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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---OCOs

Congressional oversight over OCOs legally fails

Lorber 13 [Eric Lorber, Principal, Cyber, Risk & Regulatory; “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?”; 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961 2013; DOA: 6/24/22; ; Lowell-ES]

The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the balance between congressional and executive war-making powers. The reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself: the Intelligence Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the non-use or withdrawal of forces.234 Further, these reports must be made in a “timely” fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small number of Congressmen (at most eight).235 Thus even if the President had to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be able to share the information, because of its classified nature, with other members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of these capabilities. The resulting picture is one of increased presidential flexibility; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act—while arguably ineffective in many circumstances—provide increased congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop deployments and covert actions. Yet these statutes do not cover offensive cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign policy tool outside congressional reach.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity Oversight fails

Cordero and Thaw 20 [Carrie Cordero is the Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow and General Counsel at CNAS. Her research and writing interests focus on homeland security and intelligence community oversight, transparency, surveillance, cybersecurity, and related national and homeland security law and policy issues. David Thaw is a professor at the University of Pittsburgh and holds appointments in the School of Law and the School of Computing and Information. He is also an Affiliated Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep27475.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverpage=false&addFooter=false]//LP

Cybersecurity oversight is due for a reboot. This paper explores the need for refreshed congressional oversight of cybersecurity. After laying out why cybersecurity oversight presents special challenges, this paper suggests that the disparate nature of the cybersecurity policymaking legal framework is mismatched to the nature of the cybersecurity problem, resulting in difficulty legislating in this space. It then provides two key recommendations to guide a congressional cybersecurity oversight reboot. Cybersecurity is a broad challenge spanning many disciplines and industries. This paper argues that the current “patchwork” legal framework is ill suited to address cybersecurity questions either for legislative oversight or effective policymaking. The paper provides an overview of the nature and scope of the cybersecurity problem, with a focus on how the complexity of the field affects congressional oversight activities. Congress has been conducting a substantial amount of oversight in this area in recent years. Those efforts, however, have not yet resulted in legislative actions that have demonstrably improved national cybersecurity. This paper seeks to aid the effort to craft legal authorities that deal with an increasingly complex set of cyberthreats. This short exposition provides a path to rebooting Congress’ approach to cybersecurity oversight in a way that would allow these issues to be addressed more comprehensively. Cybersecurity is a complex, integrated challenge spanning topics as diverse as (but not limited to) international affairs, national security and defense, criminal law, civil liability, data protection, privacy and personal responsibility. Cybersecurity also involves many different actors, ranging from governments to companies to organizations to individuals. And it involves virtually every type of computing and information technology in use today, representing a plethora of technologies far more diverse than the personal computers and servers of yesteryear. Thus, perhaps the greatest challenge of developing a comprehensive cybersecurity governance framework is the fact that it is a highly complex problem, pervasive and interrelated across many aspects of government, the private sector, and society. From a federal government perspective, cybersecurity presents a set of interrelated challenges. Cybersecurity responses to malign cyber activities of hostile nation-states cannot be resolved the same way traditional kinetic defense threats would be handled. For example, cybersecurity cannot just be handed off to one agency, such as the Department of Defense (DoD) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Although those departments play important roles, neither can—as a result of limits on legal authorities and their appropriate roles and responsibilities— address the problem comprehensively. The current “patchwork” legal framework is ill suited to address cybersecurity questions either for legislative oversight or effective policymaking. Most commonly, the term cybersecurity refers to some type of defensive technical security problem. Its meaning varies both descriptively and normatively across industrial sectors, types of actors, and disciplinary backgrounds. In reality, however, cybersecurity problems generally describe only one piece of a complex puzzle. The lack of a framework for defining these issues diminishes the ability of policymakers to create policy that adequately addresses the full spectrum of cybersecurity problems. This spectrum is broad and is not limited to traditional defensive boundaries. It includes strategic and adversarial planning and operations, spanning parties from private sector targets to law enforcement to military operations. In a fully internetworked world of connected appliances, vehicles, Internet of Things devices, and mobile devices, holistic consideration of cybersecurity questions is necessary. This discussion takes an expansive view of the elements that impact “cybersecurity”— ranging from technical aspects of system security to principles of international law in the context of armed conflict. This wide view is unified by the theme of efforts to improve the health of the U.S. information and computing infrastructure as an empirical matter, agnostic of any particular normative policy prescription of consumer protection, economic policy, or related issues. The technological aspects of cybersecurity further complicate this problem in two ways. First, they create a degree of opacity for nontechnologists in understanding key elements of the problem. Second, the highly technical nature of cybersecurity lends itself to the false belief that technical measures can provide complete solutions. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, solutions focusing on technological “silver bullets” often are beneficial to adversaries because of the false sense of security they provide. Many of the most effective methods of “hacking” often rely on human vectors. Just as a technological perimeter is an infeasible system in an interconnected world, a cyber border defended by the Armed Forces is impractical.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---Cybersecurity

Congressional oversight over cyber fails

Cordero and Thaw 20 [Carrie Cordero and David Thaw; Member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, CNN legal and national security analyst and professor of law at Georgetown / Professor at the University of Pittsburg in the School of Law with a focus in cybersecurity; “Rebooting Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight”; January 30, 2020; DOA: 6/24/22; ; Lowell-ES]

Currently, existing laws, executive structure, and congressional oversight mechanisms are a mismatch for the nature of the cybersecurity challenges presented by a complex, technologically integrated society. Existing mechanisms for congressional cybersecurity oversight are likewise disjointed and uncoordinated. Unlike in many other policy areas, there is no one clear committee or clear set of committees responsible for cybersecurity issues. These are divided among many committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, often along historical lines that may not match current expertise. The Judiciary committees often encounter cybersecurity issues in the context of surveillance, cybercrime enforcement, and privacy issues. The Armed Services committees are called upon to consider cybersecurity issues when evaluating legislation concerning offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, which are part of the government’s response to counter hostile cyber activities by foreign nation-states. The Intelligence committees engage on cybersecurity activities most recently from the perspective of protecting electoral system infrastructure from foreign influence and malign cyber activities related to foreign interference in democratic processes. And the Homeland Security committees are heavily involved in cybersecurity oversight due to the critical cybersecurity functions that DHS provides in securing the federal government’s civilian networks and in coordinating information sharing between government entities and the private sector. The lack of a coordinating function among these committees limits Congress’ ability to obtain a comprehensive picture of the cybersecurity problem, particularly when these committees advance legislation solely from their own jurisdictions.39

