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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Syrian War Impact › 1NC

Turkey-Russia relations allow peace in Syria–Turkey just needs to stop working with the US

Goff Taylor 17 (Moira Goff-Taylor, Moira Goff-Taylor has worked as a foreign policy analyst in the US Government since 2000. Her research focuses on crosscutting political and socioeconomic trends in Europe and the Middle East, including European nations’ relations with the Middle East, September 17, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-turkey-needs-russia//RM)

Turkish security concerns also played a major role in Ankara’s rapprochement with Moscow. The Turkish Government had grown increasingly frustrated with the United States and the West’s Syria policy. The United States’ unwillingness to directly confront Syrian regime forces, its focus on countering ISIS, and western collaboration with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) through the Syrian Defense Forces aggravated Erdogan. Ankara views the YPG and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) as off-shoots of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 2016, as the PYD expanded control along the Turkish-Syrian border and the United States considered arming the YPG, the Turkish government grew alarmed, as it did not want to see the creation of an autonomous Syrian Kurdish region on its border nor a strengthened YPG or PKK.[vi] Erdogan knew that if he wanted to take action to counter PYD expansion in Syria he would need to work with Moscow. Turkey’s openness to working with Russia on the Syria crisis revealed a shift in Turkish priori-ties. Since the fall of 2011, Turkey and Russia had been on opposites sides of the Syria crisis; Ankara was focused on Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s ouster while Moscow supported the regime. Turkey’s fear over the growing strength of the PYD began to outweigh its aversion to the Asad regime and necessitated better cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. In August 2016, Turkey launched the Euphrates Shield offensive, supporting Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces against ISIS, and succeeded in both taking back the town of Jarabulus and preventing Kurdish forces from gaining additional territory. Turkish plans for this offensive probably encouraged the restoration of Turkey’s bilateral ties with Russia. Ankara likely sought out Moscow’s acceptance of the military operation to avoid a confrontation with Russian and Syrian regime forces. Turkey also began to work closely with Russia to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Ankara worked with Moscow to facilitate a ceasefire in Aleppo and participated in Russian led peace talks in Astana. Russia likely welcomed Turkey’s new focus as it forced Ankara to be more flexible on Asad’s status in future Syrian governments and offered an opportunity for greater Russian influence over Turkey. Ankara’s security concerns over the potential for an autonomous Syrian Kurdish controlled region along the Turkish border and the strengthening of PKK forces motivates Turkey to work with Moscow, as well as Washington, on the Syria crisis. While unable to convince either Russia or the United States to adopt Turkey’s perspective on the YPG and PYD, the Turkish government will maintain dialogue with both in an attempt to protect its agenda. Erdogan sees Russia as a dominate force in the crisis and will continue to work with Moscow in the hope of influencing the future of Syria. Ankara will push to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria and limit the power and influence of Syrian Kurds. Erdogan has repeatedly stated that Turkey will never allow the establishment of a Syrian Kurdish state in northern Syria.[vii] Turkey is possibly working on a deal with Russia and Iran on Kurdish-controlled Afrin and the city of Idlib, with Ankara working to get groups it backs to retreat from Idlib in exchange for Turkey having more leeway to take action against YPG forces in the Afrin region.[viii]

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Turkey Relations [Insert Impact] › 1NC

Anti-western sentiment ties Russia and Turkey together–NATO recentralization wrecks this relationship

Dalay 5-20 (Galip Dalay is a CATS Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP. (5-20-2022). Deciphering Turkey's geopolitical balancing and anti-westernism in its relations with Russia. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/deciphering-turkeys-geopolitical-balancing-and-anti-westernism-in-its-relations-with-russia//BVN SC)

The war in Ukraine is set to increase the pressure on Turkey’s balancing policy, shed light on the role of anti-Westernism in Ankara-Moscow relations, and reshape Tur­key’s relations with Russia and the West. The balancing policy will face a less permissive environment. However, a rupture in Turkey-Russia relations is not to be expected. Given the prohibitive cost of a breakdown, Ankara will strive to maintain functional bilateral relations with Moscow. More broadly, despite the changed con­text, Turkey will continue to seek autonomy in its foreign and security policy. This quest precedes the balancing policy and was not driven solely by discontent with the West. It was also informed by Turkey’s reading of the global order becoming more multipolar and less Western-centric. In spite of similarities in their narratives, the Turkish and Russian anti-Westernisms manifest themselves differently in policy terms. Finally, Russia’s geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey and the West relatively closer together in matters geopolitical and strategic, provided that Turkey’s current blockage of Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership bid is resolved in the not too distant future. The pace and depth of developments in Turkish-Russian relations since 2016 has been intriguing. Discontent with the West has been a major driver for rapidly improv­ing ties. In fact, one could argue that it was anti-Westernism that created Turkey’s geo­political balancing policy between Russia and the West, coupled with the understand­ing that a multipolar global order was in the making. The close relationship with Russia has led to further rifts between Tur­key and the West. However, despite their shared discontent with the West, Russian and Turkish anti-Westernism differ in nature, origin and manifestation. Turkish anti-Westernism tends to be selective and policy-focused, whereas the Russian version is more structural and encompassing. For instance, Russian For­eign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke of ending US and western dominance of the inter­national system as the core goal of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Unlike Russia, Turkey also benefits from the Western-centric inter­national system it criticises. These differences carry major policy implications. The invasion of Ukraine has also injected a whole set of new dynamics into the Turkey-Russia-West triangle. Ankara’s geopolitical balancing policy is now entering difficult terrain, if not becoming unfeasible, as NATO and the West treat Russia explicitly as an enemy. The cost of such a policy is likely to increase. But even if balancing became unfeasible, Ankara would still strive to maintain some form of function­ing bilateral relationship with Moscow. Geopolitical Balancing Policy and Functional Bilateral Relations The major difference between Turkey’s geopolitical balancing policy and its quest to maintain functional bilateral relations with Russia is the scope of cooperation. A functional bilateral relationship meant cultivating economic, energy and political ties, but did not extend into the strategic realms of geopolitical and defence industry cooperation. Geopolitical balancing in­volves strategic cooperation, military pro­curement (purchasing the Russian S‑400 air defence system), and geopolitical engagement in conflict zones in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. The balancing policy is driven by discontent with the West and rests on a particular reading of global poli­tics, which Ankara sees becoming increas­ingly multipolar and less Western-centric (if not post-Western). It has also been informed by Ankara’s assessment that the West lacks internal cohesion, seeing signs of fragmentation between Europe and the United States (especially during the Trump presidency) and within Europe post-Brexit.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › 1NC – Turkey Relations [Insert Impact] › 1NC

