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2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Human Dignity

No solvency – ALL weapons violate human dignity – not just autonomous weapons

Pop, 2018 – diplomat for the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs [Ariadna April 10 “Autonomous weapon systems: A threat to human dignity?” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Human dignity in anti-AWS arguments As we have seen above, anti-AWS arguments frequently employ Kantian terminology when invoking the concept of human dignity. Unfortunately, however, in none of these arguments do we get an account of how exactly human dignity is violated by the employment of AWS. This is not satisfactory. Unless it can be shown why the concept of human dignity mandates the prohibition of AWS, such a prohibition is not justified. Let us therefore assume that human dignity stands for unconditional, intrinsic value. Let us assume further that this intrinsic value has its source in our autonomy, understood as our ability to make self-determined choices. What can plausibly follow from such an understanding regarding the use of AWS? To be sure, if we are hurt or killed against our will, it severely impacts our ability to make our own choices. Hence, to allow AWS to deliver force is certainly incompatible with the moral value of autonomy. But how are AWS different in this regard from regular weapons? After all, any type of weapon or method of warfare, be it a remote-controlled long-distance missile, a drone, an air strike or conventional ballistic weapon, is designed to seriously harm human beings. What is it about AWS that renders them particularly reprehensible from the point of view of human dignity? I fail to see what the relevant argument could look like and have also not found any satisfactory explanation in the literature. Note that I am not saying that there are no morally questionable aspects in the employment AWS, there certainly are. My point is simply that if the morally significant dimension is taken to be human dignity, and if human dignity is understood as a value that has its source in our capacity for self-determination, then the relevant incompatibility is not restricted to a specific weapon system, but is shared by any type of force that harms our agency.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 2NC---Solvency---Human Control

No solvency – it is impossible to verify human control

Horowitz, 2019 - Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania [Michael C. May 2“When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Jervis argues that arms races occur due to a security dilemma when states have the ability to measure each other’s capabilities, but not their intentions.57 LAWS could be especially risky in this regard because of potential opacity about capabilities, in addition to the “normal” opacity that exists about intentions. First, it will be extremely difficult for states to credibly demonstrate autonomous weapon capabilities. The difference between a remotely-piloted system and an autonomous system is software, not hardware, meaning verification that a given country is operating an autonomous system at all would be difficult. Second, uncertainty about the technological trajectory of machine learning and specific military applications means that countries might have significant uncertainty about other countries’ capabilities. Thus, countries might invest a lot in artificial intelligence applications to military systems due to fear of what others are developing.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 2NC---Solvency---Human Control

No solvency – it is easy to circumvent the human control norm – weapons can shift easily from autonomous to non-autonomous.

Kania 2018 - fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Elsa B. “China’s Strategic Ambiguity and Shifting Approach to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” April 17, 2018 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

China argues that lethal autonomous weapons are characterized by: lethality; autonomy, “which means absence of human intervention and control during the entire process of executing a task” “impossibility for termination” such that “once started there is no way to terminate the device”; “indiscriminate effect,” in that it will “execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of conditions, scenarios and targets”; and “evolution,” “through interaction with the environment the device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities in a way exceeding human expectations” (emphasis added throughout). Banning weapons systems with those characteristics could be a symbol, while implicitly legitimizing the development of semi-autonomous or even fully autonomous systems that do not possess such qualities. By such a standard, a weapons system that operates with a high degree of autonomy but involves even limited human involvement, with the capability for distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets, would not technically be a LAWS, nor would a system with a failsafe to allow for shutdown in case of malfunction. Interestingly, this particular definition is much more stringent than the Chinese military’s own definition of the concept of “artificial intelligence weapon.” According to the dictionary of People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology, an artificially intelligent weapon is “a weapon that utilizes AI to automatically [] pursue, distinguish, and destroy enemy targets; often composed of information collection and management systems, knowledge base systems, assistance to decision systems, mission implementation systems, etc.,” such as military robotics. Because this definition dates back to 2011, the Chinese military’s thinking has evolved as technology has advanced. It is important, therefore, to consider that there may be daylight between China’s diplomatic efforts on autonomous weapons and the military’s approach.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Human Control

No solvency - human control is vague which prevents it from establishing a norm.

Bode, 2021 - Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern Denmark [Ingvild June 25, AutoNorms “Reflecting on the Future Norms of Warfare” https://www.autonorms.eu/reflecting-on-the-future-norms-of-warfare-2/ Acc. 5/27/22 TA]

We may therefore continue to have two parallel processes shaping the norms of war and conflict that do not necessarily overlap. Further, even if states agree on setting a legal norm defining a necessary quality of human control, that legal norm is likely going to be ambiguous in character, providing states with a significant amount of leeway. States may therefore continue to engage in use of force practices with AWS in much the same way as before the legal norm was in place. Norms that have emerged as part of practices of designing and using AWS therefore run the risk of undercutting deliberative legal efforts. To counter these dynamics, it is vital that such silent norm-making processes are closely examined closely and publicly expressed. Autonomous weapon systems and an emerging norm of human control The debate about autonomous weapons systems poses fundamental questions to the extent to which the use of force in conflict and warfare, as well as the very application of international law, remains in human hands. At first glance, practically all states parties addressing the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS highlight the importance of maintaining human control over the use of (lethal) force. The most substantial outcome of the GGE yet, the Guiding Principles on LAWS, includes a principle on human-machine interaction. We can therefore observe the potential making of a new legal norm, if states proceed towards a negotiation stage. This option has arguably gathered steam after the ICRC’s clear positioning in favour of new international law around LAWS in May 2021. But any consensus on what quality of human control is appropriate is yet to emerge. Many states favour a long-term view on human control as something that should be present throughout the entire life cycle of a weapon system from design to operation. Further, the US and Australia have argued that autonomous features can enhance human control in specific use of force situations by “effectuating the intent of commanders”. This perspective treats AI as a straightforward extension of human agency. Such thinking downplays the complexity of human-machine interaction and how this challenges the decision-making capacity of humans operating (or working in teams) with AI-driven weapon systems. Indeed, we must consider the extent to which the technology itself, having been designed and conceptualised in a certain way, can itself become a change agent for shaping (new) legal norms.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Circumvention

Lack of clarity over definitions of LAWs mean that there is no enforcement mechanism for the aff.

