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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---China Perceptions

The perception of backsliding US power relaxes Beijing

Blanchette ‘21 [Jude; Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Previously, he was engagement director at The Conference Board’s China Center for Economics and Business in Beijing, where he researched China’s political environment with a focus on the workings of the Communist Party of China and its impact on foreign companies and investors. Prior to working at The Conference Board, Blanchette was the assistant director of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego; 3-11-21; "Beijing's visions of American decline”; https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/03/11/beijings-visions-of-american-decline-492064; Politico; accessed 6-26-2022; AH]

The first modern surge of Beijing’s declinist narrative began in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and was given a scientific sheen by relying on metrics that measured “comprehensive national power.” It was not just a perception that America was sliding toward second-tier status, but an empirical fact. There was yet another uptick in declinism in 2016, after the election of Donald Trump and the rise of anti-globalization populism. Events in the U.S. over the past 12 months have given declinists in China a steroids shot: The U.S. mishandling of the Covid-19 pandemic, the resulting economic recession, demonstrations sparked by the killing of George Floyd and the chaos after Trump disputed the outcome of the presidential election have resulted in a full-blown euphoria. Two days after pro-Trump rioters stormed the Capitol Building, an article in the People's Liberation Army Daily declared, “The shocking events at [the Capitol Building] highlight a grim reality: Not only has the United States been severely impacted by Covid-19 and an economic recession, but it’s political system and society are also experiencing a deep crises.” Then, of course, came the power crisis in Texas last month, during which the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson took time from a regular briefing to crow that the chaos in Houston “made us believe more strongly that China is on the right path.” Writing in the Beijing Daily recently, China University of Political Science and Law professor Qi Kai declared, “Texas is the second most economically powerful state in the U.S., and is a major energy-producing state, [and so] it is amazing that such a serious power outage accident occurred. In my opinion, this reflects American society’s chaotic ecosystem.” The message from Beijing is simple: America is broken. “America’s Main Opponent is Itself,” proclaimed the headline in a recent edition of the People’s Daily. The article’s author, a researcher at the China Institute for International Studies, argued, “The United States has arrived at its current situation because the design and operation of its political and economic system has gone awry, the inevitable result of the short-sighted pursuit of profit.” It would be easy — and comforting — to dismiss this as mere propaganda, and of course we don’t know just how deep the declinist consensus is in China, owing to the tight constraints on open discourse and unavailability of robust polling data. But your host believes that we’ve reached a tipping point, with a growing narrative of cautious confidence that’s emboldened by data points of decline in America.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---China Perceptions

Perceptions of backsliding US power are leading Beijing to pursue a policy of stable “strategic competition” now – but they want assurance that the US won’t try to suppress China

Clarke and Sussex ‘22 – Professors of Foreign Policy [Michael Clarke and Matthew Sussex; Professor Michael Clarke is a UTS:Australia China Relations Institute Adjunct Professor and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Defence Research at the Australian Defence College. His major areas of research and publication include: the history and politics of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China (PRC); Chinese foreign and security policy; American grand strategy; and nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. Associate Professor Matthew Sussex is a Fellow at the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affair. His research is primarily focused on Russian foreign and security policy, Asia-Pacific geopolitics and Australian foreign policy. He is editor, with Michael Clarke and Nick Bisley, of “The Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific” (Lexington Books, 2020).; 1-11-22; "The U.S.-China Rivalry According to China”; https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30238/the-conflicting-viewpoints-behind-u-s-tensions-with-china-ccp; World Politics Review; accessed 6-26-2022; AH]

Much has already been said about the recent heightening of U.S.-China tensions and its potential fallout. What gets less attention is how the U.S. and China themselves perceive the status of their relationship, and how that affects their plans for the future. An analysis of prevailing elite opinion in the U.S. and China—starting with reactions to the Nov. 16 virtual summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping—can shed light on how each side understands the root causes of the current competition, and why they believe they can overcome them. For the United States, the rivalry is driven by China’s challenge to U.S. power and leadership, as well as its belief that Beijing is trying to alter the international order for its own benefit. For Beijing, it is driven by the United States’ continued “hegemonic” pretensions amid what Chinese elites see as its inevitable decline. While both Washington and Beijing believe that their relationship will be primarily defined by competition rather than cooperation for the foreseeable future, there are nonetheless indications that both states are hoping to protect themselves by establishing new “guardrails” to provide strategic stability, even as they continue to compete with one another. But doing so will be difficult. A Study in Contrasts Both the U.S. and China framed the Biden-Xi virtual summit of Nov. 16 as a “polite” but “straightforward” exchange on major areas of contention. Yet a comparison of the two sides’ readouts of the discussion also demonstrates that each country has a fundamentally different understanding of their positioning relative to one another, in addition to their divergent objectives. The White House statement is brief, comprising a mere four paragraphs. It begins by noting that Biden and Xi acknowledged the “importance of managing competition responsibly,” framed by an understanding of where their “interests align,” and where their “interests, values, and perspectives diverge.” According to the White House, the U.S. and China align on climate change; on regional security challenges such as those posed by Afghanistan and North Korea; and on “managing strategic risks” in the bilateral relationship. In particular, Biden emphasized the need for “common-sense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict and to keep lines of communication open.” From there, the Biden team devoted far more attention to the divergences, naming specific topics like Taiwanese sovereignty, ongoing trade disputes and human rights violations in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. The memo is prefaced with the statement that the U.S. would “continue to stand up for its interests and values and, together with our allies and partners, ensure the rules of the road for the 21st century advance an international system that is free, open, and fair.” For the United States, then, the defense of its “interests and values” is inextricably bound to the future of a “free, open and fair” international order. Biden’s team sees stabilizing the U.S.-China relationship as a significant part of its broader efforts to restore U.S. global leadership and revitalize U.S. power after the chaos of former President Donald Trump’s term. More importantly, the readout underscores the fact that Biden sees China as an obstacle to achieving those goals. Beijing’s readout, which is much longer, also notes areas of shared interest like climate change and expresses a desire to establish “guardrails.” While “it is only natural that China and the United States have differences,” the statement says, both share an interest in “constructively” managing relations to “avoid expansion and intensification” of disagreements. But the Chinese readout also bears stark contrasts to that of the Biden administration, particularly when it comes to three issues: its view on China’s current global status, its conceptions of international order and its assessment of U.S. intentions. First, Beijing repeatedly emphasizes a fundamental equality of status and role between the U.S. and China. The opening paragraph claims that “as the world’s top two economies and permanent members of the U.N. Security Council,” Beijing and Washington “should strengthen communication and cooperation,” not only for the benefit of their own citizens, but to “also shoulder our due international responsibilities.” According to Beijing, then, both countries already share global leadership. Second, Beijing disputes the implication that China is trying to spread its authoritarian system of government to other countries, thereby posing a challenge U.S. values and interests, as well as the broader international order. It asserts that while China’s development and modernization is an “inevitable historical trend,” China “has no intention of selling its own path to the world.” Instead, Beijing says it would encourage other countries “to find a path of development that suits their national conditions.” Rather than an international order defined by “interfering in the internal affairs of other countries through human rights issues,” as the Chinese readout puts it, China’s preference, according to Xi, is for both China and the U.S. to “safeguard … an international order based on international law and basic norms of international relations” that derive from the “purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter.” This reflects Beijing’s historical emphasis on the U.N. Charter’s guarantees of non-interference and state sovereignty over its guarantees of human rights, the tabling of which it portrays as an instrument by which the U.S. is trying to stifle China’s rise. Third, the Chinese readout quotes Biden as stating: China was already a great power 5,000 years ago. I want to reiterate clearly that the U.S. does not seek to change China’s system of governance, does not seek to counter China through alliances and has no intention to have conflict with China. The U.S. government is devoted to pursuing the long-standing One China policy, does not support Taiwan independence and hopes that the Taiwan Strait will remain peaceful and stable. This quote does not appear in the White House version, and Biden’s team has not confirmed or denied its accuracy. Nonetheless, its inclusion is significant, because it sheds light on what China would like to hear from the United States: recognition of China’s great power status; assurances that the U.S. does not seek to overthrow the ruling Chinese Communist Party or go to war with China; and assurances that the U.S. still abides by the One China policy, which Beijing frames as supporting Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. A Struggle for Two Orders In light of these differences, how should tensions between the U.S. and China be managed? The views of each country’s foreign policy specialists can provide some clues here. What is striking is that they tend to be mirror images of one another, suggesting that “strategic competition” may remain the default posture for the foreseeable future.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---China Conflict

The Ukraine War has made it clear that competition between US and China for global hegemony is high now – Taiwan is still the most likely flash point

Saxer 4/14 - heads the Asia department of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Previously he worked in the FES regional office in India and Thailand and he coordinated the project Economy of Tomorrow in Asia, 4/14/22. (Marc, “The coming world order”, International Politics and Society, , accessed 7/7/22)//jd