Turkey-Russia relations are high now

Gaber 22 (Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a Ukrainian foreign-policy expert, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University where she is currently teaching a course on Black Sea regional security, June 22, 2022, Turkey’s wartime bridge to the West is collapsing, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkeys-wartime-bridge-to-the-west-is-collapsing//RM)

For the first time in a while, Turkey was not only acting in line with transatlantic allies but also taking a lead in the region in a way that has bolstered its importance as a key NATO member. US officials have gone as far as to suggest that Turkey transfer its S-400 missile-defense systems to Ukraine in a bid to finally solve the problem of Russian air defense systems stationed in a NATO member state and the consequent Western sanctions imposed on Ankara. Turkey has bluntly rejected that proposal. Instead, it has slowly allowed domestic problems, regional geopolitics, and pragmatism to dictate its approach to the war. As a result, Turkish leadership once again appears eager to continue business as usual with an increasingly isolated Russia. Shifting winds Though only obliged to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits for the naval ships of states at war under Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, Ankara has denied access to non-littoral NATO states as well. Turkey’s fears of losing out to the West in its ambitions for a kind of regional ownership of the Black Sea prevailed over the security threats posed by Russia. Turkey’s desire to limit the presence of NATO vessels in the Black Sea, which might lead to further escalation with Russia, is understandable—even if not in line with the Alliance’s objectives. It is harder to justify the statements of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar wondering whether mines discovered in the Black Sea had been laid there deliberately to create an excuse for NATO minesweepers to enter those waters. Turkey is also blocking the quick addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO, trying to use the situation to solve its own problems and voice its own security concerns. It is highly unlikely that Turkish leadership will block the membership of the two Nordic countries in the long term. Nevertheless, its current diplomatic bargaining has revealed major differences in threat perceptions as seen from Ankara and other capitals. While for most of the European states, the major threat on NATO’s eastern borders is a revisionist Russia, for Turkey it is Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) fighters operating in Syria and allegedly finding a safe haven in Finland and Sweden. Obviously, skyrocketing anti-American sentiments in Turkey and a traditional mistrust for the West limit the possibilities for cooperation on Ukraine. Whereas the majority of Turks support Ukraine in this war, polls show that more than 48 percent blame the United States or NATO for the conflict while only 34 percent hold Russia responsible. There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the war in Ukraine is just another regional conflict instigated by Western powers after Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and others. Russia’s invasions and aggression in in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, and more recently in Ukraine and Syria don’t evoke a similar response among Turks. Populist rhetoric, burgeoning ahead of next year’s elections, as well as massive anti-Western propaganda on Turkish media mostly featuring retired generals, nationalist pundits, and (pro-)Russian experts with a strong Eurasianist agenda, do not help either. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s economic and strategic agendas also depend on close coordination with Moscow. Russia supplies almost half of Turkish domestic gas demand, provides technology for the country’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, and serves as the source of more than five million tourists annually. The Kremlin’s support is also vital for Turkey to maintain its presence in the South Caucasus and Middle East. The recent meeting of Çavuşoğlu with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Ankara clearly showed that Turkey is keen to stick to mechanisms for cooperation with Russia, like the Astana Platform in Syria or the 3+3 format in the South Caucuses (which also involves Iran, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Instead of using this crisis as a chance to decrease its strategic dependence on Russia, Turkey seems eager to bind itself even more to Moscow within new formats. Money matters Ukraine has so far largely respected Turkey’s sensitivities and not pushed too hard on sanctions, instead focusing on arms supplies and Ankara’s mediator role. However, that dynamic is coming under stress with Russian oligarchs using Turkey as a safe haven to bypass European Union restrictions. According to Lavrov’s recent statements, Russia-Turkey bilateral trade doubled in the first quarter of 2022, and there are now ongoing talks on expanding the use of Russia’s MIR payments system in Turkey. In March, Erdoğan suggested to Putin that their countries switch to national currencies or gold in commercial deals instead of the dollar or euro. Izzet Ekmekcibashi, the head of the Turkish-Russian Business Council (DEIK), said that more than one thousand new Russian companies opened in Turkey in March alone. Most recently, a well-connected Turkish journalist reported on a Russian-Turkish agreement to move the European headquarters of forty-three leading Russian companies including Gazprom to Turkey. Turkish-Russian cooperation in tourism has also quickly developed. Turkish media outlets have reported that Turkish carriers are operating 438 flights per week to Russia this summer at a time when sanctions have made it difficult for Moscow to arrange flights. According to the pro-government Sabah newspaper, Turkish Airlines has signed a deal to bring 1.5 million Russian tourists over in 2022. The newspaper’s report suggests that Ankara also plans to issue loans under state guarantees to support Turkish travel companies working with Russian tourists and back a new airline with the specific mandate of transporting Russian tourists to Turkey. Ankara, which earlier called on Moscow to end its blockade of Ukrainian ports so grain exports could restart, is now taking a more pro-Russia position, advocating for the international community to help unblock not only Ukraine’s but also Russia’s trade in grain and fertilizers through safe logistics, ship insurance, and a return of Russian banks to the SWIFT system. During Lavrov’s recent visit to Turkey, Çavuşoğlu said that Turkey considered Moscow’s demands “reasonable” and “feasible” and backed easing Western sanctions against Russia. There is also ample evidence of Ankara’s involvement in the illegal shipment and trade of Ukrainian grain stolen by Russian forces to the Middle East via the Turkish ports of Samsun, Derince, Bandırma, and Iskenderun. So far, despite strong evidence of Russian crimes and official appeals from Ukraine, Turkish authorities have remained silent on these cases. These moves by Turkey don’t just undermine its credibility as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia but also raise questions about Ankara’s geopolitical choices in a broader regional and transatlantic framework. As it leans toward Russia in a bid for stability at home, Turkey risks finding itself estranged from the West and aligned with a pariah state on the international arena. The Ukrainian case will become a major test for Turkey. Whether Ankara prefers to use it to bridge the gaps with the West or to burn the bridges remains to be seen.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Impact Turn

