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2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Security Cooperation › Actor

Security Cooperation on Cyber, AI, or Biotech requires Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration or Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics action

DoD 16 [Pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, provisions in various National Defense Authorization Acts, and administrative practices relevant to certain security assistance authorities administered on behalf of the Department of State, this issuance establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the administration of security cooperation to encourage and enable allied and partner nations to apply their military capabilities and capacities, consistent with U.S. strategy, priorities, and defense objectives “DoD Directive 5132.03: DOD POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO SECURITY COOPERATION” https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDD_513203_on_Security_Cooperation.pdf]//LP

2.6. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (DTSA). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DTSA: a. Develops DoD technology security policies related to foreign transfers of defense-related articles, services, and technologies. b. Builds technology security capabilities of U.S. allied and partner nations to increase interoperability and protect critical technology and information. c. In coordination with DoD Component heads, provides the security cooperation enterprise with information on allied and partner nations’ willingness and ability to protect sensitive U.S. information and technologies and how that may affect DoD security cooperation efforts. d. In coordination with Director, International Cooperation, Office of the USD(AT&L), prioritizes and pursues policies and defense agreements required to facilitate transfer of defenserelated articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations, including development of DoD anticipatory policies to support accelerated timelines to transfer such items to support security cooperation priorities. 2.7. USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L): a. Establishes and maintains policies for the effective development of international acquisition, technology, and logistics programs, including international armaments cooperation (e.g., collaboration in science and technology; research, development, test, and evaluation; and acquisition, in-service, and logistics support (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements)), to support security cooperation goals. In coordination with the USD(P), leads the development of policies and procedures for the transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to foreign countries, and co-chairs the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, to ensure such policies and procedures comply with national laws and regulations, including technology security and foreign disclosure requirements. c. In coordination with the USD(P) and the Department of State, identifies, prioritizes, and pursues defense acquisition-related agreements required to facilitate the cooperative development, acquisition, and transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations. d. Engages with industry to provide DoD priorities for allied and partner nation capability investments. e. Ensures that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities. f. Manages and administers those Title 10, United States Code, programs for which the USD(AT&L) has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities. g. Coordinates on security cooperation policy guidance and theater campaign plans.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality › Security Cooperation › Arms Sales

Arms Sales and Transfers require State Department involvement – that’s not Security cooperation

Congressional Research Service 22 [ The Congressional Research Service (CRS) serves as shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. CRS experts assist at every stage of the legislative process — from the early considerations that precede bill drafting, through committee hearings and floor debate, to the oversight of enacted laws and various agency activities. “Arms Sales - Congressional Review Process” https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=2a6ef852-069e-49f2-854a-0ee1f994aec4&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A65P5-8D21-JC11-13S0-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=299219&pdteaserkey=sr1&pditab=allpods&ecomp=rz2yk&earg=sr1&prid=a549e521-5a95-41d1-94bc-a9e81fa9f6e2]//LP

Congressional Review Process Informal Notifications The Department of State (on behalf of the President) submits to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee an informal notification of a prospective major arms sale 20 calendar days before the executive branch takes further formal action. An August 2020 State Department Office of Inspector General report explains that, in addition to the AECA formal notification process, 'the Department has by long-standing practice submitted a preliminary or informal notification of prospective major arms transfers in advance of their formal notification to the congressional committees of jurisdiction.'/3 The informal notification practice began with a February 18, 1976, letter from the Department of Defense making a commitment to give Congress these preliminary classified notifications./4 Beginning in 2012, the State Department implemented a new informal notification process, which the department calls a "tiered review," in which the relevant committees are notified between 20 and 40 calendar days before receiving formal notification, depending on the system and destination in question./5 * * * 1 Originally titled The Foreign Military Sales Act. 2 For more information, see CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities, by Nathan J. Lucas and Michael J. Vassalotti. 3 Review of the Department of State's Role in Arms Transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Department of State Office of Inspector General ISP-I-20-19, August 2020. 4 Letter of February 18, 1976 from Lt. Gen. H.M. Fish, USAF, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 5 Prior to giving such notice, the State Department transmits to the committees any license applications for commercially licensed arms sales as soon as the department receives them. The State Department does not provide the same notice regarding government-to-government foreign military sales. * * * During June 2017 testimony, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Tina Kaidanow described this process as a 'review period during which the Committees can ask questions or raise concerns prior to the Department of State initiating formal notification. The purpose is to provide Congress the opportunity to raise concerns, and have these concerns addressed, in a confidential process with the Administration, so that our bilateral relationship with the country in question is protected during this process.'/6 The State Department "generally will not formally notify an arms transfer if a member of Congress raises significant concerns by placing a hold during the informal review stage," the Inspector General report states, noting that "the Department is not precluded from proceeding with an arms transfer subject to a congressional hold."/7 Formal Notifications The AEA contains provisions for congressional review and disapproval of arms sales. The President may not proceed with a proposed FMS or DCS transaction if Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval within the statutory review periods described below. It is worth noting that a congressional recess or adjournment does not stop these review periods. Foreign Military Sales Section 36(b)(1) of the AECA requires the President formally to notify the Speaker of the House, as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 calendar days before issuing a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for an FMS-administered sale, enhancement, or upgrading of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more; the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more; or the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services valued at $200 million or more./8 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency transmits the notifications to Congress./9 In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the President must formally notify Congress 15 calendar days before proceeding with the sale./10 * * * 6 "Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy," Statement Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 15, 2017. 7 Department of State Office of Inspector General, August 2020. 8 The Letter of Offer and Acceptance is the legal instrument used by the U.S. government for FMS transactions. (See CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities.) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795) amended the Foreign Military Sales Act to add a $25 million dollar threshold for defense articles and services. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729) added major defense equipment with a $7 million threshold. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113, 95 Stat. 1519) changed the $7 million threshold to $14 million and the $25 million threshold to $50 million. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-533, 94 Stat. 3131) added design and construction services with a $200 million threshold. 9 See E.O. 13637, "Administration of Reformed Export Controls," March 8, 2013. 10 For the Senate, these review periods appear to begin when the relevant Congressional notification notice is published in the Congressional Record.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › GOP Good DA › 2NC – Latino Voters

Latino voters are crucial for both sides.

Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas 7-18 Director of Research at UCLA Latino Policy and Politics Initiative, “Latino voters will play pivotal role in 2022 U.S. Senate races”, UCLA Newsroom, gbs

The Latino electorate played a decisive role in key U.S. Senate races in 2020 and will again be crucial in determining outcomes in the 2022 midterm elections, according to a report published today by the UCLA Latino Policy and Politics Institute. The report analyzes the choices of Latinos in 2020 Senate elections in five states where Latino voters were pivotal either because of their large numbers or the part they played in close races: Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, New Mexico and Texas. And with an eye toward 2022’s most contested races, the authors spotlight the frequency with which Latinos selected one party’s candidate for president and another’s for the Senate. In all these states, the authors found, Latino voters supported Democratic Senate candidates by wide margins in 2020. In Arizona, Colorado and Georgia, they voted for Democratic Senate candidates over Republican candidates by a 3-to-1 margin, and in New Mexico and Texas by a 2-to-1 margin. Yet despite this overwhelming support for Democratic Senate candidates, a considerable number of Latino voters — between 2% and 10%, depending on the state — split their ballots between parties when choosing Senate and presidential candidates in 2020. These swing voters will likely be a critical segment in this year’s midterm elections, particularly in states like Arizona and Georgia where Senate races are currently considered toss-ups, the authors said. Importantly, determining the future balance of power in the currently divided Senate and elsewhere will depend heavily on Latino voter turnout efforts, especially continued investments by all political parties in direct voter engagement and mobilizations by political campaigns, said the institute’s founding director, Sonja Diaz. “Voting patterns show the critical role Latinos play in pivotal midterm elections, but these votes must be earned,” Diaz said. “Campaigns for House and Senate seats should ensure they are reaching the Latino electorate by addressing the needs of this community and utilizing tailored outreach techniques proven to result in voter mobilization.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › GOP Good DA › 2NC – Latino Voters

