2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
The Economist 20 – The Economist newspaper was founded by a Scottish hat manufacturer to further the cause of free trade, The Economist Group has evolved into a staunchly independent global media and information-services company with intelligent brands for an international audience. (The Economist, "Why NATO should grit its teeth and help Turkey in Idlib," Economist, 5-7-2020, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/03/07/why-nato-should-grit-its-teeth-and-help-turkey-in-idlib, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)
The crisis is an opportunity for the alliance to reinvigorate itself, while alleviating the suffering Few places on Earth are more miserable than Idlib province, the last big pocket of rebel-held territory in war-torn Syria. It is home to some 3m people, roughly half of whom are there only because they have fled fighting elsewhere. Along with the poor, huddled masses came jihadists, who now largely control the territory. Syria’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad, wants it back, even if that means reducing it to rubble. His months-long bombing campaign has destroyed schools, houses and hospitals, and pushed a million people towards Turkey’s sealed border. Many are trapped there, cold, hungry and exposed. The world is at last waking up to this humanitarian crisis—and to the fact that Turkey is the only country trying to stave it off. Fearing another flood of migrants, its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has sent thousands of troops to Idlib in recent weeks to stop Mr Assad’s offensive. Dozens were killed in an attack by Syrian (and perhaps Russian) forces on February 27th, prompting retaliatory strikes from Turkey (see article). But what got the attention of European countries was Mr Erdogan’s decision to open Turkey’s borders and send refugees streaming their way (see article). Turkey is crying out for help in Idlib. Its nato partners should provide it, not only to stop the suffering of desperate Syrians, but also to reinvigorate their faltering alliance. Some nato members are reluctant to work with Mr Erdogan. This is understandable. He locks up dissidents, cosies up to Russia, uses refugees as bargaining chips, and is often at odds with nato. Look no further than Syria, where Turkey has pounded Kurdish fighters, whom it calls terrorists, but whom America regards as allies in the fight against Islamic State. Mr Erdogan sees Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, as the man to deal with in Syria—and elsewhere. Mr Putin, in turn, uses Mr Erdogan to divide and weaken nato. Russia’s sale to Turkey of an s-400 anti-aircraft system, which is incompatible with nato systems, has deepened the rift between Turkey and its allies. But Turkey is too important for nato to abandon. It has the alliance’s second-biggest army and sits at the crossroads between west and east. The situation in Idlib, dire as it is, provides an opportunity to reset relations. Turkey has renewed its call for nato to patrol a no-fly zone over the province and asked America for Patriot missiles to defend itself against attack. Western leaders are understandably reluctant to put troops on the ground or planes in the air around Idlib. nato, though, can do more than merely express solidarity. Promises of more ammunition, humanitarian aid and radar surveillance over Syria are a start. Spain already stations Patriot missiles in Turkey and other European allies should step in. nato should put its weight behind talks to reach a political settlement over Idlib. And Turkey should insist that some of its allies should be present at such talks, something Russia rejects. These moves will not completely heal the rift between Turkey and the West, nor will they solve the problem of Idlib, which has been festering for years. But they might restore some of Turkey’s faith in its allies and send a message to Mr Putin. The fact that such strategic considerations—and a fear of Syrian refugees—might motivate Western policymakers more than their concern over struggling Syrians is disheartening. Yet nato attention would look the same to the people of Idlib whatever its motive. Helping Turkey there would alleviate some of their suffering.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Jovanovski 22 – Kristina Jovanovski is a reporter for The Media Line. (Kristina Jovanovski, "US hopes arms deal with Turkey will deter Russia, analysts say," The Jerusalem Post, 05-15-2022, https://www.jpost.com/international/article-706793, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)
US President Joe Biden sought approval from congressional leaders to sell missiles, radars and electronics to Turkey for its F-16 fighter jets, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday.
Turkey will spend more than $500 million on the arms deal if it goes through, Bloombergreported.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Dokoupil 22 – Tony Dokoupil is an American broadcast journalist and author, known for his work as a co-anchor of CBS Mornings. He was also a news correspondent for CBS News and MSNBC. (Tony Dokoupil, "Conflict in Ukraine triggers fear of nuclear warfare," CBS, 4-29-2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/conflict-nuclear-warfare-ukraine-russia/, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)
The threat of a global nuclear war doesn't feel as distant as it did a few weeks ago. A recent CBS News poll found that 70% of adults are worried Russia's invasion of Ukraine could lead to fighting with nuclear weapons.