Russia increases African instability.

Siegle ’22 [Joseph Siegle; ; 2-2-2022; The future of Russia-Africa relations; Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/; 7-16-2022; SK]

Russia has been aggressively pursuing its strategic objectives in Africa in recent years—securing a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, gaining naval port access in the Red Sea, expanding natural resource extraction opportunities, displacing Western influence, and promoting alternatives to democracy as a regional norm.

Africa, thus, is a “theater” for Russia’s geostrategic interests rather than a destination itself—a perspective reflected in the means that Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia is not investing significantly in conventional statecraft in Africa—e.g., economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia relies on a series of asymmetric (and often extralegal) measures for influence—mercenaries, arms-for-resource deals, opaque contracts, election interference, and disinformation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Libya Impact

Russia’s presence in Lybia breeds instability and civilian casualties.

Gaouette & Browne, 19

[Nicole & Ryan; journalists for CNN; 11-26-2019; US says Russian troops are destabilizing Libya; https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/26/politics/us-russia-destabilizing-libya/index.html]

Russia has deployed military forces to Libya that are “de-stabilizing” the North African country, a top State Department official warned Tuesday. David Schenker, the State Department’s assistant secretary for near eastern affairs, told reporters that Russia is deploying troops in “significant” numbers to support Libyan Gen. Khalifa Haftar, whose Libyan National Army launched an April offensive to seize Tripoli from the UN-backed Government of National Accord. US officials have previously told CNN that they believe hundreds of Russian mercenaries affiliated with the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization with ties to the Kremlin, have been in Libya for some time, working on behalf of Moscow and helping Haftar in his bid to capture Tripoli, however Schenker said that Russia is now deploying regular uniformed personnel there as well. “Russian regulars are being deployed in significant numbers to support the LNA,” Schenker said, describing their presence as “incredibly destabilizing.” The presence of the Russian troops “raises the specter of large-scale casualties among the civilian population,” Schenker said. His comments come days after a senior US delegation met with Haftar on Sunday to “discuss steps to achieve a suspension of hostilities and a political resolution to the Libyan conflict,” according to a State Department statement issued Monday.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Libya Impact

Russia and Turkey are pulling out.

Klapper ’21 [Rebecca Klapper; ; 6-23-2021; Russia, Turkey reach agreement to remove troops from Libya, U.S. official says; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/russia-turkey-reach-agreement-remove-troops-libya-us-official-says-1603508; 7-19-2022; SK]

A senior U.S. official said Russia and Turkey have tentatively reached an agreement to begin the process of withdrawing foreign troops from Libya in agreement with Germany's Foreign Minister pledging to remove foreign forces from Libya.

The official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the Associated Press that the deal is not yet done, but each country is prepared to discuss an incremental withdrawal of about 300 troops by both sides.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

Russia has a history of torturing and killing African civilians.

Human Rights Watch, 5/3

[Human Rights Watch investigates and reports on worldwide human rights violations; 5-3-2022; Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/central-african-republic-abuses-russia-linked-forces]

(Nairobi) – Forces in the Central African Republic, whom witnesses identified as Russian, appear to have summarily executed, tortured, and beaten civilians since 2019, Human Rights Watch said today. National authorities, the country’s Special Criminal Court (SCC), or the International Criminal Court (ICC), should investigate these incidents as well as other credible allegations of abuse by Russia-linked forces with a view to criminal prosecution. Several Western governments, and United Nations experts and special rapporteurs have found evidence that the forces linked to Russia operating in the Central African Republic include a significant number of members of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military security contractor with apparent links to the Russian government. On April 15, the United Nations announced it would investigate the circumstances in which at least 10 people were killed in the northeast, with some initial reports alleging Russian forces may have been involved. “There is compelling evidence that Russian-identified forces supporting the Central African Republic’s government have committed grave abuses against civilians with complete impunity,” said Ida Sawyer, crisis and conflict director at Human Rights Watch. “The failure of the Central African Republic government and its partners to forcefully denounce these abuses, and to identify and prosecute those responsible, will most likely only fuel further crimes in Africa and beyond.” Between February 2019 and November 2021, Human Rights Watch interviewed 21 people in person and 19 others by phone, including 10 victims and 15 witnesses, about abuses they said were committed by men with white skin speaking Russian, a language the witnesses recognized. Witnesses said that the men were carrying military-grade weapons and wearing beige khaki clothes, scarves to cover their faces, military boots, gloves, and sunglasses. In August 2018 the Central African Republic and Russian authorities signed an agreement under which “primarily former military officers” from Russia, also called “specialists”, would train Central African Republic forces. Russia-linked forces in the Central African Republic do not wear a designated uniform with official insignia or other distinguishing features. Twelve people spoke about an incident on the morning of July 21, 2021, in which apparent Russian-speaking forces killed at least 12 unarmed men near the town of Bossangoa. Human Rights Watch obtained the names of those killed from the United Nations and others who knew the victims. Bossangoa officials said the Central African authorities concluded that 13 people were killed in the attack. Witnesses said that men speaking Russian set up a roadblock, stopped the men, beat, and shot them dead, and then put at least eight of the bodies in a shallow hole next to the road. On August 2 the government said that it would set up a special commission of inquiry to establish responsibility and take appropriate measures. On October 27, in a joint statement, 16 UN Working Group experts and special rapporteurs referred to the special commission finding earlier that month that “Russian instructors” had committed human rights and laws of war violations. However, the commission has not published its findings. Human Rights Watch also spoke with six men who said that Central African army forces accused them and fifteen other men of being rebels and unlawfully detained them for several days or weeks between June and August 2021 in inhuman conditions in an open hole at a national army base in Alindao, in Basse Kotto province, in the south. They said both national army and Russian-speaking forces beat five of the men and that both forces may have executed two who were rebel combatants. Human Rights Watch was unable to independently verify the allegations of extrajudicial executions. Human Rights Watch also documented cases of detention and torture by Russia-linked forces in Bambari in 2019.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