Republicans winning Latino voters now

Will Weissert 3/11 and Adriana Gomez Licon, “Texas results hint GOP Hispanic gains may endure post-Trump”, Associated Press, //gbs

WASHINGTON (AP) — Just 46 residents of Starr County, Texas, cast ballots in the state’s Republican primary two years ago. But last week, nearly 1,100 Republicans voted in the sparsely populated county that hugs the Mexican border. A similar surge in Republican turnout unfolded across South Texas, a longtime Democratic stronghold dominated by Latino voters. In five U.S.-Mexico border counties, nearly 30,000 people voted in the GOP primary, an increase of more than 25% in participation from 2020. The Texas primary, which ushered in the 2022 midterms, is emerging as an urgent warning for Democrats who are clinging to narrow majorities in Congress. The drift of Latino support toward Republicans that surfaced while former President Donald Trump was in office may prove to be a more enduring political trend that could force Democrats to reassess how they win elections. The reverberations are being felt far beyond Texas. In South Florida, where Democrats were caught off guard by losing two House seats in 2020 that they’d flipped the previous cycle, some say the party must intensify on-the-ground operations that were largely suspended during the pandemic. Perhaps more fundamentally, they say, Democrats must do more to listen to the priorities of Latino voters and make fewer assumptions about their support. “It plays to this elitist branding that the Democratic Party is trying so hard to shake,” said Devon Murphy-Anderson, the Florida Democratic Party’s former finance director. “You can’t do that when you’re pointing the finger at somebody and saying, ‘We know what’s best for you, and it’s our candidate.’” Murphy-Anderson, is co-founder of Mi Vecino, a Florida Democratic advocacy group that plans to spend at least $2.3 million in the midterm cycle and register a minimum of 30,000 new voters in heavily Hispanic areas. Overall, Latinos still support Democrats by wide margins. Biden carried them in 2020, 59% to 38%, but that was 17 percentage points lower than Hillary Clinton’s 2016 margin, according to Pew Research Center data. Kellyanne Conway, a Trump adviser and his 2016 campaign manager, said she presented data on GOP inroads with Hispanic voters during last weekend’s Republican National Committee retreat. “The left just sees them as immigration voters,” Conway said of Hispanic voters. By contrast, she said, Trump has helped Republicans win over Hispanics on issues including job creation, education and traditional religious beliefs: “We connected with them intellectually, economically and spiritually.” Abel Prado, executive director of the Democratic advocacy group Cambio Texas in the Rio Grande Valley, acknowledged that Republicans have intensified candidate recruitment efforts that may have contributed to small gains in primary participation. But “when you look at the raw votes, we’re still outvoting them 3-to-1.” Prado also said Republican efforts could backfire, ultimately energizing local Democrats. “Hopefully the bad headlines do encourage candidates to invest way more heavily in the Rio Grande Valley,” he said. “Republicans are throwing money at the Valley without any remorse. You don’t see the same thing from Democrats.” Mayra Flores, who won the Republican nomination for an open South Texas congressional seat last week, said former president Donald Trump “played a huge role” in energizing Latinos in part by labeling Democrats as socialists. Still, she said the party’s gains aren’t dependent on him being on the ballot — as last week’s turnout shows. She said she personally connected with voters. “They’re finally seeing a Republican that looks like them, that has a similar story to them and shares their values,” Flores, who was born in Mexico and immigrated to the U.S. at age 6, said of voters in her district, which includes the border city of Brownsville. “I think that’s very important.” Improving Republican primary turnout in GOP primaries could buck decades of Democratic suggestions that Texas’ booming Hispanic population would eventually flip America’s largest Republican state. A ballooning Hispanic community, after all, helped transform once GOP-leaning California into the nation’s biggest blue state in the 1990s. Flores voted for Barack Obama in 2008, but later became a Republican, after becoming more politically engaged and deciding that the party better represented her community’s traditional family and religious values. She later worked as a Hispanic organizer for Trump’s 2020 campaign, trying to woo voters who had long voted Democratic more out of habit than political conviction. “Unfortunately, most of the people did not know who they were voting for,” Flores said of longtime South Texas Democrats she’s now looking to flip in her own race. Flores said the National Republican Campaign Committee has pledged financial support despite her being an underdog in the general election. Democratic U.S. Rep. Vicente Gonzalez switched districts and is now competing with Flores in November, and got 23,000-plus votes in securing the Democratic nomination, more than double Flores’ total. Texas gained more residents than any state between 2010 and 2020, with Latinos driving the growth that swelled its population to 29.1 million. Trump won 35% of the Hispanic vote nationally in 2020, about the same as he won in Texas, according to AP VoteCast, a nationwide survey of the electorate. But VoteCast showed he made inroads with Latino voters in some states, including Florida (45%) and Nevada (42%). Florida also saw its Hispanic and overall population boom according to last year’s census, and Trump won the state twice as Republicans ousted Democratic U.S. Reps. Donna Shalala and Debbie Mucarsel-Powell in Miami in 2020. Juan-Carlos Planas, an election attorney and former Republican Florida state representative who is now a Democrat, said there’s time before the state’s Aug. 23 primary for Democrats to make up ground. “Things could look bad today, but you never know what will happen next,” Planas said. “Do I think Democrats need to step up in voter registration? Yes, absolutely. Democrats need to step up their ground game.” Florida voters register by party, unlike open-primary Texas. Last year, registered Florida Republicans outnumbered Democrats for the first time in modern history, and the GOP’s lead of active registered voters has widened in more recent months. Trump performed well with Cuban-American voters in South Florida and greatly narrowed Democrats’ lead in Miami-Dade County in 2020. Republican Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, who is up for reelection this fall and is a potential 2024 presidential candidate, organized roundtables in support of last summer’s anti-governmental protests in communist Cuba. The Biden administration has also approached oil-rich Venezuela and its socialist President Nicolás Maduro after canceling U.S. oil imports from Russia — potentially alienating exiled Venezuelan-American voters in Florida who fled the unrest in that country. Dan Smith, a University of Florida political scientist who studies elections, said 2016 voters in heavily Cuban precincts had not heavily backed Trump, but that changed in 2020. “Certainly Democrats have lost any advantage they once had,” Smith said, adding that GOP efforts to label Democratic candidates as socialist was effective among Cuban and Venezuelan exiles.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › GOP Good DA › 2NC – UQ Doesn’t Overwhelm

The midterms are a wash for Democrats – Biden’s failures guarantee a loss

Charlie Cook 7/21 [Cook is an American political analyst who specializes in election forecasts and political trends, 7/21/22, “What Could Save Democrats From a Midterm Catastrophe?,” ] //mh

At a time when very little if anything is “normal” about American politics, we have come to expect the unexpected. While the House looks very, very likely to flip into Republican hands and the Senate more likely than not, what kind of event might keep at least one if not both chambers in Democratic control?