Many are curious as to what a nuclear war would look like — so Alex Wellerstein, a historian and professor at the Stevens Institute of Technology, developed a website called "NUKEMAP." It can simulate a detonation anywhere in the world.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Santora and Cohen 22 – Marc Santora is the International News Editor based in London, focusing on breaking news events. He was previously the Bureau Chief for East and Central Europe based in Warsaw. He has also reported extensively from Iraq and Africa. Roger Cohen is the Paris bureau chief of The Times. He was a columnist from 2009 to 2020. He has worked for The Times for more than 30 years and has served as a foreign correspondent and foreign editor. Raised in South Africa and Britain, he is a naturalized American. (Marc Santora and Roger Cohen, "Momentum in Ukraine Is Shifting in Russia’s Favor," No Publication, 6-11-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/11/world/europe/russia-momentum-ukraine.html, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)
A war in Ukraine that began with a Russian debacle as its forces tried and failed to take Kyiv has seemingly begun to turn, with Russia now picking off regional targets, Ukraine lacking the weaponry it needs and Western support for the war effort fraying in the face of rising gas prices and galloping inflation.
On the 108th day of President Vladimir V. Putin’s unprovoked war, driven by his conviction that Ukraine is territory unjustly taken from the Russian Empire, Russia appeared no closer to victory. But its forces did appear to be making slow, methodical and bloody progress toward control of eastern Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Morris and Cancian 22 – Frank Morris is a reporter for NPR and has supervised the reporters in KCUR's newsroom since 1999. Mark Cancian works for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. ("Javelin missiles are in short supply and restocking them won't be easy," NPR.org, 5-27-2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/05/27/1101701890/javelin-missiles-are-in-short-supply-and-restocking-them-won-t-be-easy, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC) **audio descriptions excluded from transcript**
One of the best weapons Ukraine has in its war with Russia is Javelin missiles. But supplies are low, and restocking them will not be easy. Frank Morris of our member station KCUR explains why.
FRANK MORRIS, BYLINE: Every conflict has its iconic weapons - tanks in World War II, helicopters in the Vietnam War. And Mark Cancian with the Center for Strategic and International Studies says the war in Ukraine has distinguished an American-made, shoulder-fired, precision-guided anti-tank missile - the Javelin.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Brands 19 (Brands, Hal. “How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics.” Bloomberg, 11-07-2019, . Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Most recently, he is the co-author of "The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order.")
Would the U.S. fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states back in 2004. Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense. There was a time when it seemed quite normal to risk nuclear war over the sanctity of European frontiers. During the Cold War, NATO was outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces, and it would have had great difficulty stopping a Soviet attack with conventional weapons. From the moment it was formed, NATO relied on the threat of nuclear escalation — whether rapid and spasmodic, or gradual and controlled — to maintain deterrence. American thinkers developed elaborate models and theories of deterrence. U.S. and NATO forces regularly carried out exercises simulating the resort to nuclear weapons to make this strategy credible. After the Cold War ended, the U.S. and its allies had the luxury of thinking less about nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Tensions with Russia receded and nuclear strategy came to seem like a relic of a bygone era. Yet today, with Russia rising again as a military threat, the grim logic of nuclear statecraft is returning. The spike in tensions between Russia and the West over the past half-decade has revealed a basic problem: NATO doesn’t have the capability to prevent Russian forces from quickly overrunning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian invaders would be at the gates of the Baltic capitals in two to three days; existing NATO forces in the region would be destroyed or swept aside. NATO could respond by mobilizing for a longer war to liberate the Baltic countries, but this would require a bloody, dangerous military campaign. Critically, that campaign would require striking targets — such as air defense systems — located within Russia itself, as well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities within the Kaliningrad enclave, which is situated behind NATO’s front lines. Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert. Russian officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. They are particularly alarmed at the possibility of NATO using its unmatched military capabilities to conduct conventional strikes within Russian borders. So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms. This concept is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of evidence that the Russians are serious about it. A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict. It could also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons raises the question of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead, through deliberate choice or miscalculation, to a general nuclear war involving intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and apocalyptic destruction?
