Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Counterplan
2NC---LIO › 2NC---Uniqueness---LIO Unsustainable › 2NC---New Powers

Mearsheimer , PhD, 19

(John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He received his PhD in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He spent the 1979-1980 as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. Between 1998-1999 he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally and has published six books, written 4/1/2019, accessed 7/1/2022, “Bound to Fail The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order” https://mitp.silverchair-cdn.com/mitp/content_public/journal/isec/43/4/10.1162_isec_a_00342/5/isec_a_00342.pdf?Expires=1659722161&Signature=BBJ9TgEDByNGuRLQngMWu4iJwPlnZmIKEJRVokeo67Ys~XFw1~v0zJN2tCrQSKoRF8fKL0j3BuISb2BLVAM15GFeoVzrsZ0gvUS7mQyFss4WF8hQmplRzZKACs7rTFrLA-i-EoqD3r1aKXxdOOwIbDukhqY8b-ObC2jrbnmynXkfRBhsiVehD~8zewRppqKI-qpeuO3ZT-pfwTKz~n2ue~ufdbIi3oieZxQ~K3A-xTAj5KzfbwKsy6Spr8OZIpxBwoVvYmRhog~cr5m7vMz8lK1k8W-uS-mh4uPgLfEF8kExFRUyYs4HEK4orHdziXf0YCDcozvHOra-V-DMMakrsQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIE5G5CRDK6RD3PGA)//lexmw

Agnostic orders also tend to have substantial staying power, because the unipole accepts the heterogeneity that is inherent in political and social life and does not try to micromanage the politics of nearly every country on the planet. That kind of pragmatic behavior helps preserve, if not augment, the hegemon’s power. An agnostic order is likely to meet its end when unipolarity gives way to either bipolarity or multipolarity, making the order realist; or if the sole pole experiences a revolution at home and adopts a universalistic ideology, which would surely lead it to forge an ideological order. By contrast, any ideological international order based on a universalistic ideology, such as liberalism or communism, is destined to have a short life span, mainly because of the domestic and global difficulties that arise when the unipole seeks to remake the world in its own image. Nationalism and balance of power politics work to undermine the requisite social engineering in countries targeted for regime change, while nationalism also creates significant problems on the home front for the sole pole and its ideological allies. When such problems emerge, the unipole is likely to give up trying to remake the world in its own image, in effect abandoning its efforts to export its ideology abroad. It might even forsake that ideology altogether. When that happens, the order stops being ideological and becomes agnostic. An ideological order can also come to an end in a second way. New great powers could emerge, which would undermine unipolarity and lead to either a bipolar or a multipolar system. In that event, the ideological order would be replaced by bounded and international realist orders.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2NC---LIO › 2NC---Uniqueness---LIO Unsustainable › 2NC---Democratic Deficit

The democratic deficit and “mission creep” guarantee LIO collapse

Ignatieff, PhD, ’21 ( Michael, he received his doctorate in history from Harvard University, was the Edward R. Murrow Chair of Press, Politics, and Public Policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and is currently a professor of history at Central European university Vienna, leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and Leader of the Official Opposition from 2008 until 2011, published 12/6/21, access 7/5/22, “The Collapse of Liberal Internationalism”, https://www.persuasion.community/p/the-collapse-of-liberal-internationalism)//lexmw

Liberal internationalism promised to promote democracy and strengthen a “rules based international order” with other countries. Rather than turning inwards, it envisioned an active role for the West, as a champion of human rights abroad. But its signature projects, military intervention and nation-building, have failed in Afghanistan, just as they did in Syria and Libya. As a painful demonstration of the limits of American military might, liberal internationalism’s collapse has accelerated the decline of Washington’s global power too. What went wrong? At its heart, liberal internationalism suffered from a democratic deficit. It was a product of what the political scientist Stephen Walt has called “the blob”, the bipartisan foreign policy elite that dominated policymaking during the Cold War and beyond. But “the blob” forgot that power-projection overseas depended ultimately on the willingness of Americans to fight and pay for it. American domestic support, never robust anyway, drained away as body counts mounted in Afghanistan and the “forever war” blundered on without end. When divorced from the pursuit of vital American security interests, which might have carried the backing of the electorate, liberal internationalism degenerated into boutique virtue signaling, social work in places we understood poorly and had no essential reason to be in, anyway. Alongside its lack of domestic support, liberal internationalism suffered from a fatal case of “mission creep”—the tendency to expand objectives beyond their initial parameters. If the U.S. had limited its aims in Afghanistan to countering the terrorist threat and had withdrawn when the threat had been contained, military operations there would have served American vital interests and maintained sufficient domestic support. Instead, the U.S. and its allies let themselves be drawn into an objective—a stable and democratic Afghanistan—which was never realizable. Both the U.S. military and the international civil society that flooded in to “rebuild” Afghanistan failed to grasp the political canniness of their Taliban foe or confront the inveterate corruption of their Afghan political friends. American aid agencies and NGOs raised the hopes of their Afghan partners, and then, once the game was up, the United States abandoned them all. In the bleak clarity of hindsight, nation building in Afghanistan was worse than a mistake. It was a side-show. The main strategic challenge was China. Instead of developing a long-term strategy to deal with its first serious competitor since the end of the Cold War, America wasted time, money and lives on a peripheral enterprise that could only end in failure.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2NC---LIO › 2NC---Uniqueness---LIO Unsustainable › 2NC---Generic

Mearsheimer , PhD, 19

(, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He received his PhD in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He spent the 1979-1980 as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. Between 1998-1999 he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally and has published six books, written 4/1/2019, accessed 7/1/2022, “Bound to Fail The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order” https://mitp.silverchair-cdn.com/mitp/content_public/journal/isec/43/4/10.1162_isec_a_00342/5/isec_a_00342.pdf?Expires=1659722161&Signature=BBJ9TgEDByNGuRLQngMWu4iJwPlnZmIKEJRVokeo67Ys~XFw1~v0zJN2tCrQSKoRF8fKL0j3BuISb2BLVAM15GFeoVzrsZ0gvUS7mQyFss4WF8hQmplRzZKACs7rTFrLA-i-EoqD3r1aKXxdOOwIbDukhqY8b-ObC2jrbnmynXkfRBhsiVehD~8zewRppqKI-qpeuO3ZT-pfwTKz~n2ue~ufdbIi3oieZxQ~K3A-xTAj5KzfbwKsy6Spr8OZIpxBwoVvYmRhog~cr5m7vMz8lK1k8W-uS-mh4uPgLfEF8kExFRUyYs4HEK4orHdziXf0YCDcozvHOra-V-DMMakrsQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIE5G5CRDK6RD3PGA)//lexmw

The attempt by the United States and its allies to create a liberal international order faced three main problems. First, it required the liberal states in the system, especially the United States, to pursue a highly revisionist and wildly ambitious policy of regime change that was almost certain to fail in an era in which nationalism, with its emphasis on sovereignty and selfdetermination, remains a remarkably powerful force. The policy was also stymied by balance of power politics at both the global and regional levels. Second, by pushing for the free movement of people across borders and the delegation of substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions, the expanding liberal order caused significant political problems inside the liberal states themselves. The results often clashed with beliefs about national identity and sovereignty, which matter greatly to most citizens in modern nation-states. Third, although some people and countries benefited from hyperglobalization, it ultimately caused major economic and political problems inside the liberal democracies, which eventually led to a serious erosion of support for the liberal international order. At the same time, the economic dynamism that comes with hyperglobalization helped China rapidly turn itself into a great power at roughly the same time Russia was reestablishing itself as a great power. That shift in the global balance of power put an end to unipolarity, which is a prerequisite for a liberal world order. In the emerging multipolar world, there is likely to be a realist international order that will be concerned with managing the world economy and also fostering and maintaining arms control agreements. The emphasis in that order will be on facilitating interstate cooperation. In addition, there are likely to be Chinese-led and U.S.-led bounded orders that will help prosecute the security competition that is almost certain to arise between China and its allies, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies, on the other. That rivalry will have both economic and military dimensions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
2NC---LIO › 2NC---Uniqueness---LIO Unsustainable › 2NC---Generic

Mearsheimer , PhD, 19

(, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He received his PhD in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He spent the 1979-1980 as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. Between 1998-1999 he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally and has published six books, written 4/1/2019, accessed 7/1/2022, “Bound to Fail The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order” https://mitp.silverchair-cdn.com/mitp/content_public/journal/isec/43/4/10.1162_isec_a_00342/5/isec_a_00342.pdf?Expires=1659722161&Signature=BBJ9TgEDByNGuRLQngMWu4iJwPlnZmIKEJRVokeo67Ys~XFw1~v0zJN2tCrQSKoRF8fKL0j3BuISb2BLVAM15GFeoVzrsZ0gvUS7mQyFss4WF8hQmplRzZKACs7rTFrLA-i-EoqD3r1aKXxdOOwIbDukhqY8b-ObC2jrbnmynXkfRBhsiVehD~8zewRppqKI-qpeuO3ZT-pfwTKz~n2ue~ufdbIi3oieZxQ~K3A-xTAj5KzfbwKsy6Spr8OZIpxBwoVvYmRhog~cr5m7vMz8lK1k8W-uS-mh4uPgLfEF8kExFRUyYs4HEK4orHdziXf0YCDcozvHOra-V-DMMakrsQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIE5G5CRDK6RD3PGA)//lexmw

The early successes of the United States and its allies in building a liberal international order notwithstanding, the order contained the seeds of its own ruin. Even if Western policymakers had been wiser stewards of that order, they could not have extended its longevity in any meaningful way. It was doomed to fail because it contained three fatal flaws. First, intervening in the politics of countries to turn them into liberal democracies is extremely difficult, and attempting such ambitious social engineering on a global scale is virtually guaranteed to backfire and undermine the legitimacy of the enterprise itself. Nationalism is almost certain to cause significant resistance inside the countries targeted for regime change. Balance of power politics will also help impede the enterprise in particular cases. States that fear regime change—or other forms of U.S. interference—will band together for mutual support and seek ways to thwart the United States’ liberal agenda. Thus, Syria and Iran aided the Iraqi insurgency after the 2003 U.S. invasion, and Russia and China have backed each other economically, militarily, and within international forums such as the UN Security Council. Second, the liberal international order ultimately creates conditions that lead to serious political problems regarding sovereignty and national identity within the liberal democracies themselves, and all the more so when efforts at regime change fail and produce large-scale refugee flows into liberal countries. Again, the principal cause of the problem is nationalism, which is far from dead even in avowedly liberal societies. Third, hyperglobalization has produced significant economic costs for large numbers of people inside the liberal democracies, including the sole pole. Those costs, including lost jobs, declining or stagnant wages, and marked income inequality, have serious domestic political consequences, which further undermine the liberal international order. Moreover, the open international economy helped fuel the rise of China, which, along with Russia’s revival, eventually undermined unipolarity, an essential condition for creating a liberal international order.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Iran Prolif

Iran won’t cooperate on proliferation until US heg decreases.