Democrats fervently hope that the reversal of Roe v. Wade, gun legislation, and the findings of the Jan. 6 committee (or some combination thereof) might galvanize their voters enough to retain at least one chamber. But data suggests that even a combination of all three is unlikely to be the antidote for their problems.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › GOP Good DA › 2NC – UQ – Smear Campaign

A smear campaign against Democrats guarantees a Republican win

Jon Raasch 7/20 [Raasch is a journalist and producer for Fox News, 7/20/22, “Midterms because of these key issues, GOP Leader McCarthy says,” ] //mh

Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy said his party will retake the House this fall because of their stance on inflation, immigration and other key issues that he shared exclusively with Fox News Digital.

"The Democrats have failed the American public," McCarthy said. "I think the extremism on the Democratic side has pushed people away."

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › GOP Good DA › 1NC – UQ – General

GOP wins now – momentum

Blake Hounshell 7/19 [Hounshell is the editor of the NYT On Politics newsletter and a writer for the NYT, 7/19/22, “The Midterm Races That Give Democrats Nightmares,” ] //mh

Professional Democrats have many fears about the 2022 midterm elections that keep them up at night.

Chief among them: losing Congress and handing over investigative powers and the ability to set the Washington agenda to Kevin McCarthy and Mitch McConnell. Granting Republicans full control over states where abortion remains contested. Seeing President Biden turned prematurely into a lame duck.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › Dems Good DA

Trump’s gains don’t apply to the Senate races.

Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas 7-18 Director of Research at UCLA Latino Policy and Politics Initiative, “Latino voters will play pivotal role in 2022 U.S. Senate races”, UCLA Newsroom, gbs

Republican inroads with Latino voters: A larger trend? The authors’ analysis shows that Democratic candidates for the Senate outperformed Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden with Latino voters in 2020 in four of the five states analyzed, excluding Texas. Georgia’s hotly contested 2021 Senate runoff elections saw the largest gap, with Democratic Senate candidates outpacing Biden among Latinos by more than 10 percentage points. The report also shows that in Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico, between 2% and 3% of Latinos voted for Donald Trump while voting for the Democratic Senate candidate. Overall, Trump improved his margin with Latino voters between the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, but the data show no evidence of a generalized drop in Latino backing for Democratic candidates in 2020. The authors noted that Trump’s biggest gains were limited regionally to areas of Florida and Texas and emphasized the current report’s findings of strong support among Latinos for Democratic Senate candidates. Still, Latino swing voters could be a decisive factor in some close Senate races, they noted, particularly with the continued rapid growth of the Latino electorate. Between 2016 and 2020, the number of Latino voters who cast ballots increased by almost 31%, nearly double the nationwide 15.9% growth in ballots cast between those four years, said Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, the institute’s research director and one of the report’s authors. “Our research continues to show the growing power of Latino voters,” Dominguez-Villegas said. “With a million Latinos coming of voting age every year, the Latino electorate will play a pivotal role in the 2022 midterms and beyond.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › Dems Good DA

Dems gaining momentum with women – they’re key

Kaitlin Lewis, 7-18-2022, "As midterm fears mount, Democrats seek to rally on women's issues to win," Newsweek, gbs

Hours after the Supreme Court overturned the federal protection for abortion in June, President Joe Biden addressed the nation with a clear statement: "Roe is on the ballot this November." That message has been a focus point for the Democratic Party heading into midterm elections at a time when Biden faces historically-low approval ratings, even among supporters, sinking to 36% in July according to a poll conducted by CNBC. But in the wake of overturning Roe, the issues of abortion access and women's health have been pushed to the top of voters' issue lists, offering Democrats a ray of hope for beating their Republican opponents in key state elections in November. A poll conducted by the The Associated Press and the NORC Center for Public Affairs Research at the University of Chicago (AP-NORC) in the days following the Dobbs vs. Jackson case, in which the Court ended the federal protection for abortion, found that 22% of voters label abortion or women's rights as a top-priority issue for this year's election, nearly triple the percentage the same study found in December 2021. And a report from the Kaiser Family Foundation on June 9, a few weeks before the decision was handed down, found that 25% of women voters ages 18 to 49 say they would be motivated this fall to only support a candidate who wants to protect access to abortion. One expert told Newsweek there is a simple formula for gender politics in an election year. "In general, the strategy for Democrats in a tight year is: win women by more than you lose men by," said Celinda Lake, a leading political strategist in the DNC. According to the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), women voters have turned out in higher numbers than men since the 1980s, including in midterm elections, and are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates. In 2020, women outvoted men 68.4% to 65%. But even with an increased focus on women's health, abortion access still falls behind other voter issues approaching the midterms. A New York Times/Siena College poll conducted in early July found that abortion and women's rights were listed as the sixth-highest problem facing the country today, trailing the economy, inflation and gun policies. However, Lake told Newsweek that women voters could still prove to be valuable for the DNC, given that inflation typically impacts their market baskets differently than men. For example, women are more likely to look for support this fall for the rising cost of healthcare, groceries and education – issues on which voters typically trust Democrats more than Republicans. "Men think it's a good day when the government hasn't done anything bad to you," Lake said. "Women think that they and their families might need a safety net program at some time. Many men think, 'I can handle that on my own; I can take care of my family.'" "That's the area of tackling inflation where Democrats have the biggest advantage," Lake added.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › Dems Good DA

Trump will cost Republicans the midterms – his forthcoming presidential run and continuous presence in politics will turn swing states blue

Kelsey Vlamis 7/24 [Kelsey is a breaking news reporter for Insider, 7/24/22, “Gov. Larry Hogan said if Trump announces a 2024 run before the midterms GOP governors worry it will 'cost us seats',” ] //mh

Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan said he and other Republicans are worried about how the party's chances in the midterms could be impacted by former President Donald Trump announcing a 2024 run before election day.

"We had discussions about that at the Republican Governors Association last week," Hogan said during an interview with ABC's "This Week" on Sunday.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › Dems Good DA

The polls are neck-and-neck – Democrats are poised to pull ahead now

Kyle Morris 7/13 [Morris is a political reporter, 7/13/22, “Shock Poll: Democrats closing gap with Republicans ahead of midterm elections,” ] //mh

A new poll has found that Democrats and Republicans are neck and neck in the upcoming midterm elections, with Democrats citing gun violence as their number one concern even as the economy continues to tumble.

The Siena College Research Institute poll, conducted on behalf of the New York Times between July 5 and 7 among 849 registered voters, found the race to control Congress is tight, with voters preferring Democrats to Republicans by just one percentage point, 41%-40%. Nineteen percent of respondents remain undecided.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Other › Threat Inflation

American hegemony leads to threat inflation

Fuller 21 – is a former CIA agent and was the vice-chairman of the National Intelligence Council and he is an adjunct history professor at Simon Fraser University, 2/7/21 (Graham, “US primacy is a self-fulfilling threat generator”, Responsible Statecraft, , accessed 6/26/21)//jd 