Russia only intervenes in North Africa to further its interests. Russia supports autocratic, corrupt leaders which is destabilizing and detrimental to African People

Siegle, PhD, 2/22

(Joseph, leads the Africa Center’s research program, which produces security briefs and research papers with the aim of generating policy relevant analyses that contribute to addressing Africa’s security challenges. He has written widely for leading policy journals and newspapers and is a regular media analyst, The future of Russia-Africa relations, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/)

Russia has been aggressively pursuing its strategic objectives in Africa in recent years—securing a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, gaining naval port access in the Red Sea, expanding natural resource extraction opportunities, displacing Western influence, and promoting alternatives to democracy as a regional norm. Africa, thus, is a “theater” for Russia’s geostrategic interests rather than a destination itself—a perspective reflected in the means that Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia is not investing significantly in conventional statecraft in Africa—e.g., economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia relies on a series of asymmetric (and often extralegal) measures for influence—mercenaries, arms-for-resource deals, opaque contracts, election interference, and disinformation. PARTNERSHIP WITH WHOM? Russia’s Africa-focused initiatives are typically concentrated on propping up an embattled incumbent or close ally: Khalifa Haftar in Libya, Faustin Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic (CAR), and coup leaders Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali and Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, among others. To assess the future of Russia-Africa relations, therefore, it is necessary to be clear that the “partnerships” that Russia seeks in Africa are not state- but elite-based. By helping these often illegitimate and unpopular leaders to retain power, Russia is cementing Africa’s indebtedness to Moscow. This strategy works for Russia and the respective leaders who gain international diplomatic cover, resources to consolidate power domestically, a mercenary force, arms, and revenues from resource deals. However, Russia’s opaque engagements are inherently destabilizing for the citizens of the targeted countries, resulting in stunted economic development, human rights abuses, disenfranchisement of African citizens, the perpetuation of illegitimate governments, and social polarization. Through this model, Russia has been able to advance its objectives with limited financial and political costs. Accordingly, we can expect to see Moscow continuing to expand its influence on the continent in 2022. FOCAL POINTS FOR AFRICA-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN 2022 Libya. Russia retains Wagner mercenary forces (former Russian defense intelligence troops) and military assets on the ground in support of its proxy, warlord Khalifa Haftar. Russia can be expected to try and steer the outcome of the postponed presidential and legislative elections with the aim of emerging as the principal powerbroker in this geo-strategically important territory—with access to oil reserves and deep-water ports in the eastern Mediterranean and a permanent presence on NATO’s southern flank. Sudan. Russia has been striving to gain naval port access in the Red Sea, especially Port Sudan. It also has longstanding ties to the Sudanese military, elements of the ousted Bashir regime, and gold trafficking networks in the west. Continuation of the military government in Khartoum provides a ready entry point for expanded Russian influence. Mali. The military coup in Mali has provided Russia an opportunity to become a pivotal actor in the Sahel. We can expect Moscow to provide political cover to the junta of Assimi Goïta as it seeks to avoid a transition back to a democratic government. Indications are that Wagner mercenaries have already been deployed in support of the junta. Guinea. Russia has long been a patron of former president Alpha Condé, who had been a strong supporter of Russia’s extensive mining (bauxite) interests in Guinea. Following Condé’s ouster in a coup in September 2021, Moscow can be expected to refocus its diplomatic efforts on propping up the military junta of Colonel Mamady Doumbouya in return for Moscow’s continued political sway and unencumbered access in the mining sector. Gulf of Guinea. Having consolidated its position in the CAR in 2021, Russia is set to expand its influence in nearby Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gabon in 2022. Moscow has been cultivating ties with leaders of all three countries with an eye on becoming a more significant player in the lucrative oil and mineral networks of Central Africa. Angola. President João Lourenço is contending for a second term in office in 2022 amid a long recession, criticisms for increasing authoritarianism, and divisions within his ruling party. Russia’s opportunistic strategy of coming to the aid of isolated leaders as a means of enhancing Moscow’s leverage makes Lourenço an attractive target. His military academy training in the USSR, Russia’s extensive Cold War era ties to Angola, and Angola’s vast diamond, oil, gold, and mineral resources will all factor into increased Russian attention on Lourenço in 2022. CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND SCRUTINY Since Russia’s engagements in Africa are typically predicated on co-opting leaders facing limited checks and balances, they are nearly always detrimental to African citizens who must endure deepened institutionalized corruption, diverted public revenues, unaccountable leaders, and instability. Reform, therefore, will not come from these leaders but from African citizens, which will entail greater civil society engagement, enhanced transparency around contracts, and higher levels of scrutiny of any deals struck with Russia. Building more mutually beneficial Africa-Russia relations depends on changes in both substance and process. Such a shift would require Russia to establish more conventional bilateral engagements with African institutions and not just individuals. These initiatives would focus on strengthening trade, investment, technology transfer, and educational exchanges. If transparently negotiated and equitably implemented, such Russian initiatives would be welcomed by many Africans.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thump Libya Impact

Ukraine war has caused de-escalation in Libya.