To develop a successful cybersecurity approach, Congress must first be able to obtain a comprehensive picture of the problem. This is challenging, and not just because of the lack of committee coordination. The complex nature of the problem itself, previously illustrated, requires gathering information about the interaction of a large set of actors, economic sectors, and government departments. How would increased organized criminal investigative activities impact the incentives of potential nation-state actors? How would the responses by those foreign actors alter the availability of malicious tools and code to third parties targeting private organizations and individuals? How might proposals to legalize “hacking back” affect adversaries’ incentives to engage in false-flag operations? These are complicated questions spanning many different areas yet attempts to address any one area impact nearly all others. This is no easy challenge for Congress, made worse by the fact that it is happening in real time, and pressure to act is growing on executive agencies Congress must oversee.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---Cybersecurity

Congress can’t keep up in cybersecurity due to political divisions

Marks 21 [Joe Marks writes The Cybersecurity 202 newsletter focused on the policy and politics of cybersecurity. Before joining The Washington Post, Marks covered cybersecurity for Politico and Nextgov, a news site focused on government technology and security. He also covered patent and copyright trends for Bloomberg BNA and federal litigation for Law360 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/12/08/congress-cant-even-pass-easy-cyber-stuff/]//LP

Expansive new cyber reporting requirements now appear dead in Congress. Congress has cut requirements for companies to share cyber threat information with the government from its must-pass defense bill, which passed the House last night and is expected to pass the Senate shortly. The failure of such a popular and bipartisan effort – which would have marked the largest expansion of government involvement in private-sector cybersecurity in years – raises questions about whether Congress is up to the task of responding to a wave of ransomware and other attacks that have battered industry in recent years. It would have required companies in critical industry sectors such as energy and transportation to alert the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency whenever they’re hacked or hit with other significant cyber incidents. It would have required disclosures from a far broader group of companies if they paid ransoms to hackers. But the measure also looked meager given the hacking threats facing industry. More than 90 percent of cyber experts and current and former officials supported the changes in a recent Cybersecurity 202 poll. The government has already imposed far more stringent cyber requirements on several key industry sectors in just the past few months. “This result is beyond disappointing and undermines national security,” said House Homeland Security Chairman Bennie G. Thompson (D-Miss.) and Rep. Yvette Clarke (D-N.Y.), chair of the committee’s cyber panel and a sponsor of the House version of the bill. Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) wanted to curtail a cyber reporting provision in a major defense policy bill. It ended up getting cut entirely. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post) The dispute centered on the ransomware provision, which Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) considered too broad, Senate aides told me. Scott wanted to substitute a provision that would have limited ransomware reports to just critical infrastructure — that’s a group of 16 industry sectors that includes financial services, health care and chemical facilities among others. The fight over the provision lasted so long that by the time they’d reached a compromise, House and Senate negotiators who were putting together the final bill ended up leaving it out entirely, as Tim Starks reports for CyberScoop. The fine print Because of some peculiarities about how the bill came together this year, lawmakers could still try to add amendments in the Senate, including the cyber reporting provisions. But leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees are begging them not to out of fear one or more of those amendments will prevent the bill from passing entirely. If that happens, it would mark the first time in more than five decades Congress has failed to pass the bill, known as the National Defense Authorization Act. Sen. Gary Peters (D-Mich.) championed a cyber reporting provision that got cut from the National Defense Authorization Act. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post) The blame game: Thompson and Clarke laid the blame for provision being cut at the feet of Senate Republican leaders as did Senate Homeland Security Chairman Gary Peters (D-Mich.). “I am disappointed Senate Republican leaders blocked these common sense provisions that have broad bipartisan support — including from the bipartisan leaders of the Senate Homeland Security and Intelligence Committees,” Peters said. “Cyberattacks, including ransomware attacks, are one of the greatest threats to our national and economic security.” An aide for Scott told The Hill’s Maggie Miller that Scott was disappointed the full provision got left out of the NDAA and that he’d only wanted to limit its scope. He denied Republicans were to blame.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---AI

Oversight of AI fails

Stone 21 [Corin R. Stone, Scholar-in-Residence at the Washington College of Law; “Artificial Intelligence in the Intelligence Community: Oversight Must Not Be an Oversight”; November 30, 2021; DOA: 6/25/22; ; Lowell-ES]

But intelligence oversight is complicated and has not sufficiently evolved with the times. When it comes to assessing progress of IC programs, standard oversight processes typically track defined, pre-determined requirements, cost, and timelines. These metrics have worked reasonably well for large programs like the acquisition of satellites and buildings, for which there is a clear beginning, middle, and end, with easily identifiable milestones and a definite budget. However, AI is different; its development moves back and forth across a spectrum of activities often without discrete steps, and failure is a necessary part of the process as the technology evolves and matures. Traditional metrics are, therefore, less effective for AI, as the value (or lack thereof) of certain milestones may only become clear partway through the development process and desired end-states may shift.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---AI

Without massive reforms congressional oversight of AI fails

Engler 20 [Alex C. Engler is a Fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution, where he studies the implications of artificial intelligence and emerging data technologies on society and governance. Engler also teaches classes on data science and visualization at Georgetown’s McCourt School of Public Policy, where he is an adjunct professor and affiliated scholar. https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-the-biden-administration-should-tackle-ai-oversight/]//LP

