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2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › Sustainability

China won’t rise to hegemon – its leaders want a peaceful multipolar world order

Golden 22 – Senior Associate Researcher, CIDOB (Sean, March 2022, “China’s “enlightened authoritarianism” as an alternative to liberal democracy,” Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/2022/china_s_enlightened_authoritarianism_as_an_alternative_to_liberal_democracy)//KH

China wants a new world order, but not the new world order initiated in Ukraine by the Putin regime. A joint statement issued by China and Russia before the invasion proposed to “uphold the outcomes of the Second World War and the existing post-war world order” and to “resist attempts to deny, distort, and falsify the history of the Second World War”. The Cold War froze in place one aspect of that outcome —the Yalta agreement. The fall of the USSR eroded that example of Realpolitik. The Warsaw Pact disappeared but NATO expanded, claiming interests that run from Vladivostok to Vancouver. China is a nervous observer of this process.

The joint statement also proposes to “protect the United Nations-driven international architecture and the international law-based world order, seek genuine multipolarity” and to “promote more democratic international relations, and ensure peace, stability and sustainable development across the world”. Implicit in this catalogue, in addition to a defence of the veto power of the victors in WWII, is a criticism of a world order dominated in the voting systems of the Bretton Woods institutions by the USA and Western Europe, and the elevation of the losing WWII enemies (Germany and Japan) to the status of NATO allies at the cost of two of the winning allies (then the USSR and the Republic of China, now Russia and the PRC). More important is the insistence on “genuine multipolarity”, “more democratic international relations” and “sustainable development” without interference in the interest of developed countries.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › Sustainability

Their ev assumes current pandemic conditions, but long-term trends prove China’s rise will outpace the US

Nolke 22 – Professor of Political Science at Goethe University (Frankfurt) and Senior Researcher at the Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE. (Andreas Nolke, May 10, 2022, Post-Corona Capitalism, “Chapter 27: China– US Struggle for Global Economic Hegemony: Contender or Incumbent?” pp. 169-173, Bristol University Press, Project Muse via UMich Libraries, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/100967)//KH

Is China prepared for global leadership? A core requirement for this leadership role would be political and economic stability. These two aspects are interrelated, as political stability in an authoritarian regime such as China depends primarily on the ability to guarantee a constantly improving standard of living. In comparative political economy research on the Chinese economy, we can identify two perspectives on the likeliness of this stability. On the one hand, there are mainly Western observers with a background in liberal economics (for example, Economy, 2007). These observers of China predict that China will be not be able to continue its economic rise, due to the lack of sustainability of its state- centred economy – but they have been articulating this negative prediction for many years already, to no avail. The alternative perspective, more often articulated by political economists and non- Western observers, is that China’s economic rise will continue, since it is based on a coherent non- liberal model of capitalism (Nölke et al, 2020). What does the evidence of the coronavirus crisis tell us with regard to these two competing perspectives? Several issues are at stake. China may suffer from a decoupling of global production networks (see Chapter 17). It also encounters backlashes with regard to the acquisition of foreign companies and technologies (see Chapter 18). The Chinese economy, however, has weathered the pandemic well so far. Based on draconian health measures and substantial fiscal as well as monetary policy interventions, China recovered quickly (Tian, 2020), particularly in international comparison.

With regard to its international leadership role, China has suffered some setbacks, such as a bad image as country of origin of the virus. However, China has tried to overcome these setbacks by its concerted diplomatic efforts in terms of health assistance, including emergency supplies to EU member states: ‘China’s public diplomacy has gone into overdrive’ (Seaman, 2020: 8). In contrast to the EU and the US, China has used its health diplomacy successfully as a soft- power weapon in order to further its geo- economic influence (Gauttam et al, 2020). Moreover, China has used the crisis to promote its pre- existing ‘techno- authoritarian project’ that fuses technological surveillance, a strong focus on public security and public health, although it is yet unclear whether this approach will diffuse globally (Greitens, 2020).