Abdullah 4/20 [Bilal Abdullah; ; 4-20-2022; Russia-Ukraine War and the De-escalation in Libya; No Publication; https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/russia-ukraine-war-and-the-de-escalation-in-libya; 7-19-2022; SK]

Libya has been relatively calm since the Russian war on Ukraine started on February 24. Although this North African nation has long been viewed as a potential arena for settling scores between Russia and the West, the situation in Libya is currently moving in the opposite direction. Its political disputes have become less severe, and the flashpoints between the political rivals have decreased.

This analysis touches on three main areas of conflict between Russia and the West in Libya in the post-February 24 period – oil, the UN mission’s future, and military deployment. The analysis also examines the impact of these points of contention on the local dispute and any local party’s ability to seize the transitional authority or manage any settlement.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Western Intervention Mod

Which causes nuclear war.

ABC ’20 [ABC News; ; 12-31-2020; Hot spots to watch: What crises could explode in 2021; ABC News; https://abcnews.go.com/International/hot-spots-watch-crises-explode-2021/story?id=74607383; 7-16-2022; SK]

Here are the top conflicts or issues that could burst into all-out crises in 2021.

Nuclear arms race: From rogue states to regional tensions

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Western Intervention Mod

Western intervention in Africa fuels instability and leaves chaos in the wake of withdrawal – empirics prove.

Face2Face Africa ’21 [Face2face Africa; ; 8-30-2021; Western military intervention is bad for Africa. A lesson from Afghanistan; Face2Face Africa; https://face2faceafrica.com/article/western-military-intervention-is-bad-for-africa-a-lesson-from-afghanistan; 7-16-2022; SK]

After two decades of war, the United States withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. Soon after the withdrawal of America-led NATO troops started, the Taliban launched an offensive against the Afghan government. The insurgents swept across the country in an unbelievably quick overtake, capturing all major cities in a matter of days, as Afghan security forces, trained and equipped by the US and its allies, melted away.

Like in Afghanistan and the Middle East, military intervention has been a common feature in post-colonial African history. Most African leaders view the US- and NATO – as the protector of democracy and a moral mediator of national conflicts. The United States even has a Mission to African Union to strengthen democratic institutions, promote peace and stability, etc. But with the US-induced chaos in Afghanistan, African countries should become wary of foreign military interference. Africa’s past is an indicator of this.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Advanced Weaponry Mod

Which draws in other powers.

Pars Today ’21 [Pars Today; Iranian News website; 11-6-2021; Israel considers selling Iron Dome missile system to Morocco for use against Algeria, says Report ; Pars Today; https://parstoday.com/en/news/west_asia-i157056-israel_considers_selling_iron_dome_missile_system_to_morocco_for_use_against_algeria_says_report; 7-8-2022; SK]

Israel has reportedly reached out to Morocco over the possibility of selling Iron Dome missile system, nearly a year after the Tel Aviv regime and the North African country normalized diplomatic relations in a deal brokered by former US president Donald Trump.

According to a report published by French-language Moroccan newspaper Le Desk, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, which has developed the system, has expressed interest to supply the military hardware to Morocco.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Advanced Weaponry Mod

The race for high-tech military technology between Morocco and Algeria increases the risk of conflict in North Africa.

Helou 7/5 [Agnes Helou; writer for Breaking Defense; 7-5-2022; In North Africa, a fighter jet arms race, with Russia and the US on either side; Breaking Defense; https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/in-north-africa-a-fighter-jet-arms-race-with-russia-and-the-us-on-either-side/; 7-8-2022; SK]

BEIRUT: While it may not make the rounds in Washington as one of the big geopolitical rivalries of the era, tensions between Morocco and Algeria are real, and have escalated in recent years thanks to a dispute over the Western Sahara, which Morocco claims to be its own territory, while Algeria backs the Tindouf-based Polisario Front rebel group.

As a result, both nations have begun investing heavily in their militaries — and specifically in airborne systems that can counter one another.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › 2NC Impact Toolbox › 2NC – Libya Impact – AT: Not Russia’s Focus

Russia sees stability in North Africa as a core foreign policy goal as long as its stranded from the West

Mihai Chihaia ’18, is an Expert with the Romanian think tank Strategikon and a PhD Candidate in International Relations, “North Africa – A Gateway for Russia’s Involvement”, Global Policy, 3/7/20, https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/03/2018/north-africa-%E2%80%93-gateway-russia%E2%80%99s-involvement