CFDS, 21 [Center for Digital Security is a research center under the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Gadjah Mada, 7-16-2021, accessed on 6-21-2022, Cfds.fisipol.ugm.ac, "A Posthuman Argument to a Human Problem: Discourse on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems : Center for Digital Society",

One product of the development[ii], following Polimpung’s formula, is the incorporation and development of artificial intelligence (AI)—and other disruptive technologies—in the military. The intended result is the hard to define Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Perhaps it is easier to get out of the way of what LAWS is not—yet. They are not Terminators, Decepticons, Ultron, or HAL 9000. They are weapons that can, with the help of AI, identify and engage targets without intervention by a human operator. LAWS can take shape in a drone, a sentry gun, a missile system, etc. The difficulty in defining these types of weapons stem from the degree of separation of humans from the interaction, are they only highly automated, or are they actually autonomous?

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Circumvention

Lack of brightline over “human control” makes enforcement null.

Sauer, 16 [Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer at Bundeswehr University in Munich, October, 2016, accessed on 6-27-2022, Armscontrol, "Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems | Arms Control Association", https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-09/features/stopping-%E2%80%98killer-robots%E2%80%99-why-now-time-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems]/ISEE

Perspectives for Arms Control The human brain needs time for complex evaluation and decision-making processes, time that it cannot be denied in the interaction between human and machine if the human role is to remain relevant, in other words, if the decision-making process is merely to be supported, not dominated, by the machine. Establishing where to draw that line is shaping up to be the key challenge in Geneva. Arriving at a decision in that regard would also mean producing the first definition of autonomous weapons systems in terms of international law. At the CCW meetings, the almost mantra-like repetition of a shared commitment to retain “meaningful human control” over the use of force by states-parties and civil society actors has become pivotal. Keeping weapons systems under meaningful human control and banning autonomous weapons systems are two sides of the same coin. The concept of meaningful human control introduced at the end of 2013 by Article 36, a member of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, has since been taken up by governments. It goes beyond the “appropriate levels of human judgment” approach specified by the 2012 Pentagon directive. Thus, the argument that human control over life-and-death decisions must always be in place in a significant or meaningful fashion, as more than just a mindless pushing of a button by a human in response to a machine-processed stream of information. According to current practice, a human weapons operator must have sufficient information about the target and sufficient control over the weapon and must be able to assess its effects in order to be able to make decisions in accordance with international law. At the same time, modern weapons systems are already highly computerized and automated, a trend that is only accelerating. So, determining how much human judgment can be replaced by algorithms before human control is no longer “meaningful” involves various technical, legal, ethical, and political considerations.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Circumvention

Circumvention is easy---there is no difference between highly autonomized systems and completely autonomous systems.

Anderson et al., 14 [Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner, and Matthew Waxman, 2014, accessed on 6-27-2022,90 INT’L L. STUD. 386, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, "Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems", https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA613290.pdf]/ISEE

Before addressing some of the enforceability problems and dangers of any effort to prohibit autonomous weapons, it is important to understand the proposed formulas do not, as it may seem initially, contain a bright line that would be useful for promoting adherence. Lawyers experienced in the law of armed conflict will quickly see that each of these seemingly clear-cut definitions leaves many open questions as to what systems would be banned under any particular formulation. Even something as seemingly plain as “lethal decision making” by a machine does not address, among other things, the lawfulness of targeting a tank, ship or aircraft which is ultimately the source of the threat, but inside of which is a human combatant. Beyond definitions, the technology and basic architecture of an autonomous system and a nearly autonomous, highly automated system are basically the same—if you can build a system that is nearly autonomous, for example with human override, then you can probably reprogram it to eliminate that human role. Moreover, whether a highly automated system—say, one with a human supervisor who can override proposed firing decisions—is in practice operating autonomously depends on how it is being manned, how operators are trained and how effectively oversight is exercised. It also depends on operational context and conditions, which may limit the degree to which the human role is in any way meaningful. For these and other reasons, a fully autonomous system and a merely highly-automated system will be virtually indistinguishable to an observer without knowing a lot about how that system is used in particular operational conditions. The difference might not matter very much in practice, given the variable performance of human operators. In any case, these systems will be easily transitioned from one to the other. The blurriness of these lines means that it will be very difficult to draw and enforce prohibitions on “fully” autonomous systems or mandates for minimum levels of human decision making. Given the great practical difficulty of distinguishing between autonomous and highly automated systems, applying a legal ban on autonomous systems would be relatively easy to circumvent and very difficult to enforce. At the same time, and as alluded to above, imposing a general ban on autonomous systems could carry some highly unfavorable consequences— and possibly dangers. These could include providing a clear advantage in autonomous weapon technology to those States which generally would not join (or in reality comply with) such a ban. They could also include losing out on the numerous potential advantages of autonomous systems of improving decision making on the battlefield, including through avoiding emotion-based response; improving system accuracy, thereby probably minimizing collateral injuries; and possibly limiting human loss of life on both sides and among civilians.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Bans Fail