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312_(Deterrence_Defense_Baltic)_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)
Estonia and the Baltics will remain vulnerable to a broad spectrum of Russian threats. Chapter 1 noted the range of Russian threats from the sub-conventional level to a full invasion and occupation. The proximity of the Baltic states to Russia and the disparities between NATO and Russian forces in the region leave the Baltic states vulnerable in a variety of potential scenarios. Accordingly, NATO’s security posture in the Baltic region must move from a focus on forward presence to persistent forward defense, which entails having sufficient combat-ready forces positioned and ready to “fight tonight” to deter and, if necessary, to stop or greatly slow a Russian invasion. NATO and Europe as a whole do not have the option of returning to the pre-2022 European security status quo. The most likely persistent threats are those on the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum, where Russia could employ various “gray zone,” or sub-conventional, measures to attempt to intimidate or coerce Baltic states. Potential operations may try to use the Orthodox religion, Soviet nostalgia, or education and citizenship issues to manipulate Russian-ethnic populations living in strategically relevant areas of the Baltics such as Tallinn, Paldiski, Narva, Riga, or Daugavpils.96 Other scenarios below the threshold of open conflict include the weaponization of migrants, exploitation of natural or man-made disasters, or promotion of social unrest in the Baltics. Russia, however, could also try to provoke repeated reserve mobilizations in the Baltics through limited incursions or provocations in order to impose economic costs, mobilization exhaustion, or create tensions within NATO while also desensitizing indications and warning about possible future Russian operations. Mobilizing in response to any Russian provocation, however small, might risk Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania wearing out the current sense of urgency within the Alliance and could jeopardize the perceived legitimacy of their claims on other Alliance members. Even after recent events in Ukraine, it remains to be seen if and for how long the supposedly greatly heightened threat perceptions in western European NATO members persist.97 The Baltic states themselves, with limited assistance from NATO, are best positioned to counter these sub-conventional threats because they typically require civil and government rather than military responses. Further along the conflict spectrum to conventional military operations, limited air and missile strikes or “pulsed” ground incursions would put the onus on NATO to react or escalate.98 Limited attacks or incursions could create tensions within the alliance between members who want to rapidly escalate and hit back, and members who would prefer other, less risky response measures. These types of attacks would place a premium on air and missile defense capabilities, which the Baltic states do not possess in substantial numbers. Given the potentially high costs of these scenarios to NATO and their relatively low cost to Russia, the Alliance should work to significantly improve the Baltic states’ ability to defend against such Russian provocations. A key question for NATO to consider is the threshold at which point Estonia, the other Baltic states, and/or the Alliance would strike Russian territory in retaliation. A conventional ground invasion to seize and occupy one or more Baltic states is possible. Although it has been the least likely scenario, it is the most dangerous one, and one that NATO must be adequately prepared for. This scenario is especially salient now, given that Russia has actually undertaken exactly such an action against Ukraine. In the event of a similar future invasion, the Baltic states must be able to withstand preliminary Russian attacks and heavily attrite Russian forces as they enter NATO territory and sustain the fight as other NATO forces assemble and move to reinforce the region. Fundamentally, the credibility of the Alliance, both as a military organization and with regard to the Baltic region, rests on its ability to counter Russian threats by reinforcing units and assets, moving its forces rapidly to decisive combat areas, and executing successful conventional military operations to defeat such a Russian invasion. The NATO Alliance must also be prepared to counter these Russian threats in the face of increased nuclear saber-rattling from Russia.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
White 22 – Sarah White is a reporter for Real Clear Defense. (Sarah White, "The Baltic States Need Advanced NATO Weapons to Compensate for Their Geographical Disadvantages," RealClearDefense, 5-6-2022, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/05/06/the_baltic_states_need_advanced_nato_weapons_to_compensate_for_their_geographical_disadvantages_831021.html, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)
Now that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has passed the 60-day mark, the focus on the possibility that Russia might invade the Baltics next has lessened, but the risk may be no less heightened than in the war’s early days. The three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are all at a geographical disadvantage to Russian aggression, and, as members of NATO, carry the highest possible stakes in the event of an attack.
Many neighboring countries are re-evaluating their own defense policies in the event that Russian aggression reaches their borders. Even Germany, which had a default policy of non-aggression after the Second World War, has committed to buying the F-35 fighter jet from the U.S., anticipating the need to defend itself. Finland and Sweden, which had a policy of neutrality when it came to joining NATO, are now seriously considering membership.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312_(Deterrence_Defense_Baltic)_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)
There are many lessons to be learned from the Ukrainian operations against Russia to date that appear directly applicable to the defense of Estonia and the other Baltic states based on preliminary reports from the fighting in Ukraine. Further lessons will be confirmed over time as analysis and reporting on the conflict continues and solidifies. The successful Ukrainian employment of precision strike capabilities in a highly “asymmetric” operational approach based heavily on the employment of large numbers of small, short- and some medium-range, lethal precision strike weapons in the ground, air, and sea domains could suggest particularly important lessons highly relevant to the defense of other nations, including Baltic and other NATO states. The Ukrainian military has been able to inflict a remarkably high level of attrition on Russian forces by employing large quantities of small, mostly short-range, lethal precision-guided weapons (PGW) that it received from NATO allies and other states.39 These have included very large quantities of anti-tank/vehicle weapons such as Javelins and NLAWs. General Milley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Staff, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) that as of early April 2022, the U.S. and allies had provided 60,000 anti-tank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons to Ukraine.40 These systems have been particularly useful because of favorable terrain and their ease of use.41 Armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS), notably the Turkish TB-2, have proven singularly effective in detecting and destroying Russian tanks and other vehicles and equipment.42 Those aircraft are also able to perform in other roles such as