It seems to run in the American DNA. For as long as I’ve been involved in U.S. foreign policy — as a CIA operations officer and a long-term CIA forecaster, and later at a prominent think tank — I perceive remarkably little change in that one deep-seated, almost unconscious presumption of basic American innocence, that the U.S. mission in the world is fundamentally benign. It pervades all our public utterances. It is dangerous. I have no wish to launch into a litany of American sins, failures, or mistakes by omission, or more often commission, that have by almost any measure been disastrous for so many foreign countries “visited” by U.S. military operations. The list is long and well known — Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, indirectly in Yemen in most recent times. Acts of omission include neglect of the half-century running sore of Israel’s occupation of Palestine and friendship with unsavory dictators because they “serve the U.S. national interest,” while publicly stressing America’s (cherry-picked) commitment to democracy overseas. China oppresses Uighurs, bad. India oppresses Muslims in Kashmir, no comment. Hypocrisy abounds. But I’m writing about something even simpler. I am baffled by the kind of American mindset that, seemingly without guile, simultaneously maintains two quite incompatible views of the U.S. role in the world. Premise One: With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Washington boastfully proclaimed itself the “world’s sole superpower.” The United States at once gained the ability — even the right — to exercise unrestricted intervention, and with military force, anywhere in the world. No region is ever deemed too insignificant, too distant, too small not to fall at some point within the framework of a “major U.S. national security interest.” Unsurprisingly, it is probably this self-arrogated license, this global sheriff’s badge, that marks the beginning of the disastrous decline of U.S. foreign policy ever since. But it’s the second accompanying belief or premise that is the stunner: The United States, so goes the self-narrative, has simply been working steadfastly to maintain global stability and a global “order” — an order that is supposed to represent a global good for all. While engaged in this selfless task, crocodiles have been nipping at our legs wherever we go. Consequently, as we engage in this self-appointed task, we find ourselves constantly being “challenged,” or “threatened” by other states or groups that do not seem to recognize or acquiesce in the universal goodness of Pax Americana. So, think about it: how can the United States exercise supreme and unchallengeable power around the world on the one hand, and yet simultaneously not provoke negative reactions from others? You can’t be the most powerful player on the block — or what the U.S. military often tellingly calls its global footprint” — and yet not expect strong reactions from those affected by it. Again, I’m not even trying to assess how good or bad, how generous or harsh, how wise or foolish U.S. actions have been. It’s simply the perception in our eyes that we are nearly always the aggrieved party facing negative or ungrateful reactions. So, we read again and again about the endless array of challenges we face: our media talks non-stop about how Washington must meet the “Russian challenge,” “the Iranian threat,” “the Chinese threat,” “the Islamic extremist challenge,” etc. But how often do we ask the question, why do they present a threat? Some political scientists might simply suggest that any two major powers are destined to clash. Yet any such clash still represents a choice by their national leaderships. Why were Britain and France sworn enemies for centuries until one day they weren’t? Why were France and Germany seen as “natural enemies” for over a century and then suddenly decide after World War II they didn’t have to be? Some might respond that the game changed because new “enemies” cropped up to replace old ones. Maybe so. But we must acknowledge that we are always making conscious choices and decisions about who we select as the enemy du jour based on our assessment of what serves our “national interest,” a phrase routinely invoked by foreign policy specialists and politicians. But “national interest” tends to be a highly subjective affair that is eminently debatable. In fact, determining just what are our true national interests is what foreign policy debate is all about. And the answer depends on your worldview, your ideology. One problem with being the “world’s sole superpower” is that any challenge to one’s hegemony from any quarter identifies the challenger as an enemy, or potential enemy. Hegemony finds any challenge insufferable. It has been an integral part of Washington’s worldview for many decades now. Any government that resists U.S. hegemony should ideally be intimidated, overthrown or eliminated. Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Syria, Egypt in the day, China, Russia, Venezuela — it’s hard to get off that enemy list when you actively assert your independence from Washington. For these reasons, then, I find myself deeply disturbed when, within President Biden’s brand-new foreign policy team, we find officials still darkly invoking the “threats” posed by other countries. Mere invocation of the word “threat” is all it takes. The charge eventually becomes axiomatic. China? Sure, obvious threat, no need to think about it. Everybody knows Russia is a black hat. Everybody knows that Iran is a “malign” actor. But we seem unwilling to consider for a moment just how we arrived at these assessments, however accurate or inaccurate. As the world’s greatest military power, should we even wonder whether U.S. policies towards Russia since the Soviet collapse had anything to do with Moscow’s policies and views of the United States? This question seems out of bounds in the mainstream media. And, in our tensions with China, is it worth considering what a timeline of relations might show about a possible two-way street of provocation? Is Iran inherently anti-American, a stereotype that has been perpetuated over decades? Was there no earlier formative background worth considering? This is why our diplomats, armchair strategists and pundits should at least be reading the “enemy press” for a more nuanced view of how we appear to others. (Or do we instinctively know it’s all propaganda or “fake news?”) Might not our nation be served by periodically reprinting editorials from the Russian, Chinese, or Iranian media — just out of curiosity as to how they see things? Or do we fear contamination of our supposed purity of vision and beneficence? Strikingly, Washington’s latest favorite interpretation of why relations with China are poor is because we were somehow guilty of an “overgenerous assumption” that, if we were nice to Beijing, then they would become just like us. We deceived ourselves; we were naïve. It’s a fairly self-serving argument: if we bear any blame for bad relations with Beijing, it is because we were too nice. Well, no more Mr. Nice Guy. I’m not suggesting that the answer to all these questions invariably comes down to “blame America.” I’m just suggesting that maybe we should be a little less utterly self-absorbed, self-righteous and self-referential to consider that maybe it takes two to tango, or not tango. Sadly, sole superpowers are never going to welcome the rise of any competitor in any arena; it nearly automatically becomes an official “threat.” There seems to be no other way to look at the world except through this lens of American exceptionalism and the divine right of American leadership. Not to mention the massive military-industrial complex and the Beltway security bureaucracy that have a vested interests in sustaining this worldview. How do we ever wriggle out of these deeply ingrained habits of sole superpowerdom? Frankly, I’m not sure it can be done, short of a massive shock to the system that compels a rearrangement of our perceptions and priorities, including budgets. I’m not holding my breath. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Other › Modeling

The U.S.’s declining heg allows other nations to model more prosporous democracies which revitalizes the global economy and checks environmental harm

Meisenhelder 20 [10-11-2020, Meisenhelder, Thomas, Thomas Meisenhelder is a retired Professor of Sociology from California State University, San Bernardino., “Declining American Hegemony Could Be A Good Thing”, Common Dreams, ]//AA