LAWs aren’t the root cause of the aff’s violence – a ban fails

Galliott 18 [Jai Galliott (Dr Jai Galliott is a senior lecturer at UNSW Canberra, non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute, West Point and visiting fellow at the University of Oxford, PhD on the ethics and social implication of autonomous systems@Macquerie University.) 08-31-18, "Elon Musk wants to ban 'killer robots'. Here's why it's a bad idea," No Publication, ] // st

People kill people While it has become a distasteful dictum in the wake of recent shootings, people kill people. It is not the weapon that is the root of the evil. The terrible damage inflicted on multitudes of human beings in places like Rwanda and Sudan with knives, sticks or stones shows the need for a very different approach to the international debate on autonomous weapons. Lack of consensus among the 125 nations involved in the UN meetings in Geneva, including countries with significantly advanced robotics technology such as the US, Russia, China, and Israel, has created a vacuum in which a consortium of non-government actors led by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has encouraged ill-informed countries to subscribe to a ban on lethal autonomous weapon systems. This is despite the fact that autonomous robots are a highly effective defensive weapon for countries like Australia. They are always on, unafraid of getting shot, can be quickly deployed and spare soldiers' lives. Covered by gun fire, they can create a formidable obstacle. A ban would be impossible to enforce No ban will ever obtain universal agreement in this age of uncertainty. It would also be difficult to control and impossible to enforce. It would bind only those nations which, were they to use autonomous weapons, would do so in an orderly and therefore naturally less destructive fashion. The reluctance of Australia's key allies to ban autonomous weapons, for example, will likely never be overcome. For instance, if the US were to agree to regulation, it would come with conditions — in particular the right to retain autonomous weapons on the Korean Demilitarised Zone. They would also call for a strict verification regime, which is difficult to implement when it comes to inspecting ones and zeros. And although modern warfare is increasingly mobile and digital, there will always be positions that will have to be held in the transition to a better world. Autonomous weapons provide a powerful means for troops to rapidly protect themselves and others. Just as important is that there are no major conflicts are on the horizon, and that trade dependencies remain effective at stopping international violence before it occurs. Autonomous weapons might even have limited applications in peacekeeping operations. Rogue regimes will always acquire them Simple autonomous weapons in the form of self-guided bombs have also been used since World War I. More advanced systems like the Phalanx close-in weapon system, capable of protecting naval ships from incoming enemy planes, have been used for decades without moral qualms, so why ban killer robots altogether? Unlike nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, which require rare scientific and technical knowledge and rare earth minerals, as well as large-scale manufacturing and storage facilities, basic autonomous weapons are more easily developed than the public might think. There is no shortage of disaffected programmers and engineers willing to serve the next prominent non-state group likely to surface in the West's game of whack-a-mole. Some components are also able to be purchased off-the-shelf and open-source software code can always be deployed for nefarious purposes. Regardless of any ban, rogue regimes or militant forces will always acquire and use them if they feel the need. Robots can do nothing without a human Meanwhile, if a ban were to go ahead, law-abiding nations would be deprived of weapons that could be force for good in some scenarios. The campaign to ban autonomous weapons merely serves to detract attention from the fact that nations should be seeking to regulate human beings with killer intentions, rather than killer weapons. Another more limited objective would be achievable. What we need to do is understand how human beings frame the lethal decisions of robots through code and algorithms and how they are written and engineered by fallible human beings. Robots themselves can do nothing without a human, contrary to the fear mongering of certain proponents of a complete moratorium. Can we not investigate proactive technical solutions to ameliorate potential misuses of AI technologies? Such refocusing might reveal the true positive potential autonomous weapons. Imagine if we could automate the recognition of protected symbols such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent symbol and that this could be built into "killer robots" to enable the automatic protection of the persons, vehicles, ships and buildings bearing them, immediately reducing casualties and limiting unwarranted destruction.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Bans Fail

US officials reject a ban of LAWs

Guardian 12/2 [Guardian (A global news organization that delivers fearless, investigative journalism - giving a voice to the powerless and holding power to account. Their independent ownership structure means we are entirely free from political and commercial influence. Which means they determine the stories we choose to cover – relentlessly and courageously.) , 12-2-2021, "US rejects calls for regulating or banning ‘killer robots’," ] // st

The US has rejected calls for a binding agreement regulating or banning the use of “killer robots”, instead proposing a “code of conduct” at the United Nations. Speaking at a meeting in Geneva focused on finding common ground on the use of such so-called lethal autonomous weapons, a US official balked at the idea of regulating their use through a “legally-binding instrument”. The meeting saw government experts preparing for high-level talks at a review conference on the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons from 13 to 17 December. “In our view, the best way to make progress ... would be through the development of a non-binding code of conduct,” US official Josh Dorosin told the meeting. The United Nations has been hosting diplomatic talks in Geneva since 2017 aimed at reaching an agreement on how to address the use of killer robots. Activists and a number of countries have called for an all-out ban on any weapons that could use lethal force without a human overseeing the process and making the final kill order. In November 2018, the UN chief, António Guterres, joined the call for a ban, but so far countries do not even agree on whether there is a need to regulate the weapons. During Thursday’s debate, a number of countries, including India and the United States, criticised the idea of a legally binding agreement. Dorosin insisted a code of conduct “would help states promote responsible behaviour and compliance with international law”.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Bans Fail

It is impossible to ban LAWs because there is no solid definition of LAWs.