Had Democrats decisively won control of the White House and the Senate, there would be a robust conversation around legislatively expanding the federal government’s authority for technology oversight. While this conversation would take a backseat to issues like fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and shoring up the economy, legislation on new data privacy and algorithmic consumer protections could have had a chance in the first term of the Biden administration. Even a technology oversight agency would have been possible, and perhaps still is, pending the results from the Georgia special elections. Yet, even without a Democratic majority in the Senate, there are meaningful steps that the Biden administration can take to further reasonable oversight of the technology sector, and specifically the largely unregulated use of artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithmic decision-making. The Biden administration can reverse Trump-era executive orders and agency regulations, instead requiring federal agencies to enforce existing discrimination laws on algorithmic systems and expanding their regulatory capacity to do so. President-elect Biden should push Congress to enact new algorithmic consumer protections in any new legislative compromises on privacy or antitrust, and further support the revival of the Office of Technology Assessment. These efforts are likely not sufficient in the long term. The digital economy accounts for over 9% of GDP–larger than the finance sector–and was growing at 6.8% per year before the pandemic. Since the rise of the modern regulatory state in the 1970s, perhaps no other segment of the overall economy has experienced such growth while remaining largely unregulated. Even that framing understates the importance of data systems and algorithms, which are affecting nearly every part of our society. While the economic growth is undeniable, the mass proliferation of data systems and algorithms—especially in the form of permissionless innovation—has enabled extensive societal harms. A new regulatory agency, or expanded capacity of an existing agency such as the Federal Trade Commission, is necessary. For now, however, the Biden administration should take the available steps to curtail the direct harms, especially algorithmic discrimination, enabled by AI. EXECUTIVE ACTIONS TO ENFORCE EXISTING LAWS The use of algorithmic decision-making in many industries poses serious challenges for regulatory enforcement of existing laws. Health insurance companies implement risk prediction tools that are likely prioritizing care in racially biased ways, which is illegal for any providers receiving federal funds from programs like CHIP and Medicaid or insurers participating in the Affordable Care Act exchanges. AI systems used to perform automated video interviews are undoubtedly deeply flawed as well, and there is cause for investigation to see if they discriminate against people with disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The algorithms that manage Uber and Lyft drivers can make decisions that obscure the lines between employee and independent contractor for purposes of enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, the Office of Civil Rights within the Department of Health and Human Services, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, and the Department of Labor, respectively, may not be equipped to handle these questions. The Biden administration should be more proactive than the Trump White House, which took minimal action to avoid problems associated with the use of algorithms. Following a February 2019 executive order, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued its final guidance on the regulation of artificial intelligence on Nov. 17, 2020. While there are serious and reasonsed aspects of the document, it makes clear that AI innovation, and not regulatory protection, is the foremost priority of the Trump administration. For instance, while it seems encouraging that the guidance includes mention of “fairness and non-discrimination” as well as “disclosure and transparency,” these were part of a long list of required considerations before implementing new regulations. A careful reading of this document—such as the section offering a series of non-regulatory interventions—suggests it is meant to deter, not encourage or enable, new regulatory safeguards for AI applications. It is possible that this is an overly critical reading of the White House guidance—to its credit, it does prompt agencies to think more about AI regulation. However, the status quo is untenable, as it functionally inoculates companies from anti-discrimination laws when they use algorithms. Since this guidance from OMB Director Russell Vought downplays the well-documented discriminatory harms from some AI systems, the Biden administration should amend this guidance to ensure that current law is appropriately enforced on algorithmic systems. Specific agency-level guidance needs reversal as well, such as a rule from the Department of Housing and Urban Development that places an insurmountable burden of proof on claims of discrimination against algorithms used for mortgage loan or rental applications. In order to execute on this guidance, federal agencies will need the capacity to investigate algorithmic systems. These ex-post audits should focus on highly impactful, large-scale AI systems, and especially those that have already been implicated by nonprofits and academic evaluations. While it may seem as though this would require the models themselves, this is far less important than access to the underlying datasets and model outputs. Therefore, regulatory agencies should use available administrative subpoena powers to gain access to the relevant corporate datasets. There are already about 335 of these authorities across the federal government. The auditing of these massive data systems may be a daunting task for many agencies. In order to support this new responsibility, the Biden administration should direct the United States Digital Service (USDS) to hire a line of data scientists and engineers to support the algorithmic regulatory capacity of federal agencies. USDS has been a successful initiative to bring technical talent into the federal government to modernize services, and it is well-positioned to bring in the talent needed to build secure data environments and conduct algorithmic audits. The Biden administration should make this endeavor a policy priority, using hiring authority within the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and Presidential Innovation Fellowships to bring in more expertise. Lastly, Biden should also endorse the revival of the Office of Technology Assessment, which seeks to provide Congress with additional capacity and more informed technology sector oversight. The fast pace of technological development and proliferation has left Congress behind, especially since the defunding of the original Office of Technology Assessment in 1995. Further, congressional offices have reduced staff funding in their Washington offices, leading to younger, less-experienced staff working on a larger number of policy issues. This is hardly an ideal outcome for handling the novel and complex challenges posed for AI and technology governance. Of course, this is not to argue that the Biden administration should only work to rein in the use of AI. The administration should continue the extensive new funding streams from the National Science Foundation for National AI Institutes. The administration should also keep engaging the Global Partnership on AI, working toward democratic norms for AI’s role in the world. Investing in AI research and working toward global consensus on AI are both critically important. However, it is AI oversight that needs a course correction. To keep citizens safe from the overuse and abuse of algorithmic systems, the Biden administration has much work to do—but it also has the tools to get started.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Morale Turn

Congressional oversight is bad for policy implementation because it undermines agency morale

Marvel and McGrath 16 [John Marvel is an associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government, where he teaches courses on organization theory and public administration. Rob McGrath is an Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Programs at the Schar School, George Mason University. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Iowa and a BA from Saint Peter’s College in his native New Jersey and spent two years (2013-2015) as a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholar in Health Policy Research at the University of Michigan. “Congress as manager”{ Journal of Public Policy https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26775351.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae8b3afaa1639be3c927190917a3a1dd8&ab_segments=&origin=]//LP