The war in Ukraine is part of the struggle for a new world order. Russia and China are openly challenging the Pax Americana. But the question how the next world order will look like remains open. In Moscow and Beijing, but also in Washington, the model of a multipolar concert of the great powers, with exclusive zones of influence, is finding support. Despite a growing unwillingness to play the role of ‘the world's policeman’, however, the majority of Americans have not yet abandoned the unipolar, American, liberal world order. And not only in China, there is still support for the Westphalian model with its emphasis on nation state sovereignty and its condemnation of post-colonial meddling in internal affairs. These three models envision very different ground rules. Who is authorised to use force – all states, only the strongest, or only the hegemonic power? Does the law of the strongest apply, or the strength of the law? Is there a historical ideal (e.g. liberal democracy and market economy) towards which all states will (or should) develop, or are there multiple modernities with competing political systems and cultural civilisations that can coexist more or less peacefully? Will there be a global showdown between an alliance of democracies and the ‘axis of autocrats’? Or is the price of peace giving up on implementing universal human rights? Which of these models will prevail – or from what precise mixture of old and new elements the new world order will emerge – will determine not only war and peace, but also what the global energy, production, distribution, and financial systems of the future will look like. The global energy system In the German debate, under the immediate impact of the war, the focus is mostly on how to deny Russia the revenue from its oil and gas exports without asking too much of consumers who are dependent on Russian energy supplies. In the long term, this dependence is to be reduced by accelerating the energy transition away from fossil fuels. Less attention is being paid to the efforts of China and India to avail themselves of the cheapest possible supplies on the Russian energy market without being hit by Western sanctions. And far too little attention is being paid to the efforts of important suppliers and their customers to ‘de-dollarise’ the international energy trade. It takes little imagination to foresee the biggest shake-up in global energy trading since the oil price shocks of the 1970s. What is less clear, however, is the direction in which the global energy system will move. Given the ongoing geopolitical confrontation, the imperatives of climate protection and energy security are now pointing in the same direction. On the one hand, this is likely to further accelerate the exodus of global capital from fossil industries. On the other hand, the industrialised countries are technologically still not in a position to free themselves from their addiction to fossil fuels. And it is precisely the bridging technology of natural gas that has now hit a geopolitical dead end. In the short term, Germany will hardly be able to close the looming supply gap without committing climate policy sins involving coal and nuclear power. In the long term, alongside renewable energies, the international supply chains for hydrogen need to be developed at pace. The US is trying to slow down the economic rise of its rival China. In the medium term, however, this means having to satisfy the demand for gas by diversifying suppliers. Surprising shifts of alliances, involving both old enemies (e.g. the US and Venezuela) and old friends (e.g. the West and the Arab monarchies; Russia and Kazakhstan), cannot be ruled out. How quickly, in this competitive world, the need to secure national energy supplies can collide with the principles of value-based foreign policy was something the new German government had to discover in its very first days in office. The global division of labour (production and supply chains) Since the 2008 financial crisis, global trade and cross-border investments have not really picked up again. The Covid-19 crisis has made people more aware of the vulnerability of global supply chains. The failure of China’s Zero Covid strategy and the drastic lockdowns in Shenzhen and Shanghai indicate that, two years now after the outbreak of the pandemic, the risk of disruptions to global supply chains has still not been eliminated. If parts from the Far East are missing, the assembly lines in Europe, too, come to a standstill. The paradigm shift away from efficiency (‘Just in Time’) to greater resilience (‘Just in Case’) is accelerating the hidden trend towards deglobalisation that has been under way for some time. But geo-economic as well as geopolitical motives also favour the shortening and unbundling of supply chains, and are now driving the separation and isolation of markets. The US is trying to slow down the economic rise of its rival China. Behind the scenes, pressure from both is mounting on their allies and on third countries to choose sides. Europeans and Asians are still resisting being drawn into this new Cold War. But the disputes over gas pipelines, chip manufacturers, and the 5G communications infrastructure show how quickly companies and entire states can get caught between opposing fronts. The ultimate outcome of this development could quite possibly be rival blocs that make it difficult or impossible for unwanted competitors to access their markets. Hardly have they escaped Trump-America’s sanctions, German companies are now facing headwinds on the Chinese market. Nevertheless, the majority is resisting the pressure to decouple from China, while some double down on the Chinese market despite ever worsening conditions. Given the importance of the Chinese market, the call in the Federal Government's Indo-Pacific strategy paper to reduce one-sided dependencies through diversification therefore often goes unheard. But the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine might now alter this calculus. Hardly anyone would have thought it possible that the West would react so quickly, so strongly, and with such unity to Russian aggression. Russia’s expulsion from the SWIFT system, the sanctions against the Russian central bank, but also the voluntary withdrawal of Western companies from the Russian market, all this has made its mark – not least in China. Even some in Germany were surprised at how quickly even supposedly sacred cows like the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline were slaughtered. This experience of enormous public and political pressure is likely to lead many German companies to reassess their strategies towards other ‘problematic markets’. Should the sales opportunities for German business in global markets be closed off in the medium-term future, Germany will have to rethink what it is willing to do to lead the vital European home market out of its protracted crisis. Less well known is the geostrategic motivation behind the Belt and Road Initiative. The realignment of the global economy according to geopolitical interests is putting key industries such as the German car industry under pressure. If the engine of growth falters, distribution conflicts within and between societies intensify. Fear of social decline is increasing even among the middle classes. This fear of decline is the sounding board that populists use for their agitation against the preconditions for the success of the export model, the free flow of goods, capital, people, and ideas. The global trend towards protectionism is thus driven not only by external factors but also by internal pressure. In such a world, there can no longer be any world champions in exporting. Germany above all will therefore have to rethink its export-oriented economic model. Infrastructure When Western critics discuss the Chinese Silk Road project, their focus is usually on debt traps or on the creation of political dependencies. There is a justified suspicion that the mammoth project represents a Chinese push to become a dominant power in Asia and in the world. Less well known, however, is the geostrategic motivation behind the Belt and Road Initiative. Since the end of World War II, the United States has established bases on a chain of islands running from Japan in the north to Indonesia in the south. And since the Obama administration announced its ‘Pivot to Asia’, the US has been concentrating its forces here. Between the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz (the Americans call these straits ‘choke points’), the United States and its allies can block Chinese trade and supply routes at any time. China feels encircled and reacts in an aggressively defensive manner. The aim of its arms build-up in the East and South China Seas is to break through the ‘First Island Chain’, and to drive the US out of Chinese coastal waters. Chinese hawks go one step further and want to force the reunification of the ‘unsinkable American aircraft carrier’ Taiwan with the motherland. As Chinese bombers fly over Taipei, Chinese propaganda accuses the US of challenging the status quo by questioning the One China policy, and thus provoking a conflict. This is a highly dangerous poker game, not only because Taiwan produces indispensable semiconductor chips, but also because from the perspective of the Americans, traumatised by Pearl Harbor, the defence of their homeland begins at the First Island Chain. So in the Taiwan Strait lies a fuse that could set off World War III. By means of the Silk Road project, China is therefore trying to break out of the American stranglehold towards the West. The immediate goal of the numerous ports, corridors, and railway lines is to prevent the disruption of Chinese supply routes. The initial enthusiasm of the landlocked states of Central Asia shows the high hopes held by the BRI partners that the strategy for connectivity along the ancient Silk Road will lead to prosperity gains for all. The real prize, however, lies at the other end of Eurasia: the European market, which is supposed to guarantee sales opportunities for Chinese products in the long run. If Beijing succeeds in tying Europe closer, China and Russia will have taken a big step towards their goal of neutralising US influence in Eurasia. Chinese hawks now see in the sanctions against Russia an opportunity to attack the supremacy of the US dollar. With the start of a new Cold War, however, a new Iron Curtain now threatens to cut through the Chinese Silk Road. From China’s point of view, that would be a geostrategic catastrophe. This is one reason why China, despite the only recently proclaimed ‘limitless friendship’, does not really provide substantive assistance to its junior partner Russia (the second reason is the Russian recognition of two breakaway provinces of a sovereign state; looking at Taiwan, a Chinese horror scenario). Beijing thus has a vested interest in a quick end to the Ukraine war (but is reluctant to take on the responsibility of a mediator). If this does not happen, China is likely to push forward with the expansion of the maritime Silk Roads. Money and financial markets From the point of view of Chinese strategists, following the decline of American industry, the remaining foundation – and thus the Achilles’ heel – of US hegemony is the role of the dollar as the reserve currency on the international goods and financial markets. China has therefore been tinkering for some time on an alternative to the SWIFT system (‘CIPS’) and on a digital currency (Digital Yuan, e-CNY). However, neither of these instruments is yet ready to pose a real threat to the greenback. Chinese hawks now see in the sanctions against Russia an opportunity to attack the supremacy of the US dollar. The freezing of Russian central bank reserves has put all the world’s central banks on high alert. In order not to be blackmailed themselves, they are now likely to shift reserves on a grand scale. If this is at the expense of US investments, it could destabilise the dollar’s position as the global reserve currency. The role of the US dollar as a transaction currency is also a source of frustration. After all, the inflationary pressure emanating from the American Federal Reserve is passed on around the globe by all those actors who rely on the US dollar for conducting their cross-border trades. Russia, China, India, and Iran have therefore been trying for some time to ‘de-dollarise’ their economies by using a broader basket of currencies for their foreign trade. It is therefore hardly surprising that Russia now wants to settle its oil and gas transactions only in roubles. China’s attempts to de-dollarise its own foreign trade also aligns with Beijing’s strategic goal of upgrading the global status of its own currency. But if a US ally like Saudi Arabia is now seriously negotiating to settle its oil deals with China in yuan, this shows how widespread is the resentment of the hegemon. This is not risk-free, because after the abandonment of the gold standard the US dollar was tied to the central commodity of fossil industrial capitalism by the clearing and settlement processes for the global oil trade. If other OPEC countries were to abandon the petrodollar, the returning greenbacks would probably further increase inflationary pressures in the US in the short term. In the long term, both the Chinese RMB and blockchain-based cryptocurrencies could mature into stable transaction currencies. US-sceptical strategists believe that if the US dollar’s functions as a reserve, investment, and transaction currency do indeed continue to erode, then the position of the US currency as the global reserve currency could actually begin to totter. American hawks want to ‘bleed the Russians to send a signal to the Chinese to keep their hands off Taiwan’. However, even after a decade and a half, efforts aiming at ‘de-dollarisation’ have not seriously jeopardised the position of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. As recently as last year, 90 per cent of all foreign exchange transactions continued to be settled in US dollars, and 60 per cent of all central bank reserves are invested in dollars. The blockchain cryptocurrencies in particular are a long way from being able to replace the dollar.And whether a Chinese (digital) currency without open Chinese financial markets can actually take over the functions of a reserve currency is doubtful. American experts therefore believe that the dollar’s position is even more entrenched today because foreign central banks know that in an emergency the American Fed will do everything to shore up the dollar-denominated part of the financial system. What the coming world order will look like will be decided by global power relations. Russia has overestimated its own strength. Even if Moscow still succeeds in winning the war in Ukraine militarily, in geopolitical terms it will fall back into the second tier as China’s junior partner. However, the new instability on the European continent is likely to dampen the economic outlook for Western Europe as well. Following the Ukrainian reality check, geopolitical dreams of an independent European power pole will therefore certainly be re-evaluated by EU member states. This leaves only China and the United States as powers capable of setting and maintaining order. This explains why Washington and Beijing do not wish to be drawn into this ‘European conflict’: the two superpowers read the conflict above all through the lens of their competition over global hegemony. Accordingly, American hawks want to ‘bleed the Russians to send a signal to the Chinese to keep their hands off Taiwan’. Although this is not uncontroversial in Washington, a bipartisan coalition for a Cold War against the ‘alliance of autocracies’ has already been in place for some time. In Beijing, on the other hand, there is still disagreement as to whether it is really in China’s interests to disappear behind a new Iron Curtain alongside a weakening Russian pariah, or whether China would not benefit much more in the long run from an open world order. Geopolitically, it would therefore be a fatal mistake to over-hastily lump the Chinese and the Russians together in an ‘axis of autocracies’. It would be better instead to examine together what a rules-based, multilateral order might look like, one that provided a framework within which the core interests and security concerns of all the powers could be peaceably negotiated and reconciled. Those who think this is unrealistic should remember the last Cold War: then, too, cooperation between systemic rivals within the framework of agreed ground rules was successful.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---Econ Decline

American hegemony is unsustainable and hinders economic development

Fichtner 16 [29 June 2016, Fichtner, Jan, Jan Fichtner is Senior Research Fellow in the CORPNET project at the University of Amsterdam. His research interests lie in the interdisciplinary field of International Political Economy, particularly Global Finance (index funds, index providers, concentration of corporate ownership, structural power, financialization, hedge funds, and offshore financial centers). In the CORPNET group Jan leads the subproject on the rise of index providers and the ascent of very large passive asset managers, such as BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street – and their impact on global corporate governance, corporate control and climate change mitigation., “Perpetual decline or persistent dominance? Uncovering Anglo-America’s true structural power in global finance”, Cambridge University Press, //AA

The Lockean heartland concept, developed by Kees van der Pijl, is an IPE approach integrating both political and economic dimensions.Footnote 18 The approach is named after John Locke who had generally argued for the withdrawal of the state from social and economic life and for self-regulation of civil society. According to van der Pijl, the Lockean state/society complex became recognisable in England in the late seventeenth century.Footnote 19 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 led to the constitutional limitation of state power and the protection of the genuinely ‘private’. The pattern of self-government that settlers from Britain brought with them to North America and Australia enabled the subsequent transnationalisation of the Lockean state/society complex. This formed the basis for the subsequent development of a transnational Lockean heartland spanning across the English-speaking countries: ‘with the Lockean pattern transmitted to the new areas of settlement, there emerged, on the foundations of industrial/commercial centrality and predominance, a heartland of the global political economy’.Footnote 20 The counter model to this Lockean state is the ‘Hobbesian’ state, which is characterised by the primacy of the state. The Hobbesian state generally has an explicit doctrine of national interest and relies on a powerful administration to regulate economy and society. In contrast, the Lockean state generally relies much on free markets that are largely seen as ‘self-regulating’. The mode of expansion of the Lockean state is transnational, whereas that of Hobbesian states is international. One of the primary purposes of the Lockean state is to foster free (capitalist) enterprise that ‘civil society’ (primarily the financial and business elites) pursues at home and abroad. The predominance of the Lockean heartland over the international political economy has been challenged by other states that rose to power. Such ‘Hobbesian contender states’ included Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. China could become the next contender in a few decades;Footnote 21 as a Hobbesian state it seeks to steer and regulate its economy tightly – particularly its financial markets. In addition to Anglosphere and Lockean heartland, there is also the term Anglo-America. Andrew Gamble argues that Anglo-America is an ‘imagined community’, one that is ‘encompassing both ideals and interests, which is constructed and sustained through various narratives and embodied in particular institutions’.Footnote 22 Furthermore, Anglo-America has not one distinct centre, but consists of different states and nations, such as Australia, Britain, Canada, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and the US. He argues that ‘Anglo-America is a political space constituted by wider economic, political, ideological and cultural relationships, and is as a consequence many-sided’.Footnote 23 Similarly, Peter Katzenstein argues that Anglo-America is ‘fluid, not fixed’.Footnote 24 According to Gamble, the hegemony of Anglo-America has four main dimensions. The first is military and has arguably been the most apparent dimension during the last century. The second and third dimensions are political, respectively cultural in nature: the political model advocated by Anglo-America is based on the idea of self-government, and the importance of (transnational) civil society; Anglo-American culture, shaped by Protestantism and individualism, manifests today primarily as consumerism. Finally, the fourth dimension has been the dominant Anglo-American model of capitalism – which is characterised by the primacy of markets, short-term goals, and the confinement of the state to enabling free enterprise rather than actively steering economic development –, and particularly the dissemination of this liberal economic order around the world. Gamble summarises the position of Anglo-America:Footnote 25 Global hegemony is how Anglo-America appears to those outside it, as a hegemonic order fashioned over two hundred years, in which the differences between its various states are less important than what they have in common. Empirical evidence for the existence of an Anglo-American model of capitalism has been found by a number of scholars. Peter Hall and David Soskice as well as Bruno Amable argue that the Anglophone economies constitute a distinct socioeconomic model – ‘liberal market economies’ or ‘market-based economies’;Footnote 26 whereas countries pursuing an opposing model, such as China, have been dubbed ‘state-permeated market economies’.Footnote 27 Schwartz uses the term ‘Americanised Rich’ to characterise the group of Anglophone countries (plus the Netherlands, Sweden, and tentatively Switzerland). He finds that the group of the Americanised Rich has similar housing markets and corporate finance systems to those of the US.Footnote 28 In addition, these countries exhibit an overseas investment pattern comparable to the US, and their inward and outward direct investment from/to America is disproportionately high compared to other countries, such as the ‘Repressed Rich’ (Germany, France, Japan, and others). The exceptionally close transnational ties between the Anglo-American countries are reflected in various statistics pertaining to global finance. For example, the UK is by far the largest source of direct investment into the US when measured by country of ultimate beneficial owner.Footnote 29 The bilateral private portfolio investment relation between the US and the UK is the largest one in the world by far with almost US $2 trillion. Banking claims by foreign investors on the US, and vice versa US banking claims on foreigners, are dominated by the Anglosphere – over 60 per cent in each category.Footnote 30 Furthermore, investment banking, hedge funds, private equity, and burgeoning passive asset management (for example, BlackRock) are quintessentially Anglo-American financial industries, based around New York and London – and virtually nowhere else. The same is true for the top global law firms. Dariusz Wójcik uses the apt term ‘NY-LON’ to capture the joint global dominance of both intertwined financial centres.Footnote 31 Jeremy Green argues that there has been a close interaction between the Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street nexus in the US and the City-Bank-Treasury nexus in the UK.Footnote 32 Moreover, a ‘transatlantic regulatory feedback loop’ between the US and the UK fostered international financial liberalisation and deregulation, making Anglo-America fundamental to the process of financial globalisation.Footnote 33 The dominance of Anglo-America in finance is underpinned by common law, which provides extensive freedom of contract. The legal systems of all Anglophone countries and territories are based on common law, in which law evolves in a bottom-up fashion from individual case decisions, thus significantly facilitating (transnational) finance. Under civil law (Germany, France, Japan, etc.) the state creates law in a top-down manner, which is rather hampering finance – this contrast between common and civil law reflects the Lockean/Hobbesian dichotomy by van der Pijl.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---Econ Decline

Economic downturn is on the brink now due to U.S. hegemony

Fichtner 16 [29 June 2016, Fichtner, Jan, Jan Fichtner is Senior Research Fellow in the CORPNET project at the University of Amsterdam. His research interests lie in the interdisciplinary field of International Political Economy, particularly Global Finance (index funds, index providers, concentration of corporate ownership, structural power, financialization, hedge funds, and offshore financial centers). In the CORPNET group Jan leads the subproject on the rise of index providers and the ascent of very large passive asset managers, such as BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street – and their impact on global corporate governance, corporate control and climate change mitigation., “Perpetual decline or persistent dominance? Uncovering Anglo-America’s true structural power in global finance”, Cambridge University Press, ]//AA