North Africa has long been an essential vector for Russian foreign policy, with multiple political, diplomatic and military resources dedicated to the presence in this region. On the overall, Russia looks to build up its presence in the area through establishing closer links in mutually beneficial areas such as military, energy and nuclear energy in particular (developing nuclear reactors with local partners) and also looks to boost strategic partnerships or explore new domains of cooperation (establishing factories of Russian manufacturers in the region, developing new paths of economic cooperation in agriculture, technology, tourism etc.). The main aim is to display itself as a strong partner and develop economic ramifications that bring revenues and political influence. Strategically speaking, the Russian government aims to recognize the local economic and military needs in North Africa and enhance its regional presence. In this sense, wearing off debts under some form of agreement and attractive financial schemes are very effective tools. Russia also quantifies on the need of the regional actors to diversify their international partners, for instance when acquiring military equipment. What are the implications for the region? The North African countries are looking for economic stability and development, diplomatic support, and to ensure that their security needs are met. In other words, this indicates that the local governments are ready to cooperate with global and regional powers. Therefore, they generally welcome the Russian involvement, although they treat it with cautiousness. On the long term it is rather difficult to assess developments but naturally, the EU and the US will search for ways to become more visible and enhance their credibility in the region, countering the Russian influence. The extent of cooperation between Russia and the North African countries In the context of the uncertainty of the relations with the US (a traditional long-standing ally), it is clear the need for Morocco to search to strengthen ties with other international powers and explore every option available. Proof of this is the king’s visits to China and Russia, in spring 2016, in order to deepen strategic ties. Russia developed relations with Morocco on two directions, namely economic and security & defense. Once again, Russia is seizing the opportunity to fill a gap and extend its influence by being ready to supply Morocco with military equipment and expand economic ties (growing foreign investments, trade and expanding tourism opportunities – Morocco seems very appealing for Russian tourists). I would argue that in the case of Morocco, Russia is looking to establish itself as a strategic partner in multiple areas. The recent visit of the Russian Prime Minister in October 2017 confirms this, its scope being to explore new dimensions for furthering this partnership, the economic area being the most feasible way to do so (with emphasis on agriculture, trade, energy, tourism etc.) while also exploring cooperation in the military sphere. The Russian Prime Minister’s tour also included Algeria, highlights of the visit being discussions to further deliver military equipment (aircrafts and air defense systems) and to establish factories of Russian companies that make trucks, bulldozers etc. The Russians are looking to extend the economic cooperation and maintain Algeria as an important weapons buyer. Russia is the largest supplier of military equipment to Algeria and according to the data gathered by SIPRI, every year from 1999 to 2016 Algeria has signed deals to buy significant weaponry from Russia (a few examples in this sense are the acquisitions of multi-role fighters Su-30MKI(A) and Mi-28 attack helicopters). Another point worth mentioning in the case of Algeria-Russia relations is that the Russian government agreed to erase the debt owed to the former Soviet Union and in exchange Algeria purchased Russian goods in the amount of the disregarded debt. This has been a practice in multiple cases in Africa. Cooperation in the energy field is very important, Russian companies being very involved in Algeria – Gazprom and Sonatrach explored together the El Assel block and found oil and gas reserves with further exploration currently underway (Gazprom owns 49% of the project). Nuclear energy cooperation is also on top of the cooperation agenda between Russia and Algeria, the countries having signed an agreement to cooperate in 2014 and being currently in discussions to build Algeria’s first nuclear power plant. The deal concerning the nuclear energy area signed in 2016 with Tunisia is also relevant and involves cooperation in research and development of nuclear infrastructure including reactors and power plants. Furthermore, the rise of the Russian tourism in Tunisia in the past years is very important in the overall relations between the two countries. On military cooperation, it is noticeable the intention of the Russians to supply Tunisia with military equipment (helicopters, bullet-proof vests and night-vision goggles) with the aim of supporting Tunisian forces in the fight against terrorism. Russia goes the extra mile and brands itself as an important partner in fighting terrorism in the region by being ready to support with military equipment, sharing intelligence and expertise. In the context of worsening relations with the US and rather stranded ones with the EU, Egypt has moved closer to Russia in the recent years. The August 2017 visit of Egyptian Prime Minister to Russia and the meeting between Putin and Sisi in China at the BRICS summit in September are just the most recent examples of the strengthened relations between the two countries. The military equipment package deal (2014), the agreement to buy Russian attack helicopters (2016), cooperation in fighting terrorism in the region and joint military exercises are all part of the nexus of cooperation between Egypt and Russia. The agreement on the construction of the El-Dabaa power plant, a partnership between Rosatom and the Egyptian authorities, has been finalized during the September meeting with a very good financial scheme in place (a loan offered by the Russians that will cover 85% of the costs). The relationship between the two countries is also important from a political standpoint, through the lens of regional issues where the two actors have common interests and support or can support each other such as in the case of Libya. Amidst the crisis in Libya, Russia is providing support to the Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, and is present in the overall international negotiations expecting to play a role in a future stable Libyan state.

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Russia is the key regional broker for bringing peace to Libya and North Africa broadly

Marianna Belenkaya ’19, writes on the Middle East for the Russian daily Kommersant. An Arab studies scholar with almost 20 years of experience covering the Middle East, “Russia keeps plugging away at cooperation with North Africa”, Al-Monitor, 1/29/20, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/01/russia-north-africa-algeria-morocco-tunisia.html

Tunisia’s ambitions and abilities are more modest; nevertheless, the nation managed to spark interest in Russian entrepreneurs, who are also weighing the prospects of working in Libya. In any case, Russia is obviously willing to develop its relations with Africa in general and with the northern part of the continent Africa particularly. For instance, Moscow plans to organize a Russia-Africa summit in the fall. North Africa's Arab nations are likely to provide much-needed help and support, considering that currently they are Russia’s main are primary drivers of cooperation between Russia and the African continent. According to authors of the “Russia-Africa Shared Vision 2030” report who spoke with Al-Monitor, from 2010 to 2017 Russian exports to Africa basically tripled, increasing from $5.1 billion to $14.8 billion. It should be noted, however, that this amount almost exclusively consists of trade with North African countries; more precisely, Algeria and Egypt received 73% of such Russian exports in 2017. Lavrov’s meetings in the Maghreb also touched upon the conflicts in Libya and Western Sahara. In its view of the latter, Moscow tries to balance between Algeria and Morocco. As the Russian foreign minister moved from one country to another, he had to adjust his statements with utmost caution. However, in regard to this conflict, as with many others, Russia formally advocates for compromise and dialogue. Expressing his position on the situation in Libya, Lavrov objected to the arbitrary choice of election dates, emphasizing that the conflicting sides should reach a consensus first. He said Russia is willing to become a mediator for anyone interested in peace.