Part of the job of any manager, in any organisational setting, is to motivate employees. Doing so involves cultivating employee work attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction, organisational commitment) and behaviours (e.g. arriving to work on time, aiding coworkers) that are thought to be associated with individual- and organisational-level performance. In exercising its oversight function, however, Congress is not necessarily interested in doing these things. Instead, it is primarily interested in ensuring federal agencies’ responsiveness to legislative preferences.4 However, in pursuing responsiveness, Congress can unwittingly harm agency morale. Before fully developing this argument below, we define the empirical focus of our study – agency morale – and discuss its importance for agency performance. We use the term “agency morale” to denote agency employees’ collective feelings of autonomy and job satisfaction. Theory and evidence from the organisational behaviour literature suggest that, at the individual level, both of these traits are positively related to job performance. In a meta-analysis of 312 independent samples, Judge et al. (2001) found a correlation between job satisfaction and job performance of 0.30. Similarly, in a meta-analysis of 101 independent samples, Spector (1986) found a correlation between autonomy and job performance of 0.26. In fact, these correlations likely underestimate the total impact of job satisfaction and autonomy on performance, given that both are associated with numerous other work attitudes and behaviours that are themselves related to performance. These include, for instance, organisational commitment, role conflict, role ambiguity, emotional distress, absenteeism, turnover intention and actual turnover (Spector 1986; Mathieu and Zajac 1990; Tett and Meyer 1993; Meyer et al. 2002; Riketta 2002). Theories of public sector organisational effectiveness and political control pay special attention to autonomy. The former typically emphasises autonomy’s salutary operational qualities: it allows agencies to use their expertise to solve pressing implementation problems, make and execute decisions quickly, and pursue their missions in an administratively rational manner (see, e.g. Wilson 1989; Wolf 1993; Meier 1997; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Brewer and Selden 2000). These theories also assume that autonomy has motivational benefits at the employee level. Individuals – particularly individuals with high levels of formal education and professional training – value autonomy and work harder when it is given to them (see, e.g. Gagné and Deci 2005). In contrast, theories of political control tend to view autonomy as necessary – bureaucracies have expertise that political actors lack, and so delegations of authority are sometimes unavoidable – but potentially problematic, given that bureaucracies are nonelectoral institutions. Yet, even political theories note the importance of autonomy for organisational performance. Gailmard and Patty (2007, 2012), for example, argue that congressional principals, who generally prefer informed to uninformed policymaking, proactively grant autonomy and policymaking discretion to bureaucratic agents in order to incentivise investments in expertise. Whatever their differences, both schools tend to agree that autonomy is systematically associated with organisational performance and the development of policy expertise. Consequently, we believe it is important to examine whether congressional oversight is associated with agency autonomy. Congressional oversight and its managerial consequences We expect that congressional oversight will be negatively associated with autonomy and job satisfaction when such oversight is primarily meant to monitor and control the bureaucracy for political reasons, rather than to aid it in the performance of agency duties (Weingast and Moran 1983; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Shipan 2004). Congress is often unlike the manager or firm owner described in standard economic accounts of principal-agent theory. In these accounts, it is usually assumed that the principal is concerned with securing some outcome and is, moreover, happy to let the agent choose whatever means or behaviours best serve that end (for a review, see Eisenhardt 1989). The congressional impulse to control, however, often seeks to dictate the bureaucracy’s choice of means. This impulse is intensified in our separation of powers system, where Congress often competes with the president for agency influence (Shapiro 1994; Whitford 2005). Below, we identify three particular mechanisms through which congressional oversight can harm agency morale and conclude by arguing that oversight’s relationship with morale is ultimately conditional on whether it is adversarial or friendly. Mechanism I: micromanagement Consistent with the predilection of Congress to be interested in control rather than performance, scholars have long noted that its oversight relationship with the federal bureaucracy has been characterised by micromanagement, or “intervention by Congress in administrative details” (Gilmour and Halley 1994, 10). As early as 1885, Woodrow Wilson complained that Congress “has entered more and more into the details of the administration, until it has virtually taken into its own hands all the substantial powers of government” (Wilson 1896, cited in Beermann 2006). Similarly, Wilson wrote that “Congress is commonly criticized for ‘micromanaging’ government agencies; it does and it always has” (1989, 241). More recently, Behn identified political micromanagement as one of public administration’s most pressing problems and elucidated how it hampers agency performance: “The legislative branch is, for some reason, unhappy with the way an executive-branch agency is performing; so the legislators impose some rules on the agency … These new rules prevent, or at least constrain, the agency from doing what the legislature dislikes. Unfortunately, these rules also constrain the agency from producing the results for which it is responsible” (1995, 316). There is reason to believe that oversight has become increasingly driven by this impulse to micromanage and constrain bureaucratic discretion. Summarising a series of 10 case studies on oversight, Gilmour and Halley concluded: The cases show a “congressional co-manager” intervening directly in the details of policy development and management rather than enacting vague, wide-ranging, sweeping statutes to change fundamental policy directions … Gone almost without a trace is the post-New Deal Congress that optimistically delegated broad-scale public problems and policy questions for solution and resolution by the executive branch. Much diminished as well is an executive branch relied upon by Congress for neutral competence and specialized expertise. Instead, the story … is one of the retrieval of executive discretion and the highly specific redefinition—by Congress—of prior delegations of authority. (1994, 335–336) In the same vein, Aberbach (1990) showed that the average number of pages per statute enacted by Congress rose sharply between the 80th (1947–1948) and the 103rd (1993–1994) sessions of Congress, indicating an increased command-and-control orientation in legislative-bureaucratic relations. More recently, Balla and Deering (2013) coded a sample of all congressional hearings that occurred during the 96th (1979–1981), 100th (1987–1989), 104th (1995–1997) and 108th (2003–2004) sessions of Congress. They found that most hearings – over 80% in each session – are police patrols, as opposed to fire alarms, indicating that Congress has an abiding interest in monitoring what the federal bureaucracy is doing and in how it is doing it. As a recent illustration of this mechanism, scholarly research and witness testimony from administrators from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) attest that members of Congress are keen to micromanage policies governing provider payment (Pham et al. 2009). Besides this micromanagement mechanism, there are at least two more possible avenues by which oversight may harm agency morale. First, preparing for and participating in oversight hearings, especially high-profile ones, levies opportunity costs on agency employees. Rather than focussing on, say, fulfilling their missions, or competently implementing legislative policy, agency employees must respond to the priorities of a committee holding an oversight hearing. We call these opportunity costs short term to differentiate them from the more fundamental (and psychological) crowding-out of experienced meaning that congressional micromanagement entails. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that negative congressional attention whose aim is to publicly embarrass high-level agency managers would be demoralising to the agency as a whole. A recent example of this involves the General Services Administration (GSA) and the attention it received in 2012, after stories of wasteful spending at its Western Regions Conference surfaced in the media. The aftermath included many high-profile oversight hearings and numerous internal reports that sought to assign responsibility for the agency’s actions. As “fraud, waste and abuse” are anathema to both parties, Democrats as well as Republicans relentlessly attacked the GSA in hearings. In this instance, Congress can be seen to have had a genuine interest in improving GSA performance into the future. In other words, this was an ideal opportunity for Congress to act as a genuine performance manager – that is, to take a sincere interest in remedying whatever underlying organisational problems (e.g. issues with organisational culture, ineffective internal accountability structures, etc.) may have contributed to the GSA scandal. Instead, Congress appeared to be more interested in obtaining whatever political mileage it could by publicly scolding top-level GSA employees.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Polarization Turn