The nine segments discussed in this article allow for a truly comprehensive analysis of Anglo-America’s structural power in global finance roughly from 2000 until 2014. There is no space in this article to attribute different weights to the nine segments (if that is indeed possible) – however, it is clear that financial wealth is by far the largest segment. All nine segments together constitute contemporary global finance – the financial structure in which other states and foreign corporations have to operate. Table 1 provides an overview of the different segments, specifying the latest share of Anglo-America (also split up into the share of the US and that of the other Anglo-American jurisdictions) as well as the trajectory observed in the period for which data have been available. The market shares in the different segments have to be seen against the backdrop that Anglo-America represents about 31 per cent of global GDP. In all segments, except inward direct investment, Anglo-America has a much higher share than this 31 per cent. Anglo-American dominance has been particularly strong (and increasing) in the first two segments of OTC trading. Here, NY-LON has a very dominant position. The third segment is about foreign exchange reserves. Here, the US dollar clearly dominates globally (being also the leading international payments currency). The US is the dominant country in terms of the market capitalisation of domestic publicly listed corporations, the subject of segment four. America accounts for about 22 per cent of global GDP, yet its corporations are responsible for 41 per cent of total global market capitalisation. Thus, US corporations are in a very powerful position globally, as also found by Starrs.Footnote 92 Anglo-America as a whole even accounts for 53 per cent of global market capitalisation. Table 1 Anglo-America’s dominance in nine key domains of global finance (latest year, in percentages). Source: Author. This dominant position is similar in segment five, external bank deposits. Again, the UK plays an important role here, helping to increase Anglo-America’s share in recent years. Segments six, seven, and eight have to be seen together. Segment six, inward direct investment, is the only one in which Anglo-America (28 per cent) has a global share below 43 per cent. However, this should not be interpreted as a weakness, because it is a manifestation of what Schwartz has called ‘global financial arbitrage’;Footnote 93 the US (and Anglo-America in general) invests more in high-yielding outward direct investment, whereas non-Anglophone investors mostly hold lower yielding portfolio investment (including US treasuries) and significantly less inward direct investment into (Anglo-)America. The four novel visualisations presented in this article show very clearly that the US-UK axis is the fulcrum of private global finance and that Anglo-America as a whole has a very dominant position in cross-border finance. The vast majority of non-Anglophone countries shown in the different visualisations is profoundly integrated into Anglo-American structures of global finance, making it extremely difficult for them to decouple. Finally, the analysis of global financial wealth – a good proxy for financial power – is very instructive. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Anglo-America’s share in financial wealth has increased since the financial crisis and remained stable since the early 2000s. If we assume that hegemony in international political economy is cyclical, as many world-system analysis scholars seem to suggest, than it would be logical to conclude that the US is on a trajectory of perpetual decline vis-à-vis the rising powers, such as China. Analysing the power position of the US in isolation misses the big picture, however. America has a ‘family’, so to speak, which is the group of the Anglophone countries. The Anglo-American countries and territories have deep common roots that manifest themselves in similar socioeconomic systems, likewise legal systems based on common law, and comparable overseas investment patterns. Moreover, the Anglosphere has its own corporate community via board interlocks as well as a distinct cross-border direct investment network.Footnote 94 Finally, the unparalleled global intelligence cooperation of the Anglophone countries is the most obvious indication that we should analyse Anglo-America together and not classify the individual jurisdictions solely on geographical grounds. Van der Pijl calls this formation the Lockean heartland of the global political economy, in which Anglo-American ‘civil society’ (primarily the business and financial elites) operates transnationally. That is arguably why Anglo-America is strongly integrated by private financial holdings. The very nature of the Lockean state/society complex implies that Anglo-America is not a formally organised and politically centralised entity. Instead, integration is more informal and often private (the Five Eyes cooperation, board interlocks, or ownership patterns), resulting in extremely elastic and flexible yet robust and ‘deep’ ties that are frequently overlooked by conventional analyses, but nonetheless bind. Occasional disagreements (for example, about joining the AIIB) do not contradict this. On the contrary, they are an immanent feature of the Anglo-American ‘family’ and should not be overrated. The findings of this article show that Anglo-America clearly dominates the structure of global finance with market shares in eight key segments between 43 per cent and 75 per cent. Hence, Anglo-America exerts dominant structural power in global finance. Arguably, today Anglo-American global finance – a complex amalgam of public and private authority – permeates almost every political economy in the world and influences political and economic decision-making. At least in the OECD-world, finance has become the ‘super-structure’, increasingly dominating the structures of production and knowledge (though not necessarily security). The global financial crisis, which developed in Anglo-America and then spread internationally, certainly has led to growing scepticism and even resistance against the liberal Anglo-American model of global finance amongst citizens and politicians in a number of countries.Footnote 95 However, business and financial elites of most countries are still strongly attracted towards Anglo-American markets and corporations. Once countries have integrated themselves into the open international financial order created and dominated by Anglo-America it becomes extremely costly to extricate themselves from it. This is comparable to what Walter Russell Mead has called the ‘sticky’ power of America.Footnote 96 The eurozone and Japan are certainly stuck to this Anglo-American global financial order. At present, the only conceivable challenger to Anglo-America is China, which is actively trying to increase its autonomy, for example, through the AIIB. The findings of this article suggest a coming dilemma for Beijing: if China wants to truly challenge Anglo-America in the global structure of finance, it eventually will need to abolish capital controls. This, however, would diminish Beijing’s control over domestic finance significantly and the interests of Chinese business and financial elites would, over time, increasingly align themselves to the Anglo-American centre, which, contrary to conventional wisdom, is not in perpetual decline but enjoys persistent structural power in global finance. A final note is in order, though. The dominance of Anglo-America in global finance is unambiguous yet at the same time marked by a high degree of latent fragility. Global finance has not been re-regulated drastically after the global financial crisis;Footnote 97 significant imbalances, inequalities and contradictions persist and are even likely to grow, potentially undermining the legitimacy and the stability of the whole system. However, most OECD countries (and increasingly China too), have integrated themselves in the open global financial order dominated by Anglo-America and are hence not inclined to directly challenge it – even though the Anglophone centre (NY-LON) seems to reap significantly larger benefits than them.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---Retrenchment

Retrenchment is gradual now – perception and consistency are key.

Shapiro 22, director of research at the European Council on Foreign Relations, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 05-27-2022 (Jeremy, "Getting to Restraint, Responsibly," World Politics Review, ,  kav) 

The right question is not whether reducing America’s global commitments should take place, but how it can be accomplished in the most responsible manner. 

This fear often expresses itself as an appeal to American exceptionalism and its unique role in upholding world order. For many foreign policy thinkers in the United States, the long arm of U.S. global hegemony has become necessary for maintaining stability in the world and even democracy at home. “The only hope for preserving liberalism at home and abroad,” Robert Kagan informs us, “is the maintenance of a world order conducive to liberalism, and the only power capable of upholding such an order is the United States.” 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---US Decline

Heg is declining ☹

Larison 20 (Daniel Larison, published author and columnist, PhD in history from UChicago, 4/23/2020, “Please Tell The Establishment That U.S. Hegemony Is Over”, The American Conservative, accessed 6/26/2022, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/somebody-tell-the-establishment-that-american-hegemony-is-over/)//sfs

More than 10 years ago, the columnist Charles Krauthammer asserted that American “decline is a choice,” and argued tendentiously that Barack Obama had chosen it. Yet looking back over the last decade, it has become increasingly obvious that this decline has occurred irrespective of what political leaders in Washington want.

The truth is that decline was never a choice, but the U.S. can decide how it can respond to it. We can continue chasing after the vanished, empty glory of the “unipolar moment” with bromides of American exceptionalism. We can continue to delude ourselves into thinking that military might can make up for all our other weaknesses. Or we can choose to adapt to a changed world by prudently husbanding our resources and putting them to uses more productive than policing the world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---US Decline

The “American century” has reached its end -- waning trust with allies and continuous conflict prove

Borger 21 [Borger, Julian, Julian Borger is the Guardian's world affairs editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans., “After the chaos in Kabul, is the American century over?”, The Guardian, ]//AA

A few months ago there were US bases all over Afghanistan where you could immerse yourself in Americana, buy Coke and Snickers bars from vending machines and watch live sport on TV. Now the outpost has shrunk to one side of Kabul airport, a chaotic remnant of a 20-year stay where rearguard troops are trying to salvage the last scraps of dignity and honour, seemingly tossed aside by the political leadership in Washington, by trying to extract American stragglers and Afghan allies. Those allies, once inspired by talk of democracy, women’s rights and the free press, are now faced with the awful life-and-death dilemmas of preserving evidence of their work for or with the US-led coalition, in the hope of last-minute salvation, or destroying it, in a bid to escape execution. The speed and totality of the defeat at the end of the longest war in US history inevitably raises questions about its place in the broader sweep of modern history, and the biggest question perhaps is whether these scenes mark the last throes of the “American century”. It has been an era in which the US was supposed to act as the world’s policeman, maintaining order according to a fixed set of rules, and stepping in when necessary to stop the worst crimes against humanity. The reality often turned out to be far short of that ideal, but is the whole project, in theory and practice, now coming to an end? The term “American century” was coined in 1941 in an essay by the publishing tycoon Henry Luce, who suggested that: “We can make a truly American internationalism something as natural to us in our time as the airplane or the radio.” That ambition was certainly achieved in the years that followed. The liberation of Europe from the Nazis was followed by astoundingly successful exercises in nation-building in West Germany and Japan, which became prosperous democracies and reliable allies. The D-day landings in 1944 cemented America’s commitment to global intervention. There are other populations around the world who have reason to see the US global policeman as essentially a good cop, such as the Bosnians and Kosovans, for whom America stepped in when European powers failed to lead. “It certainly wasn’t the Cuban missile crisis, it certainly wasn’t Iraq, but [the Bosnian intervention] is a good showcase of what can be done when America has a moderate, benign, ambition,” said Sabina Ćudić, of the Bosnian liberal reformist party Naša Stranka. It was in the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Bosnia and the subsequent Dayton peace accords that the US secretary of state Madeleine Albright said: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation.” Few if any US officials talk like that now, and the last Americans left in Afghanistan feel very dispensable indeed. In other parts of the world, the experience of American global policing has been quite different. It was there to allow the oil to flow and the tankers to sail unimpeded, enforcing a set of rules, albeit rules that were designed at the outset to benefit the US and the handful of great powers. In Latin America, the veneer was even thinner, and the policeman acted like the private security firm for a few corporate interests. The American century reached its zenith after the fall of the Berlin wall, and the emergence of the US as the world’s sole, unrivalled superpower. The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, a neat half-century after Luce published his essay. The apotheosis would last a decade, until disaster arrived out of a clear blue sky on 11 September, 2001. Nearly 3,000 were killed in the attacks on New York and Washington, but it was America’s visceral reaction that would prove to be more damaging to US standing in the world. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 marked the high point of US power around the world. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 marked the high point of US power around the world. Photograph: Sipa Press / Rex Features It triggered the “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq, which may be coming to an end for the US now, but which will continue to be the reality for the civilian populations left behind for years, perhaps decades, to come. Disaster followed disaster: the Arab spring was a grotesque inversion of the European democratic revolution it was supposed to emulate, leaving bloody chaos both where the old regimes fell, such as Libya, and where they held firm – Syria. The damage done by 9/11 did not unfold quite as terrorist leader Osama bin Laden intended, according to Nelly Lahoud, an analyst at the thinktank New America who has been sifting through his papers, but it did have a “catastrophic success” in changing the world. It was a case of the autoimmune response proving far more deadly than the infection it was supposed to fight. In a new book, Reign of Terror: How the 9/11 Era Destabilized America and Produced Trump, former Guardian journalist Spencer Ackerman argues that the worst damage was self-inflicted, through the impact of the “global war on terror” and all its excesses: torture, mass surveillance, militarism and authoritarianism. “Of all the endless costs of terrorism, the most important is the least tallied: what fighting it has cost our democracy,” Ackerman writes. “How like America it is not to recognise that the true threat was counterterrorism, nor terrorism.” The backlash produced a repugnance in US public opinion for foreign intervention. One of the few things that Donald Trump and Joe Biden had in common was their determination to leave Afghanistan, and Biden completed the withdrawal that Trump agreed with the Taliban in February 2020 in Doha. The 9/11 attacks provoked retaliatory action that even Osama bin Laden could not have anticipated. The 9/11 attacks provoked retaliatory action that even Osama bin Laden could not have anticipated. Photograph: Peter Morgan/Reuters The speed of the Afghan government’s collapse reflected not just military weakness but also a fecklessness and incompetence which had clearly spread through administrations. At the president’s prompting, officials were adamant that the events unfolding at Kabul airport were not a repeat of the evacuation of Saigon in 1975, photos of which had been an emblem of American defeat for more than a generation. But the similarities were unavoidable. “Having literally been in Saigon for the fall of Saigon, it certainly looks like Saigon to me,” said Viet Thanh Nguyen, a Pulitzer-prize winning author whose family fled Vietnam when he was four, in a tweet. The US evacuated 130,000 Vietnamese allies in 1975 and subsequently accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. It was a test of humanity, but also power. A superpower that cannot or will not protect its allies is not worthy of the name. In a New York Times commentary Nguyen urged the Biden administration to do as much for the Afghans. “For these civilians, the war hasn’t ended, and won’t end for many years. Their future – and Mr Biden’s role in determining whether it’s one of resettlement and new beginnings or one of fear and misery – is what will determine whether America can still claim it will always stand by its allies,” he wrote. The withdrawal of US troops in 1973, and the fall of Saigon two years later, seemed at the time as serious a debacle as Kabul feels now. But it was by no means the end for America’s preeminent role in the world. Mobs scale the wall of the US embassy in Saigon, just before the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Mobs scale the wall of the US embassy in Saigon, just before the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Photograph: Neal Ulevich/AP “As it turns out, US strategy during the cold war – supporting freedom and resisting Soviet communism – succeeded, even in the face of Washington’s blunders in Vietnam and elsewhere,” said Daniel Fried, a former senior state department official now at the Atlantic Council thinktank. The US remains, by most measures, the world’s biggest economy, with a far stronger network of alliances than its rival, China. Josef Joffe, the veteran editor of Die Zeit now an international affairs professor at Johns Hopkins University, said the Kabul fiasco “certainly damages three critical assets of a great power: reliability, credibility and alliance cohesion.” “Nations will now think twice about committing to the US, hedging their bets by edging toward China and Russia,” Joffe said. “Decline, however, this is not. Great powers falter when their material assets wane – as in the case of Britain in the 20th century. By contrast, the US remains the greatest economic power, backed up by technological advantage and the world’s most sophisticated army that can intervene anywhere on the planet, not to speak of the vast cultural clout China and Russia do not have.” Even after Afghanistan, the US military reach around the globe will still be fearsome, with almost 800 bases in more than 70 countries. “The US is the most hyper-interventionist great power in modern history, so that even when the American pendulum sort of swings more toward non-interventionism, the US is still globally involved,” said Dominic Tierney, political science professor at Swarthmore College and the author of The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts. Tierney noted that the US war was not even necessarily over in Afghanistan. The administration has said it will continue to carry out air strikes from afar in the name of counterterrorism. Furthermore, the reduction in the military footprint in Afghanistan and the Middle East is intended to free resources for sharper competition with China. Donald Trump’s chaotic term as president unbalanced US geopolitical relationships around the world. “A retrenchment from the greater Middle East in the service of focusing on greater rivals is something that might well shore up US global hegemony, not weaken it. And I would think that is what most of the Biden administration thinks that they are doing,” said Stephen Wertheim, a historian and fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who examined the origins of the American century in his book, Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of US Global Supremacy. Wertheim argued however that the character of US military interventionism could change in the wake of the defeat in Afghanistan. “It’s hard to imagine that the idea of nation-building by force will survive the war in Afghanistan,” he said, expressing hope that humanitarian impulses would be channelled through non-military means. “That, to me, is a much more productive form of humanitarianism than the fraught project of trying to kill some people in order to save other people.” Few Bosnian Muslims, however, believe more humanitarian supplies would have prevented more Srebrenica-scale massacres in 1995. Ćudić, now a member of the federation parliament in Sarajevo, said: “With all the deserved criticism and analysis of the American foreign policy of the past decades, we will live to regret the decline of American ambition.” The concern in Sarajevo is that Russia and China are filling the space vacated by the US, but without the same interest in preventing the ultimate partition of Bosnia on ethnic lines. It is a pattern being witnessed around the world. “One of the great dangers for analysis that seeks to be critical of imperialism is the assumption that only the west, indeed only the USA, has imperial ambitions and scope. This is fatal,” said Priyamvada Gopal, professor of postcolonial studies at Cambridge University. “By the end of this century, if the world makes it there, the centre of imperial power will have shifted entirely. “What is important is that the centre of gravity of capitalism is shifting southwards, and players from Russia and China to India are emerging.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---US Decline