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › Sustainability

Insufficient institutional COVID response destroyed the US-led LIO

Nolke 22 – Professor of Political Science at Goethe University (Frankfurt) and Senior Researcher at the Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE. (Andreas Nolke, May 10, 2022, Post-Corona Capitalism, “Chapter 27: China– US Struggle for Global Economic Hegemony: Contender or Incumbent?” pp. 169-173, Bristol University Press, Project Muse via UMich Libraries, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/100967)//KH

The coronavirus crisis as a challenge to the liberal global order

Very early in the pandemic, the crisis was seen as a problem for the liberal economic order (Norrlöf, 2020a). Next to the challenges of democratic and liberal capitalism on the domestic level (see Chapters 30 and 31), it also affected some of the core pillars of the LIO in the international economic realm; for example, the freedom of individual movement (see Chapter 6), the transnational openness for the movement of goods (see Chapters 17 and 20) and the transnational openness of financial markets (see Chapter 18). Importantly, these are challenges to the specific LIO, not to intergovernmental cooperation or international organizations per se; the latter often were even able to expand their scope and policy instruments during the crisis (Debre and Dijkstra, 2020), although they were unable to ensure comprehensive international cooperation on core issues such as the prevention of ‘vaccine nationalism’ (Abbas, 2020).

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › Sustainability

“Hegemony sustainable” scholars underestimate domestic influence on international standing – US divisions mean zero chance the plan revitalizes heg

Acharya 22 – Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service at American University (Amitav, July/August 2022, "Hierarchies of Weakness," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2022-06-21/hierarchies-weakness-social-divisions)//KH

In the year and a half since U.S. President Joe Biden came to office, the international order has often seemed defined by a resurgence of great-power conflict. China and the United States remain locked in a robust rivalry. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Washington and its NATO allies have been drawn into a large-scale war in Europe that pits the liberal West against an autocratic Russia. In this volatile world, many analysts suggest, the most important kinds of power are once again military and economic: the continued ability of the United States to limit the threat of authoritarian rivals depends on the extent to which it can maintain the most advanced armed forces in the world and ensure that its economic might can outpace China’s.

Often overlooked in the commentary, however, are the ways in which military and economic power are dependent on social stability at home. Biden’s populist predecessor, Donald Trump, exploited growing divisions over class, race, gender, and religion for political purposes. He also shunned multilateral alliances, pulled out of international agreements, and cultivated cozy relations with autocrats such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin, all in the name of rejecting the values of liberal elites and the existing Western establishment in favor of a more nationalist, “America first” vision. One result is that many U.S. allies today have much less confidence in the ability of Washington to uphold the liberal international order. Although they have welcomed renewed U.S. engagement in NATO and Europe, many European governments wonder how long the approach will last if another populist president is elected in 2024.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › AT: Multipolarity

Chinese hegemony is temporary – environmental costs zero its economic and military growth by 2050 even in the world of renewables

McCoy 22 – Alfred McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (Alfred, 2-25-2022, "Will the Fight for Hegemony Survive Climate Change?," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/environment/climate-china-usa-beijing/)//KH

Simultaneously, China was also becoming the world’s largest auto manufacturer as the number of vehicles on its roads soared to 340 million in 2019, exceeding America’s 276 million. However, all of this impressive news is depressing news as well. After all, by clinging to coal production on a major scale, while reaching for a bigger slice of the world’s oil imports for its transportation triad, China’s greenhouse-gas emissions doubled from just 14 percent of the world’s total in 2000 to 30 percent in 2019, far surpassing that of the United States, previously the planet’s leading emitter. With only 150 vehicles per thousand people, compared to 850 in America, its auto industry still has ample growth potential—good news for its economy, but terrible news for the global climate (even if China remains in the forefront of the development and use of electric cars).