Polarization makes congressional oversight ineffective

Friedrichs and Tama 3/11/22 [Gordon Friedrichs, postdoctoral researcher at the Chair for Multi-Level Governance at the Department of Political Science at Freiburg University AND Jordan Tama, Provost Assoc Professor at School of International Service at American University; March 11, 2022; DOA: 6/23/22; “Polarization and US foreign policy: key debates and new findings” ; Lowell-ES]

Domestic polarization not only affects the policymaking process but also the way policies become implemented. Scholars of US foreign policy have shown that over time, the highly contentious forces of domestic politics in some policy areas, such as international economics, have incentivized the president to rely more heavily on other instruments, such as military deployments and defense procurement (Milner and Tingley 2015). Others have shown that partisan incentives have reduced presi- dents’ use of force abroad and influenced how presidents carry out military operations (Howell and Pevehouse, 2007; Kriner 2010). Meanwhile, others have found that greater prospects for legislative success incline the president to engage in more high-risk military interventions and fewer humanitarian interventions (Marshall and Prins 2016). In addition, studies on presidential use of executive agreements suggest that domestic polarization inclines presidents to advance their agenda unilaterally (Caruson and Farrar-Myers 2007; Amirfar and Singh 2018).

Polarization also influences the effectiveness of US foreign policy execution. As some scholars have argued, polarization has limited the rally-around-the-flag effect in response to external security threats (Myrick 2021). In addition, political and material costs for the execution of certain partisan foreign policies and visions of international order have increased in times of domestic polarization (Bafumi and Parent 2012; Kreps et al. 2018). As a consequence of the widening gap domestically for a cohesive strategy, the executive branch is more incentivized to politicize US foreign policy through wedge-issues to weaken political opposition (Snyder et al. 2009). This, in turn, has contributed to a polarization of US relationships with allies and partners (Drezner 2018).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Military Turn

The best diplomacy is a strong military. Oversight destroys US leadership. Extinction.

O’Rourke 22 [Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs; "Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress"; Congressional Research Service; Published: 2-10-2022; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1159700.pdf; KL]

Maintaining U.S. Superiority in Conventional Weapon Technologies

As part of the renewed emphasis on capabilities for high-end conventional warfare, DOD officials have expressed concern that U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies has narrowed or in some cases even been eliminated by China and (in certain areas) Russia. In response, DOD has taken a number of actions in recent years that are intended to help maintain or regain U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies, including increased research and development funding for new militarily applicable technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous unmanned weapons, hypersonic weapons, directed-energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology. 68 A February 2, 2022, press report stated:

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---AT: Human Rights Link

No link to NATO.

PN = partner nation

Bushley 17 [U.S. Army Capt. Adam Bushley, Rule of Law attorney for Task Force Wolverine, 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team; "Governance: The Missing Ingredient in Security Cooperation"; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Published: 2017; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf; KL]

As stated previously, CRS research found that regardless of the strategic objective sought, the programs implemented in fragile or failing states were almost universally the least successful programs.189 Likewise, they also found the opposite to be true—the higher the degree of good governance and legitimacy in a partner nation’s institutions, the greater the likelihood of a successful SC/SA program.190 Therefore, if SC/SA efforts focused on strengthening defense institutions, power structures, incentives, the rules of the game, and norms and behaviors, long-term U.S. SC/SA objectives could be more effectively achieved with a PN with a more legitimate and accountable defense institution.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Ukraine Thumper

Ukraine thumps.

Yousif 22 [Elias Yousif, TLDR. Research Analyst, Conventional Defense, Stimson. More quals. Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child soldiers prevention. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, Elias was the Deputy Director of the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy where he analyzed the impact of U.S. arms transfer and security assistance programs on international security, U.S. foreign policy, and global human rights practices. Elias was previously a Campaigns and Research Officer with Crisis Action in Beirut, Lebanon, where he worked on advocacy and policy proposals to improve civilian protection, humanitarian access, and conflict resolution in Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan. He also worked with Crisis Action in Washington, D.C. as a Campaigns and Advocacy Associate, where he advised on U.S. policy related to civilian harm in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Elias received his BA from American University; "Ukraine to Set Record for U.S. Security Assistance • Stimson Center"; Stimson Center; Published: 5-23-2022; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://www.stimson.org/2022/ukraine-to-set-record-for-u-s-security-assistance/; KL]

Less than halfway through the year, the May 19, 2022 passage of more than $41 billion in emergency funding for Ukraine positions the country to become the largest single recipient of U.S. security sector assistance in 2022. The latest funding includes at least $6 billion in direct military aid to Ukraine, and billions more for Ukraine and other European partners. Altogether, even a conservative estimate places the value of the military assistance Ukraine will receive in 2022 as equivalent to what the U.S. provided Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt in FY2020 combined.