Hegemony is declining, multilateralism is on the rise

Kupchan 21 (Charles Kupchan, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1/15/2021, “The Case for a Middle Path in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Foreign Policy, accessed 6/26/2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/judicious-retrenchment-isolationism-internationalism/)//sfs

Making matters more complicated is the fact that the United States is no longer a champion of open markets and treaty-based multilateralism. Amid job loss and stagnant wages, protectionism is in vogue on both sides of the aisle. In the meantime, most Republicans have lost their appetite for international partnership; Trump speaks for much of his party when he proclaims that “we will no longer surrender this country or its people to the false song of globalism. … We will never enter America into any agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs.” Democrats remain far more receptive to teamwork with other nations, but getting most treaties through the Senate may be out of reach for the foreseeable future.

Nonetheless, the United States cannot afford to return to the stiff-necked unilateralism that guided its statecraft from the founding era until World War II. Broad international cooperation will be needed to address urgent challenges, including managing a globalized and interdependent economy, arresting climate change, shutting down terrorist networks, countering nuclear proliferation, promoting cybersecurity, and advancing public health. The United States will not be able to accomplish these goals without the help of like-minded partners.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---Heg Low

Russia challenging the US over Ukraine marks the end of US heg

Walt, PhD, 4/14/22 (Stephen M., a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, He receives his bachelors from Stanford University, and his masters and PhD from UC Berkeley, published 4/14/22, accessed 7/7/22, published by Foreign Policy, “The Ukraine War Doesn’t Change Everything”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/13/ukraine-war-realism-great-powers-unipolarity/)//lexmw

Whatever the outcome, many observers believe the war will have a . They see the war in Ukraine as a watershed moment: a giant fork in the road. If Russia loses big, the “liberal world order” will get a new lease on life and the forces of autocracy will suffer a setback. If Putin ekes out some sort of win, however, they foresee a . Existing norms against the acquisition of territory by force will be eroded, and other autocrats will presumably be empowered to launch similar campaigns whenever the geopolitical stars align in their favor. I see it differently. The war in Ukraine is a significant event, but not because the outcome will have a dramatic independent effect on the global balance of power or the normative environment that states have constructed (and sometimes adhere to). Rather, it is important because it signals the end of the brief “unipolar moment” (1993-2020) when the United States was the world’s sole genuine superpower and because it heralds a return to patterns of world politics that were temporarily suppressed during the short era of unchallenged U.S. primacy. The end of that era was in sight long before Russia invaded Ukraine, however, and the war itself is more of a punctuation mark. (For a similar take, see Stephen Kotkin .) I am less inclined to see the war in Ukraine as a transformative moment because I’ve heard that song too many times in recent decades. We were told that “everything had changed” when the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union imploded, and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. A new world order was at hand, the “,” mankind had supposedly reached the “,” and liberal capitalist democracy (preferably the American version) was now the only game in town. But then “everything changed” again on Sept. 11, 2001, and we were suddenly in a “global war on terror,” which some tried to repackage as “.” But hold on! “Everything changed” yet again when financial markets collapsed in 2008 and Wall Street’s “masters of the universe” were revealed to be gullible, fallible, and corrupt. And then “everything changed” once more when Donald Trump became president and began trampling every norm in the U.S. political playbook. So forgive me if I have trouble seeing the war in Ukraine as a decisive turning point in the history of humanity. For all the damage and suffering that have already occurred, it has a long way to go before it reaches the levels of destruction wrought by the wars in Indochina, between Iran and Iraq, or in —or by the . The war could still get there, of course—especially if weapons of mass destruction are used—but the odds are against it (a prediction that I fervently hope turns out to be correct). More importantly, what is different about the current war is that for the first time since the early 1990s—but hardly the first time in history—there are rival great powers on the opposite sides of a major war. But this is a reversion to familiar patterns of great-power conflicts (and proxy wars) and not something novel or unique. As suggested above, this war is more accurately seen as marking the official end of the brief quasi-peace that followed the end of the Cold War. War didn’t disappear in that period—the United States fought in a bunch of them and started several—but the conflicts during this period were either civil wars, wars between minor powers, gross mismatches between major powers and minor powers, or some combination of all three. Direct great-power competition was muted because neither Russia nor China was strong enough to openly resist the United States. Dartmouth College political scientist William Wohlforth was partly right when he wrote of the “”: Few countries wanted to face the “focused enmity” of the United States or take actions that might bring the United States into the game in opposition. Where Wohlforth erred was his prediction that unipolarity might last even longer than Cold War bipolarity. That misjudgment was not entirely his fault, however, as he could not have foreseen the repeated blunders that hastened the end of the unipolar era. U.S. primacy and unipolar stability would have lasted longer if U.S. policymakers had been smarter, less ideologically driven, and more realistic (in every sense of that term). Instead of preserving U.S. power, resolving conflicts wherever possible, and working to ensure that no peer competitor emerged, U.S. officials mostly did the exact opposite. They and squandered trillions of dollars in . Instead of extending liberal institutions gradually through mechanisms such as the Partnership for Peace, they expanded NATO with scant regard for Russian concerns and blithely assumed that Moscow could or would do nothing to stop it. Instead of taking a more measured approach to globalization and making sure its benefits were widely shared inside the United States, they embraced neoliberal approaches to global trade and investment and did not do enough to insulate endangered sectors of the U.S. workforce from globalization’s consequences. And instead of working overtime to make American democracy a model that other societies might want to emulate, U.S. politicians—and here I refer primarily to the Republican Party—repeatedly trampled on the principles and norms that are essential for true democracy to survive. The unipolar moment was never going to last forever, but repeated sins of omission and commission—for which no one was ever held accountable—brought it to a premature end. So where will this leave us? In the immortal words of Talking Heads: “.” First, it is a world where hard power still matters, as everyone has now been reminded. If Russia succeeds in incorporating the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and a land bridge to Crimea, it will be because its military forces were able to accomplish that mission despite their earlier miscalculations and missteps. If Ukraine retains all or most of its former territory, it will be because of the hard power its citizens employed (with lots of outside help) to stop its larger neighbor. If the much ballyhooed “norm against conquest” gets reinforced, it will not be because Putin suddenly remembered that norms ought to be followed but because the combination of Ukrainian nationalism and effective weaponry proved too much for Moscow to overcome.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---Heg Low

Ukraine marks the limits of America’s influence, letting multipowers emerge

Ashford, PhD, 7/4/22(Emma M., is currently a resident senior fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and has a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, published 7/4/22, accessed 7/7/22, “Ukraine and the Return of the Multipolar World”, )//lexmw

It is therefore easy to see why many have hailed the —and the unexpected successes of the Ukrainian military in pushing back the initial Russian onslaught—as a repudiation of spheres of influence in world affairs, and a reassertion of the notion of an American-led liberal international order in which power and might matters less than norms and values. But nothing could be more mistaken. A is not a normative concept, nor something a state cedes to another out of courtesy or pity. It is instead a simple fact: the place where one great power is unwilling or unable to commit the necessary resources to force another state to submit. In that regard, Ukraine is itself not a repudiation of the idea of spheres of influence, but rather a clear example of how they work in practice. Ukraine is both a clear indicator of the limits of America’s global sphere of influence in the post-Cold War period, and a demonstration of the extent to which Russia is able to defend what it sees as its own regional sphere. The war in Ukraine thus does not mark a continuation of the , but instead, a dividing line between the period when the United States saw the whole world as its sphere of influence, and a new, more multipolar world in which U.S. power is . To put it another way: the war in Ukraine has demonstrated three things about the shifting balance of global power. First, while America may still claim a global sphere of influence, it is not willing in practice to risk a with Russia to protect Ukraine. American arms, intelligence, and finance have undoubtedly served to tip the balance in the conflict, but it will not be fought by American troops. Second, spheres of influence are rarely uncontested, and Russia has thus far proven incapable of imposing its will on Ukraine, failing to achieve both its primary and secondary military goals in this war. As such, the boundaries of a potential Russian sphere of influence may in practice be far smaller than assumed prior to February 24. They may be limited to little more than Russia’s own borders. Third, while much of the coverage of the war in Ukraine has been framed in this bipolar way—presenting the conflict as a struggle between Russia and the West—the response to the war has been far . Outside of Europe, most states have taken a more nuanced approach to the crisis. Poorer African and Asian states have joined UN votes condemning Russia but have not joined sanctions. India has refused to take sides, a decision rooted in its partial dependence on Russian military exports, and has benefitted from cut-rate Russian oil exports. The Gulf States have for the most part carefully cultivated their neutrality, refusing to increase oil production or even to call the conflict a war. Meanwhile, Beijing has pursued cautious support of Moscow but has resisted any deeper political or economic involvement. None of this suggests either that we are headed back into the post-Cold War unipolar moment, or that we are headed for a new Cold War-style showdown with Russia, or even with both Russia and China. Instead, it suggests that the world is increasingly fracturing into a more complex and multipolar environment, one in which America’s long-running foreign policy adventurism and overreach are liable to leave it overextended. For all the triumphalism of the Washington foreign policy narrative on Ukraine, it would be foolish for U.S. policymakers to assume that this war presents either a vindication of the or a repudiation of power politics and spheres of influence. Instead, it suggests that they must learn to navigate a world that is not divided into black and white, but rather, into many shades of gray.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Other › 2NC---UQ---Heg Low

Heg low now – COVID, climate change, and Ukraine

Guyer 3/1 – foreign policy journalist, 3/1/22. (Jonathan, “The Ukraine war shows the limits of US power”, Vox, , accessed 7/7/22)//jd