Batrawy 21, Mideast Correspondent at Associated Press, former producer for The New Arab Debates, former senior correspondent for Mideast at German Press Agency, former Adjuct Journalism Professor at American University in Cairo, B.A. from University of South Florida, M.A. from SOAS University of London, 9-22-2021, (Aya, “Iran’s president slams US in first speech to UN as leader," AP NEWS, , kav)

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Iran’s new president slammed U.S. sanctions imposed on his nation as a mechanism of war, using his first U.N address since his swearing-in to forcefully call out Washington’s policies in the region and the growing political schism within America.

President Ebrahim Raisi on Tuesday delivered a far more critical and blunt take on American foreign policy than his moderate predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, had done in previous speeches to the U.N. General Assembly. Raisi, who was sworn in last month after an election, is a conservative cleric and former judiciary chief seen as close to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Conflict

Hegemony threatens US problem solving policy

Ward and Wertheim 20 Alex is a reporter covering the White House, with a focus on foreign policy and national security, PhD, MPhil, MA; History; Columbia University, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Alex Ward Interviewing Stephen Wertheim,”How military superiority made America less safe”, Vox, //KS) 

Far from contributing to American security, the plan of global military superiority has made America — and Americans — less safe. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Conflict

Only hegemonic restraint can prevent conflict – its key to alliances

Mallet 21 – is a PhD Candidate at the University of Surrey’s politics department, 2/15/21 (Ellis, “Not Your Grandparents’ Grand Strategy: Rethinking Liberal Hegemony”, U.S. Studies Online, , accessed 6/26/22)//jd 

Liberal internationalism as a grand strategic paradigm has created a resistance to— or perhaps more bluntly, a rejection of—a realist balance of power thinking. As such, the advancement of a liberal international order has led to discrepancies between American power and the resources available to it. The ‘shining city upon a hill’ finds itself increasingly overstretched through its involvement in endless Middle Eastern wars, its self-proclaimed duty to promote democracy abroad, the reality of a resurgent Russia and China, and global democratic relapsing, all in the face of domestic turmoil at home. A strategy of liberal internationalism has resulted in a costly foreign policy approach in which freedom and liberty have become the linchpin of American creed. Rallying against this conventional wisdom, Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy aimed to repudiate some of the core tenets of liberal internationalism and implicitly rejected the United States’ role as ‘world policeman’. His administration confronted American allies as ‘free-riders’, entered negotiations with adversaries without preconditions and showed hostility towards free trade and international cooperation. This is not to say Trump had a coherent or effective foreign policy, or that he completely abandoned the use of military force and steered away from a goal of regime change—quite the opposite—but his condemnation of the narrow Washington consensus provided a unique opportunity for American policy elites to question the underlying logic of its traditional trajectory. Nevertheless, President Joe Biden has committed not only to rebuilding America, but also to “building back better”. While the new administration is likely to pursue a rigorous restoration of American exceptionalism and liberal internationalism, a return to the pre-Trump status quo ante is not likely to improve US foreign policy in a way that is able to effectively address the contemporary challenges it faces today. The prevailing path-dependencies that exist around the forward leaning military posture in which the United States must attempt to tackle tyranny all over the world is one of the biggest problems in American foreign policy. The alliance structures and force postures of the bygone Cold War era are incompatible with emerging shifts in the global balance of power. The Biden administration must steer away from the inclination to conflate global leadership with military force and it must refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of others to its own detriment. America no longer enjoys unfettered unipolar primacy and can therefore no longer rely on business-as-usual policies that are ill-suited to the complexities of the 21st century. It is precisely the preponderant power of the United States that has accelerated the process of its own relative decline whereby excessive military adventurism has resulted in an inability to distinguish between vital national security interests and those things that America can live without. By seeking to restore American primacy, President Biden is likely to miss the opportunity to build a more constructive, less militarised foreign policy that is better suited to the world America finds itself in today. Where America must go from here After four years of Trumpism, if the Biden administration wants to successfully begin the task of self-restoration at home, it should practice restraint abroad. The United States is not in danger of conquest; thus, US territorial integrity is secure. As such, a grand strategy of restraint would force policy elites to rethink its assessment of the national interest based on the reality that presents itself as opposed to being founded upon idealistic ambition. Broadly, restraint seeks to revise existing alliance structures and to encourage responsibility among them in order to shift regional defence burdens away from the United States. It emphasizes the danger of threat inflation, reduces existing US defence commitments and minimizes the forward-deployment of troops along with the frequent use of force. In particular, it would see a reduction of investment in the Middle East and a careful withdrawal of troops; a shifting of defence burdens to allies in Europe as a result of reduced US commitments in the region and an end to NATO expansion; and the maintenance of a stable balance of power in Asia, namely achieved through alliance commitments. Restraint drives home the point that the United States is not here to come to the rescue as has often been assumed—it must rely on regional actors to maintain regional balances of power and intervene only when American national interest is at stake, using military force as a very last resort. The results of such a grand strategy would see global tensions eased, direct threats to American personnel reduced, the burden on US forces in regions of peripheral interest lessened, progress on areas of mutual concern come to fruition, and, perhaps most importantly, it will allow the new administration to more effectively combat the coronavirus pandemic and allow for a degree of economic recovery. Supporters of liberal hegemony wrongly conflate a grand strategy of restraint with isolationist tendencies which is, in part, why it has existed on the margins of an acceptable elite opinion. But restraint in no way advocates that the United States should retrench entirely from the global stage—military power still remains central to US national security—it merely suggests that America has the ability and opportunity to preserve its security at a lesser cost than that of liberal internationalism. Restoring the foreign policy toolkit to focus on creative diplomacy, international institutions and cooperative engagement to deal with collective threats should be coupled with a demilitarisation of US foreign policy. Such a strategy requires a self-control that recognises not everything and anything is in the interest of the United States. Overall, a grand strategy of restraint would reject the need for global hegemony and refute the idea that a safe world is only one that is remade in America’s image 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Conflict

U.S. heg fuels unnecessary conflict by creating tensions with and intimidating other nations

Kelly 19 [6 Aug 2019, Kelly, Robert E., Robert E Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University., “US foreign policy: restraint without retrenchment”, The Interpreter, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-foreign-policy-restraint-without-retrenchment]//AA