To power such headlong development, China has, in fact, raised its domestic coal production more than a thousand-fold, from just 32 million metric tons in 1949 to a mind-boggling record of 4.1 billion tons by 2021. Even if you take into account those massive natural-gas pipelines it is building, its enormous hydropower dams, and its world leadership in wind power, as of 2020 China still depended on coal for a startling 57 percent of its total energy use, even as its share of total global coal-fired power climbed relentlessly to a record 53 percent. In other words, nothing, it seems, can break that country’s leadership of its insatiable hunger for the dirtiest of all fossil fuels.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Russia revisionist

Russian and Chinese revisionism on a double front proves now is critical for the US to leverage its ample capabilities to hedge back

Brands 22 – Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (Hal, 2-25-2022, "The Eurasian Nightmare," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-25/eurasian-nightmare)//KH

The greatest strategic problem the United States faces is the convergence of its two main rivals, China and Russia—countries that don’t always like or trust each other but nonetheless derive great benefits from their simultaneous assaults on the existing international order. And as Moscow and Beijing contest the balance of power at both ends of Eurasia, they are drawing together in ominous ways.

China has refused to condemn Russia's brazen invasion of Ukraine. Instead, on the day of Russia's attack, it accused the United States and its allies of “fanning the flames.” China’s non-denunciation is part of a broader pattern of Sino-Russian convergence, as both Beijing and Moscow are using old and new methods to upend the global status quo. In January 2022, China publicly supported Russia’s intervention in Kazakhstan to thwart a “color revolution” in the two countries’ shared backyard. In early February, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping issued a long joint statement endorsing efforts to keep U.S. influence out of their near abroads, attacking the United States’ alliances as Cold War relics, defending their own autocratic models of government, and declaring that Sino-Russian friendship has “no limits.” All of this follows significant, sustained upticks in military, economic, diplomatic, and technological cooperation. Expect more in the future: as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine crystallizes tensions between Putin and the West, it also underscores his need for support from Beijing.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Russia revisionist

Neither US influence nor NATO expansion are the cause of Russian aggression – Putin is ideologically revisionist, proven by Russian history

Brands 22 – Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (Hal, 15 March, 2022, "Putin’s Biggest Lie: Blaming NATO for His War," https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3532081/hal-brands/putin%E2%80%99s-biggest-lie-blaming-nato-his-war)//KH

The great NATO enlargement debate never ends. In the 1990s, US officials and academics argued about whether pushing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Eastern Europe was likely to sustain the post-Cold War peace or prematurely end it. More recently, critics have charged that Russia’s war in Ukraine is a natural response to the aggressive expansion of America’s most powerful alliance.

Now Russian officials, and even President Vladimir Putin himself, have echoed — and sometimes directly cited — American scholars such as political scientist John Mearsheimer, who argues that the current crisis “is the West’s fault.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › AT: Unsustainable – Afghanistan

Afghanistan wasn’t a failure or a litmus test for hegemonic decline – net success and biased hindsight prove

Kagan 21 – Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; adjunct professor at Georgetown (Robert, 8-26-2021, "Opinion: It wasn’t hubris that drove America into Afghanistan. It was fear," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/26/robert-kagan-afghanistan-americans-forget/)//KH

Americans long remembered where they were when they learned about the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915. The shock and horror of that event, in which a German submarine deliberately sank a British ocean liner with nearly 2,000 men, women and children aboard, produced more than moral outrage. It also reshaped Americans’ perception of the world and their role in it, ultimately leading them into the First World War. But neither their outrage at Germany nor their reconfigured view of foreign policy lasted very long. Ten years later, Americans still remembered the Lusitania, but they did not remember why they went to war — or, more specifically, how they felt about the series of events, beginning with the sinking, that ultimately led them to embrace war as their only remaining option. Instead, they came to regret their intervention in that war and to wonder what or, rather, who had gotten them into it.

Americans have undergone a similar experience over the two decades since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. The feelings and perceptions of threat that led them to war in Afghanistan have faded, and all that is left are the consequences of that decision, the costs in lives and money, the inevitably mixed and uncertain results, and the unanswerable question: Was it all worth it?