reconnaissance and targeting for ground troops. Similarly, thousands of SHORADS such as Stingers, Starstreaks (UK), and other “Man-Portable Air Defense Systems” (MANPADS) not only inflicted attrition but as importantly “highly unpredictable ground-mobile SAMs complicate the tactical threat picture even more for Russia,” while being highly survivable compared with larger static air defense systems.43 Other types of weapons and supplies such as machine guns and assault rifles, ammunition, and body armor and other protective gear offered by NATO allies and others clearly have been of great utility as well, but it is the PGWs and the ways they have been employed by the Ukrainians that have underpinned the exceptional battlefield results seen to date. The battlefield experience in Ukraine provides but the most recent evidence of the key role of PGWs in modern warfare. It has highlighted the deadly effectiveness and high usage rate of modern precision weapons, particularly shorter-range weapons that are able to operate without a near-real-time targeting network.44 Indeed, the ability to detect and strike targets in near-real-time without the need for sophisticated real-time targeting networks may be the defining characteristic of a shorter-range PGW.45 This has important implications for addressing serious concerns about the resilience of command, control, communications, computer, and ISR (C4ISR) capabilities under attack in wartime.46
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Allen 22 – Director, AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program. (Gregory, "Russia Probably Has Not Used AI-Enabled Weapons in Ukraine, but That Could Change," CSIS, 5-26-2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-probably-has-not-used-ai-enabled-weapons-ukraine-could-change, Accessed 6-19-2022, LASA-SC)
In March, WIRED ran a story with the headline “Russia's Killer Drone in Ukraine Raises Fears About AI in Warfare,” with the subtitle, “The maker of the lethal drone claims that it can identify targets using artificial intelligence.” The story focused on the KUB-BLA, a small kamikaze drone aircraft that smashes itself into enemy targets and detonates an onboard explosive. The KUB-BLA is made by ZALA Aero, a subsidiary of the Russian weapons manufacturer Kalashnikov (best known as the maker of the AK-47), which itself is partly owned by Rostec, a part of Russia’s government-owned defense-industrial complex.
The WIRED story understandably attracted a lot of attention, but those who only read the sensational headline missed the article’s critical caveat: “It is unclear if the drone may have been operated in this [an AI-enabled autonomous] way in Ukraine.” Other outlets re-reported the WIRED story, but irresponsibly did so without the caveat.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Suciu 20 – Peter Suciu is a defense writer and journalist for the National Interest. (Peter Suciu, "Coming Soon: AI-Powered Jam-Resistant Munitions," National Interest, 12-5-2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/coming-soon-ai-powered-jam-resistant-munitions-173858, Accessed 6-18-2022, LASA-SC)
Since antiquity once a weapon was developed there were soon methods to counter it. Just as the shield and armor were meant to protect a soldier from swords and spears, today there are now countermeasures designed to stop smart munitions, which were first developed during the Second World War.
While the United States has continued to develop even smarter bombs, including laser- and GPS-guided bombs, the latest efforts include those that could select targets automatically when dropped from an aircraft. Such smart munitions could maneuver in flight after being launched, but efforts have continued to counter such measures and this has included the use of jamming technology.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Clark 22 – Maiya Clark is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for National Defense. (Maiya Clark, "The War in Ukraine Continues; Can the U.S. Defense-Industrial Base Keep Up?," Heritage Foundation, 4-30-2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-war-ukraine-continues-can-the-us-defense-industrial-base-keep, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)
The conflict has, however, given rise to silver linings. Many of our allies are waking up to the need to boost their defense spending.
Germany has decided to buy F-35s from the U.S. and pledged an increased defense budget, exceeding NATO’s 2%-of-GDP target. Poland has moved to increase its defense spending as well, with the goal of reaching 3% of GDP by 2023.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › 1AC › 1AC – Arms ADV
Mahnken 22 – Thomas G. Mahnken is president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a senior research professor at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. (Thomas G. Mahnken, "The US needs a new approach to producing weapons. Just look at Ukraine.," Defense News, 4-26-2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2022/04/26/the-us-needs-a-new-approach-to-producing-weapons-just-look-at-ukraine/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)
The war in Ukraine has offered vivid testimony of the effectiveness, and the high usage rate, of modern precision weapons. Ukraine has so far been fortunate to receive a massive supply of such munitions from the United States, Britain and other NATO states.
Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has told Congress the West has delivered 60,000 antitank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons to Kyiv. Weapons such as the Javelin anti-tank guided weapon and Stinger surface-to-air missile played an important role in halting Moscow’s initial offensive and forced the Russian leadership to scale back its expansive objectives. However, it has become increasingly apparent such weapons are neither cheap nor available in unlimited numbers. Indeed, the United States has reportedly provided Kyiv one-third of its overall stockpile of Javelins.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---No Link
Anderson and Dalton 19 [Dr. James Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities. Prior to his current appointment in the Department of Defense, Dr. Anderson served for three years as the vice president for academic affairs at the Marine Corps University. His previous positions include dean of Academics and deputy director at the Marine Corps War College, director of the program in Advanced Security Studies at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, and director of Middle East policy in the International Security Affairs Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Anderson earned his doctorate in international relations and master of arts in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University; Melissa Dalton, the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Shifting the Burden Responsibly: Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance"; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Published: 4-25-2019; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://www.csis.org/analysis/shifting-burden-responsibly-oversight-and-accountability-us-security-sector-assistance-0; KL]
Security cooperation is often behind the news we read at night but rarely the frontline story. Luckily we’re also blessed with another influential group that cares deeply about security cooperation – the Congress. In FY ’17 Congress undertook the largest, most sweeping, and most substantial reforms to security cooperation in our nation’s history. The FY ’17 NDAA consolidated dozens of authorities into a narrow band of activities in Chapter 16. It set up requirements for human rights vetting, institutional capacity building, and assessment monitoring and evaluation.