US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has come under growing criticism for its expansive, even aggressive, character. Despite its name, “liberal hegemony” often seems illiberal, belligerent, even militaristic. The US has used force regularly over the last 30 years, often with dubious results. Iraq 2003 is the most obvious example, but Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and (through its Saudi proxy) Yemen also spring to mind. The current US President Donald Trump has also threatened force against North Korea, Venezuela, and Iran. In response to these excesses, a clutch of realist critics have argued variously for restraint or retrenchment – Barry Posen, Daniel Larison, and Stephen Walt immediately spring to mind. I found this H-Diplo review of Walt’s recent book nicely summarises the issues at hand. The primary argument is that the United States does far too much overseas, especially when it does not need to. The US faces no existential threats. Its geography – its distance from the contentious theatres of Eurasia – is generous. It is the wealthiest country in the world, with an unmatched military. Before the First World War, it restricted itself mostly to the Western hemisphere. Its expansion in the 20th century was driven by threats emanating from Eurasia, first fascism, then communism. Yet since the “end of history” and the dissipation of those threats in 1989, there has been no pull-back. Instead, the US has been ever more sucked into places around the world. This expansion produces unnecessary tension with China, Russia, and the Islamic world. Worse, the US now fights more often than it did during the Cold War. These interventions often take far longer than the public is led to expect. They kill far more people and cost far more money than admitted. At home, a massive national security state has emerged, confirming President Dwight Eisenhower’s famous warning of the “military-industrial complex”. US military interventions have often taken far longer than the public is led to expect (Photo: US Central Command/Flickr) The policy response to this sprawl is some mix of retrenchment and restraint. A US grand strategy of “offshore balancing” would husband American resources at home. Intervention would only occur when facing a genuine hegemonic challenger – most obviously China. But the “small wars” which have characterised US intervention in recent decades would stop, for we now know that they do not stay small. Diplomacy would be properly funded; US foreign policy would be de-militarised. Multilateralism and international organisations would be given a chance where the US today disdains them. From an American point of view, it is hard to argue with a lot of this. The country is pretty clearly exhausted with “forever wars” such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Trump openly ran against “dumb wars” in America’s traditionally hawkish party and still won easily. That is a powerful signal for change from the public. It is also hard to see wars with Iran, Venezeula, or North Korea staying “regional contingencies”, because as with other US ground conflicts, they would almost certainly explode in size and duration. Similarly, it is hard to argue against US allies doing more. US presidents have complained for decades about allied free-, or more accurately cheap-, riding. Trump has unfortunately tarnished this concern with his otherwise reprehensible conduct, but the notion of a more balanced, less hegemonic American alliance network is rather appealing. So restraint – fewer wars, less “omni-directional belligerence”, more diplomacy – is not too controversial. I imagine most US allies would actually like this, too. Many US partners were dismayed at getting chain-ganged into the Iraq war, for example, agreeing to it only to retain US friendship. Similarly, Trump was nearly alone in pushing for war with North Korea in 2017. Donald Trump openly ran against “dumb wars” (Photo: US Central Command/Flickr) It is important to distinguish this restraint from retrenchment though, which I do not think this literature does well. Restraint ultimately means better US judgment – less paranoia, less worst-case-scenario thinking, less willingness to describe every unfriendly government or far-off region as “strategic” to the US, less activism and jumpiness. No one disagrees with greater US perspicacity, except perhaps America’s most irresponsible partners such as the Saudi royals or Israel’s Likud party. Give a child a hammer, and everything is an upraised nail – give a superpower a massive military and global basing, and threats become an easy recourse. Retrenchment is more than this though. It is actual withdrawal of US forces back to the Western hemisphere from forward bases in Eurasia, specifically from Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia. Given China’s rise however, retrenchment would like fall on Europe and the Middle East first. Europe, most observers would agree, has the wealth and state strength to do far more for its own security, while US policing of the Middle East is simply beyond even its superpower reach. Restrainers’ argument for retrenchment is temptation. It is formally possible, as I am arguing, that US forces could stay forward – that is, in Eurasia – without fighting more unnecessary wars. But as long as they are there, as long as there are US forces near countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, it will be hugely tempting for US policy-makers to militarily threaten those states. This is akin to the “law of the hammer” – give a child a hammer, and everything is an upraised nail. Give a superpower a massive military and global basing, and threats become an easy recourse. A full-blooded restraint argument would claim greater US foreign policy discipline is possible only when the US is physically out of the way. Ideally though, the US could stay where it was wanted – eastern Europe, Australia, South Korea, Japan – without actually leaping therefrom into wars. The advantages of staying forward are clear. US presence bolsters alliances. It helps solidify liberal democracy in places which might otherwise backslide. It builds democratic solidarity around the world among otherwise disparate states to push back concertedly on authoritarians such as Russia or China. It builds interoperability with local partners should future military needs arise and gives the US a location from which to operate should local geopolitics worsen. Even a small US presence can reinforce positive trends, such as democratisation or the deterrence of Sino-Russian meddling, without, hopefully, being large enough to invoke the law of the hammer. And the financial assistance from allies could offset the cost of US forward stationing. In South Korea and Japan, the US, Japanese, and South Korean governments frequently repeat that is actually cheaper to keep US forces there than bring them home. Allied support, plus the costs to the US to build new facilities back in the US, offsets the expense – although hard data to substantiate these claims is not forthcoming. Eastern Europe is an obvious example. US retrenchment from Europe would almost certainly encourage more Russian meddling from Vladimir Putin and worsen democratic backsliding in those new democracies. Those would be moral and strategic costs to the United States. In response, could the US keep a small local presence that both provides the “reinforcement effects” described above without so much combat power as to encourage unnecessary war-making? Can we have restraint without full-blown retrenchment? Or would even small US presences encourage so much allied free-riding or intervention temptation that they are not worth it? “Places not bases”, in which the US retains “lily pads” for possible operations in the future without large contingents of men and material, are one possibility to square this circle.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Econ

Ending US led hegemony would benefit the world’s economy-Alternative currencies like China’s foster prosperity

Moak 19 {Ken Moak, taught economic theory, public policy and globalization at the university level for 33 years. He co-authored a book titled "China's Economic Rise and Its Global Impact". “Why ending U.S. dollar hegemony would benefit the world” , 1LEE & //KS}

Since World War II, the U.S. dollar has become the world's unchallenged reserve currency. The monetary functions literally affords the U.S. the ability to print and spend as much money as it wants without repercussions. If a state wants to "cash in" its U.S. dollar dominated financial assets (i.e. the U.S. Treasury), all America has to do is print the Treasury's face value. In short, U.S. dollar hegemony is the source of American hegemony, because money is power, affording America the ability to build as many weapons as it wants and buy influence around the world. With an "endless" supply of money, the U.S. could likewise enjoy "unlimited" power over other countries.

However, the U.S. has been misusing, if not abusing the privilege, using it to build a formidable military force in enforcing in maintaining American supremacy. Any nation – Iran, the DPRK, China and Russia, etc. – seen as a threat to its global hegemony would be threatened with military force or sanctions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Econ

Focusing on hegemony diverts attention away from the economy

Jackson 2/12/22 {Van Jackson is a professor of international relations at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand. Before entering academia, Van was a foreign policy practitioner, working as a strategist and policy adviser in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration Van Jackson, “The Threat to Economic Hegemony is Economic Hegemony: Part II”, Duck of Minerva, //KS}

For one thing, I think the popular impression of America as the world’s economic hegemon is overstated. Yes, the United States has many economic advantages. Its domestic market is still the destination of choice for manufacturing exports. It has the world’s reserve currency (which means it enjoys the “exorbitant privilege” of running crazy deficits). It has veto rights at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (which it shouldn’t have, but that’s a separate argument). And it has unique control over the “pipes” of the international financial system.

But in Asia — the world’s wealthiest and most populous region — China established economic centrality years ago. America’s economic throw-weight in Asia is far less than China’s, in part because of trade volume, but also because America’s large investments in Asia are not state-backed or centrally coordinated, which makes them somewhat un-leverageable. And US exclusion from Asia’s dense financial architecture makes it likely that things will continue trending in that direction. That means what’s going on is the economic equivalent of “uni-multipolarity” or “multi-multipolarity” — system level hegemony, perhaps, but regional level contested hierarchy for sure.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Econ

Hegemonic commitments cause economic decline

Norrlof 17 [17 July 2017, Norrlof, Carla, Carla Norrlöf is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, a Senior Fellow of Massey College and a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council. Her research is on theories of international cooperation with a special focus on great powers particularly US hegemony in the areas of money, trade and security., “Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Unipolarity: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Hegemonic Order Studies”, Politics, ]//AA

The negative economic consequences of America’s ambitious foreign policy objectives were echoed by prominent voices (Calleo, 1982; Kennedy, 1987). Providing a stable and secure environment was seen as especially damaging to the hegemonic power because it allowed others to divert resources to economically profitable activities. The financial implications of security commitments formed the backbone of Kennedy’s “military overstretch” hypothesis (Kennedy, 1987). Kennedy posited negative feedback between hegemonic commitments and the economy. Specifically, he argued that the military spending required to finance security guarantees drains the economy and reduces the resource base to fund overseas engagements in a downward spiral, putting hegemony at risk. Security scholars started worrying about the “Lippmann gap”—the political stalemate resulting from the difference between America’s increasingly broad commitments and its means to fulfill those commitments (Lippmann, 1943). Perspectives on whether U.S. security undertakings entail economic burdens that undermine long-term economic prospects, and eventually U.S. hegemony, figure prominently in the debate. In discussions of U.S. grand strategy, authors argue that the military spending needed to finance America’s security engagements is economically debilitating, thus driving debt and decline (Drezner, 2013; Gholz, Press, & Sapolsky, 1997; Layne, 1997, 2002; MacDonald & Parent, 2011; Pape, 2009; Posen, 2007; Posen & Ross, 1996; Schweller, 2014; Walt, 2005, 2011; Williams, 2016). This near consensus view has produced massive support for a diminished U.S. role, with a minority questioning the theory and evidence informing a reorientation of U.S. hegemony (Brooks, Ikenberry, & Wohlforth, 2013; Brooks & Wohlforth, 2016; Norrlof & Wohlforth, 2016; Nye, 1995).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Iran War

Hegemonic pressure makes conflict with Iran more likley – economy and prolif

Parsi 20 - has a Ph.D. in foreign policy from John Hopkins University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from Uppsala University and a Master’s Degree in Economics from the Stockholm School of Economics. He has served as an adjunct professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University SAIS, New York University, and George Washington University, as well as an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and as a Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC. He currently teaches at Georgetown University in Washington DC, 4/30/20. (Trita, “Trump Can Either Leave the Middle East or Have War With Iran”, Real Clear Defense, , accessed 7/5/22)//jd