Lewis, 2020 - Research Director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict [Dustin September 28, “An Enduring Impasse on Autonomous Weapons” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The Current Impasse The current impasse on autonomous weapons might be traced to at least two factors. The first concerns definitions. There are widely differing conceptions of autonomous weapons and their technical characteristics (at least for purposes of the GGE). And there is also a divergence on sequencing, especially whether States must first agree on minimal definitional elements before taking more concrete steps or, alternatively, whether countries can develop a political declaration (or even a legal instrument) without first establishing agreement on what specific technologies are of concern. The second factor is a significant difference of views on what international law already permits, mandates, and prohibits in practice and corresponding positions on whether or not the law is satisfactory.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Bans Fail

Even if a ban is good, definitional issues and variations guarantee circumvention

Rosert and Sauer 20 [Elvira Rosert (Faculty of Business, Economics, and Social Sciences, Universität Hamburg and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg, Germany) and Frank Sauer (Researcher at Institute for Political Science, Bundeswehr University Munich, Munich, Germany), 5-30-2020, "How (not) to stop the killer robots: A comparative analysis of humanitarian disarmament campaign strategies," Taylor & Francis, ] // st

Conclusion In this article, we set out to answer how an international, legally binding regulation of LAWS can be brought about. Humanitarian advocacy campaigns wield significant influence in general; the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots does so in particular. We thus focused on its strategy in engaging the international community at the CCW in Geneva, the epicenter of the debate surrounding a possible regulation of LAWS. We found the campaign’s strategy to be less than optimal. As our comparative analysis of three humanitarian disarmament processes revealed, the campaign against LAWS is modeled after past successes, despite weapon autonomy differing from blinding lasers or landmines in several important ways. These differences limit the portability of some tried-and-tested strategy components. Actor-related components such as awareness-raising, dissemination of expertise, and coalition-building are similar in the three campaigns against LAWS, BLW and APL, and appear to be conducive to the goal of a ban on LAWS too. However, rehashing the issue- and institution-related components of the BLW and APL campaign strategies creates weak spots in the case of LAWS. The “killer robots” frame, for instance, while attempting to convey a simple and dramatic message, also renders the issue futuristic and, thus, less urgent. The prominent focus on the indiscriminateness of LAWS is an attempt to activate an argument that proved powerful against APL and CM, but might turn out to be obsolete in the case of LAWS due to technological improvements. Most importantly, LAWS are portrayed as a category of weapons, which is not accurate because weapon autonomy is an elusive function in a human-machine system. Lastly, due to the lack of critical mass and “champion state” leadership, the LAWS process is not (yet) ripe for a venue shift. Our approach confirms the necessity of the components we studied, but it cannot (nor was it designed to) specify their relative importance or identify sufficient combinations. That said, our findings do highlight an aspect that deserves further attention: the fit of the framing to the issue. This insight is less trivial than it may seem. In theoretical literature thus far, the framing’s fit has been considered almost exclusively with regard to different audiences and normative environments. The issue itself has remained neglected. Having shown how a mismatch between the framing and the issue’s key characteristics can compromise a campaign’s message, we suggest exploring the relevance of the framing/issue fit in additional cases. Our findings also suggest that modifying the substance of the argument, the expected regulatory design, and the institutional factors would increase the likelihood of the KRC’s strategy achieving its stated goal. In terms of substance, the most straightforward argument against LAWS is not a legal but an ethical one, namely, the argument that delegating life and death decisions to machines infringes upon human dignity. We therefore propose moving further away from the KRC’s initial messaging, which was heavily focused on the indiscriminateness of LAWS, their incompatibility with IHL, and the plight of civilians. Shifting toward more fundamental ethical concerns will, first, make the case against LAWS less susceptible to consequentialist counter-positions (which argue that the illegality of LAWS will be remedied by technological progress). Second, it makes it more likely that the general public will react viscerally and reject LAWS more sharply (Rosert & Sauer, 2019; Sharkey, 2019, p. 83).

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Bans Fail

Lack of international support for bans ensures they fail

Morgan 20 [Forrest E. Morgan (A senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs) "Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World." Published by the Rand Corporation in 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1097313.pdf]// st

A significant number of countries supports a new legally binding treaty that would ban the development and use of LAWS. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has circulated a list of 26 states that support a ban. However, most of the states supporting a new legal instrument are developing countries that do not possess sophisticated AI technology sectors or have military forces with extensive AI capabilities. Meanwhile, most of the major military powers perceive significant value in military AI and do not wish to create new international constraints that could slow its technological development. The United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and other countries hold that existing international law, including LOAC, already provides significant humanitarian protections regarding the use of LAWS, and thus no new treaty instruments are necessary. China, conversely, has proposed a ban on LAWS modeled on the UN protocol prohibiting the use of blinding laser weapons, but it seems to define LAWS so narrowly that a ban on this class of weapons would not apply to systems currently under development. China has also suggested that concepts such as meaningful human control should be left up to sovereign determination, rather than defined through international processes. Thus, it appears that China’s professed support for a new legal instrument would not actually constrain the development or use of military AI. In addition, some states have questioned what verification and monitoring measures would be associated with any new international ban. Given the inherent lack of transparency of many AI systems, states have expressed concern that signatories to any ban might not live up to their international commitments. As a result, many governments, including those of France, Germany, and other European states, have supported simply developing a nonbinding political declaration that would articulate the importance of human control being designed into and exercised across the acquisition, development, testing, and deployment life cycle of military AI systems. A nonbinding declaration or code of conduct of this sort would be easier to reach than a new treaty, but other states have expressed doubt that it would be useful, since it could not be enforced. Given the resistance of several major military powers and the need for their acquiescence to a new treaty, the international community is not likely to agree to a ban or other regulation in the near term. However, there is a view broadly resonant among many countries, including the United States, key allies, and important stakeholders, such as the International Committee on the Red Cross, that further international discussion regarding the role of humans in conducting warfare is necessary.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Definition