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Cooperation depends on anti-US sentiment

Samuel Ramani ‘20, is a DPhil candidate at the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations, “Russia Takes its Syrian Model of Counterinsurgency to Africa”, Rusi, 9/9/20, https://rusi.org/commentary/russia-takes-its-syrian-model-counterinsurgency-africa

In spite of its military setbacks and cautious counterterrorism policy, Russia has capitalised on anti-Western sentiments and effective branding of its Syrian model of counterinsurgency to secure arms deals and economic contracts. Russia is the leading arms vendor to Africa, as it supplied 49% of North Africa’s weapons and 28% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s weapons between 2014–18, and numerous African states struggling with insurgencies have requested Russian weaponry. After human rights concerns prevented the US from selling advanced aircraft to Nigeria in 2014, Abuja struck a deal with Moscow to purchase Mi-35 and Mi-17 fighter jets. Nigeria’s reliance on Russian aircraft in its struggle against Boko Haram resulted in its agreement to purchase another 12 Mi-35 fighter jets from Russia in October 2019. Russia has also supplied light weaponry to Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan, as all three countries grapple with varying degrees of isolation from international arms markets. Russia has also presented itself as a counterinsurgency partner in order to expand its access to the continent’s mineral deposits. Russia’s PMC deployments in support of Central African Republic’s President Faustin-Archange Touadera against Seleka rebels are closely intertwined with its desire to profit from the country’s vast diamond reserves. Russia has spearheaded efforts to lift export restrictions on diamond sales from the Central African Republic and leveraged its counterinsurgency campaign to profit Lobaye Invest, a mining company with close ties to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Russian media outlets and think tanks often assert that US and French counterterrorism campaigns in the Sahel are aimed at securing hegemony over the region’s vast uranium stockpiles. However, Russia’s civilian nuclear energy giant Rosatom’s forays into Nigeria and aspirations to enter Niger’s uranium market are undoubtedly strengthened by the positive impact of counterinsurgency cooperation on Moscow’s bilateral relationships with West African countries.

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Coop is driven by Russia’s distance from the West

Samuel Ramani ‘20, is a DPhil candidate at the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations, “Russia Takes its Syrian Model of Counterinsurgency to Africa”, Rusi, 9/9/20, https://rusi.org/commentary/russia-takes-its-syrian-model-counterinsurgency-africa

Although it remains unclear whether Moscow assisted Mali’s coup plotters, supporting an extra-legal turnover of power would severely undercut Russia’s aspirations to become a counterinsurgency leader in Africa. Since Russia embarked on its military intervention in support of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad in September 2015, the Kremlin has advertised its ‘Syrian model’ of counterinsurgency to African countries struggling with political violence. This model emphasises state-to-state cooperation between Russia and African governments and presents authoritarian stability as the most effective antidote to extremism. As the unilateralism that underpins US counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and Washington’s frequent attachment of human rights conditions for military assistance have frustrated African leaders, Russia’s alternative counterinsurgency model has become increasingly attractive in Africa. In April 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Somalia desired Russian equipment to aid its counterterrorism operations and Somalia subsequently requested Moscow’s assistance in upgrading its military preparedness. Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir praised Russia’s Syrian model of counterinsurgency more explicitly in November 2017 by stating that ‘if it were not for the Russian intervention in the situation in Syria, then this country would be lost’. More recently, US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper’s wavering commitment to African security and France’s counterinsurgency struggles in the Sahel have increased the appeal of Russia’s counterterrorism model in West Africa. Nigeria’s Ambassador to Russia Steve Ugbah argued in in October 2019 that ‘We’re sure that with Russian help we’ll manage to crush Boko Haram’ and cited Russia’s defeat of the Islamic State in Syria as proof for this statement. In November 2019, large-scale anti-French and anti-UN protests erupted in Mali’s capital Bamako calling for Russia to vanquish Islamists in Mali like it did in Syria.

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Western abandonment is key to Russia-North Africa relations

Isabelle Falcon ’17, Deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, “Russia’s quest for influence in North Africa and the Middle East”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, 4/11/17, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programs/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/russias-quest-influence-north-africa-and-middle-east-2017