“Everybody who has touched the Middle East has gotten bogged down.” Candidate Donald Trump rightly pointed this out in October 2015 as he laid out his vision for a foreign policy that would end America’s forever wars and extract America from its Mideast quagmires. Trump not only tapped into public anger toward Washington’s indifference to the American people’s pain and suffering, but he also pointed to America’s indisputable interest in ending misguided foreign adventures and refocus on domestic needs. President Trump, however, speaks of leaving the region while doing precious little about it. Nowhere has his policy contradicted his promise to get out of the Middle East more than his maximum pressure strategy on Iran. “Our brave troops have now been fighting in the Middle East for almost 19 years,” Trump complained in his State of the Union address in February 2019. "In Afghanistan and Iraq, nearly 7,000 American heroes have given their lives. More than 52,000 Americans have been badly wounded. We have spent more than $7 trillion in the Middle East... As a candidate for President, I pledged a new approach. Great nations do not fight endless wars." On this, Trump is right. The United States has spent trillions of dollars maintaining military dominance in the Middle East while often fighting other countries’ wars for them. It has done so in the name of establishing stability in the region and security for America. Neither of those objectives has been achieved. U.S. interventions in the Middle East have destabilized the region while incentivizing U.S. allies to forego regional diplomacy and instead spend lobbying dollars in Washington to convince the United States to fight their wars for them. In the meantime, the trillions of dollars spent on weapons systems have left the American people naked and vulnerable to far more likely non-military threats such as COVID-19. Mindful of the dwindling importance of Middle East oil to the U.S. and the U.S.’s lack of resources and expertise to “fix” dysfunctional states in that region, the cost-benefit analysis of retaining military hegemony in the Middle East no longer makes sense. As Trump correctly quipped last year, “Let someone else fight over this long-bloodstained sand.” As a Presidential candidate, Trump often pointed to the alternative cost of America’s Middle East wars. "We've spent $4 trillion trying to topple various people that, frankly, if they were there and if we could have spent that $4 trillion in the United States to fix our roads, our bridges, and all of the other problems — our airports and all the other problems we have — we would have been a lot better off,” Trump argued back in 2015. The American public - and Trump’s base in particular - continue to share these views. A survey of Trump voter attitudes by The Tarrance Group last month revealed that 86% of his base support pulling out of Syria while 58% want troops to leave Iraq as well. An overwhelming majority (66%) prefer diplomacy with Iran, and only 25% favor war with the country. This is why Trump's policy on Iran is so baffling. True, Trump has not ended any of the endless wars thus far. His agreement with the Taliban will likely only bring down U.S. troop levels to Trump’s own pre-surge levels. In Iraq, the government asked the U.S. to leave, and instead of treating it as an opportunity to bring the troops home, Trump rejected the request and even threatened to sanction Iraq. On Iran, however, Trump has not only failed to end confrontational policies - he has actively pursued a path that has put the U.S. on the verge of a new war in the Middle East. The policy of maximum pressure has inflicted massive pain on the Iranian economy - its GDP had contracted more than 15% even before the COVID pandemic. Yet, three years after reimposing sanctions, Trump has not only failed to achieve a single one of his objectives, in most cases, Tehran has intensified the very policies Washington has sought to change. Maximum pressure has not compelled Iran to end uranium enrichment. Instead, Iran has expanded its nuclear activities. It has not ended its ballistic missile program, rather, Tehran has continued and intensified its ballistic missile testing as well as its support for allied groups in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen. Nor did the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, arguably Iran’s most important military commander, “deter Iran from conducting or supporting further attacks against United States forces and interests.” In the past few weeks, we have seen more attacks against U.S. troops in Iraq, including several deaths, prompting Trump to issue a threat of war over Twitter on April 1, 2020. Not surprising, the logical conclusion of economic warfare is military warfare. Rather than securing Iran’s capitulation, maximum pressure has drawn the U.S. closer to yet another war in a region Trump had promised to leave. None of this is to deny that Iran positions itself as an enemy of the United States, that it has targetted U.S. troops, or that it is entangled in a rivalry with the United States for influence in the Middle East. But so are the Taliban. And for the sake of the higher goal of extracting the U.S. from Mideast quagmires, Trump rightfully moved to bury the hatchet with the Taliban in order to bring U.S. servicemen and women home. On Iran, Trump has done the opposite even though discarding the reckless rivalry with Tehran is a critical step towards withdrawing from the Middle East. Indeed, why engage in a rivalry for the control of a region you don’t want to control - particularly when the accusations of Iran seeking hegemony in the Middle East are questionable at best and advanced by the very same U.S. “allies” who have their own beef with Tehran and need the U.S. to be entrapped in the region so that it will be forced to fight the Iranians. As former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates said, the Saudis want to fight the Iranians till the last American. Reality is that all of Trump’s promises to free America from its Mideast misadventures will come to naught if he continues his economic warfare against Iran. He can either leave the region or have war with Iran. He can’t have both.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Iran War

Only retrenchment can avoid war with Iran and promote diplomacy

Parsi 21 - has a Ph.D. in foreign policy from John Hopkins University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from Uppsala University and a Master’s Degree in Economics from the Stockholm School of Economics. He has served as an adjunct professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University SAIS, New York University, and George Washington University, as well as an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and as a Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC. He currently teaches at Georgetown University in Washington DC, 1/21/21. (Trita, “Toward an Inclusive Security Arrangement in the Persian Gulf”, The Quincy Institute, https://quincyinst.org/2021/01/21/toward-an-inclusive-security-arrangement-in-the-persian-gulf/, accessed 7/5/22)//jd