States that utilize LAWs have an incentive to disagree over definitions

Thornton, 2019 - Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence Education Research and Analysis, King’s College [Rod, “One to ponder: the UK’s ethical stance on the use of Artificial Intelligence in weapons systems https://defenceindepth.co/2019/06/17/one-to-ponder-the-uks-ethical-stance-on-the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-weapons-systems/ Acc 4/16/22 TA]

Given its declared position, it might seem logical for the UK to push for an international ban on the use of LAWS. Trying to level the playing field so that no other state possessed them would seemingly work to the UK’s advantage. A ban is also the favoured UN option. UN Secretary General António Guterres has, for instance, described LAWS as ‘morally repugnant’. Within the UN, however, the UK is part of a group of states (alongside Australia, Israel, Russia and US) that has collectively stated that currently they do not want to see any regulation that forbids the use of LAWS. To explain the UK’s position, an MOD spokesperson said that, ‘We believe a pre-emptive ban is premature as there is still no international agreement on the characteristics of lethal autonomous weapons systems’. We are thus back to the thorny problem of definitions. If we do not know what something is then how can it be banned? The question here, though, is why is the UK trying to prevent a ban on a weapon it has ‘no intention’ of developing itself? This does not look very ethical or, indeed, sensible. It seems to be giving licence to potential adversaries to continue with their own development of LAWS while the UK sits on its AI hands. Whatever the UK’s position, it seems that LAWS will prove impossible to ban anyway. Firstly, because the world’s major states will be seeing the benefits of LAWS there will probably (and maybe conveniently?) never be an internationally agreed definition on them, which would then allow any ban to accrue. Secondly, the technology that underpins any ‘killer robot’ will come to be developed anyway in the civilian sector – with systems designed, for instance, to deliver parcels or to tackle forest fires. Any military organisation could simply buy such systems off the shelf and convert them readily into LAWS. The genie will thus be out of the bottle on LAWS fairly soon anyway and can never be put back in. It will therefore, and unfortunately, be very hard for the UK to maintain a credible stance as a ‘pioneer in ethical AI’.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Solvency › 1NC---Solvency---Alt Causes---General War

The aff’s attempt to ban LAW’s spectacularizes their violence whilst ignoring the way that warfare before remains entrenched in the same violence they critique.

Jones et al. 18 [Emily Jones is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex, and Sara Kendall, and Yoriko Otomo, (2018) Gender, War, and Technology: Peace and Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. Australian Feminist Law Journal, 44 (1). pp. 1-8. ISSN 1320-0968.]/ISEE

Since the end of the last world war, the global economy has witnessed tremendous change. This was driven by developments in computing and (mechanical, genetic, electrical, chemical and materials) engineering, which we call ‘technology’ for the purposes of this issue. The resulting impact on social, behavioural and economic changes were shaped in large part by post war ideology that scalable inventions could make human life extend further, act faster, and work cheaper.4 With the evolution of proxy warfare during and after the Cold War (and resulting war-weariness among the populations of the Great Powers), the capacity for states to exercise their influence, both remotely and diffusely, has been driving the global military research agenda. The second half of the twentieth century thus saw the invention of the internet, the development of cybernetics/artificial intelligence and the creation of new materials (genetic, programmable) and laser weaponry. This century such technologies have evolved to produce the likes of drones (lethal autonomous weapons) and other military landbased autonomous and semi-autonomous robots.5 Not only has the transformation of armed conflict through such inventions impacted on targeting methods, but it has also materialised an apocalyptic vision of everyday surveillance warfare.6 This has provoked sustained global debate, both in international law and international policy fora. In a telling example from late 2017, a UC Berkeley-based computer scientist and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots advocacy organisation used a United Nations platform to screen a dystopian futuristic film, ‘Slaughterbots’, to call greater state attention to the perils of autonomous weapons systems while lobbying for an international treaty to ban their use. 8 The event illustrates how overlapping communities – academics, humanitarian activists and state representatives – turn to legal forms as sites of potential regulation and redress for technological developments in armed conflict that are seen to threaten human well-being. It also invites critical reflection: about the relation between the human and the non-human (or indeed post-human); the broader political economies of armed conflict in which such weapons may be used; the role of legal architectures in constraining – and at times enabling – the use of force and methods of warfare; and on what other forms of suffering remain hidden from view when spectacular forms of violence determine political agendas. We think there is a pressing need for further examination of the interplay between these emerging inventions against existing international laws and the changing backdrop of contemporary armed conflict. Importantly, the role of gender in their creation, production and deployment is under-theorised: this special issue is an invitation to others to think with us. 9 The contributors to this issue undertake their analyses alongside, but not within, existing legal debates, which predominantly concern matters of procedure and classification. The articles here look outwards, at more amorphous but no less important forces on law and war: the interplay between rhetoric, images, ideology, and affect. What matters of concern appear within this constellation? 10 As the following articles illustrate, triangulating gender, war and technology as a field of inquiry produces a wide domain of analysis, with topics ranging from human enhancement technologies to autonomous weapons systems, surveillance and aerial bombardment, artificial intelligence and big data. The three terms themselves invite interpretation and debate. 11 ‘Gender’, for example, has been used in the context of international humanitarian law to signify vulnerability; women are treated as a group that may require further protection, where gender operates as a qualified identity that supplements the category of civilian.12 Yet some of the articles considered here adopt a more reflexive approach informed by feminist scholarship, considering issues of agency, difference, and intersectionality, and contesting gendered constructions that presuppose femininity, ethnicity, and passivity. Animated by concern about this and other technological inventions described earlier – and by the relative shortage of scholarly feminist perspectives on technology and conflict – this special issue emerged from out of an international workshop organised by Emily Jones in June 2016 at SOAS University of London that sought to address this gap.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn--- Positive LAWs

When ethical robots go to war, they place themselves in harms way, rather than human soldiers. The proliferation of LAWs will dramatically decrease casualties of war.