Russia has violated Ukraine’s sovereignty and international law. The US response has been economic: sanctions against Russia that are the largest ever and yet simultaneously unlikely to alter the shape of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression. So, how should we think about the US as a superpower in 2022? It’s too early to draw broad conclusions about what war in Eastern Europe means for the future of America in the world. But there are enough clues to suggest that America’s power has limits, and indeed it always has. With the Soviet Union’s demise, the United States achieved global dominance for a brief unipolar moment. Then President George W. Bush squandered it through destructive (and expensive) misguided regime-change wars. Subsequent presidents gaslit the American public on progress in the Middle East in two conflicts that killed hundreds of thousands. Despite all those unforced errors, the United States remains a superpower, though the limits of non-military power have been exposed. Thomas Pickering, who served as ambassador to Russia from 1993 to 1996, says that the “caricature” of America as a superpower has obscured the way most Americans think about how the world works. As a career diplomat over four decades, Pickering witnessed America’s global position change from the Cold War to the breakup of the Soviet Union to the height of US supremacy at the turn of the millennium. “If your assumption is that a superpower can do anything, anywhere, anytime it wishes, without suffering the consequences of risk and uncertainty, then you misperceived the current world situation,” he told me. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, explained A superpower is not infallible and omnipotent. The United States will not send in troops but has shipped hundreds of millions of dollars of weapons to Ukraine, shepherded an international coalition to institute wide-ranging economic sanctions, and encouraged tech companies and global organizations like FIFA and the Olympics to pursue the cultural isolation of Russia. And yet the United States, even with the world’s largest military and most robust economy, has not been able to induce Russia toward a different path. So, Putin continues to deploy his army toward Kyiv. And stopping that incursion does not appear to be something America has the power to change without risking nuclear war. Superpowers need to pick their battles and engage in the same tough choices as any other country — especially when confronted with an adversary with nuclear capability, such as Russia. And rather than grasping the complexity of world affairs, many Americans have internalized the shibboleths that the US has never lost a war and that the US never compromises with enemies, especially during a conflict. Neither is true. Both factors show that, as a country, the United States has failed to recognize its own constraints, some of which have long existed and are simply accentuated by Russian aggression. How the unipolar moment ended When the Cold War ended in the ’90s, the United States possessed unrivaled economic and military power. Scholar Francis Fukuyama claimed the “End of History” and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted the centrality of American exceptionalism in her coinage, “the indispensable nation.” Some argue that that unipolar moment was overstated. “Look, the Americans suffered from hubris after the end of the Soviet Union,” said Joseph Nye, a Harvard professor who has written widely about American power. “The unipolar moment, I think, was always illusory.” At the end of the Cold War, the US did continue to hold itself out as the guarantor of security. “The United States appointed itself as responsible for peace, security, and democracy in Europe,” Stephen Wertheim, a historian of US foreign policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me. In response to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the United States, through NATO, took military action against Serbia. The intervention was relatively limited, and the outcome of it was a successful projection of US might. But that unilateral moment, real or imagined, was short-lived. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were not what challenged that global supremacy, argues Wertheim. Rather, it was the 20 disastrous years of overreach in America’s response. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the limits of US power. It could be said that Osama bin Laden understood something about Americans that they didn’t understand about themselves, namely that in reaction to heinous terror attacks America would overreact. With the invasion and occupation of two countries, the US would face two decades of blowback that tore at the country’s seams, that undermined democratic values through the war on terrorism at home and abroad. “Basically, with the Iraq invasion, we bite off more than we can chew, and we get a comeuppance,” said Nye. The United States, mired in the Middle East and Afghanistan, continued to expand its role as global policeman through a network of US bases and military commitments that, counterintuitively, detracted from US power. It’s at this time that China began to rise as a counterbalancing force and Russia reemerged as a power in Europe. “As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have obvious problems, we start to enter into a gradual period of decline in belief that the United States can reshape other societies,” Wertheim explained. “One problem is that this led us to make commitments to Ukraine. That means that we suffer a loss of prestige when we don’t make good those commitments.” President Joe Biden speaks about the end of the war in Afghanistan from the White House on August 31, 2021. Evan Vucci/AP Now that the US is caught in a potential face-off with a nuclear superpower, it is clear that perhaps the biggest failure of recent years has been the de-emphasis on arms control and the reduction of nuclear weapons worldwide. President Barack Obama, who in his early life was a staunch anti-nuclear activist, negotiated a new START Treaty in 2011, which curbs and monitors the US and Russia’s nuclear warheads. That’s now been extended to 2026, but more is needed. Over decades, Washington and Moscow allowed the arms control regime to decline, which culminated in President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the important 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. “Slowly, the structures that kept US-Russian military competition visible and predictable fell away,” said Heather Hurlburt, of the think tank New America. “At the same time, Beijing” — itself a nuclear power — “is building up its arsenal and making it very clear that it’s not interested in the US-Soviet arms control model.” And other global crises, such as the pandemic, have exposed the inability of the US to lead as the indispensable nation. The lesser-discussed dynamics that have undermined US power Now the United States and Europe are waging an economic war against Russia. Underneath that, one can see America’s failure to imagine a post-oil economy or a globally urgent set of policies to address the climate crisis. Even as sanctions hobble Russia, the international market depends on Russian energy resources — with inevitable knock-on effects that damage everyone else. The human rights rhetoric from American leaders has also deluded Americans. Most US presidents, with the exception of Trump, have spotlighted abuses worldwide. But they have not stopped the American way of doing hefty business with prominent abusers like Russia and China. Europe also got comfortable with this equation, as Maximilian Popp writes in Spiegel International. It’s a contradiction that has empowered authoritarians like Putin. While the US has failed to act assertively on the global crises that it cannot avoid — climate and pandemic, to name only two — the diplomatic corps have also been hollowed out. Trump can be blamed for some of this disintegration but not all of it. Europe has wondered whether the problem wasn’t only Trump but, at its core, America. This is especially the case after the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan last summer. “The Afghanistan thing got to a deeper worry that they have about American power,” said Jeremy Shapiro of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Though European leaders may be muted about this issue now, he told me that there are concerns about American competence because of polarization in Washington, “because the Republicans and Democrats are playing domestic politics with everything.” US democracy and America’s capacity to promote human rights worldwide are connected, says Suzanne Nossel, the CEO of PEN America. “It’s now hit home at a much deeper level, that those two things are intertwined and that our democracy is seen as teetering and crumbling at the edges, that we cannot be an effective force for democracy globally,” she told me. A country that has depended on its standing as an economic force and a democratic authority worldwide is at its weakest and most dysfunctional in half a century or more. Hurlburt calls it “self-inflicted decline.” The combined result is that the US is effectively not showing up. It’s good that Biden has ruled out putting US troops into Russia’s new war in Europe, a potentially endless conflict for a country that took two decades to leave Afghanistan. That decision lays bare a reality that American foreign policy circles have too often ignored. As Hurlburt put it, “Gravity applies to us just like everybody else.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---China Rise

US Econ downturn is happening now - China catching up and inflation are telltale signs

Donnan and Curran 22 [4 March 2022, Donnan, Shawn, Shawn Donnan is an award-winning senior writer for Bloomberg News where he reports on the US and global economies. He joined Bloomberg in 2018 from the Financial Times where he served as World Trade Editor and prior to that, World News Editor, coordinating the paper's global coverage of economics and politics. He also worked as a correspondent and editor for the FT in Indonesia and Hong Kong, from where he edited the paper's China coverage. He is a graduate of Boston University., Curran, Enda, Hailing from a farming family in the hills of County Wicklow, Ireland, Enda covers major themes and trends driving Asia’s economies as a correspondent for Bloomberg News. Recent coverage has focused on China’s transition, Myanmar’s fading star and Japan’s struggle for growth. Before joining Bloomberg News, Enda was at The Wall Street Journal where he covered the Asian operations of the world’s biggest financial institutions. Previous postings included London and Sydney., “America Flexes Its Financial Dominance”, Bloomberg, ]//AA

The Mighty Greenback Ever since Donald Trump entered the White House, the global economy has been shuffling into what strategic thinkers have warned is increasingly a bipolar world featuring a rising China-led club of autocracies against the U.S. and its fellow declining guardians of liberal democracy. This is the week that, thanks to Vladimir Putin and the U.S.-led reaction to his invasion of Ukraine, the shuffle arguably turned into a sprint towards that divided world. It’s also the week that a U.S. written off by many at home and abroad as a dysfunctional aging power reasserted its unique place in the global economy. China Is Catching Up in Economic Weight... Share of global GDP (at PPP) History moves frighteningly fast some times. But when it does so it also usually shines a light on truths that we’ve forgotten. And that second point above — the one about American power reasserting itself — may just be the forgotten truth to seize on this time. The dominant strategic narrative about the approaching bipolar world depended a lot on an ever-rising China being ready to offer an alternative to the U.S. This week we’re learning that it probably isn’t and that Xi Jinping has reasons to be nervous about that. ... But Far Behind in Financial Clout The Chinese currency remains a bit-part player on the global scene Source: SWIFT, International Monetary Fund As we write in today’s Bloomberg Big Take here, China may be catching up when it comes to economic output, the bit measured by GDP. But the U.S. still controls the financial architecture that makes the global economy run, which gives it and its allies the ability to turn off the switch and quickly isolate even big economies like Russia. Beijing’s efforts over more than a decade to create an alternative have so far fallen way short of presenting a meaningful alternative to the dollarized world. The renminbi accounts for just about 3% of global payments and a mere 2.7% of official foreign-exchange reserves. As analysts at the Rhodium Group wrote, the China Interbank Payment System set up as a way around dollar-based payments, so far features just 75 participants, all of which are overseas branches of Chinese banks. That may change. The war in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia’s central bank and its foreign reserves brought by the U.S. and Europe may precipitate a rush out of the dollar and a broad embrace of China’s new systems, as some have warned. But there's an equally plausible opposing prediction — that the war and the economic lessons of the response serve as a reminder of the lack of real alternatives and cement the dollar's place for some time. —Shawn Donnan Got tips or feedback? Email us at ecodaily@bloomberg.net Sign up here to get the latest updates on the Russian invasion of Ukraine The Economic Scene G-7 Inflation Consumer price indexes across major economies are already on the rise Source: OECD * Supply chains that rattled the global economy through the pandemic are unleashing another shock as efforts to choke off trade with Russia strain resources ranging from fertilizer needed for crops and palladium for car-making, to oil that’s used to produce almost everything. The upshot: a world economy that again faces the prospect of stagflationary forces as inflation quickens and growth fades, compelling central banks to choose which to tackle while fearing the challenge they don’t take on then gets out of hand. The choice is even starker now than it was during the early days of the pandemic. Back then, monetary policy makers elected to buoy demand as a recession hit. Now inflation is at multi-decade highs, forcing them to focus on runaway prices, although perhaps alert to the risk they may have to move more slowly than anticipated. “Were this 2022 supply shock a first, central banks would be more confident of its transitory inflation impact,” said Alan Ruskin, chief international strategist at Deutsche Bank AG. “But this is an inflation shock compounding pre-existing evidence of sticky inflation, so adding to concerns that policy will have to treat attendant higher prices as more than a temporary phenomena, even if growth slows.” Need-to-Know Research What’s the difference between 5% and 5.5%? When it comes to China’s growth target for 2022 — set to be announced by Premier Li Keqiang the morning of March 5 in Beijing — it amounts to a notably different trajectory for policy the rest of the year. So say JPMorgan Chase & Co. economists led by Zhu Haibin. Observers’ expectations have coalesced around a 5.5% goal and a 5% bottom line. The lower target would involve “neutral” policy, while the higher one would require stronger monetary easing, they wrote to clients this week. Reliable GDP Growth Targets China’s economy has almost never missed its target Sources: Government Work Reports; National Economic and Social Development Reports; National Bureau of Statistics Note: GDP growth targets: 2000, 2002-2004: ~7% | 2001: 7%; 2005-2011: ~8% | 2012: 7.5% | 2013-2014: ~7.5%; 2015: ~7% | 2016: 6.5%-7% | 2017-2018: ~6.5% | 2019: 6%-6.5%; 2020 no target | 2021 >6% One reason confidence in financial markets has yet to recover from the tumble in late 2021 and early this year is that policy settings aren’t in accord with 5.5% growth this year, they wrote. The team also provides some plain-English explanations of language that may come up during the week-and-a-half-long National People’s Congress gathering. “Efficiency” in fiscal policy refers to how well it’s coordinating with monetary policy. “Precision” means targeted support for manufacturing along with bigger cuts to taxes and fees, while “sustainability” refers to minding fiscal deficits and controlling local government debt risks.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---China Rise

American Hegemony is collapsing now --- China is ahead in key areas

Mccoy 22 -  is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1/20/22 (Alfred, “Washington’s Dominion Is Ending—but Not Without a Struggle”, The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/washingto-china-pacific-hegemony/, Accessed 6-17-2022)//jd 