In the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Ukraine had already become the most significant recipient of U.S. security assistance in Europe, receiving $2.7 billion in American military aid between 2014 and 2021. But now, those totals are being quickly eclipsed as the United States and its western allies rush billions of dollars worth of weaponry to Kyiv.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Uniqueness

The impacts non-uq - Presidents circumvent the WPR today

FCNL 22 [The Friends Committee on National Legislation, FCNL Education Fund, and Friends Place on Capitol Hill are national nonprofit, nonpartisan Quaker organizations working collectively to advance peace, justice, and environmental stewardship. https://www.fcnl.org/updates/2022-06/war-powers-resolution-activist-guide]//LP

Even with the War Powers Act written into law, the president and Congress have been at odds in regards to the proper division of war powers post-1973. U.S. presidents have consistently said that the War Powers Act is an unconstitutional infringement on the executive branch’s powers. President Reagan used the military without congressional authorization in Grenada. President George H.W. Bush did get authorization for the first Gulf War but asserted that he did not need permission from Congress to go to war. The use of military force over the decades has cost Americans and humanity at large millions of lives and trillions of dollars. Constitutional scholars have argued that Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama did not comply with the requirements under the War Powers Act and was not authorized by Congress, in accordance with Article I of the Constitution. Similarly, in 1998 President Clinton sent troops to Kosovo to conduct an extensive air campaign without Congressional authorization. One week after the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the “nations, organizations, or persons” who planned, aided, or committed the attacks, as well as anyone who harbored those nations, organizations or persons. This law paved the way for President George W. Bush and the three subsequent presidents to send U.S. forces not only to Afghanistan but also to Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and other nations as part of the War on Terror. After more than two decades, the terror threats to the United States and its allies look very different from those at the time of the attacks on September 11. According to the Department of Homeland Security, the vast majority of attempted terrorist attacks since 2011 have emanated from domestic groups rather than foreign ones. The 2001 AUMF has been used as grounds for the use of military force against groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, and Al Shabaab, despite the fact that these groups were formed many years after the attacks on September 11. Many in Congress now support a sunset of the 2001 “War on Terror” AUMF and a repeal of the 2002 AUMF that authorized the war in Iraq. But while expressing the desire to repeal and replace these laws and end endless wars, the Biden administration has not articulated a coherent strategy that would actually do so. The use of military force –both authorized and unauthorized – over the decades has cost Americans and humanity at large millions of lives and trillions of dollars. It has also contributed to the destabilization of multiple countries, an expanding refugee crisis, accelerating climate devastation, and the rise of new terror groups, all of which have made the United States and people around the globe less secure.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Uniqueness

Oversight low---warmaking

Shackelford 21 [ELIZABETH SHACKELFORD, U.S. diplomat; “To Stop Endless Wars, Biden Needs to Give Up Some Power”; Feb 09, 2021; DOA: 6/23/22; ; Lowell-ES]

Several of the operations launched under the 2001 AUMF target the Islamic State, a terrorist organization that did not even exist in 2001. Nearly all have resulted in civilian casualties and high financial costs, and most have incurred U.S. troop casualties as well. None was subjected to the congressional oversight that our Constitution envisioned would raise the bar for lethal action and keep us out of wars of choice.

The danger of the steady expansion of executive war-making authority was on full display a year ago with the Trump administration’s strike against Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani. Congress called foul, passing a law requiring congressional authorization for any further military action against Iran, but that effort provided cold comfort in the wake of the provocative attack. Congress’ attempt to enforce its oversight failed even to reach the threshold necessary to escape a veto. Biden has the power to insulate America from future risks of an unpredictable executive wielding war power independently, but only if he chooses to do so.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Uniqueness

Oversight is dead.

Khan 21 [Alyssa Khan, Research Associate at Digital Forensic Research Lab; "Rethinking War Powers: Options for Reestablishing Congressional Authority Over US Foreign Policy"; Marcellus Policy Analysis; Published: Fall 2021; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://jqas.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Kann-Analysis1.pdf; KL]

American military actions—most not subject to public scrutiny or congressional accountability—have occurred in at least 20 countries in 20 years. These military operations have been made possible through increasingly broad presidential war powers, despite the fact that the Constitution reserved most war powers for Congress. In addition to over half a million lives lost in these military operations and trillions spent, this executive encroachment on war powers has eroded governmental accountability, civil rights, democratic institutions, and the role of the public and Congress in war making.

This executive overreach in military affairs has occurred in a variety of ways, particularly through Congress’ passage of the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Yet many scholars have described a broader trend in the past several decades of increasing executive power in military affairs, such as presidents justifying unilateral operations through their inherent authorities as president and through international organizations.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---SC Uniqueness

SC big high

RAND 19 [RAND; "Taking Stock of RAND's Security Cooperation Research"; Published: 2019; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://www.rand.org/ard/topics/security-cooperation.html; KL]

The type of security cooperation that DoD deploys depends on the objective at hand and capabilities of the partner nation. DoD tends to deploy building partner capacity programs and security force assistance to less developed partner nations in an effort to improve their tactical and operational capabilities, while defense institution building initiatives are used in similar contexts to strengthen ministries of defense at the strategic level. On the other hand, programs aimed at interoperability tend to be targeted at more-developed allies. DoD conducts about 3,000 to 4,000 security cooperation events each year in more than 130 countries, while total U.S. assistance to foreign militaries and police forces runs from $15 billion to $20 billion per year. Security cooperation activities touch tens of thousands of foreign security forces around the world every year. What do we know about security cooperation? Are the strategic and operational goals of the enterprise being met? Does security cooperation "work"? If so, under what conditions?

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AFF › DoS CP › 2AC---Links to Tradeoff

DoS Title 22 links to DoD tradeoff and causes confusion.

Young 20 [Thomas-Durell Young, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School; "The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance"; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation; Published: 9-10-2020; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://www.dasadec.army.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2344014/the-politics-of-security-cooperation-and-security-assistance/; KL]

Since 2006, the previous position of the Department of State, which originally had the lead in funding (and therefore some influence in controlling) these activities, has been eclipsed. While it continues to control funding for its many Title 22 programs, they are largely executed via DSCA and the MILDEPs. Although Congress has recognized that it has, in effect, created the basis for confusion via the two departments’ dual congressionally mandated authorities and authorizations, a political decision to create a clear lead agent for these activities remains missing. One will return to the U.S. Government’s well-used practice of “fudging” when it comes to identifying who’s in charge.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NON-MILITARY CP/DA UPDATES › Impact › 2NC---AT Oversight Bad

Congressional oversight is vital to effective foreign policy---empirics

ROSS 18 [Tommy Ross is a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation at the Pentagon and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. He has also held other senior positions in the House and Senate. https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/at-a-crossroads-part-iii-reasserting-congress-oversight-role-in-foreign-policy/]//LP