With lots of work in the trenches by both DOD and Congress, this all hit at once, and it was welcome. Implementing an ambitious vision remains a challenge, particularly for those activities that were funded out of service accounts or regional initiatives. Many security cooperation activities were not being looked at holistically across the spectrum. Programs were siloed and oversight sometimes limited.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---No Link
Bushley 17 [U.S. Army Capt. Adam Bushley, Rule of Law attorney for Task Force Wolverine, 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team; "Governance: The Missing Ingredient in Security Cooperation"; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Published: 2017; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf; KL]
DOS has long had oversight over SC/SA programs in order to define, synchronize, and deconflict U.S. strategic objectives. This is because Congress has consistently authorized, expected, and in many cases, mandated DOS to provide this oversight role.
There is an overlap between DOS and DOD when it comes to arms trades, training, and military alliances. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates helped popularize the term “shared responsibility” regarding SC/SA as it refers to the joint responsibility between DOD and DOS in supporting U.S. foreign SC/SA programs, relationships overseas, and national security interests.89 According to ADP 1, the DOD’s role is to deter enemies, counter threats, and fight and win the nation’s wars. The DOS is responsible for foreign policy and U.S. diplomatic relations. DOS’s role in the shared responsibility of SC/SA programs is to calculate and measure associated trade-offs between short-term limited scope program objectives and long-term national interests. Some have described DOS as having veto power over some DOD developed plans, even when they are DOD directed authorities. 90
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---Ukraine Thumper
Brian 5/13 [Danielle Brian is the executive director of the Project On Government Oversight, a nonprofit watchdog that investigates and exposes waste, corruption and abuse of power. https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/3487430-theres-no-oversight-of-billions-in-ukraine-aid-we-need-an-inspector-general/]//LP
As the Senate works to pass the almost $40 billion in emergency supplemental funds for Ukraine just passed by the House, leaders in Washington must also ensure proper oversight of this spending. They can and must do both quickly. The Biden administration and Senate must also prioritize installing permanent inspectors general to government agencies so they can monitor aid to Ukraine. These independent watchdogs can ensure that taxpayer money is not siphoned off by fraudsters or war profiteers and that weapons remain in the hands of the Ukrainian military. The simplest route would be to install permanent inspectors general at existing offices tasked with doling out the aid and ensure those offices have the resources they need to oversee surge funding like this. The Pentagon and State Department, the two agencies overseeing the bulk of spending for Ukraine assistance, are both missing permanent internal watchdogs — and the Pentagon has been missing one for over six years The need for effective inspectors general is already apparent given the level and nature of U.S. assistance committed to Ukraine. The speed at which the U.S. has transferred this defense material to the country presents real oversight challenges in terms of both spending and monitoring its use. Oversight and monitoring of arms transfers are generally difficult in the first place, but without U.S. personnel on the ground in Ukraine, something we do not advocate for, it’s even more challenging to monitor whether U.S. arms are staying in the hands of the Ukrainian military. The State and Defense Departments desperately need internal watchdogs to prevent, detect and investigate abuse of funds as well as ineffective or insufficient tracking of weapons by the agencies’ respective monitoring programs.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---Ukraine Thumper
Harrigan 6/16 [https://reason.com/2022/06/16/the-u-s-is-spending-130-million-a-day-on-military-aid-for-ukraine-without-meaningful-congressional-oversight/]//LP
Yesterday the Biden administration announced that it would send an additional $1 billion in military aid to Ukraine as the country continues to combat invading Russian forces. The new aid package comes on the heels of The Wall Street Journal reporting earlier this week that the U.S. is now "sending roughly $130 million a day in military aid to Ukraine plus economic and other assistance." American financial support for Ukraine has largely been uncontroversial in Congress. Lawmakers approved a $40 billion aid package in May, adding billions of dollars to the money President Joe Biden originally requested. "The leaders of both parties raised few questions about how much money was being spent or what it would be used for," wrote The New York Times. Just 11 senators voted against the bill's passage as it breezed through Congress. One of them, Sen. Rand Paul (R–Ky.), drew criticism from both parties for delaying Senate approval of the $40 billion package after expressing concern that Congress was "trying yet again to ram through a spending bill" and had failed to outline oversight mechanisms. Paul unsuccessfully sought to add language to the bill appointing an inspector general to supervise the spending. Meanwhile, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R–Ky.) emphasized the need to get help to Ukraine "right now," and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D–N.Y.) charged that Paul "doesn't want to aid Ukraine." Unfortunately, those arguments are helping lawmakers avoid important debates about the amount and nature of aid the U.S. is sending to Ukraine, as well as the potential for future misuse as billions of fast-passed dollars flood into a war zone without proper oversight. American politicians have chosen a risky course of action and are neglecting to realistically discuss the U.S. role in this conflict. American officials told The Wall Street Journal that they have "little direct knowledge" of where equipment goes once it reaches the Ukrainian government. One military