Beyond the military operations in Syria starting from September 2015, Russia surprised the international community through its capacity to talk with several major players about the Syrian issue, including non-state actors, such as the Kurds. This significantly contributed to the fact that it managed to impose itself as a vital mediator. This approach reflects the strategy pursued more generally in the Northern Africa/Middle East region. No relation is excluded, including those with Fatah or the Iraqi Kurds. Such an approach aims at widening Russian room for manoeuvre. If the legacy of the Soviet era favours the development of certain relations, it does not render them exclusive. Thus, from 2001, President Putin signed a strategic partnership agreement with his Algerian counterpart. However, this did not stop Moscow from engaging with Morocco with whom the Kremlin had always maintained relations, and conversely with Tunisia. In the Middle East, the partnership with Iran has reached an unprecedented level. In four years (2013 – 2017), Presidents Putin and Rouhani have met on eight separate occasions. The last meeting being the first bilateral meeting between the two men. Tehran has authorised Russia to temporarily use the base of Nojeh for its air strikes in Syria. This increased Russo-Iranian proximity has not stopped the links between Russia and Israel from becoming an important paradigm of the Kremlin’s regional policy. The demographic weight of Israeli citizens of Soviet origin undoubtedly contributed to this development. Communication between the two countries became particularly during the Russian military intervention in Syria. The Russian government is showing itself to be particularly attentive to Israel’s concerns regarding the presence of Hezbollah and the military influence of Iran in Syria. Considering that dialogue is preferable to tension and recriminations, Russia has actively sought to establish workable relations with Saudi Arabia. The two countries show themselves inclined to compartmentalise the issues that characterise their bilateral relations. Thus Russia has shown itself to be faithful to a new foreign policy that seeks to diversify its relations in all regions. In the region concerned, this effort must take into consideration the fact that the inherited networks of the Soviet era have been significantly eroded since the 1990s. Moreover, the growing instability in the zone, especially since the Arab Spring, has forced the Kremlin to demonstrate its flexibility so as to not remove any options in the event that political relations were to evolve. In this context, Moscow has also managed to appreciate the opportunity that was presented by the perception spread at the regional level of a “confusion” of Western powers (caused by such factors as the “abandonment” of Mubarak, red lines not followed in Syria and the United States’ regional disengagement). Thus, Moscow did not hesitate to manipulate the disappointments left by Western political leaders to its advantage. This partly explains the development of relations with Egypt, which, after the military coup d’état of 2013, is looking to establish a more independent foreign policy. Despite the strong ambiguities that will lastingly encumber the Russo-Turkish relationship (starting with the Kurdish question), Turkey and Russia continue to share a strong disdain for the West. After the coup attempt in Turkey, the immediate support offered by Moscow to the “legitimate authorities” help to repair the damage left by the crisis of the Su-24 shot down by Turkish forces. This marked a stark contrast with Western capitals which voiced their concerns about the repression carried out by the Turkish regime. Russia also knows that its link with Tehran indirectly benefits from the suspicion Iran harbours for the Western powers. The pragmatism observed in the Saudi Arabia/Russia relationship is tied to Riyadh’s desire to diversify its foreign policy in a context where its relationship with Washington has undergone a restructuring in recent years. The arms deals made with Iraq underline Baghdad’s desire to strengthen its political independence from Washington. In the Maghreb, even the situation is less “severe” for the West, “the Russian project finds a favourable environment due to these countries’ belief in the necessity for a better balanced, bipolar world” (against a highly fluid backdrop, a rapprochement with Moscow can now be used to put pressure on EU countries and the US ). These circumstances have notably favoured the recent development of Russo-Moroccan relations and, to a lesser extent, Russo-Tunisian relations. In general, Russia plays a sensitive game in the entirety of the region. This is demonstrated when Moscow states that its policy in the Middle East and North Africa will always be led on a basis of “respecting their [states’] sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right to self-determination without outside interference” (Foreign Policy Concept).

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Distrust in the US is key

Youssef Cherif ’19, Deputy Director, Columbia Global Centers, Tunis, “The Interests of Putin’s Russia in the MENA Region in Historical Perspective”, EuroMesco, The Role of Russia in the Middle East and North Africa Region. Strategy or Opportunism?, April 2019, https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Joint-Policy-Study_12_The-role-of-Russia-in-the-MENA-region.pdf

Russia’s return was also encouraged by America’s problems. The US was stuck in the Iraqi whirlpool. Syria was participating in undermining America’s presence in Iraq. Iran, Russia’s partner, was expanding its reach in the Middle East (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria). Washington, which had plans to contain Iran, was itself contained in Iraq between Syria and Iran. It was that moment of weakness that Putin sought to exploit. On the other hand, a general malaise was felt inside the Arab ruling elites in the 2000s vis-à-vis Washington. Most Arab countries (as well as Iran and Turkey) opposed the US war on Iraq, and that included the most pro-American ones among them. They were therefore on the same line as Moscow. The Bush administration’s discourse about democracy and human rights, the destitution of Saddam Hussein and the introduction of democracy to Iraq, as well as the US-backed Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, all this had spread fear among the ruling autocrats. In the Kremlin, where conspiracy theories about US-led revolutions are rife, the Arab leaders found a listening ear and repeated it constantly to their US counterparts. 5 This convergence in opinions created a synergy between Moscow and many Arabs that would blossom in the following decade. Whether Putin meditated carefully on his current MENA strategy or if he is simply an opportunist will continue to be debated until more Russian archives are declassified. What is certain is that Moscow managed to cultivate friends in all of the MENA countries and to prove indispensable for some. By the end of the 2000s, Russia was an important player in the region, to be counted along with the US and the EU. It seems that Vladimir Putin has jumped on every single opportunity that presented itself, calculated the benefits Russia can make – be it economic or geopolitical – and threw the dice. So when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2010, he was in the right place. The moment was ripe to increase Russia’s presence in the region, which he did. Today, Russia can engage with all sides, including sworn enemies who wage wars against each other, and is once again treated as a global power not to be neglected.

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Drive by Western isolation – key to intervention in Libya

Eugene Rumer ’19, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, “Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10/31/19, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-in-middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233

Russia’s return to North Africa too has to be considered against the backdrop of the United States’ disengagement from the region. The relationship between Moscow and Cairo, interrupted in the 1970s with the latter’s pivot toward the United States, underwent a significant upgrade after the 2013 coup in Egypt and the rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to the presidency. Criticized in the West for his human rights abuses, Sisi found in Putin a convenient partner to help shore up his domestic standing and leverage vis-à-vis Washington. Egypt has emerged as an important customer for Russian arms. Russia and Egypt have partnered in supporting one of the factions in the Libyan civil war, the Libyan National Army, but the country remains too badly fractured for the LNA to score a decisive victory. Moscow expects to have a say in negotiations about the conflict and to reestablish commercial opportunities derailed by Muammar Qaddafi’s demise.