Del Re, 2017 – US Army Major [Amanda “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Take the Human Out of the Loop A paper submitted to the Faculty of the US Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Ethics of Emerging Military Technology Graduate Certificate. 16 June 2017 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1041804 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) should be employed by the United States on the field of battle. LAWS will save lives because they are potentially more proficient on the battlefield than humans. There will not be as many combat-related deaths or injuries which will result in a healthier, more resilient military. It behooves the United States to employ this emerging technology because other nations already are. As a superpower, the United States bears the burden of setting the example in warfare and foreign policy. A Lethal Autonomous Weapon is a robot that is designed to select and attack military targets without direct intervention by a human operator. The idea of not having a human operator is called “human-out-of-the-loop.” Autonomous weapons also have the capability of operating with a “human-in-the-loop” (like a drone and drone operator) or a “human-on-the-loop” in which a human operator supervises the targeting process and can intervene at any time during the cycle. Currently, the US employs both human-in-the-loop and human-on-the-loop weapons in combat. Lethal autonomous Weapons are also called LAWS, LARS (lethal autonomous robots), robotic weapons, or killer robots. For these purposes, LAWS, robots, or lethal autonomous weapon will be used. This study will present a somewhat unrepresented argument, that LAWS should be developed and employed by the United States on the battlefield. There are several premises to support this conclusion. First, humans are overall inferior on the battlefield as compared to robots. Historically humans deal poorly with the traumatic effects of combat resulting in war atrocities, posttraumatic stress disorder, increased veteran suicide and homelessness; robots would not be negatively affected by combat like humans are. Additionally, human soldiers are more expensive in the long run than robots. 7 Second, the United States needs to stay on the cutting edge of technology especially in warfare. History provides examples of the United States using ethically questionable strategies in war such as unrestricted submarine warfare and strategic bombing, both in WWII, without having had the chance to fully examine the potential ramifications of those strategies prior to the heat of conflict. Moreover, other nations are already employing LAWS. The United States needs to lead the development of these weapons in terms of technological capabilities and ethical standards so that an international agreement can be achieved before they are misused by another nation.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn--- Positive LAWs

Specifically, a fear of accidents will limit nuclear LAWs to only positive ones.

Horowitz, 2019 – prof of Political Science at Univ of Pennsylvania [Michael with Paul Scharre, and Alexander Velez-Green “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence” December arXiv:1912.05291 https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05291 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Many of these ways that autonomous systems could increase the resiliency and accuracy of NC2 are speculative, however. Existing automation, as the Petrov incident shows, already creates the risk of automation bias. Knowledge of this will probably make most nuclear-armed states unlikely to further automate the early warning or command-and-control processes, with two exceptions: first, in situations where human-machine teaming might be further integrated to mitigate potential false alarms; second, in situations where a state fears for its secure second strike, and believes that further automation would reinforce deterrence of a potential aggressor. It is also possible, though less likely, that more automation could occur via a highly risk-tolerant nuclear-armed state that believes automated NC2 protocols would improve its ability to manage escalation.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---NATO Bad for Feminism

NATO is ineffective at gender mainstreaming

Jody M Prescott, 10-30-2013, "NATO Gender Mainstreaming," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2013.847722

As currently constructed, however, NATO gender mainstreaming has two significant flaws that will likely prevent its effective institutionalisation for some time to come. The first of these is the apparent overtasking and underresourcing of the personnel held most responsible for incorporating a gender perspective into NATO military operations: the gender advisors. The second flaw is its current approach to the conduct of operations, characterised by an emphasis on international human rights law, which, as it applies outside contexts of armed conflict, tends to neglect the importance of factoring gender into kinetic military operations. As such, NATO should devote greater numbers of qualified personnel to gender mainstreaming and its members’ forces should adopt a holistic approach in incorporating a kinetic appreciation of gender into their doctrine and education, training and exercises, information gathering and intelligence analysis, and planning and operations in order to truly effect gender mainstreaming. Directive 40-1 and the Roles of the Gender Advisors The NATO gender-mainstreaming programme suggests a three-tiered advisory hierarchy. In static headquarters, Gender Advisors provide advice and expertise on gender matters. In field headquarters, Gender Field Advisors perform this function, while in subordinate tactical units, Gender Focal Points receive the mission as another assigned task. Whilst comprehensive in the sense that the programme sets out a staffing mechanism that would appear to provide for gender expertise at the different levels of command, the directive’s implementation is likely to be marred by certain flaws in its provisions regarding training, the terms of reference of the gender advisor as a staff officer, and the large number of specific and complex tasks gender advisors would be expected to accomplish. As to the training to be undertaken by gender advisors, Directive 40-1 identifies both mandatory and recommended courses and posits a learning programme consisting of online ‘advanced distributed learning’ courses with classroom instruction. Although it is intended that advisors participate in operational planning groups as part of their wider role, the directive only ‘recommends’ courses in this area, rather than making them mandatory. 14 However, experience suggests that not only should these operational planning courses be required so that advisors in static and field headquarters can participate in actual planning with a sufficient degree of expertise and credibility as staff officers in this function, there should also be a requirement that trainee advisors actually participate in a number of exercises, if not operations, as full-time members of operational planning groups before being certified as Gender Advisors or Gender Field Advisors. Directive 40-1 states that the roles and responsibilities of the Gender Advisor and Gender Field Advisor will be set out by a standard operating procedure, and that ordinarily they are expected to report directly to the commander, because such access would highlight to the rest of the staff the importance of the gender advisors and their multidisciplinary function. Depending on the nature of the operation, and the size of the headquarters, however, such access might be infrequent at best. To be accepted by the rest of the staff asspecial staff advisors who add value, the Gender Advisors and Gender Field Advisors will likely find themselves attending many different meetings and working group sessions over the course of a typical day – meetings in which they might have no substantive role to play but which they cannot afford to miss because they will otherwise not be seen as part of the team. Furthermore, the directive, quite properly, requires gender advisors to establish a technical chain among superior and subordinate gender advisors within the command structure.15 The directive does not, however, set out what the responsibilities and obligations of superior and subordinate gender advisors are in relation to each other. This could become problematic when contingents from different troop-contributing nations begin implementing their own versions of gender mainstreaming in accordance with their respective national action plans and guidance.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---NATO Bad for Feminism

