavridis is a retired United States Navy admiral, currently Vice Chair, Global Affairs and Managing Director of the global investment firm the Carlyle Group, and Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation. (James Stavridis, "Turkey is a mediocre NATO ally, but Russia is enemy No. 1," Japan Times, 3-2-2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/02/commentary/world-commentary/turkey-mediocre-nato-ally-russia-enemy-no-1/#.Xue2G2pKiRt, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

I explained that there was more to it than Putin’s desire to show the world his loyalty to a long-term ally. He felt that engaging militarily would diminish U.S. influence in the region, ensure Russia’s access to warm-weather ports on the Mediterranean and enhance his sway with Iran (which also supports Assad). He also wanted to demonstrate to the Russian people that he was a decisive global player unafraid to stand up to the West. His strategy remains coherent, and it appears he will succeed in helping Assad crush the rebellion. Turkey has been opposed to Assad and aligned with some of the rebel forces for years; hence its deploying troops to Idlib. Like Putin, Erdogan is pursuing a larger strategy in the region. He wants to control the Syrian border to diminish attacks in Turkey by Kurdish terrorists from the south, and to exert Turkish influence across the former Ottoman Empire. He also aims to demonstrate to his political base in Turkey that, like Putin, he is an authoritarian man of action. He figures the ends are worth placing at risk the strong economic ties between the two nations, tourism from Russia, and a cordial personal relationship with Putin. Erdogan has hardly been an ideal ally recently: sending his troops to slaughter U.S.-allied rebels in Syria, purchasing an advanced missile-defense system from Russia, and threatening to shut down NATO installations on Turkish soil, among other provocations. Still, the potential of a military collision between Russia and Turkey is of far greater concern for the NATO alliance. If the two nations’ troops end up in direct combat, Erdogan could call on the rest of NATO for assistance against a military great power. We’ve been here before. During my time at NATO, we saw several incidents involving Russian and Turkish fighters and defense systems. Eventually we ended up deploying Patriot air-defense batteries to southern Turkey. That forced Assad and his Russian allies to concentrate on other parts of Syria to avoid an accidental clash with NATO. This time, with significant land forces in close proximity and active combat underway, the chances of a miscalculation are far higher. Last Wednesday, Erdogan insisted that Turkey would not take even the “smallest step back” in an escalating standoff with Russia. He also called for again sending Patriot batteries to his southern border. From an alliance perspective, there are a handful of actions that might ease tensions and avoid an open conflict triggering Article 5, the guarantee that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all. The top NATO brass and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg need to meet with their Turkish counterparts and make the case for doing everything to avoid Russian forces on the battlefield — which of course is easier said than done. NATO can provide what militaries call “deconfliction” between Russian and Turkish forces by providing high-level intelligence about Russian troop deployments and intentions. It can also technically assist Turkey with developing preventative protocols to avoid combat with Russia. The U.S. and Russia do this, for example, at sea, where we have very specific rules about approaching each other’s ships and aircraft, the so-called Incidents at Sea agreements. NATO can also provide logistical and humanitarian assistance to the refugee population. Most important perhaps, the U.S. must let Moscow know in no uncertain terms that the consequences of combat operations against Turkish troops would include further sanctions and greater military support for Turkey in accordance with the NATO treaty — to include, for example, the Patriot deployment Erdogan has requested. Clearly, there needs to be a global response to the violence in Idlib, and the United Nations Security Council must address this with more than calls to action. The idea of a negotiated “safe zone” between Turkey and Syria is still worth pursuing, although Assad and Putin feel they have all the momentum at the moment. It’s unlikely we can avert the tragedy facing three million Syrians civilians — many women and children — about to be crushed between Putin’s and Erdogan’s competing strategic plans. Still, things would get immeasurably worse for everyone in the case of a full-blown NATO-Russia confrontation. Without nuanced U.S. and NATO efforts to both rein in and protect the interests of their fractious Turkish ally, that isn’t an unthinkable result.