'The declining global hegemony of the United States will be an opportunity to build better lives everywhere' Recently, some of the “talking heads” on the news have been worrying about the demise of US global hegemony. We are told that the “American empire” is in decline and our influence and status around the world are falling. We are told that this bodes poorly for both the people of the United States and the rest of the world. That is not how I see it. While I tend to agree that the United States is losing its hegemony, I believe that all of us (in the USA and elsewhere) will be better off if the United States is no longer the “leader” of the world. Our decline has been going on since the time of Richard Nixon, through Carter, the Bushes, Clinton, Obama, and has accelerated under Trump. The President’s favoritism for the white and the rich, his erratic destruction of the administrative and diplomatic state, his complete inability to address COVID-19, his rejection of reason, science and expertise, his cultural ignorance, his meanness and cruelty, his selfish disregard for others (nations and peoples) all have underscored and advanced our national decline. We have been taught to think that our country’s position in the world stems in part from our status as the world’s one true democracy, but it is now very clear that is not the case. Especially since Citizens United, political power in this country has prioritized wealth and those who have it. The United States is now a county “of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich.” We have tax laws that favor capital over income; we have civil and criminal justice systems that protect property more than people; our public institutions routinely criminalize immigrants, the poor, and people of color. If the new global “role models” are places like Denmark, Norway, or Costa Rica, surely the world would be headed towards fewer threats to peace, less military spending, fewer attacks on local democracies, more concern for human rights, less environmental destruction, more environmental protection, and more democracy. Our national elections are not decided by the popular vote, but instead by an archaic process based an unrepresentative group called the “electoral college.” Our laws and policies reflect the interest of the wealthy as communicated to wealthy legislators by the lobbyists of big business. We have voting laws that make it a burden to vote for many. As a result, too often public policy does not reflect the opinions or interests of the majority. If it did, we would be like other developed countries and adopt national health care, paid parental leave, stronger controls on guns and weapons, free higher education, reproductive rights, and a higher minimum wage. If we are honest with ourselves, we must admit that there are many more democratic nations in the world today. Their influence inevitably rises as ours falls and this is a good thing for everyone. Much of the U. S. hegemony has stemmed from the fact that the United States is surely the most heavily armed and most militarily active country in the world. The national myth is that we use military force reluctantly and only when it is necessary to insure human rights, peace, and security. But let’s look at the record: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Cuba, Grenada, Dominican Republic, Chile, Central America, Libya, Congo, Iran, Iraq, Panama, Afghanistan. Are any of these places were made better as a consequences of our covert and overt actions? We spend more on weapons of war than any other country in the world. Researchers at Brown University have found that since the horror of 9/11, the so-called “war on terrorism” has killed 800,000, displaced 37,000,000, and cost taxpayers $6.4 trillion. We are told that the United States is the greatest, most productive and fairest economy in the world. It isn’t. Over the last several years, our share of world production has declined significantly. Increasingly our economy is characterized by wide inequalities, environmental destruction, and decreasing life chances for the many. The earnings ratio between CEOs and their employees has widened dramatically. Bosses now earn as much as 400 times the incomes of their employees. Ordinary Americans no longer believe that future generations will have more comfortable lives than current ones. People of color in the United States face significant economic damage just because of their heritage and ethnicity. President Trump did not create this situation, but he is making it worse. His administration’s mishandling of COVID has driven down the lives of ordinary Americans. Unemployment is up; incomes are down; mass evictions are looming; GDP has collapsed; and all this is doubly true for persons of color. The only folks doing well are a few tech bosses and those who live off the stock market. In addition, the American economy is not sustainable environmentally. Since we no longer can claim any kind of real commitment to environmental protection, we can not even pretend to be an international leader in this area. Out tax system is notoriously unfair and confusing. It favors the wealthy over the middle and working classes; it favors growth over maintenance and endurance; it favors corporations over families. We rescue banks from their unwise and sometimes criminal investments while allowing health care expenses to bankrupt ordinary people, who already live without paid medical or parental leave, decent vacations, or old age pensions (all commonplaces in developed and developing nations around the world). Americans live shorter and less healthy lives than people do in most developed nations. Our schools are nowhere near the best in the world, and many schools in poor and working class areas are so underfunded and under-resourced that they look more like tenements than campuses. They test and segregate more than they build and educate. Classes are large, standardized testing proliferates, teachers are underpaid, armed cops patrol the halls, and facilities are crumbling. Simply put, we have nothing to teach the rest of the world about how to build an economy that serves the people. Many nations already know how to do it and hopefully, as we decline, they will become ready international examples of “best practices.” We have long believed we are the proverbial “city on the hill,” a place that is home to a life so rewarding that it is a model for all. That emperor, too, has no clothes. A supposed “nation of immigrants,” we do not welcome newcomers. Instead, we attempt to deter migrants through practices of harassment, detention, and family separation. The Coronavirus and the continuing trauma of police brutality have revealed that our society and its communities are unhealthy. Too often, residents have no trust in their government and see the police and other agencies as the agents of an occupying power. And people around the world recognize that we are a violent nation. Gun violence rages and mass shootings in schools, churches, nightclubs, and movie theaters have become distressingly common. Deadly police repression and practices of mass incarceration impact our communities, particularly neighborhoods of color. Guns and violence even characterize our entertainment media, which we export around the globe. “Hollywood” gets rich by displaying false and elaborately decorated images of fear, violence and anger. What does such an unreflectively violent place have to teach the rest of the world? The cultural spread of a violent breed of radical individualism and the acceptance of deep inequalities are destroying the foundations of our society. ¨Looking out for number one” cannot form the basis of a livable, functioning community. Norms of reciprocity and equity suffer when people must struggle against each other to fulfill even the most basic needs such as food, clothing, housing and medical care. While many countries define the collective provision of basic needs as the necessary social infrastructure of a good society, we worry about something called the “nanny state.” The few such programs we do have are inefficient and inadequate by design, rife with unnecessary administrative costs, bureaucratic means testing, and minimal resources. In many, if not most, developed nations ordinary people earn better wages, have better schools, live healthier lives, and are more secure and comfortable in communities where they feel respected, valued, and cared for. So, it is very likely that the declining global hegemony of the United States will be an opportunity to build better lives everywhere. If the new global “role models” are places like Denmark, Norway, or Costa Rica, surely the world would be headed towards fewer threats to peace, less military spending, fewer attacks on local democracies, more concern for human rights, less environmental destruction, more environmental protection, and more democracy. And, if America uses this opportunity to change what we spend on and how we care for each other, life will be better here at home too.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Author Indicts › Brands and Feaver

Brands is wrong and ignores historical examples that support offshore balancing – offshore balancing is the best way to ensure US interests

Mearsheimer ’16 – Professor of Political Science [John; JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy SchoolHal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy. PETER FEAVER is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University.; November 2016; "Should America Retrench?”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/should-america-retrench; Foreign Affairs; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]