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › AT: Unsustainable – China dependence

They have it backwards – China depends on the US for economic might, and decoupling is possible without failure

Green and Brands 22 – *senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS and chair in modern and contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,**Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and columnist for Bloomberg (Mike* interviewing Hal**, February 25, 2022, “Twilight Struggle: Lessons from the Cold War for China Strategy Today,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/twilight-struggle-lessons-cold-war-china-strategy-today)//KH

Mike Green: And maybe the biggest difference... And, again, you're not saying this is a new Cold War. But in terms of using that experience to understand the dynamics of geopolitical competition and what it means for the American way of government and strategy, probably the biggest difference, you'd agree, I think, is you didn't have such a stake in Soviet economic interests. You didn't have, you know, prominent Wall Street financiers, to this day, calling for basically no decoupling and faith in the marketplace with China. You didn't have soybean farmers in most states of the union getting most of their income from exports to China. You didn't have all of these stakeholders within the US system who had so much to gain from the Chinese economy.

Mike Green: You didn't talk a lot about that in the book, but how would you amend the lessons, given that piece of it? We've surveyed this, you know, at CSIS, and both thought leaders and the American public are quite willing to decouple on high tech and do things like that. But when it comes to stopping agricultural exports or things that benefit us or cheap consumer goods, there's not a lot of support, and that's very different from the Soviet Union. We had no economic relationship, really, that affected average Americans. So what do you do with that one when you're trying to look at the parallels and the lessons?

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Sustainability

Ukraine proves US hegemony is inevitable and drawback causes conflict – only increased intervention solves

Kagan 22 – Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; adjunct professor at Georgetown (Robert, May/June 2022, "The Price of Hegemony," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/russia-ukraine-war-price-hegemony)//KH

For years, analysts have debated whether the United States incited Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interventions in Ukraine and other neighboring countries or whether Moscow’s actions were simply unprovoked aggressions. That conversation has been temporarily muted by the horrors of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A wave of popular outrage has drowned out those who have long argued that the United States has no vital interests at stake in Ukraine, that it is in Russia’s sphere of interest, and that U.S. policies created the feelings of insecurity that have driven Putin to extreme measures. Just as the attack on Pearl Harbor silenced the anti-interventionists and shut down the debate over whether the United States should have entered World War II, Putin’s invasion has suspended the 2022 version of Americans’ endless argument over their purpose in the world.

That is unfortunate. Although it is obscene to blame the United States for Putin’s inhumane attack on Ukraine, to insist that the invasion was entirely unprovoked is misleading. Just as Pearl Harbor was the consequence of U.S. efforts to blunt Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland, and just as the 9/11 attacks were partly a response to the United States’ dominant presence in the Middle East after the first Gulf War, so Russian decisions have been a response to the expanding post–Cold War hegemony of the United States and its allies in Europe. Putin alone is to blame for his actions, but the invasion of Ukraine is taking place in a historical and geopolitical context in which the United States has played and still plays the principal role, and Americans must grapple with this fact.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Sustainability

US hegemony is inevitable and stable, but renewed efforts are necessary to check transition wars and dismantle US psychological hegemonic denialism

Kagan 21 – Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; adjunct professor at Georgetown (Robert Kagan, March/April 2021, "A Superpower, Like It or Not," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-16/superpower-it-or-not)//KH

All great powers have a deeply ingrained self-perception shaped by historical experience, geography, culture, beliefs, and myths. Many Chinese today yearn to recover the greatness of a time when they ruled unchallenged at the pinnacle of their civilization, before “the century of humiliation.” Russians are nostalgic for Soviet days, when they were the other superpower and ruled from Poland to Vladivostok. Henry Kissinger once observed that Iranian leaders had to choose whether they wanted to be “a nation or a cause,” but great powers and aspiring great powers often see themselves as both. Their self-perception shapes their definition of the national interest, of what constitutes genuine security and the actions and resources necessary to achieve it. Often, it is these self-perceptions that drive nations, empires, and city-states forward. And sometimes to their ruin. Much of the drama of the past century resulted from great powers whose aspirations exceeded their capacity.