THE THREE PILLARS OF US GLOBAL POWER In the late 1990s, at the absolute apex of US global hegemony, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, far more astute as an armchair analyst than an actual practitioner of geopolitics, issued a stern warning about the three pillars of power necessary to preserve Washington’s global control. First, the United States must avoid the loss of its strategic European “perch on the Western periphery” of Eurasia. Next, it must block the rise of “an assertive single entity” across the continent’s massive “middle space” of Central Asia. And finally, it must prevent “the expulsion of America from its offshore bases” along the Pacific littoral. Drunk on the heady elixir of limitless global power following the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, Washington’s foreign-policy elites made increasingly dubious decisions that led to a rapid decline in their country’s dominance. In an act of supreme imperial hubris, born of the belief that they were triumphantly at the all-American “end of history,” Republican neoconservatives in President George W. Bush’s administration invaded and occupied first Afghanistan and then Iraq, convinced that they could remake the entire Greater Middle East, the cradle of Islamic civilization, in America’s secular, free-market image (with oil as their repayment). After an expenditure of nearly $2 trillion on operations in Iraq alone and nearly 4,598 American military deaths, all Washington left behind was the rubble of ruined cities, more than 200,000 Iraqi dead, and a government in Baghdad beholden to Iran. The official US Army history of that war concluded that “an emboldened and expansionist Iran appears to be the only victor.” Meanwhile, China spent those same decades building industries that would make it the workshop of the world. In a major strategic miscalculation, Washington admitted Beijing to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, bizarrely confident that a compliant China, home to nearly 20% of humanity and historically the world’s most powerful nation, would somehow join the global economy without changing the balance of power. “Across the ideological spectrum,” as two former Obama administration officials later wrote, “we in the U.S. foreign policy community shared the underlying belief that U.S. power and hegemony could readily mold China to the United States’ liking.” A bit more bluntly, former national security adviser H.R. McMaster concluded that Washington had empowered “a nation whose leaders were determined not only to displace the United States in Asia, but also to promote a rival economic and governance model globally.” During the 15 years after it joined the WTO, Beijing’s exports to the United States grew nearly fivefold to $462 billion while, by 2014, its foreign currency reserves surged from just $200 billion to an unprecedented $4 trillion, a vast treasure it used to launch its trillion-dollar “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), aimed at uniting Eurasia economically through newly built infrastructure. In the process, Beijing began a systematic demolition of Brzezinski’s three pillars of US geopolitical power. THE FIRST PILLAR—EUROPE Beijing has scored its most surprising success so far in Europe, long a key bastion of American global power. As part of a chain of 40 commercial ports it’s been building or rebuilding around Eurasia and Africa, Beijing has purchased major port facilities in Europe, including outright ownership of the Greek port of Piraeus and significant shares in those of Zeebrugge in Belgium, Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and Hamburg, Germany. After a state visit from Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2019, Italy became the first G-7 member to officially join the BRI agreement, subsequently signing over a portion of its ports at Genoa and Trieste. Despite Washington’s strenuous objections, in 2020, the European Union and China also concluded a draft financial services agreement that, when finalized in 2023, will more fully integrate their banking systems. While China is building ports, rails, roads, and powerplants across the continent, its Russian ally continues to dominate Europe’s energy market and is now just months away from opening its controversial Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea, guaranteed to increase Moscow’s economic influence. As the massive pipeline project moved to completion last December, Russian President Putin intensified pressures on NATO with a roster of “extravagant” demands, including a formal guarantee that Ukraine not be admitted to the alliance, removal of all the military infrastructure installed in Eastern Europe since 1997, and a prohibition against future military activity in Central Asia. In a power play not seen since Stalin and Mao joined forces in the 1950s, the alliance between Putin’s raw military force and Xi’s relentless economic pressure may indeed slowly be pulling Europe away from America. Complicating the US position, Britain’s exit from the European Union cost Washington its most forceful advocate inside Brussels’ labyrinthine corridors of power. And as Brussels and Washington grow apart, Beijing and Moscow only come closer. Through joint energy ventures, military maneuvers, and periodic summits, Putin and Xi are reprising the Stalin-Mao alliance, a strategic partnership at the heart of Eurasia that could, in the end, break Washington’s steel chains that have long stretched from Eastern Europe to the Pacific. THE SECOND PILLAR—CENTRAL ASIA Under its bold BRI scheme to fuse Europe and Asia into a unitary Eurasian economic bloc, Beijing has crisscrossed Central Asia with a steel-ribbed cat’s cradle of railroads and oil pipelines, effectively toppling Brzezinski’s second pillar of geopolitical power—that the United States must block the rise of “an assertive single entity” in the continent’s vast “middle space.” When President Xi first announced the Belt and Road Initiative at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University in September 2013, he spoke expansively about “connecting the Pacific and the Baltic Sea,” while building “the biggest market in the world with unparalleled potential.” In the decade since, Beijing has put in place a bold design for transcending the vast distances that historically separated Asia and Europe. Starting in 2008, the China National Petroleum Corporation collaborated with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to launch a Central Asia-China gas pipeline that will eventually extend more than 4,000 miles. By 2025, in fact, there should be an integrated inland energy network, including Russia’s extensive grid of gas pipelines, reaching 6,000 miles from the Baltic to the Pacific. The only real barrier to China’s bid to capture Eurasia’s vast “middle space” was the now-ended US occupation of Afghanistan. To join Central Asia’s gas fields to the energy-hungry markets of South Asia, the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline was announced in 2018, but progress though the critical Afghan sector was slowed by the war there. In the months before it captured Kabul, however, Taliban diplomats turned up in Turkmenistan and China to offer assurances about the project’s future. Since then, the scheme has been revived, opening the way for Chinese investment that could complete its capture of Central Asia. THE THIRD PILLAR—THE PACIFIC LITTORAL The most volatile flashpoint In Beijing’s grand strategy for breaking Washington’s geopolitical grip over Eurasia lies in the contested waters between China’s coast and the Pacific littoral, which the Chinese call “the first island chain.” By building a half-dozen island bases of its own in the South China Sea since 2014, swarming Taiwan and the East China Sea with repeated fighter plane forays, and staging joint maneuvers with Russia’s navy, Beijing has been conducting a relentless campaign to begin what Brzezinski called “the expulsion of America from its offshore bases” along that Pacific littoral. As China’s economy grows larger and its naval forces do, too, the end of Washington’s decades-long dominion over that vast ocean expanse may be just over the horizon. For one thing, China may at some point achieve supremacy in certain critical military technologies, including super-secure “quantum entanglement” satellite communications and hypersonic missiles. Last October, the chair of the US Joint Chiefs, Gen. Mark Milley, called China’s recent launch of a hypersonic missile “very close” to “a Sputnik moment.” While US tests of such weapons, which can fly faster than 4,000 mph, have repeatedly failed, China successfully orbited a prototype whose speed and stealth trajectory suddenly make US aircraft carriers significantly more difficult to defend. But China’s clear advantage in any struggle over that first Pacific island chain is simply distance. A battle fleet of two US supercarriers operating 5,000 miles from Pearl Harbor could deploy, at best, 150 jet fighters. In any conflict within 200 miles of China’s coast, Beijing could use up to 2,200 combat aircraft as well as DF-21D “carrier-killer” missiles whose 900-mile range makes them, according to US Navy sources, “a severe threat to the operations of U.S. and allied navies in the western Pacific.” The tyranny of distance, in other words, means that the US loss of that first island chain, along with its axial anchor on Eurasia’s Pacific littoral, should only be a matter of time. In the years to come, as more such incidents erupt around Eurasia’s ring of fire, readers can insert them into their own geopolitical model—a useful, even essential, means for understanding a fast-changing world. And as you do that, just remember that history has never ended, while the US position in it is being remade before our eyes. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---China Rise

U.S. hegemony is over -- China will replace the U.S. as primary hegemon

Layne 18 [Layne, Christopher, Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and the Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His fields of interest are international relations theory, great power politics, U.S. foreign policy, and grand strategy., “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana”, Oxford University Press, International affairs (London) Vol. 94, Issue 1]//AA