aid component of the May package, totaling $6 billion, is a transfer account that Congress doesn't have strong control over. "The statutory language requires that [the Department of Defense] report to Congress 15 days before any transfers occur," explains the Center for Strategic International Studies. "Congress could block such transfers, but that is difficult to do politically and procedurally." Oversight experts warn that issues surrounding transfers are inevitable. "Even if it's a noble cause, there's going to be theft. There's going to be misconduct," warned Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko, whose office has uncovered rampant misuse of U.S. funds that took place during nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. "If there's one thing we learned from Afghanistan, you've got to have oversight in the beginning." Many components of the May package and other aid installments deserve more scrutiny from lawmakers than they have received. Not-insignificant chunks of money are going toward countering "Russian disinformation and propaganda narratives," bolstering the Department of Justice's "efforts to pursue high value asset seizures from sanctioned individuals," paying the salaries of Ukrainian government officials, and prepping munitions for military skirmishes that aren't related to the conflict in Ukraine. In rushing the passage of aid, Congress has neglected to debate whether these are appropriate spending priorities for the U.S.—especially, as Paul notes, when the American economy is already in such bad shape. And there's a deeper, more conflict-relevant concern at hand. The end goals for U.S. assistance are still murky, even as American politicians repeat their opposition to Russian aggression and support for Ukraine regaining its territory and sovereignty. Rajan Menon, director of the Grand Strategy program at Defense Priorities and a professor at the City College of New York, argues that the U.S. must determine what its precise aims are in order to shape responsible policy. Without establishing clear objectives, politicians can shift the goal posts and more easily justify staying involved. Menon asks, for instance, whether the eventual goal is to restore Ukrainian borders to their pre-2022 state or if it's to reclaim Crimea. "The latter is…ambitious, it's far more dangerous, and it will make the war even longer than [it] otherwise will be," Menon explains. "To say…this is all up to Ukraine to decide is to overlook the fact that we are its principal arms supplier and therefore are deeply implicated in this war. Kyiv is certainly entitled to make its choices but that doesn't release us from the obligation to make our one." In eschewing proper debate over military aid to Ukraine, American lawmakers are opting out of an uncomfortable—but necessary—conversation. "If we ramp up arms supplies to Ukraine, which is already urgently calling for more, we should take into account that Russia may at some point treat us as a co-belligerent," Menon points out. "Simply assuming that that would be a bridge too far for them would be a mistake." U.S. politicians need to discuss the line not to be crossed before America is effectively acting as a co-combatant rather than allowing Russia to make that determination itself. Providing military aid to Ukraine strikes many Americans as the right move. It might seem like the best available option, given that alternatives include putting American boots on the ground or securing a no-fly zone over Ukrainian airspace—both of which would prove disastrous. But those impulses don't relieve U.S. lawmakers of their responsibility to ensure aid is being directed toward appropriate uses and being used properly. To willingly avoid those discussions all but ensures that the war in Ukraine will be another conflict involving fiscal irresponsibility on America's part.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---Uniqueness
Bies 19 [John E. Bies is Chief Counsel at American Oversight, a non-profit focused on government accountability. He served for eight years in the Obama administration at the Department of Justice, first as Counselor to Attorney General Eric Holder and then spending seven years as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel where he advised White House and executive branch officials on FOIA, Congressional oversight, executive privilege, ethics, separation of powers, and other constitutional, statutory, and administrative law issues. https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutional-hardball-and-congresss-oversight-authority]//LP
At least since Watergate, if not for longer, the executive branch has recognized the important role congressional oversight plays in the constitutional system and has understood itself to have a constitutional obligation to accommodate legitimate oversight requests from Congress. This long-standing executive branch perspective is embodied in a 1982 memorandum to all agency heads regarding how to respond to congressional requests, often referred to as the Reagan memo. This memorandum, which remains in force, explicitly states that it is executive branch policy “to comply with congressional requests for information to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch.” While the Reagan memo recognizes there may be times when it is necessary to withhold information to protect important executive branch confidentiality interests, it emphasizes the expectation that such impasses should be rare and limited to “compelling circumstances.” Instead, the Reagan memo underscores the importance of engaging in a good faith negotiation to accommodate the interests of both branches: “Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the Executive Branch have minimized the need for invoking executive privilege, and this tradition of accommodation should continue as the primary means of resolving conflicts between the Branches.” This process of good faith negotiation has become known as the accommodation process. To be sure, in nearly every administration since the Reagan memo, there have been a handful of contentious issues where a dispute between Congress and the executive branch regarding access to executive branch information reached a high-profile impasse. These instances of interbranch conflict have been controversial matters that garnered significant media