Congressional oversight of foreign policy hasn’t always been this way. A far cry from today’s marginalized and demoralized bodies, Congress’ foreign affairs committees once stood side-by-side with the presidency at the center of America’s foreign policymaking. One need only look at Henry Cabot Lodge’s famous campaign leading to the Senate’s 1919 rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, on the grounds that the Senate had not been adequately consulted, to see the impact of aggressive congressional oversight of foreign policy. Or consider the heady era of the mid-20th century, when Congress faced a new international landscape shaped by two world wars and the emergence of the Cold War and mutually assured destruction. Far from shrinking from these responsibilities, Congress undertook a historic effort to write — and then re-write — the rules of the road for foreign policy. In 1951, lawmakers replaced the Marshall Plan with the Mutual Security Act, then overtook that legislation ten years later with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which remains the foundational statute governing U.S. aid overseas. Congress enacted the War Powers Act in 1973 and, in 1976, passed the landmark Arms Export Control Act. As congressional oversight of foreign policy gained strength during the Vietnam War, scholar Linda Fowler notes that “the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was at the vanguard of the resurgence of Congress in international affairs,” citing the panel’s establishment of a special investigative subcommittee to examine executive branch foreign policies. That subcommittee, chaired by Sen. Stewart Symington, identified a range of executive branch abuses, uncovered expansive military operations whose existence or scope had been previously undisclosed, and paved the way for the Church Committee and, ultimately, establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It also defined for Congress a role of comprehensive, sustained oversight of U.S. foreign activities, presence, and commitments. These debates were messy, complex, and occasionally partisan, but the results were substantial. However, the 1980s and 90s saw the beginning of a dramatic decline in congressional engagement — and effectiveness — in conducting foreign policy oversight. Fowler’s work documents the decrease in oversight hearings conducted by both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in the Senate, beginning in the 1990s. Likewise, Congress’ ability to enact legislation setting out the priorities, expectations, and authorities of the State Department crumbled. This final installment in a three-part series (part I addressed defense oversight and part II examined intelligence) about congressional national security oversight argues regular State Department authorization bills — and their focus on bureaucratic and programmatic management — are essential to effective oversight. And effective oversight in this arena has never been more urgently needed: Draconian cuts to both State and the U.S. Agency for International Development proposed in the Trump administration’s 2018 and 2019 budgets present America’s foreign policy establishment with a colossal crisis. Regardless of the outcome of November’s mid-term elections, both the House and Senate foreign affairs committees will see new leadership. These new leaders will have an opportunity to set their committees on a path to reestablish their place at the center of foreign policymaking. Doing so will require a smart strategy for regaining the committees’ capacity to legislate, a renewed focus on structural and management issues impacting the foreign policy enterprise, investment in the committees’ own oversight capacity, and attention to long-simmering cross-committee jurisdictional challenges. Oversight is a profound responsibility, deeply embedded in the Constitution’s grant of powers to the Legislative Branch. Effective oversight means a serious, objective, and persistent examination of whether the Executive Branch is making use of the taxpayer resources entrusted to it in ways that are effective, efficient, accountable, and in accordance with law and congressional direction. It also means — critically, in this era of increasingly sophisticated threats and responses — helping to educate the public. To achieve both goals, it must be conducted with balance, bipartisanship, and restraint against tendencies to pursue political vendettas.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NON-MILITARY CP/DA UPDATES › Impact › 2NC---AT Oversight Bad

Foreign policy most effective with oversight. No holdup – all bipart.

USIP 19 [United States Institute of Peace, a Congressional established independent institution devoted to the nonviolent prevention and mitigation of deadly conflict abroad;“Congressional Oversight for Effective Foreign Policy”; May 14, 2019; DOA: 6/23/22; ; Lowell-ES]

While sharp differences arise in some foreign policy areas, the subcommittee plans to focus on how to make U.S. diplomatic and development efforts more efficient and effective today and in the future, said Bera, a California Democrat who chairs the panel. He and Zeldin, the panel’s ranking Republican, appeared last week at USIP as part of the Institute’s Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue, which brings together leaders from both political parties to address urgent national security and foreign policy challenges.

“We would like to take a deep dive into the vacancies and their causes at State and USAID that even precede this administration,” Bera said, ticking off areas of concern. “How can we make sure they have the tools to do their job in the most effective way? How do we modernize these organizations? We are losing the next generation of senior development and diplomatic leadership. How do we retain them?”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NON-MILITARY CP/DA UPDATES › Impact › 2NC---AT Oversight Bad---Overreaction

Oversight-avoidance causes Congressional overreach---devastates military effectiveness

Berger 19 Rick Berger, 7-16-2019, "The Pentagon should treat Congress as a partner, not an obstacle," Defense News, Rick Berger is a research fellow with the American Enterprise Institute. He previously served as a staff member on the Senate Budget Committee.

A strong U.S. military rests upon broad, bipartisan support among the American people translated through their representatives in Congress. Yet, amid the onset of great power competition and a generational conflict against jihadis, the Pentagon’s atrophied outreach to Congress has undermined support for the U.S. military. Although the Pentagon’s “” has rightly garnered a great deal of attention, the American public isn’t the only audience getting the cold shoulder from the Department of Defense. The Pentagon has failed to treat Congress as a partner in executing America’s defense strategy. In explanations both of budget choices and policy decisions, senior defense leaders have repeatedly neglected to invest in relationship building with Capitol Hill or to provide sufficient information to lawmakers and senior staff. This administration’s penchant for secrecy at the Pentagon further strains an already dysfunctional relationship based on mutual distrust. If Congress believes it hasn’t received sufficient answers to its oversight questions, it responds with public excoriations, punishments and regulatory actions that levy inefficiency on the daily operations of the Pentagon. The building, fearing such outcomes, refuses to share adequate information with Congress, hoping that such information can be kept secret, or that congressional complaints will blow over in time. If nothing else, the silence emanating from the building engenders mistrust and cynicism about the choices the military makes. Clearly, Congress understands that some of these strategic messaging and outreach snafus stem from the White House. In particular, anemic information flow about the president’s decision to border wall funding through the military or the Office of Management and Budget’s abuse of the overseas contingency operations account cannot be laid at the Pentagon’s feet. But Capitol Hill has proven much less forgiving of the Pentagon’s failures of communication and lack of outreach. The department even to provide a basic account of how the 2020 military budget request matched the new defense strategy. This year’s congressional defense legislation is  expressing severe bipartisan displeasure over the Pentagon’s lack of documentation and insufficient justifications for important acquisition decisions. In early March, Congress learned of the plan to decommission the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman from the press, and the rationale behind the decision remained opaque for weeks.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
NON-MILITARY CP/DA UPDATES › Impact › 2NC---Exec Flex Impact