NATO is inherently patriarchal – gendered violence, trafficking, and decreased social welfare programming. This makes it impossible for the aff to solve conflict by preserving excess militarization and intentionally viewing “weak” countries through a feminine lens; thus, “proper” manhood is synonymous with violence. This infiltrates every aspect of the affirmative and turns any aff claim of solvency.

TW: non-graphic mentions of sexual violence and human trafficking

War Resisters' International 10 [War Resisters' International (A global pacifist and antimilitarist network with over 80 affiliated groups in 40 countries. They facilitate mutual support, by linking people together through publications, events and actions, initiating nonviolent campaigns that actively involve local groups and individuals, supporting those who oppose war and who challenge its causes, and promoting and educating people about pacifism and nonviolence), 09/20/10, "Women-against-NATO," ] // st

What is our ‘feminist case’ against NATO? In many ways it’s the same case we make against militarism and war in general. That’s to say, we note the adverse ways they impact on women, and the damaging gender roles, active and passive, into which they draw both sexes. We point up the fact that gender relations, as we know and live them, are relations of power and inequality, founded in violence. They involve the social construction of masculinity as combative. Proper manhood requires a readiness to use force in defence of ‘honour’, while femininity is associated with passivity and victimhood. Women who want to escape the feminine stereotype have little choice but to imitate the masculine model. This dichotomous gender culture is one of the long-term, underlying, causes of war, because it predisposes our societies to see taking up arms as a normal and acceptable way of dealing with political conflicts. Consequently, feminist activists call for the transformation of gender relations as a necessary element of the movement to end war. So how does this apply in the struggle against NATO? It’s important to stress that, for sure, all the women on our ‘Women Against NATO’ e-list are making exactly the same base-line case as all other opponents of NATO. Briefly, that NATO is a Cold War instrument that should have been closed down when the Warsaw Pact folded; that it is primarily a vehicle for the economic and military interests of the USA and to a lesser extent those of the post-colonial Western European states; and that its current strategy of enlargement and its increasingly ‘expeditionary’ mode make it a growing threat to peace on a global scale. Furthermore, NATO’s existence flouts international law and United Nations principles; it chimes with increasing militarization of the European Union; and it locks member states into the nuclear weapons and MDI systems on which the USA continues to insist. However, beyond this general critique of NATO, we perceive the alliance in gendered terms. NATO is a massive military alliance of nation states. Nira Yuval-Davis and other feminist theorists have shown how the concept of ‘nation’ is gendered, how nationalism and patriarchy are interlocked, and how nations and nationalists use and exploit ‘women’. NATO is the product of Cold War thinking that saw the globe as divided into two ‘blocs’ of nation states, champions of rival ideologies. Some feminist contributions to the Strasbourg workshop talked about the ‘patriarchal logic’ of blocs, a brotherhood of nations in arms seeking out fantasy enemies long after the Cold War has ended. Secondly, women have been making a feminist case against NATO’s military bases, installations and production facilities in our countries. Although, for the most part, these belong to the national armed forces of member states, they are in effect part and parcel of NATO resources in Europe. Several women wrote workshop papers about the damaging effect of military installations on the lives of women in neighbouring communities. They described women’s non-violent direct action outside the razor wire and security checkpoints, protesting against the toxic pollution, the danger of radiation, the noise and blighted areas entailed by the military use of land. Women also protest against sexual exploitation and violence against women by military personnel. In Bosnia and Kosovo, UN and NATO-led forces not only generated a massive sex industry, but individual soldiers – along with NATO contractors and UN police – were actively involved in the trafficking process, receiving trafficked women and girls at borders, smuggling them into military bases and acting as pimps. Although NATO adopted, in 2004, a Policy Against Human Trafficking, no suspected NATO traffickers have been prosecuted.[2] Third, the persistence of the ‘NATO system’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union has prevented each European country cashing in ‘the peace dividend’ by reducing its armed forces and humanizing its international posture. It has required them to sustain a high degree of militarization that masculinizes and deforms everyday life. It has, what’s more, fostered the militarization of the European Union, so that an economic alliance we joined as a guarantor of cooperation and harmony is turning into yet another war-fighting machine. It has been argued that the EU is converting to this ‘hard’ image in response to the chiding of US policy-makers that Europe is a feminine, soft, civilian power. European leaders want to play ‘with the big boys’.[3] A commitment to contribute to a European force as well as to NATO calls for high military expenditures in EU member states. Feminists argue that this drains funds from the education, health and housing services badly needed by women, the sex that still carries a very high proportion of the burden of domestic life and care. Finally, feminist antimilitarists make a case against NATO as a perpetrator of wars. The effects of war are dramatically gendered. There is a growing trend to civilian casualties, disproportionately women and their dependants. Women are the majority of the displaced and refugees, trying to maintain their families in impossible circumstances. Thousands are widowed, deprived of a viable existence. Sexual violence redoubles in and after war. We see all this in NATO’s war in Afghanistan. Improbable as it may seem, NATO prides itself on ‘mainstreaming’ gender into its structures and activities. ‘NATO and its Partners’, they say on their website, ’are promoting the role of women within NATO-led operations and missions’ and increasing the knowledge and skills available on ‘gender and diversity’. Last year the Strategic Commands received guidelines for the integration into the NATO Command Structure of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on ‘Women, Peace and Security’. There is a NATO Office on Gender Perspectives, and gender advisers have been appointed. An implementation report is to be published in time for the Lisbon Summit.[4] Given the implications for women of NATO’s campaign Afghanistan, the Alliance’s self-professed gender sensitivity can only deepen feminist cynicism about ‘gender mainstreaming’. Here is an alliance of powerful Western states exploiting the notion of ‘liberating Afghan women from oppression by the Taliban’ as one of its devious justifications for invading the country. Women’s insecurity is multiplied in the chaos and brutality of a decade of armed conflict. Then the intruders announce plans to make their escape by negotiating the re-entry to power of – the Taliban. Afghan women certainly have a feminist case against NATO. So do women in NATO member states.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Military