Americans have the opposite problem. Their capacity for global power exceeds their perception of their proper place and role in the world. Even as they have met the challenges of Nazism and Japanese imperialism, Soviet communism, and radical Islamist terrorism, they have never regarded this global activism as normal. Even in the era of the Internet, long-range missiles, and an interdependent global economy, many Americans retain the psychology of a people living apart on a vast continent, untouched by the world’s turmoil. Americans have never been isolationists. In times of emergency, they can be persuaded to support extraordinary exertions in far-off places. But they regard these as exceptional responses to exceptional circumstances. They do not see themselves as the primary defender of a certain kind of world order; they have never embraced that “indispensable” role.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Sustainability

NATO expansion hasn’t caused conflict – US hegemonic promotion is peaceful and sustainable

Brands 22 – Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (Hal, 15 March, 2022, "Putin’s Biggest Lie: Blaming NATO for His War," https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3532081/hal-brands/putin%E2%80%99s-biggest-lie-blaming-nato-his-war)//KH

The great NATO enlargement debate never ends. In the 1990s, US officials and academics argued about whether pushing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Eastern Europe was likely to sustain the post-Cold War peace or prematurely end it. More recently, critics have charged that Russia’s war in Ukraine is a natural response to the aggressive expansion of America’s most powerful alliance.

Now Russian officials, and even President Vladimir Putin himself, have echoed — and sometimes directly cited — American scholars such as political scientist John Mearsheimer, who argues that the current crisis “is the West’s fault.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Sustainability

Alliance post-Trump proves East Asia and Europe will always be dependent on the US – Ukraine marks a shift towards optimism

Kagan and Neil 22 – Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; adjunct professor at Georgetown (Andrew Neil interviewing Robert Kagan, 5-10-2022, "Episode 3: Robert Kagan," Tortoise, https://www.tortoisemedia.com/audio/episode-3-robert-kagan/)//KH

Andrew Neil: So, given Europe’s robust response to the invasion of Ukraine so far, are Americans still from Mars and Europeans still from Venus, as you once memorably wrote?

Robert Kagan: I still think it’s the case and, by the way, for entirely understandable reasons that the United States is still more prone to use force in situations than Europeans are. That derives to some extent from European capabilities; Europe doesn’t really have much in the way of force projection capabilities and up until now, I think it has been quite clear that Europeans haven’t wanted it. The discussion has certainly been taking place for decades, right? How many times have we said that the Europeans, that the Europeans have said that they are going to build up their military? They haven’t; they’ve made their choice. Maybe that will change to some extent but I don’t see Europe playing that kind of, becoming its own sort of stand-alone superpower, even though I would be delighted if it did.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Sustainability

Post-Ukraine, a European economic shift means the US’ position as a global hegemon is secure

Brands 22 – Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Hal Brands, May, 21, 2022, "Democracies Can Out-Compete the China-Russia Alliance," https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3657196/hal-brands/democracies-can-out-compete-china-russia-alliance)//KH

The economic trauma of the Ukraine War is only beginning: Energy shocks, food-supply disruption and commodity shortages will have growing impact as the conflict persists. The war, moreover, is just part of an acceleratng geo-economic realignment.

The golden age of globalization, when countries pursued interdependence with minimal fear of insecurity, is over. The global economy is now being reshaped by competition and conflict. That will create some opportunities for the US to strengthen its position — as well as a whole lot of worldwide turmoil.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Sustainability

China is threatening, but the US is an early stage of competition. Sustainability indicts assume the squo, not the longer-term trends of US strength. No safe alternative to US hegemony.

Green and Brands 22 – *senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS and chair in modern and contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,**Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and columnist for Bloomberg (Mike* interviewing Hal**, February 25, 2022, “Twilight Struggle: Lessons from the Cold War for China Strategy Today,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/twilight-struggle-lessons-cold-war-china-strategy-today)//KH

Mike Green: My favorite quote of the people you quote in the book is the quote you have of Kennan, who argues that... At the very beginning of thinking about containment, he argues there is no real security in this strategic competition we were starting out with vis-a-vis the Soviets, no real security and no alternative to living dangerously. That really stuck with me because we are, it seems to me, at a cathartic moment in American strategic thought, and, as you know well, by the way, Australia and the Japanese and a lot of other allies, about this problem, and that just was kind of chilling. There is no alternative to living dangerously. That, to me, is the strategic point of discontinuity we've hit in the last few years. We now realize there's no responsible stakeholder. There's no new model of great power relations. There is no alternative to living dangerously. That really stuck with me. But that's a little bit of a depressing note to strike, so how would you characterize... What does it mean, in your words, to be preparing for a long struggle?