Pax Americana vs. inclusive security While Washington warms to the idea of an inclusive security dialogue, circumstances in the region remain problematic. Though the conditions and norms necessary to make a security arrangement successful and durable are largely missing, most of these cannot be expected to exist prior to constructing this architecture. Instead, they will come into existence through the deliberations that establish the new security arrangement. For instance, norms such as noninterference in other states’ internal affairs, or a taboo against the pursuit of regime-change in neighboring countries, are notoriously weak in the Middle East. Similarly, virtually all major powers in the region engage in funding and supporting armed nonstate actors in other countries, though few as extensively and successfully as Iran. The strengthening of norms of noninterference cannot constitute preconditions for the pursuit of a new security architecture. Instead, the adoption and strengthening of these norms should be on the agenda, together with mechanisms to regulate and limit military buildups and expenditures, as the security arrangement is negotiated. Such an arms control component of the agreement would have to address ballistic missile programs as well as the use of paramilitary groups. Other necessary changes in the conduct of Persian Gulf states do not pertain to particular activities but rather to the very conception of security and the principles for ordering the region. A common perspective in Riyadh and the United Arab Emirates is to divide the region between Arab and non–Arab states. Statements critical of Iran and Turkey often focus on their alleged interference in Arab affairs. “The Turkish interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries is a clear example of negative interference in the region,” the UAE’s foreign minister, Anwar Gargash, recently charged.[17] The Saudi foreign minister, Ibrahim al–Assaf, and other Saudi officials regularly make similar charges about Iran. “One of the most dangerous forms of terrorism and extremism is what Iran practices through its blatant interference in Arab affairs,” al–Assaf told the Arab League in 2019.[18] The emphasis on Arab affairs may appear benign but has profound implications. It suggests that Saudi Arabia — which kidnapped, Saad al–Hariri, the Lebanese prime minister, in 2017, has contributed in Yemen to what the United Nations considers the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, intervened militarily in Bahrain to crack down on dissidents, and was on the verge of invading Qatar to overthrow its government — can engage in these activities legitimately by virtue of its ethnic Arab makeup.[19] At the same time, Turkey and Iran are, by definition, rendered illegitimate actors by virtue of their non–Arab composition. (Going forward, Riyadh may have to make an exception for Israel, which otherwise would fall into the same category as Turkey and Iran.) Under this mindset, a shared history, cultural ties, borders, and trade do not provide avenues for influence (positive or negative) — only the ethnic identity of the state does. While such a racist division of the region may serve Saudi Arabia’s bid for regional leadership by disqualifying its non–Arab rivals by default, the refusal to recognize the legitimacy of other states based on ethnicity is not conducive to the creation of an inclusive security arrangement. Iran’s refusal to recognize Israel presents a similar dilemma. These conceptions add to a reluctance among some Persian Gulf states to support an inclusive security architecture for the region. For many of these states, the continuation of Pax Americana offers a far more attractive option: The United States tips the regional balance in their favor, affords them a security umbrella, contains and weakens their regional rivals, obviates any need for compromise with their regional foes — and, all the while, hands the bill to the American taxpayer. In the words of Robert Gates, the former U.S. defense secretary, the Saudis want to “fight the Iranians to the last American.”[20] Binding the United States to their own security and political ambitions has, as a result, been imperative. These states watch with trepidation the shifting of political winds in Washington away from the United States acting as a world policeman and sustaining an infrastructure of more than 800 military bases and facilities worldwide. “Bringing the troops home” is equivalent to a call to abandon America’s Persian Gulf security partners, in their view. Their harsh reactions to any sign or measure that could conceivably weaken Washington’s commitment to their security and ambitions are revealing. Saudi Arabia and the UAE (along with Israel) viewed the 2015 Iran nuclear accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, less as an arms control agreement and more as a measure that would allow the United States to pivot to Asia and cease its three-decades-old role as a counterbalance to Iranian power. American officials were baffled to hear some Arab officials view the agreement as a first step toward abandoning the Sunni states of the Persian Gulf in favor of a renewed U.S.–Iran alliance, akin to what existed during the time of the shah. After all, the agreement would end Iran’s political and economic isolation and terminate Washington’s policy of containing Iran, all the while facilitating an American military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. The details of the nuclear agreement were not their primary concern. In the words of Michael Morell, acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President Obama: “If I was going to put my finger on the single most important factor that explains the largest number of actions that are taking place in the region today, it is the widespread perception of American withdrawal.”[21] These Saudi, Emirati, and Israeli fears have not been limited to the presidency of Barack Obama, under whose watch the JCPOA was negotiated and concluded. President Trump, who took American deference toward these autocratic regimes to new levels, further intensified nervousness in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi about America’s commitment to their security. Two events in the summer and fall of 2019 confirmed their fears. Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising diplomatic options they had earlier shunned. After a tense summer with mysterious attacks against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, most likely at the hand of Iran, Tehran shot down an American spy plane it claimed had entered its airspace. At first, Trump approved retaliatory strikes against targets in Iran, but he reversed his order at the last moment and instead directed a cyberattack against Iran. The reversal stunned the world as well as America’s security partners in the region. John Bolton, the hawkish U.S. national security advisor and ardent supporter of war with Iran, was devastated by Trump’s decision.[22] Three months later, a spectacular drone attack against Saudi refineries in Abqaiq and Khurais, in the eastern part of the country, disrupted more than half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production for several weeks. Though a U.N. investigation could not confirm Iran’s involvement in the attack, Saudi officials had no doubt about the culprit’s identity. They expected the United States to come to their defense.[23] Once again, Trump showed little interest in starting a war with Iran on behalf of the Saudis, causing Middle East officials and much of the Washington foreign policy establishment alike to accuse him of having abandoned the Carter Doctrine.[24] Rather than the Middle East descending into chaos, as proponents of Pax Americana had predicted, Persian Gulf states began exploring regional diplomacy.[25] Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising diplomatic options they had earlier shunned. Saudi officials quietly reached out to Iran via intermediaries seeking ways to ease tensions. Tehran, in turn, floated a peace plan based on a mutual Iranian–Saudi pledge of nonaggression. Riyadh also stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen to ease tensions with their backer, Iran.[26] Abu Dhabi went even further. The UAE started withdrawing troops from Yemen and opened direct talks with Tehran over maritime security. It even released $700 million in funds to Iran in contradiction to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy.[27] While the calculation behind these measures might have been tactical, it is nevertheless noteworthy that as the United States showed military restraint, its erstwhile allies tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to reverse their rejection of diplomacy because they could no longer presume they operated under the protection of the United States. With the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, however, the pendulum once again swung in the direction of confrontation and away from diplomacy, courtesy of American military intervention. These developments suggest that Saudi and Emirati opposition to an inclusive regional dialogue can be allayed. As long as the United States remains committed to intervening in the region militarily, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi tend to prefer an aggressive posture intended to direct U.S. power toward weakening and defeating Iran. Once Washington convincingly demonstrates its disinclination to get involved in an armed confrontation with Tehran, the Saudis and Emiratis adjust accordingly and begin exploring diplomacy to secure their interests through more peaceful coexistence with their northern rival. Consequently, openness to and readiness for an inclusive security architecture is likely to emerge only when the United States clearly has abandoned all ambitions to dominate the Persian Gulf. Sullivan and Benaim recognize this as well and view it as an opportunity. The realization that the Americans are “not going to be our saviors” is compelling Saudi Arabia and the UAE to take regional diplomacy much more seriously and “to take matters into their own hands to a more significant degree,” according to Sullivan.[28] As long as the United States remains committed to intervening in the region militarily, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi tend to prefer an aggressive posture intended to direct U.S. power toward weakening and defeating Iran. The recent normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE is best understood in this context — as a counter to this trend. It is not so much a peace deal as it is an arms deal — and an implicit defense pact. The UAE gets access to the United States’ most advanced fighter jet, the F–35, in return for normalizing relations with Israel while further binding the United States to Abu Dhabi’s security. Arab states in the Gulf Cooperation Council have long treated American weaponry purchases as informal defense arrangements that oblige the United States to protect them militarily. Of course, positioning the Emirati–Israeli accord as an anti–Iran move also reinforces America’s status-quo military commitment to the Middle East. The notion that the threat from Iran is so overwhelming that it compelled the UAE to strike a deal with Israel is belied by the fact that Abu Dhabi is far more embroiled in countering Ankara’s regional ambitions and Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Emiratis define as their primary political enemy.[29] Iran, in turn, poses a different set of challenges. Its official rhetoric calls for the United States to exit the region altogether. A security architecture should be created and sustained by the Persian Gulf alone, Tehran maintains. To the other states in the Persian Gulf, this is a nonstarter for the same reason Tehran finds it preferable: With the United States removed from the Persian Gulf, the path will open for Iran to become the dominant power in these waters (as it was during the time of the shah). However, given the Persian Gulf’s importance in the global economy, Tehran has little choice but to accept a role for outside powers in any inclusive security architecture. Getting to this point may prove less arduous than Iran’s official statements suggest. Senior Iranian officials privately concede that the architecture will have dim chances of success without the support and approval of the United States and possibly other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. However, the proposition has not been tested, since a serious effort at creating an inclusive security arrangement has yet to be undertaken. A truly inclusive security architecture Given the will to move forward, the vital issues that Persian Gulf states would initially need to agree on are whether to build on existing organizations and structures or set up an entirely new institution. They would also have to determine the organization’s scope, ambition, and, finally, its membership. Starting with humble ambitions limited to kickstarting diplomacy without any formal structures, as Sullivan and Benaim suggest, may be wise in the interim. But in the longer term, diplomatic activity needs to be institutionalized. The diplomacy deficit in the Persian Gulf region is notorious. Except for the Gulf Cooperation Council, there are no multinational security organizations. But building upon the GCC may be unwise, if this is even possible, as it suffers from numerous flaws. It was conceived as a defense pact against Iraq and Iran rather than an inclusive organization with a cooperation-oriented mission and purpose. Its raison d’être has been premised primarily on the existence of an external threat that member states unite against. Moreover, it is paralyzed by internal conflicts, mainly the standoff between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their partners on the one hand, and Qatar on the other. Though the blockade against Qatar imposed in mid–2017 has been lifted, the underlying causes of their dispute remain unresolved. A new security architecture has a better chance of succeeding if it instead is inspired by successful, security-enhancing institutions in other regions, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Though these are vastly different organizations, they are inclusive and cooperation-oriented rather than premised on the need to balance a common threat. Moreover, by sidestepping the GCC, the new initiative will also evade much of its divisive baggage. In terms of scope and purpose, ASEAN’s more soft-security focus — disaster-relief cooperation and humanitarian assistance — might be an easier lift initially for the Persian Gulf states but is likely to prove insufficient in the long run. Equally, the OSCE’s all-encompassing approach — from confidence-building measures to human rights promotion to hard security issues — may be too ambitious at first. Still, it should be the organization’s long-term objective to promote cooperation on all such issues. Combating drug trafficking and pandemics, environmental issues, maritime security, and pilgrimage-security agreements are all challenges on which collaboration may be relatively forthcoming. Eventually, however, the region’s hard security challenges must be addressed: defense expenditures, weapons acquisition, foreign bases, limits on ballistic missiles, and the use and arming of militias, to name a few such questions. The composition of the new security organization is another crucial issue. For the Persian Gulf states to have a sense of ownership, which is essential to the success of any such endeavor, they have to lead it themselves rather than rely on the United States or other major powers to drive it. However, curtailing Washington’s instinct to always lead and control diplomatic mechanisms will be challenging. Simultaneously, without buy-in and support from major powers, regional powers will likely prove unable to negotiate the new security architecture successfully. Including the United States risks pushing Iran to opt out; not including the United States will compel most GCC monarchies to disengage. This new approach would not mean disengaging from the Persian Gulf but would instead prioritize diplomatic and economic involvement over military hegemony, military interventions, and arms sales. The solution may lie in expanding external involvement beyond the United States. One option would be to provide observer status to all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the P5. This approach would anchor the security architecture in the international system’s existing structures and likely reduce objections and hesitation from all sides. Sullivan and Benaim have signaled openness to this idea.[30] Another option would be to anchor it in a combination of the P5, some EU member states in the form of “lead groups,” and the Asian powers with the most significant stake in Persian Gulf security due to their dependence on its energy supplies. On the one hand, coordination on the Iran nuclear file between the EU’s foreign policy institutions (e.g., the European External Action Service) and the so-called E3 — France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — could represent a form of European involvement in and contribution to the new security organization. On the other hand, India, Japan, and South Korea (in addition to China) are the most significant importers of Persian Gulf gas and oil. Their own tensions and rivalries risk turning the Persian Gulf into an arena for their geopolitical competition in coming decades. Including them in the security architecture can help strengthen the arrangement and dilute the influence of the U.S. and China while protecting the region from inter–Asian geopolitical rivalries in the future.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Russia War

American attempts to expand hegemony through Ukraine prompts Russian retaliation – that exacerbates conflicts and leads to nuclear war

Mearsheimer 22 - is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 3/19/22 (John, “John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian crisis”, The Economist, , Accessed 6-18-22)//jd 