American decline redux Today the military, economic, institutional and ideational pillars that have supported the Pax Americana are being challenged by China. This raises two fundamental and intimately connected questions: if China surpasses, equals or even approximates the United States in these dimensions of power, can the Pax Americana endure? And, if it cannot, what will replace it? Posing these questions raises the contentious issue—contentious at least in the US—of whether American power is, in fact, declining. During his abortive 2012 run for the Republican presi- dential nomination, Jon Huntsman—President Obama’s Ambassador to China, and now President Trump’s Ambassador to Russia—succinctly expressed the prevailing view of the US foreign policy establishment when he said: ‘Decline is un-American.’ Leading US security studies experts agree. These primacists argue that the extent of China’s rise—and hence of America’s decline—are, like prema- ture reports of Mark Twain’s death, greatly exaggerated. Primacists believe the international system is still unipolar, and that US power will keep it that way for a long time to come. This claim is increasingly dubious. Indeed, the case made by the ‘declinists’ of the 1980s—notably Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, David Calleo and Samuel P. Huntington—looks stronger every day.23 Contrary to the portrayal of their argument by many of their critics, the 1980s declinists did not claim either that America’s post-Second World War power advantages had already dissipated, or that the United States was on the brink of a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they pointed to domestic and international economic drivers that, over time, would cause American economic power to diminish relatively, thereby shifting the balance of power. In essence, the declinists believed that the United States was experiencing a slow—‘termite-like’—decline caused by fundamental structural weaknesses in the American economy that were gradually nibbling at its founda- tions.24 Kennedy himself was explicitly looking ahead to the effects this termite decline would have on the US world role in the early twenty-first century. As he wrote: The task facing American statesmen over the next decades … is to recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there is a need to ‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage.25 The unwinding of the Pax Americana Decline may be ‘un-American’, but that does not mean it isn’t happening. Ameri- ca’s ‘unipolar moment’ has turned out to be rather—well, momentary.26 The Great Recession that began in 2007–2008 did not end America’s unipolar ascen- dancy. It did, however, focus attention on, and accelerate, the ebbing of American power—the evidence of which has cumulated rapidly over the ensuing ten years. This slippage of US dominance is chipping away at each of the four pillars on which the Pax Americana was erected: military power; economic power; institu- tions; and soft power. As these pillars erode, it becomes increasingly doubtful that the Pax Americana can endure. China’s challenge to American military power Until now the dominant view within the US foreign policy establishment has been that military strength is the one area in which America’s advantage is insur- mountable (at least within any meaningful time-frame). American military power is considered by US policy-makers and many security studies scholars to be the geopolitical trump card—no pun intended—that will ensure continuing American dominance even if China closes the economic and technological gaps separating it from the United States.27 However, some within the foreign policy establish- ment are beginning to question this viewpoint. Important recent studies of the Sino-American military balance suggest that some analysts are taking a fresh look at the question of how long it will take China to catch up with the US militarily. China and the United States face different grand strategic challenges. As self- styled global hegemon, America must be able project decisive military power to the three regions it considers vital to both its security and its prosperity: Europe, the Middle East and east Asia. In contrast, China’s strategic goals, at least for now, are more limited. China aims at dominating its own geographic backyard: that is, it seeks regional hegemony in east and south-east Asia, which have become the focal points of Sino-American geopolitical competition. Even if China is not at present able to mount a global challenge to the US, there is evidence that it is beginning to draw level with the United States in regional military power in east Asia. In a recent report on the Sino-American military balance, the RAND Corporation refers to the ‘receding frontier of US military dominance’ in east Asia.28 According to RAND, the trend lines in the Sino-American military rivalry in east Asia are not favourable for the United States: ‘Although China has not closed the gap with the United States, it has narrowed it—and it has done so quite rapidly. Even for many of the contributors to this report, who track military developments in Asia on an ongoing basis, the speed of change … was striking.’29 In a recent book, Roger Cliff, an east Asian security expert at RAND, says that by 2020 China’s military establishment will be almost on an equal footing with America’s with respect to doctrine, equipment, personnel and training (though still lagging behind in organizational structure, logistics and organizational culture). Consequently, he predicts that by 2020 American military dominance in east Asia will be significantly eroded.30 He predicts that the 2020s will witness a power transition in east Asia and that at this point China will be able to challenge the regional status quo.31 American economic decline and the impairment of US economic hegemony During the past decade, signs of waning US economic power—and China’s growing economic muscle—have become too numerous to ignore. Since the onset of the Great Recession, China has successively taken top position in the world in exports (passing Germany); in trade (passing the United States); and in manufacturing (claiming a title the United States had held for a century). In 2014 the World Bank made the stunning announcement that China had vaulted past the United States to become the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity (PPP);32 and in the early to mid-2020s China is predicted to overtake the United States in GDP measured by market exchange rate.33 These shifts in the relative economic power of China and the United States have enormous economic and geopolitical implications. Indeed, in July 2017 Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, stated that in ten years’ time the organization’s headquar- ters—which are required by its by-laws to be located in its member country with the largest economy—could be in Beijing.34 Taken together, these indicators paint a clear picture of relative economic decline. American primacists have advanced a number of clever but unconvincing arguments in an attempt to downplay the significance of the ongoing economic power shift from America to China. For example, some primacists assert that per capita GDP is a better yardstick of national power than aggregate GDP; that newly developed metrics of national power have diminished the importance of GDP as a measure of a state’s economic power; that China is far behind the United States in advanced technology; and that China is incapable of doing innovation.35 This last claim is ubiquitous among primacists.36 It is, however, undermined by recent developments. For example, in September 2016 China began operating the world’s largest radio telescope, which is intended to project China’s ambitions deep into the universe, and bring back the kind of dramatic discoveries that win honours such as Nobel Prizes.37 In August 2016 China launched the world’s first quantum satellite, which could lead ‘to new, completely different methods for transmitting information’.38 In another example of how China is catching up with the United States in innovation and technology, in June 2016 a Chinese computer (using made-in-China microprocessors) topped the ranking of the world’s fastest supercomputers.39 In July 2017 China’s State Council announced an ambitious plan to sprint to the front of the pack in artificial intelligence (AI), including both military and civilian applications.40 Indeed, The Economist recently observed that already ‘China could be a close second to America—and perhaps even ahead of it—in some areas of AI’.41 And China is moving to the forefront in green technologies (solar panels and wind-generated power) and in electric cars.42 The waning of US economic dominance may not be obvious to primacists, but it is perfectly apparent to many observers in the real world.43 The weakening of US relative economic power, which became unmistakably clear during the Great Recession, has undercut the Pax Americana both by compromising the United States’ ability to manage the international economy and by shifting the Sino- American geopolitical balance in east Asia. During the Great Recession it became evident that in some (not all) respects the United States was unable to fulfil its responsibility as the international economy’s manager. After all, an economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them. But it was the freezing up of the US financial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the global economy into hot water. The economic hegemon is supposed to be the lender of last resort in the international economy. The United States, however, has become the borrower of first resort—the world’s largest debtor. When the global economy falters, the economic hegemon is supposed to jump-start recovery by purchasing other nations’ goods. From the end of the Second World War until the Great Recession struck, it was America’s willingness to consume foreign goods that constituted the primary firewall against global economic downturns. When the Great Recession hit, however, the US economy proved too infirm to lead the global economy back to health. It fell to China to pull the global economy out of its nose-dive by stepping up to the plate with a massive stimulus programme. Barack Obama acknowledged the deeper implications of this when, at the April 2009 G20 meeting in London, he conceded that, in important respects, the United States’ days as the economic hegemon were numbered because it was too deeply in debt to continue as the world’s consumer of last resort. Instead, he said, the world would have to look to China (and other emerging market states, plus Germany) to be the motors of global recovery. ‘If there is going to be renewed growth,’ Obama stated, ‘it can’t just be the United States as the engine, everybody is going to have to pick up the pace.’ He added that in some ways the world has become accustomed to the United States being a voracious consumer market and the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide. And I think that in the wake of the crisis, even as we’re doing stimulus, we have to take into account our own deficits.44 Another example of the slipping US grip on global economic leadership is Washington’s inability to prevail over Germany in the transatlantic ‘austerity versus stimulus’ debate that began in 2009. Reflecting their different historical experiences, the United States and Germany adopted divergent fiscal policies during the Great Recession. Economic policy-makers in the Obama administra- tion were guided by the Keynesian lessons learned from the Great Depression of the 1930s: in essence, that to dig out of a deep economic slump, the federal government should stimulate demand by pump-priming the economy through deficit spending, and the Federal Reserve should support this policy of stimulus with low interest rates and easy money. Obama administration policy-makers, and leading American economists, were haunted by the ‘1937 analogy’—the fear that, if stimulus is withdrawn prematurely, nascent recovery could be aborted. On the other hand, Germany—the EU’s economic engine—has long been haunted by the ‘1923 analogy’—the fear that inflation easily can become uncon- trollable, with potentially disastrous economic, social and political consequences.45 From the founding of West Germany after the Second World War until the advent of European monetary union, and eventually the euro, the primary missions of the West German central bank, the Bundesbank were to combat inflation, and to preserve the Deutschmark’s value. For the German government, assurance that the new European Central Bank would follow the Bundesbank’s sound money policy was a sine qua non for its decision to give up the Deutschmark in favour of the euro. The US–European divide on austerity versus stimulus manifested itself at the April 2009 London G20 summit. The US objective at this meeting was to achieve a rebalancing of the international economy by inducing the Europeans—which meant Germany—to lift the continent out of recession by emulating Washington’s use of deficit spending to spur economic revival. Washington wanted Germany to export less and import—and consume—more. Berlin flatly rejected US entreaties with respect to rebalancing. German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that for states—especially ones already deeply in debt—to accumulate more debt in an effort to spend themselves out of recession would only set the stage for an even greater crisis down the road.46 Washington’s inability to persuade Berlin to adopt a policy of economic stimulus highlighted America’s flagging ability to act as the leader of the interna- tional economy. The then Treasury Secretary Jack Lew implicitly admitted this at the October 2015 IMF–World Bank biannual meetings when, echoing President Obama, he stated that the United States could not be the ‘sole engine’ of global growth. And the Trump administration, although it has complained loudly that Germany exports too much and imports too little, has like its predecessor been unable to push or persuade Berlin into reducing its trade surplus while simultane- ously increasing its consumption. Even as the US ability to manage the international economy is decreasing, China’s growing economic clout has profound implications for the Sino-American strategic balance. For example, the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to Asia was intended to reassure the nations of east and south-east Asia that the United States would use its military power to offset China’s growing economic influence in the region. As Jeffrey Bader, the Obama administration’s National Security Council director for Asia, put it: China’s emergence, China’s rise, is the focus of attention not only of the United States but among all countries in the region. None of them wants to have hostile or adversarial relations with China. At the same time, none wants to be dominated by China. The countries in the region welcome the US presence as, if you will, a kind of balance against China.47 However, the outlook for this ‘balancing’ strategy is clouded. Doubtless, Bader was correct: regional states do not want to be forced to choose between aligning either with China or with the United States. But economic trends suggest that they will be inexorably drawn into Beijing’s geopolitical orbit by the overpow- ering magnetic pull of the Chinese economy. The lessening of America’s regional economic influence, and the corresponding jump in that of China, have been dramatic. In 1993 China accounted for only 2 per cent of ASEAN’s trade in goods, and the United States accounted for 18 per cent. By 2013, however, the American share of ASEAN trade in goods had shrunk to 8.2 per cent while China’s had skyrocketed to 14 per cent.48 Growing economic dependence on China is reflected in geopolitical alignments. Since 2016, Malaysia, Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines have all tilted away from the United States and towards China. Even Australia, long a staunch US ally, is debating the merits of taking a more equidistant political stance between Washington and Beijing because of its economic dependence on China. In the coming years these trends are likely to continue, and China will be able to leverage its economic power to enhance its geopolitical position in east and south-east Asia—and diminish that of the United States. The institutional challenge to the Pax Americana Not only is the Pax Americana being whittled away by constraints on Washing- ton’s ability to continue playing its role as the manager of the global economy, and by China’s ever-increasing economic dominance of its region; even more strikingly, the institutional framework is being challenged. An important indicator of the Pax Americana’s erosion is the weakening of its legacy institutions amid calls, magnified by the Great Recession, for a major overhaul of the international institutional order. Examples include demands that the IMF and World Bank be reformed to give China (and other key emerging market economies) greater voting power, and a (so far unsuccessful) push to expand the membership of the UN Security Council by adding, among others, Brazil and India. Another indicator of the shifting global balance occurred in November 2008 when the G8 global economic summit was transformed into the G20 by the addition of China and other emerging market states including India, Indonesia and South Africa. The G20’s creation as the new focal point for coordinating international economic policy was a response to the insistence of China, and the other major emerging market states, that they be given a greater voice in interna- tional economic affairs. Implicitly, the G20’s emergence confirmed three trends. First, the necessity of conceding power to the emerging market states—especially China—confirmed that America’s relative power is declining. Second, the G20’s empowerment underscored the shift in power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. Whereas only one Asian nation ( Japan) had been a G8 member, the G20 has six members from the region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea. Finally, the G20’s emergence as the central organ of international economic management demonstrated that—as a result of the Great Recession— the prestige and authority of the United States and Europe as stewards of the international economy had slipped dramatically.49 The past decade or so also has seen the creation of new institutions that potentially could constitute a parallel—‘shadow’—international order outside the framework of the Pax Americana. The most important of these may be the Beijing- backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Other examples include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organiza- tion, the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). The staying power and impact of these institutions are uncertain; but at the very least they are important symbolically. They underscore the decline of the American-designed post-Second World War international order, and the rise of new powers such as China and India—and the resurgence of old ones such as Russia—demanding recognition of their status and prestige, and a concomitant voice in the management of the international system. Soft power: the end of the US monopoly One of the major impacts of the Great Recession was its effect on perceptions of US soft power. As Martin Wolf argued at the nadir of the meltdown, the collapse of the American financial system marked a ‘humiliating end to the “unipolar moment”’.50 The meltdown has also damaged America’s status and ideational power. As Martin Jacques has suggested, the fact ‘that the American-run interna- tional economic system has been plunged into such turmoil as a result of a crisis which had its origins in the United States has served further to accentuate the loss of American power and prestige’.51 US claims that the so-called Washington Consensus—based on free markets, democracy and globalization—is the only viable path for economic and political development have been discredited. As former US Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman said, the Great Recession ‘put the American model of free market capitalism under a cloud’.52 In the wake of the meltdown, China has broken the US monopoly on soft power.53 Beijing has become increasingly adept at developing its own brand of soft power based on its culture, its diplomacy and the attractiveness of its own system— ‘market authoritarianism’—as an alternative to the American model.54 Indeed, even before the crash, Kurt Campbell and Michele Flournoy—both of whom would go on to hold senior national security positions in the Obama administra- tion—acknowledged that China, despite not being a democracy, might already have leapt ahead of the United States in soft power. This was, they observed, ‘a troubling indictment of our current course’.55 China’s challenge to the Pax Americana: the AIIB, and ‘one belt, one road’ In May 2016 leaders of 29 nations, and representatives from some 80 others, descended on Beijing to discuss China’s ambitious ‘one belt one road’ (OBOR) development initiative—also referred to by some as the ‘new Silk Road’. This plan is the follow-on to China’s creation several years ago of the AIIB, conceived as a new major international institution to foster economic development in south-east, south-west and central Asia. OBOR—a signature policy of Chinese President Xi Jinping—calls for the investment of massive amounts of money (US$1 trillion, according to some reports) to promote trade and economic devel- opment by constructing transport links that will tie together east Asian manufac- turing hubs with markets and raw material suppliers in south-east Asia, central Asia, south-west Asia and Africa.56 These new transport routes will also connect China and the participating Asian nations with Europe—thereby creating new markets for the goods and services it produces. Some analysts regard the devel- opmental aspects of OBOR as a Chinese version of the post-1945 Marshall Plan (albeit on a much grander scale). OBOR is also seen as an instrument for extending China’s geopolitical influence—especially in central Asia. Indeed, it has been suggested that OBOR is part of a strategy of establishing Beijing’s dominance over the Eurasian ‘heartland’, to use the term favoured by the early twentieth- century British geopolitical theorist Sir Halford Mackinder, who argued that control of the heartland was the key to dominating the international system.57 Since the early 1940s, leading American policy-makers and academic strategists have—explicitly or implicitly—embraced Mackinder’s ideas about geopolitics.58 The AIIB and OBOR are both indicators of receding US power, and they challenge the Pax Americana—not just geopolitically, but also with respect to international economic leadership and international institutions. Beijing envisions the AIIB as a rival to the IMF and World Bank. In discussions of Sino-American rivalry, less attention is usually paid to these issues than to the military balance between the United States and China, or to the flashpoints—the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula—that could spark a conflict. But the contest for international economic and financial leadership, and for the guiding hand in reconfiguring the twenty-first century’s international institutions, will also shape relations between Washington and Beijing, and help determine the fate of the Pax Americana. The diminution of US influence—itself a signal of the Pax Americana’s erosion—was underscored by Washington’s inability to derail China’s plans to create the AIIB. This failure was not for lack of effort. When Beijing rolled out its AIIB plans, the Obama administration kicked into high gear diplomatically in an attempt to quash the project. As the New York Times reported, Washington ‘lobbied against the [AIIB] with unexpected determination and engaged in a vigorous campaign to persuade important allies to shun the project’.59 Washington’s attempt to dissuade its allies from joining the AIIB failed. Or, to put it more bluntly, in the face of China’s growing power, the United States could not keep its allies onside. The dam burst when, in a decision taken fittingly on the Ides of March in 2015, Britain—ostensibly America’s closest ally—announced it was going to become a member of the AIIB (Et tu, Britain?). London’s action set off a stampede as other states that previously had been on the fence rushed to sign up for membership in the new institution. Those joining the AIIB included traditional US allies such as Australia, France, Germany, Italy and South Korea. Beijing’s diplomatic coup in attracting widespread support for its AIIB initiative was viewed—correctly— as a direct challenge to America’s global geopolitical and economic leadership. Writing in the Financial Times, former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers said that London’s AIIB decision and its aftermath ‘may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system’.60 Beijing’s ability to persuade America’s allies to sign up to the AIIB also was a concrete demonstration of the lure of China’s financial and economic clout. China’s AIIB initiative is important because it represents a double-barrelled challenge simultaneously to US leadership of the global economy and to the Pax Americana’s institutional (and ideational) foundations. At the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, the United States took the lead in constructing the struc- ture of the post-Second World War international economy by creating the IMF and the World Bank, which were intended to anchor the postwar international economic system. Both of these institutions were structured to ensure Washington would have veto power over their decisions. As China’s importance in the world economy grew, however, Beijing demanded that voting power in the two Bretton Woods institutions be recalibrated. In April 2010, the IMF and World Bank agreed to increase China’s voting weight. However, to become effective, this agreement required approval by the US Congress; and the Obama administration was unable to persuade Congress to enact the necessary legislation until January 2016. Beijing’s frustration with the stalemate on voting rights helped drive its decision to launch its AIIB initiative.61 With the AIIB, Beijing seeks to enhance China’s roles both in the management of the international economy and in international development. The AIIB was also intended to signal that China was serious in demanding an increase in its voting power in the IMF and World Bank commensurate with its current economic and financial clout. The AIIB is—and is intended to be—a direct challenge to the primacy of both of these Bretton Woods legacy institutions.62 At the same time its impact reaches beyond international economic affairs, because it signals that the Sino-American balance of power now is tilting towards Beijing.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---US Domestic Collapse

Internal divisions and crisis are driving US collapse now

Rapanyane 20 – is a Lecturer of Politics & International Relations at the North West University, Mahikeng Campus, and has an Ma in International Relations from the University of Limpopo, 3/31/20 (Makhura Benjamin, “The new world [dis] order in the complexity of multi-polarity: United States of America's hegemonic decline and the configuration of new power patterns”, Journal of Public Affairs, Volume 21, Issue 1, accessed 6/23/22)//jd 

In this article, Hegemonic decline is defined as the hegemonic reverse from one superpower to another one, while ensuring that there is a military and political framework for the trans-border amassment of capital (Komlosy, 2016). Thus, in order for one to grasp the whole process, it is imperative to highlight and look into the principal attributes that underpin this, therefore, to put it forward that USA's hegemonic decline owes deeply to the following: USA's deep internal political cleavages, USA's inability to resolve the inflexibility that exist between the Democrats and the Republicans (Ferguson, 2014). Equally important is the acceptance that there is a decline and/ loss of the manufacturing employment capacity of the USA which slowly denies the country's industry of its principal role in the global economy as the leading manufacturing employment economy in the world (Skrabec, 2014). For statistical proof, the author was unable to place figures in this document due to technical aspects. Thus, for the readers' confirmation of the latter assertion, they can see Bailey and Bosworth (2014, p. 4) who have shown a figure depicting Manufacturing Value added and employment as a Share of the Total US Economy, 1960–2011. In making a quick document review of alternative scholars in this subject, it becomes apparent that other internal challenges including the outsourcing of the US manufacturing sector to the economical production sites of the Global South which often result in the emergence of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). These include the likes of South Africa, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Turkey, Thailand etc. (Komlosy, 2016; Majaski, 2019). The foregoing is often epitomized by structural unemployment and social despairs which often sabotage social peace in the USA that exists between the labor force and the capital bosses. A case point would be the degeneration of the Fordist welfare State in the early 2000s. The 2008's Great Recession also contributed immensely to the hegemonic decline of US, which resulted in the USA promoting dictatorial leaders in other regions. This was led heavily by the desire to intensify the problems faced by other regions such as civil war victimization (in the Middle East) and mineral resource curse (in Africa). Thus moving from promoting and spearheading democracies to dictatorships in the world (Komlosy, 2016). Equally important is USA's strong adoption of privatization policies, which brought widespread practice of scams, profit gaming systems and also corruption to only show some signs of the Third World kleptocracy (Engelhardt, 2014). This had also projected USA as a prospective Third World Nation. Another significant point to consider in as the internal challenge is the issue of De-legitimization of the Presidency and the US Congress (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2019). This gained prominence in the year 2014 when the American confidence was proven at the polling outfits outlining well that Americans expressed the utmost confidence in the military with 50% and the Supreme Court in the second with 23% and the presidency in the third place with 11% and lastly was the Congress with 5% (Engelhardt, 2014). The Congress and President have been delegitimized to a point where they no longer possess the powers of declaring a war against countries, which abuse human rights like Syria (Lind, 2017; Nelson, 2016). In the process of delegitimizing the president, a relevant case point would be that of John Boehner's visit to Israel to sign the presidential deal with Benjamin Netanyahu with a letter of support signed by 47 Republican senators (Rudoren, 2015). The foregoing is also supported by the soaring of the National Security State as the fourth Branch of the US government. This branch of government is attested to be gaining prominence and autonomy very fast (Engelhardt, 2014). Equally important is the branch's ability to be able to authorize any of its desires with practically no resistance from Washington, which is the continual feature of the contemporary US politics (Engelhardt, 2014). Even though this fourth branch of government does not get too much attention from the media house and the government, it has become apparent that this branch of government has taken over the National Security State and incorporated it into its own, making it stronger with “labyrinthine structure” and that this whole process shows something very brand new in the American World [dis] order (Engelhardt, 2014). The other significant symptom of US hegemonic decline is the issue of demobilization of the people of America characterized heavily by abject poverty, inequality in wages and the collapse of labor market in line with the society's militarization. This process, started after world war II, is partially explained by Operation Magic Carpet (Everipedia, 2019). This process was initially enacted as a response to the rebellious and disruptive Vietnam-era draftees. This process involved the prioritization of advertising agencies over the citizens' army resulting in the public being sent to their homes, to never again interfere in the affairs of the military. Thus, this whole process also led to the weakening of the National policy of the USA to some extent, endangering the security of the USA nation (Everipedia, 2019). Having said that, it is important to highlight also that since the early 2000s, demobilization has been entrenched and made a normal thing for the security and safety of the people, but there are protests which were motivated by the militarization of the policemen and women in brown and black communities in the USA (Engelhardt, 2014). 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---Trump