Hal Brands: So it's a great question, and I think maybe I'll start by starting in the present and then working my way backwards. You mentioned the transition period in US-China relations that probably began about five years ago with the advent of the Trump presidency when we decided that the responsible stakeholder was more or less dead and we were moving into a period of competition. In a way, I think that realization kind of felt liberating for a lot of American policymakers. I mean, there was less concern about not rocking the boat in the US-China relationship, and there was freedom to do things that the United States might have wanted to do but felt constrained to do in economic competition or technological competition for a while.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Sustainability

States’ reaction to multiple spheres of influence proves a regional shift away from Chinese revisionism and towards the USA!

Green and Brands 22 – *senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS and chair in modern and contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,**Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and columnist for Bloomberg (Mike* interviewing Hal**, February 25, 2022, “Twilight Struggle: Lessons from the Cold War for China Strategy Today,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/twilight-struggle-lessons-cold-war-china-strategy-today)//KH

Mike Green: You have a whole chapter on the contest and the periphery, and there was a great... The Soviets and the Chinese had an advantage because, for example, the fight in the Korean Peninsula or Vietnam was a continental Asian fight. They had interior lines. We had to go across the vast maritime space, and we ended up getting sucked into continental wars. The peripheral problems this time, with a few exceptions, are maritime. That's different, isn't it? It's South China Sea, it's East China Sea. It's increasingly not only the first but the second island chain. It's closer to home, and it's sort of more vital in the sense of American sea lanes and the, if you will, Anglo-American source of hegemony for 400 years. How do we think about these peripheral risks and which ones worry you, like Taiwan?

Mike Green: Riffing off what I just said, to me, it sort of says, "Worry more about the maritime periphery than the continental." But how do we think about these peripheral challenges? We're not looking at a direct US-China fight. It's about the periphery. It's about third states. It's about spheres of influence and all that. How do you think about it? What are the ones that worry you, and what does it mean that it's now increasingly maritime and, therefore, in our face?

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Sustainability

The threat of Chinese revisionism has increased US hegemonic sustainability

Beckley 22 – Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, associate professor at Tufts University (Michael, March/April 2022, "Enemies of My Enemy," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-02-14/china-new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy)//KH

The international order is falling apart, and everyone seems to know how to fix it. According to some, the United States just needs to rededicate itself to leading the liberal order it helped found some 75 years ago. Others argue that the world’s great powers should form a concert to guide the international community into a new age of multipolar cooperation. Still others call for a grand bargain that divides the globe into stable spheres of influence. What these and other visions of international order have in common is an assumption that global governance can be designed and imposed from the top down. With wise statesmanship and ample summitry, the international jungle can be tamed and cultivated. Conflicts of interest and historical hatreds can be negotiated away and replaced with win-win cooperation.

The history of international order, however, provides little reason for confidence in top-down, cooperative solutions. The strongest orders in modern history—from Westphalia in the seventeenth century to the liberal international order in the twentieth—were not inclusive organizations working for the greater good of humanity. Rather, they were alliances built by great powers to wage security competition against their main rivals. Fear and loathing of a shared enemy, not enlightened calls to make the world a better place, brought these orders together. Progress on transnational issues, when achieved, emerged largely as a byproduct of hardheaded security cooperation. That cooperation usually lasted only as long as a common threat remained both present and manageable. When that threat dissipated or grew too large, the orders collapsed. Today, the liberal order is fraying for many reasons, but the underlying cause is that the threat it was originally designed to defeat—Soviet communism—disappeared three decades ago. None of the proposed replacements to the current order have stuck because there hasn’t been a threat scary or vivid enough to compel sustained cooperation among the key players.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Reps defense