MEARSHEIMER AND WALT REPLY In “The Case for Offshore Balancing,” we argue that if a potential hegemon emerges in Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Persian Gulf, Washington should commit resources to preserve a favorable balance of power and, if necessary, fight to defend it. If no potential hegemon is present, however, the United States should remain offshore and let regional powers uphold the balance. Hal Brands and Peter Feaver reject this recommendation and contend that the United States should continue its failed pursuit of its existing grand strategy, liberal hegemony. But they repeatedly misrepresent our argument and offer a dubious account of the relevant history—unwittingly underscoring the superiority of offshore balancing. Brands and Feaver begin by claiming that we want the United States to remain offshore in Europe, Asia, and the Gulf, intervening in those regions only after war has broken out and a hegemon is about to win. This assertion allows them to accuse us of wanting to roll back current U.S. alliances in all three areas and to suggest that had U.S. policymakers adopted our approach in the late 1940s, there would have been no NATO, no strategy of containment, and no Cold War victory. This predictable attempt to make us sound like isolationists is wrong. In our article, we make it clear that the United States should deploy forces onshore before war breaks out if the regional powers cannot check a rising hegemon, and we describe the United States’ Cold War alliances as a clear-cut example of this policy. Moreover, we recommend the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Asia to counter any future Chinese attempt to dominate that region. Contrary to what Brands and Feaver say, Washington’s alliances and force postures during the Cold War and in Asia today are wholly consistent with offshore balancing. In effect, Brands and Feaver portray U.S. policy in much of the first half of the twentieth century as textbook offshore balancing but claim that Cold War containment represented the “reverse” of that policy. Not so: the United States followed the core logic of offshore balancing from 1900 to 1990 and embraced liberal hegemony only after the Soviet Union collapsed. Under offshore balancing, the United States exploits its favorable location and calibrates its overseas commitments according to what is happening in key regions. Under liberal hegemony, by contrast, those factors hardly matter. The United States is supposed to deploy forces around the globe under any and all circumstances, whether it faces a single peer competitor, a complex multipolar world of contending great powers, or no serious enemies at all. No matter what the world looks like, the recommendation is always the same: the United States should try to run it. But as the past 25 years have shown again and again, this approach leads to costly quagmires and repeated foreign policy failures. Indeed, it is telling that Brands and Feaver never say what U.S. interests are or attempt to specify priorities among them. Instead, they justify the deployment of U.S. forces almost everywhere by assuming that doing so guarantees peace. Again, Brands and Feaver are mistaken. They suggest that the United States could have prevented World War II had it committed troops to Europe before the conflict started. But Europe was a simmering cauldron of great-power rivalry in the interwar period, and in all likelihood, even an enormous U.S. military presence there would not have calmed the continent. It’s hard to believe that U.S. troops would have proved sufficient to deter Hitler or put an end to the suspicions between Berlin and Moscow. Moreover, committing a large army to Europe would have ensured that the United States was involved in the bloodbath of World War II from the beginning. From an American perspective, it was better to enter that conflict as late as possible and let others bear the brunt of the fighting. Events since 1945 provide abundant evidence that a large U.S. military presence does not always ensure peace. Such a presence in East Asia failed to keep the United States out of two bloody wars there during the Cold War (Korea and Vietnam), and despite the tens of thousands of troops in the region today, few would deny that there is a serious possibility of military clashes between China and the United States over the East China and South China Seas, Taiwan, or the Korean Peninsula. Nor did a major U.S. military presence in Europe prevent the Balkan wars in the 1990s or the current war in Ukraine, which could escalate into a broader conflict involving the United States. And in the Middle East, repeated U.S. military engagement since the end of the Cold War has not kept the region from becoming engulfed in wars—and in fact caused many of those wars. This is no accident, because pursuing liberal hegemony, as Brands and Feaver advocate, not only fails to guarantee peace around the world; it also leads to foolish wars. The belief that the United States should be committed all over the world produced the Vietnam War, a clear departure from offshore balancing. That same thinking lay behind the disastrous 2003 invasion of Iraq—which Feaver supported and we opposed—as well as the failed U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. The United States has also interfered in Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, among other places, with little to show for it. Brands and Feaver trivialize these costly failures as “a few undeniable setbacks,” but they were in fact an inevitable consequence of the misguided attempt to garrison the world and spread democracy by force. Brands and Feaver also reject offshore balancing by saying that “although the right moment for intervening can sometimes be seen in hindsight, identifying it in real time, amid enormous uncertainty, is far harder.” But deciding whether and when to intervene is much easier under our strategy, since offshore balancers, unlike liberal hegemonists such as Brands and Feaver, provide clear criteria to inform that decision. But if the United States has vital interests everywhere and U.S. intervention guarantees peace, as they maintain, then it should have intervened to prevent every Arab-Israeli war, all three Indo-Pakistani wars, the Iran-Iraq War, the First and Second Congo Wars, and so on. By their logic, Washington should keep expanding its overseas military presence until the entire world is at peace. Lastly, Brands and Feaver write that offshore balancing makes the United States “more dependent on morally bankrupt regimes,” insisting further that “Americans expect their allies to abide by minimum humanitarian standards.” History shows otherwise. The United States allied with Joseph Stalin in World War II and tacitly with Mao Zedong in the 1970s—both of whom murdered millions of their own citizens. Washington has also propped up numerous Latin American dictators, today backs a military regime in Egypt and a harsh theocracy in Saudi Arabia, and continues to turn a blind eye to, if not support, Israel’s brutal treatment of the Palestinians. International politics is a dangerous business, and moral tradeoffs are sometimes necessary. By committing U.S. power more selectively, however, offshore balancing requires such compromises only when the United States faces imminent threats to its vital interests. By encouraging the U.S. military to get involved everywhere, Brands and Feaver’s approach often forces Washington to rely on dubious allies in far-flung regions. Once committed to defending them, of course, it has little leverage over their behavior. Given liberal hegemony’s many flaws, it is no wonder U.S. foreign policy has failed so often in recent years. One does wonder, however, why Brands and Feaver continue to defend it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Author Indicts › Mearsheimer

Mearsheimer is an anti-Semite

Goldberg 2011(Jeffrey Goldberg is the editor in chief of The Atlantic and a recipient of the National Magazine Award for Reporting. He is the author of Prisoners: A Story of Friendship and Terror. “John Mearsheimer Endorses a Hitler Apologist and Holocaust Revisionist”, //KS)

Rather unbelievably (or believably, depending on where you sit) Mearsheimer has written an endorsement of Atzmon's new book, "The Wandering Who?" Here is what Mearsheimer says about Atzmon: Gilad Atzmon has written a fascinating and provocative book on Jewish identity in the modern world. He shows how assimilation and liberalism are making it incredibly difficult for Jews in the Diaspora to maintain a powerful sense of their 'Jewishness.' Panicked Jewish leaders, he argues, have turned to Zionism (blind loyalty to Israel) and scaremongering (the threat of another Holocaust) to keep the tribe united and distinct from the surrounding goyim. As Atzmon's own case demonstrates, this strategy is not working and is causing many Jews great anguish. The Wandering Who? Should be widely read by Jews and non-Jews alike.' In this new book, Atzmon suggests, among other things, that scholars should reopen the question of medieval blood libels leveled against Jews-- accusations that Jews used the blood of Christian children to make matzo, and which provoked countless massacres of Jews in many different countries. If you recall from the fight over "The Israel Lobby," which Mearsheimer wrote with Stephen Walt, of Harvard, the authors claimed that they were simply writing a critique of American foreign policy, and of certain American citizens who, they said, "distorted" foreign policy. Many of us disagreed. Here is a bit of what David Rothkopf wrote about Mearsheimer and Walt: "W)hatever the pale intellectual merits of his hackneyed argument may be (the authors) know full well that their prominence on this issue has come not because they have had a single new insight but rather because they were willing and one can only believe inclined to play to a crowd whose 'views' were fueled by prejudice and worse. They may not be anti-Semites themselves but they made a cynical decision to cash in on anti-Semitism by offering to dress up old hatreds in the dowdy Brooks Brothers suits of the Kennedy School and the University of Chicago." Now, Mearsheimer is endorsing the writing of a man who espouses neo-Nazi views. In other words, he's not even bothering to make believe anymore -- he's moved from a self-described critic of Israel to a corrosive critic of Jewry itself. The blogger Adam Holland, like yours truly, didn't quite believe that Mearsheimer would endorse such a crude anti-Semite, so he asked him to confirm: I had trouble believing that a distinguished professor at one of the world's greatest universities would link himself to a hatemonger like Atzmon. So I sent Professor Mearsheimer an email quoting the blurb and asking him to verify it's accuracy. I also gave him an opportunity to amend it or add to it. Here's what he wrote back: "The blurb below is the one I wrote for "The Wandering Who" and I have no reason to amend it or embellish it, as it accurately reflects my view of the book." Gliad Atzmon, by the way, is also on record saying this: "I believe that from certain ideological perspective, Israel is actually far worse than Nazi Germany." Perhaps Mearsheimer has found a new co-author.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Author Indicts › Beckley

Michael Beckley provides an inaccurate picture of US-China relations

Shifrinson 13 [Winter 2012/13, Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson’s teaching and research interests focus on the intersection of international security and diplomatic history, particularly the rise and fall of great powers and the origins of grand strategy. He has special expertise in great power politics since 1945 and U.S. engagement in Europe and Asia., “Debating China's Rise and U.S. Decline”, The MIT Press, ]//AA