Executive constraint is necessary to prevent rights violations

Ng and Gray 21 [Yee-Fui Ng is a Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, and Deputy Director, Australian Centre for Justice Innovation, Monash University. Stephen Gray is a Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University. https://www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/07-Ng-Gray.pdf]//LP

In exceptional situations of disaster and crisis, the executive government tends to take a pre-eminent role in managing emergencies and threats to the nation, while the other branches of government, Parliament and the courts, tend to relinquish their robust scrutiny roles, leading to a ‘government by decree’.220 This tendency, coupled with a ‘sophisticated bureaucratic and regulatory state … with the capacity to observe, police and regulate its citizens’, 221 generates great risks for individual rights and liberties. As we are faced with the largest worldwide public health crisis for a century, it is timely to consider what lessons can be gleaned from adopting a long-run historical perspective to major crises involving emergency powers such as wars and pandemics. In times of war, it can be observed that temporary coercive measures have become permanent, or reincarnated in similar forms in other legislation. The external wars with defined boundaries have been reimagined as internal amorphous threats in the form of the ‘War on Terror’, justifying the continuation of broad-ranging executive powers beyond a clearly defined emergency period. These sweeping executive powers have then been strategically deployed by successive governments for unintended purposes: to attack dissidents, protestors, journalists and whistle-blowers. The Second World War has also been used to successfully wrest financial power from the States to the Commonwealth, paving the way to an enduring vertical fiscal imbalance where the States are now permanently beholden to the Commonwealth for the funding of their programmes and policies. Yet wars can be distinguished from pandemics, as national security concerns create a centralising force, where there is a need for a uniform approach and secrecy in the governmental approach, which needs to be concealed from the enemy. In such crises, the ‘national-level executive branch will have access to unique information in the form of intelligence resources and capability assessments’.222 On the other hand, we argue that pandemics create a centrifugal or decentralising force, as information needs to be deployed to the whole of the community, and subnational governments tend to play a strong role in health-care provision. Thus, pandemic regulation requires intergovernmental coordination and cooperation between the Commonwealth and the States, as administration of quarantine is ‘intimately entwined with the state government functions of public health, policing, customs, harbours and marine and government health officers’.223 On that basis, Ginsburg and Versteeg have contended that in crises such as a pandemic – in which information is dispersed, the crisis is slow-moving, and local governments are needed to implement the crisis response – the executive should be structurally more bound, i.e. subject to legal and parliamentary checks and balances, than in national security crises.224 Yet Australia’s modern approach to pandemic regulation displays strong centralising features. From the fledgling federalist efforts during the 1918 Spanish Flu that failed spectacularly, the Commonwealth government has through fiscal dominance and strengthened national federalist arrangements managed to solidify its powers in terms of managing risks of infectious diseases in Australia. This centralisation is exhibited in the information-gathering processes in COVID-19. While Ginsburg and Versteeg contend that there should be decentralisation of information-gathering processes in a pandemic, as valuable information is dispersed amongst public and private actors such as universities, pharmaceutical companies and healthcare providers as to the best health response,225 this has not been the case in Australia. Rather, in Australia, information has been centralised in the form of the Chief Medical Officer in the Commonwealth and States – a medical technocratic response to crisis governance.226 Although it is reasonable in a public health crisis for politicians to defer to medical experts, reliance on such advice needs to be supplemented with greater procedural and legislative safeguards to prevent abuse.227 Further, this technocratic approach may have flow-on effects on the way that Australian courts and legislatures may see their role. For instance, Ginsburg and Versteeg’s empirical study of 106 countries has shown that Australia was in a small minority of democratic countries worldwide ‘where the legislature, courts and subnational units have not (yet) exercised active oversight’ during COVID-19,228 whereas in 82% of countries, there was either legislative involvement, judicial enforcement, or resistance from subnational units. Thus, Australian legislatures and judiciaries have been remarkably acquiescent to the executive government in COVID-19 compared to other democracies worldwide. In terms of individual rights and liberties, a distinction can be made between individual versus population-wide coercive measures. While far-reaching population-wide restrictions tend to be rolled back by governments as soon as possible, as it is not tenable to maintain widespread restrictions on the freedom of association and movement for the whole populace for an extended period, the coercive individual biosecurity measures pose a fundamental threat to individual rights and freedoms. The permissive legislative regime for individual coercive measures that allows biosecurity officials to subject individuals to executive detention and invasive bodily treatments therefore present a significant risk of misuse. There have been cases in Australia and overseas where the power of quarantine has been used by governments for reasons beyond genuine public health concerns, e.g. to target and segregate certain races or vulnerable groups.229 As Mariner, Annas and Parmet observe: ‘Measures like quarantine, surveillance, and behavior control have historically been targeted at people who are already disadvantaged, those on the margins of society, especially immigrants, the poor, and people of color’. 230 For instance, entire ethnic groups were quarantined during the Sydney plagues.231 More recently, in the handling of COVID-19 in Australia, concerns were raised that the hard-line housing commission tower lockdown in Melbourne,232 which confined 3,000 vulnerable individuals to their rooms for 14 days, enforced by a battalion of police that stormed into the housing commission towers immediately during the government announcement. This was seen to be a heavy-handed approach that directly targeted a vulnerable lower socio-economic group, while equivalent outbreaks in affluent areas were not treated in the same way.233 In late 2020, the Victorian Ombudsman found that this ‘hard lockdown’ imposed on residents at the Melbourne public housing tower was in breach of the human rights of those residents, including the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty.234