Benevolent hegemonic offensive rhetoric is key – otherwise, worse, anti-democratic rhetoric fills in

Green and Brands 22 – *senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS and chair in modern and contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,**Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and columnist for Bloomberg (Mike* interviewing Hal**, February 25, 2022, “Twilight Struggle: Lessons from the Cold War for China Strategy Today,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/twilight-struggle-lessons-cold-war-china-strategy-today)//KH

Mike Green: So the way you write the book is looking at different themes in Cold War strategic competition and then, at the end of the book, tying together some lessons or implications for us. You don't come out and say, "We need to recreate exactly NSC-68, or we need"... It's not redo what we did but what are the implications for how we prepare for this ourselves? There is a bit of a contradiction in there, which may be something you can resolve for us. But, on the one hand, you want an open educational exchange with China, for all the reasons you just said, but you also quote... And I agree with this, too, by the way. You quote Kennan on the need for offensive, not just defensive, but offensive political warfare, information warfare, so poking at the seams, the inconsistencies, the contradictions in the adversary's way of life.

Mike Green: The contradiction is this. This is the excuse Xi Jinping and other authoritarians used to shut down civil society and free academic learning and discourse, because it's all just part of an American campaign of offensive political warfare. This is a kind of tactical question, really. I don't think we ever figured it out in the Cold War, really. How do you take advantage of our open society, the attraction of our values, even within an authoritarian state, and therefore wanting to preserve an open exchange in academic and intellectual, rich interaction with China while at the same time engaging in political warfare, which we need to do? Do you have any sort of lessons from the Cold War or thoughts on the way forward?

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Now key

COVID created a hegemonic reset with a global-power step down – now is a rare gap to positively reconstruct the world order

Zelikow 22 - Professor of History at the University of Virginia. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations (Philip, July/August 2022, "The Hollow Order," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system)//KH

There they were, meeting in Beijing on February 4: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Shortly before the start of the 2022 Winter Olympics, the two leaders released a remarkable 5,300-word joint statement about how the partnership between China and Russia would have “no limits.” The document went on at length about the two nations’ commitment to democracy. It called for a universalist and open world order, with the United Nations at the center. It stressed a commitment to international law, inclusiveness, and common values. It did all this even though Russia, as Xi and Putin both knew, was sending tanks and missile launchers to the Ukrainian border.

By comparison, the September 1940 joint statement issued by Germany, Italy, and Japan was a model of candor. The Axis powers were at least truthful when they announced that it was “their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things.” Russia, meanwhile, has described its war against Ukraine as one of liberation. It decided that the country’s Jewish president was a Nazi. It declared that there was really no such thing as “Ukraine.” And it argued that a NATO alliance with a U.S. force commitment in Europe that was only one-seventh as large as it had been at the height of the Cold War was now an existential threat.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Hegemony is good! › Now key

Now is critical for a US heg booster! Post-Ukraine encouraged international collaboration and Western leadership

Daalder and Lindsay 22 - *President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013, **Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. (*Ivo H. and **James M., July/August 2022, "Last Best Hope," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/last-best-hope-world-order-west)//KH

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirmed what has long been apparent: the rules-based order created after World War II is at risk of collapse. Russia is not content to be a responsible stakeholder in a system set up by others, and neither is China, which has supported Moscow’s aggression. Both countries want to remake the order to serve their autocratic interests. As U.S. President Joe Biden said in Warsaw in March, the West now faces “a battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.”

History was not supposed to play out this way. In the heady days after the Cold War, the order appeared both unchallenged and unchallengeable. Washington believed that its unquestioned primacy allowed it to determine the future of other countries as well as its own. U.S. allies believed they had escaped the tragedy of great-power politics and had entered an era of self-enforcing rules. As time went on, however, habits of collaboration eroded, and the sense of common purpose faded. Rather than using the unique moment of U.S. dominance to deepen and strengthen the rules-based order, the West let that system wither.