Michael Beckley’s article deserves attention for challenging the view that the United States is declining because China is rising.' Its ambiguous definition of decline, how- ever, sends the wrong impression about the distribution of economic and military power between the United States and China. Without being explicit, Beckley implies that the United States is not declining because the absolute difference of economic, mili- tary, and technological capabilities between the United States and China is growing. In contrast, both theory and history suggest that it is more important that the relative dis- tribution of economic and military capabilities between the United States and China is falling: as I propose below, decline is best defined as a decrease in the ratio of economic and military capabilities between two great powers. As a result, even if the United States maintains a large advantage in absolute capabilities, the fact that U.S. capabilities are decreasing relative to China’s means that (1) China will find it easier to advance its interests where U.S. and Chinese goals diverge, while (2) the United States’ ability to pursue its own interests in world affairs will be increasingly constrained by Chinese power. The remainder of this letter proceeds in four sections. First, I challenge Beckley’s definition of decline and emphasize the need to analyze the relative distribution of ca- pabilities when assessing the decline phenomenon. Using historical examples, I next demonstrate that the relative distribution of power better captures the ability of states to compete with one another. Subsequently, I show that the United States is declining relative to China across several measures of economic and military power. Finally, I propose that the United States’ relative decline suggests a different response to China’s rise, namely, U.S. retrenchment. DEFINING DECLINE AND MEASURING POWER In his article, Beckley does not define what he means by “decline.” He implies, how- ever, that decline occurs when the absolute difference in capabilities between two states falls (pp. 44-55). For example, Beckley states that it is “significant that the average Chi- nese citizen is more than $17,000 poorer relative to the average American than he was in 1991” (p. 59). Particularly important for Beckley is the difference in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and measures of technological sophistication: larger absolute differences between the United States and China in these indicators mean an economi- cally and militarily stronger United States (pp. 58—59, 63—65). This definition, however, sets an artificially high bar by which to assess decline, one that mischaracterizes the debate over American decline and makes limited theoretical sense. Instead, decline is better defined in terms of the relative distribution of economic and military capabili- ties between two great powers: decline occurs when one state’s economic and military capabilities increase at a faster rate than the other’s, such that the ratio of capabilities between the two falls. As such, it is more important for assessing the current distribu- tion of power that the ratio of American per capita GDP to Chinese per capita GDP fell from 67:1 in 1991 to 9:1 in 2011, than it is that the difference in per capita GDP rose from $37,300 in 1991 to $41,600 in 2011 (in constant 2010 dollars).° Few participants in the decline debate argue that China is likely to overtake the United States across all measures of economic and military power.3 More representative of mainstream views in the debate is the National Intelligence Council’s Global 2025 re- port, which argues, “Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength [...] will decline and US leverage will become more constrained. 4 In other words, the policy discussion centers on whether China’s growth is making it relatively harder for the United States to pursue its interests without other states opposing its actions—not whether the United States is losing out to China in absolute terms. Furthermore, for purposes of international relations theory, scholars usually distin- guish between decline as an absolute loss of power and decline as a relative loss of ca- pabilities.5 Many also assume that there is a threshold above which a state is a great power, defined as an actor with sufficient aggregate economic, military, technological, and geographic resources to influence others’ behavior on an international scale. De- cline occurs when a state above this threshold increases its capabilities at a faster rate than another state, such that the ratio of capabilities between the two shrinks. This change matters in two ways. First, the relative loss of capabilities between states A and B requires A to struggle to maintain its international position by improving economic performance or building military forces. Second, B’s improved capabilities make it more difficult for state A to challenge state B’s interests than had previously been the case-A is constrained by B’s growing power—while B can more readily compete with A if their interests conflict.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Author Indicts › Ikenberry

Ikenberry and liberal primacists are wrong about global leadership and China – the policy they promote is what drives China escalation in the first place

Shidore 21 – is the Director of Studies at the Quincy Institute, and is a senior non-resident fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks. His areas of research and analysis are geopolitical risk, grand strategy, and energy/climate security, with a special emphasis on Asia and a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc, 8/4/21 (Sarang, “Calling ‘liberal internationalism’ what it is: American primacy”, , accessed 6/23/22)//jd 

Deudney and Ikenberry greatly stress liberal primacy to achieve global economic equity and avert environmental catastrophe. However, under liberal primacy’s long innings in Washington, these challenges have only multiplied at home and abroad. The United States, under the major influence of primacists of all shades, did not by itself create all these problems. But its disproportionate power and wealth means that it is more responsible than any other single actor. Moreover, when liberal and other primacists make extraordinary claims of global leadership and explicitly seek to preserve unipolarity, they should also accept a corresponding level of responsibility for all that has gone wrong under their watch. Liberalism is also by no means necessarily tied to U.S. primacy. The work of scholars such as Stephen Wertheim (a co-founder of the Quincy Institute) and Michael Kazin has cogently highlighted a very different American internationalism in the pre-WW II era that opposed primacy in the long national tradition (notwithstanding a few exceptions) of staying away from foreign wars and advocating diplomacy to resolve disputes in extra-hemispheric conflicts. Nowhere do Deudney and Ikenberry seriously engage the core argument of restrainers of armed dominance detracting from domestic priorities and raising risks of regional and global conflict. Liberal primacists have belatedly come around to reducing (though not eliminating) the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East. But, as Quincy Institute president Andrew Bacevich has laid out, few lessons appear to have been learned from the Iraq war, which was not so much a “blunder” as a flagrant violation of international law and American values. Nearly two decades after that fateful step, primacists (liberal and otherwise) show little desire for accountability from actors who supported and executed this war ridden with illegal actions, a reluctance that severely undermines their justifications for prosecuting violations of other states. It is on China, however, that liberal primacists flirt with the greatest danger to the international order. A rising China is framed as a threat, predominantly due to its authoritarian system as also its recent actions in the region. Domestic and foreign policies of most states are indeed linked, but they may manifest in apparently inconsistent ways. For example, powerful, authoritarian states may not necessarily seek global conquest or even dominance (for example, China in the 15th century) just as major democratic states may disavow global hegemony (the United States itself from the late 19th century until World War II). Democratic powers may also empower tyranny, as was seen with Israel’s export of the cyber-weapon Pegasus to several authoritarian governments recently. Liberal primacy has a deterministic, inflated view of Chinese power and threat and little space for the major uncertainty in Chinese capabilities and intentions two or three decades in the future. Whereas Washington is stepping up on framing China in stark cold war-type language, much of the world, including many U.S. partners, has a much more nuanced viewpoint of the competition. The reluctance of Southeast Asia or treaty ally South Korea to join the U.S.-led Quad and the general lack of support across much of the world for the monochromatic view of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as an exploitative debt trap are two examples. Prominent Southeast Asian voices in particular are increasingly worried at the turn liberal primacists’ China strategy is taking. Whittling away at the time-tested One-China policy, over-militarization of relations with the Quad states, and aggressive, publicly announced military FONOPs close to the Chinese coast are only some of the ways in which liberal and other primacists are helping raise risks of great power conflict. China is not an existential threat to the United States. This is not to say that China’s excessive claims in the South China Sea, coercive pressure on U.S. partners including Taiwan and India, exploitative deep-sea fishing, cyber-attacks on the homeland, and certain trade practices should not be of major concern. But it takes two hands to clap. When it comes to China, liberal primacy’s reign in Washington feels as escalatory as the Trump era. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Author Indicts › Kagan