US heg is collapsing now – Covid allowed Beijing to take the lead

McCoy 21 – is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1/29/21 (Alfred, “American Hegemony Is Ending With a Whimper, Not a Bang”, The Nation, , accessed 6/26/22)//jd 

Once in office, Trump soon bent the nation (but not the world) to his will, rupturing time-tested alliances, tearing up treaties, denying incontrovertible climate science, and demanding respect for American authority with a thundering, if largely empty, rhetoric that threatened military retaliation or economic reprisals globally. Despite the manifest inanity of his policies, the Republican Party capitulated, corporate tycoons applauded, and nearly half the American public cleaved to their newfound savior. As with all sellout shows, the best was saved for last. When the Covid-19 pandemic struck with full force in March 2020, Trump turned up at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, donning a MAGA hat, to proclaim his “natural ability” when it came to medical science, while distinguished doctors stood by like studio extras in mute testimony to his otherwise risible claims. As the pandemic began climbing toward its terrible, still developing toll, Trump hijacked White House briefings by medical experts to promote a succession of crackpot claims—wearing a mask was merely “politically correct”; Covid-19 was just another flu that “becomes weaker with warmer weather”; hydroxychloroquine was a cure; and shining ultraviolet “light inside of the body” or injecting “disinfectant” were possible treatments. A surprising number of Americans started drinking bleach to protect themselves from the virus, forcing months of public health warnings. After nearly a century in which the United States had been a world leader in promoting public health, the Trump administration, to escape blame for its own escalating failures, walked out of the World Health Organization. Lending the country the aura of a failed state, the CDC itself, once the world’s gold standard in medical research, bungled the development of a coronavirus test and so forfeited any serious, nationwide attempt to successfully track and trace the disease (the most effective means of controlling it). While smaller nations like New Zealand, South Korea, and even impoverished Rwanda effectively curbed Covid-19, by the end of Trump’s term the United States already had experienced more than 400,000 deaths and 24 million infections—significantly above any other developed nation’s death rate and a full quarter of the world’s total cases. Meanwhile, Beijing mobilized a rigorous public health campaign that quickly contained the virus to just 4,600 deaths in a population of 1.4 billion. In only four months, China virtually eliminated the virus (despite periodic new local breakouts) and had its economy humming along with a 5 percent increase in gross domestic product, which accounted for 30 percent of global growth last year. Meanwhile, after 11 months of an incessant pandemic, the United States remained mired in a crippling recession. This striking disparity in state performance only accelerated China’s quest to surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy and, with all that financial clout, become its preeminent power. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---Trump

The Trump administration’s aggressive foreign campaign worsened the U.S.’s already severe imperial overstretch

Heuvel 20 [January 7, 2020, Katrina vanden Heuvel, Education: Princeton University, BA in Politics, Katrina vanden Heuvel writes a weekly column for The Post. She is the editor and publisher of the Nation magazine. She has also edited or co-edited several books., “The 2010s were a decade of imperial overreach. Trump is making it worse.”, The Washington Post, ]//AA

With the 2010s over, now is a good time to consider what characterized the United States’ foreign policy of the past decade. Many establishment voices have described the 2010s as a decade of American retreat from the world. In fact, it would be more accurate to call the past decade the “decade of imperial overreach” — a major expansion of U.S. foreign policy goals and power beyond what is prudent or constructive. The overreach began during the Obama years. Despite a demonstrable reluctance on the part of President Barack Obama at times, it was his administration, with strong congressional support, that extended U.S. foreign policy goals in the Middle East to include regime change in Libya and Syria and increased containment of Iran. It was the Obama administration that expanded the global war on terror to more countries in the Middle East and Africa. In Eastern Europe, the Obama White House, again with a huge assist from members of Congress, helped participate in a coup against the duly elected (though deeply corrupt) Viktor Yanukovych government in Ukraine and actively pursued a campaign to pull Ukraine exclusively into the Western camp — and to eliminate Russian influence in a country that historically had been closely aligned with Moscow. In East Asia, the Obama administration hyped a “pivot” to the region that was in fact simply an expansion of the United States' military and geoeconomic goals in the Asian-Pacific region. It entailed not just the ill-fated Trans-Pacific Partnership but new military deployments aimed at controlling the sea lanes and trade routes in East Asia, upon which China depends for its supply of oil and raw materials, as well as its transport of manufactured goods. U.S. overreach has only accelerated under President Trump. Despite his campaign promises to end forever wars and to pull forces out of the Middle East, Trump has gone along with the national security bureaucracy and a sanctions-happy Congress to extend the United States’ foreign policy and military reach. In the Middle East, the Trump administration stepped up Washington’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran — after abandoning the Obama administration’s successful, multilateral nuclear deal. And with the assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani last week — without congressional approval — already-escalating tensions between the United States and Iran have been raised to new, extraordinarily dangerous levels. Incendiary rhetoric, military brinkmanship and Trump’s recklessness have brought us to the edge of war. Trump has also undertaken direct military strikes against Syria and placed American troops in the country in an effort to control the country’s oil resources and to block trade with Iraq and Iran. As part of its ongoing goal of countering Iranian influence in the region, the administration has sought to increase its influence in Lebanon and drive a wedge between Iran and Iraq’s governments. And, perhaps most ominously, it has increased the deployment of U.S. troops and weapons systems to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. More than 4,000 additional forces are already headed there, with more promised. The greatest expansion of American power and goals, of course, has been reserved for the containment of Russia and China. Trump’s 2018 National Security Strategy named China and Russia as the United States’ greatest threats and committed to large military buildups to counter their influence. The goal of the strategy appears to have gone beyond deterrence and even containment to a form of active pressure — especially in the case of Russia. This entails not just the encirclement of Russia with U.S. and NATO forces but also a strategy of weakening Russia economically and politically with more stringent sanctions, such as those imposed against international companies working on the completion of the Nord Stream II pipeline. As in years past, NATO has been the principal vehicle used to advance Washington’s ambitious goals. Despite fears that Trump would act on his threats to dismantle the 70-year-old alliance, the administration has given it new missions — a NATO military buildup in Poland and the Baltic States, extension of the alliance’s ranks in the Balkans, adding space as an operational domain and naming China as a security challenge for the first time. As a result of these and other actions, the United States is now committed to a new cold war on two fronts, Russia and China, and perhaps three fronts when one adds the maximum-pressure campaign against Iran. These have opened up several new geopolitical theaters with expanded U.S. foreign policy goals. Under Trump, the goal of U.S. foreign policy has expanded from controlling the traditional sea lanes in the Euro-Atlantic, Asia-Pacific, and Middle East and Persian Gulf to controlling them in the Arctic, as well. Also under Trump, the United States has greatly increased geopolitical ambitions in controlling the world’s energy markets. The expansion of the United States’ foreign policy goals does not, however, mean the expansion of U.S. influence or greater U.S. security or economic well-being. Indeed, the United States’ influence arguably has declined even as its foreign policy ambitions have increased. Historically, imperial overstretch does not end well, and there is ample evidence that Trump’s foreign policy is failing nearly everywhere. With this past week’s offensive military action against Iran, it is clear the United States is not retreating under Trump. It is expanding, and in often stupid, militaristic and dangerous ways. It is that expansion that most threatens our security and economic well-being, and it is time that we begin to call out what is happening.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---Overstretch

America’s hegemony risks imperial overstretch

Fox 16 [Justin Fox, Justin Fox is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering business. A former editorial director of Harvard Business Review, he has written for Time, Fortune and American Banker. He is author of “The Myth of the Rational Market.”, 6-13-2022, "America's in Danger of Imperial Overstretch”, Bloomberg, ]//AA

Twenty-nine years ago, historian Paul Kennedy coined the term "imperial overstretch" to describe what happens to great powers when their global commitments become too expensive to sustain. He also suggested that the U.S., which at the time was in the midst of a defense-spending boom under Ronald Reagan, might be overstretching things a bit. A lot of the points Kennedy made in the forward-looking final chapter of "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000" seem prescient today: The Soviet Union suffered from a much more extreme case of overstretch than the U.S., he argued. Check. The focus of global economic activity was going to shift toward Asia, with China becoming one of the world's leading economies. Check. The U.S. would continue to be beset by fiscal deficits, disappearing blue-collar jobs and declining relative economic power. Check. Kennedy, a professor at Yale University, also seemed convinced, though, that defense spending was going to represent an ever-growing burden for the U.S. He wrote: Great Powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on "security," and thereby divert potential resources from "investment" and compound their long-term dilemma. Hasn't happened. Since Kennedy published those words in 1987, the share of U.S. gross domestic product going to the military has declined from 6.1 percent to 3.3 percent. The amount of spending was almost exactly the same, in constant dollars, in 2015 as in 1987; the shrinking of the military's share of GDP was due entirely to economic growth. Still, military spending didn't rise. It didn't rise because the collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the Cold War, which led to outright declines in military spending in the 1990s in the U.S. and around the world (all these numbers are from the military expenditure database maintained by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute): As you can see, spending stopped declining in the late 1990s, then rose strongly over the first decade of the new millennium. That was partly because the world's biggest military spender, the U.S., got involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and because other post-Cold War conflicts flared up in the Middle East and Africa. You can see evidence of those wars in the list of countries that devote the highest share of GDP to defense. 1 But global defense spending also rose in the 2000s because global economic growth was strong outside the U.S., allowing nations on the rise to invest in their militaries without overburdening their economies. The most dramatic example of this was China, where military spending rose more than tenfold, in constant-dollar terms, from 1989 to 2015, even as the percentage of GDP going to defense actually fell from 2.5 percent in 1989 to 1.9 percent in 2015. 2 In the process, China rose to second place in global military spending, with more than twice the expenditures of No. 3 Saudi Arabia. This is consistent with Kennedy's rise-and-fall story. Countries with faster-growing economies -- in this case China and India, mainly 3 -- are beginning to catch up with the dominant great power. They're still miles behind, India is increasingly looking like a U.S. ally and China doesn't seem to have anything like the global military ambitions that the Soviet Union did. But it is nonetheless possible to envision a near future in which U.S. military spending as a share of GDP starts rising steadily as perceived threats to the country's security grow faster than the economy. Defense spending isn't all bad, in economic terms. Because the U.S. makes its own weapons, buying more of them can have a stimulative effect -- although some economists argue that this effect disappears if the purchases are made with borrowed money. There's a long history of positive spillovers into the rest of the economy from military research and development. And sometimes spending more money on defense is essential to, you know, defend yourself. Still, Kennedy's "security" vs. "investment" tradeoff has to come into play at some point. Is the U.S. anywhere near it? Probably not yet. But I can't see any reason why we should be immune from imperial overstretch forever.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---Overstretch

The US is backsliding now – adversaries are taking advantage of overextension to gain power

Brands ’22 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 1-18-22; "The Overstretched Superpower”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-18/overstretched-superpower; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-26-2022; AH]

This realization prompted a major change in U.S. defense planning. The Trump administration’s defense strategy declared that the two-war standard was history. The U.S. military would henceforth be sized and shaped to win one major war against a great-power competitor. The United States would still be capable of “deterring” aggression in other theaters, but, as a bipartisan commission that included several current Biden administration officials pointed out, how exactly the Pentagon would do so without the capability to defeat such aggression remained ambiguous. Shifting to a one-war standard was a sensible way to motivate the lethargic Pentagon bureaucracy to find creative solutions to the urgent, daunting challenge of war with a near-peer rival. It involved a sober recognition that losing a great-power war could inflict a death blow on the U.S.-led international order. Yet the 2018 defense strategy was also an acknowledgment of overstretch: the United States could focus on its primary challenge only by reducing its ability to focus on others. This limitation is the root of the problem Biden has inherited, and it has some dangerous implications. THE CREDIBILITY GAP The most glaring danger, highlighted by the concurrent crises in eastern Europe and East Asia, is that the United States could have to fight wars against China and Russia simultaneously. This would indeed be a nightmare scenario for a one-war military. But it wouldn’t take a global security meltdown to reveal the problems caused by Washington’s predicament. First, overstretch limits U.S. options in a crisis. Where the United States should draw the line against Russian aggression in eastern Europe, how hard it should push back against Tehran’s provocations in the Middle East, and whether it should use force to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state are matters that reasonable people can debate. But the fact that the United States increasingly has a China centric defense strategy has a constraining effect in other theaters. If a U.S. president knows that the Pentagon will need everything it has for an all-too-plausible war with China, he or she will be less inclined to use force against Iran or Russia, lest Washington be caught short if violence erupts in the Pacific. This issue leads to a second problem: the loss of diplomatic influence in situations short of war. Since the Taiwan and Ukraine crises of early 2021, some observers have speculated that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are coordinating their coercion as a way of threatening Washington with a two-front war. The reality is that explicit coordination is hardly necessary to profit from U.S. overextension. Leaders in Moscow and Tehran can see that the United States is stretched thin militarily and eager to pay more attention to China. This gives them an incentive to push Washington harder in hopes of achieving gains at the expense of a distracted superpower. As the Russia expert Michael Kofman has written, Putin’s strategy of using military coercion to revise the post-Cold War order in Europe is premised on his belief that the “greater threat from China” will eventually “force Washington to compromise and renegotiate.” The more intense its focus on China, the higher the price the United States may be willing to pay for restraint in other places. The perils of overstretch, however, are not confined to secondary theaters. Weakness at the periphery can ultimately cause weakness at the center. A decade ago, the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq to economize in the Middle East and pivot toward the Pacific. Iraq’s subsequent collapse forced Washington to reengage there, fighting a multi-year conflict that devoured resources and attention. Similarly, if the United States finds itself in a showdown with Iran or if Russia attempts to revise the status quo in eastern Europe, Washington may once again find itself pivoting away from the Pacific to reinforce under-resourced regions that still matter to U.S. security. America’s defense strategy is increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific, but its foreign policy remains stubbornly global. That’s a recipe for trouble all around.