THE WAR in Ukraine is the most dangerous international conflict since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Understanding its root causes is essential if we are to prevent it from getting worse and, instead, to find a way to bring it to a close. There is no question that Vladimir Putin started the war and is responsible for how it is being waged. But why he did so is another matter. The mainstream view in the West is that he is an irrational, out-of-touch aggressor bent on creating a greater Russia in the mould of the former Soviet Union. Thus, he alone bears full responsibility for the Ukraine crisis. But that story is wrong. The West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the crisis which began in February 2014. It has now turned into a war that not only threatens to destroy Ukraine, but also has the potential to escalate into a nuclear war between Russia and NATO. The trouble over Ukraine actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, when George W. Bush’s administration pushed the alliance to announce that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”. Russian leaders responded immediately with outrage, characterising this decision as an existential threat to Russia and vowing to thwart it. According to a respected Russian journalist, Mr Putin “flew into a rage” and warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.” America ignored Moscow’s red line, however, and pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. That strategy included two other elements: bringing Ukraine closer to the eu and making it a pro-American democracy. These efforts eventually sparked hostilities in February 2014, after an uprising (which was supported by America) caused Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to flee the country. In response, Russia took Crimea from Ukraine and helped fuel a civil war that broke out in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The next major confrontation came in December 2021 and led directly to the current war. The main cause was that Ukraine was becoming a de facto member of NATO. The process started in December 2017, when the Trump administration decided to sell Kyiv “defensive weapons”. What counts as “defensive” is hardly clear-cut, however, and these weapons certainly looked offensive to Moscow and its allies in the Donbas region. Other NATO countries got in on the act, shipping weapons to Ukraine, training its armed forces and allowing it to participate in joint air and naval exercises. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. Operation Sea Breeze almost provoked Russia to fire at a British naval destroyer that deliberately entered what Russia considers its territorial waters. The links between Ukraine and America continued growing under the Biden administration. This commitment is reflected throughout an important document—the “us-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership”—that was signed in November by Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, and Dmytro Kuleba, his Ukrainian counterpart. The aim was to “underscore … a commitment to Ukraine’s implementation of the deep and comprehensive reforms necessary for full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.” The document explicitly builds on “the commitments made to strengthen the Ukraine-u.s. strategic partnership by Presidents Zelensky and Biden,” and also emphasises that the two countries will be guided by the “2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration.” Unsurprisingly, Moscow found this evolving situation intolerable and began mobilising its army on Ukraine’s border last spring to signal its resolve to Washington. But it had no effect, as the Biden administration continued to move closer to Ukraine. This led Russia to precipitate a full-blown diplomatic stand-off in December. As Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, put it: “We reached our boiling point.” Russia demanded a written guarantee that Ukraine would never become a part of NATO and that the alliance remove the military assets it had deployed in eastern Europe since 1997. The subsequent negotiations failed, as Mr Blinken made clear: “There is no change. There will be no change.” A month later Mr Putin launched an invasion of Ukraine to eliminate the threat he saw from NATO. This interpretation of events is at odds with the prevailing mantra in the West, which portrays NATO expansion as irrelevant to the Ukraine crisis, blaming instead Mr Putin’s expansionist goals. According to a recent NATO document sent to Russian leaders, “NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to Russia.” The available evidence contradicts these claims. For starters, the issue at hand is not what Western leaders say NATO’s purpose or intentions are; it is how Moscow sees NATO’s actions. Mr Putin surely knows that the costs of conquering and occupying large amounts of territory in eastern Europe would be prohibitive for Russia. As he once put it, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” His beliefs about the tight bonds between Russia and Ukraine notwithstanding, trying to take back all of Ukraine would be like trying to swallow a porcupine. Furthermore, Russian policymakers—including Mr Putin—have said hardly anything about conquering new territory to recreate the Soviet Union or build a greater Russia. Rather, since the 2008 Bucharest summit Russian leaders have repeatedly said that they view Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat that must be prevented. As Mr Lavrov noted in January, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.” Tellingly, Western leaders rarely described Russia as a military threat to Europe before 2014. As America’s former ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes, Mr Putin’s seizure of Crimea was not planned for long; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In fact, until then, NATO expansion was aimed at turning all of Europe into a giant zone of peace, not containing a dangerous Russia. Once the crisis started, however, American and European policymakers could not admit they had provoked it by trying to integrate Ukraine into the West. They declared the real source of the problem was Russia’s revanchism and its desire to dominate if not conquer Ukraine. My story about the conflict’s causes should not be controversial, given that many prominent American foreign-policy experts have warned against NATO expansion since the late 1990s. America’s secretary of defence at the time of the Bucharest summit, Robert Gates, recognised that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching”. Indeed, at that summit, both the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, were opposed to moving forward on NATO membership for Ukraine because they feared it would infuriate Russia. The upshot of my interpretation is that we are in an extremely dangerous situation, and Western policy is exacerbating these risks. For Russia’s leaders, what happens in Ukraine has little to do with their imperial ambitions being thwarted; it is about dealing with what they regard as a direct threat to Russia’s future. Mr Putin may have misjudged Russia’s military capabilities, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance and the scope and speed of the Western response, but one should never underestimate how ruthless great powers can be when they believe they are in dire straits. America and its allies, however, are doubling down, hoping to inflict a humiliating defeat on Mr Putin and to maybe even trigger his removal. They are increasing aid to Ukraine while using economic sanctions to inflict massive punishment on Russia, a step that Putin now sees as “akin to a declaration of war”. America and its allies may be able to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, but the country will be gravely damaged, if not dismembered. Moreover, there is a serious threat of escalation beyond Ukraine, not to mention the danger of nuclear war. If the West not only thwarts Moscow on Ukraine’s battlefields, but also does serious, lasting damage to Russia’s economy, it is in effect pushing a great power to the brink. Mr Putin might then turn to nuclear weapons. At this point it is impossible to know the terms on which this conflict will be settled. But, if we do not understand its deep cause, we will be unable to end it before Ukraine is wrecked and NATO ends up in a war with Russia. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---Russia War

US hegemony causes Russia war---domestic turmoil and lack of adherence to democratic principles has weakened international perspective to the point of no return

Hirsh 5/11/22 [Hirsh, Michael, Michael Hirsh is a senior correspondent at Foreign Policy. Previously, he was the national editor for Politico magazine. He has also served as foreign editor, chief diplomatic correspondent, and national economic correspondent for Newsweek. Education: Tufts University, B.A. (philosophy; magna cum laude), 1979; Columbia University, graduate degree (international and public affairs)., “Why Biden’s Anti-Putin Democracy Crusade Is Failing”, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/us-russia-war-ukraine-democracy-autocracy/]//AA

In the beginning, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine appeared to be an ideal rationale for U.S. President Joe Biden’s global democracy campaign. What better endorsement could there be than the spectacle of a brave, doughty democracy fighting off a brutal autocrat? As Biden put it in a major speech in Poland in March, Ukraine was now “on the front lines” in “the perennial struggle for democracy and freedom.” But despite Ukraine’s success on the ground against Putin’s military, the White House’s efforts in the months since to frame the conflict as a titanic worldwide battle between democracy and autocracy don’t appear to be working very well. Outside of Western European allies and longtime U.S. partners such as Japan, much of the rest of the world simply isn’t signing on. Problem one: Most of these countries either aren’t democracies or are so deeply flawed as democracies that they’re less than inspired by the rhetoric. Problem two: In the eyes of much of the world, the country that’s doing the preaching—the United States—is a badly broken democracy that ought to heal itself first. These problems were evident at the White House this week, when Biden welcomed leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), most of whom are autocrats or represent one-party states that show no signs of going democratic. Among them: Cambodia’s longtime strongman Hun Sen; Thai Prime Minister Pravuth Chan-ocha, a former general who seized power in a 2014 coup; and the authoritarian leaders of Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei. To Biden’s relief, the head of Myanmar’s junta, Min Aung Hlaing, another ASEAN member, was not among them. On Wednesday, Kurt Campbell, Biden’s lead White House advisor on East Asia, acknowledged that the talks would be “maybe a little bit uncomfortable at times” but did not directly address the issue of flagging democracy in the region. “I do think we will have a full exchange and we acknowledge that there are differences of view,” he said at a forum at the United States Institute of Peace. Most of these countries have indicated they are nonaligned in the struggle between Russia and the West; Indonesia, another leading ASEAN member and a democracy, has even invited Putin to the G-20 summit it is hosting in November. The ASEAN countries are joined by nations across the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America, and Africa—countries that include a number of democracies but also a quasi-rogue gallery of autocrats and dubious democrats who represent the majority of the world’s population. And they are not persuaded that Russia, a major source of oil and gas supplies, needs to be cut off from the global system. “Their attitude is, ‘Who are you to be telling us what to do or telling us what our rights are? People in your country who win the popular vote don’t even get elected president. So don’t preach to us!’” said Michael Coppedge, an expert in democratization at the University of Notre Dame who is one of the managers of an exhaustive international study by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, released last month. According to a report by Freedom House, “Reversing the Decline of Democracy in the United States,” “[A]mid a 16-year decline in global freedom, democracy in the United States has suffered serious erosion.” The report found that the United States had dropped to level of flawed democracies like Panama, Romania, and South Korea and concluded, “The weakening of American democracy did not start with [former U.S.] President [Donald] Trump’s direct pressure on democratic institutions and rights, and his departure from the White House has not ended the crisis.” Critics say that while the Biden administration’s framing of the conflict is working well within NATO and the West—joined by firm U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea—the U.S. president needs to rethink his approach if he wants to corral more allies in his efforts to isolate and weaken Russia. The real issue being tested, they say, is not democracy per se but rather an issue that most countries can identify with more readily: the sanctity of their borders under post-World War II norms upheld by United Nations-sanctioned international law. “This is about territorial integrity and non-use of force to change borders, along with international norms. Those are the core issues,” said Bruce Jentleson, a political scientist at Duke University and a former senior foreign-policy advisor to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. “In that respect, it’s akin to Kuwait 1990,” when then-U.S. President George H.W. Bush won a broad international consensus against then-Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. In an email, Jentleson added that while he has “great admiration” for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s wartime leadership, Ukraine itself has long been known to be a “questionable democracy” and one of the world’s most corrupt countries. Chas Freeman Jr., a former senior U.S. diplomat who helped to frame George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” concept during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, agreed with this assessment. And Biden has indeed condemned Russia’s invasion as ​“a flagrant violation of international law.” But Freeman said the United States would have to work hard to restore its credibility on that front in the wake of its own more recent violations of international norms, including the use of torture and the invasion of Iraq. “We need to return to the basic principles of international law that we foolishly set aside, but that’s going to be a problem,” Freeman told Foreign Policy. “The United States sponsored, created, and enforced what is now called the liberal international order after World War II. So you have the U.N. Charter, which lays out the basic principles of international law. You can’t go to war without a justification from the U.N. Security Council, which we had [in 1990-91]. But that was the last time we observed those norms. After that, every principle of international law that we pioneered, we violated.” Returning to those basic principles, with appropriate mea culpas, may be the only course forward if the United States is to win over much of the world, Freeman said. What won’t work, he added, is evangelizing about the glories of democracy—an old American habit, and one that he believes the Biden team is resorting to for largely domestic political benefit. “I’ve thought from the beginning that frankly this is a load of crap,” Freeman said. “It’s a very American conceit. And it’s particularly ironic that it should come to the fore during a period when our own democracy is manifestly in deep trouble and we’re not even sure we’re going to have a peaceful transition in 2024.” Biden’s credibility problem extends to other major nations that have not gone along with Biden’s campaign—and which continue to temporize over the Russian invasion. For India, the issue has little to do with democracy and everything to do with border security, said Rani Mullen, a scholar at the College of William & Mary. Its increasingly autocratic leader, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is a populist fanning sectarian hatred between Hindus and Muslims while on the international stage, he pursues relations with both Moscow and Washington. Since the beginning of the year, India has dramatically stepped up its purchases of discounted Russian oil—which Modi desperately needs to shore up India’s weakening economy. Modi’s stance is entirely about realpolitik, said Mullen, an expert in South and Central Asia. And that means maintaining workable relations with Russia so as not to encourage a deeper partnership between Moscow and China, the Indians’ most feared potential aggressor along with Pakistan, which has a cozy relationship with Beijing. For New Delhi, the most paramount issue is border integrity under the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement (which the Chinese call the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”) between India and China. “Ultimately, India’s stance is driven by thinking that alienating Russia will undermine its security,” Mullen said. “Democracy? What does it care? That’s the reality of it. It’s all about China. So framing Russian actions in a way that would guarantee mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity—that would strike a different chord.” More broadly, the stark fact Biden must confront is that democracy has been in retreat since the Cold War. “The level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2021 is down to 1989 levels. The last 30 years of democratic advances are now eradicated,” a report by the V-Dem Institute said. “Dictatorships are on the rise and harbor 70% of the world population—5.4 billion people.” The study found that liberal democracies can now be found in only 34 nations, down from its peak of 42 in 2012, which are home to only 13 percent of the world’s population. A key fence-sitter in this global struggle over international norms is authoritarian China, which has sought to find a middle ground between Russia and the West. Chinese President Xi Jinping is sticking by his partnership with Putin, yet Beijing has mostly observed economic sanctions against Russia. Chinese officials say their country is loath to choose sides, but Washington has made that difficult by portraying the conflict as one that is primarily about Western-style democracy rather than global norms. As Robert Manning, a former U.S. intelligence official and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, wrote in Foreign Policy this week: “The logic of ‘democracies only’ could lead to a bifurcated or maybe trifurcated world.” China covets Taiwan much as Russia does Ukraine, but even Washington still officially embraces its long-time “one China” policy, acknowledging that Taiwan is part of a single China. Beijing is angry that this diplomatic mainstay is also fraying, with Biden’s State Department removing such language from its official guidance website, which no longer states that Washington “does not support Taiwan independence.” Nor has the Biden administration offered up any new initiatives to wean Beijing away from Moscow. Other major nations, even those that are democratic, also are making calculations based on factors that have little to do with the threat to democracy. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro recently said he would continue to support Russia’s participation at international forums, such as the G-20, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Some experts say the inconsistencies in Biden’s approach to democracy have hurt him as well. The president’s virtual democracy summit at the end of last year was widely criticized for the seemingly arbitrary way some countries were invited while others were snubbed. The Philippines’ anti-U.S. president, Rodrigo Duterte, was welcomed for example despite his violent campaign of extrajudicial executions, whereas Washington-aligned Singapore, which was rated “partly free” in Freedom House’s annual study of rights and liberties worldwide, was excluded. Singapore’s Freedom House ranking was also higher than some other invitees, such as Angola, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Lebanon. In the Philippines, Duterte will soon be replaced by Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son and namesake of the country’s long-time dictator, who has said he wants to draw closer to Beijing. “Countries that are not democratic are being treated as democratic. It’s completely a fool’s errand,” said Raffaello Pantucci, a visiting senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “It alienates people on the ground.” Yet for all that, Ukraine is also not Kuwait circa 1990-1991: a state ruled by monarchs. It is genuinely a democracy in peril. And Biden appears unready to compromise on an agenda that he has embraced since the beginning of his presidency, when he declared in his first State of the Union address that “In the battle between democracy and autocracy, democracies are rising to the moment, and the world is clearly choosing the side of peace and security.” Biden administration officials like to point to the economic weight of the United States and its Western allies, which make up “50 percent-plus of global GDP” while “China and Russia are less than 20 percent,” as U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said in February.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---China War