coverage and public interest. But the salience of these occasional instances of conflict should not obscure the extent to which the branches have been able to resolve the vast majority of disputes through good faith engagement in the accommodation process. Every year Congress issues hundreds if not thousands of oversight requests to the White House and executive branch agencies. Yet the number of disputes that reach the level of public consciousness in a presidential term can usually be counted on one hand. This is because in most oversight matters, the branches reach a reasonable accommodation, which often includes some disclosure of agency information arguably subject to a potential executive privilege claim, and thus avoid impasse and escalation. This approach to accommodation is not driven just by policy but also by recognition of a constitutional obligation to seek such reasonable accommodations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has explained this constitutional mandate in a manner worth quoting at length in light of present circumstances: The framers ... expect[ed] that where conflicts in scope of authority arose between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote the resolution of the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective functioning of our governmental system. Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversarial relationship to one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather, each branch should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation. * * * [Because] it was a deliberate feature of the constitutional scheme to leave the allocation of powers unclear in certain situations, the resolution of conflict between the coordinate branches in these situations must be regarded as an opportunity for a constructive modus vivendi, which positively promotes the functioning of our system. The Constitution contemplates such accommodation. Negotiation between the two branches should thus be viewed as a dynamic process affirmatively furthering the constitutional scheme. In 1981, Reagan’s attorney general described the essence of this process: “The accommodation required is not simply an exchange of concessions or a test of political strength. It is an obligation of each branch to make a principled effort to acknowledge, and if possible to meet, the legitimate needs of the other branch.” There are important ramifications of recognizing a constitutionally based obligation to engage in a serious and good faith effort to reach a reasonable accommodation when there is a disagreement between the branches. Every executive branch official swears an oath to uphold the Constitution upon taking office, and this commitment should be understood to include the constitutional mandate to engage in good faith to seek reasonable accommodations.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---Uniqueness
Foster 20 [Jason Foster served as counsel to four congressional committees in the U.S. House and Senate, where he directed fact-finding inquiries to inform their oversight and legislative functions. He draws on his decades of experience navigating a broad array of high-profile disputes to help clients develop strategic research and intelligence useful in tackling legal, regulatory, and public affairs challenges. https://thefederalist.com/2020/08/15/congressional-oversight-is-broken-heres-how-to-fix-it/]//LP
The interview was a rough listen: two political allies frustrated with each other and with the reality that accountability in Washington, D.C., is hard. Hugh Hewitt seemed to think that a subpoena from Chairman Ron Johnson’s committee to James Comey would force the former FBI Director to confess his role in an attempted coup on President Donald Trump—if Johnson only had the guts to issue it. Johnson seemed to think that he was powerless to force more transparency on the issues that concern Hewitt and his conservative radio audience. Both are mistaken. Similar conversations are often heard on the other side of the political spectrum too, as the base of each party demands that the subject of the latest outrage be “hauled” up to Capitol Hill and “grilled” under the TV lights. Except that almost never works. From Ollie North 33 years ago to Bill Barr three weeks ago, it hardly ever goes well for the committee or satisfies the base voters hungry for red meat. Sally Yates versus Lindsey Graham is another recent example. This model of congressional hearing—confronting a lone hostile witness—has an awful track record. It should be obvious why. Who’s going to do most of the talking? The witness chews up most of the clock arguing with the premise of hostile questions from one side of the aisle and fielding soft balls from allies on the other. By contrast, in a well-designed hearing, a majority of the witnesses testify to facts that the majority of the committee wants to highlight. At its best, a congressional hearing tells a story with friendly witnesses. Victims and whistleblowers should outnumber villains. And a credible, neutral figure, like an inspector general or subject matter expert, can refute any disingenuous political spin. But even a well-designed hearing is a bad way to gather facts. That’s not its purpose. The hearing comes after doing the hard work behind the scenes. That means first scouring reams of documents and questioning key witnesses with trained, professional interrogators who don’t need to play to the cameras for sound bites. It’s not sexy, but it’s effective. Unfortunately, too many judge the success of oversight by the amount of press coverage rather than the facts uncovered. The media and Members alike prefer the dopamine of the confrontation over data. These one-witness show trials, where politicians grandstand and berate a single “target” witness simply don’t work, no matter how much people might want them for the entertainment value or how much a chairman might fancy himself as Perry Mason. If Senator Johnson could subpoena James Comey to appear on Hugh Hewitt’s radio program, it would be quite a show even though we probably wouldn’t learn much. Comey has already testified multiple times on Trump-Russia issues. Of course, Hugh Hewitt doesn’t have to yield half of his time to adversaries like Kamala Harris on the other side. Senator Johnson does. Outside critics like Hewitt are right to be