Robert Kagan is a warmonger and wrong about Ukraine

Bacevich 22 - is Professor Emeritus of International Relations and History at Boston University. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, and received his PhD in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, 4/13/22 (Andrew J, “Robert Kagan’s Selective Memory”, The American Conservative, , accessed 6/26/22)//jd 

In the pages of Foreign Affairs, the indefatigable Robert Kagan recently weighed in with yet another fervent appeal on behalf of empire. Ever the true-blue American, Kagan avoids using the offensive E-word, of course. He favors the term hegemony, which, he explains, is benign, involving neither domination nor exploitation but willing submission—“more a condition than a purpose.” Scratch the surface, however, and “The Price of Hegemony” offers a variation on Kagan’s standard theme: the imperative of militarized U.S. global primacy, whatever the price and with little regard for who pays. Few would charge Kagan with being a deep or original thinker. As a writer, he is less philosophe than pamphleteer, albeit one possessing a genuine gift for packaging. Recall, for example, his famous assertion that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” Once deemed to express a truth of Lippmannesque profundity, this warriors vs. wimps formulation has since lost much of its persuasive appeal, not least because the warriors, a.k.a. “the troops,” have not fared especially well when dispatched to liberate, pacify, or depose. So rather than being enshrined alongside Walter Lippmann, Kagan will likely share the fate of Scotty Reston or Joe Alsop, once prominent Washington-based columnists who are now totally forgotten. Of course, much the same fate awaits the entire gaggle of commentators (this writer included) who pontificate on America’s role in the world under the mistaken impression that senior officials in the White House, Foggy Bottom, or the Pentagon seek their counsel. Rarely do they do so. That said, Kagan stands out from the rest of the pack in one respect: His knack for combining consistency with flexibility is matchless. He is nothing if not nimble. Whatever may occur in the real world, he is ready with an explanation for how events affirm the indispensability of assertive American leadership. In Washington (and in the pages of Foreign Affairs), this is always a welcome conclusion. This nimbleness is vividly on display in his most recent essay, its subtitle posing this question: “Can America Learn to Use Its Power?” Kagan arrives at his own answer—the United States not only can learn but must—even as he ignores altogether what the vigorous expenditure of American power over the past two decades has achieved, and at what cost. So his essay contains various dark references to Russian misbehavior, along with a handful to objectionable actions by China. Perhaps inevitably, Kagan also throws in a few ominous allusions to Germany and Japan in the run up to World War II, in Washington circles the go-to source of authoritative historical instruction. As to post-9/11 U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, he is silent. They qualify for not a single mention—none, zero, null, nada. According to Kagan, the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War occurred at least in part due to American passivity. Successive post-Cold War U.S. administrations fell down on the job. Put simply, they did not exert themselves to keep Russia in check. While it would be “obscene to blame the United States for Putin’s inhumane attack on Ukraine,” Kagan writes, to “insist that the invasion was entirely unprovoked is misleading.” The United States had “played a strong hand poorly.” In doing so, it gave Vladimir Putin cause to think that he could get away with aggression. Thus did Washington—as if sitting on its hands during the first two decades of the present century—provoke Moscow. By “wielding U.S. influence more consistently and effectively,” presidents beginning with the elder Bush could have prevented the devastation that Ukrainians have suffered. From Kagan’s point of view, the United States has been too passive. Today, he writes, “the question is whether the United States will continue to make its own mistakes”—mistakes of inaction, in his view—“or whether Americans will learn, once again, that it is better to contain aggressive autocracies early, before they have built up a head of steam.” The reference to containing aggressive autocracies early requires decoding. Kagan is dissimulating. What he is actually proposing is further experiments with preventive war, which in the wake of 9/11 became the centerpiece of U.S. national security policy. Kagan, of course, supported the Bush Doctrine of preventive war. He was all in on invading Iraq. Implemented in 2003 in the form of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush Doctrine produced disastrous results. Now, even two decades later, Kagan cannot bring himself to acknowledge the grotesque immensity of that mistake, nor its side effects, to include the rise of Trumpism and all of its ancillary evils. “Can America Learn to Use Its Power?” That this rates as an urgent question is certainly the case. Yet to fancy that Robert Kagan possesses the qualifications to offer an intelligible answer is a delusion. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Author Prodicts › Prodict---Layne

Layne was right—US primacy failing new strategy is necessary

Nye 12 [Joseph S., "Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a “Post-American” World", OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/56/1/215/1940537?login=true// KS]

Where I suspect that Layne and I might agree is on the need for a new American strategy in a world marked by “the rise of the rest.” We should learn from the prudence of Dwight Eisenhower. The number-one power does not have to man every boundary and be strong everywhere. The attempt to do so would violate Ike's prudence in resisting direct intervention on the side of the French in Vietnam in 1954. Also relevant today is Ike's conviction that it is essential to preserve the strength of the American economy to undergird our military strength. Applied to today's world, an Ike-like strategy would avoid involvement of ground forces in major wars on the Asian continent, even if there was not a fiscal deficit. Counterinsurgency is attractive as a military doctrine in the way that it pays careful attention to the tactical balancing of hard and soft power, but in a strategic sense, it should not lead us into imperial occupation of weak states and “nation building” in places that are beyond our limits. The maxim of avoiding major land wars in Asia or other poor countries does not mean withdrawing a forward military presence from places like Japan and Korea, or ending military assistance of various types to countries like Pakistan or Egypt. Some analysts call this a strategy of “off-shore balancing,” but that term must mean more than just naval and air force activity. An American land presence that is welcome and supported by allies should not be ruled out by a slogan. Eisenhower also understood the limits of what is possible in terms of American domestic institutions and public attitudes. The British historian Niall Ferguson, an enthusiast for empire, lamented at the time of the Iraq War that the United States lacked the capacity for empire because of three domestic deficits: manpower (not enough boots on the ground); attention (not enough public support for long-term occupation); and financial (not enough savings and not enough taxation relative to public expenditure). He was correct. A stomach for empire or colonial occupation is one of the important ways in which American political culture differs from that of imperial Britain. Whether worthy of applause or lament, such are our domestic limits. At the same time, universalistic values are also in the nature of our political culture, but we often promote these values best by being what Ronald Reagan called “a shining city on a hill.” The global information age of the twenty-first century will be different from the past century and will require a better strategy than America used in the past decade, but it will not be a “post-American world.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Good › Multipolarity › Multipolarity is Peaceful

History proves that multipolarity is peaceful.

Patriota, 17

(Antonio de Aguiar, Brazilian ambassador to Italy, Malta and San Marino and permanent representative of Brazil to the United Nations from, Cooperative Multipolarity: Is the World Ready?, May, https://risingpowersproject.com/world-ready-cooperative-multipolarity/)

Historically, several situations provide useful lessons or insights for a world in transition such as ours. Two centuries ago a unipolar period came to an end and gave rise to a multipolarity of sorts, after the defeat of the Napoleonic army by the combined strength of Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia. At the Vienna Congress of 1815 a diplomatic effort aimed at reorganizing the European geopolitical landscape can be said to have brought about several decades of relative stability based on new forms of cooperation. The Concert of Europe was the precursor of the high-level conferences to which world leaders and diplomats have become accustomed. The Holy Alliance – though conservative in its objectives and repressive in its methods – could be considered a pioneer exercise in preserving peace. Equally noteworthy was the fact that France, although defeated in the battlefield, was not subjected to humiliating treatment by the victors.