China doesn’t pose a threat – any other ev is constructing its threats.

Walt 17, columnist at Foreign Policy, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 6-30-2017, (Stephen, "Everyone Misunderstands the Reason for the U.S.-China Cold War," Foreign Policy, , kav)

The United States is pretty polarized these days, but nearly everyone seems to agree that China is a big problem. The Trump administration has been at odds with China on trade issues since day one, and its 2017 National Security Strategy labeled China a “revisionist power” and major strategic rival. (President Donald Trump himself seems to have been willing to give Beijing a free pass if it would help him get reelected, but that’s just a sign of his own venality and inconsistent with the administration’s other policies.) Presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden may have started his campaign in 2019 downplaying fears that China was going to “eat our lunch,” but his campaign has grown increasingly hawkish over time.

Not surprisingly, hard-line Republican members of Congress like Josh Hawley and Matt Gaetz have been sounding the alarm as well, while progressives and moderates warn of a “new cold war” and call for renewed dialogue to manage the relationship. Despite their differing prescriptions, all of these groups see the state of Sino-American relations as of vital importance.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---China War

US Hegemony guarantees war with China --- only retrenchment avoids great power war

Keay 18 – is a graduate in Modern History from Oxford University and a current MA applicant in International Relations, 2/22/18 (Leo, “Sleepwalking into Thucydides's Trap: The Perils of US Hegemony “, The International Spectator, https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/sleepwalking-thucydidess-trap-perils-us-hegemony) //jd 

Rigid alliance structures also magnify the risks of great power conflict. On the eve of the First World War, Europe was divided between the “Dual Alliance” of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the “Triple Entente” of France, Russia and Great Britain. It was the unshakeable nature of each bloc’s security commitments that transformed Austria-Hungary’s invasion of Serbia into a global military conflict. The only way to avoid future conflagrations is to adopt an attitude of radical humility. America’s leaders must accept that the tectonic shifts of geopolitical power cannot be reversed, only managed so as to minimise friction. This is more profound than the distinction between vital and vested interests suggested by Allison. It requires the ruling power to fundamentally scale down its ambitions to those of a great power. The US must cease to aspire to global hegemony, and instead aim for limited dominance. President Obama had the foresight to appreciate this. As he explained in his 2015 NSS: “America leads from a position of strength. But, this does not mean we can or should attempt to dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events around the world […] our resources and influence are not infinite”.[13] One possible solution could be to return to the fundamentals of nineteenth-century US grand strategy, the Monroe Doctrine. Washington’s priority should be to preserve its strategic autonomy in the Western hemisphere. Consequently, it must continue to safeguard its security in the Pacific by maintaining its military bases and honouring its alliance commitments there. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---China War

The threat of China is made up in pursuit of US heg.

Swaine 20, director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute, 3-31-2020, (Michael, "China Doesn’t Pose an Existential Threat for America," Foreign Policy, , kav)

It has become a cottage industry in Washington and in parts of Europe these days to highlight all the many ways in which China threatens U.S., Western, and Asian interests. Politicians, military officers, and pundits take turns describing the dangers posed by Beijing’s “expansionist” and “aggressive” military, “implacably hostile” ideology, “predatory” economic and tech policies, and “insidious” overseas influence operations.

Despite shunning the Trump administration’s habitual use of most of these inflammatory adjectives, U.S. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken nonetheless depict Beijing as challenging the entire “rules-based order that maintains global stability” and as the major focal point of a global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, which is now, according to Biden, at an “inflection point.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Links › 2NC---L---China War

And - China will rise peacefully now but the plan’s perceived containment triggers lash out and US-China War.

Brands ‘21 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 9-24-21; " China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-26-2022; AH]