Usage of LAWs avoid exposing soldiers to unnecessary harms

Reisen 2/28 [Erich Reisen (writer for The Blog of the American Philosophical Association (APA) which shares a variety of perspectives from a broad array of APA members, to highlight the activities being undertaken by the APA, as well as provide a forum where the APA leadership and membership can communicate with one another more effectively), 2-28-2022, "The Moral Case for the Development of Autonomous Weapon Systems," Blog of the APA, ] // st

In a 2010 paper, Bradley J. Strawser offers a convincing argument in favor of the use of remotely piloted but uninhabited aerial vehicles (i.e., drones) provided the war being fought is a just one. On his view, drones are just another in a long list of weapons that remove soldiers further from harm’s way. The use of spears, guns, tanks, planes, and drones are all justified, according to Strawser, by the Principle of Unnecessary Risk (PUR). PUR says (roughly) that a state and its agents should avoid exposing their soldiers to unnecessary lethal risk. Regardless of the weaponry wielded by the enemy, if the war is just, then governments, armies, and commanders ought to provide their soldiers with whatever weapon(s) will most shield them from unnecessary lethal risk while still being able to get the job done. Applying PUR to drones gives us the following conditional: “For any just action taken by a given military, if it is possible for the military to use [drones] in place of inhabited aerial vehicles without a significant loss of capability, then the military has an ethical obligation to do so” (2010, p. 346). Worrying that such a principle might be used to argue in favor of AWS, Strawser tells us that this “fails to appreciate that PUR, although a strong at first view moral principle, can be overridden by a strong enough countervailing normative reasons,” and he finds the “principled objections [to AWS] to be sufficiently strong such that they override the moral demands of PUR” (ibid., p. 350). One might further point out that drones already provide a lot of coverage when it comes to lethal risk: Can it really get any safer than bombing the enemy from a bunker in Nevada? And would the additional coverage that (perhaps) comes from taking humans further out of the loop be enough to outweigh the objections to AWS? I think Strawser unfairly stacks the deck against AWS by focusing on lethal risk. Lethal risk is not the only type of risk that soldiers must deal with. Depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and feelings of guilt have a severe and negative impact on the well-being of our soldiers. Due to this, I suggest the following extension of PUR (EPUR): The state and its agents should avoid exposing their own soldiers to unnecessary moral, psychological, and lethal risk. If we have some technology that could reduce such risk, while remaining as effective as alternatives, we ought to use it. Moreover, if a military technology might seriously reduce the moral, psychological, and lethal risk of soldiers in the future if only we were to develop it, then we have strong reasons to spend some time and money doing so. I contend that a state and its agents would avoid exposing their own troops to unnecessary moral, psychological, and lethal risk by deploying AWS, and that there is no other feasible way of achieving these decreased levels of risk. Therefore, a state and its agents are obligated to deploy technologically sophisticated AWS. A technologically sophisticated autonomous weapon is one that matches the average performance of human-in-the-loop systems (e.g., drones) when it comes to acting in accordance with the laws of war (e.g., distinctness, surrender, proportionality). In other words, if we were to create AWS that can reliably adhere to the laws of war, we would have strong moral reasons to use them. Utilizing such systems would reduce psychological risk by reducing the number of humans on the ground (or in Nevada) making life and death decisions. Fewer pilots and soldiers means less psychological harm.

2022 Michigan Negative
**AT: Case** › Turns › 1NC---Turn---Hacking

Banning LAWs increases the risk of hacking because it undermines research that helps cyber defense against hacking

Messinger 15 [Eric Messinger (the Assistant Managing Editor of Just Security and Research Associate at the Center on Law and Security), 1-15-2015, "Is it Possible to Ban Autonomous Weapons in Cyberwar?," Just Security, ]

Of course, those familiar with the debate over AWS in kinetic warfare have already heard arguments about potential upsides for efficacy. Yet the nature of the cyber battleground, and especially cyber defense, will provide strong incentives to employ autonomous offensive cyber systems. The cyber theater consists in whole or in part of computerized systems, where the speed of movement is not constrained by the physical limitations of feet and engines and rockets, and where the scope and scale of combat may proceed beyond the ability of human observers to comprehend in real-time. As Dorothy Denning argues, “[a]t the speed of cyber, placing humans in the loop at every step is neither practical nor desirable.” As a result, in direct analogy to defense systems such as anti-missile systems, [m]ost anti-malware and intrusion prevention systems have both manual and automated components. Humans determine what goes into the signature database, and they install and configure the security software. The processes of signature distribution, malicious code and packet detection, and initial response are automated, but humans may be involved in determining the final response. Effective cyber defenses, in short, will have to rely upon automatic routines. Further, to date, the technological development and practical adoption of autonomous weapons systems for defense has progressed further than that of autonomous offensive systems.