frustrated with how ineffective congressional oversight has become. However, they need to understand the process, study the procedural limitations that committee chairmen face, and work constructively to support reforms that could make a real difference. Sometimes the problem is lack of guts, but more often, it’s a lack of experience, procedural tools, and the expertise to use them. A subpoena is not a magic bullet. In the modern era, Congress has essentially forgotten how to enforce them. It abandoned the historical practice of using its inherent constitutional authority to impose consequences directly on witnesses who are in contempt. Now, it turns to the Executive or Judicial Branches for help rather than standing up for itself and the people it’s elected to represent. Reclaiming the Legislative Branch’s proper role as the First Branch of government would mean re-learning the full scope of its own authorities and summoning the political will to use them. It would mean allocating resources to recruit and retain more senior, more experienced staff—or failing that, contracting with top-notch outside professionals to help do battle with the legal talent arrayed against it. The most effective practitioners of legislative oversight have been long-serving, career legislators—like John Dingell and my former boss, Chuck Grassley—who stay close to their constituents back home while devoting significant time and staff resources to the job of acting as a check and balance on the Executive Branch. Too few aspire to be like Dingell and Grassley. Too many Members and staff see their time on Capitol Hill as just a stepping stone to something bigger and better, and it shows. Rather than just cursing the problem, critics could help by focusing on solutions. There are organizations working to strengthen the Legislative Branch to serve the people it represents more effectively. If you are concerned about countering the permanent, unelected bureaucracy in Washington, then you should join them in working for a stronger, more competent Congress.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---Polarization
Devins 09 [Neal Devins is a Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. “Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop” Willamette Law Review 45 https://heinonline-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=usjournals&handle=hein.journals/willr45&id=402&men_tab=srchresults]//LP
Finally and, for my purposes, most significant, party polarization contributes to the rise of presidential unilateralism. When the Congress is polarized, members of the President's party are not likely to break ranks and vote to limit presidential initiatives. When government is unified, this means that no bill will get through Congress to limit presidential initiatives. When Congress is divided, members of the President's party will resist any opposition party efforts to repudiate the President. More than that, since divided government is increasingly common (thirty of the past forty years), it is also increasingly difficult for Congress to enact significant legislation. As such, Presidents have even more incentive to act unilaterally-since they cannot get Congress to enact their legislative agenda Consider, for example, Bill Clinton's health care reforms and George W. Bush's faith-based initiatives. In both instances, the President went to Congress seeking legislative authorization for his policy agenda. In both cases, Congress did not bite, leaving it to the President either to abandon his policy initiative or pursue his initiative through unilateral action. Clinton did so by issuing several directives that, among other things, "established a patient's bill of rights for federal employees . . . and set penalties for companies that deny health coverage to the poor and people with pre-existing medical conditions."51 Bush likewise acted unilaterally, establishing the White House Office of Faith Based Initiatives and ordering an audit of government agencies to make sure that their practices did not improperly discourage or forbid faith-based organizations.5 2 Political polarization, moreover, encourages Presidents to act unilaterally and take greater control of the administrative state. Specifically, with political polarization and divided government shifting the locus of government policymaking away from lawmaking and towards executive and administrative action, Presidents (beginning with Ronald Reagan) have used the Office of Management and Budget to review agency policymaking.53 Likewise, in an effort to ensure that agency policymaking conforms to the President's policy agenda, Presidents (again beginning with Ronald Reagan) have made use of signing statements and pre-regulatory directives.54 Finally, Presidents have used their appointments power to ensure agency loyalty to the President's agenda.55 More than any President before him, George W. Bush pushed the boundaries of presidential unilateralism. "What almost no one disputes," wrote Adam Liptak in The New York Times, "is that a central legacy of the Bush presidency will be its distinctively muscular vision of executive power." 56 The architect of this campaign was Vice President Dick Cheney. 7 A witness to Watergate and its aftermath, Cheney helped staff the "White House with conservative veterans of the 1970s and 1980s who believed that" the President should push his agenda "without having to compromise" and that Watergate-era reforms had wrongly "emasculated the presidency."'5 8 More to the point, just as the Nixon administration pushed the boundaries of executive power, the Bush administration extended the efforts of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton to assert broad inherent power over national security, to make use of executive orders to unilaterally advance policy objectives, and to centralize presidential control of the administrative state. To cite a few well known examples: the assertion of the power to indefinitely detain so-called enemy combatants, the establishment of a military tribunal system without formal congressional approval, the warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens, the robust use of executive privilege, and the expansive use of presidential signing statements to direct agency policymaking-including agency non-enforcement of laws that the President deems unconstitutional.