There is an entire swath of literature, known as “power transition theory,” which holds that great-power war typically occurs at the intersection of one hegemon’s rise and another’s decline. This is the body of work underpinning the Thucydides Trap, and there is, admittedly, an elemental truth to the idea. The rise of new powers is invariably destabilizing. In the runup to the Peloponnesian War in the 5th century B.C., Athens would not have seemed so menacing to Sparta had it not built a vast empire and become a naval superpower. Washington and Beijing would not be locked in rivalry if China was still poor and weak. Rising powers do expand their influence in ways that threaten reigning powers. But the calculus that produces war—particularly the calculus that pushes revisionist powers, countries seeking to shake up the existing system, to lash out violently—is more complex. A country whose relative wealth and power are growing will surely become more assertive and ambitious. All things equal, it will seek greater global influence and prestige. But if its position is steadily improving, it should postpone a deadly showdown with the reigning hegemon until it has become even stronger. Such a country should follow the dictum former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping laid down for a rising China after the Cold War: It should hide its capabilities and bide its time. Now imagine a different scenario. A dissatisfied state has been building its power and expanding its geopolitical horizons. But then the country peaks, perhaps because its economy slows, perhaps because its own assertiveness provokes a coalition of determined rivals, or perhaps because both of these things happen at once. The future starts to look quite forbidding; a sense of imminent danger starts to replace a feeling of limitless possibility. In these circumstances, a revisionist power may act boldly, even aggressively, to grab what it can before it is too late. The most dangerous trajectory in world politics is a long rise followed by the prospect of a sharp decline. As we show in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, this scenario is more common than you might think. Historian Donald Kagan showed, for instance, that Athens started acting more belligerently in the years before the Peloponnesian War because it feared adverse shifts in the balance of naval power—in other words, because it was on the verge of losing influence vis-à-vis Sparta. We see the same thing in more recent cases as well. Over the past 150 years, peaking powers—great powers that had been growing dramatically faster than the world average and then suffered a severe, prolonged slowdown—usually don’t fade away quietly. Rather, they become brash and aggressive. They suppress dissent at home and try to regain economic momentum by creating exclusive spheres of influence abroad. They pour money into their militaries and use force to expand their influence. This behavior commonly provokes great-power tensions. In some cases, it touches disastrous wars. This shouldn’t be surprising. Eras of rapid growth supercharge a country’s ambitions, raise its people’s expectations, and make its rivals nervous. During a sustained economic boom, businesses enjoy rising profits and citizens get used to living large. The country becomes a bigger player on the global stage. Then stagnation strikes. Slowing growth makes it harder for leaders to keep the public happy. Economic underperformance weakens the country against its rivals. Fearing upheaval, leaders crack down on dissent. They maneuver desperately to keep geopolitical enemies at bay. Expansion seems like a solution—a way of grabbing economic resources and markets, making nationalism a crutch for a wounded regime, and beating back foreign threats. Many countries have followed this path. When the United States’ long post-Civil War economic surge ended, Washington violently suppressed strikes and unrest at home, built a powerful blue-water Navy, and engaged in a fit of belligerence and imperial expansion during the 1890s. After a fast-rising imperial Russia fell into a deep slump at the turn of the 20th century, the tsarist government cracked down hard while also enlarging its military, seeking colonial gains in East Asia and sending around 170,000 soldiers to occupy Manchuria. These moves backfired spectacularly: They antagonized Japan, which beat Russia in the first great-power war of the 20th century. A century later, Russia became aggressive under similar circumstances. Facing a severe, post-2008 economic slowdown, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded two neighboring countries, sought to create a new Eurasian economic bloc, staked Moscow’s claim to a resource-rich Arctic, and steered Russia deeper into dictatorship. Even democratic France engaged in anxious aggrandizement after the end of its postwar economic expansion in the 1970s. It tried to rebuild its old sphere of influence in Africa, deploying 14,000 troops to its former colonies and undertaking a dozen military interventions over the next two decades. All of these cases were complicated, yet the pattern is clear. If a rapid rise gives countries the means to act boldly, the fear of decline serves up a powerful motive for rasher, more urgent expansion. The same thing often happens when fast-rising powers cause their own containment by a hostile coalition. In fact, some of history’s most gruesome wars have come when revisionist powers concluded their path to glory was about to be blocked. Imperial Germany and Japan are textbook examples. Germany’s rivalry with Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is often considered an analogue to U.S.-China competition: In both cases, an autocratic challenger threatened a liberal hegemon. But the more sobering parallel is this: War came when a cornered Germany grasped it would not zip past its rivals without a fight. For decades after unification in 1871, Germany soared. Its factories spewed out iron and steel, erasing Britain’s economic lead. Berlin built Europe’s finest army and battleships that threatened British supremacy at sea. By the early 1900s, Germany was a European heavyweight seeking an enormous sphere of influence—a Mitteleuropa, or Middle Europe­—on the continent. It was also pursuing, under then-Kaiser Wilhelm II, a “world policy” aimed at securing colonies and global power. But during the prelude to war, the kaiser and his aides didn’t feel confident. Germany’s brash behavior caused its encirclement by hostile powers. London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, Russia, formed a “Triple Entente” to block German expansion. By 1914, time was running short. Germany was losing ground economically to a fast-growing Russia; London and France were pursuing economic containment by blocking its access to oil and iron ore. Berlin’s key ally, Austria-Hungary, was being torn apart by ethnic tensions. At home, Germany’s autocratic political system was in trouble. Most ominous, the military balance was shifting. France was enlarging its army; Russia was adding 470,000 men to its military and slashing the time it needed to mobilize for war. Britain announced it would build two battleships for every one built by Berlin. Germany was, for the moment, Europe’s foremost military power. But by 1916 and 1917, it would be hopelessly overmatched. The result was a now-or-never mentality: Germany should “defeat the enemy while we still stand a chance of victory,” declared Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke, even if that meant “provoking a war in the near future.” This is what happened after Serbian nationalists assassinated Austria’s crown prince in June 1914. The kaiser’s government urged Austria-Hungary to crush Serbia, even though that meant war with Russia and France. It then invaded neutral Belgium—the key to its Schlieffen Plan for a two-front war—despite the likelihood of provoking Britain. “This war will turn into a world war in which England will also intervene,” Moltke acknowledged. Germany’s rise had given it the power to gamble for greatness. Its impending decline drove the decisions that plunged the world into war. Imperial Japan followed a similar trajectory. For a half-century after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan was rising steadily. The building of a modern economy and a fierce military allowed Tokyo to win two major wars and accumulate colonial privileges in China, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. Yet Japan was not a hyper-belligerent predator: Through the 1920s, it cooperated with the United States, Britain, and other countries to create a cooperative security framework in the Asia-Pacific. During that decade, however, things fell apart. Growth dropped from 6.1 percent annually between 1904 and 1919 to 1.8 percent annually in the 1920s; the Great Depression then shut Japan’s overseas markets. Unemployment soared, and bankrupt farmers sold their daughters. In China, meanwhile, Japanese influence was being challenged by the Soviet Union and a rising nationalist movement under then-Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek. Tokyo’s answer was fascism at home and aggression abroad. From the late 1920s onward, the military conducted a slow-motion coup and harnessed the nation’s resources for “total war.” Japan initiated a massive military buildup and violently established a vast sphere of influence, seizing Manchuria in 1931, invading China in 1937, and laying plans to conquer resource-rich colonies and strategic islands across the Asia-Pacific. The goal was to build an autarkic empire; the result drew a strategic noose around Tokyo’s neck. Japan’s push into China eventually led to a punishing war with the Soviet Union. Japan’s designs on Southeast Asia alarmed Britain. Its drive for regional primacy also made it a foe of the United States—the country from which Tokyo imported nearly all of its oil with an economy vastly larger than Japan’s. Tokyo had antagonized an overwhelming coalition of enemies. It then risked everything rather than accepting humiliation and decline. The precipitating cause, again, was a closing window of opportunity. By 1941, the United States was building an unbeatable military. In July, then-U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt imposed an oil embargo that threatened to stop Japan’s expansion in its tracks. But Japan still had a temporary military edge in the Pacific Ocean, thanks to its early rearmament. So it used that advantage in a lightning attack—seizing the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and other possessions from Singapore to Wake Island as well as bombing the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor—which guaranteed its own destruction. Japan’s prospects for victory were dim, acknowledged then-Japanese Gen. Hideki Tojo, yet there was no choice but to “close one’s eyes and jump.” A revisionist Japan became most violent when it saw that time was running out. This is the real trap the United States should worry about regarding China today—the trap in which an aspiring superpower peaks and then refuses to bear the painful consequences of descent. China’s rise is no mirage: Decades of growth have given Beijing the economic sinews of global power. Major investments in key technologies and communications infrastructure have yielded a strong position in the struggle for geoeconomic influence; China is using a multi-continent Belt and Road Initiative to bring other states into its orbit. Most alarming, think tank assessments and U.S. Defense Department reports show China’s increasingly formidable military now stands a real chance of winning a war against the United States in the Western Pacific.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---China Perceptions

Beijing’s view of declining US power is fueling aspirations for a peaceful rise

Clarke and Sussex ‘22 – Professors of Foreign Policy [Michael Clarke and Matthew Sussex; Professor Michael Clarke is a UTS:Australia China Relations Institute Adjunct Professor and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Defence Research at the Australian Defence College. His major areas of research and publication include: the history and politics of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China (PRC); Chinese foreign and security policy; American grand strategy; and nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. Associate Professor Matthew Sussex is a Fellow at the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affair.His research is primarily focused on Russian foreign and security policy, Asia-Pacific geopolitics and Australian foreign policy. He is editor, with Michael Clarke and Nick Bisley, of “The Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific” (Lexington Books, 2020).; 1-11-22; "The U.S.-China Rivalry According to China”; https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30238/the-conflicting-viewpoints-behind-u-s-tensions-with-china-ccp; World Politics Review; accessed 6-26-2022; AH]

In China, meanwhile, foreign policy specialists’ views about engagement with the U.S. have gone through several stages since the 1990s, each of which corresponded to a different view on what U.S. “hegemony” means for China. During the 1990s, the consensus view was that China had to marshal its “comprehensive national power” to resist U.S. pressure during Washington’s “unipolar moment.” In the subsequent decade, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Chinese analysts began to see the key inflection points of the era—the global war on terrorism, the 2003 Iraq War and the 2008 global financial crisis—as opportunities for China to take advantage of Washington’s distraction. Beijing began to embrace a strategy of “peaceful rise,” with rhetoric assuaging regional concerns about its intentions. The next shift, toward a more proactive approach, came during Xi Jinping’s first term as China’s president, starting in 2013. Under the overall goal of “national rejuvenation,” Beijing sought to harness Chinese power to build a “community of common destiny,” allowing it to shape the international order. During this time, some Chinese foreign policy specialists claimed not only that the U.S. was in decline, but that so too was “hegemony” as an ordering principle of international relations. This view made it possible to present Xi’s proposed “community of common destiny” concept not as China’s own hegemonic project, but as a vision for a more pluralistic world that would replace U.S. hegemony. Finally, in the past five years, during Xi’s second term, Chinese elites have realized that Washington would not go quietly into the night. Instead, they began to see the U.S. as a “declining” hegemon lashing out at its supposed challengers. The “conventional wisdom,” as the influential foreign policy specialist Wang Jisi noted, now holds that the U.S. is “driven by fear and envy to contain China in every possible way,” making it “the greatest external challenge to China’s national security, sovereignty and internal stability.” In this sense, Chinese specialists frame their country as being in a struggle for “two orders”: the domestic order, which would be secured through continued CCP rule, and the international order, where China needs to defend against efforts to limit its influence. This view of U.S. aggression was clearly expressed in Chinese analysts’ assessments of the Biden-Xi summit. Zhao Minghao, for instance, described a U.S. that, “having failed to win the trade war,” is now “maliciously” playing the Taiwan card to “interrupt China’s peaceful rise through a war.” Others, like Wang Honggang, note that while Biden appears more interested in multilateralism than Trump, the “beginning and end of the Biden administration’s strategic thinking is still to preserve American hegemony.” He argues that the Biden administration is seeking to signal that it “has strength” out of fears that the Trump years damaged the United States’ credibility and influence. In fact, he argues, it is a “weak government.” Finally, Huang Renwei of Fudan University has argued that U.S.-China relations are following the three phases of war identified in “On Protracted War,” Mao Zedong’s 1938 treatise: strategic defense, strategic stalemate and the strategic counteroffensive. According to Huang, U.S.-China relations are currently in the phase of “strategic stalemate” and may stay there for some time, since the U.S. “does not have the ability and will to devote all its resources to the confrontation with China, thus limiting the scale of the confrontation.” That gives China the upper hand, Huang says, because if the U.S. “continues to intensify its efforts against China over a period of time, its expended resources and costs will overwhelm the U.S. itself, at which point the strategic stalemate will shift in China's favor.”